9004234349

The Mozi as an Evolving Text

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/hct

Studies in the History of Chinese Texts

Edited by

Martin Kern, Princeton UniversityRobert E. Hegel, Washington University, St. Louis

Ding Xiang Warner, Cornell University

VoLUME 4

www.brill.com/hct

The Mozi as an Evolving Text

Different Voices in Early Chinese Thought

Edited by

Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert

LEiDEN • boSToN2013

Cover illustration: The Chinese text on the cover is from Tang Yaochen 唐堯臣 (16th century), Mozi 墨子, Ming woodblock edition from 1553 repr. in Mozi daquan 墨子大全, eds. Ren Jiyu 任继愈 and Li Guangxing 李广星, beijing: beijing tushuguan chubanshe, 2004, vol. 3, 131.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

The Mozi as an evolving text : different voices in early Chinese thought / edited by Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert. pages cm. — (Studies in the history of Chinese texts ; volume 4) includes bibliographical references and index. iSbN 978-90-04-23434-5 (hardback : alk. paper) — iSbN 978-90-04-24620-1 (e-book) 1. Mo, Di, fl. 400 b.C. Mozi. i. Defoort, Carine, 1961– author, editor of compilation. ii. Standaert, N., author, editor of compilation.

b128.M8M627 2013 181’.115—dc23

2013000783

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Dedicated to Watanabe Takashi, Angus Graham, and Roman Malek, inspiring Mozi scholars

CoNTENTS

introduction: Different Voices in the Mozi: Studies of an Evolving Text .............................................................................................. 1Carine Defoort and Nicolas Standaert

1. Are the Three “Jian Ai” Chapters about Universal Love? ............. 35Carine Defoort

2. How to End Wars with Words: Three Argumentative Strategiesby Mozi and His Followers ..................................................................... 69Paul van Els

3. Mozi 31: Explaining Ghosts, Again ....................................................... 95Roel Sterckx

4. Mozi’s Remaking of Ancient Authority .............................................. 143Miranda Brown

5. The Ethics of the Mohist Dialogues .................................................... 175Chris Fraser

6. From “Elevate the Worthy” to “intimacy with officers” inthe Mozi ....................................................................................................... 205Hui-chieh Loy

7. Heaven as a Standard .............................................................................. 237Nicolas Standaert

bibliography ..................................................................................................... 271References to the Mozi .................................................................................. 281 Subject index .................................................................................................... 287

IntroductIon: dIfferent VoIces In the Mozi: studIes of an eVolVIng text

carine defoort and nicolas standaert

子墨子曰: 吾非與之並世同時, 親聞其聲, 見其色也。以其所書於竹帛, 鏤於金石, 琢於槃盂, 傳遺後世子孫者知之.

Master Mozi said: “since I was not alive when the [sages] lived, I have not personally heard their voices or seen their faces. It is because of what they wrote on bamboo and silk, carved in metal and stone, engraved on plates and bowls, and passed on to their descen-dants, that I know it.”

Mozi 16: 28/29–29/1

Mo di 墨翟 (ca. 479–381 Bce) claims to know that the ancient sages were caring and compassionate even though he has not personally heard their voices or seen their faces. fortunately for him, their writings were pre-served on bamboo and silk, metal and stone, or plates and bowls. so he could use their authority to promote his own novel ideas among the ruling elite of his day. he himself, however, was not so lucky: the book named after him was not carved in metal or stone, and it fared less well than the sages’ writings. the Mozi 墨子, a book of seventy-one units,1 was seriously neglected in the course of chinese history partly due to its perceived low literary value and uninteresting content. this agelong neglect has caused such serious textual corruption and interpretive difficulties that even con-temporary scholars are often reluctant to tackle this text. nevertheless, the authors of the current volume have chosen this voluminous source of Mohist thought—or, at least, its best-preserved parts—as their topic.

Written over a period of some two hundred years (roughly in the fourth and third centuries Bce) and possibly put into its current shape during the han dynasty, the Mozi appears to have been largely forgotten until its

1 only fifty-three pian (units, chapters) are extant. But the fact that a Mozi version in seventy-one pian was listed in Hanshu 30.1738, has led to the belief that it originally had seventy-one chapters. for the textual history of the text, see Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 29–34.

2 carine defoort and nicolas standaert

inclusion in the Daozang 道藏 (daoist canon) published in 1447.2 despite some emerging attention from the Ming dynasty onward, serious interest in Mozi began only with the textual studies of the Qing dynasty—more specifically, those studies conducted by scholars such as Bi Yuan 畢沅 (1730–1797), Wang niansun 王念孫 (1744–1832), Wang Yinzhi 王引之 (1766–1834), Yu Yue 俞樾 (1821–1907), and sun Yirang 孫詒讓 (1848–1908).3 Missionary interest emerged with James legge (1861) and ernst faber (1877)4 in the nineteenth century and was followed in the twentieth and twenty-first centuries by Japanese,5 chinese, and Western scholarship and translation. the first Western translation, almost complete, was in german, by alfred forke (1922).6 Important partial english translations were made by Mei Yi-pao 梅貽寶 (1929),7 Burton Watson (1963),8 angus c. graham (1978),9 and Philip Ivanhoe and Bryan Van norden;10 most recently, a complete translation by Ian Johnston (2010) has appeared.11

even though the Mozi is still not a hot topic in academic research, there has been an increasing interest during the last decades: there have been studies on Mohist thought or philosophy, on the social and geographi-

2 In this edition, which forms the basis of the presently transmitted version, eighteen out of the seventy-one chapters were already missing. for the four earliest extant Ming editions and their supposed song source, see durrant, “an examination of textual and grammatical Problems in Mo Tzu,” 63–68.

3 for an overview of Mohist studies, see Zheng Jiewen, Ershi shiji Moxue yanjiushi. this study does not mention any Japanese or Western Mozi research. li Quanxing, “ershi shiji Mozi yanjiu lunzhu suoyin 20” also includes Japanese scholarship. for a brief overview of different and more recent trends in chinese Mozi research, see the preface to defoort, “Mo Zi research in the People’s republic of china.”

4 see faber, Die Grundgedanken des alten chinesischen Socialismus. legge translates Mozi’s “universal love” writings and discusses their connection to Yang Zhu and Mencius in his The Chinese Classics, vol. 2, 103–126.

5 see hashimoto sumiya, “riben de ‘Mozi’ yanjiu gaiguan”; tan Jiajian, Mozi yanjiu, appendix 3, 623–644.

6 see forke, Mê Ti. forke’s translation of the defense chapters is rather a paraphrase. for more on forke’s study and translation, see Maeder, “some observations on the com-position of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 35–37.

7 see Mei, The Ethical and Political Works of Motse. It was republished with the chinese original and a modern chinese translation added under the title The Works of Motze. It contains a complete translation of the opening chapters, core chapters, and dialogues.

8 see Watson, Mo-tzu, Basic Writings. 9 for a study and translation of the dialectical (or logical) chapters (40–45) of the

Mozi, see graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science.10 Ivanhoe and Van norden, Readings, 55–109, is a partial translation of the core

chapters.11 see Johnston, The “Mozi.” for a longer list of chinese and Western translations of

the Mozi, see ibid., lxxviii–lxxxi. Johnston is preparing a new translation for the Penguin series.

introduction: different voices in the mozi 3

cal provenance of Mo di and his followers, on the nature and history of the Mohist school or lineage (mojia 墨家), on its division and perceived demise by the end of the Warring states, on its contemporary relevance for and influence (or lack thereof) on chinese culture, and so forth. some research more narrowly concerns the book Mozi, asking questions about its composition, history, textual corruption and reconstruction. the pres-ent volume feeds into this last domain by focusing on the three most read-able parts of the Mozi, namely the opening chapters (chapters 1–7), the core chapters (chapters 8–37), and the dialogues (chapters 46–49/50). With their focus on moral, political, and social matters, these three parts are distinguished from two other parts that are generally identified as being of a more “technical” nature: the dialectical chapters or Mohist canon 墨經 (40–45)12 and the defense or Military chapters (52–71).13 these two somewhat later parts are not discussed in this volume because they are different in style, very technical in content, and bedeviled by tex-tual corruption.14

Versions of the essays collected in this volume were originally presented during workshops and seminars at the university of leuven (Belgium), where the Mozi has been a research topic for a decade. the discussions and reflections during these scholarly meetings shaped the topic of the current volume and, more specifically, its background hypothesis: despite variations in content and approach, all contributors share an awareness of the differences that can be found in the book Mozi, not only between its major parts but also within the parts, the chapters, and the fragments. therefore, generalizing statements about “the” Mohists or Mohist thought in general will often make way for the possibility of different voices in the text and for more specific questions about evolutions or tensions within the three parts of the Mozi identified above. It is not our intention to deny

12 the Western opus magnum about the dialectical chapters is graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science. although impressive in its achievement, this book is not always very easy to consult. for a criticism of graham, see geaney, “a critique of a.c. graham’s reconstruction of the ‘neo-Mohist canons’.” see also Johnston, “choosing the greater and choosing the lesser”; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” 372–373.

13 robin Yates’s dissertation is probably the most complete source on these chapters: “the city under siege: technology and organization as seen in the reconstructed text of the Military chapters of the Mo Tzu” (harvard university, 1980). see also Yates, “the Mohists on Warfare”; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” 732–733.

14 these two parts are tentatively dated around the late fourth and third centuries Bce. see graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 337–338; Johnston, The “Mozi,” xxxii–xxxiii; fraser, “Mohism,” see “supplement to Mohism: text and authorship.”


the often noticed and claimed unity of Mohist thought, but rather to com-plement this generalizing reading with a more detailed account.

this interest in differences within the Mozi has, in turn, shaped three basic methodological assumptions that are shared by the editors of this volume and have to some extent influenced the contributions. first, we keep a firm focus on the text rather than its context. to put it bluntly: we think not so much of a master with disciples and opponents bringing about a text, but rather of a text describing (and thereby creating) a mas-ter, disciples, and opponents. When detecting information in the written source about the lives, status, or provenance of its authors or its audience, we refrain from making strong inferences about their historical existence. only when specific issues posed by matters of style, content, rhetoric, or grammar make these matters relevant for our purposes do we occasion-ally reflect on them. a second idea is that we attribute the differences in the core chapters (and some other chapters) mainly to an evolution over time and not to rivalry between opposing Mohist sects. We therefore offer some suggestions about the chronological arrangement of several core chapters. our last leading thought concerns the titles of the core chap-ters, which may have been added at a relatively late stage. We believe that these titles may reflect the shape into which Mohism had evolved by the end of the Warring states period. and we are convinced that they have to a considerable degree influenced interpretations of early Mohism until today. for a fresh interpretation of the text, it may be fruitful to read the chapters while temporarily ignoring their titles.

Before presenting the various contributions of this volume, we briefly outline these three guiding ideas that, for want of a better phrase, we call “basic assumptions.”

First Basic Assumption: Focus on the Text

the received Mozi consists of 71 numbered units, conventionally called “chapters” (or “books,” pian 篇), which were transmitted on fifteen rolls ( juan 卷). the label “early Mozi” usually refers to the core chapters (8–37), which are believed to date from the early fourth until the early third century Bce and to contain the original ideas of Master Mo and his followers.15 they are often framed as Master Mozi’s responses to sup-

15 graham believed that they go back to the beginnings of the school and are not later than 350 Bce. a. taeko Brooks ranges the core chapters from ca. 390 to ca. 273 Bce. Watanabe takashi postulates a much longer time span for the evolution of the core chap-


posed objections of opponents. although only 23 out of these 30 chapters are extant, the short description of a 71-pian Mozi preserved in the Book of Han suggests that by the han the core of Mozi had already assumed its current shape, consisting of ten sets of three chapters each. conse-quently, these chapters have often been called “triplets” or “triads.” the three chapters in each triplet carry the same title, and the ten titles are believed to reflect the ten “dogmas” or “theses” of early Mohism.16 even though there has been disagreement about the translation of these titles (some are discussed in the contributions to this volume), the general con-tent of the core ideas is relatively clearly reflected by them.17 throughout this volume, we normally transliterate and translate the titles of the trip-lets as follows: “shang xian” 尚賢 (elevate the Worthy; chapters 8–10), “shang tong” 尚同 (conform upward; 11–13), “Jian ai” 兼愛 (Inclusive care; 14–16), “fei gong” 非攻 (against Military aggression; 17–19), “Jie yong” 節用 (Moderation in expenses; 20, 21, with 22 missing), “Jie zang” 節葬 (Moderation in Burials; 25, with 23 and 24 missing), “tian zhi” 天志 (Will of heaven; 26–28), “Ming gui” 明鬼 (explaining ghosts; 31, with 29 and 30 missing), “fei yue” 非樂 (against Music; 32, with 33 and 34 miss-ing), and “fei ming” 非命 (against fatalism; 35–37). the three chapters within each triplet are distinguished as, respectively, shang 上 (upper), zhong 中 (Middle), and xia 下 (lower). “fei ru” 非儒 (against the ru; 39, with 38 missing) is sometimes called a “duplet” or “diad” because it was registered as two chapters and not as a “triplet” or “triad”. the status of the sole extant “fei ru” as a core chapter is questionable, even though its title and position in the corpus both suggest that it could be consid-ered the “eleventh dogma,” containing Mohist criticism of the ru 儒 (the classicists, erudites, confucians). not only its exceptionally polemic tone but also its composition, content, and grammar suggest that this duplet postdates the core chapters and fits better with the dialogues.18

ters, from the early fourth century to the end of the third century Bce. for more informa-tion on these views, see below.

16 Hanshu 30.1738. for more details on the textual history of the Mozi, see Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 29–34; and graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 65.

17 for a brief discussion of the core chapters and a summary of the discussions about their titles, see Johnston, The “Mozi,” xxxiv–lxvi. We discuss the titles in more detail below.

18 for these and other reasons to exclude “fei ru” from the core chapters, see below and desmet, “all good things come in threes,” 224–243; a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 105–106; and ding sixin, “a study on the dating of the Mo zi dialogues and the Mohist View of ghosts and spirits,” 51–52.


the dialogues (46–49/51) consist of anecdotes, sayings, and conversa-tions between Mozi and his disciples or opponents. slightly postdating or perhaps partly overlapping with the core chapters, they are tentatively attributed to the master’s first generation of disciples and dated to the middle of the fourth century Bce.19 like the core chapters, they discuss a mixture of moral, social, and political matters, but stylistically they are framed as actual dialogues between Master Mozi and historical per-sons. to have such a collection of sayings and wise responses of a master postdating the relatively structured essays of the core chapters seems to reverse the chronological evolution recognized in early chinese texts. the oldest-known texts are often a collation of rather fragmentary nota-tions, such as wise enunciations of or (staged) dialogues with a master, while somewhat structured statements resembling essays postdate them.20 Indeed, these dialogue chapters have been called the “Mohist Analects” and were perhaps modelled on the Lunyu 論語.21 the first chapter, “geng Zhu” 耕柱 (geng Zhu; 46), is named after a disciple of Mozi; “gui yi” 貴義 (Valuing Morality; 47) mostly contains sayings attributed to Master Mo; “gongmeng” 公孟 (gongmeng; 48) is named after a ru who opposes Mohist views; and “lu wen” 魯問 (lu’s Questions; 49) is a record of con-versations with the ruler of lu. unlike these four chapters, “gongshu” 公輸 (gongshu Pan 盤; 50) is a long narrative about Mozi convincing the king of chu to call off an attack on song. It is not always counted among the dialogues because of this stylistic difference as well as its military con-tent, which is more in line with the defense chapters (52–71) immediately following the dialogues in the received Mozi. since the content and the title of chapter 51 are lost, we cannot determine its nature.

the last group of chapters that we discuss are the seven short mis-cellaneous essays at the beginning of the book, which we call opening chapters. they have also been labeled “appendices,” “digests,” “epitomes,”

19 see fraser, “Mohism,” see “supplement to Mohism: text and authorship.” ding sixin, “a study on the dating of the Mo zi dialogues and the Mohist View of ghosts and spirits,” 73 dates some of them in the Qin and han dynasties.

20 see, e.g., fu sinian, “Zhanguo wenji zhong zhi pianshi shuti—yige duan ji,” 17–21; and Boltz, “the composite nature of early chinese texts.”

21 some scholars believe that the dialogues predate the core chapters and portray the historical Mo di in interaction with his actual disciples and rivals. for a recent recapitu-lation of the arguments, see Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 4, 46. for an early refutation of this view, see durrant, “a consideration of differences in the grammar of the Mo Tzu ‘essays’ and ‘dialogues,’ ” 255–256; and, more recently, ding sixin, “a study on the dating of the Mo zi dialogues and the Mohist View of ghosts and spirits,” 57, 73.


or “summaries.”22 they contain a variety of topics, some in line with the core chapters and others remarkably ru in content. their authenticity, affiliation, and textual history have been a topic of debate. chris fraser considers them “probably the latest part of the corpus,” and taeko Brooks tentatively dates them, in reverse order, from 270 to 250 Bce. she calls them “singlets,” as distinguished from the triplets and duplet presented above.23 Various scholars consider the first three opening chapters spuri-ous and un-Mohist: these are “Qin shi” 親士 (Intimacy with officers; 1), “xiu shen” 脩身 (cultivating the self; 2), and “suo ran” 所染 (What has Been dyed; 3). others believe that the last four chapters consist of fragments of otherwise lost material: “fa yi” 法儀 (standards and norms; 4), “Qi huan” 七患 (seven Misfortunes; 5), “ci guo” 辭過 (eschewing faults; 6), and “san bian” 三辯 (three arguments; 7).24 the opening chapters belong to the better-preserved and nontechnical parts of the Mozi, those that that we discuss in this volume.

this volume certainly does not aim at providing a complete study of all chapters included in these three parts but rather takes the core chapters, dialogues, and opening chapters as the scope in which all the contri-butions fall. following the chronological order that we attribute to the chapters, the volume begins with three studies that focus on the core chapters: one on the “Jian ai” triplet, by carine defoort; one on the “fei gong” triplet, by Paul van els; and one on the sole remaining chapter of the “Ming gui” triplet, by roel sterckx. the contribution on the author-ity of the ancient sages by Miranda Brown mostly concerns all three parts of the Mozi. the next study, by chris fraser, mainly discusses the dialogues. and the last two contributions, by hui-chieh loy and nicolas standaert, each start from one opening chapter, namely “Qin shi” and “fa yi,” respectively.

our focus on the book Mozi rather than on the reality hidden behind it is not meant to deny that the parts, chapters, fragments, or paragraphs

22 these labels are used by many scholars, such as Mei, durrant, graham, Maeder, lowe, and Johnston.

23 fraser, “Mohism,” see “supplement to Mohism: text and authorship”; Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 107, 117. there is a consensus on the relative lateness of the first seven chapters. see, e.g., Wu Yujiang et al., “Mozi gepian zhen wei kao,” 1025–1026; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” xxxii.

24 Mei, The Works of Motze, 2, notes that the first three chapters “are judged to be spuri-ous almost unanimously by competent textual critics.” hu shi, zhongguo zhexueshi dagang, 133, believes that the seven opening chapters are all later forgeries: the first three are not Mohist at all; the last four are constructed out of lost Mohist fragments. for an overview of various chinese views about these chapters, see Yang Yi, Mozi huanyuan, 19–23, 211–12.


have been written down by and for actual persons. But in the case of the Mozi much has been said and little can be ascertained about these “Mohists.”25 that is one reason why we refrain from speculating on the historical identity of the persons behind the text, whether the authors/editors or the audience. as for the authors/editors, we alternately ascribe the views expressed in these chapters to “Mozi” (the master after whom the book is named), “the author(s) of this chapter,” or sometimes “the Mohist(s).” We thereby do not insist on the “strong authorship” of any of these persons. on the contrary, like many other early chinese sources, the various chapters may well have been collected and (re)edited at vari-ous times on the basis of older fragments circulating among a group of like-minded people. the authors we have in mind are those “scholar-editors,” or “bricoleurs,” who,26 for their own reasons, gave these various chapters their current composite structure.27 Mozi himself was, of course, not that author, but rather the authority to whom the writers referred. In that sense, “our Master Mozi” 子墨子 was to some extent a creation of the book to which he was expected to lend legitimation and inspira-tion. even though the text presents itself as created by persons (a master and his disciples), these persons were also created by the text. as Mark lewis has argued, “the text, the master, and the disciples were inextricably bound together. Without the text there was no master and no disciples (beyond the lives of the individuals involved); without the master there was no authoritative text or transmitters of the text; without the disciples the text was not written or transmitted.”28 Besides this crucial triangle of text-master-disciples, the audience was also both the cause and the result of the book. We tend to agree with dan robins that the opponents staged in the Mozi defended customs and established privileges of the

25 for a summary of reflections on the identity of Mo di and his followers, see John-ston, The “Mozi,” xviii–xxv. for a careful attempt to distinguish between the “Mohists” as a social group, “Mohism” as an intellectual orientation, and “Mohist-inspired thinking,” see Brindley, “ ‘the Perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the Problem of Intellectual affilia-tions in early china,” 230–234.

26 for “scholar-editor,” see Boltz, “the composite nature of early chinese texts,” 59; for “bricoleur,” see Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 81–82. Judging from their novel ideas and relatively exclusive selection of tex-tual fragments, the earliest Mozi authors/editors probably belonged to a relatively closed group, the latest perhaps dating from the han dynasty.

27 for the composite structure of early chinese texts as opposed to individual author-ship of integral, structurally homogeneous texts, see Boltz, “the composite nature of early chinese texts,” 70–71; and Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 28, 82.

28 lewis, Writing and Authority, 58.


ruling elite rather than theories of particular philosophical lineages or schools.29 We also agree with him, against the conventional interpreta-tion, that the opponents in the Mozi do not coincide with the ru, who are seldom mentioned in the book and never in the core chapters.30 the opponents—anonymously staged in the core chapters and presented as specific individuals in the dialogues—play an important role in bringing up objections that are, of course, all convincingly refuted by the master. even though in these two parts of the Mozi the setting still exudes the master’s authority, this is gradually taken over by the increasingly subtle argumentation that one would expect in a philosophical essay. this evo-lution of increasing opposition and refutation can be perceived in these chapters and will be discussed further on.

Second Basic Assumption: Evolution in the Core Chapters

Most studies of Mohist thought tend to consider the core chapters as representative of Master Mo’s original ideas. they attribute to each trip-let one consistent vision, such as the promotion of universal love or the rejection of aggressive warfare, and therefore quote from any of the three chapters to illustrate the relevant thesis or dogma.31 But those who focus on the book Mozi have long been fascinated by the threefold structure of the core chapters. Qing scholars started searching for explanations of the differences within the triplets: did the upper (shang), Middle (zhong), and lower (xia) chapters represent three sets of lecture notes, different branches within Mohism, or stages in its evolution? Yu Yue 俞樾, luan tiaofu 欒調甫, fang shouchu 方授楚, alfred forke, Watanabe takashi 渡邊卓, stephen durrant, angus graham, taeko Brooks, chris fraser, and Karen desmet, among others, have identified consistent differences among the triplets on the basis of such things as particle use, vocabulary, compounds, fixed formulas, rhetoric, style, references to authority, use of

29 see robins, “the Moists and the gentlemen of the World,” 388–389. If anything, the Mohist insistence on using good reasons and objective criteria must have initiated the (philosophical) debate rather than joined it.

30 see ibid., 386. the ru are explicitly attacked in “fei ru” (chapter 39) and to a lesser extent in “gong Meng” (chapter 48). otherwise, they are not explicitly mentioned in the Mozi.

31 Zheng Jiewen considers the core chapters more mature and later than the dia-logues, and traces an evolution between the ten triplets, but he never mentions any evo-lution or difference within the triplets, nor does any chinese author that he discusses in his overview of Mozi research. see Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 1–24.


logic, and the intellectual, political, social, or technological content.32 the following overview outlines the three steps in this debate that have most guided our own reflections: the “three-sects theory” as presented by a. c. graham, the “sequence theory” as presented by taeko Brooks, and the alternative “evolution theory” defended long ago by Watanabe takashi.33

The Three-Sects Theory

Inspired by stephen durrant’s study of the Mozi,34 a. c. graham appor-tioned each triplet (or triad) among three rival sects or factions, which he labeled “Purist,” “compromising,” and “reactionary.” to reach this conclu-sion, he first distinguished grammatical features and vocabulary in the different chapters and then went on to look for differences in content. he thus began by dividing most chapters into three groups, named Y, h, and J after a special grammatical feature: the Y chapters cite Mozi after the opening sentence with the formula zi Mozi yan yue 子墨子言曰 instead of 子墨子曰 (therefore called Y[an] chapters); the h chapters replace the postverbal particle yu 於 by hu 乎 when possible (therefore called h[u] chapters); and the J chapters use the particle ran 然 ( jan in Wade-giles transcription; therefore called J chapters) after citing an ancient source. on the basis of their content, graham argued that these chapter groups were written by three competing sects into which Mohism is said to have divided according to Han Feizi “xian xue” 顯學 (eminent learning] chapter 50) and zhuangzi “tianxia” 天下 (the World; chapter 33): the Y group was seen as defending the purest and most radical Mohist doc-trine and as residing in the northern part of the realm; the h group, also from the north, was somewhat more accommodating to political reali-ties; and the J group, in the south, was the most accommodating to poli-tics and therefore farthest removed from the original doctrine.35 graham

32 for an overview of various theories concerning the threefold nature of the core chapters, see durrant, “a consideration of differences in the grammar of the Mo Tzu ‘essays’ and ‘dialogues,’ ” 253–255; Yang Yi, Mozi huanyuan, 213–215.

33 these three are not the first nor the only scholars presenting such theories on Mozi, but they represent three steps in our initial acquaintance with the debate. other scholars, mainly chinese and Japanese, are mentioned in the notes. We refer to Karen desmet, “all good things come in threes,” 17–71 for a fuller overview of the topic.

34 see durrant, “an examination of textual and grammatical Problems in Mo Tzu”; and durrant, “a consideration of differences in the grammar of the Mo Tzu ‘essays’ and ‘dialogues.’ ” the three-sects theory was first suggested by Yu Yue in his preface (“Yu xu” 俞序) to sun Yirang’s Mozi jiangu.

35 graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of “Mo-tzu,” 18–19.


concluded: “We can well understand why the Mohist sects disputed so fiercely. It would seem to the Purist that out of eagerness for political power the true teachings of Mo-tzu had been shamefully diluted by the compromisers and utterly betrayed by the reactionary.”36 although these labels could also be interpreted as reflecting an evolution, graham saw them rather as matching with roughly coexistent and rival sects each using the dialect of their own region.37 since three core chapters did not fit this framework, he considered them later additions: either as “digests” of the Mohist doctrine (14, “Jian ai, shang”; and 20, “Jie yong, shang”) or as a dislocated “manuscripts (fragment)” (17, “fei gong, shang”).38 his divi-sion of the core chapters can be graphically represented as follows:39

table 1. the division of the core chapters according to graham

triplets digests andfragment

YPurist

hcompromising

Jreactionary

尚賢 8 9 10尚同 11 12 13兼愛 14 15 16非攻 17 18 19節用 20 21 (22)節葬 (23) (24) 25天志 26 27 28明鬼 (29) (30) 31非樂 ? ? 32 ?非命39 35 36 37

Source: graham, “Mo tzu,” 336–337.Note: the chapters in parentheses are not extant.

36 graham, Disputers of the Tao, 53.37 Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of “Mo-tzu,” 28, graham

explicitly sets aside questions of dating.38 graham thought that chapter 17 was mistakenly cut from the end of chapter 26,

where, according to him, it belonged. for more details, see ibid., 3–4. see also Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 69–75.

39 this triplet is generally considered very corrupt. graham used parts of chapters 35 and 36 to reconstruct the Y chapter of the “fei ming” triplet, he added a piece of chapter 35 to chapter 37 to form the h chapter, and the J chapter is again a mixture of the original chapters 35 and 36. see graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of “Mo-tzu,” 12–16.


although this three-sects theory has been very influential, especially among Western scholars of early chinese thought,40 most Mozi scholars have recently abandoned it. as Qin Yanshi 秦彦士 has pointed out, doc-trinal disputes within the triplets are remarkably absent, which weakens the hypothesis of fierce rivalry.41 Moreover, the opponents mentioned in the core chapters do not seem to be other Mohists, not even other philos-ophers or masters, but rather members of the ruling elite preserving and defending their customs against Mohist attacks. however, the rejection of the hypothesis of fierce disputes between rivals does not necessarily imply the rejection of the possibility of a different regional provenance of some chapters, while leaving open the possibility of temporal progress. taeko Brooks has taken these possibilities—the combination of regional varia-tion and chronological sequence—into account in her sequence theory.

The Sequence Theory

on the basis of graham’s work, taeko Brooks has argued that the dif-ferences within the triplets may bear witness to a political, intellectual, technological, and social evolution rather than to a division into three competing sects. Based on formal features (e.g., initial attribution formu-las, the use of past authority, the elite mentioned in the text, the reference to written sources) and differences in content (e.g., opposition, refer-ences to supernatural sanctions, populism, controversy, self-definition), she argues that the triplets are the result of successive revision and pro-gressive accommodation to political realities within one and the same school, moving from the state of Zheng to Wei and then to song.42 she concludes “that those differences are plausible as developing over time, as the Micians [Mohists] move from outside critics to inside members of the system, philosophize it in their terms, make peace with its intrinsic war aims, and cope with the increasingly harsh conditions which apply to all who serve the state.”43 the layers distinguished by Brooks in the core chapters are presented in the following table and are tentatively dated from 390 to 273 Bce:

40 see, e.g., schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 137–138; hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 99; tong shuye, Xian Qin qi zi sixiang yanjiu, 59.

41 Qin Yanshi, Mozi yu Mojia xuepai, 23. see also Johnston, The “Mozi,” xxiv. the earli-est rejection of the three-sects theory came from luan tiaofu, “Mozi shu zhi chuanben yuanliu yu pianshi cidi,” 180.

42 for speculation on the location of the Mohists, see a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 116.

43 a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 111.


table 2. tentative dates for the core chapters according to taeko Brooks

尚賢尚同兼愛非攻節用節葬天志明鬼非樂非命

390–375 Bce14

(386)

17(390)

20(382) [23]

(378)

374–345 Bce 11(372)

18 (362)

21(367)

[24](357) 26

(352) [29](347)

342–324 Bce8

(338)

15(342)

19(326)

[22](334) 25

(330)[30](324)

322–317 Bce

9(317)

12(322) 32

(320) 35(319)

310–287 Bce 16(310) 27

(302) 31(298) [33]

(295) 37(291)

282–273 Bce

10(275) 13

(273)

28(282)

[34](277)

36(280)

Source: Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 117.Note: We exclude the “fei ru” duplet chapter and the opening chapters (or singlets), which taeko Brooks includes in her study of the “ethical chapters” of the Mozi. the chapters between square brackets are not extant. the dates are given in parentheses.


Without subscribing to every claim and date presented by taeko Brooks, we retain three important conclusions from this table that con-cern our interest in the book Mozi. first, Brooks supports the sequence theory as opposed to graham’s three-sects theory to explain the differ-ences between the three chapters within each triplet. second, she does away with graham’s suggestion that three short chapters were “digests” or a “manuscripts (fragment)” later added to the book. We agree on these two points. the third point is that Brooks mostly44 considers the upper-Middle-lower sequence of the chapters as their actual chronologi-cal order. following the work of Watanabe takashi, we take issue with this point.

An Alternative Evolution Theory

the sequence theory developed by Brooks is in fact more recent than the evolution established by the Japanese scholar Watanabe takashi 渡邊卓, who published his views on the Mohist core chapters as early as 1962.45 after a thorough study of the contents of all the core chapters together and, especially, of the increasing sophistication of ideas and logic, he fitted each chapter into a period and proposed a chronological order. Very roughly, the evolution went as follows: in the early Warring states period, the Mohist movement began with the promotion of jian ai and fei gong; when the movement became more structured and the demands for political advice increased, the Mohists came up with shang xian, jie yong, jie zang, and fei yue. at the end of the Zhou dynasty, when their movement was falling apart, the Mohists promoted shang tong, tian zhi, ming gui, and fei ming. Watanabe takashi does not give exact dates for the chapters but suggests that the last chapter, “shang xian, zhong” was written by the end of the Warring states period or the beginning of the Qin dynasty.46 on the basis of his analysis, Watanabe concludes that in

44 all triplets are chronologically ordered upper-Middle-lower, except the (very cor-rupt) “fei ming” triplet, which is upper-lower-Middle.

45 for the three periods that Watanabe takashi distinguishes, see his “Mozi sixiang,” 4, 26–50. he does not exclude regional differences between the chapters (e.g. the states of Qi, song, chu, and Qin). for other early Japanese scholarship on the core chapters, see hashimoto sumiya, “riben de ‘Mozi’ yanjiu gaiguan,” 259–262, 264–268.

46 Watanabe takashi “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 2, 30–31 identifies a fourth short and overlapping stage ending around 210 Bce, but he places that stage with the third stage in the third period. for a more recent Japanese theory, dating all core chapters between ca. 400 and ca. 250 Bce, see Yoshinaga shinjirō, “Jian ai shi shenme,” 585.


table 3. the chronology and evolution of the core chapters according to Watanabe takashi

Warring states

Year 尚賢尚同兼愛非攻節用節葬天志明鬼非樂非命

early period

400 Bce 1417

Middle period

380 Bce

350 Bce

8

15

16

18

19

20

21

late period

300 Bce

250 Bce

220 Bce

10

9

11

13

1225

26

28

2731

32353637

Note: the three triplets with a shang-xia-zhong sequence are underlined.

three triplets—“shang xian,” “shang tong,” and “tian zhi”—the chrono-logical order is upper (shang)–lower (xia)–Middle (zhong) and not the traditional order of upper–Middle–lower.47 table 3 presents an overview of Watanabe’s results.

again without subscribing to Watanabe’s actual dating of the various chapters, we believe that his suggested evolution theory is superior to the two previous theories: like taeko Brooks, he considers graham’s “digests” (chapters 14 and 20) and “fragment” (chapter 17) to be early core chap-ters; and he presents an evolutionary picture, although one that differs in the sequence of chapters within the triplets. Moreover, this theory fits well with some data from graham’s own analysis a few decades later: the

47 When forke, Mê Ti, 23, divided the core chapters into “source” (Quelle), followed by “elaboration” (Erweiterung) and finally by “paraphrase” (Paraphrase), he also reversed the order of these three triplets and of “fei ming.”


chapters that Watanabe characterizes as written last in each triplet all happen to coincide with graham’s h chapters. this suggests that what graham regarded as a regional characteristic might have been a (chrono-logical and/or regional) sign of the last group of authors/editors of the triplets. Karen desmet’s recent study of the use of compounds in the core chapters confirms Watanabe’s hypothesis.48

these three theories by graham, Brooks, and Watanabe takashi, which reflect the views of a larger community of Mozi scholars, generated our second basic assumption: focusing on the core chapters, we believe that they contain interesting differences that to some extent suggest an evolu-tion of ideas in the order presented by Watanabe. the various contribu-tors to this volume do not necessarily subscribe to this insight, but they are all aware of it and consider its implications. the four most striking developments that are traced throughout various papers of this volume are the ever-increasing radicalization of ideas, a growing search for a theo-retical foundation and consistency, a move from acts to motivation, and a multiplicity of voices. In the “Jian ai” triplet, for instance, the demand to “inclusively care for everybody” does not diminish its radical nature while Mohists adapt to political realities; on the contrary, it is only slowly con-ceived, and as it undergoes a conceptual evolution, it increasingly gains force. an example of the second development is the ever-more-frequent use of references to heaven and ghosts, which occur relatively late in various core chapters and provide the Mohist proposals with a respected authority. next, the move from actions to motivation is visible in the views on ghosts and the type of behavior that they respond to: not only good acts but also noble intentions. and finally, the dialogues and opening chapters, even more than the core chapters, convince us that there are

48 see desmet, “the growth of compounds in the core chapters of the Mozi,” 111–117. her research also shows that all the h chapters (in graham’s terms) consistently contain a higher ratio of different compounds, which confirms Watanabe takashi’s conviction that they form the latest group. these are always the lower (xia) chapters except in the trip-lets “shang xian,” “shang tong,” and “tian zhi,” where the Middle (zhong) chapters belong to the h group. If one focuses only on those compounds that are unique for one group and hence are not shared throughout the Mozi, one finds that the h chapters contain not only most compounds but also those that begin to occur only in relatively late War-ring states texts. chapters from the Y and J groups contain fewer exclusive compounds, which moreover also occur in some older texts. these conclusions are inevitably tentative because of the controversies on the nature of compounds as well as on the dates of early chinese sources.


different and even inconsistent voices to be heard in this one book, both on the side of the opponents and on that of the defenders.

despite reflections on these and other possible differences within the book Mozi, we also share a strong awareness of the fact that the book is both less and more unified than presented in this volume. on the “lesser” side, we believe that not only the book as a whole lacks unity, but so do the various parts in which it has been conveniently divided, among which are the core chapters, dialogues, and opening chapters. Just as we hear a variety of voices speaking in these parts, we also perceive a variety of opponents and addressees: the ruling elite, some ru, Mohist adherents, and critical disciples. the vocabulary and values in the Mozi that also commonly occur in many Warring states texts do not always dis-tinguish the Mohist authors very clearly from other “schools” or “lineages” either, even though they sometimes insist on their own interpretations of treasured values such as ren 仁 and yi 義. But the strongest reminder of the degree of disunity within the Mozi certainly comes from erik Maeder, who has traced differences between the paragraphs (ce 冊) of the same chapter (pian 篇). the fact that some characteristics identified by graham with the h group are clustered in only some paragraphs of these chapters, while other characteristics checked by Maeder are equally spread over the chapters, suggests that the former belonged to older documents used by the Mohist authors, while the latter might be from the final hand.49 for such reasons and despite Maeder’s strong support for some of graham’s conclusions, he also argues in favor of a complex temporal evolution of the core chapters.50 Maeder’s study also makes us aware that the Mozi (as probably many other ancient texts) is an evolving text consisting of many layers, fragments, and lacunae, and that its authors were more edi-torial compilers or inventive bricoleurs than the “strong authors” we tend to expect behind a text.51

on the other hand, we also believe that there is more unity in the book Mozi than we have tried to show in this volume. We therefore also

49 Maeder, “some observations on the composition of the ‘core chapters’ of the Mozi,” 44–47. In the same article, Maeder also shows that there are remarkable similari-ties between paragraphs in very different pian. this suggests the use of older texts by the Mohist authors. see ibid., 74–75, 81–82.

50 see ibid., 76. for Maeder’s strong support of graham’s three-sects theory and “digest/manuscripts (fragment)” theory, see ibid., 39–40, 54–55, 75.

51 Ibid., 81–82. Postmodern theory has shown that even “strong authors” can be seen as bricoleurs of existing quotes. the cut-and-paste habits of contemporary computer use have made this characterization even more apt.


understand the general tendency to present Mohism as one consistent vision, and each triplet as the expression of one dogma or thesis. first of all, the differences between the chapters of each triplet are sometimes rather small and only implicit; they are not explicitly emphasized as one would expect from rivalling sects holding fierce debates. second, there is a principle of charity that expects the reader or listener, at least to some extent, to make sense of the author or speaker and, hence, to distill a coherent message despite apparent incoherence.52 We do not want to cas-tigate other Mozi scholars for having done exactly that. a third reason to attribute unity to the Mozi is the fact that it was ascribed to one particular master, constructed as one text by the han dynasty, and read as such in the many centuries thereafter, at least when the text was available. even though the Mozi parts that we have focused upon may have been com-posed on the basis of older written or oral sources, they do not appear to be merely “a reservoir of so-called textual building blocks,” in William Boltz’s terms. rather, they attest to “an editorial process,” which “pre-sumes a doctrinal or other similarly purposeful motivation.”53 however multivocal, loose, and corrupt the chapters sometimes are (or appear), there clearly were people who identified with this composed text.54 By preserving the three different versions of the triplets under the labels “upper,” “Middle,” and “lower,” the last of the Mohist authors/editors may have given us an exceptional glimpse into the reworking of perhaps many more early texts and into the efforts that a community put into weaving the tapestry of their intellectual tradition.55 one final reason for attribut-ing unity to the various triplets more specifically is their identical titles,

52 the “principle of charity,” named as such in 1958–1959 by neil Wilson and much dis-cussed by philosophers, requires the reader or listener to interpret an author’s or speaker’s statements as rational, coherent, valid, and interesting. there has also been much discus-sion about the possible disadvantages of such an attitude, especially over the boundaries of times and cultures. see, e.g., feldman, “charity.”

53 Boltz, “the composite nature of early chinese texts,” 59.54 the perceptible looseness may also differ per chapter. for instance, although the

Middle and lower chapters of the “Jian ai” triplet are relatively well structured, they give the impression of having been constructed out of previously existing fragments more than the upper chapter does; the latter is a nicely constructed essay and probably just as much “composed” as is a modern essay. see the essay by carine defoort in this volume.

55 the exceptional threefold nature of the core chapters may result from the han edi-tors’ benign neglect, resulting in their failure to edit the Mozi into a unified text. It is perhaps not irrelevant that in Hanshu 30.1738 the book is listed as the very last of the Mohist writings, analogous with the collections of “daojia yan” 道家言 under taoism, “Za yinyang” 雜陰陽 under the Yin Yang lineage, and “fajia yan” 法家言 under legalism.


with each chapter of a triplet distinguished only by “upper,” “Middle,” and “lower.” But who added those titles to the chapters, and when did they do so? tentative answers to these questions are discussed under the third basic assumption made by the editors of this volume.

Third Basic Assumption: Temporary Suspension of the Titles

We should be cautious with expectations created not only by the modern notions of “book” and “author” but also by “titles.” In his study of one Xunzi chapter, “tian lun” 天論 (about heaven), edward Machle warns that its title “may have created expectations that misled generations of readers as to the real subject matter of the essay.” having removed the title from its privileged position, Machle concludes that “the discussions in the essay are not chiefly about Tian, but about the conditions for suc-cessful government, the full development of human possibilities, the lim-its of human responsibility, moral discipline, the proper attitude toward omens and sacrifices, the necessity of following Li, and the limitations of some prominent philosophers.” he therefore speculates “that xun Qing would be quite surprised to see the title that has been given to the work, and would reject it as a determiner of the essay’s interpretation.”56 In a similar vein, we first reflect on the presence and nature of the core chap-ter titles before speculating about their emergence as slogans or mottos representing Mohist thought.

Titles

unlike Machle, we do not think of one particular person as the real author who would have rejected later added titles. But we do believe that the risk of titles misleading the reader haunts Mozi studies. In the case of the core chapters, the risk is even greater, because early Mohism has been identified almost literally with the titles of these ten triplets. for example, Mozi scholars have taken the “tian zhi” 天志 triplet as containing the master’s original views about the will of heaven. But could it be that when the three chapters were first constructed, they lacked titles? for what it is worth, the expression tian zhi 天志 hardly occurs in the triplet named

56 Machle, Nature and Heaven in the “Xunzi,” 58. for Machle’s reflections on titles in Xunzi, see ibid., 57–58.


after it (only once in chapter 26 and once in 28, i.e., “tian zhi, shang” and “tian zhi, xia”), and never in the rest of the book. hence the question: did the Mohist authors have an inkling of the importance that we now attribute to these titles?

for learning about the importance and frequency of chapter titles, we can take advantage of the many manuscripts discovered in the twentieth century. We know from unearthed materials as well as from references in han sources that the current distinction between chapters and books was very fluid in early china.57 lin Qingyuan 林清源 has divided early writings preserved on wood, bamboo, and silk into different categories, one consisting of texts or fragments about thought (sixiang 思想). two conclusions, about the dates and nature of their titles, may be relevant for our research.

first, writings about thought only began carrying titles by the mid- or late Warring states period. “Warring states texts about thought often have no titles and the formation of titles does not yet seem to have turned into strict rules; but han texts on thought often have titles and their formation is full of change.”58 thus, unearthed manuscripts suggest that perhaps few philosophical manuscripts from that period carried titles. since no sub-stansive part of the Mozi has hitherto been discovered in a tomb, there is no specific information to be expected from that side.59 But it is possible that the core chapters—the oldest part of the book—at an early (perhaps pre-final) stage did not carry any titles.

second, lin’s conclusion about the nature of these writings’ titles is that they often reflect the general content of the text.60 the titles of the Mohist core chapters indeed seem to refer to the general content and have also been perceived as such—hence, for example, the established association

57 han sources discussing writings about thought tend to refer to (what we now know as) chapter titles rather than to (what we now know as) book titles. see Yu Jiaxi, Muluxue fahui, 200–204.

58 lin Qingyuan, Jiandu boshu biaoti geshi yanjiu, 7. the category of “title” is also com-plex: there is discussion of whether an expression is a title or merely a fragment heading. see ibid., 69–105.

59 some (mostly chinese) scholars have identified the shanghai manuscript “guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 (title added by contemporary editors) as Mohist. for doubts about this identification, see Brindley, “ ‘the Perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the Problem of Intellectual affiliations in early china,” 218–230; and the essay by roel sterckx in this volume.

60 see lin Qingyuan, Jiandu boshu biaoti geshi yanjiu, 7–9, 48–50. three other types of titles are created by (1) expressing the concrete object discussed in the texts, (2) repeating the first keywords of the text, and (3) quoting the first unit of a series of items.


of the “tian zhi” chapters with Mohist views on the will of heaven. But when was this title chosen and why? neither the expression tian zhi nor tian zhi zhi 天之志 is common in the triplet.61 nor is the expression zun tian 尊天 (revere heaven), a motto that seems to have represented Mohist thought, as we will argue further on. an expression very similar to tian zhi, namely tian yi 天意, appears eleven times in the relevant triplet (ten times in the upper version and once in the Middle version) but was not chosen as its title.62 and on top of all this, we have the strong impression, as did Machle in the case of the Xunzi’s “tian lun,” that these chapters do not mainly discuss heaven’s will but rather “righteousness” ( yi 義). the three “tian zhi” chapters begin and end with the idea of yi; they plead for a new understanding of righteousness and find a foundation for their novel views in heaven.

the absence of the expression tian zhi from the triplet (and even from the whole received text), combined with a content that does not entirely coincide with its title, suggests that the addition of titles may have hap-pened at a relatively late stage, when the argument was already formed. William Boltz has speculated with respect to early chinese writings that “unedited, ‘raw’ source material” at some point was edited into a “text” carrying an authorial, or at least editorial, voice. as an example, he sug-gests that the untitled pre-han guodian fragments (now labeled Laozi 老子) might be an instance of the former, while the two Mawangdui man-uscripts from the han titled “de jing” (classic of Power) and “dao jing” (classic of the Way) might be of the latter type.63 the Mohist core chap-ters, as we now have them, clearly belong to the latter type: they are rela-tively well structured and do make a point, which reflects the presence of some ideological motivation behind the construction of the text. But

61 the combination tian zhi zhi 天之志 never appears in chapters 26 and 27; it appears only three times in chapter 28 and two times in chapter 49. It might be significant for linguistic research that expressions “noun + zhi + noun” (see also tian zhi yi in the following note) appear only in the Middle and lower versions and never in the upper version.

62 Tian zhi yi 天之意 never appears in chapter 26; it appears nine times in chapter 28 and twenty-four times in chapter 27. the Mohists may have invented a new concept (tianyi 天意) to express heaven’s will, since heaven’s Mandate (tianming 天命) was prob-ably too closely associated with fatalism (ming). the occurrences of yi 義 in the Mozi are most concentrated in this triplet (65 occurrences out of a total of 302).

63 Boltz, “the composite nature of early chinese texts,” 58–61. these two titles are based on the first keywords of each part and were added at the end of the manuscripts together with the number of characters. “de jing” and “dao jing” are good examples of titles that prob-ably do not represent the content of the text, but that have almost without exception led to such an interpretation, as if they formed a book about the “Way” and its “Power.”


the point that they make does not always coincide with their titles. We therefore suspect that the core chapters may have been constructed in various stages, with the addition of titles at a relatively late stage, possibly in the han.64 the addition shang, zhong, and xia to the titles of the trip-lets also suggests the influence of such editorial hands. If one accepts that these individual chapters came into being at different times, as we do in this volume, then some editor or team must have considered them one unity and arranged them in the current redaction. In order to speculate on the insertion of titles in the core chapters, we extend our exploration to determine where and how often these phrases occur in the Mozi as a whole (table 4).

table 4. the occurrence of the core chapter titles in the Mozi

尚賢 shang xian chapter 8 chapter 9 chapter 10 elsewhere

4 15 13 1

尚同 shang tong chapter 11 chapter 12 chapter 13 elsewhere

1(5 上同)

13 [+1](2 上同)

14(1 上同)

1 [+1](1 上同)

兼愛 jian ai chapter 14 chapter 15 chapter 16 elsewhere

0 0 1 9 [+1]

非攻 fei gong chapter 17 chapter 18 chapter 19 elsewhere

1 0 1 [1]

節用 jie yong chapter 20 chapter 21 — elsewhere

0 1 — 1

節葬 jie zang — — chapter 25 elsewhere

— — 0(1 節喪)

2

64 sun Yirang attributed the redaction of the Mozi to the imperial han librarian liu xiang 劉向 (77–6 Bce), who was responsible for the order of the chapters and sections in various works, such as Xunzi, Guanzi, and zhan guo ce. In an edict of 26 Bce emperor cheng di ordered him to collate writings for the imperial library (Hanshu 10.310, 30.1701). there is, however, no proof that liu xiang did this redaction or gave the titles to the chapters of the Mozi. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 653. Many scholars seem to follow this attribution. see e.g. Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 202, 252, 289.


table 4 (cont.)

天志 tian zhi chapter 26 chapter 27 chapter 28 elsewhere

1 0 1 0

明鬼 ming gui — — chapter 31 elsewhere

— — 0 0

非樂 fei yue chapter 32 — — elsewhere

1 — — 1

非命 fei ming chapter 35 chapter 36 chapter 37 elsewhere

0 0 0 3

Note: chapter titles are excluded from the count. numbers between square brackets refer to the occurrences of characters indicated in the Mozi zhuzi suoyin as being reconstructed. alternative characters are added in parentheses.

table 4 reveals three remarkable facts. first, only the “shang xian” and “shang tong” triplets display a clear correlation between the title and the use of the expression in the chapters. In the others there is hardly any correlation at all. second, as we saw with the expression tian zhi, there is remarkably little reference to these so-called “central dogmas” in the rest of the book: most titles occur only once elsewhere in the Mozi, namely in a fragment of chapter 49, “lu wen,” that will be discussed further on.65 a third remark is that the expression jian ai occurs slightly more often in the rest of the Mozi, but hardly in the triplet named after it.

on the basis of table 4, we are led to conclude that the authors of the Mozi were simply not aware of the “ten dogmas” of original Mohism or, at least, that they failed to give them the importance that we now attribute to them, except in “shang xian and “shang tong.” for the eight other trip-lets, the chapters themselves contain no strong clue as to why they carry precisely the titles they do.66 hence, we cannot exclude the possibility that the chapters were arranged into their current shape by someone who had

65 the expression jie zang occurs once in chapter 21, “Jie yong,” and the expression fei ming occurs twice in chapter 45, “xiao qu” 小取 (choosing the lesser).

66 Perhaps the fact that the phrases making up the titles do not appear in the text of the triplets can to some extent be explained by the nature of titles of philosophical writings, which are concise mottos as opposed to running text. e.g., while the expression ming gui is totally absent from the received Mozi, the terms gui and ming are discussed in relation to each other.


no idea that these expressions would come to represent Mozi’s thought and that they would be added as titles. for that reason, we believe it is worth trying to read these core chapters without the dominant influence of their titles. some advantages of this approach are that the reader carries weaker expectations concerning the unity of the chapter, that there is also more attention to the differences between the three chapters of a triplet, that there is no (possibly misleading) presupposition about the content of the chapter, and that one is more on the alert to the importance and recurrence of other expressions in the chapter.

Mohist Mottos

But the existence of the titles shows that there must have been a moment in the history of Mohism when the master’s ideas were thought of in terms of these relatively fixed expressions or mottos. one indication that the extant titles functioned as such short slogans is perhaps the occurrence of several “fei x” (against x) constructions: against military aggression ( fei gong), against music ( fei yue), against fatalism ( fei ming), and against the ru ( fei Ru).67 the use of fei 非 as a transitive verb “be against . . .” cor-responds to the characterization of the debates among masters in the late Warring states as “shi fei” 是非 (pro and contra), but it occurs more in the Mozi titles than in the running text.68 this seems to confirm their status as mottos or slogans summarizing the content of the chapters.

there is also one piece of textual evidence that Mohist thought at some point came to be closely identified with the ten expressions that now function as the titles of the core chapters: it occurs in “lu wen” 魯問, which records a conversation between Mozi and a disciple about what to expound first when meeting the lords of the four quarters.

子墨子游魏越, 曰:「既得見四方之君子則將先語？」子墨子曰:「凡入國, 必擇務而從事焉。國家昏亂, 則語之尚賢尚同; 國家貧, 則語之節用節葬, 國家說音湛湎, 則語之非樂非命; 國家淫辟無禮, 則語之尊天事鬼; 國家務奪侵凌, 則語之兼愛非攻。故69 曰擇務而從事焉。」

67 three of these titles are from chapters that are usually thought to be among the lat-est core chapters (“fei yue” and “fei ming”) or even to postdate them (“fei ru”). they may represent the increasing severity of the Mohist ideology. “fei gong,” however, is generally considered an early triplet.

68 about “pro and contra” or “right versus wrong” debates, see graham, Disputers of the Tao, 36, 167, 176–177; and the essay by chris fraser in this volume.

69 Gong 攻 and 故 do not occur in the daozang edition but are indicated as being restored in the Mozi zhuzi suoyin. hence, the oldest extant Mozi edition contains nine (and not ten) dogmas.


When our Master Mozi was traveling, Wei Yue asked: “having been granted an audience with the lords of the four quarters, what would you expound first?” our Master Mozi said, “Whenever you enter a state, you must select a task and work on it. If the state is in disorder, expound to them ‘elevating the worthy’ and ‘conforming upward’; if the state is impoverished, expound ‘moderation in expenditure’ and ‘moderation in burial’; if the state over-indulges in musical entertainment, expound ‘against music’ and ‘against fatalism’; if the state is dissolute and indecorous, expound ‘revering heaven’ and ‘serving ghosts’; if the state is devoted to aggression and intimidation, expound ‘inclusive care’ and ‘against military aggression.’ therefore, I say: select a task and work on it.” (49: 114/7–10)

this fragment tells us at least three things. first, in what sounds like a summary of Mozi’s political doctrine, fei Ru (非儒) does not occur; this provides further support for its rejection as a core chapter. the second piece of information concerns the possible dates of the core chapter titles. one cannot fail to notice that the political remedies ascribed here to Mozi correspond almost exactly to the titles of the ten core chapters except for the expressions zun tian 尊天 (revere heaven) and shi gui 事鬼 (serve the ghosts), which appear as tian zhi and ming gui in the titles. since this is the only fragment in the extant corpus of pre-Qin texts listing these ten slogans, it may have had some relation—as cause or result—to the creation of the titles. chris fraser dates the dialogues around the middle of the fourth century Bce, and taeko Brooks dates this particular chapter to 262 Bce.70 a third reflection inspired by this fragment is the question whether the expressions zun tian and shi gui would have provided more appropriate titles for the “tian zhi” and “Ming gui” triplets. the slogan zun tian occurs eight times in the Mozi but only once in the “Will of heaven” triplet (26: 43/11). It is always paired with shi gui (shen 神), an expression that occurs alone in three more instances but never in the extant “Ming gui” chapter.71 thus, from their occasional appearance in the book Mozi, we might postulate that the alternative expressions zun tian and shi gui

70 fraser, “Mohism,” see “supplement to Mohism: text and authorship”; a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 115.

71 In chapter 26, it occurs in the threefold statement about the ancient sage-kings: “In their work, they upward revered heaven, in the middle served the ghosts, and downward took care of men” 其事上尊天, 中事鬼神, 下愛人. In the other cases, the expression 尊天事鬼 is used (4: 5/1, 9: 12/22, 35: 59/7–8, 48: 107/27, 48: 111/7, 49: 111/23, and 49: 114/9).


were more widespread slogans in early Mohism than the actual chapter titles, but they hardly occur in the two relevant triplets either.72

as several contributions to this volume show, many topics from the core chapters are taken up in other parts of the Mozi. But, aside from this fragment from “lu wen,” there is little evidence of the emergence of the core chapter titles from mottos or fixed expressions representing Mohist thought.73 table 4 shows that these expressions do not often occur in the Mozi. their appearance together in clusters is even rarer, except for the unique fragment quoted above. there are three short and rather similar clusters to be found in the dialogues, which could attest to the emerging association of Mohism with some key ideas or mottos: revering heaven, serving ghosts, and caring for others. In “gongmeng,” for instance, gong-mengzi 公孟子 asks Mozi why confucius was never made son of heaven despite his broad knowledge of the classical heritage. Mozi explains that knowledge is not enough: “a wise person must revere heaven and serve the ghosts, care for others, and moderate expenditures. the combination of these makes one wise” 夫知者必尊天事鬼, 愛人節用。合焉為知矣 (48: 107/27). this answer clusters three slogans (zun tian and shi gui from the list in chapter 49, not the actual titles), one title “Jie yong,”74 and per-haps an echo of jian ai, namely ai ren 愛人. In the same chapter Mozi explains that he does not mind being accused of a lack of humanity (bu ren 不仁) as long as he is acknowledged as “revering heaven, serving the ghosts, and caring for others” 尊天事鬼愛人 (48: 111/7). here the master explicitly endorses the two slogans mentioned above, again followed by a possible echo of jian ai. a last fragment occurs in “lu wen,” where the lord of lu asks for assistance against the attacks by Qi. referring to the exem-plary rulers of the past, Mozi’s advice is as follows: “I wish that the lord would, upward, revere heaven and serve the ghosts and, downward, care for and benefit the people” 吾願主君之上者尊天事鬼,下者愛利百姓. he then continues with a longer list of concrete suggestions (49: 111/23). again, we have no more than the two slogans from the list in chapter 49, followed by a general instruction to care for the people.

72 It is striking that the ten mottos in this fragment, including zun tian and shi gui, can be understood as verb + object constructions. this is not the case for the actual title “tian zhi.”

73 for more about these Mohist mottos, see defoort, “do the ten Mohist theses rep-resent Mozi’s thought?”

74 as the Ics edition of Mozi zhuzi suoyin indicates, the original edition (= Daozang) had yong jie. apparently, Bi Yuan corrected this ‘mistake’ without leaving any comment.


even though the exact motto jian ai does not occur in these short clus-ters, there is always a mention of caring. taken together with the occa-sional appearance of jian ai in the whole book (see table 4), and including slightly variant expressions such as ai ren, jian xiang ai 兼相愛 (care for each other inclusively), and jian er ai 兼而愛 (caring inclusively), it some-what stands out among the ten early dogmas.75 even in the core chap-ters postdating the “Jian ai” triplet, the expression already occurs, usually paired with the two slogans found in the dialogues: “revere heaven” and “serve the ghosts.” In “shang xian, zhong,” for instance, the author claims that the sage-kings, “when ordering everybody in the world, inclusively cared for them all and hence benefited them, and also led all the peo-ple of the world to elevate and revere heaven and to serve the ghosts” 其為政乎天下也, 兼而愛之, 從而利之, 又率天下之萬民以尚尊天事鬼 (9: 12/21). therefore, they were rewarded and made sons of heaven. In one “tian zhi” chapter, the expression jian ai occurs no fewer than four times (28: 48/4 [twice], 28: 48/8, 28: 48/15) and in another “downward, loving others” 下愛人 complements the instruction to “revere heaven above and serve the ghosts in the middle” 上尊天中事鬼神 (26: 43/11). finally, in “fei ming, shang,” Mozi talks about the sage-kings “caring for all the people mutually and benefiting each other in interaction” (與其百姓兼相愛交相利, followed by the claim that they “led these people to thereby, revere heaven and serve the ghosts above” 率其百姓, 以上尊天事鬼 (35: 59/9).76

Moving from the core chapters postdating the “Jian ai” triplet toward the dialogues, jian ai becomes even more explicitly identified as a spe-cific Mohist ideal or slogan. Wumazi 巫馬子, for instance, confronts Mozi with the following claim:

子兼愛天下, 未云利也; 我不愛天下, 未云賊也。功皆未至, 子何獨自是而非我哉?

75 兼相愛 occurs 13 [+1] times in the book (three times in chapter 14, five times in chapter 15, twice [+1] in chapter 16, once in chapter 26, and twice in chapter 35); 兼而愛 occurs five times (twice in chapter 4, once in chapter 9, once in chapter 26, and once in chapter 28); 兼天下而愛 occurs twice (in chapter 27). see also sato, “the Idea to rule the World,” 38–40.

76 also, in “fa yi” it is said that the sage-kings “inclusively [cared for] all the people in the world and led them to revere heaven and serve the ghosts” 兼[愛]天下之百姓, 率以尊天事鬼 (4: 5/1), with the character ai 愛 restored by Bi Yuan “on the basis of the meaning.”


You inclusively care for everyone in the world but cannot quite be said to benefit them; I do not care about everyone but cannot quite be said to hurt them. since neither of us has had any effect, why do you consider yourself alone right and me wrong? (46: 100/20–21)

In the same chapter Wumazi also tells Mozi that in one respect he “dif-fers from the master, [since] he is not able to inclusively care for others” 我與子異, 我不能兼愛, explaining that he cares more for those who are located more in his own vicinity (46: 102/24). Mozi, in one of the dia-logues, speaks about his sense of justice ( yi 義) in terms of caring, which constitutes his “hooks and clamps”; at the end of the day, they are far superior to “the hooks and clamps used in naval battles” 舟戰之鉤強 (49: 115/18–19).

We tentatively conclude that the titles of the core chapters postdate the earliest construction of the chapters themselves and even most of the received Mozi. In only two triplets, “shang xian” and “shang tong,” did the authors probably finalize the text in full knowledge of their titles. In the other core chapters it is difficult to understand why they would have constructed a text (possibly from older fragments) or rewritten it without making any reference to the slogan or motto that was chosen as title. It is also striking that the rest of the Mozi hardly shows awareness of these mottos, even of the expressions shang xian and shang tong. there is, however, an emerging identification in the book of a Master Mozi’s thought with fixed expressions or mottos. the oldest seems to have been “care (for all),” joined by two expressions—“revering heaven” and “serv-ing ghosts”—which for some reason were not chosen as chapter titles. the unique fragment in “lu wen” is the only testimony in Warring states texts identifying Mozi’s core ideas with ten (or nine) mottos that are very close to the current core chapter titles. But uncertainty about its date leaves many hypotheses open.77 other questions that remain unresolved concern when these titles were added, why they were chosen (especially in the case of “tian zhi” and “Ming gui,” since alternatives were circulat-ing), and how they relate to the threefold structure of the triplets. as was the case with the two previous basic assumptions, we do not claim to have firmly proven an alternative view (there is not enough evidence to do this), but we believe in the methodological value of approaching titles

77 a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician ethical chapters,” 115, believes that “the triplet chap-ters had been rounded off, and the Mician doctrines officially fixed at ten” somewhat before 262 Bce.


critically. the point we want to get across is that disregarding the titles of the core chapters (and probably of many other chapters of early chinese texts) is not only reasonable but also fruitful for a fresh interpretation of the text. a title both leads and misleads the reader; it should not remain a shackle by which all past and future interpretations are held captive.

Parts and Characteristics of this Volume

Most of the essays in this volume originated in presentations at the work-shop “the Many faces of Mozi: a synchronic and diachronic study of Mohist thought” (leuven, 2009);78 others were originally presented at the workshop “argument and Persuasion in ancient chinese texts” (leuven, 2005);79 and several of them were developed during monthly seminars with colleagues from the netherlands on the textual nature of the Mozi (leuven, 2002–2005).80 the three basic methodological assumptions—the focus on the text itself, understanding the differences among the chapters as reflecting evolution over time rather than Mohist sectarian differences, and the temporary disregard for the chapter titles—informed the basis of our selection. We have also asked the authors to rewrite their contri-butions with these assumptions in mind. the seven studies are mostly arranged in what we believe is the chronological order of the Mozi chap-ters that they discuss.

each of the first three essays focuses on one triplet. the first essay con-centrates on the “Jian ai” (Inclusive care) triplet (chapters 14–16). carine defoort asks the basic question: do these three chapters really concern the topic of “universal love” or “inclusive care”? she discerns an ever-increasing radicalization of moral demands in the triplet: first, “caring for oneself ” is rejected in favor of “caring for each other” in relationships of

78 three papers focusing on Mohist influence in late Zhou and han were published in oriens Extremus 48 (2009): nylan, “Kongzi and Mozi, the classicists (ru 儒) and the Mohists (Mo 墨) in classical-era thinking”; sato, “the Idea to rule the World”; and gentz, “Mohist traces in the Chunqiu fanlu.” two papers were published in chinese: guo, “ru Mo liang jia zhi ‘xiao,’ ‘san nian zhi sang’ yu ‘ai’ de qubie yu zhenglun”; and ding sixin, “Moyu chengpian shidai kaozheng ji qi Mojia guishen guan yanjiu.” they were both translated in Contemporary Chinese Thought 42.4 (2011).

79 three papers on Mozi were published in oriens Extremus 45 (2005–2006): defoort, “the growing scope of Jian 兼”; loy, “on a Gedankenexperiment in the Mozi core chap-ters”; and desmet, “the growth of compounds in the core chapters of the Mozi.”

80 the participants in these seminars were carine defoort, Karen desmet, dirk Meyer, nicolas standaert, Karel van der leeuw, and Paul van els.


reciprocity (chapter 14); then the scope is gradually broadened from one’s familial or political in-group to include others, by “inclusively caring for each other and mutually benefiting each other” jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li 兼相愛, 交相利 (chapter 15); finally, with the advice to “replace exclusive-ness with inclusiveness” (chapter 16), the ideal of jian ai slowly emerges, but its full-fledged promotion takes shape only later. defoort then turns to the somewhat later triplet the “Will of heaven” (chapters 26–28), in which the expression jian ai occurs more often than in the chapters that have the motto in their title. In this triplet the emergence of the model of heaven leads to an unconditional type of caring for everybody else, ultimately without any expectation of reward. defoort thus shows that one of the core concepts attributed to Mohist thought underwent an evolution of which only the beginning can be observed in the “Jian ai” triplet.

another way of observing variation can be found in the “fei gong” (against Military aggression) triplet (chapters 17–19), which is the topic of the second essay in this volume. Instead of treating these three chap-ters as one homogeneous unit, Paul van els asks another basic question: what are the differences between them? his starting point is that each “fei gong” chapter displays a remarkable conceptual coherence and clear argumentation, which indicates that it forms a closed textual unit in the eyes of whoever created its received version, be it Mozi, his followers, or later editors. then, van els searches for conceptual differences between the chapters and discerns three types of arguments against aggressive war-fare. chapter 17 approaches warfare from the angle of morality, which van els calls the “moral argument.” chapter 18 is all about counting and cal-culating, as it quantifies the costs and benefits of a military campaign: the “economic argument.” chapter 19 speaks of ghosts and spirits and repeat-edly claims that warfare harms the interests of heaven, which van els calls the “religious argument.” In sum, the analysis of these core chapters shows that the Mohists did not uphold just one argument against military aggression but instead actively pursued different lines of argumentation, possibly to persuade different audiences.

the third study concentrates on Mozi 31, which is the only extant chapter of the “Ming gui” (explaining ghosts) triplet and which is sup-posed to represent the Mohist view on spirits. the basic question asked by roel sterckx is whether there is one clear Mohist view on the issue. sterckx shows that the absence of two out of the possibly three original chapters forming the “Ming gui” triplet does not prevent us from pictur-ing a more polyphonic Mohist view of the spirit world. first, he under-takes a close reading of units at the subchapter level, then he compares


them with passages in the other core chapters and the dialogues, and finally he introduces a chu bamboo-slip manuscript on ghosts and spir-its that is now housed at the shanghai Museum. sterckx’s analysis sug-gests that Mohist views on spirits evolved or, at least, diversified across the received Mozi text. some Mohists, for instance, were skeptical about the prescience of the spirit world, although that was a firm belief of Mozi. the philosophical issue of the “existence” of ghosts and spirits, on the one hand, and the more pragmatically inspired question of whether they were capable of punishing and rewarding, on the other hand, were seen as separate issues.

the fourth essay in this volume functions as a transition between the discussion of the core chapters in the first three studies and the dia-logues and opening chapters in the last three. Its focus is the notion of the exemplary past in the core chapters, a notion that was central to the development of chinese traditions of thought. Miranda Brown won-ders what role the Mohists played in shaping it. her starting point is the observation that there are numerous appeals to ancient sages (sheng 聖) and sage-kings (sheng wang 聖王) in the Mozi, while there is a paucity of references to the compound “sage-king” in what she identifies as the pre-Mohist corpus. she compares the vocabulary and rhetorical strate-gies of the Mohist core with other early chinese texts, while also pay-ing attention to the differences between the various strata of the Mozi. she concludes that the Mohist view of the ancient rulers differed from that found in earlier works: while the early Mohists were not the first to make appeals to past rulers, they nevertheless played a role in creating the image of the three dynasties as a golden age with reference to a full set of exemplary kings: Yao 堯, shun 舜, Yu 禹, tang 湯, KingWen 文王, and King Wu 武王. such a vision, Brown argues, was motivated largely by rhetorical necessity: invocations of the sage-kings bolstered, rather than undermined, the Mohist attack on aristocratic traditions. the investiga-tion of this idea of wise rulers within and without the Mozi reveals how this central notion in the chinese tradition was shaped by the Mohists.

While the next contribution concentrates on the dialogues, it does not leave the core chapters behind. chris fraser’s essay argues that the ethics of the dialogues is largely consistent with the middle and late stratum of the core chapters, but that the dialogues also developed new ethical ideas. tracing evolutions in Mohist thought, fraser presents four important exten-sions of older Mohist ethical ideas. first, the dialogues further develop the Mohist conception of morality as norms that can be promulgated through statements or teachings and that lead to beneficial, self-consistent


consequences if “constantly” followed by all people. second, they pres-ent a series of views on moral worth that tie it to the agents’ character and intentions. third, they develop the Mohist view of moral motivation and indicate how the Mohists might approach issues related to weakness of will. and finally, they also set forth a more radical ideal of personal sagehood. on the whole, fraser concludes, the dialogues present a more demanding conception of the moral life than the triplets do.

later evolutions in Mohist thought can also be found in the opening chapters, which are the subject of the last two studies in this volume, again in connection with the core chapters. hui-chieh loy analyzes “Qin shi” (Intimacy with officers), which is the first chapter in the received Mozi. It has often been considered either a mere appendix to the core chapters, specifically, the “shang xian” (elevate the Worthy) triplet, or even a non-Mohist essay. and although the ideas in this chapter are akin to counsels found in “shang xian,” questions remain as to how these chap-ters relate to each other. does “Qin shi” simply repeat—briefly or with elaboration—the points made in one or more of the “shang xian chap-ters? or does it contradict, go beyond, or qualify the latter? By pointing at various differences, hui-chieh loy argues that “Qin shi” improves upon “shang xian” in the sense that it provides a more sophisticated construc-tion of the motivations that worthies have to enter government service. If in “shang xian” worthies are portrayed as motivated by a somewhat mercenary pursuit of wealth, honor, and power, in “Qin shi” they are pre-sented as acting from apparently nobler motivations.

the final essay in this book takes “fa yi” (standards and norms) as its starting point. commonly presented as a “summary” of the “tian zhi” chapters, it portrays heaven in close relation to the idea of a “standard.” Which stage in Mohist thought does this chapter represent? What evolu-tion is there in the Mozi concerning the relationship between tian and fa? By analyzing the similarities and differences with the core chapters, nicolas standaert argues that “fa yi” may have been one point in an evolu-tion of the Mohist doctrine, not necessarily the final one. In the course of the book Mozi there is a growing need for certainty and for a foundation of the core ideas. the analogy with artisan tools, such as the compass and square, is an expression of this need. consequently, the instruments of the artisan are taken as a metaphor for the use of standards in human behavior: the rather abstract fa 法 (such as “inclusive care of each other and mutual benefit to each other”) and the more concrete standards (such as the “ancient sage-kings”) are all supposed to function in the same way:


objectively, measurably, and infallibly. the ultimate standard is heaven, an idea that appears in “fa yi” as well as in the late core chapters.

despite the methodological connections and shared interest of these seven contributions, they can also be read separately. this explains why each essay contains some basic information that may appear repetitious but allows the reader to freely determine the order of reading the contri-butions. as for the Mozi text, though various editions have been consulted, such as those by sun Yirang and by Wu Yujiang 吳毓江, all fragments are quoted using the chinese text in d. c. lau’s Mozi zhuzi suoyin 墨子逐字索引 (A Concordance to the “Mozi” ).81 all references to Mozi fragments are to this edition; the chapter number is given first, followed by a colon and then the page number and line number separated by a slash—for example, 16: 29/2. We have followed the editors’ reconstructions except where indicated otherwise. When we count the number of times terms appear in the Mozi, we explicitly indicate reconstructions marked by the Ics editors. although we have consulted one or more existing translations, such as those by Mei Yi-pao (from 1929), Burton Watson (from 1963), and Ian Johnston (from 2010), the translations are by the authors themselves except where indicated otherwise. for other primary sources, the original chinese text is not quoted and we only refer to the chapter, except when specific fragments are commonly recognized by a number (e.g., Lunyu, 1.2, Laozi, 24, and Mengzi 3a9).

Acknowledgements

like the chapters in the book Mozi, the studies in this volume went through at least three different versions. at each stage different audiences and “opponents” shaped the content and sharpened the arguments. the first versions of most papers were submitted to the workshop “the Many faces of Mozi: a synchronic and diachronic study of Mohist thought.” We are grateful to the chiang ching-kuo foundation for International scholarly exchange for supporting this workshop as well as the publi-cation of the papers in the present volume, and to the participants for engaging in the debate and thereby forcing us to rethink our arguments. aside from the contributors to this volume, these participants included

81 Mozi zhuzi suoyin 墨子逐字索引, edited by d. c. lau, Ics ancient chinese texts concordance series 41 (hong Kong: commercial Press, 2001).


ding sixin, Joachim gentz, guo Qiyong, roman Malek, Michael nylan, Michael Puett, sato Masayuki, shun Kwong-loi, hashimoto sumiya, Mar-tin svensson, and Zeng hantang. the second versions of the essays and the introduction were discussed in two seminars that took place in leuven in the spring of 2010 and 2011. We thank Karen desmet, annick gijsbers, Burchard Mansvelt Beck, Paul van els, griet Vankeerberghen, and sara Vantournhout for their critical reading. the third version of the chapters was submitted to the careful copyediting of Pamela J. Bruton. In addition we thank els ameloot, lee ting-mien, and lise Merken for their multiple contributions in efficaciously finalizing the manuscript. We also thank Martin Kern for his critical comments on the almost final manuscript. unlike the editors of Mozi’s core chapters, we decided not to publish the three different versions of the various papers, a decision for which we are sure the readers will thank us.

support for the Mozi project at the university of leuven was gener-ously provided by fWo-Vlaanderen. We want to thank the contributors of this volume for their stimulating papers and patient response to vari-ous comments. and finally, we express our gratitude to all the old and new friends we encountered through the study of the Mozi, above all Watanabe takashi, angus graham, and roman Malek. they shared our enthusiasm, shaped our arguments, caused evolution in our own think-ing, and encouraged us to pursue the investigation of this important but often neglected ancient master. We hope that this volume may further stimulate the discovery of other voices and faces of master Mo.

Are the three “JiAn Ai” ChApters About universAl love?*

Carine Defoort

Jian ai 兼爱, which has been variously translated as “universal love,” “impartial caring,” “concern for everyone,” “inclusive care,” “co-love,” and “allumfassende liebe,”1 is more than just one among the ten central dogmas of early Mohism: it is generally considered the heart of Mozi’s thought, the very core of the so-called Core Chapters. Almost every expo-sition of Mohist philosophy begins with a claim to the effect that jian ai is “the corner-stone of the system,” “Mozi’s core and quintessence,” its “unifying principle of morality,” the “center of Mohism,” the “heart of their ethics,” a “startling, original, and even revolutionary concept,” generally opposed to the ru view of “graded love.”2 hence the three consecutive chapters titled “Jian ai” in the Mozi (chapters 14, 15, and 16) are considered crucially important. the very simple question of this essay may therefore be somewhat surprising: do these three chapters really concern the topic of “universal love”? this question can be conveniently divided into two stages: first, do they really discuss jian ai, as their titles suggest? And sec-ond, does the Chinese expression mean “universal love”? by focusing on the former question, this contribution reshapes the formulation and rel-evance of the latter one.

since the Mohist view on jian ai has always been illustrated with quota-tions from the “Jian ai” triplet, the former question may come as a surprise. in this essay i argue that these three Core Chapters do not yet discuss jian ai but provide steps toward its formulation. this conviction makes the second

* this chapter is a further elaboration of the ideas presented in Defoort, “the Growing scope of Jian 兼.”

1 For a detailed discussion of the meaning of jian, see schumacher, “An outline of the evolution of the Concept of Jian 兼 in Mohism,” 3–12. see also Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 41; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” xliii–xliv. sato, “the idea to rule the World,” 39, has recently suggested translating jian ai as “Kingly love for all.” even though jian ai is indeed first of all (but not exclusively) meant for rulers, that does not warrant such an overly specific translation of the expression.

2 these quotes are, respectively, from Forke, Mê Ti, 82, about “den eckpfeiler des sys-tems”; tan Jiajian, Mozi yanjiu, 35; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 41; Ding Weixiang, “Mojia jian ai guan de yanbian,” 70; Fraser, “Mohism”; and Watson, Mo-tzu, Basic Writings, 10. see also Zheng Jiewen, Zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 14.

36 carine defoort

question somewhat irrelevant, at least in relation to this particular triplet, since the expression jian ai occurs only once in the whole triplet and thus needs no consistent translation there.3 but the terms jian and ai do occur separately in all three chapters: ai in itself remains uncontested by oppo-nents in the triplet and will be translated as “care” or “caring,” thereby referring to actions (take care of) as well as feelings (care for).4 the term jian, however, is new and contested almost as soon as it enters the argu-ment. Considering its novelty and sensitivity, i shall translate it flexibly, moving from “inclusive” toward “impartial” as jian gradually gains shape throughout these three and some other Core Chapters. the evolution that i will trace throughout these chapters could be the reflection of changing responses to the criticism of opponents or the result of a radicalization in the internal dynamics of early Mohist thought.

While not denying an important degree of similarity among chapters 14, 15, and 16 of the Mozi, i shall highlight the differences and thus concen-trate on those views and arguments that are usually overlooked. i argue that, strictly speaking, the three chapters do not focus on the concept of jian ai and that the titles, which were added somewhat later, have steered our reading in a particular direction. this essay thus starts by temporarily ignoring the titles of the triplet (in the first two sections); then it works its way through the three chapters separately (in the following three sec-tions) and concludes with a tentative understanding of the concept of jian ai (in the last section) as it appears in the Core Chapters of the Mozi. to clarify the argument, a chart of the structure of the three chapters is appended to this essay.

Beyond the Title “Jian ai”

one of the main reasons prompting almost all scholars to treat the three “Jian ai” chapters as equal in philosophical content is their identical titles.5

3 the earliest triplet where the expression jian ai occurs more often is the “Will of heaven” (chapters 26–28). see below.

4 Johnston, The “Mozi,” xliii–xliv, agrees with James legge, who, in 1861, did “not know how to render it better than by ‘universal love.’ ” see legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 2, 104 n. 4. see also lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 93.

5 see, e.g., legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 2, 103–126; liang Qichao, Mozi xue’an, 15–26; tan Jiajian, Mozi yanjiu, 35–58; Xue bocheng, Mojia sixiang xintan, 11–28; Qi Wen and li Guangxing, Mozi shi jiang, 278–285; Fung, A History of Chinese Philosophy, 76–105; schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 135–172; and han lianqi, Xian Qin liang Han shi

are the three “jian ai” chapters about universal love? 37

We know, however, that titles in Warring states sources were usually added later and not invented by their earliest author(s), let alone by the master to whom the ideas were ascribed.6 the titles of the Core Chapters of the Mozi are not derived from their first important words or from the main concepts in the chapters; in fact, the mottos used as chapter titles often do not appear in the chapters at all.7 in the whole “Jian ai” triplet, the expres-sion jian ai occurs only once: in the last chapter (16: 29/2), in a reflection on King Wen’s attitude as described in a quotation from the “Grand oath” 泰誓.8 While it is not totally clear when and by whom the chapter titles were chosen, or to what extent the editor determined the shape of the current book, the titles seem designed to indicate the central tenet of the different chapters of each triplet.9 they may have been added after or around the formation of chapter 49, “lu wen” 魯問 (lu’s Questions), in which Mozi’s doctrines are described on the basis of ten expressions that largely coincide with the titles of the Core Chapters.10

in an attempt to read the Mozi without being distracted by a later editor’s choice of titles, i have provided the three “Jian ai” chapters with different working titles on the basis of their content: “Caring for each other” (xiang ai 相愛) for chapter 14, “inclusively Caring for each other, Mutually ben-efiting each other” ( jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li 兼相愛, 交相利) for chap-ter 15, and “With inclusiveness replace exclusiveness” ( jian yi yi bie 兼以易別) for chapter 16. only after the completion of these three chapters, i argue, did the motto jian ai come to represent their thought. in this essay, the three chapters are temporarily freed from their anachronistic title and

luncong, 298–321. some scholars, such as lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 92, 94, notice the differences but dismiss their relevance. the scholars mentioned below in this essay are counterexamples to this general current.

6 since i do not know who these authors were, i will alternatingly attribute the words to “Mozi,” “the author(s),” or “the Mohist(s),” without thereby trying to pinpoint the person(s) behind the text.

7 For more about the titles, see Yu Jiaxi, Muluxue fahui, 200–204; and lin Qingyuan, Jiandu boshu biaoti geshi yanjiu, 7–9, 48–50, discussed in the introduction of this volume.

8 For an interpretation of this passage, see below. 9 Graham presumes that the editors were liu Xiang 劉向 and liu Xin 劉歆 of the

han. see Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 17. this idea was proposed by sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 653.

10 in a conversation between Mozi and Wei Yue (49: 114/8–10), Mozi advises shang xian 尚賢 and shang tong 尚同 to order a state, jie yong 節用 and jie zang 節葬 to enrich the state, fei yue 非樂 and fei ming 非命 to prevent debauchery, zun tian 尊天 and shi gui 事鬼 (neither is the literal title of the respective triplet) to prevent wantonness, and jian ai 兼愛 and fei gong 非攻 to prevent military invasions. see also the introduction to the present volume.

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allowed to make their point separately, a point that does not totally coin-cide with “universal care” but rather marks steps in that direction.11 i shall show that an evolution of increasing radicalization in moral demands can be traced from chapter 14, through chapters 15 and 16, and continuing in the triplet “tian zhi” (Will of heaven; chapters 26, 27, and 28).12

Ding Weixiang 丁为祥 is somewhat unique among Chinese schol-ars for having highlighted the differences between the three chapters and traced an evolution from chapters 14 to 16. however, his views are radically opposite to what i shall try to establish. he believes that the most original Mohist stance contained the challenging idea of “universal love” ( jian ai), which amounted to a radical self-sacrifice for the benefit of everyone and a strong opposition to other trends of thought such as those of the ru and Yang Zhu 楊朱, known as the defender of individual-ism or egoism (wei wo 為我). later this ideal was tempered, according to Ding, as Mohism became a school that adapted to current values—hence the addition of reciprocity ( jian xiang ai 兼相爱) and utilitarian motives (li 利). other scholars who have noticed the differences between the three “Jian ai” chapters also tend to interpret them in terms of compromise or adaptation.13 i shall argue, however, that Mohism did not start off in a con-frontational manner—although some contemporaries may have found it quite challenging—but became more specific and demanding over time. As we shall see, the idea of self-sacrifice and unidirectional concern for the weak and poor is absent from chapter 14 but most clearly present in chapter 16, which is why, for this triplet at least, the evolution cannot be characterized as one of compromise or dilution.

11 For similar and other evolutions traced in the three “Jian ai” chapters, see Yoshinaga shinjirō, Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū, 77–78, 106–108; Fraser, “Doctrinal Developments in MZ 14–16;” schumacher, “An outline of the evolution of the Concept of Jian 兼 in Mohism,” 12–19; and A. taeko brooks, “Mwòdž 14–16 兼愛 ‘universal love.’ ”

12 Japanese scholars have indicated the link between the “inclusive Care” and “Will of heaven” triplets. see e.g. Yoshinaga shinjirō, Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū, 96, 106. sakai Kazu-taka, “Makki boku no ken’ai shisō,” 101–105 further includes the “Fa yi” chapter.

13 see Ding Weixiang, “Mojia jian ai guan de yanbian.” A. taeko brooks, “the Mician ethical Chapters,” 111, sees the Mohists as moving “from outside critics to inside mem-bers of the system . . ., mak[ing] peace with its intrinsic war aims, and cop[ing] with the increasingly harsh conditions which apply to all who serve the state.” see also Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 24; Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 35–36. Yoshinaga shinjirō, Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū, 77–78, 106 sees Mozi’s own moral view translated in an ever more political and utilitarian political strategy. sakai Kazutaka, “Makki boku no ken’ai shisō,” 101–105 traces an evolution from “care” toward “benefit.” Japanese scholarship has been very attentive to differences and evolutions within the triplets.


to present the three “Jian ai” chapters as different and consecutive steps within one line of thought, i shall first summarize previous research on the structure of the triplet chapters, with an emphasis on the nature of this particular triplet.

The Structure of the “Jian ai” Triplet

the threefold structure of the Mozi’s Core Chapters has long been a source of speculation. From the Qing dynasty onward, scholars have identified consistent differences among the triplet chapters—not necessarily along the divisions shang, zhong, and xia—on the basis of variation in particle use, vocabulary, fixed formulas, rhetoric, style, references to authority, use of logic, or intellectual content. two major lines of interpretation are the “three-sects theory” versus the “sequence/evolution theory.”14

Angus C. Graham believed that the differences are best explained by reference to three regionally distinguished, relatively contemporary, and competing sects. on the basis of linguistic and philosophical differences, he identified them as (1) the “purists” in north China, who defended the doctrine against rival thinkers, also called the Y group because of their use of the particle yu 於; (2) the “Compromising,” who were also from the north but adapted the doctrine to the ideology of the state, also called the h group because of their use of hu 乎 as postverbal particle instead of yu 於; (3) and, finally, the “reactionary” in the south, who adapted even more to the political situation, identified as the J group because of their use of the particle ran 然 (in Wade Giles jan) following the title of a quoted source.

When applied to the “Jian ai” triplet, Graham’s hypothesis of regional diversity and doctrinal opposition boils down to the following picture: chapter 15, or “Jian ai, zhong,” belongs to Y and defends the philoso-phy’s theoretical purity against rival thinkers; chapter 16, or “Jian ai, xia,” belongs to h and proposes a “watered-down” version that was acceptable to the politicians in power.15 because chapter 14, “Jian ai, shang,” does not contain characteristics of J, nor does it further adapt the doctrine to

14 see the introduction of the present volume. For an overview of various views, see e.g. Desmet, “the Growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi,” 99–104; and Ding sixin, “A study on the Dating of the Mo Zi Dialogues and the Mohist view of Ghosts and spirits,” 39–51.

15 see Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 24.

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(southern) political demands, it does not fit into the scheme. its brevity, its simplicity, and the absence of certain formulas suggest to Graham that this chapter is a later digest of the Mohist doctrine of “concern for every-one,” added by the editor in the place of an older, lost J chapter.16 the explanation of the Core Chapters in terms of the “three-sects theory” has been widely accepted, whether or not in the form defended by Graham.17

other scholars before and after Angus Graham, such as Watanabe takashi 渡邊卓, helwig schmidt-Glintzer, A. taeko brooks, Chris Fraser, Yoshinaga shinjirō 吉永真二郎, and Ding Weixiang, explain the differ-ences within the triplets by postulating a chronological evolution rather than synchronic alternative stances, but not necessarily along the origi-nal order of the shang, zhong, and xia chapters. this evolution, which, according to A. taeko brooks, took place from ca. 390 to ca. 273 bCe, may later have been followed by a division of the Mohist school, but that is irrelevant to the structure of the triplets.18 like brooks, Fraser believes that the three “Jian ai” chapters, in their traditional order, represent the evolution of a relatively early and central idea in Mohism.19

this outline of the two current major views on the structure of the Mohist Core Chapters in general and of the “Jian ai” triplet in particular, suffices as a background for the interpretation of these three chapters pre-sented below. Although the hypotheses of regional diversity and chrono-logical evolution do not necessarily exclude each other, my reading of this triplet in general supports the evolutionary interpretation and more spe-cifically rejects Graham’s two major claims concerning this triplet. First i believe that chapter 14, “Jian ai, shang,” is probably not a later digest but

16 see ibid., 20–27; and Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 36. Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 28, explicitly sets aside questions of dating; he focuses on particles, first quota-tion formulas, introductory and concluding formulas, and only then looks at differences in thought.

17 see Graham, Disputers of the Tao, 51. A convinced follower of Graham’s three-sects theory is Maeder, “some observations on the Composition of the ‘Core Chapters’ of the Mozi,” 44, 47, 54–55, 75–76, 82. see also schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 137–138; hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 99; tong shuye, Xian Qin qi zi sixiang yanjiu, 59; lewis, Writing and Authority, 59; Xinyi Mozi duben, 5.

18 see A. taeko brooks, “the Mician ethical Chapters,” 117. she dates chapter 14 to ca. 386 bCe, chapter 15 to ca. 342 bCe, and chapter 16 to ca. 310 bCe. Watanabe takashi sees the evolution of the Core Chapters as taking place over a much longer time span, from the early fourth century bCe till the Qin dynasty. see Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 2.

19 see Fraser, “Mohism,” see supplement. i agree with Watanabe takashi in not respect-ing the chronological order of the shang, zhong, and xia chapters in some Core Chapters. see the introduction to the present volume.


an early step in the reasoning toward “universal care.” second, the politi-cally more compromising stance of chapter 16 as compared to chapter 15 is not the major difference between them. For this triplet at least, Gra-ham’s labels of “purist” and “Compromising” are not warranted.

As for the first point, others have argued that chapter 14 could very well be the first, or “original,” of the three chapters, rather than a later summary.20 there are indications of a gradual evolution from shang via zhong to xia, at least in this triplet. throughout the three chapters, the argumentation becomes richer, the objections become more varied and specific, and the answers become better supported by narratives, quota-tions, theories, or analysis of technical concepts such as “inclusive, uni-versal” ( jian 兼), “exclusive, partial” (bie 別), “distinguishing terms” ( fen ming 分名), “right versus wrong” (shi fei 是非), and “category” (lei 類). Although many of these and other characteristics are closely intercon-nected, one could tentatively unravel them as different aspects of a pos-sible evolution.

First, comparing the atmosphere in the consecutive chapters, one notices diminishing optimism and growing impatience: chapter still expresses confidence that order can be brought about by the sage who follows the Mohist advice; chapter 15 voices concern about the current situation; while chapter 16 complains about more and worse disasters in the world. the growing impatience with opponents is reflected in the increasing use of bi 必 indicating the “necessary” or “inevitable” steps of sound reasoning that, according to the author, one should make.21 A sec-ond aspect of the evolution, analogous with the first, concerns the critics who are mentioned: none in chapter 14; the scholarly gentlemen (once 天下之士, 15: 25/19, and once 天下之士君子, 15: 26/14) in chapter 15; and in chapter 16 the stubborn “critics of jian in the world” 天下之士非兼者 (16: 27/28), those “who have all heard of jian but reject it” 皆聞兼而非之 (16: 29/15) and whose objections “still don’t stop” 猶未止也 (16: 28/12). third, and not surprisingly, the objections of these critics also increase in number and seriousness. While none are reported in chapter 14,

20 see, e.g., Fraser, “Mohism,” see supplement; and A. taeko brooks, “the Fragment theory of MZ 14, 17 and 20,” 120.

21 there is no occurrence of bi 必 (must, necessarily) in chapter 14, thirteen occur-rences in chapter 15, and twenty-seven in chapter 16. it occurs, not in the narratives or in the quotations, but in the arguments, in which the point is made either that something inevitably results from a certain cause or that a certain answer to a (didactic) question is inevitably right (bi yue 必曰, in chapter 16). this increasing use of bi in the argumentation may indicate development toward the later Mohist focus on argumentation.

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those in chapter 15 question the applicability of jian. so do four out of the five objections in chapter 16 (e.g., “how could it be used?” 豈可用哉, 16: 27/28). Mozi is said to reply impatiently that “if it were not appli-cable, even i would object to it” 用而不可, 雖我亦將非之 (16: 27/29). one objection in chapter 16 goes so far as to question the very value of “inclusiveness,” not just its applicability, by opposing it to the duties of a filial (xiao 孝) son. Along with this growing opposition comes a fourth and more complex evolution, namely in the increasing types of defense or argumentation. the plain argument of chapter 14 is supported in chapter 15 by well-known stories and model figures (with one quotation) indicat-ing the feasibility of the Mohist project; in chapter 16 the views are further supported by five quotations from authoritative sources and explicitly attributed to the exemplary figures mentioned in them. For example:

雖子墨子之所謂兼者, 於湯取法焉.

even what our Master Mozi calls “inclusive” is derived from the model of tang. (16: 29/10–11)

A fifth aspect of the evolution could be called rhetorical: while chapter 14 is one piece of monologue, chapters 15 and 16 make use of didactic ques-tions and answers, like a catechism in which purely hypothetical alterna-tives are posed, reflections on good reasoning are presented, and technical vocabulary is stipulated.

Admittedly, none of these characteristics, even when combined, is totally conclusive in the rejection of Graham’s theory, since the absence in chapter 14 of seemingly later characteristics could be determined by the style or decision of later authors. but this possibility, we will see, is much further from being proven convincingly. three more arguments in favor of the evolution theory relate to the similarities and differences between the three chapters. First, it is generally known that the three “Jian ai” chapters share ideas, vocabulary, and sentences. unique similarities exist between chapters 14 and 15, on the one hand, and between chapters 15 and 16, on the other, but there are almost none between chapters 14 and 16.22 this strongly suggests that chapter 15 made use of some written or remem-bered version of chapter 14, adding arguments and narratives to support the central idea; and that chapter 16 did the same with chapter 15, again

22 the sole exception is the use of the verb luan 亂 (to disrupt) in a parallel passage in chapters 14 and 16, where chapter 15 uses cuan 篡 (to usurp). the latter also occurs in a parallel passage in “tianzhi, shang,” which in various other ways parallels chapter 15. see Mozi 26: 43/26, 26: 43/28.


supplementing reflections, arguments, objections, and responses as the authors found necessary in the context of their time. thus, while further elaborating upon each other, the chapters increased in length, each dou-bling the previous one in number of characters.23 in Graham’s alterna-tive the later writer of chapter 14 would have made a summary of only chapter 15 without any indication of knowing the content of the best-developed arguments in the last chapter. A second indication of the chronological priority of chapter 14 could be the fact that, while increas-ing tension may have caused objections and responses to increase, some arguments seem to have disappeared, perhaps because they were consid-ered generally accepted and not disputed by opponents. For instance, the first chapter argues at length that political chaos should be handled by the sage just as a disease is treated by a doctor, namely through diagnosis and remedy: like a doctor, the sage has to find the cause of chaos and suggest a solution. this argument does not occur in chapter 15 or chapter 16, but the medical analogy is taken for granted: it is simply used without any explicit legitimation. if chapter 14 were a later summary of chapter 15 (and perhaps of chapter 16), it would be difficult to explain why it starts out by arguing a point that the other authors briefly apply and that nobody, as far as we can tell, ever calls into question. And a third indication of the prior-ity of chapter 14 is that the four cases of chaos mentioned in the first half of this chapter appear in a reversed order not only at the end of the same chapter but also in the whole of chapters 15 and 16. As will be illustrated in the next section when discussing the argument of the chapter, these differences suggest that a reversal, made for good reasons in chapter 14, was retained throughout the two following chapters.24

the final argument in favor of the chronological priority of chapter 14 concerns the second point of disagreement with Graham, namely on the characterization of the different chapters of the triplet. Connected with the changing atmosphere, the critics and their criticism, the arguments and

23 According to A. taeko brooks, “Mwòdž 14–16 兼愛 ‘universal love,’ ” 129–130, chap-ter 14 has 585 words, chapter 15 has 1,312 words, and chapter 16 has 2,716 words. this means a progression at the ratio of 1:2:4.

24 For more proof of this evolution, see Desmet, “the Growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi.” erik Maeder, in “some observations on the Composition of the ‘Core Chapters’ of the Mozi,” considers Graham’s identification of some later “Digests” as one “of the most important results of Graham’s work” (39), and he also indicates: “Atten-tion to pattern is dominant in all three ‘Digest’ chapters . . ., reaching its seeming perfec-tion in chapter 14” (55). but he does not give any extra argument in relation to chapter 14, neither for its status as a later digest nor for his more general claim that the basic unit of the chapter is the “paragraph.”

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rhetoric, there is a subtle evolution in the content of the three chapters, which is not well captured in the labels “later digest” (chapter 14), “purist” (Y, chapter 15), and “Compromising” (h, chapter 16). Graham’s arguments in relation to this particular triplet are rather thin. As for chapter 14, he believes that the “central importance of universal love in Mohism makes it incredible that ch. 14 . . . can be one of the authoritative statements of the doctrine,” because it is short, lacks quotations as well as answers to objections, has few parallels with chapters in the same triplet, and lacks attributions to Mozi (except for one mention in the conclusion).25 As for Graham’s characterization of the two other chapters, his only and indi-rect argument is that chapter 15 addresses “rival thinkers who question the doctrine of universal love,” presumably the officers (shi 士) or officer-gentlemen (shi junzi 士君子),26 while chapter 16 addresses princes and men of state and hence is more political in nature. Graham does not quote any example to support his case, but there is exactly one occur-rence of “kings, dukes, great men” 王公大人 in the conclusion of chapter 16 (30/7). the more common opponents in chapter 16 are “those among the officers of the world who reject it [ jian],” and their criticism differs from that in chapter 15 only in amplitude and philosophical subtlety, not in political demands for conformity. Graham, moreover, admits that, at least in the “Jian ai” triplet, there is no major difference in content: “in the next triplet, Chien ai, there is no evidence of compromise on the central Mohist doctrine of universal love. the J chapter is missing, but Y and h, as well as the digest ch. 14, all say explicitly that each should regard the family of another as though it were his own.”27 hence, the content of the “Jian ai” triplet does not support his labels. i have similar reservations about characterizations of the triplet as revealing an increasing political

25 Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 4. stephen Durrant concluded, on the basis of the use of grammatical particles, that either of the hypotheses (the three-sects theory and chronological evolution) could be correct. see Durrant, “An examination of textual and Grammatical problems in Mo-tzu,” 172. For arguments in favor of the chronological sequence 14–15–16, see, e.g., Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 1, 4–9; Ding Weixiang, “Mojia jian ai guan de yanbian,” 71–72; and Fraser, “Mohism,” see supplement.

26 Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 20. he must have overlooked the shi junzi at 15: 26/14 when he argues that “thinkers who oppose Mohism on the issues of universal love . . . are never called officer gentlemen” (19).

27 ibid., 24.


conformism28 and a gradual acceptance of war.29 All this indicates that, at least for the “Jian ai” triplet, Graham’s labels—“later digest,” “purist,” and “Compromising”—are not warranted.

My alternative characterization of the three chapters highlights their views concerning the nature of “caring.” nobody seems to deny that it is good to love or care (ai). but the crucial question is: to whom should this love or care be directed? oneself, each other, specific others, or everyone? And how specific should it be? the answer differs in the three “Jian ai” chapters, which, i argue, can be seen as stages in the growing scope and specificity of caring, reaching the ideal of “inclusive” or “impartial care” only in the last chapter, where the expression jian ai occurs for the first time. in this respect, what distinguishes chapter 16 from chapter 15 is not an increased willingness to compromise but rather a further radicalization of the moral stance. the evolution that will now be traced throughout the triplet starts off with relatively vague reciprocal love within familiar rela-tionships and moves toward specific and unidirectional concern of the rich and strong for the poor and weak. More striking than the tendency toward an ever-growing scope of ai, there is an increasing specification of the moral stance: the attitude of caring in chapter 14 is specified in chap-ter 15 as a double duty: feelings of concern (ai 愛) as well as beneficial acts (li 利). thus, it is only in chapter 15 that the concept of benefit or profit enters the scene in a positive sense.30 What exactly is counted as “caring” becomes ever more specific in chapter 16.

“Caring for Each Other” 相愛 (Chapter 14)

unlike the two following chapters, chapter 14 lacks short statements attrib-uted to Master Mozi in response to various critiques but instead consists of one long reflection on political chaos and order. As suggested by its

28 As argued by, e.g., Yoshinaga shinjirō, “Jian ai shi shenme”; and A. taeko brooks, “the Fragment theory of MZ 14, 17 and 20,” 120. there certainly is an increasing political interest in the triplet, but nothing indicates that Mohists occupied positions at the court.

29 As argued by, e.g., Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 19–20, and, with more nuances, by A. taeko brooks, “Mwòdž 14–16 兼愛 ‘universal love,’ ” 131.

30 in chapter 17, li is also related to egoism and harming others in terms similar to those in chapter 14 (以虧人自利也, 17: 30/18). see also Fraser, “Doctrinal Developments in MZ 14–16;” and the essay by paul van els in this volume. According to A. taeko brooks, “the Mician ethical Chapters,” 117, chapter 17 is the earliest Core Chapter, slightly predating chapter 14.

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conclusion, the whole chapter is someone’s specific interpretation of what Master Mozi may have meant by his insistent entreaty to care for others:

故子墨子曰不可以不勸愛人者, 此也。

thus, the fact that our Master Mozi says that we must encourage people to care for others is because of this. (14: 24/22)

hence, the encouragement to “care for others” (ai ren 愛人) may have been the only original echo of the master’s thought, if we consider the sayings attributed to him in the two following chapters as didactic tools rather than instances of actual speech. As Yoshinaga shinjirō has sug-gested, the encouragement to simply “care” may very well represent the earliest Mohist concern: if a master had explicitly pleaded for “inclusive care,” and if that motto was already current, the author of the first “Jian ai” chapter would not have failed to mention it.31 the Mohist starting point of jian ai is probably “care for others,” a view that was also attributed to Confucius in Lunyu (12.22):

樊遲問仁。子曰: 愛人。

Fan Chi asked about goodness. the master said: care for others.32

Why did Master Mozi, according to the author of this chapter, urge his audience to care for others? in other words, what does the “this” 此 of the conclusion refer to? it refers to his own interpretation of this moral imperative to care for others, arguing that someone who dedicates his life to the noble cause of ordering the world has to diagnose the political disease and subsequently suggest a remedy. Furthermore, the diagnosis, which consists of the first half of his argument (from 14: 24/4 to 24/12), is the failure to care for each other (xiang ai 相愛) because people care only for themselves (zi ai 自愛); hence, they benefit themselves to the detriment of others. the remedy, in the second half of the argument (from 14: 24/14 to 24/19), is that people are made to33 “care for each other inclu-sively” ( jian xiang ai 兼相愛), so that the causes of disorder are removed.

31 see, e.g., Yoshinaga shinjirō, Sengoku shisōshi kenkyū, 75, 78; and Yoshinaga shinjirō, “Jian ai shi shenme,” 31.

32 this may be a relatively late saying. i refrain from speculating about cause and effect between Mohist and Confucian ideas. see ibid., on ren as a non-familial duty.

33 Shi 使 in the sense of “order them to,” “make them,” is a political initiative, which is further developed in chapters 15 and 16. if we translate 使 as “suppose that,” then what follows is hypothetical thinking. A third possibility is that a mere hypothesis in chapter 14 was later interpreted as a political initiative.


According to the author, this is what the master meant when he encour-aged his audience to care for others. the first step that chapter 14 makes toward what will later be known as “universal caring” ( jian ai) is to widen the scope of one’s care for oneself by including others in relations of reci-procity (xiang 相). Jian enters only in the second half of the chapter: it is neither stressed nor explained but broadens the scope from one’s familial or political in-group to include others in relations of mutual care.

this broadening of scope begins implicitly through the presentation of four analogous cases of the diagnosis of disorder in the first part. At the beginning the author seeks not to antagonize contemporaries, but rather to convince them by showing that their rejection of certain types of self-ish behavior logically ought to lead to a rejection of analogous cases of “care for oneself ” (zi ai 自愛). he thus first describes a situation in which there is a lack of respect on the part of the lower actors in dyadic and hierarchical relations: of a son versus his father, a younger versus an older brother, a minister versus his lord. everyone, including the conservative elite, would call these attitudes (which i label “case 1”) “disorder” (luan 亂) and hence would reject them. in a second step, the audience is invited to also reject three other instances of egoism, namely of the father, the older brother, and the ruler in relation to, respectively, the son, younger brother, and minister (case 2). thus far, most members of the elite would have no problem sharing the Mohist concern. the third analogy concerns the indisputably despicable behavior of thieves and murderers because they, respectively, care only for their own houses and their own per-sons (case 3). the fourth and last analogy condemns the top ministers and lords, who, respectively, disrupt and attack each other’s families and states out of concern for their own families and states (case 4). At this point, we have reached the problem of political disorder that the sage is eager to solve.

the reader is tempted to follow the author in his consecutive rejection of these seemingly analogous cases of “care for oneself,” up to the rejec-tion of top ministers (dafu 大夫) and lords (zhuhou 諸侯) who fight for their own families and states. i strongly suspect that this last point is what the author wants to bring home: in the political remedy presented in the second part of chapter 14 as well as in the two following chapters, the order of these four types of disorder (luan 亂) is reversed and most atten-tion is directed toward this fourth case of the diagnosis: the chaos gener-ated by ministers and feudal lords. unfilial sons (case 1), unloving fathers (case 2), and thieves and murderers (case 3) were mainly brought into the picture as commonly rejected egoists, just like, at least according to these

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Mohists, these powerful aristocrats. but this last analogy was probably a step that some contemporaries were not willing to take. not that they particularly favored war in itself, but they generally admired knights as filial sons or loyal ministers for the honor and wealth that they acquired for their ancestors, parents, and lords. A failure to do so was considered a threat to the cornerstone of morality, namely the family or clan. in this argument, however, the Mohist challenge forces conservative contempo-raries to show where the analogy breaks down: since they reject the selfish son, the unloving father, and the thief as “caring for himself ” and failing to “care for each other,” why not also repudiate the aristocratic ministers and feudal lords who engage in war? if unable to counter the last step of this reasoning, they are compelled to join the rejection of these aristocrats on the basis of their rejection of the three analogous cases.

in the second part of chapter 14, the remedy to the chaos caused by ego-ism is that we “inclusively care for each other” ( jian xiang ai), not only in hierarchic familial and political relationships (cases 1 and 2) but also more broadly in relation to strangers (case 3) and, most importantly, to other families and states (case 4). it is worth noticing that in the final summary of this remedy, the four cases are repeated in opposite order, with most attention given to the two “egoists” of case 4: feudal lords and top minis-ters attacking and disordering each other’s states and families, respectively (14: 24/18–19). As pointed out above, this reversal is preserved through-out the two following chapters and reflects well the Mohist concern with political chaos. thus, in his argument for reciprocity in these four cases, the author also builds in an explicit plea for broadening one’s scope of care and concern: jian. precisely this aspect will be criticized by opponents and defended by the Mohists in the two following chapters. opponents could have indicated a flaw in the argument, since the scope of caring is inherently ambiguous: very often, egoism or “care for oneself ” coincides with altruism or “care for others,” such as when it benefits more than just oneself, as the third case shows (a thief steals for the people of his own house, not just for himself). While obviously rejecting the behavior of a thief, opponents risk also rejecting as egoism an attitude that they would under other circumstances (those of case 4) consider altruism: top minis-ters and feudal lords who promote the benefit of their own states or fami-lies are analogous not only with thieves and selfish sons but also with their opposites, namely respectful sons in relation to their family. the ambiguity of the scope of caring allows one to stress either one of the viewpoints.

in the Mozi there is obviously no space for this line of defense. the content of chapter 15 shows, on the contrary, that Mohism evolved away


from conventional morality by further widening its scope of concern and by increasingly insisting on concrete beneficial acts. As stated above, the double fact that, first, only chapter 14 really takes pains to incite the audi-ence in its diagnosis of political problems by initially giving priority to family virtues and, second, that the focus on top ministers and feudal lords in its second part is taken up by the two following chapters seems to further support the chronological priority of chapter 14.

“Inclusively Caring for Each Other, Mutually Benefiting Each Other” 兼相愛、交相利 (Chapter 15)

Chapter 15 is double the length of chapter 14: about one-third consists of a summary of the argument of chapter 14, including both the diagnosis and the remedy; the remaining two-thirds formulate a defense of the Mohist view in the face of two very similar criticisms. only in that part of chapter 15 does the idea of jian enter the debate as an independent concept for Mohists to defend in response to specific objections to the practicability of “inclusiveness.” the expression jian ai has not yet appeared.

the introductory summary not only briefly contains the views of chap-ter 14 but also includes some differences. the two main differences are the addition of “benefit” and the increasing specificity of morality. First, the moral duty of “caring” in chapter 14 is now divided into “caring and ben-efiting.” the author of chapter 14 may have considered ai (caring) a matter of both feeling (“care for”) and consequently acting (“take care of ”), the latter apparently amounting to a rather passive attitude of not disturbing or attacking others. the explicit splitting of the moral duty in chapter 15 somewhat moves ai to the realm of emotions or attitudes and separately stresses the importance of beneficial acts. “benefit” (li 利), which was exclusively related to egoism in the diagnosis of chapter 14,34 now posi-tively joins the duty of “caring” in a moral tandem—hence the insistent promotion throughout chapter 15 of the method ( fa 法) of “inclusively caring for each other, mutually benefiting each other.”

the second major difference in the introductory summary of chapter 15 is the increased specificity about the scope of one’s care and beneficial

34 see also Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 1, 8–9, on this new social dimension. i do not suggest that the authors of this chapter (and chapter 17) thought exclusively negatively about benefit, but it was clearly not yet an “umbrella term covering all their core values,” as Dan robins puts it in robins, “Mohist Care,” 61.

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acts, although perhaps less in the case of benefiting than of caring.35 the author’s concern is more specific and goes far beyond hierarchical rela-tions in which reciprocity conventionally dominates:

天下之人皆不相愛, 強必執弱, 眾必劫寡, 富必侮貧, 貴必敖賤, 詐必欺愚。

if people in the world all fail to care for each other, the strong will inevi-tably have power over the weak, the many will inevitably force the few, the rich will inevitably insult the poor, the noble will inevitably be arrogant toward the vulgar people, and the cunning will inevitably cheat those who are simple of mind. (15: 25/6–7)

Despite the presence of jian 兼 in the expression “inclusively care for each other,” the argument still largely runs in terms of “caring for each other,” but “inclusively” represents the widening scope that explicitly encom-passes the weak, the poor, the vulgar, and the simple of mind. these peo-ple stand for those with whom the elite usually did not have a relationship of reciprocity (相 xiang).

Following this introduction, two objections in chapter 15 specifically attack the scope of morality, namely “inclusiveness.” now, for the first time, this term is discussed separately as a concept (inclusiveness) and not just mentioned as an adverb within a longer expression (inclusively). the first objection is:

然，乃若兼則善矣。雖然，天下之難物于故36 也。

Admitted, “inclusiveness” is good indeed. but it is, nevertheless, the most difficult thing in the world. (15: 25/21)

the second objection is very similar: it also admits that inclusiveness is a worthy ideal and equally finds it “something that cannot be put into prac-tice” 不可行之物也 (15: 26/14). Criticism of the Mohist view is remark-ably mild in this chapter. i find none of the resentment and outrage that James legge reads in the opponents’ remarks.37 no critic rejects caring

35 the double slogan of this chapter “inclusively care for each other and mutually ben-efit each other” could suggest a difference between a very broad scope of ai ( jian xiang ai 兼相愛), as in the second part of chapter 14, and the mere reciprocity promoted for li ( jiao xiang li 交相利).

36 sun Yirang interprets 于故 as 迂故, “an unrealistic task” 迂遠難行之事. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 103–104.

37 legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 2, 120: “the essay [legge treats the three chapters as one essay] shows that it was resented as an outrage on the system of orthodox belief during all the life-time of Mih and his immediate disciples.” the rather mild objection to jian also occurs in four of the five objections expressed in chapter 16.


or reciprocity, not even the value of benefit. What they do object to is only “inclusiveness,” more specifically because of the apparent difficulties it entails in practice.

According to the first response in chapter 15, the problem of these crit-ics lies in a failure to understand:

天下之士君子, 特不識其利、辯其故也。

the officer-gentlemen of the world really don’t understand their benefit, nor do they distinguish their motivation [or: the causes of their actions]. (15: 25/22)

such a failure can be undone by explaining, arguing, and teaching, a duty that the author takes to heart. the misapprehension of the critics con-sists of two major aspects: shortsightedness and self-contradiction in their motivation, at which the Mohist responses are consequently aimed.

As for the shortsightedness, the author sets out to show that reciprocity also exists on a wider scope than only within conventional and hierarchi-cal relations, as there obviously is between fathers and sons, elder and younger brothers, ministers and lords:

夫愛人者, 人必從而愛之; 利人者, 人必從而利之。惡人者，人必從而惡之；害人者，人必從而害之。此何難之有？特上弗以為政，士不以為行。故38 也。

Well, one who cares for others will inevitably as a consequence be cared for by them; one who benefits others will inevitably as a consequence be benefited by them. one who hates others will inevitably as a consequence be hated by them; one who harms others will inevitably as a consequence be harmed by them. What is difficult about this? it is only that the superiors don’t make it their policy and that officers don’t make it their lifestyle. that’s what it is. (15: 25/24–25, see also 15: 26/11–12)

the author thus assumes that a failure to see this broader reciprocity makes people reluctant or even incapable of doing good to those with whom they have no specific relation. hence, these officer-gentlemen find it very difficult to include strangers in their scope of caring. but if only they recognized the benefit to be reaped from treating others well, they would certainly incorporate inclusiveness in their policies and their behavior.

second, the implicit contradiction in understanding their own motiva-tion lies in the fact that these gentlemen reject “inclusiveness” as being too difficult or impracticable while they are willing and able to do things that are much more difficult than that:

38 Following Xinyi Mozi duben, 95 n. 2; and Mozi jiaozhu, 162 n. 14.

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今若夫攻城野戰，殺身為名，此天下百姓之所皆難也。苟君說之，則士眾能為之。況於兼相愛、交相利，則與此異。

As for attacking a city and fighting in the fields, offering one’s life for a repu-tation, these are things that people in the world consider difficult. but if the lord finds pleasure in them, then masses of knights/officers are able to do them. how much easier is it, compared to this, to care for each other inclu-sively and to benefit each other mutually. (15: 25/22–24)

if capable of these military feats, how much more should they be able to “inclusively care for each other and mutually benefit each other,” an imperative that is both easier (at least not as life threatening) and more beneficial (because of the inevitable reciprocity of one’s acts)? the author refers to three stories that show how easy inclusiveness would be for sub-jects if only they understood the great benefits of this moral imperative. the stories describe cases in which ministers starve themselves, dress shabbily, or give their lives for the sake of a reputation, simply because this is what pleases their lord. these examples of fights and attacks do not necessarily indicate a growing acceptance of warfare by Mohists but illustrate a contradiction that they perceive in the elite’s code of behavior: in arguments, the officer-gentlemen reject “inclusiveness” because of the difficulties in practicing it; but in reality, they are very willing to under-take acts that are much more difficult, life threatening, and harmful. the second Mohist response of chapter 15 mainly refers to the feats of three ancient model rulers, Yu 禹, King Wen 文王, and King Wu 武王, and their ability to “practice inclusiveness” or “impartiality” 行兼 (15: 26/21, 15: 26/24, 15: 26/26).39

“With Inclusiveness Replace Exclusiveness” 兼以易別 (Chapter 16)

Chapter 16, “Jian ai, xia,” again doubles the previous chapter in length. the introductory summary of the argument, also consisting of a diagnosis and remedy, now only occupies one-fifth of the chapter, while the objec-

39 While the first response highlights the behavior of subjects, the second refers to the lords and contains references to three sagely kings from antiquity who practiced jian: Yu benefited people from all regions, including barbarians; King Wen helped the old, child-less, and widowed; and King Wu selected workers impartially, taking the blame upon himself whenever something went wrong. their acts were supposed to help people learn to practice jian themselves (15: 26/21, 15: 26/24, 15: 26/25). it is a striking indication of the power of expectations that translators often add the word “love” to their translation after 兼 ( jian), sometimes between brackets, where there is no 愛 (ai) in the original text. see, e.g., Johnston, The “Mozi,” 139, 143, 145; and Mei, The Works of Motze, 166, 170, 172.


tions and their responses occupy almost four-fifths. the two differences pointed out about the summary in chapter 15—the positive reference to benefit and the wider scope—seem to be further developed here: the social concern has increased, and “inclusiveness” is promoted from the beginning of chapter 16 as an independent value. in chapter 16, the moral value of “caring” is taken for granted, reciprocity ( jiao 交 or xiang 相) has become somewhat less dominant, and the focus lies on the scope of care, namely “inclusiveness” ( jian 兼). hence, my temporary title for this chapter is jian yi yi bie 兼以易別 (16: 27/14). A total stranger to the debate, who reads only this chapter, might initially wonder in what respect one has to be inclusive. Certainly not in hate and harm! the argumentation seems to be based on the previous chapter(s) and simply assumes that we are talking about caring.

the diagnosis has become more serious: chaos caused by attacking states and disorderly families (case 4 in chapter 14) is the major cause of harm in the world, as it was in chapter 15. this assessment is immediately followed by examples of situations in which the strong, numerous, cun-ning, and noble maltreat the weak, few, simple, and vulgar. only then are ungenerous rulers, disloyal ministers, unloving fathers, and disrespect-ful sons mentioned.40 And finally, instances are added where common people harm and hurt each other in various ways. the cause of all this misery is the opposite of “inclusiveness,” namely bie 別, “exclusion” or “exclusiveness,”41 which is said “to be wrong” 別非也 (16: 27/13). the rem-edy is its replacement by jian, the central topic of this chapter. in the argu-ment below, “caring” and “benefiting” are not even explicitly mentioned:

是故子墨子曰：兼以易別。然即兼之可以易別之故何也？曰：藉為人之國若為其國，夫誰獨舉其國以攻人之國者哉？為彼者由42 為己也。

thus, our Master Mozi says: replace “exclusiveness” with “inclusiveness.” but what is the basis for replacing “exclusiveness” with “inclusiveness”? Well, assume that people treat someone else’s state as they treat their own state.

40 A selection of cases 1 and 2 from chapter 14 is presented, but in a different order: in chapter 14, the causes of disorder (case 1) mentioned first are ministers, sons, and younger brothers, whereas in the chaos described in chapter 16, rulers are mentioned before min-isters, and fathers before sons (16: 27/8–9).

41 it is used as an adverb in the expression “exclusively/partially hate each other” 別相惡 in chapter 26.

42 read as you 猶 as in the two following parallel lines.

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Who would then mobilize his own state to attack someone else’s state? they would treat the others as they treat themselves. (16: 27/14–16)43

if, thanks to the ideal of “inclusiveness,” people cared for others as much as they did for themselves, “one would have to conclude that this would amount to benefit for the world” 即必曰天下之利也 (16: 27/18). More specifically, elderly widowers without sons would be supported in their old age, and orphans would be provided for so they could grow up (16: 27/24–25).44 it seems that in a gradual evolution from chapters 14 to 16, the Mohists expect people to show a moral concern for others, not just in traditional relations, nor just in more and larger reciprocal connections, but expanding to encompass all those who need help—an extremely “inclusive” care, gradually tending toward “impartiality” or “universality.”

the major part of this chapter (almost four-fifths) consists of five objec-tions and responses. the content of the objections and the order of their appearance strongly suggest that they do not reflect a continuous reason-ing but were collected from existing textual fragments.45 Four objections (1, 2, 3, and 5) largely resemble those of the previous chapter. they are remarkably positive toward the Mohist project: they find it good (shan 善), humane (ren 仁), and right (yi 義; this is the first appearance of the important Mohist concept of “right” or “righteous” in the whole “Jian ai” triplet!). but they too mainly doubt its practicability. the first two Mohist responses are new: they consist of thought experiments, respectively about officers (shi 士) and lords ( jun 君) who, in words and deeds, stand for bie or for jian. the author argues that everybody without exception would, in fact, prefer to deal with an “inclusive” officer or lord, even if, in theory, one rejects the value of “inclusiveness”:

我以為當其於此也，天下無愚夫愚婦: 雖非兼之人，必寄託之於兼之有是也。此言而非兼，擇即取兼，即此言行費46也。不識天下之士，所以皆聞兼而非之者，其故何也？

43 this passage is followed in 16: 27/16–17 by the same reasoning but with respect to one’s city du 都 and then one’s family jia 家.

44 this is also said about the second model ruler in the second response of chapter 15 (26/22).

45 the first and second responses go together, respectively arguing about the “officer” (shi 士) and the “lord” ( jun 君). this separation was implicitly present in chapter 15 in the sense that its first response refers to narratives about officers and its second response to exemplary rulers. the third and fifth responses in chapter 16 are inspired by, respectively, the second and first responses of chapter 15. only the fourth objection makes a further point.

46 read in the sense of fu 拂 “go against”. see Xinyi Mozi duben, 104 n. 8; and Mozi jiaozhu, 185 n. 43.


i believe that facing this [choice], there are no stupid men or women in the world: even those who reject inclusiveness would certainly depend on the one who considers inclusiveness right. this is to reject inclusiveness in words but to select it in one’s choices, which is a contradiction between words and deeds. i really don’t understand why the officers of the world reject inclusiveness once they have all learned about it. (16: 28/8–10; see also 16: 28/21–23)

this is how the two first responses in chapter 16 end, concerning the best officer (response 1) and the best lord (response 2). the focus is “inclu-siveness” or “impartiality.” the concept of “care” is absent but replaced in both hypothetical cases by acts that are considered to be caring: feeding the hungry, clothing the cold, supporting the sick, and burying the dead (16: 27/31–28/1, 16: 28/3–4, 16: 28/15–16, and 16: 28/18). the argument, more-over, illustrates well the further intellectual evolution of the Mohists: while self-contradiction was implicitly criticized in the responses of chapter 15, it has now become the major argument. by indicating the contradiction between words and deeds, the author considers the objection refuted and proceeds to the next objection.

the slogan from chapter 15, “inclusively caring for each other, mutually benefiting each other,” appears in the response to the third objection. this response, together with the fifth, closely resembles the two of the previ-ous chapter, although they are now argued more profusely.47 the third response (like the second in chapter 15) promotes the Mohist interpreta-tion of “inclusiveness” through reference to ancient sages and kings, but now explicitly supported by quotations from respectable sources: the “tai shi” 泰誓 (Grand oath),48 “Yu shi” 禹誓 (oath of Yu),49 “tang shuo” 湯說 (Declaration of tang),50 and “Zhou shi” 周詩 (odes of Zhou).51 it is here that the sole use of the expression jian ai in the whole triplet appears; it will be discussed in the following section. the fifth response contains the three narratives (of the first response in chapter 15) in which subjects prove to be able and willing to do much more difficult feats than what the

47 the third response in chapter 16 further elaborates (using more quotations from clas-sic sources) on the second response in chapter 15. the fifth response in chapter 16 largely copies the three narratives (in different order) of the first response in chapter 15.

48 this passage does not occur in the current “tai shi” in the Shangshu.49 this title does not occur in the current Shangshu, but a similar passage occurs in “Da

Yu mo.” see legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 3, 64–65.50 this passage does not occur in the current Shangshu, but the last lines contain simi-

larities with “tang gao”; see ibid., 189–190.51 this passage does not occur in the current Shijing, but the first two lines occur in the

Shangshu, “hongfan.” see ibid., 331.

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Mohists ask, as long as this pleases their lord. As in chapter 15, the contra-diction between their willingness to offer their lives, on the one hand, and their rejection of inclusiveness as something too difficult, on the other, is implicitly present but not further elaborated.

the most interesting objection of chapter 16 is the fourth, because it takes the argument a step further by showing the complexities of an ever-increasing scope of caring: it is not mere egoism combined with a failure to recognize reciprocity on a large scale that prevents the critics from treating strangers well; it is the care that they owe above all to their own parents. only the critics of the fourth objection explicitly worry about the practice of filial love:

意不忠52 親之利而害為孝乎？

should we perhaps abandon our parents’ benefit and harm the practice of filial love? (16: 29/17)

their question resonates with more conventional or familial concerns and the fear that the larger scope may endanger the smaller one.53 Chapter 14 started from a need for reciprocal caring within the conventional types of hierarchy and only then broadened the scope, mainly asking people to refrain from harmful acts; but chapter 16 clearly demands active care for widows and orphans, the hungry, the cold, the sick, and even the dead. but how can one take care of one’s parents as a filial son when all these other—sometimes even opposite—duties claim moral priority? to offer one’s life for a reputation is not just a failure to understand one’s own benefit but also an act of respect and care for one’s parents and ances-tors. reference to the reputation to be won in battle is one way in which the elite defends the drive of their knights to engage in war.54 thus, what looks like “harm to others” (strangers) from one viewpoint can be “benefit for others” (within one’s family) from another viewpoint. to fight another family is thus not unambiguously a harmful act, as the Mohists want us to believe. or, to put it in terms of the diagnosis in chapter 14, the knight who fights another family for the reputation of his own family is analogous, not with the unfilial son in case 1 but, on the contrary, with a filial son.

52 replacing the character zhong 忠 by 中, meaning “to fit, accord with.” see Mozi jiao-zhu, 194 n. 104.

53 the same concern seems to have motivated ban Gu’s criticism of Mohism: “they extend the idea of inclusive care to the point that they don’t know how to distinguish between kin and stranger” 推兼愛之意而不知别親疏. see Hanshu 30.1738.

54 see, e.g., Mozi 19: 33/26–27.


the response of the Mohists to this objection is that moral acts in the largest scope will inevitably be rewarded in the smaller scope, and not just in relation to oneself (as was the case in chapter 15). since a filial son obviously also wants other people to be good to his parents, he must be good to their parents and not harm them. thus, serving one’s own parents ultimately amounts to caring for all other parents inclusively. this is how truly filial sons reason:

若我先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？意我先從事乎惡賊人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親乎？即必吾先從事乎愛利人之親，然後人報我以愛利吾親也。

Will others reward me by taking care of and benefiting my parents if i first work hard at taking care of and benefiting their parents? or will they reward me by taking care of and benefiting my parents if i first work hard at hating and hurting their parents? Certainly, they will reward me by taking care of and benefiting my parents if i first work hard at taking care of and benefiting their parents. (16: 29/19–21)

this reasoning not only is a clear instance of common sense, according to the author, but can also be founded on ancient sources that celebrate the functioning of rewards or compensation (bao 報).55 An ode of the “Da ya” 大雅 (Great odes) makes exactly this point:

『無言而不讎，無德而不報。投我以桃，報之以李。』即此言愛人者必見愛也，而惡人者必見惡也。

“every word gets its answer. every good deed has its recompense.You throw a peach to me, i’ll reward you with a plum.”56this is saying that the one who cares for others will inevitably be cared for, and who hates others will inevitably be hated. (16: 29/23–24)

With this response to the concerns expressed by conservative opponents, i conclude the analysis of the “Jian ai” triplet, leaving the single occur-rence of the expression jian ai in the triplet to be discussed in the context of its fuller elaboration in other Core Chapters. in the whole triplet, “care” in itself is never an object of controversy, but only its scope and specific content: the value of reciprocity (xiang) that was prominent in chapter 14 was slowly replaced by inclusiveness ( jian) from the middle of chapter 15

55 on this concept, see Yang lien-sheng, “the Concept of ‘pao’ as a basis for social relations in China.”

56 these are two separate lines in “Yi” 抑, ode 256. see legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, 514–515.

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onward, and most explicitly so in chapter 16. the deep-rooted idea of reci-procity has not disappeared but has become a part of the explicit argu-ment in favor of impartiality: those who are not shortsighted realize that being good to others will involve compensation for themselves (chapter 15) and for their loved ones (chapter 16). but this is clearly not the final stage of jian ai: its occurrence in chapter 16 as well as in other Core Chapters illustrates the inherent dynamics of the Mohist idea: the new demand for inclusive caring moves further on, almost leaving behind all reflections in terms of reciprocity.

The Birth of Jian Ai

What was the steering force behind the above-traced evolution of jian in these three and other Core Chapters of the Mozi? one could imagine that Mohist thought evolved as a consequence of various types of criticism, by gradually accommodating the critics. As noted above, Ding Weixiang reads in the three “Jian ai” chapters an evolution of accommodation and watering down of an originally quite radical doctrine. Yoshinaga shinjirō traces an evolution from a moral vision in chapter 14 toward an increas-ingly political and utilitarian stance in chapter 16.57 if we focus on those objections that were quoted in the triplet—admittedly perhaps only an unrepresentative portion of the actual critical voices—we can detect a minor and a major trend.

the minor and most critical trend is represented only by the fourth objection in chapter 16, which concerns the duty of “filial love” or “care for one’s kin” (xiao 孝). since a filial son must reciprocate the care that his par-ents gave him, he cannot treat them merely like others to whom he owes nothing. even a theoretical understanding of the reciprocity that rules the larger scope of one’s relations cannot undo this priority. the growing scope of jian that i have tried to describe is certainly not an accommoda-tion to this objection. there are other records of attempts to counter the criticism of traditionalists by nuancing the Mohist view.58 such compro-mises between the broad scope of jian and the conventional priority of

57 Yoshinaga shinjirō, “Jian ai shi shenme.”58 Mozi 44 and Mengzi 3A5 are often understood as compromises of later Mohists

stressing the division ( fen 分) of labor between one’s feeling of caring for everybody and the concrete implementation that starts with one’s own relatives. For the Mohist canon, see Graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 249–250. For Mencius, see nivison, “two roots or one?,” 740–747; and shun, “Mencius’ Criticism of Mohism.”


the familial scope, are more subtle and mature than the response in chap-ter 16, which promises certain benefit for the parents of one who benefits the parents of others. there are no indications of accommodation to fam-ily values as a response to this or other objections, although the author is remarkably respectful of conventional values and hierarchical roles throughout the three chapters: not only in the beginning of chapter 14, as a possible captatio benevolentiae of the audience, but also at the end of chapter 16, where “inclusiveness” is ascribed to the gentleman ( junzi 君子) who works hard at being a wise ruler, a loyal minister, a loving father, a caring son, a friendly elder brother, or a brotherly younger brother (16: 30/7–9).59 perhaps the Mohist departure from conventional morality only began in this early triplet and is mirrored in the sequence of its three chapters. its thought has not yet reached the point of accommodation but instead follows its inherent logic of demanding more equality and social concern.

the major and milder trend of all other recorded objections in chap-ters 15 and 16 is a combination of approval and doubt concerning the prac-ticability of something as difficult as “inclusiveness.” this mixed criticism of Mohism is also echoed in other early sources.60 Again, the response is not a bit accommodating: first, the author points out that aristocrats are capable of much more difficult feats if they are really motivated; and second, he quotes authoritative sources concerning model rulers who were all examples of jian and inspirations for Mozi. it is in such a context that the expression jian ai occurs for the very first time—in chapter 16’s response to the third objection.

《泰誓》曰：『文王若日若月乍照光于四方于西土。』

即此言文王之兼愛天下之博大也，譬之日月兼照天下之無有私也，即此文王兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者，於文王取法焉。

the “Great oath” says: “King Wen was like sun and moon, spreading and shining his light over the four quarters and the Western region.”this says that King Wen’s impartial caring for the world was broad and great. he is being compared to how sun and moon are impartial in their shining over the world. this is the inclusiveness of King Wen. even what

59 Dan robins, “Mohist Care,” 63–67 shows how role-governed relationships and parti-ality for one’s own family is compatible with the Mohist idea of inclusive care.

60 see, e.g., Zhuangzi 33; and Shiji 130.

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our Master Mozi called “inclusive” was taken from the example of King Wen. (16: 29/1–3)61

the model of jian ai is an exemplary ruler who cares for the whole world equally. he is compared to heavenly bodies, such as the sun and the moon. the emergence of this model seems to mark a further growth in the scope of “inclusiveness,” which does not result from a compromise with objections but, on the contrary, follows an inherent and radicalizing urge within Mohist thought. the ideal of jian ai in this passage and in some other Core Chapters is one in which reciprocity is further stretched and adapted, perhaps to the point of being abandoned: like heaven, the sage is able to care for others “impartially” without starting from a particular center of concern and without expecting any reward in return, either for himself or for his loved ones. the appearance of exemplary kings ruling over All under heaven (tianxia 天下) and their description in heavenly terms indicate this further growth of the concept of jian. With the advent of the model of heaven, implicit in chapter 15 and for the first time explic-itly related to jian ai in chapter 16, the ideal is no longer described as an ever-growing “inclusive” extent of caring beginning with one’s own per-sonal and familial center of concern; rather, the ideal becomes a matter of fundamental “impartiality.”

to trace this evolution further in the Core Chapters,62 we have to turn to the somewhat later triplet “Will of heaven” 天志.63 Chapters 26, 27, and 28 share ideas about the scope of caring and benefiting with the “Jian ai” triplet, using expressions such as 兼相愛交相利 (the slogan of chap-ter 15), “inclusively care for everybody in the world” 兼天下而愛之, the independent concepts jian 兼 and bie 別, and even the expression jian ai,

61 the same description of King Wen occurs in chapter 15 (26/21), but without quoting any source and without any interpretation in terms of jian ai.

62 it is remarkable that the occurrences of jian (er) ai 兼(而)愛 in other Mozi chapters are related to heaven. see, e.g., 4: 4/20–24 and 9: 12/17–22. Chapters 4 and 35 speak of 兼相愛, 交相利 in similar terms. For more occurrences, see sato, “the idea to rule the World,” 38–39.

63 A. taeko brooks, “the Mician ethical Chapters,” 117, dates chapter 26 to ca. 352 bCe, which is slightly earlier than chapter 15 (ca. 342 bCe); chapters 27 (ca. 302 bCe) and 28 (ca. 282 bCe) are slightly later. According to Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 1, 27–31, the whole triplet (26, 28, 27) is much later (end of third century). there is disagreement on the order of the two last chapters of the triplet but agreement on the priority of chapter 26. For the evolution of jian ai in the “tian zhi” triplet, see also sakai Kazutaka, “Makki boku no ken’ai shisō,” 101, 103–105.


which occurs no fewer than four times in chapter 28.64 the fragments in this triplet about caring and benefiting further illustrate the growing scope of jian in two ways, both related to the idea of reciprocity. First, they establish a reciprocity between heaven and all human beings, as a new way to motivate the inclusion of strangers in one’s scope of caring. sec-ond, they further radicalize their moral stance to the extent that reciproc-ity becomes a duty toward heaven rather than something to be expected from others. here the obligation of “inclusive caring” is for the first time explicitly identified as the will of heaven (tian zhi yi 天之意):

今天下之士君子之欲為義者，則不可不順天之意矣。曰：順天之意何若？曰：兼愛天下之人。

As for the officer-gentlemen of the world who want to do what is right, they must follow the will of heaven.but what is the will of heaven?it is to impartially care for everybody in the world. (28: 48/1–4)65

We know that heaven cares for everyone in the world because it has in all times and all regions accepted offerings from all peoples, including the bar-barians. the offerings made by men to heaven seem to initiate a general relation of reciprocity and cause heaven’s positive response to everybody:

苟兼而食焉，必兼而愛之。譬之若楚越之君，今是66楚王食於楚之四境之內，故愛楚之人；越王食於越之四境之內，故愛越之人。今天兼天下而食焉，我以此知其兼愛天下之人也。

if it impartially accepts food from them,67 it must impartially care for them. Compare it to the lords of Chu and Yue. Well, since the king of Chu is fed by all those in the territory of Chu, he takes care of the people of Chu; since the king of Yue is fed by all those in the territory of Yue, he takes care of the

64 For other passages in common with the “Jian ai” triplet, see also the essay by nicolas standaert in this volume.

65 see also Mozi 28: 48/23–24: “to follow the will of heaven is ‘inclusiveness’; to go against the will of heaven is ‘exclusiveness.’ if ‘inclusiveness’ determines the Way, it is gov-ernment through justice. if ‘exclusiveness’ determines the Way, it is government by force” 順天之意者，兼也; 反天之意者，別也。兼之為道也，義正。別之為道也，力正.

66 Following Wang Yinzhi in reading jin shi 今是 as jin fu 今夫. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 211.

67 here as well as in a similar fragment in chapter 4, Johnston, The “Mozi,” 27, 267 trans-lates shi 食 as heaven “feeding them” or “providing food for them”. i agree with Mei, The Works of Motze, 30, 306, that it should be that heaven “accepts offering from them” or “is fed by them.”

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people of Yue. Well, since heaven is fed by everybody impartially, i know that it takes care of everyone in the world impartially. (28: 48/6–8)68

Another indication of heaven’s caring for everybody is the fact that it punishes anyone who hurts others and it rewards those who are good to others. the best proof is:

故昔也三代之聖王堯、舜、禹、湯、文、武之兼愛天下也，從而利之.

the impartial caring for and consequently benefiting of the world by the sage-kings of antiquity, Yao, shun, Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu. (28: 48/14–15)

since they cared for those whom heaven cared for and also benefited them, they were rewarded by heaven and became known as “sagely kings.” but punishments were inflicted upon violent kings such as Jie, Zhou, You, and li, who hated the world and harmed it against the will of heaven (28: 48/10–21).

heaven is thus promoted as the foundation of jian ai: it meaningfully relates to all humans, whether by accepting offerings or by compensating human actions. the promise of a broad type of reciprocity among humans that was gradually formulated as a response in the “Jian ai” triplet is now strengthened or replaced by the promise of a reward to be expected from a communicative heaven,69 an idea that is almost totally absent from the “Jian ai” triplet.70 the idea of a responding heaven as it was inspired by

68 because jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li is now being paired with bie xiang wu, jiao xiang zei, with both jian 兼 and bie 別 used adverbally, schumacher, “An outline of the evolu-tion of the Concept of Jian 兼 in Mohism,” 19, 21, believes that chapter 26 precedes chapter 16, where both characters stand for independent and central concepts, namely “inclusive-ness” (which is being promoted) and “exclusiveness” (which is being rejected). it is also possible that the two opposite concepts were already established when chapter 26 was written. otherwise, it is difficult to understand why the author wrote “exclusively hate each other” (bie (xiang) wu 別(相)惡) instead of “inclusively hate each other” ( jian (xiang) wu 兼(相)惡), which grammatically makes more sense (as it occurs in Mozi 4: 5/2 and 9: 12/26). it seems that the concept of jian was considered invariably good in chapter 28, as it was in chapter 16 (see also Mozi 26: 43/8 and 26: 43/15), and hence was not considered usable as an adverb of the verb “hate.” since bie was rejected as the opposite of jian, it is here used in connection with hate.

69 in chapter 26, there is a unique passage in which the will of heaven is twice literally quoted (故天意曰) about those sagely kings who also cared for those people that heaven cared for, and about those violent kings who did not. see the essay by nicolas standaert in this volume.

70 the sole reference in the jian ai triplet to heaven is in chapter 15 in relation to King Wen, who is compared to the sun and moon (15: 26/22), as he is in the ode in chapter 16 quoted above.


ancient textual references71 and expanded to all human beings, may have seemed a more reliable and respected foundation for the novel moral principle. the same argument is developed in chapters 26 and 27,72 but in the latter with explicit reference to “repay” or “compensate” (bao 報). heaven is portrayed as such an endless source of bounty and welfare that human beings should try to repay at least a minor fraction of its generos-ity: it orders sun, moon, and stars, regulates the seasons, sends frost, rain, and dew, grows grain and silk, provides us with hills and rivers, gathers metal and wood, bestows on us birds and beasts, and so on. hence, the motivating force of reciprocity lies not only in heaven’s promise of pun-ishment or reward but also in our duty to respond appropriately to such an enormous gift:

今夫天兼天下而愛之，撽遂萬物以利之。若豪之末，末非天之所為也，而民得而利之，則可謂后矣。然獨無報夫天，而不知其為不仁不祥也？此吾所謂君子明細而不明大也。

As for heaven, it cares for everything in the world impartially, quickly ripens all things to benefit them. since even the tip of an autumn hair is made by heaven, and people get to benefit from it, it can be said to be really substan-tial. Why then do they not compensate heaven, and do they not realize how bad and disastrous they are? this is why i say that the gentlemen under-stand things on a small scale but not on a large scale. (27: 45/17–19)

the author again resorts to analogical reasoning starting from generally accepted virtues to make his point: if a son, a brother, or a minister behaves badly toward his superior and benefactor, we do not hesitate to criticize him. Why then, do the gentlemen fail to respond appropriately toward their most obvious benefactor? if a son did not repay his loving father, who expended all his energy benefiting this son, we would be utterly shocked. Why then do we accept this ungrateful behavior toward heaven that has been going on since antiquity (27: 45/25–29)? so, in the “tian zhi” triplet, jian ai not only becomes a recurrent expression and central topic but also further evolves in the direction of impartiality. While the idea of reciproc-ity is never totally abandoned, it proves unable to contain the ever-growing moral demands of the Mohists and to support the absolute duty to care for

71 About the image of heaven in the Shi and Shu, see standaert, The Fascinating God.72 see Mozi 26: 43/7–12, where it is said that “whoever follows the will of heaven

inclusively cares for each other and mutually benefits each other and inevitably will be rewarded” 順天意者，兼相愛、交相利，必得賞, as opposed to those who “go against the will of heaven, exclusively hate each other and mutually hurt each other, and inevita-bly will be punished” 反天意者，別相惡、交相賊，必得罰. see also 27: 45/16–46/25.

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everybody without expecting anything in return. Although i have almost consistently translated jian as “inclusive” in the “Jian ai” triplet, the imag-ery of heaven seems to inaugurate a new dimension of Mohist ethics that can perhaps be characterized as impartiality or universality.73

Conclusion

the expression jian ai occurs more frequently in other sources than the Mozi and in other Mohist chapters than the triplet named after it.74 Mas-ter Mo himself and his earliest followers—possibly the authors or editors of the “Jian ai” triplet—may not have realized that Mohist thought would at some point become so firmly associated with this expression. i believe that the identification of Mohism with the ideal of jian ai is to a large extent the result of history, beginning around the time of Mencius’s harsh criticism of Mozi75 and enforced by modern scholars such as liang Qichao 梁啓超 searching for indigenous sources of Chinese modernity.76 While these two extremes on the historical scale strongly associated Mohism with jian ai, the former negatively and the latter positively, the long period between them is far less unanimous than recent reconstructions suggest. indeed, in the han dynasty there was little explicit association of Mozi with the idea of jian ai. the views of other masters and scholars are much more complex but must await further research.77

73 Chinese scholars writing from a Marxist background have argued that universality cannot have been Mozi’s ideal since he was still living in a class society. see, e.g., tong shuye, Xian Qin qi zi sixiang yanjiu, 74–75.

74 For a further elaboration, see Defoort, “Do the ten Mohist theses represent Mozi’s thought?”; and sato, “the idea to rule the World,” 52–54.

75 Mencius is exceptional among the early Chinese masters in criticizing Mozi mainly, if not exclusively, for his idea of jian ai (Mengzi 3A5, 3b9, 7A26). probably due to Mencius’s influence, Mozi was often associated with the promotion of jian ai in Chinese history. For another view, see sato, “the idea to rule the World,” 29–31, who claims that the “jian’ai doctrine had been established by the time of Mencius” because of (1) the occurrence of jian in that book, (2) sato’s early date for the shanghai manuscript “Guishen zhi ming,” and (3) sato’s identification of jian with the historical Zisi.

76 see liang Qichao, Mozi xue’an, 15–16. he was inspired by sun Yirang, who was, in turn, inspired by the Qing scholar Zhang huiyan 張惠言 (1761–1802), whose work was edited by sun Yirang. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 678. Many contemporary scholars agree on the importance of jian ai in Mohist thought. see, e.g. tong shuye, Xian Qin qi zi sixiang yanjiu, 73; Qi Wen and li Guangxing, Mozi shi jiang, 37; hu Zizong et al., Mozi sixiang yanjiu, 279. Xue bocheng, Mojia sixiang xintan, 11–13, gives an overview of Chinese scholars who agree that jian ai is the core of Mohism. For Qing views on jian ai, see Malek, Ver-schmelzung der Horizonte, 286–291.

77 some are positive about jian ai (e.g., Xunzi), or they criticize other aspects of Mohism (also Xunzi); some explicitly associate jian ai with the ru (e.g., Han Feizi 49 “Wu du”;


My analysis was focused on the question of whether the Mozi’s three “Jian ai” chapters were really about universal love. Although jian and ai gradually find each other and give birth to a radically novel idea, the expression jian ai is virtually absent in this triplet. if we ignore later influ-ences from other sources, including the chapter titles, we have to con-clude that the idea of jian ai was hardly born in the triplet named after it. by highlighting arguments about “caring” (ai 愛) and “benefiting” (li 利), “hating” (wu 惡), “hurting” (zei 賊), and “harming” (hai 害), “oneself ” (zi 自) and “each other” (xiang 相, jiao 交), “inclusively” ( jian 兼) and “exclusively” (bie 別), i have tried to describe the evolution of this con-cept from “caring for oneself,” to “caring for each other” in an ever wid-ening scope, up to an unconditional type of caring for everybody, and ultimately without any expectation of reward. the center of the debate was never caring itself but its scope and specific content. the nature and value of reciprocity changed in this evolution: since the conventional type of reciprocity (of chapter 14) became a burden for the new focus on jian, it was gradually replaced by an argued reciprocity among non-kin (in chapters 15 and 16) and ultimately with heaven. the emergence of the model of heaven in chapter 16 and in the “Will of heaven” chapters seems to coincide with the birth of the expression jian ai. this step not merely motivates a wider moral concern for others but also radicalizes it: heaven responds to humans and also expects a response from them in the form of an extremely impartial type of care for others, especially those people who cannot always reciprocate. this seems to deal a final blow to the idea of reciprocity: although heaven was demanding in its relation to humans and expected compensation for its goodness, it also relinquished the idea of reciprocity by not wanting anything for itself. this non-reciprocity thus set the new model of impartiality beyond the ever-growing and increasingly specific inclusiveness. My analysis suggests that even the short history of jian ai from its conception in chapter 14 till its birth in the “tian zhi” triplet yields grounds for a variety of translations of the term. later uses of the more mature expression, adopted by others in praise or criticism, will probably bring forth new interpretations and translations of the expression jian ai.

Zhuangzi 13 “tian dao”; and various han sources); others identify Mozi with jian (Lüshi chunqiu 17.7 “bu er”; Shizi 1.10 “Guang(ze)”) or with fan ai 汎愛 (Zhuangzi 33 “tianxia”). see Defoort, “Do the ten Mohist theses represent Mozi’s thought?”; nylan, “Kongzi and Mozi,” 1, 18; and sato, “the idea to rule the World.”

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Appendix: Scheme of the Argument (with Working Titles)

相愛 (chap. 14) 兼相愛交相利 (chap. 15)

兼以易別 (chap. 16)

Medical analogy 譬之如 . . .

i. Diagnosis: 不相愛• 1 子，弟，臣• 2 父，兄，君• 3 盜，賊• 4 大夫，諸侯

ii. remedy: 兼相愛• 1, 2, 3, 4• summarized: 4 4, 3,

1+2

Conclusion: Mozi 勸愛人

introduction

i. Diagnosis + remedy• harm in the world: 4

4, 3, 1 + 2• its cause 不相愛:

4 4, 3• 4 4, 3, 1 + 2, and

more• remedy 兼相愛交

相利: 4 4, 3• 4 4, 3, 1 + 2, and

more

ii. First objection: 兼 is 善 but 難response:• A. self-contradiction

in understanding motivation for one’s acts (辯故)

• b. Failure to under-stand benefit in large scope (識利)

• A. narratives of officers

– 惡衣– 少食– 殺身為名• b. repeated

iii. second objection: 兼 is 善 but 不可行response:• against taishan

analogy• model rulers were 兼

introduction

i. Diagnosis + remedy• harm in the world:

4 4, 3, and more, 1 + 2, 3

• its cause: 別• remedy: 兼4 ? 4• From remedy to

result: . . . and much more

ii. First objection: 兼 is 善 but 可用?response: in 行 we all prefer 兼士 not 別士, but in 言 some reject 兼.

iii. second objection: oK, but for 君?response: in 行 we all prefer 兼君 not 別君, but in 言 some reject 兼.

iv. third objection: 兼 is 仁 and 義 but 可為哉?response:• against taishan

analogy• model rulers were 兼– 文王 (+ 泰誓)– 禹 (+ 禹誓)– 湯 (+ 湯說)– 文武 (+ 周詩)


table (cont.)

相愛 (chap. 14) 兼相愛交相利 (chap. 15)

兼以易別 (chap. 16)

– 禹– 文王– 武王 (+專)Conclusion: 兼相愛交相利

v. Fourth objection: 孝response: benefit in large scope for small scope (+ 大雅: 報)

vi. Fifth objection: 難response: self- contradiction– 少食– 焚身– 苴服Conclusion: 兼者聖王之道也

How to End wars witH words: tHrEE argumEntativE stratEgiEs by mozi and His FollowErs*

Paul van Els

竊鉤者誅，竊國者爲諸侯

those who steal buckles get to be punished;those who steal states get to be feudal lords. —Zhuangzi

mozi 墨子 (fifth century bCE) and his followers were active in the socially and politically tumultuous era in Chinese history that has come to be known as the warring states period (fifth to third centuries bCE). war-fare naturally informs many aspects of their ideas and practices. From a genuine concern for the well-being of the common people, whose lives were endangered by the ongoing conflicts, they developed arguments against military aggression between states, they presented these argu-ments to belligerent heads of state, hoping to dissuade them from launch-ing attacks, and they came to the rescue of weaker cities and states under attack, offering their knowledge of defense tactics and weaponry. our main source for mohist ideas and practices is the Mozi, in which warfare

* this essay was written under the financial support of a grant from the netherlands organisation for scientific research (nwo). it studies three chapters in the Mozi 墨子 that were probably, as graham puts it (Disputers of the Tao, 35), “written down from a com-mon oral tradition which may or may not go back to the discourses of mo-tzu [mozi] him-self.” their obscure provenance notwithstanding, i ascribe the views expressed in these chapters to “mozi,” because so does the Chinese text. in so doing, i do not suggest that the views can be traced to a historical mozi, nor do i want to bypass the complex textual history of the Mozi. my motivation is merely aesthetic: “mozi argues” is more pleasing to the eye than “those who created this Mozi passage argue,” even if the latter reflects the necessary historical prudence. unless indicated otherwise, all translations in this essay are my own. they are based on a dutch translation of the three Mozi chapters that i made in collaboration with burchard mansvelt beck. when retranslating select passages into English for this paper, i consulted the translations of mei, The Ethical and Political Works of Motse; watson, Mo-tzu, Basic Writings; and Johnston, The “Mozi.” i am indebted to their work but do not systematically indicate where my translations draw upon or deviate from theirs. i presented earlier versions of this essay in leiden, bonn, and oxford, and i am thankful for all questions and comments received at those meetings. i am also grateful to Katia Chirkova, Carine defoort, Chris Fraser, ting-mien lee, Hui-chieh loy, nicolas standaert, griet vankeerberghen, and sara vantournhout, who read earlier versions of this essay and provided insightful comments and suggestions.

70 paul van els

is a recurrent topic. to give a few examples: three chapters, all titled “Fei gong” 非攻 (against military aggression), fervidly condemn offensive war-fare (Mozi 17–19). another chapter narrates how mozi walked for ten days and nights to dissuade the king of one state from attacking another state (Mozi 50). and the final chapters of the book, with titles such as “bei ti” 備梯 (Preparing against ladders), give detail on the technical aspects of city defense (Mozi 52–71).1 this essay focuses on the three “against military aggression” chapters, that is, on the theoretical foundation rather than the practical application of the mohists’ military views.

“Fei gong” is known as one of the ten core doctrines of mozi and his group. in the received Mozi, these ten basic teachings are presented in the so-called triplet chapters, each triplet consisting of three distinct chap-ters with both similarities and differences in wording and reasoning. as one of the most prominent teachings of the mohists, the “against military aggression” doctrine features prominently in current publications on the Mozi. scholars often quote freely from one or more of the three chapters, so as to present a coherent description of mozi’s stance on warfare. such descriptions usually treat the three chapters as one homogeneous unit and pay no attention to the differences between them.2 other scholars focus specifically on the differences between the three chapters, so as to explain the extraordinary threefold structure of the ten mohist core doctrines and the complex relationship between the chapters in each triplet. one expla-nation, the “three-sects theory,” holds that the triplets were written by three different groups of mozi’s followers. another explanation, currently more popular, is the “sequence theory,” which sees a temporal develop-ment between the chapters in each triplet. both explanations rely mainly (though not exclusively) on textual evidence: differences in wording, grammatical patterns, and so on.3 besides textual differences, however, there are also notable conceptual differences within the triplets. these

1 For more on these chapters, see yates, “the mohists on warfare”; or Johnston’s trans-lation, The “Mozi,” 731–921.

2 For examples, see mei, Motse: The Neglected Rival of Confucius, 94–102; or geisser, Mo Ti, 77–79. more recently, Fu, China’s Legalists, 30, sums up mozi’s doctrine of nonaggres-sion by simply saying that war does not “bring any benefit but only impose[s] hardship on the common people.” similarly, nivison, “the Classical Philosophical writings,” 763, summarizes the three chapters in a couple of lines, glossing over any differences between them, to present the mohists as “pacifists of a sort.”

3 in his study of grammatical features and differences in wording between the Core Chapters, graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, proposes the three-sects theory. in more recent studies, others argue for a sequence theory instead: a. taeko brooks, “the mician Ethical Chapters”; a. taeko brooks, “the Fragment theory of mz 14, 17 and 20”; Fraser,

how to end wars with words 71

receive little attention in the literature. For example, only a handful of scholars note that the three “Fei gong” chapters contain different argu-ments and possibly address different audiences.4 such important obser-vations regarding the conceptual differences in the “Fei gong” triplet are often made in a much broader Mozi context (such as an encyclopedia entry on mozi’s thought or the introduction to a translation of the Mozi). in my view, these inspiring publications signal the need for a systematic study of the different lines of argumentation in this triplet. this essay is an attempt to meet this need.

my study of Mozi chapters 17, 18, and 19 proceeds from two preliminary considerations:

1. i treat the three chapters as distinct textual units. this is not self-evident. words, phrases, and even entire passages in these chapters are corrupt, and a few phrases or passages occur with minor differences in more than one chapter. moreover, it has been suggested (and persuasively refuted) that Mozi 17 was originally part of another chapter, Mozi 26; and there is evidence that Mozi 19 contains different layers, some written earlier than others.5 these complexities notwithstanding, each of the three chapters displays a remarkable conceptual coherence, a clear line of argumentation, which indicates that the chapters form closed textual units in the eyes of whoever created them, be they mozi, his followers, or later editors.

2. i discuss the three chapters in what the majority of scholars now con-sider to be their chronological order: First Mozi 17, which is the oldest chapter; then Mozi 18, which is somewhat younger; and finally Mozi 19, which is the youngest of the three.6 notably, this sequential order,

“doctrinal developments in the Mozi 墨子 Jian ai 兼愛 triad”; desmet, “the growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi.”

4 For descriptions of different arguments in these chapters, see lowe, Mo Tzu’s Reli-gious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 107–115; a. taeko brooks. “mwòdž 17–79 非攻 ‘against war’ ”; loy, “mozi (mo-tzu) (c. 400s–300s bCE)”; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” xlvii–xlix. some suggest that these chapters were written for different audiences: brooks, “mz 17–19”; Fraser, “is mz 17 a Fragment of mz 26?,” 124; and loy, “mozi (mo-tzu) (c. 400s–300s bCE).”

5 Mozi 17 does not start with the standard formula “our master mozi, says” 子墨子曰 (or 子墨子言曰), which is one of the reasons why graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, 3–4, argues that Mozi 17 was originally part of another chapter, Mozi 26. Fraser, “is mz 17 a Fragment of mz 26?,” 122–123 persuasively refutes graham’s argument. For a textual analy-sis of Mozi 19, showing different layers, see desmet, “all good things Come in threes,” 124–146.

6 this sequential order is quite plausible, if only because the three chapters in this order display an increased use of grammatical compounds, which accords with broader

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however plausible, is not pertinent to my argument, for my primary concern is not the historical relationship of these chapters but the con-ceptual differences between them.

a quick glance at the three chapters shows striking differences. one cru-cial difference is their usage of the term “to attack” (gong 攻).7 in Mozi 17, the term occurs a mere three times. all three occurrences are in the verb-object construction “to attack a state” (gong guo 攻國). in Mozi 18, the term occurs about two dozen times. aside from a few occurrences in verb-object constructions (such as “to attack the state of Qi” 攻齊), most occurrences are in the noun phrase “warfare marked by attack” (gong zhan 攻戰), “military aggression” or “offensive warfare” in a more natural translation). this suggests that Mozi 18 condemns, not merely the practice of one state attacking another state, but the conceptualized idea of offen-sive warfare, possibly as distinct from other types of warfare. in Mozi 19, the term likewise occurs nearly two dozen times. this chapter also argues against offensive warfare, but the preferred terminology here is not “war-fare marked by attack” (gong zhan 攻戰) (which occurs not even once), but “to attack and to strike” (gong fa 攻伐). this shift in the choice of terminology possibly suggests that the chapters were created by different people, or different groups of people, who do not necessarily approach warfare from exactly the same angle.

not only do the three chapters differ in their usage of “to attack,” but other recurrent terms likewise vary. some keywords appear frequently in one chapter but hardly or not at all in the other chapters, as this table shows:8

linguistic trends of that period. (see desmet, “the growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi,” on the value of such compounds as criteria for dating texts.) this sequence also explains the increasing length of the chapters (17 shortest, 18 intermediate, 19 longest) and the amplified opposition to mozi’s ideas (no opponents in chapter 17 to fierce debate in chapter 19). and finally, the sequence explains the shift in the use of the term “to benefit” (li 利), from a negative, selfish benefit in Mozi 17 to a positive, altruistic benefit in Mozi 19, a shift that is also witnessed in Mozi 14–16, the “inclusive Care” triplet that is closely related to the “against military aggression” triplet. (For more on the term “to profit/benefit,” see Fraser, “doctrinal developments in the Mozi 墨子 ‘Jian’ai’ 兼愛 triad,” 4; or defoort, “the Profit that does not Profit.”).

7 this term is also rendered as “offensive warfare” or “military aggression” in English.8 i noted these keywords in the course of translating the three chapters, for they appear

to stand out as terminology specific to each of these chapters. the table lists only the absolute frequencies of the keywords. if we adjust these frequencies for the relative sizes of the three chapters (roughly 1:3:5), the differences would be even more salient. notably, the frequency of the word “to count” (shu 數) does not include its occurrences in the


Keywords Mozi 17 Mozi 18 Mozi 19

“humaneness” (ren 仁) 4 — 2“righteousness” (yi 義) 21 — 9“to harm others” (kui ren 虧人) 6 — —“crime” (zui 罪) 6 — 2“to calculate” ( ji 計) — 5 1“to count” (shu 數) — 8 4“countless” (bu ke sheng shu 不可勝數)

— 9 2

“ghosts” (gui 鬼) — 1 11“spirits” (shen 神) — 1 9“Heaven” (tian 天) — — 25

these keywords are interesting for two reasons: (1) their different frequen-cies of occurrence are revealing. Keywords typical for Mozi 17 are absent in Mozi 18, and vice versa, and Mozi 19 contains some keywords from both Mozi 17 and Mozi 18 but also features keywords that do not appear in the other two chapters. this possibly suggests that the first two chapters were created independently of each other, and that the third chapter may have been created with one or both of the other chapters in mind. (2) the keywords within each chapter by and large belong to the same semantic field. as such, the combination of keywords in each chapter appears to represent one theme, or one topic of argumentation.

more specifically, Mozi 17 repeatedly speaks of humaneness and righ-teousness, it worries about the harm done to people, and it labels war-fare a crime. this suggests that the chapter approaches warfare from the angle of what is morally right or wrong. i call this the “moral argument.” Mozi 18 is all about counting and calculating, as it quantifies the costs and benefits of a military campaign. i call this the “economic argument.” Mozi 19 speaks of ghosts and spirits and repeatedly claims that warfare harms the interests of Heaven. i call this the “religious argument.” in sum, the keywords suggest that the mohists did not uphold just one argument against military aggression. instead, they actively pursued different lines of argumentation, possibly to persuade different audiences.

in the following sections i shall individually discuss each of the three lines of argumentation, with extensive reference to the original text in

formulaic expression “countless” (bu ke sheng shu 不可勝數), and the frequency of the word “Heaven” (tian 天) does not include its occurrences in the formula “all under Heaven” (tianxia 天下), in this essay also translated as “the world”.

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translation. i explore what the argument in each of the three chapters entails, to whom it may have been addressed, and how persuasive it is from a modern academic perspective. to contextualize the three lines of argumentation, i occasionally refer to other parts of the Mozi and to other early Chinese politico-philosophical writings. in the final section, i give examples of how these arguments were used in practice, at least accord-ing to the anecdotes in the latter part of the received Mozi. my ultimate goal is to show how the mohists actively adapted their argumentative strategies so as to find the best words to end wars.

The Moral Argument

the first of the three “Fei gong” chapters, Mozi 17, is a short essay that criticizes unprovoked military offensives between states and specifically targets “the gentlemen of the world” 天下之君子 for rejoicing about such practices. in this chapter, mozi unilaterally expresses his views; opponents are not given the opportunity to respond. in plain words and clear logic, mozi rejects military aggression as unethical, or even criminal. His rhe-torical tour de force opens with a step-by-step argument that leads from minor offenses to major felony and eventually to the inevitable conclu-sion that warfare is the worst of all crimes:

今有一人，入人園圃，竊其桃李。衆聞則非之。上爲政者得則罰之。此何也？以虧人自利也。至攘人犬豕雞豚者。其不義又甚入人園圃竊桃李。是何故也？以虧人愈多。苟虧人愈多，其不仁茲甚，罪益厚。至入人欄廄，取人馬牛者。其不義又甚攘人犬豕雞豚。此何故也？以其虧人愈多。苟虧人愈多，其不仁茲甚，罪益厚。至殺不辜人也，扡其衣裘、取戈劍者。其不義又甚入人欄廄取人馬牛。此何故也？以其虧人愈多。苟虧人愈多。其不仁茲甚矣，罪益厚。當此，天下之君子皆知而非之，謂之不義。今至大爲攻國，則弗知非。從而譽之，謂之義。此何謂知義與不義之別乎？

suppose you enter someone’s orchard and pick a peach or a plum. when the people hear about it, they will condemn it. when the authorities catch you, they will punish you. why? because you harm the other to benefit yourself.

now suppose you seize someone’s dog, pig, chicken, or piglet. this unrighteous act is worse than picking a peach or a plum from someone’s orchard. why? because you cause greater harm to the other. the greater harm you cause to the other, the greater your lack of humaneness and the graver your crime.

and now suppose you enter someone’s stable and seize a horse or an ox. this unrighteous act is even worse than seizing someone’s dog, pig, chicken,


or piglet. why? because you cause greater harm to the other. the greater harm you cause to the other, the greater your lack of humaneness and the graver your crime.

and finally, suppose you kill an innocent man, strip him of his fur coat, and appropriate his spear or sword. this unrighteous act is far worse than entering someone’s stable and seizing a horse or an ox. why? because you cause far greater harm to the other. the greater harm you cause to the other, the greater your lack of humaneness and the graver your crime.

up to this point, the gentlemen of the world know enough to condemn such acts and brand them as unrighteous. yet when it comes to the grav-est act of attacking other states, they do not know enough to condemn it. instead, they applaud it and call it righteous. How can we say they know the difference between righteous and unrighteous? (17: 30/17–24)

this passage is immediately followed by a similar line of argumentation, in which the crime of murder increases in gravity:

殺一人謂之不義，必有一死罪矣。若以此說往: 殺十人十重不義, 必有十死罪矣; 殺百人百重不義，必有百死罪矣。當此，天下之君子皆知而非之，謂之不義。今至大爲不義攻國，則弗知非。從而譽之，謂之義。

if you kill a man, you are branded as unrighteous and must pay for this crime with your own life. reasoning along these lines: if you kill ten people, you are ten times as unrighteous and should pay for these crimes with ten lives; and if you kill a hundred people, you are a hundred times as unrigh-teous and should pay for these crimes with a hundred lives.

up to this point, the gentlemen of the world know enough to condemn such acts and brand them as unrighteous. yet when it comes to the gravest form of unrighteousness, attacking other states, they do not know enough to condemn it. instead, they applaud it and call it righteous. (17: 30/26–28)

the first of these two passages opens with the observation that even minor offenses, such as stealing fruit, are widely recognized as both reprehensi-ble and punishable, because such offenses contravene the public’s sense of justice and breach the laws. those who commit petty larceny enrich themselves at the cost of others, which is why “the people” (zhong 衆) condemn the theft and “the authorities” (shang wei zheng zhe 上爲政者) punish the thief. with both the people and the authorities on his side, it is virtually impossible to disagree with the very foundation of mozi’s moral argument. moreover, each new step in these two passages follows seemingly logically from the preceding step: from fruit, to small animals, to larger animals, and so on; from one person, to ten people, and so on. this means that whoever agrees with the foundation of mozi’s argument must also accept the conclusion. that is, whoever rejects small crimes

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must also reject larger crimes and ultimately reject warfare as the worst of all crimes.

some of mozi’s contemporaries nonetheless fail to follow his argument all the way through. they do not take the ultimate step of rejecting war-fare. mozi accuses these people, whom he disdainfully refers to as “the gentlemen of the world,” of applying double standards: they condemn minor wrongdoings but support what he considers the gravest wrongdo-ing of all. such people are obviously “confused in their moral judgment,” as lowe notes.9

who are these morally confused gentlemen of the world? robins iden-tifies them as “men distinguished by their social and political power,” whose group includes “rulers and other members of the nobility, though probably many were not strictly noble.”10 the ruling elites upheld views and customs that mozi and his followers, emerging from outside the elite circles, criticized as unserviceable to the well-being of the common peo-ple. robins convincingly shows that the elites are the main opponents of the mohists, at least in the early stages of their movement. as such, the elites also serve as the main addressees of Mozi 17. Clues in this chapter help us determine more specifically who these men were and what it was about them that bothered mozi and his group. with a hint of sarcasm, the chapter discusses the views of the gentlemen of the world on military aggression:

情不知其不義也，故書其言以遺後世。若知其不義也，夫奚說書其不義以遺後世哉？

they must truly fail to see how unrighteous it is, for they commit their words to writing, so as to hand on to later generations. if they knew how unrigh-teous it is, then how do we explain that they commit this kind of unrigh-teousness to writing, so as to hand on to later generations? (17: 30/28–29)

Evidently, while Mozi 17 condemns the unprovoked aggression between states, more importantly it criticizes people who fail to condemn such aggression—that is, people who write about the glory of warfare and fail to see the injustice of it. in all likelihood, the “words committed to writ-ing” in this passage refer to the records kept by the elites about their deeds and achievements, in which they note for posterity, presumably without the slightest bit of guilt, how their clan fought and won wars. Hence, in

9 lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 109.10 robins, “the moists and the gentlemen of the world,” 386.


my view, this chapter mainly argues against an elite culture that upholds a self-sustaining rationale that justifies or even encourages war.

mozi’s moral argument aims to counter the prevalent hawkish ratio-nale by rejecting the commonly made distinction between crime and war. He claims that war is no different from ordinary crime, only graver. this is a novel idea in the context in which mozi and his followers operated. many thinkers in those days, such as Confucius and mencius, were critical of warfare but they never branded it a crime. the idea is also revolution-ary in that it puts the ruler on a par with his people. in mozi’s view, moral standards and criminal laws apply to both the people and their ruler, and whoever breaches the law shall be punished. there are, however, two problems with this argument.

the first problem is that while this chapter condemns the practice of one state “attacking another state,” it does not explain what this means nor does it distinguish between different possible motives for attacking. this lack of precision, combined with the forceful tone of the argument, easily leads to the impression that mozi rejects all kinds of warfare, an impression shared by some of his and some of our contemporaries.11 but even without a definition of “to attack,” the parallel lines of argumenta-tion in this chapter allow us to infer what is meant by the term. similar to entering someone’s premises to steal fruit or animals or taking someone’s life to steal clothes or weapons, mozi here speaks of entering someone’s state and willfully sacrificing human lives for the purpose of gaining booty or territory. in the first line of argumentation, mozi explicitly condemns the killing of “an innocent person.” the word “innocent” seems redundant here, as one would normally find any robbery with murder reprehensible, whether or not the victim has a clean slate. that mozi explicitly criti-cizes the killing of innocent people implies that he exclusively condemns attacks on “innocent” states, that is, states led by rulers who pose no threat to their own population or to the region. notably, mozi does not mention defensive warfare or condemn wars against “guilty” states. in fact, i would even argue that mozi is not ill-disposed toward the latter. the opening lines of Mozi 17 clearly state that authorities punish guilty people, such as those who steal fruit. by extension, it seems that guilty rulers may likewise be punished. Hence, the chapter can be said to contain implicit support

11 For mozi’s contemporaries, see the opponents mentioned in this chapter. For our contemporaries, see, e.g., Fu, China’s Legalists, 30, who straightforwardly labels mozi “an active pacifist.”

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for military action against rogue states, even when it explicitly brands any other kind of military aggression as a crime.

the second and related problem is that mozi accuses the ruling elites of inappropriately distinguishing between crime, which they condemn, and war, which they applaud. mozi argues that stealing goods and attacking states are essentially the same and merely differ in the degree of harm inflicted upon others. but there may be a reason why people distinguish between the two. Crime normally takes place within the context of one state and can be handled by the judiciary system of that state. a mag-istrate decides if someone should be punished for stealing fruit or not. but who decides whether or not the attack on a state is justified? and more importantly, who is capable of enforcing punishment if the attack is decided to be unjustified? in cross-border conflicts, when the judiciary systems of individual states fall short, there is need for a universal and objective entity that is above both adversaries. in mozi’s day, the zhou clan was no longer able to serve as arbiter. Conversely, the waning power of their dynasty had given rise to the armed competition among subordi-nate states that were vying to succeed the zhou. while mozi loathes the hawkish rhetoric and endless battles that dominated his days, in Mozi 17 he does not identify a universal and objective judiciary entity that is capa-ble of deciding whether an attack is a justifiable punishment of a rogue state or a loathsome expedition for more goods or grounds. without this universal and objective judiciary body, mozi can only appeal to the rul-ing elites’ sense of humaneness and righteousness, in the hope that they extend the moral standards that are effective in their state to their relation with other states. given the hawkish attitude that mozi identifies among “the gentlemen of the world,” this appeal probably yielded little result.

The Economic Argument

the second of the three “Fei gong” chapters, Mozi 18, is an essay of inter-mediate size that includes counterarguments by those who resist mozi’s opposition to offensive warfare. these opponents are not named, nor are they referred to as “the gentlemen of the world.” instead, they are labeled as “those who put a pleasing façade upon military aggression” (shi gong zhan zhe 飾攻戰者). it is unclear if these opponents were actual histori-cal figures or fictional characters made up for rhetorical purposes by mozi and his followers. Either way, their counterarguments lead to heated dis-cussion in this chapter.


the chapter opens and closes with quotations of ancient sayings. For example: “when the plan you made does not work, then observe the past to know what is ahead and observe the visible to know what is hidden” 謀而不得，則以往知來，以見知隱 (18: 31/9–10). one man’s fault may be another man’s lesson, these sayings appear to say, as they encourage people to learn from past mistakes. this emphasis on the past leads some scholars to see the argument in this chapter as historical.12 the chapter is indeed interspersed with historical anecdotes. then again, so is the next chapter (Mozi 19). moreover, the function of the anecdotes in this chap-ter is to illustrate a more fundamental idea, namely that warfare is an extravagant waste of resources.

Chapter 18 does not address the morally confused elites (as does Mozi 17) but specifically targets those who make plans for the state (as in the ancient saying quoted above) and who are in a position to decide whether or not to go to war. in trying to argue policy makers out of engaging in warfare, this chapter does not mention abstract ethical notions such as “humaneness” or “righteousness”, nor does it brand warfare a crime (as does Mozi 17). instead, it focuses on two very concrete aspects of war-fare: gain and loss. the central message of the chapter is clear: in war, the anticipated gain never outweighs the guaranteed loss. because this chapter is mainly concerned with a careful calculation of gain and loss, i call this the economic argument. the word “economic” here refers to the careful, efficient, and prudent management of the resources of a state. one way to use these resources in a responsible manner and avoid unnec-essary waste or expense, mozi argues, is to stop wars.

mozi’s economic argument comes in what i consider three subargu-ments. He claims that in war (1) loss outweighs gain, (2) losers outnumber winners, and (3) even winners eventually become losers. i now outline each of these subarguments to show how they combine to form mozi’s economic argument.

Loss Outweighs Gain

in the first part of the chapter, mozi suggests that the belligerent rulers of his day are fixated on expected gain and conveniently overlook the

12 lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 109; Johnston, The “Mozi,” xlviii.

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extensive costs of a military campaign. to counterbalance this one-sided fixation, he offers a detailed quantification of the costs involved:

今嘗計軍上。竹箭羽旄幄幕甲盾撥劫，往而靡弊腑冷不反者，不可勝數；又與矛戟戈劍乘車，其列住碎折靡弊而不反者，不可勝數。與其牛馬肥而往，瘠而反，往死亡而不反者，不可勝數。與其涂道之脩遠，糧食輟絕而不繼，百姓死者，不可勝數也；與其居處之不安，食飲之不時，飢飽之不節。百姓之道疾病而死者, 不可勝數。喪師多不可勝數，喪師盡不可勝計。則是鬼神之喪其主后，亦不可勝數。

now let us calculate the costs of a military expedition.13 arrows, flags, tents, armor, shields, sword hilts—countless quantities are taken on a campaign, where they wear, tear, rust, and rot, never to return again. spears, lances, swords, poniards, chariots, carts—countless quantities are taken on a cam-paign, where they break, burst, rust, and rot, never to return again. oxen and horses—countless quantities start out fat and come back lean, or perish and do not return at all. Countless people will die because of the long journey or the shortage of food supply. Countless people will fall ill and die on the way because the encampments are unsafe, they do not eat and drink at proper times, and appetite and satiation are poorly attuned to one another. Count-less troops will be lost in large numbers or perish entirely. as a result, also countless spirits will lose their worshipers. (18: 31/12–17)

the wide range of the expenditure is impressive, and the listed costs display an increasing value: materials > animals > humans > spirits. the diverse materials required for a military campaign (weapons, vehicles, tents) are extensive, but with enough financial resources, these goods can be replaced. animals are more costly, for they take time to breed and are expensive to replace. Human lives, in mozi’s eyes, are precious, and even more so are their spirits. in the early Chinese worldview, the spirit of a sol-dier who dies on the battlefield, far from home, cannot be worshiped and turns into a hungry ghost, haunting the family and disrupting the cosmic and social order. if possible, this should be prevented at all costs.

mozi is obviously concerned with the effects of warfare on the popula-tion, a concern to which “those who put a pleasing façade upon military aggression” must be oblivious, for they attack other states irrespective of the number of casualties. what, then, do they expect to gain? mozi men-tions two probable motives for warfare: fame and territory. He fumes at the first motive, because “when we calculate what they gain for them-selves, it has no use whatsoever” 計其所自勝，無所可用也 (18: 31/20).

13 For “military expedition,” i follow sun yirang in reading 軍出 instead of 軍上.


given that fame does not bring the state any tangible gain, mozi does not waste another word on it. as for the second motive, he notes that the net proceeds of an attack are always negative, since conquering even a single walled fortification costs at least thousands of lives:

今攻三里之城，七里之郭。攻此不用銳，且無殺而徒得此然也。殺人多必數於萬，寡必數於千，然後三里之城，七里之郭，且可得也。

suppose you laid siege to a city with inner walls measuring three miles and outer walls measuring seven miles.14 if you were able to take this city by attacking without the use of weapons and without shedding blood, it would be okay. in reality, taking a city with inner walls measuring three miles and outer walls measuring seven miles is possible only if the number of casual-ties at best runs into the thousands, and in the worst case tens of thousands die. (18: 31/21–22)

the idea that sieges are pointless finds support in an unexpected source. the Art of War (Bingfa 兵法), the famous military-strategic text ascribed to sunzi 孫子, states that “the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities” 其下攻城.15 there is, however, one notable difference between the military strategist and the political thinker. whereas sunzi criticizes sieges as a military-strategic mistake, mozi sees them as an economic error. He argues that sacrificing people to gain territory is inherently illogical, for territory is what rulers had in abundance, while people were in short supply:

今盡王民之死，嚴下上之患，以爭虛城，則是棄所不足，而重所有餘也。爲政若此，非國之務者也。

if you send your subordinates to certain death and aggravate disaster among superiors and inferiors, with the sole purpose of capturing a town in ruins, you waste what you so desperately need so that you may increase what you already have in abundance. with policies such as these, you render a dis-service to the state. (18: 31/24–25)

in sum, these passages serve as a powerful reminder that any potential benefits from a military campaign will not be great enough to offset the various costs involved. this reminder is meant to dissuade warmongers, whose picture of war is often too rosy, from going into battle. while mozi’s

14 these measurements may seem overly precise, but a similar city is described in Men-cius 4.1. see lau, Mencius, 85. this may have been a standard way of referring to a city of a certain size.

15 giles, Sun Tzu on the Art of War, 18.

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cost-benefit analysis may seem solid, “those who put a pleasing façade upon military aggression” do not throw in the towel just yet.

Losers Outnumber Winners

in the next part of the chapter, mozi’s opponents mention four states (Chu 楚, yue 越, Qi 齊, Jin 晉) that started out small but increased both their territory and their population through military campaigns. with these examples, they challenge mozi’s claim that an expansion of territory necessarily entails a reduction in population. in his own typical way, mozi identifies their claim as a fallacy of converse accident, an unfair general-ization (“warfare is effective”) based on a small number of examples:

雖四五國則得利焉，猶謂之非行道也。譬若醫之藥人之有病者然。今有醫於此，和合其祝藥之于天下之有病者而藥之。萬人食此，若醫四五人得利焉，猶謂之非行藥也。故孝子不以食其親, 忠臣不以食其君。古者封國於天下。尚者以耳之所聞。近者以目之所見。以攻戰亡者不可勝數。

Even if four or five states drew benefit from it, we would still call this an ineffective method. Compare it with a doctor who treats people with an illness. suppose this doctor prescribes a uniform drug to all the sick in the world. if ten thousand took it and only four or five drew benefit from it, we would still call this an ineffective medicine. a filial son would not admin-ister it to his parents, nor would a loyal subject administer it to his ruler. now, in ancient times the empire was divided into many small states. some existed long ago and are known only through stories. some existed until recently and perished in front of our eyes. Either way, countless states have vanished due to military aggression. (18: 32/4–7)

For each triumphant state, mozi argues, numerous weaker ones perished. with a ratio of four or five to ten thousand, the chances of winning are statistically minimal. rulers who hold up the example of the historical suc-cesses of Chu, yue, Qi, and Jin while ignoring the numerous vanquished states adopt a highly one-sided reading of history. the successes of these few states are no guarantee for other states.

there are two problems with mozi’s argumentation. First, the chance of a triumphant attack may be minimal, but it is not nil. although, statis-tically speaking, rulers had better take note of the thousands of perished states rather than focus on the handful of successful ones, the incentive still exists to strive for the power and glory of the triumphant few. second, and more important, the argument would have worked if the thousands of states had perished as aggressors. in actual fact, some of the smaller and weaker states were annexed by larger and stronger ones. Hence, this argu-


ment could even be taken as an encouragement for states to grow large and strong, so as to prevent annexation by other states. not surprisingly, mozi’s opponents picked up on this flaw in his argumentation.

Even Winners Eventually Become Losers

in the final part of the chapter, mozi’s opponents claim they can avoid the sad fate of the vanquished states by making effective use of their popula-tion, as allegedly did the few victorious states. Even this justification of warfare cannot convince mozi, because employing the people well is not the same as treating them well, and good treatment of the masses is para-doxically made impossible by successful warfare:

子雖能收用子之衆，子豈若古者吳闔閭哉？古者吳闔閭教士七年。奉甲執兵，奔三百里而舍焉。次注林，出於冥隘之徑，戰於柏舉，中楚國而朝宋與魯。及至夫差之身，北而攻齊，舍於汶上，戰於艾陵，大敗齊人而葆之大山。東而攻越。濟三江五湖，而葆之會稽。九夷之國莫不賓服。於是退不能賞孤，施舍群萌。自恃其力, 伐其功，譽其智，怠於教，遂築姑蘇之臺，七年不成。及若此，則吳有離罷之心。越王句踐視吳上下不相得，收其衆以復其讎。入北郭，徙大舟，圍王宮。而吳國以亡。

no matter how capable you are in employing the masses, are you as capable as King Helü from the ancient state of wu? King Helü drilled his troops for seven years. wearing armor and carrying weapons, they could march a hundred miles a day before encamping for the night. He pitched a camp at zhulin, emerged from the narrow pass at ming’ai, and fought a battle at boju. He subdued Chu and forced the states of song and lu to surrender. then his son, King Fuchai, succeeded to the throne and attacked the state of Qi in the north. He pitched a camp on the wen river, fought a battle at ailing, defeated Qi, and forced its soldiers to retreat to mount tai. in the east he attacked the state of yue. He led the army to cross the three rivers and the Five lakes and forced the soldiers of yue to retreat to Kuaiji. all the barbarian states were subdued. yet when the war was over, he could not find it in his heart to console the families of those who died in battle or to distribute war booty among the people. He relied upon his might, exagger-ated his achievements, and praised his intelligence, but he neglected drilling his troops and had the gusu Palace built, which was not completed even in seven years. by then, the people of wu were disheartened and divided. seeing the friction between superior and subordinates in wu, King gou-jian from the neighboring state of yue mobilized his army to take revenge. they entered the city wall from the north, removed Fuchai’s royal boats, and encircled his palace. wu thereupon perished. (18: 32/17–23)

this passage describes the transition from war to postwar peace, and the psychology of the victor in this process. according to mozi, no one is able

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to hold one’s own when faced with the seductions of success. rulers may start out with the best intentions, but constant victories inevitably make them fall victim to arrogance and greed, because power corrupts and more power corrupts even more. For instance, the victorious ruler would not want to manage his enlarged realm from a humble abode but would desire an impressive palace that matches his newly acquired status. this only widens the distance between ruler and masses, if only because the latter are forced to slave at constructing the new palace.

in sum, according to mozi’s economic argument, the negative payoff of military aggression will necessarily be larger than the positive payoff. the costs of a military offensive are high and the gains few, the chances of losing are many and the chances of winning few, and even the most victorious states eventually collapse. He therefore maintains that policy makers who against all odds decide to go to war render a disservice to the state. as it turns out, mozi and his opponents in this chapter argue from fundamentally different views on governance. His opponents believe that people serve the ruler, while mozi holds the opposite stance. where his opponents propose making effective use of the population for their own benefit, mozi wants them to distribute war booty among the people as a means to win their hearts and minds and thereby strengthen the state. but what ruler who attacks other states out of greed would be inclined to do so?

The Religious Argument

the third of the three “Fei gong” chapters, Mozi 19, is a lengthy essay in which mozi again argues with opponents. these opponents are probably comparable to the ones in the preceding chapter, but in chapter 19 they are more verbosely referred to as “rulers who delight in military aggres-sion and put a pleasing façade upon their bellicose rhetoric so as to criti-cize our master mozi” 好攻伐之君, 又飾其說以非子墨子 (19: 34/16). this explicit description suggests that the antiwar rhetoric by mozi and his followers had gained a firm foothold and attracted the attention of the ruling classes. as a result, the tone of the debate between mozi and opponents is fierce. the chapter opens with mozi’s suggestion that his opponents are utterly stupid:

今天下之所譽善者，其說將何哉？爲其上中天之利，而中中鬼之利，而下中人之利，故譽之與？意亡非爲其上中天之利，而中中鬼之利，而下中人之利，故譽之與？雖使下之愚人，必曰將爲其上中天之利，而中中鬼之利，而下中人之利，故譽之。


when the people in the world praise something as good, what is their rea-son? do they praise it because it benefits Heaven on high, the spirits in the middle realm, and the people below? or do they praise it because it does not benefit Heaven on high, the spirits in the middle realm, and the people below? Even the lowest fool still understands that they praise it because it benefits Heaven on high, the spirits in the middle realm, and the people below. (19: 33/12–15)

those who fail to understand that military aggression harms the interests of Heaven, spirits, and people, mozi insinuates, surpass even the lowest fool in stupidity. this is the first time in the “Fei gong” triplet that the Heaven–spirits–people trinity is mentioned.16 How does this trinity work? taylor explains that in mozi’s view “Heaven is an active force; it is capable of intervening in the world for the promulgation of its ways. such inter-vention takes the form of rewards and punishments. those who abide by the ways of Heaven are rewarded, and, in turn, those who reject Heaven suffer punishment.”17 in carrying out its retributive powers, Heaven is assisted by spirits, who serve as intermediaries between Heaven on high and the people on earth. we will see examples of how this works in the course of this section. For now, suffice it to say that given the crucial role of Heaven and the spirits in this chapter’s line of argumentation, i refer to it as the religious argument.

Having pointed out the stupidity of his opponents, mozi continues by saying that the ancient sage-kings abided by the ways of Heaven. in his version of the past, the sages ruled humanely and did not engage in unprovoked military aggression:

是故古之知者之爲天下度也，必順慮其義，而後爲之行。是以動則不疑，速通成得其所欲，而順天鬼百姓之利。則知者之道也！是故古之仁人有天下者，必反大國之說。一天下之和，總四海之內。焉率天下之百姓，以農臣事上帝山川鬼神。利人多，功故又大。是以天賞之，鬼富之，人譽之。使貴爲天子，富有天下。名參乎天地, 至今不廢。此則知者之道也，先王之所以有天下者也。

therefore, the wise men in ancient times, when outlining a policy for the world, carefully contemplated whether it was righteous, and only then would they implement it. this way, they could act with determination, meet the needs of people far away and nearby, and bring benefit to Heaven, the spirits, and the people. such is the way of the wise! Hence, the humane men who long ago possessed the world resolutely rejected any rhetoric of expanding the realm. instead, they united the world in harmony, and they brought together

16 the trinity does occur in other Core Chapters, such as Mozi 10, 26, 27, and 28.17 taylor, “religion and utilitarianism,” 340.

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all within the four seas. they led the people in serving and honoring the lord on high and the spirits and ghosts of mountains and rivers. the more benefit they brought to the people, the greater their achievements. Heaven therefore rewarded them, the spirits enriched them, and the people praised them. they were honored with the rank of son of Heaven, and all the worldly wealth fell to them. they shared the same reputation as Heaven and Earth and are remembered to this day. such is the way of the ancient wise and the reason why the early kings held possession of the whole world. (19: 33/17–21)

the degenerate rulers of mozi’s own time are in no way comparable to the sages:

今王公大人、天下之諸侯則不然！將必皆差論其爪牙之士，比列其舟車之卒伍，於此爲堅甲利兵，以往攻伐無罪之國。入其國家邊境，芟刈其禾稼，斬其樹木，墮其城郭，以湮其溝池，攘殺其牲牷，燔潰其祖廟，勁殺其萬民，覆其老弱，遷其重器。卒進而柱乎鬥，曰：「死命爲上。多殺次之。身傷者爲下。又況失列北橈乎哉，罪死無赦！」以譂其衆。

How different are the kings, nobles, and dignitaries, all the feudal lords of today! they dispatch their best soldiers, arrange their boats and chariot forces, and equip them with strong armor and sharp weapons to attack innocent states. they cross the borders of those states, cutting down grain fields, felling trees and woods, tearing down city walls, filling up ditches and ponds, slaughtering cattle, setting ablaze the ancestral temples, mas-sacring the people, exterminating the aged and the weak, and carrying off treasures and valuables. they force their soldiers to move forward and fight by saying: “bravest are those who are killed in action. next are those who kill many enemy combatants. lowest are those who are wounded in battle. and whoever leaves the ranks and flees will be executed without mercy!” so their soldiers are kept in fear. (19: 33/23–27)

mozi makes it perfectly clear that whoever indulges in attack and annex-ation will never be revered as a sage-king. but his opponents deliver a clever rejoinder. they acknowledge the existence of ancient sages and even name three examples: yu 禹, founder of the Xia dynasty; tang 湯, founder of the shang dynasty; and King wu 武王, founder of the zhou dynasty. they then cleverly observe that these distinguished kings, held in esteem by mozi too, founded their dynasties by attacking and ousting the last rulers of the preceding dynasties. so why are these three heads of state, in spite of their military offensives, still revered as sage-kings? in what appears to be an irritated tone, mozi replies:

子未察吾言之類，未明其故者也。彼非所謂攻，所謂誅也。

you have not examined the nuances of my theories nor grasped the under-lying reasoning. what these three kings did is not called “to attack” but “to punish.” (19: 34/18)


mozi apparently distinguishes between “to attack” (gong 攻) and “to pun-ish” (zhu 誅). the former stands for assaults on innocent states, which Heaven condemns; the latter, for punitive action against guilty states, which Heaven conditionally supports, as we shall see.

although mozi criticizes his opponents for failing to understand the distinction between “offensive warfare” and “punitive warfare,” in all fairness he has not been clear about it. the distinction may have been explained in his oral teachings, but the written records of these teachings bear no witness to the fact. in the received Mozi, the usage of both terms is unclear. the term “to attack” (gong 攻) is used in various ways, but its precise meaning is not always clear. For instance, as i mentioned earlier, Mozi 17 condemns the practice of states attacking other states, but it does not explicitly distinguish between different possible motives for an attack, leaving it up to the reader to figure out that unprovoked assaults moti-vated by greed are meant here. the term “to punish” (zhu 誅) is not used in any of the three “Fei gong” chapters until mozi introduces it here. For instance, when mozi notes that authorities punish fruit thieves (Mozi 17), he uses the word fa 罰, not zhu 誅. in fact, the latter word does not occur very often in the Mozi, and when it does, it often simply means “to pun-ish” without any reference to warfare.18 notably, although mozi blames his opponents for not grasping the difference between “offensive warfare” and “punitive warfare,” he himself does not systematically observe the distinction. For instance, Mozi 49 encourages the practice of “attacking an unrighteous state” 攻不義之國 (49: 113/27). since this attack appears to serve as a punishment for that state’s unrighteous behavior, by mozi’s own terminology the term “to punish” would have been preferred here. in another example, Mozi 31 states that the exemplary ruler King wu “attacked the shang dynasty to punish the tyrannical ruler zhou” 攻殷誅紂 (31: 52/23). Here the terms “to attack” and “to punish” are compat-ible, not contrastive. Hence, mozi’s criticism of his opponents may not be entirely fair if he does not use the two terms consistently in his own teachings.19

18 the term “to punish” occurs several times in compounds such as “punishments and penalties” (zhu fa 誅罰) or in phrases such as “punishments by ghosts and spirits” (gui shen zhi zhu 鬼神之誅). in fact, the only time when it has a clear military connotation is in the phrase “outward punishing” (chu zhu 出誅, i.e. punishing other states), which is contrasted to “inward defending” (nei shou 内守, i.e. defending the homeland) in Mozi 9 and 12.

19 it may be the case, as Hui-chieh loy (personal communication) suggests, that pas-sages in which the two terms are compatible date from a period when the mohists had not yet settled on “to attack” and “to punish” as technical terms with clearly demarcated

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the distinction that mozi draws between “offensive warfare” and “puni-tive warfare” derives from a worldview that he shares with his contempo-raries, in which dynasties rule by virtue of the mandate of Heaven (tian ming 天命). once a dynasty fails to secure the well-being of the popula-tion and hence loses the right to govern, it has become “guilty” and may be replaced by a new, humane administration. according to this wide-spread belief, the Xia, shang, and zhou dynasties were founded in this way, after the alleged moral bankruptcy of the preceding dynasties. what are the signs of moral bankruptcy? mozi paints a clear picture. take his description of the dawn of the shang dynasty, when the exemplary King tang dethrones the tyrant Jie:

逮至乎夏王桀，天有誥命。日月不時，寒暑雜至，五穀焦死，鬼呼於國，鶴鳴十夕餘。天乃命湯於鑣宮，用受夏之大命 . . . 湯焉敢奉率其衆，是以鄉有夏之境，帝乃使陰暴毀有夏之城。少少有神來告曰：「夏德大亂，往攻之，予必使汝大堪之，予既受命於天。⸥ 天命融隆火，于夏之城閒西北之隅，湯奉桀衆以克有夏，屬諸侯於薄，薦章天命，通于四方，而天下諸侯莫敢不賓服。則此湯之所以誅桀也。

in the case of King Jie of the Xia dynasty, Heaven sent down its direst com-mand. sun and moon failed to appear at the proper time, winter and sum-mer came in confusion, all grains seared and died, ghosts wailed throughout the land, and cranes shrieked for more than ten nights. Heaven then com-missioned tang in the biao palace to receive the grand mandate that had been given to the Xia. . . . only then did tang dare to lead his troops to enter the borders of the Xia realm, while a deity destroyed the fortifications of the Xia with immeasurable force. soon afterward, a spirit appeared and reported to tang: “the Xia are in grave moral decay. go and attack them. i will make sure that you win, for i have my orders from Heaven!” Heaven then ordered zhurong to send down fire on the northwestern corner of the capital city of the Xia, so that tang, who had received the defecting multi-tudes of the tyrant Jie, could defeat the Xia. tang then summoned all the nobles to bo and made clear to them the mandate of Heaven, sending word of it to all quarters of the world, and none of the feudal lords in the world failed to do obeisance to him. this is how the sage-king tang punished the tyrant Jie. (19: 34/23–35/1)20

meanings. in that case, the contrastive use of “to attack” versus “to punish” in this chapter may well be prescriptive (i.e., enjoining people to use the terms in this new way) rather than straightforwardly following the conventional meaning.

20 the Chinese text of this passage is corrupt. it includes, for instance, a duplication of some phrases. my translation follows most of sun yirang’s suggestions.


in mozi’s account of how the sage-kings rose to power, Heaven steers the course of events. it assists soon-to-be kings in ousting tyrants who besmirched its mandate. in the mohist worldview, rulers must follow Heaven’s orders, for Heaven always commands what is beneficial to the world.21 the people in the world are the primary concern for Heaven, which encompasses all people irrespective of their origin and cares for them without distinction or discrimination.22 this idea is made explicit in the third of the “Fei gong” chapters, Mozi 19, which uses terms such as “Heaven’s men” (tian zhi ren 天之人) and “Heaven’s subjects” (tian min 天民). this terminology, which places the ownership of people with Heaven and not with individual rulers, enables mozi to highlight the para-doxical nature of warfare:

夫取天之人，以攻天之邑，此刺殺天民，剝振神之位，傾覆社稷，攘殺其犧牲，則此上不中天之利矣！

now, if you deploy Heaven’s men to attack Heaven’s towns, thereby mas-sacring Heaven’s subjects, driving out the spirits of their ancestors, over-throwing their altars of the soil and grain, and slaughtering their sacrificial animals, you bring no benefit to Heaven on high! (19: 33/28–29)

if all the people in the world belong to Heaven, as mozi claims, then war implies that one group of Heaven’s subjects (the inhabitants of one state) attacks another group of Heaven’s subjects (the inhabitants of another state). whichever state wins, Heaven always loses due to the casualties on both sides. therefore, in mozi’s view, Heaven would always reject “offensive warfare” and approve of “punitive warfare” only in exceptional cases, when all other options would cause even more suffering (e.g., when a tyrant causes starvation and death among the people).

mozi’s religious argument introduces Heaven as an objective standard, a universal guideline for moral conduct. High above the world, literally and figuratively, Heaven is in a position to decide whether or not an attack is morally justified, or even mandatory. in a time when numerous states competed with one another and each state claimed to be in the right, an objective standard was no luxury. the absence of an objective standard

21 the issue of whether or not mozi subscribes to a divine-command theory has led to heated debate among a number of scholars (e.g., ahern, vorenkamp, soles, duda). see duda, “reconsidering mo tzu on the Foundations of morality.”

22 this aspect of Heaven is mentioned in several places in the received Mozi, most notably in the “intention of Heaven” triplet, where we read that “since it accepts food from all people without discrimination, it must care for all people without discrimination” 苟兼而食焉，必兼而愛之 (28: 48/6–7).

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explains the application of double standards, of which mozi accuses “the gentlemen of the world” in Mozi 17. to put it differently, Heaven is the impartial arbiter that mozi was looking for in that chapter.23 in a conflict between two states, Heaven decides which of the antagonists is in the right and punishes the one who has done wrong. when a ruler reigns as a tyrant, Heaven wreaks havoc in his state as a sign that he has lost the mandate. simultaneously, Heaven indicates to a humane leader that he is chosen to overthrow the tyrant, for the mandate has been transferred to him. rulers who wish to attack and annex other states had better ascer-tain whether they have received Heaven’s support. if no unequivocal signs of approval have occurred, their attack lacks legitimacy. they may initially achieve successes, but eventually they will fail, as the example of Fuchai in the preceding chapter shows.

the religious argument may be mozi’s ultimate line of argumentation against military aggression, for it is based, not just on the public’s sense of justice (Mozi 17) or on a solid cost-benefit analysis (Mozi 18), but on the will of the almighty Heaven. whoever disagrees with mozi and con-tinues to proceed with unprovoked military offensives acts in opposition to Heaven and will receive due punishment. the argument nonetheless leaves many questions unanswered, especially with regard to Heaven’s intervention in the human world: How many signs should Heaven send down to signal the loss of the mandate? what would these signs look like? How can rulers be prevented from inventing signs or claiming ordinary natural phenomena as special signs from Heaven? this issue appears to be a major loophole in mozi’s argumentation. as benjamin wong and Hui-chieh loy point out, any ambitious ruler can claim that “spirits have visited him” and furthermore “contrive things so as to give the appear-ance that Heaven is on his side, and thus claim an even closer alignment between his actions and those of the sage-kings.”24 since so much depends on subjective interpretation, does the religious argument offer a way to determine objectively whether or not the actions of a ruler are just, and whether or not his military offensive is justified?

it appears that, contrary to what mozi suggests, there is no objective standard when Heaven’s signs have to be subjectively interpreted by man.25 mozi may have been aware of this, judging by the extraordinary

23 this is further proof that Mozi 17 predates Mozi 19 (see above), as the reverse order would make little sense.

24 b. wong and loy, “war and ghosts in mozi’s Political Philosophy,” 347.25 see also nicolas standaert’s essay in this volume.


historical examples he gives in which it is absolutely clear that warfare was necessary. His descriptions of the founding of the Xia, shang, and zhou dynasties are unique. no other text is known to contain descrip-tions of such dramatic intensity. while the stories may have been taken at face value in those days, it appears that mozi embroidered them with shocking elements (crying ghosts, shrieking birds, natural disasters, etc.) to make it virtually impossible for contemporary rulers to claim a similar situation. Hence, his religious argument is perhaps best seen as an “impos-sible test” that puts the bar for permissible wars unfeasibly high.26 if the contemporary situation in a state is not as deplorable as in mozi’s stories, Heaven obviously has not issued clearly identifiable signs that would jus-tify the invasion and annexation of that state. whoever does launch an attack without these signs (i.e., without the mandate of Heaven) acts in opposition to Heaven and is doomed to fail. the religious argument, then, ultimately depends on a belief in Heaven and spirits and on a belief in mozi’s version of history. but what can mozi do if bellicose rulers remain undaunted by his warnings?

The Dialogues

the three Core Chapters under discussion may be seen as the theoreti-cal foundation of mozi’s military views. Elsewhere in the received Mozi, we are shown how the different arguments were used in practice—if the recorded anecdotes are historically accurate. these anecdotes occur in the so-called dialogues (Mozi 46–49/50), which are filled with short con-versations between mozi and various followers and opponents. several conversations appear to draw from or build on the arguments proposed in the “Fei gong” triplet. most of these conversations are between mozi and lord wen of luyang 魯陽文君.

one passage, Mozi 49: 112/20–22, is essentially a summary of the moral argument. in words similar to those in Mozi 17, mozi tells lord wen that “the gentlemen of our times” 世俗之君子 understand small wrongdo-ings (crime) but fail to understand mistakes of greater magnitude (war). another passage, Mozi 46: 103/5–9, is reminiscent of the economic argu-ment: here mozi compares a ruler who has all the fertile lands he needs but still desires some remote areas of a neighboring state to a man who

26 i thank michael nylan (personal communication) for suggesting the term “impos-sible test.”

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cannot finish all the delicacies his chef prepares but still craves the cake of his neighbor. this comparison convinces lord wen into admitting that both are cases of “kleptomania” (qie ji 竊疾). another passage, in chapter 46, likewise invokes the economic argument, when mozi (perhaps some-what facetiously) compares the extravagant waste of resources in warfare to a little boy playing horse:

子墨子謂魯陽文君曰:「大國之攻小國，譬猶童子之為馬也。童子之為馬，足用而勞。今大國之攻小國也，攻者農夫不得耕，婦人不得織，以守為事。攻人者，亦農夫不得耕，婦人不得織，以攻為事。故大國之攻小國也，譬猶童子之為馬也。」

our master mozi told lord wen of luyang: “when a large state attacks a small state, this can be compared to a little boy playing horse. when a little boy plays horse, he exhausts himself by constantly running on his own legs. now, when a large state attacks a smaller one, in the small state under attack, farmers do not get a chance to plow and their wives do not get a chance to weave, because they are too occupied defending the state. moreover, in the state that initiated the attack, farmers also do not get a chance to plow and their wives also do not get a chance to weave, because they are too occupied attacking the other state. that is how large states attacking smaller states can be compared to a small boy playing horse.” (46: 101/26–28)

the impact of war on the lives of the common people is also part of the economic argument in Mozi 18, where mozi emphasizes that no season is good for warfare (winter is too cold to fight, summer too hot; in spring, the people are kept from sowing, in autumn from harvesting). this chapter, Mozi 46, expands the economic argument by noting that battles keep the people on both sides of the conflict needlessly occupied.

and in yet another passage, in chapter 49, the religious argument comes up. as in Mozi 19, this passage discusses unjust “attacks” (gong 攻) and their proper “punishment” (zhu 誅). and as earlier, mozi’s opponent notices a loophole in his argumentation:

魯陽文君將攻鄭。子墨子聞而止之，謂魯陽文君曰:「今使魯四境之內，大都攻其小都，大家伐其小家，殺其人民，取其牛馬狗豕布帛米粟貨財。則何若？」魯陽文君曰:「魯四境之內，皆寡人之臣也, 今大都攻其小都。大家伐其小家, 奪之貨財, 則寡人必將厚罰之。」子墨子曰:「夫天之兼有天下也，亦猶君之有四境之內也。今舉兵將以攻鄭，天誅亓不至乎？」魯陽文君曰:「先生何止我攻鄰也？我攻鄭，順於天之志。鄭人，三世殺其父，天加誅焉。使三年不全，我將助天誅也。」子墨子曰：「鄭人三世殺其父，而天加誅焉。使三年不全，天誅足矣。今又舉兵，將以攻鄭，曰「吾攻鄭也，順於天之志」。譬有人於此，其子強粱不材，故其父笞之，其鄰家之父, 舉木而擊之，曰「吾擊之也，順於其父之志」，則豈不悖哉？」


lord wen of luyang was about to attack zheng. upon hearing this, our mas-ter mozi stopped him, saying: “suppose that within the four borders of your realm, the large cities attacked the smaller ones, the large families struck at the smaller ones, killing their people, stealing their livestock, their clothes, their food, and other valuables. what would you do?” lord wen of luyang replied: “within the four borders of my realm, all people are my subjects. if the large cities attacked the smaller ones, the large families struck at the smaller ones, to seize their valuables, then i would severely punish them.” our master mozi replied: “you see, Heaven possesses the whole world in the same way that you possess everything within the four borders of your realm. if you were to raise troops and attack zheng, wouldn’t Heaven’s pun-ishment be imminent?” lord wen of luyang asked: “How can you prevent me from attacking zheng when, by attacking zheng, i am merely comply-ing with the will of Heaven? For three generations, the people of zheng have killed their father [i.e., their ruler], and Heaven extended punishment on that state. if after three years this punishment is not yet completed, i will assist in executing Heaven’s punishment.” our master mozi replied: “indeed, for three generations, the people of zheng have killed their father, and Heaven extended punishment on that state. but even if after three years this punishment is not yet completed, Heaven’s punishment is sufficient. if you raise troops to attack zheng with the excuse that ‘in attacking zheng, i am merely complying with the will of Heaven,’ then this can be compared to a man whose son is violent and dim-witted, so the man flogs him with a bamboo stick, whereupon their neighbor also picks up a stick to beat him, with the excuse that ‘in beating him, i merely comply with the intention of his father.’ wouldn’t this be perverse?” (49: 112/6–14)

this dialogue confirms the stubbornness of mozi’s opponents, who will try any flaw in his argumentation to proceed with their desired military offensive.

whether fact or fiction, the dialogues between mozi and lord wen appear to serve as test cases for the various “against military aggression” arguments. in these conversations, mozi confirms the validity of his argu-ments and strengthens them by closing potential loopholes. the con-versations further reinforce the arguments by adding a hint of sarcasm, humorous yet very destructive elements intended to belittle those who wage unnecessary wars. For instance, he has lord wen confirm that bel-ligerent rulers are nothing but kleptomaniacs, and he claims that rulers who engage in warfare are fooling around like little boys. this rhetorical strategy apparently worked, for the text has lord wen exclaim: “indeed, when i look at the matter in the light of what you have just told me, then what the world finds acceptable [i.e., attacking other states] is cer-tainly not so!” 然，吾以子之言觀之，則天下之所謂可者，未必然也 (49: 112/18).

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in the Mozi, mozi naturally wins all debates. His opponents, such as lord wen, heed his advice and wake up from their expansionist dreams. meanwhile, history shows that, in spite of their noble efforts, mozi and his followers were not able to end wars with their words. For the warring states period came to an end in 221 bCE . . . after the state of Qin had con-quered all competitors in a series of military campaigns.

Conclusion

the preceding sections studied three distinct arguments against military aggression: moral, economic, religious. they show that mozi’s antiwar stance cannot be reduced to one coherent argument or, worse, to the simplistic label “pacifist.” the arguments are complex, and so is the tex-tual relationship between the three chapters that contain them. in the past decades, efforts to solve the complex puzzle of the Core Chapters’ threefold structure intensified. scholars proposed various criteria, mainly textual, to expose different layers of text and provide rough dates for each layer. while there is consensus that Mozi 17, 18, and 19 were created in that sequence, more precision is lacking. it is telling that a recent study of the mohist Core Chapters concludes with the observation that the history of the Core Chapters “is much more complex than is generally thought.”27 then again, the quest for textual-historical precision, however important, distracts from what i consider the most attractive aspect of the three “Fei gong” chapters: the fact that we have here, in one book, no fewer than three distinct lines of argumentation on one topic. irrespective of when and where these chapters were created, and by whom, or how precisely they relate to one another, these chapters offer a fascinating insight into the dynamics within the school of mozi. the chapters show how the mohists passionately condemn military offensives and forward different arguments in response to different audiences or objections raised. Elites who frown upon crime but rejoice about war are shown the duplicity of their moral standards. warmongers raising troops are confronted with the insurmountable costs of the operation or scared with Heaven’s wrath.

27 desmet, “all good things Come in threes,” 250–251.

Mozi 31: Explaining ghosts, again

Roel sterckx*

one prominent feature associated with Mozi (Mo Di 墨翟; ca. 479–381 BCE) and Mohism in scholarship of early Chinese thought is his so-called unwavering belief in ghosts and spirits. Mozi is often presented as a Chi-nese theist who stands out in a landscape otherwise dominated by this-worldly Ru 儒 (“classicists” or “Confucians”).1 Mohists are said to operate in a world clad in theological simplicity, one that perpetuates folk reli-gious practices that were alive among the lower classes of Warring states society: they believe in a purely utilitarian spirit world, they advocate the use of simple do-ut-des sacrifices, and they condemn the use of excessive funerary rituals and music associated with Ru elites. as a consequence, it is alleged, unlike the Ru, Mohist religion is purely based on the idea that one should seek to appease the spirit world or invoke its blessings, and not on the moral cultivation of individuals or communities. this sentiment is reflected, for instance, in the following statement by David nivison:

Confucius treasures the rites for their value in cultivating virtue (while virtually ignoring their religious origin). Mozi sees ritual, and the music associated with it, as wasteful, is exasperated with Confucians for valuing them, and seems to have no conception of moral self-cultivation whatever. Further, Mozi’s ethics is a “command ethic,” and he thinks that religion, in the bald sense of making offerings to spirits and doing the things they want, is of first importance: it is the “will” of heaven and the spirits that we adopt the system he preaches, and they will reward us if we do adopt it. he takes it for granted that we will not do what we should (in this sense) if we do not believe in spirits or heaven or if we think that good fortune depends on

* i would like to thank Carine Defoort and nicolas standaert for detailed comments and corrections on an earlier draft of this essay, as well as the participants of the Univer-sity of leuven conference “the Many Faces of Mozi: a synchronic and Diachronic study of Mohist thought” (25–28 June 2009) for their input on the paper out of which it has grown.

1 see, e.g., Ching, Chinese Religions, 70. Jeeloo liu speaks of Mozi as the “only ancient philosopher who dealt with philosophy of religion” and “the most religious among ancient philosophers.” see liu, An introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 110, 124. angus graham char-acterizes the Mohists as being “at once the most religious and the most logical of the ancient thinkers.” see graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 4.

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“fate” rather than being a reward for good deeds. so people must believe in spirits and must not believe in fate. in his view of religion there is (as in his ethics) no inner feeling or awe.2

sophisticated Ru are juxtaposed here to simple-minded Mo and the impli-cation is that both are rival camps. Michael puett emphasizes that the Mohists were not bent on sacrificing to transform heaven. sacrifices for the Mohists, he argues, “are simply a case of humans giving the spirits what the spirits need, just as the spirits give humans what humans need.”3 in puett’s reading, neither heaven nor the spirits can be capricious to the Mohist since they act according to a clear moral calculus. Mohist inter-action with the spirit world therefore is highly perfunctory and efficient since the spirits act in an entirely predictable way: you get out of the spir-its what you put into them.

another simplification of Mohist religiosity is the idea that their views on spirits are a remnant of an archaic religious world that became gradu-ally superseded by a tide of conceptually more sophisticated philosophies. in this linear view of the history of Chinese thought, Warring states ghosts and spirits make way for rationality and ritual as we move toward the han. For instance, Burton Watson speaks of “a growing atmosphere of sophisti-cation and rationalism [that] led men to reject or radically reinterpret the ancient legends and religious beliefs that Mozi had so fervently affirmed.”4 Mozi’s “inability to prove that heaven or the spirits deliver immediate rewards and punishments,” Benjamin schwartz writes, “probably left his upper-class hearers indifferent to his particular religious message.”5 and, according to lester Bilsky, the Mohist view that spirits give blessings in proportion to the number of offerings they receive had little impact on the overall practice of religion and government.6

sometimes, the plebeian nature of Mozi’s take on the spirit world is grafted on to a sociology of the Mohist community, a subject for which very little concrete evidence survives in our sources. angus graham

2 loewe and shaughnessy, Cambridge History of Ancient China, 761. Chris Fraser writes in a similar vein but qualifies his statement: “the mundane tone of their religious thought is perhaps partly due to the Mohists’ general disregard of aesthetic and cultural value. Yet it would be indefensibly parochial to expect them to conform to a modern Westerner’s conception of religiosity, since the comparatively mundane character of Mohist religion is typical of much traditional Chinese folk religion.” see Fraser, “Mohism.”

3 puett, To Become a God, 101–104, quotation on 102.4 Watson, Mo-tzu, Basic Writings, 9–13, quotation on 13. 5 schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 170.6 Bilsky, The State Religion of Ancient China, 211–212.

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notes that “in passing from the Analects to Mozi one has the impression of descending to a lower stratum of society without access to the higher culture of Zhou.”7 Mozi’s alleged association with the profession of arti-san-carpenters is adduced to support this point. thus, graham suggests we think of Mohism “as springing from a class to some extent compa-rable with the merchant class of Renaissance Europe.”8 While, to be sure, there is artisanal imagery present in the received Mozi, it remains risky to infer the provenance of metaphors from an undocumented biography.9 like others mentioned above, graham takes the Mohist belief in ghosts and spirits that are capable of punishing and rewarding as a concept that “belongs rather to folk religion.” and like others he contrasts this with the Confucian instinct to keep the spirit world at a distance, appease and offer sacrifice, and refrain from drawing direct moral correlations that inspire do-ut-des type of veneration. “the Mohist,” graham writes, “. . . comes from a less sophisticated class in which the perennial folk religion of China is still alive, and does not like his masters to forget that they too are subjects of still higher beings.”10 on balance, we are led to believe that Mohist views on the spirit world are to be equated with the lower, or “popular,” strata of society, whereas other “schools” or thinkers deal with conceptu-ally more elevated numinous forces such as heaven and the Mandate or with strategies for moral self-cultivation. the assumption then is that cul-tic practices were irrelevant to intellectual elites or, indeed, that “popular” or “common” religion can be confidently associated with a social class, a premise that is highly questionable.11

to be sure, all these interpretations are invaluable attempts at teasing out the Mohist take on spirits. Yet it is striking that they seem to begin from

7 graham, Disputers of the Tao, 34. 8 ibid., 45. see also graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 8. philip ivanhoe

and Bryan Van norden characterize Mozi’s philosophy as “distinctively anti-aristocratic.” see ivanhoe and Van norden, Readings in Classical Chinese Philosophy, 55.

9 indeed, because artisans are also associated with the creation of goods and products that support the luxuries and riches of aristocrats, Mozi would have to disown his own professional affiliation if ever he had one.

10 graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 14. Yuri pines writes: “Most Zhanguo texts . . . largely neglect heaven’s will, and no Zhanguo thinker, with the exception of Mozi, assigns divine forces any significant role in political and social life.” see pines, Foundations of Confucian Thought, 55. pines’s statement holds only if one uses a very narrow definition of “divine forces” and excludes, for example, ancestral spirits.

11 For a critique of distinctions in belief systems according to social class, see harper, “Warring states, Qin, and han periods”; harper, “Contracts with the spirit World in han Common Religion”; and sterckx, “Religious practices in Qin and han.”

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two assumptions: first, that views on the spirit world across the received Mozi are unitary and internally uncontested; second, that Mozi’s views on the spirit world should invariably be seen as conversant with or pitched against a countercurrent, the so-called Ru (if there is such a thing as a uni-tary Ru view on spirits). in what follows i argue that these assumptions are problematic and overlook subtle differences and problems embedded in the received Mozi text. i suggest that this is specifically the case with Mozi 31, the only preserved chapter in the “Ming gui” 明鬼 (Explaining ghosts)12 triad and the principal source adduced to represent Mohist doctrine on the spirit world.13 When read carefully against the other Core Chapters, the Dialogues, and, to a lesser extent, the opening Chapters, Mozi 31 not only leaves significant question marks over how the Mohists conceived of the spirit world and its workings but also throws doubt on whether we can speak at all of one unitary and agreed Mohist view on the issue. My analysis suggests that Mohist views on spirits evolve or, at least diversify, across the received Mozi text, although the temporal sequence in which these developments took place remains nearly impossible to reconstruct. My claim in favor of a more variegated and multipolar Mohist view of spirits not only is based on an internal analysis of the received Mozi but also is reinforced by possible readings of a manuscript fragment, titled “guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 (ghostly percipience) by its editors, among the Chu bamboo-slip materials held in the shanghai Museum.

12 Most translators take ming as an adjective to mean something along the lines of “percipient” or “conscious.” these are certainly possible. i have opted for a verbal transla-tion since the chapter covers more ground than the question of ghostly consciousness.

13 the textual history of the received Mozi (divided into seventy-one chapters, fifty-three of which are extant) continues to be full of unknowns. pre-tang bibliographies indi-cate that a version of the text was circulating that included a separate index chapter (mu yi juan 目一卷), but no mention is made of this in sources after the mid-tang. see Wang Changmin, “Mozi guben mulu ji yipian kaoshuo”; and Wang Changmin, “Mozi pianmu kao.” it remains uncertain when exactly the two missing chapters in the “Ming gui” triad were lost, if they ever existed at all. they are first listed as missing together with six other titled chapters in the oldest fully preserved Mozi text, the Ming zhengtong Daozang 正統道藏 (1447), which forms the basis of the presently transmitted version. For the purpose of this essay i circumnavigate some of the more complex text-critical hypotheses on the Core Chapters as a whole that have been proposed by scholars such as alfred Forke, Chris Fraser, stephen Durrant, angus graham, Erik Maeder, Carine Defoort, Karen Desmet, and others. i will refer to philological and text-critical points made by scholars where they have a significant bearing on the actual arguments and ideas presented in the text. Most schol-ars have drawn on intratextual signifiers to propose hypotheses on internal developments within a Mohist “school.” With reference to Mohist views on the spirit world, intra- and intertextual evidence that permits us to tease out clearly articulated currents of thought within Mohism beyond a reasonable level of speculation remains scarce.


The Arguments in “Ming gui, xia”

let us look first at the arguments in the received Mozi 31 and the struc-ture of its narrative. Mozi 31, which, at 3,406 characters, is the longest of the Core Chapters,14 applies Mozi’s three tests of verification to the ques-tions of “whether spirits exist” 鬼神之有與無之別 and whether “they are capable of rewarding the worthy and punishing the wicked” 能賞賢而罰暴 (31: 50/25–26).15 these three tests are (1) spirits exist since there have been reports and eyewitness accounts of them throughout the ages and across geographical space; in other words, common observation and veri-fiability through hearing and sight constitute proof; (2) spirits exist since the sages of antiquity believed in their existence; in other words, ancient authority forms the basis of proof; and (3) they exist since spirits are a necessary condition for the establishment of a morally functioning soci-ety, and people will behave better when they know that their actions are sanctioned; in other words, practical utility and applicability for the ben-efit of society provide proof. the elaboration of these three tests (called “source,” “root,” and “use” by Chris Fraser),16 in that order, forms the bulk of the chapter.

structure of Mozi 31

introduction: the contemporary world and its social structure are in disorder. Why?

Because:1. there exists doubt on the existence of spirits.2. people fail to realize that spirits have rewarding and punishing powers.

proof:test 1: Witness accounts:

1. the unrighteous killing of Du Bo 杜伯 by King xuan of Zhou 周宣王 (827/25–782 BCE).

2. the spirit gou Mang 句芒 prolongs the life of Duke Mu of Qin 秦穆公 (659–621 BCE).17

3. the unrighteous killing of Zhuang Ziyi 莊子儀 by Duke Jian of Yan 燕簡公 (504–493 BCE).

14 Following the Sibu congkan edition as in the table presented in Desmet, “all good things Come in threes,” 11; and Desmet, “the growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi,” 100.

15 the second question no doubt inspired E. R. hughes’s (in many ways, rather ade-quate) translation of ming 明 as “moral intelligence,” although, strictly speaking, it mis-translates ming gui. see hughes, Chinese Philosophy in Classical Times, 50.

16 see Fraser, “Mohism.”17 Following Bi Yuan and sun Yirang, most scholars replace 鄭 by 秦.

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4. a sacrificial officer of Duke Wen of song 宋文公 (610–589 BCE) is caned by a spirit through the intermediary of an invocator for provid-ing substandard offerings.

5. a minister of Duke Zhuang of Qi 齊莊公 (794–731 BCE) is head-butted by a goat during a blood oath.

test 2: the sages of the past firmly believed in spirits, as is reflected in their sacrificial practices and documented in their texts.

test 3: Making a belief in ghosts foundational to the state (本施之國家) will benefit the people.

Concluding reservations:include a stretched argument on filial piety and an expression of doubt by Mozi concerning his own thesis.

the interlocutors in Mozi 31 are referred to as “those who maintain that there are no ghosts” (執無鬼者, mentioned seven times). throughout the chapter the assumption is that the masses (天下之眾) are naturally receptive to believing in ghosts and are in doubt only when their superi-ors (天下之王公大人士君子) question the spirits’ existence. note that the proposition of the chapter is not the positive assertion that “ghosts exist”; rather, the chapter concerns a search to confirm “whether or not they exist” and “whether or not they reward and punish.” the key of Mozi 31 lies not in providing existential proof but rather in demonstrating the utility of argument. note also that the proposal to make people believe in ghosts is formulated in the conditional voice, implying that those in charge need not necessarily believe in their existence but can promote creeds and cults as a ploy to influence social behavior:

今若使天下之人借若信鬼神之能賞賢而罰暴也, 則夫天下豈亂哉.

now, if one could cause all people under heaven to conform to the belief that ghosts and spirits are capable of rewarding the worthy and punishing the wicked, then how could there be disorder in the world? (31: 50/26–27)

there are no explicit indications in Mozi 31 that Mozi equates “those who maintain that ghosts do not exist” specifically with the Ru. the graph 儒 does not occur at all in Mozi 31. the only Core Chapter in which it appears is Mozi 39 (“Fei Ru, xia” 非儒下), which is believed to be a later addi-tion to the ten other doctrines. Beyond that, the graph ru appears only in Mozi 48, a chapter (“gongmeng” 公孟) among the Dialogues.18 With

18 naturally, the absence of the graph ru need not mean by itself that the Ru could not be implied, but the statistics are striking nevertheless.


the exception of a covert reference to the three-year mourning period (in witness accounts 1 and 3 of test i), there is little that directly links the ideas presented in this chapter to a clearly identified individual or group of interlocutors anywhere else in the received Mozi. the recurring for-mula that introduces the Mozi 31 interlocutors as “those who hold that . . .” (zhi . . . zhe 執 . . . 者) need not refer to the same group of people across all Core Chapters. it can simply be used to set up a dialogic setting.19

the first test—witness accounts—is structured along a series of paral-lel stories with clear intratextual parallels. the choice of witness accounts suggests a rhetorical claim for the universal application of the Mozi 31 thesis. the incidents described take place across geographical space on a spring and autumn period map: Zhou (central), Qin (west), Yan (north-east), song (south), and Qi (east).

the unlucky protagonists who are submitted to an unjust execution in accounts 1 and 3 reply to their executioners in similar phrases with only the formula for the embedded conditional clause (underlined) showing significant grammatical variety:

(account 1) 吾君殺我而不辜, 若以死者為無知則止矣; 若死而有知, 不出三年, 必使吾君知之. (31: 51/8–9)(account 3) 吾君王殺我而不辜, 死人毋知亦已, 死人有知, 不出三年, 必使吾君知之. (31: 51/23–24)

My lord (majesty), you are about to put me to death although i am not guilty of a crime. if the dead do not have consciousness, then it stops here. if the dead do have consciousness, they will make sure that my lord knows this before three years have elapsed.

Even more striking is the recurrence across witness accounts 1, 3, 4, and 5 of the following identical statement:

當是(之)時, X人從者莫不見, 遠者莫不聞, 著在 X 之《春秋》˳ 諸侯傳而語之曰:

at that time, there were none among the [name of state x] attendants who did not see what had happened and no one in distant regions who had not caught rumor [heard ] of it; it was written in the springs and autumns of [name of state x], and the feudal lords handed down the story saying: [moral lesson x]. (31: 51/26–27, 31: 52/5–6, 31: 52/13–14, and slightly differ-ently in 31: 51/11–13)

19 Cf. similar formulas such as 執厚葬久喪者 and 執有命者 in 25: 39/9, 25: 40/28, 25: 41/18, 35: 58/15, 35: 58/17, 35: 59/2, 35: 59/4, 35: 59/17, 35: 59/21, 35: 60/7, and 35: 60/13.

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the core elements in witness accounts 1, 3, 4, and 5 include (1) the actual cause that provokes ghosts to avenge themselves and (2) the universal relevance of the moral message across all states marked by the fact that the incidents were recorded in the local chronicles and then didactically applied by successive feudal lords. the progression of authority runs as follows: “seeing” (jian 見) → “hearing” (wen 聞) → “recording” (zhu 著) → “transmitting” (chuan 傳).20 only account 2 stands out in that it describes a spirit rewarding a virtuous character (though not in the language of shang fa 賞罰) and in that it lacks reference to a written record. in sum, these witness accounts, with the exception perhaps of account 2, seem to be built around a formulaic set of nearly identical narrative cues in which an author inserts different events. if broken down to subunits such as the level of the paragraph (ce 冊) therefore, we may have a series of parallel accounts strung together with the narrative formula “it is not only in the explanations found in these writings that it is so, but . . .” 非惟若書之說為然也, a formula that occurs five times in Mozi 31. in the absence of potentially two preceding chapters in the triplet, one might be tempted to infer a temporal sequence across the witness accounts based on the dat-ing of each account’s chief persona. this however reveals little. While the most parallel accounts (1 and 3) are set around three hundred years apart, there appears to be no temporal progression from past to present, unlike in the narrative buildup for the second test, discussed below. Finally, it is worth pointing out that drawing on recorded witness accounts as a way to invoke authority is hardly an original Mohist argumentation strategy. When read as an independent unit, it remains unclear who Mozi’s spar-ring partners are in Mozi 31.

if empirical accounts (耳目之情) fall short of proving the existence of ghosts, the second test ( fa 法) consists of invoking the authority of past sages. taken on its own, calling on the ancients to bolster one’s argument is a rhetorical technique that does not really set Mohists apart from other Warring states thinkers. in his choice of past exemplars the compiler of Mozi 31 does not specifically favor the golden age of Zhou over any other period. this is a pattern that recurs across the other Core Chapters, where Mozi tends to select his examples from among the three Dynasties

20 Mark lewis notes that empirical observation here gains the status of proof once it is written down: “the fact of inscription demonstrates the truth of an account. it is granted a weight equal to that of direct perception.” see lewis, Writing and Authority, 115. i would argue that writing does not necessarily grant equal authority to direct perception but rather that it is the result of a sustained sequence of witness accounts.


(xia, shang, Zhou) without a particular preference for the time of Con-fucius.21 Examples adduced to suggest that the ancients did believe in the existence of spirits include the shang conqueror King Wu’s 武王 sharing of sacrifices with his feudal lords, the fact that each of the three Dynasties issued rewards at the ancestral temple and punishments at the altar of the soil to publicly demonstrate their justness, and the existence of writ-ten records testifying to the existence of spirits (mentioned are a partial quotation of “Wen wang” 文王, ode 235 of the “Da ya” 大雅 (great odes), and allusions to the “Yi xun” 伊訓 and “Yu shi” 禹誓 (i.e., “gan shi” 甘誓) chapters in the Shangshu). similar to the rhetoric of inclusive geographi-cal space in test 1, the test 2 narrative claims universal applicability across time. Mozi 31 builds up the argument by progressively pushing exam-ples farther back in time: starting with the books of Zhou, then shang, then xia.

the third test—utility and social benefit—zooms in on the second proposition in Mozi 31, namely the rewarding and punishing powers attributed to the spirit world, a belief that can be used to instill moral order. the general tenet of test 3 is that spirits are all-seeing; they spot all untoward behavior among humans (鬼神見之), and their punishments overcome all. the parallel to 鬼神之明 (ghostly percipience) is therefore 鬼神之罰 (ghostly punishment):

故,鬼神之明不可為幽閒廣澤, 山林深谷, 鬼神之明必知之.

鬼神之罰不可為富貴眾強, 勇力強武, 堅甲利兵, 鬼神之罰必勝之.

therefore, when it comes to the percipience of ghosts and spirits,it cannot be (escaped from) in dark creeks and broad swamps, mountain forests and deep valleys,since the percipience of ghosts and spirits will inevitably know about you. (31: 54/11)

When it comes to punishment meted out by ghosts and spirits,it cannot be (overcome) by wealth, nobility, strength of numbers, bravery, physical power, military valor, strong armor, or sharp weapons,since the punishments meted out by ghosts and spirits will inevitably conquer these. (31: 54/11–12)

21 as noted in a. Cheng, Histoire de la pensée chinoise, 99. see also Miranda Brown’s essay in the present volume.

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Unlike the reverse chronology in test 2, examples from the past in test 3 are ranked from past to present: heaven commands King tang 湯 to chastise King Jie 桀 of the xia; heaven commands King Wu 武 to chas-tise King Zhou 紂 of the shang. note that the expression used is 至明罰 (to carry out clear/visible/enlightened punishments), suggesting again that we have a wordplay following the parallel structure sketched above in which, somehow, ming 明 and fa 罰 are treated as coordinate con-cepts, which is difficult to convey in translation. Both accounts end with an identical sentence in conclusion:

此吾所謂鬼神之罰, 不可為富貴眾強、勇力強武、堅甲利兵者, 此也.

this is what i mean when i say that punishments meted out by ghosts and spirits cannot be (overcome) by wealth, nobility, strength of numbers, brav-ery, physical power, military valor, strong armor, or sharp weapons. (31: 54/ 17–18)

Finally, reference is made to a text entitled “Qin ai” 禽艾 (31: 54/27), pos-sibly a lost chapter from the Yi zhoushu 逸周書.22

Following test 3, Mozi 31 then takes a sudden thematic turn in which the “ghosts do not exist” party brings up the subject of filial piety. the text at this point is not at all clear, and its link to what precedes is vague, which could suggest that the passage is corrupt or does not belong with the rest of Mozi 31. the claim by the skeptics seems to be that belief in ghosts (generally) implies that one does not benefit one’s kin (parents) and hence is detrimental to fulfilling the duties expected of filial offspring (namely to be filial to one’s own lineage first). Mozi in turn seems to sug-gest that, “provided ghosts and spirits really exist” 若使鬼神情/誠有, even the obligation to be filial toward one’s own kin (a virtue that could be depicted as partial) hinges on a belief in the existence of ghosts, in this case ancestral spirits, who are offered food and drink in sacrifice. (Clan-based) filiality (xiao 孝) and (altruistic) benefit (li 利) therefore need not be mutually exclusive.

the final part of Mozi 31 then adopts a slightly different tone in which the force of Mozi’s argument seemingly dissipates. although Mozi can-not answer the central question on the existence of the spirit world, he suggests that even if ghosts or spirits do not exist, one should behave as

22 the figure of Qin ai occurs in Yi zhoushu “shi fu.” Zheng Jiewen speculates that “Qin ai” is the title of a chapter in a Shangshu version circulating in Zhanguo times. see Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 107.


if they really did since this would benefit society. organized religion, if not theologically watertight, at least has the advantage of bringing people together:

若使鬼神請亡, 是乃費其所為酒醴粢盛之財耳˳ 自夫費之, [非]特注之汙壑而棄之也, 內者宗族, 外者鄉里, 皆得如具飲食之˳ 雖使鬼神請亡, 此猶可以合驩[歡]聚眾, 取親於鄉里˳

if ghosts and spirits truly do not exist, all this may seem to be nothing more than a waste of material resources (cai) used for sacrificial wine and grains. But, over and above, such expenditure is not a case of simply throwing things away into a ditch or gully. For the members of the clan and friends from the village and district can still come together and eat and drink [the offerings]. so even if there were really no ghosts and spirits, a sacrifice still enables them to gather together at a party, and people can befriend their neighbors. (31: 55/5–7)23

Compared with the sustained buildup and consequential logic displayed in the three tests, the argument in the final part of Mozi 31 lacks vigor; in fact, this part of the chapter seems to represent a strand of Mohism that is less convinced of or indeed less preoccupied with the theoretical proof of the existence of ghosts. in its claim that even if one allows for the pos-sibility that spirits do not exist, one should still perform cult rituals, this final segment is ultra-utilitarian in that it is no longer concerned with the question of the you 有 or wu 無 of a spirit world. in short, the part of Mozi 31 following test 3 reads more like a discourse about the validity of the thesis itself rather than part of its proof. in that sense it is more akin to the skeptical tone we encounter in some of the passages on spirits in the Dialogues, as we shall see, rather than to the argumentative style that characterizes most of the Core Chapters.

Even if one takes these final exchanges as somehow related to test 3 on account of their advocacy of the pure social utility of the sacrificial cult, and even if one takes “those who hold that there are no ghosts” to be an implicit reference to the Ru, it remains uncertain how the arguments in Mozi 31 can be seen as diametrically opposed to what one might expect from the Ru. neither “school” uses, for the sake of argument, mutually exclusive definitions of the types of spirits that make up their pantheon. it is true that in Mozi 31 the master claims: “What constitutes ghosts in past and present consists of nothing other than the ghosts of heaven,

23 this passage is also singled out in schmidt-glintzer, Mo Ti: Solidarität und allgemeine Menschenliebe, 27.

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and also the ghosts and spirits in mountains and rivers, and also dead people turning into ghosts” 古今之為鬼, 非他也, 有天鬼, 亦有山水鬼神者, 亦有人死而為鬼者 (31: 55/1–2). Yet these attempts at delineat-ing a clear-cut identity of what should be understood by a “ghost” should not be taken literally. For instance, at no point does Mozi 31 imply that the Mohist spirit world does not include ancestors: ghosts of dead people must include ancestors, the text also mentions the lineage (zongzu 宗族) gathering in convivial sacrifice, and it speaks of sacrifice as a demonstra-tion of filial piety (31: 55/5–6). Furthermore, Mozi 31 insists that spirits as a rule brought rewards to people at the ancestral temple (zu 祖) and punished at the altar of the soil (she 社), both loci not quite congruent with the idea of impartiality found elsewhere in the Core Chapters. like-wise, throughout Mozi 31 the use of the terms gui 鬼 and shen 神 seems arbitrary, and neither term is used consistently with a clear referent.

the image presented at the end of Mozi 31, namely that of sacrificial ceremonies as feasts and occasions for human interaction, could sit equally well with the classicist take on sacrifice. however, the proposal here to maintain the cult, in the absence of theological substance, for the sake of promoting social cohesion might be difficult to square with a comment in Mozi 39 where Mozi castigates the vulgar Ru as beggars who “stuff food away like hamsters,” dragging themselves along to large funerals with their extended family to feast on drink and food.24 Whereas in the Mozi 39 passage the targets of Mohist criticism are explicitly identi-fied as Ru, the social aspect of sacrificial religion invoked in Mozi 31 is not far removed from expectations one may find expressed in a Ru context. one could even argue that the above line of argument—“when in doubt about the existence of spirits, sacrifice to them communally anyway”—comes close to the highly functional or even utilitarian admonishment to “respect ghosts and spirits but keep them at a distance” 敬鬼神而遠之 of the Analects (6.22).

in short, Mozi 31 poses a number of interpretive hurdles. While its overtone is clear, there are few internal clues in the text that allow us to assume that the chapter is pitched deliberately as an exclusively anti-Ru polemic. Even its own central proposition, the existence of ghosts and spirits, is phrased in the conditional voice and subject to doubt at the end of the chapter. parts of the chapter, such as the witness accounts, appear like a catalog of nearly identical story units, while the latter half

24 see Mozi, “Fei Ru, xia” (39: 64/19–26).


of the chapter is interspersed with moments of self-interrogation aimed at clearing away doubts about the validity of the central proposition, the existence of ghosts. ghosts may not really exist, but a persuasive argu-ment that they do can be useful regardless.

The Dating of Mozi 31

since Mozi 31 is the only transmitted chapter in its triplet, it is difficult to draw on it to establish significant temporal developments in Mohist views on the spirit world. in the case of the “Ming gui” triad, it is impos-sible to test the influential three-sects theory—proposed by alfred Forke, luan tiaofu 欒調甫, angus graham, and others—according to which each of the triplets would represent a distinct school of Mohism. there are indications toward the end of Mozi 31, as i have suggested above, that we might be dealing with a less radical and more self-inquiring group of Mohists. But such speculation only stands if the final part of Mozi 31 is taken as a continuous narrative following on from test 3 rather than a text unit that has slipped in from elsewhere and is better read together with some exchanges in the Dialogues.

in the 1960s Watanabe takashi 渡邊桌 proposed that Mozi 31 belonged to the most recent period of the Core Chapters and that it could be dated to the late third century BCE around the Qin unification. Watanabe based his argument for such a late date, among other reasons, on the fact that the three tests as set out in Mozi 31 are conceptually identical to the three tests (san biao 三表) in the “Fei ming” 非命 triplet (Mozi 35, 36, 37). the fact that the term itself (san biao or san fa 三法 “three models, standards”) does not occur might indicate, he suggests, that Mozi 31 could slightly predate the “Fei ming” discussions. Watanabe is also not convinced that there ever existed a “Ming gui” triad and argues that the chapter stands by itself as a conceptual adjunct or supplement to the “tian zhi” 天志 triplet, which he also takes to be late. Watanabe further speculates that the place-names in Mozi 31 indicate that it might have been written in the state of Qin (and he goes as far as to claim that the ideas in these late chapters served the ideology of Qin unification).25 Watanabe’s 1960s hypothesis of

25 Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai”; and Watanabe takashi, Kodai Chūgoku shisō no kenkyū, 764. Zheng Jiewen speculates that since Mozi uses exam-ples that involve divination, he is carrying on song traditions that, in turn, are based on shang practices. Zheng’s assumption that shang religion equals the worship of spirits

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a Mozi 31 as recent as the 220s BCE remains hard to corroborate. if one takes the shanghai Museum fragment “guishen zhi ming,” which some scholars propose to date somewhere between 340 and 230 BCE, as in any way cognate to the themes in Mozi 31, a Qin date for Mozi 31 would be hard to sustain.26 i will discuss the shanghai Museum fragment and assess whether or not it can be linked directly to the “Ming gui” triad below.

angus graham, who sees ideological, rather than temporal, differences across the core triplets, lists Mozi 31 among his h group chapters, that is, chapters belonging to what he calls the “Compromising” group (graham identifies an h group based on the grammatical principle that in these chapters hu 乎 replaces postverbal yu 於 where possible).27 Without the remaining two chapters in the triplet graham’s three-sects theory natu-rally is problematic. one might argue that the final part of Mozi 31 is more “accommodating” than the more “purist” and “reactionary” exposition of the three tests, but we have little to go on. Furthermore, Carine Defoort’s thesis, which is based on her study of the “Jian ai” 兼愛 triplet and holds that the doctrine becomes more radical as time went by,28 would turn graham’s accommodation theory on its head if one were to apply it inter-nally within one chapter and surmise that the final part of Mozi 31 is of a later date than the exposition of the three tests.

the mixed distribution of the formulas 子墨子言曰 (occurring three times) and 子墨子曰 (occurring eight times) also reveals little. Bruce Brooks and taeko Brooks submit a date for Mozi 31 toward the end of the period 390–280 BCE, which is the timeline they propose for the compo-sition of the Core Chapters. in their evolutionary model, Mozi 31 would represent a revised or updated version of the earlier chapter in the triplet, now lost.29

Karen Desmet, who has examined the dating of the triplets according to the occurrence of compounds, concludes that the h group chapters were written last in the triplet sequence on the grounds that they consistently

while granting only a minor role to sacrifices to altars of the soil and grain, and that Zhou religion emphasizes the opposite, is too simplistic as a basis for proving a song provenance for Mohist ideas on spirits. see Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 17–24.

26 this is a criticism of Watanabe takashi recently put forward by asano Yūichi, who would like to date the shanghai Museum fragment between 373 and 278 BCE. see asano Yūichi, “ ‘guishen zhi ming’ yu ‘Mozi: Ming gui’ ”, 97.

27 graham, Divisions in Early Mohism; and graham, “Mo tzu.” see also the introduction to this volume.

28 see Defoort, “the growing scope of Jian 兼”; and her contribution to this volume.29 see a. taeko Brooks, “the Mician Ethical Chapters,” 100, 118.


contain more compounds than the Y (purist) and J (Reactionary) chap-ters. this would put the composition of Mozi 31, on philological grounds, around 300 BCE.30 Desmet further suggests, with Watanabe takashi and Erik Maeder, that the earlier two chapters in the triplet may never have existed since the three chapters in which Confucian views are challenged most vociferously (Mozi 25, “Jie zang” 節葬; Mozi 31, “Ming gui”; and Mozi 32, “Fei yue” 非樂) each represent doctrines of which only the latest, h chap-ter, survives: “all the doctrines of which only one chapter is extant (‘Fei Ru,’ ‘Jie zang,’ ‘Ming gui’ and ‘Fei yue’) are more negative doctrines, not constituting a new Mohist argument but mainly reacting against Confu-cian ideas. as the ‘Fei Ru’ doctrine itself indicates, tensions with the Con-fucians probably sharpened only later in the history of Mohism.”31 the idea that a dichotomy with “Confucians” was not clearly pronounced in the early days of the Mohist movement could tally with the paucity of the label ru in the core doctrines. But even so, the assumption that the interlocutors in the Mozi invariably are “Confucians” needs to be handled with care. Regardless of these differences in interpretation, the balance of received opinion would situate the composition of Mozi 31 in the period starting around 300 BCE and ending well into the Qin around 210 BCE.32 i see little room to further refine this dating based on internal linguis-tic or thematic arguments, other than that because of its skeptical tone the final part of Mozi 31 (following test 3) could postdate the three-theses argument.

Ghosts in the other Core Chapters (Mozi 8–37)

the other Core Chapters in the received Mozi contain several passages that touch on the issue of ghosts and spirits. it is noticeable that the ques-tion of the existence of spirits is largely left untouched in these chapters. instead, the focus is on the utility of a belief in the spirit world for the advancement of politics and government. in “tian zhi, shang” (Mozi 26) the initiative to undertake sacrifice is presented as an affirmation on

30 Desmet, “the growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi.”31 Desmet, “all good things Come in threes,” 240, 248–249.32 the only confident dissenting voice here is Fang shouchu 方授楚, who argued that,

because of its length and relative lack of rhetoric, Mozi 31 belongs to the earliest Core Chapters and thus was composed before 329 BCE. For a summary of his arguments, see Desmet, “all good things Come in threes,” 52–55.

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behalf of the ruler that he relies on the authority of heaven. sacrifice to the spirits is seen as an instrumental conduit to the power of heaven:

天之為政於天子, 天下百姓未得之明知也˳ 故昔三代聖王禹湯文武, 欲以天之為政於天子, 明說天下之百姓, 故莫不犓牛羊、豢犬彘, 潔為粢盛酒醴, 以祭祀上帝鬼神, 而求祈福於天˳ that it is heaven that entrusts the power to govern to the son of heaven is something the common people under heaven do not yet clearly under-stand. therefore, among the ancient sage-kings of the three Dynasties—Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu—wishing to make it clear to all people in the world that heaven gives the power for government to the son of heaven, there were none who did not feed oxen and sheep with grass, and pigs and dogs with grain, and cleanse the sacrificial grains and ale to offer sacrifice to shangdi and the ghosts and spirits and to seek and invoke the blessings of heaven. (26: 43/2–4, variant at 28: 48/4–8)

a clear spirit hierarchy is set out here and throughout the “tian zhi” triad. the ancient kings “in the highest sphere (shang 上) revered heaven (tian 天), in the middle sphere (zhong 中) served the spirits (guishen 鬼神), and in the lower sphere (xia 下) loved the people,” while their wicked counterparts offended at all three levels (26: 43/9–14).33 since all in the world exert themselves to prepare sacrifices to heaven, it follows that heaven loves the people equally (26: 43/18–23). the intermediary role of the spirits figures in “tian zhi, zhong” (Mozi 27), where it is said that a ruler, in response to disease and calamities, will fast and bathe himself and prepare clean sacrificial grains and wine to sacrifice to heaven and the ghosts (gui 鬼). heaven, in return, has the power to avert disasters (27: 44/17–20). Wealth or material well-being (cai yong 財用) is seen as a precondition for people to invest in sacrifices (27: 44/29–30). Reneg-ing on one’s sacrificial commitments results in the loss of heaven’s sup-port. hence, King Zhou lost the support of heaven since he “would not worship shangdi and rejected the ancestors and spirits without offering them sacrifices” (27: 46/23–24, quoting the “Da shi” 大誓). in short, in the “tian zhi” triad the spirit world acts as a sanctioning voice for the will of heaven. spirits are not the ultimate source of authority but the exclusive intermediaries of heaven.34

33 this tripartite structure is upheld throughout the “tian zhi” triad. it is possible but unclear whether, as gunnar sjöholm speculates, a spatial referent is intended here. see sjöholm, “Readings in Mo ti,” 107.

34 John Knoblock’s characterization of the spirits as “informants” comes to mind: “in this Mohist view disease, pestilence, and famine were penalties for contravening the


in “shang xian, zhong” 尚賢中 (Mozi 9) the investiture of Yao, shun, Yu, Wen, and Wu as son of heaven is presented as a reward from heaven and the spirits for their impartial love of the people and their benefiting them. Conversely, Jie, Zhou, You 幽, and li 厲 are punished by heaven and the spirits for their oppressive conduct (09: 12/20–28). “shang xian, xia” (Mozi 10) rehearses the familiar tripartite structure of the world: heaven on high, the spirits in the middle, the people below (10: 14/24–25). in “shang tong, zhong” 尚同中 (Mozi 12) another explicit reference is made to the need for proper sacrifice to prevent disasters and calamities inflicted as punish-ments from heaven:

故古者聖王明天鬼之所欲, 而避天鬼之所憎, 以求興天下之利, 除天下之害˳ 是以率天下之萬民, 齋戒沐浴, 潔為酒醴粢盛, 以祭祀天鬼˳ 其事鬼神也, 酒醴粢盛不敢不蠲潔, 犧牲不敢不腯肥, 珪璧幣帛不敢不中度量, 春秋祭祀不敢失時幾˳

therefore, the sage-kings of old understood what heaven and the ghosts desire and avoided what they resent, in order to seek and increase benefits and avoid calamities in the world. therefore, they led the myriad people in the world by fasting and bathing themselves and by purifying sacrificial wine and grains to sacrifice to heaven and the ghosts. When they were serv-ing ghosts and spirits, they did not dare to use sacrificial wine and grains that were unclean, sacrificial animals that were not fat, or sacrificial jades or silks that did not meet the standard measure. they did not dare to miss the proper timing for spring and autumn sacrifices. (12: 18/30–19/2)

although the ideology that motivates sacrifice here has a definite Mohist ring, it is equally true that, as far as the mechanics of sacrifice are con-cerned, the requirements described here—purified and glossy offerings—are common across most Warring states texts.35 interestingly, the “Jian ai” triad invokes the image of sacrifice to implore the spirits on only one occasion, in the case of King tang’s famous self-sacrifice (16: 29/7–9). “Fei gong, xia” 非攻下 (Mozi 19) condemns siege warfare on the grounds that it destroys the material provisions for sacrifices:

intentions of heaven and, as such, did not occur in an orderly age. ghosts and spirits were informants of unseen misdeeds as well as avenging agents of a wrathful heaven.” see Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 3, 6.

35 see sterckx, “the Economics of Religion in Warring states and Early imperial China”; and sterckx, Food, Sacrifice, and Sagehood in Early China, chap. 4.

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夫取天之人, 以攻天之邑, 此刺殺天民, 剝振神之位, 傾覆社稷, 攘殺其犧牲, 則此上不中天之利矣˳ 意將以為利鬼乎？夫殺之神, 滅鬼神之主, 廢滅先王, 賊虐萬民, 百姓離散, 則此中不中鬼之利矣˳

Yet to gather the people of heaven in order to besiege the towns belong-ing to heaven is akin to murdering heaven’s subjects, to dispossessing the spirits of their tablets, ruining the altars of the soil and grain, and violating and killing their sacrificial animals. this then does not offer any benefits to heaven up there. Would its intention then be to bless the ghosts? But the people of heaven are murdered,36 the tablets of ghosts and spirits are destroyed, the former kings are neglected, the myriad people are tortured, and the common people are scattered; it is then not for the benefit of the ghosts in the middle realm.37 (19: 33/28–30)

this third chapter in the triplet is, as paul van Els has shown in his con-tribution to the present volume, mostly preoccupied with a theologi-cal argument against war.38 Mozi 19 further calls on avenging spirits as punishing agents as an alternative for “offensive war.” the “Jie yong” and “Jie zang” chapters make no specific reference to the spirit world. in “Jie zang, xia” (Mozi 25), Mozi’s objection to elaborate burials and extended periods of mourning is basically inspired by economics: such practices stand in the way of wealth creation and prevent the increase of the popu-lation.39 Mozi also makes a point regarding cult: when a state becomes poor as a result of overinvestment in funerals and mourning, sacrificial goods will decline in quality, fewer people will have the means to offer sacrifice, and hence the normal sacrificial cycle will be disturbed. as a result, the spirits are upset, punish people with calamities, and abandon them (25: 40/1–8). thus, Mozi marries the idea of sacrificial duty with

36 Emending 夫殺之神 to 夫殺[天]之人 following sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 143.37 Benjamin Wong and hui-Chieh loy argue that Mozi’s political philosophy “stands

or falls with the success of his attempt to prove the existence of providential ghosts.” see Wong and loy, “War and ghosts in Mozi’s political philosophy,” 344. although warfare, in the passage above, is presented as sacrilegious in that it harms heaven, the spirits, and the people, the specific mechanism used by the spirits when “rewarding and punishing” does not draw much comment in the “Fei gong” triad, something one might expect if it was central to the thesis. Wong and loy may be reading too much into the Mohist reliance on ghosts as backup for moral action.

38 the compound guishen or variants thereof occur eleven times in Mozi 19, as opposed to only once in Mozi 18 and not at all in Mozi 17. Mozi 17 puts forward a predominantly ethical argument; Mozi 18 takes a mostly economic/utilitarian stance. see paul van Els’s essay in this volume.

39 For a more detailed treatment of this theme, see Riegel, “Do not serve the Dead as You serve the living.”


funerary economies and suggests that sacrifices should not be discon-tinued during the mourning period:

哭往哭來, 反從事乎衣食之財, 佴乎祭祀, 以致孝於親˳ 故曰: 子墨子之法, 不失死生之利者, 此也˳

You may weep on the way to and from a funeral. Yet, once returned, you should engage in earning your livelihood (clothes and food). You should actively continue to perform sacrifices in order to express filial piety toward your kin. therefore, it is said that the rules of our Master Mozi neglect the benefits of neither the dead nor the living. (25: 41/29–30)

“Fei yue, shang” (Mozi 32) insists that Mozi condemns music (and ban-queting), not because it is aesthetically displeasing, but solely on the grounds of the material and human resources required to produce and play instruments. in “Fei ming, shang” (Mozi 35) Mozi puts righteousness over a belief in fate:

義人在上, 天下必治, 上帝山川鬼神必有幹主, 萬民被其大利˳

When the righteous are in power, the world will have order; shangdi, hills and rivers, ghosts and spirits will have their lineage elders [to preside over sacrifices];40 and the people will be visited by the great blessings resulting from this. (35: 59/5–6)

a misguided belief in fate is said to result in a chaotic government and “then, there would be no means to provide sacrificial grain and wine to sacrifice to shangdi, the ghosts, and the spirits” 上無以共粢盛酒醴, 祭祀上帝鬼神 (35: 60/8).

overall then the relevant passages in the other Core Chapters empha-size the social and political role of the spirit world. the general theme in these chapters does not depart substantially from the theses set out in Mozi 31, but the emphasis is more on practice—more specifically, the need to fulfill sacrificial obligations. the philosophical issue of the exis-tence of ghosts and spirits (wu/you 有/無) is not engaged.

The opening Chapters and Dialogues

to what extent are views on ghosts and spirits and references to sacrifi-cial practice in Mozi 31 and the other Core Chapters consistent with or

40 Reading gan zhu 幹主 as meaning zong zhu 宗主 following sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 268.

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cognate to materials found in the opening Chapters (Mozi 1–7) and Dia-logues (Mozi 46–49/50)?

it is noteworthy that the spirit world does not figure prominently at all in the opening Chapters as a subject of discussion (the graphs 鬼 and 神 occur only twice each across the seven chapters). “Qin shi” 親士 (Mozi 1) mentions divination and sacrifice, but it does so only as part of a meta-phor noting that those who stand out through their talents are often more likely to find themselves in peril than others: “the numinous tortoises are burnt first, and the snakes that have spirit power are sacrificed first” (1: 1/21).41 in “Fa yi” 法儀 (Mozi 4), people’s inclination to prepare sac-rificial offerings to heaven and heaven’s impartial acceptance of such offerings are highlighted to reinforce the notion of an impartial heaven (4: 5/1–5). “Qi huan” 七患 (Mozi 5) reiterates the need to moderate sacrifices in times of famine, a theme found across other late Warring states texts (5: 5/17–24).42 if the opening Chapters are indeed of fairly late origin (mid- to late third century BCE) and hence postdate Mozi 31 and the other Core Chapters, it is striking that a theme so prevalent in the Core Chapters occurs so sparsely in the opening Chapters. this confirms the miscella-neous nature of the opening Chapters themselves and further suggests that thematic continuities should not necessarily be inferred on the basis of the purported dating of chapter groups in the Mozi, especially since the dating is so uncertain.

it is in the Dialogues (specifically, Mozi 46–49) that some of the doctri-nal uncertainties beneath the surface of Mozi 31 and, as we will see, the shanghai Museum fragment, are on the agenda again. the Dialogues are exchanges between Mozi and his disciplines and opponents. Most schol-ars consider the Dialogues to postdate the Core Chapters on the grounds that the protagonists in these chapters are second- or third-generation disciples of Mozi. it is amid the generally more polemical nature of the exchanges in these chapters that the identity of Mozi’s interlocutors is made more explicit. several passages in the Dialogues are of particular relevance to the issues debated in Mozi 31: an exchange between Mozi and

41 the reference here is to (rhyming) zhuo/*tiauk 灼, meaning “to stick a hot poker through a turtle carapace,” and pu/*bâukh 暴, a technical term for using a snake in a rain-making sacrifice.

42 For appeals to change one’s diet and practice moderation in sacrifice during times of natural disaster and famine, see, e.g., zuozhuan “lord Cheng, year 5” and “lord Zhao, year 17”; Guliang zhuan “lord xiang, year 24”; Yi zhoushu “Di Kuang” and “Da kuang jie”; Liji “Qu li” and “Yu zao”; and zhouli “shan fu.”


Wumazi 巫馬子 in Mozi 46, several exchanges with gongmengzi 公孟子 in Mozi 48, and a couple of passages on sacrifice in Mozi 49.

“geng zhu” 耕柱 (Mozi 46) contains a long interchange between Mozi and Wumazi. Commentators traditionally identify this figure as one of Confucius’s disciples, also known as Wu Maqi 巫馬期. although his exact identity remains uncertain, his stance in Mozi 46 would certainly befit that of a Ru (yet note that the chapter does not explicitly label him a Ru). in the exchange in question Mozi indicates that the perceptive quali-ties of ghosts and spirits are so superior that, were the sages able to avail themselves of them as sensory extensions, they would undoubtedly do so. sages are represented as bound by time and circumstance, whereas the knowledge of ghosts and spirits is said to transcend time:

巫馬子謂子墨子曰: 「鬼神孰與聖人明智？」子墨子曰: 「鬼神之明智於聖人, 猶聰耳明目之與聾瞽也˳ 昔者夏后開使蜚廉折金於山川, 而陶鑄之於昆吾, 是使翁難卜於白若之龜, 曰: 『鼎成三足而方, 不炊而自烹, 不舉而自臧, 不遷而自行, 以祭於昆吾之墟, 上鄉！』卜人言兆之由曰: 『饗矣！逄逄白雲, 一南一北, 一西一東, 九鼎既成, 遷於三國˳ 』夏后氏失之, 殷人受之˳ 殷人失之, 周人受之˳ 夏后、殷、周之相受也, 數百歲矣˳ 使聖人聚其良臣與其桀相而（諫）〔謀〕, 豈能智數百歲之後哉？而鬼神智之˳ 是故曰: 鬼神之明智於聖人也, 猶聰耳明目之與聾瞽也˳ 」

Wumazi spoke to our Master Mozi: “Who is more perspicacious and knowl-edgeable—ghosts and spirits, or sages?” our Master Mozi replied: “the per-cipience and knowledge of ghosts and spirits is to the sages what perceptive ears and keen eyes are to the deaf and the blind. in ancient times, King Kai [Qi] of the xia commissioned [his minister] Feilian to dig minerals in moun-tains and rivers and cast them into vessels at Mount Kunwu. he ordered [diviner] Wengnan [Yi] to divine with the tortoise of Boruo, saying:

‘let the tripods, when complete, be three-legged and square (方 *paŋ).43let them be able to cook by themselves, without fire (烹 *phrâŋ),to store themselves away without being lifted (臧 *tsâŋ),and move themselves without being carried (行 *grâŋh).Use them for sacrifice at Mount Kunwu (虛[墟] *kha).may our offerings be appreciated (鄉 *haŋʔ)!’

then the oracle spoke:

‘i have accepted the offerings. profuse are the white clouds:at one time they are in the south, then to the north, now to the west, then to the east.

43 For reconstructions of old Chinese i follow the oCM (Minimal old Chinese) recon-structions in schuessler, Minimal old Chinese and Later Han Chinese.

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the nine tripods having been completed, they will be transferred among the three states.’

When the ruler of xia lost them, the founder of Yin inherited them. When Yin lost them, Zhou inherited them. now, the transfer from xia to Yin and Zhou took several hundred years. Even if a sage planned to gather his best ministers and superior assistants to plan, how could he know events that would happen after several hundred years? ghosts and spirits, however, can know this. and it is for this reason that i hold that the perspicacity and knowledge of ghosts and spirits is to the sages what perceptive ears and keen eyes are to the deaf and the blind.” (46: 100/7–14)

the divide between Mozi and his interlocutor here is a disagreement on the highest source of authority. For Wumazi, ultimate power of judgment lies with the sages, whereas for Mozi it lies with ghosts and spirits, who act as informants of heaven that surpass the powers of divination. later on in the chapter the same Wumazi points out to Mozi that for all his righteous conduct, people do not seem to help him and ghosts do not seem to bring him blessings (46: 100/30–31).

in “gui yi” 貴義 (Mozi 47) Mozi defends the idea that people of humble social station are potential sources of good counsel by referring to the spirit world’s universal acceptance of sacrifice: “now the peasant pays his taxes to his superior, who [uses these to] make sacrificial wine and grain offerings and, with these, sacrifices to shangdi, ghosts, and spirits. Can you claim that [the spirits] would refuse these offerings because they come from people of low standing?” 今農夫入其稅於大人, 大人為酒醴粢盛, 以祭上帝鬼神, 豈曰『賤人之所為』, 而不享哉？ (47: 104/6–7). the subject of criticism here is the idea that because the spirit world mir-rors human hierarchies, spirits would therefore reward those who offered them sacrifices by reinforcing those partial social relationships that are based on lineage and social station.

the “gongmeng” chapter (Mozi 48) generally tallies closely with the key themes in the Core Chapters (and, as we will see, the shanghai Museum fragment). Unlike Mozi 31, Mozi 48 is clearly set up as a polemic directed against followers of Confucius. gongmengzi 公孟子 is generally accepted to be a Ru, possibly a disciple of Zengzi 曾子. in Mozi 48 gongmengzi mentions Confucius by name, Mozi several times disapproves of Con-fucius and the fact that he is extolled as an exemplar, and the Ru are condemned explicitly on four counts: (1) their belief that heaven is not intelligent (ming) and that ghosts do not have spirit powers; (2) their adherence to the need for elaborate funerals; (3) their esteem for music and dance; and (4) their firm belief in predestined fate (48: 109/4–8). the


first theme in the Mozi 48 dialogues that echoes Mozi 31 is the idea that ghosts and spirits control reward and punishment and that antiquity cements the authority of arguments (cf. the second test in Mozi 31):

子墨子曰: 「古者聖王皆以鬼神為神明, 而為禍福, 執有祥不祥, 是以政治而國安也˳ 自桀紂以下, 皆以鬼神為不神明, 不能為禍福, 執無祥不祥, 是以政亂而國危也˳

our Master Mozi said: “the ancient sage-kings all regarded ghosts and spir-its to be divine and perspicuous and capable of meting out calamity and blessing. they held that [ghosts and spirits] controlled good fortune and misfortune and that, by means of these, governments were well adminis-tered and states were secure. From Jie and Zhou down [however], they all took ghosts and spirits not to be divine and perspicuous and unable to mete out calamity and blessing. they held that [ghosts and spirits] did not control fortune and misfortune, and for this reason, governments became chaotic and states were in danger.” (48: 108/1–3)

a second connection with Mozi 31 is that the Mozi figure in Mozi 48 returns to the philosophical question of the existence of a spirit world. Mozi does this in a much-quoted analogy arguing that the insistence of the Ru on ritual and sacrifice is valid only if they accept the basic proposi-tion that spirits actually exist:

子墨子曰:「執無鬼而學祭禮, 是猶無客而學客禮也, 是猶無魚而為魚罟也˳」

our Master Mozi said: holding that there are no ghosts and yet studying sacrificial rituals is like learning the rites of hospitality when there are no guests or making fishing nets when there are no fish. (48: 108/17–18)

Mozi 48 also revisits other relevant themes treated in the Core Chapters, such as excess expenditure on music and burials.

as i pointed out above, where Mozi 48 differs from Mozi 31 is in its explicit reference to the Ru as advocates of the ideas that the Mohists oppose. We need to remain cautious therefore not to infer that the tenor of the debate in both chapters is exactly the same. in Mozi 48 the Ru are said “to believe that heaven is unintelligent and that ghosts do not have spirit powers” 儒以天為不明, 以鬼為不神 (48: 109/4–5). this is arguably a rather tendentious interpretation of the Ru position since it would effectively mean that, for the Ru, spirits can be dismissed as hav-ing no numinous power at all.44 Yet the Mozi 48 claim that ghosts do not

44 a point also questioned in lu Jianhua, “Mozi zhi li xue,” esp. 40–41.

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have spirit powers (鬼不神) is not quite the same as the argument put forth by Mozi’s interlocutors in Mozi 31—namely that ghosts do not exist (執無鬼). the inference in Mozi 48 is that the Ru allow for the existence of ghostly beings but that they simply deny the spirits any significant numinous powers. the philosophical issue of the existence of spirits is sidestepped in favor of a debate on their efficacy as moral agents. Finally, as in the final part of Mozi 31, Mozi 48 contains two exchanges where Mozi is put on the spot and asked again to clarify the validity of his own thesis. Both episodes start off with the same premise, expressed by an unnamed interlocutor in the first story and by someone named Die Bi 跌鼻 in the second: “sir [Mozi], you hold that ghosts and spirits are intelligent, that they are able to bring about misfortune and good fortune, give blessings to those who do good, and inflict misfortune on those who do bad.”45 how then, the interlocutor in the first story argues, is it tenable that he has not received any blessings after having served Mozi for many years? Why then, Die Bi in the second story argues, can Mozi, being an exemplary sage himself, be prone to illness (48: 109/30)? in his answers Mozi seems to suggest that ghosts and spirits do control knowledge and have agency to act upon events but that there are many causes and effects that escape their control.

“lu wen” 魯問 (Mozi 49) contains two passages that are of interest to our understanding of the Mohist stance on cult. Both discussions focus on the relationship between the materiality of offerings and the moral intent behind the act of offering sacrifice. the issue is put to Mozi by a disciple who meets him after a three-year interval:

「始吾游於子之門, 短褐之衣, 藜藿之羹, 朝得之則夕弗得, 弗得祀鬼神˳ 今而以夫子之故, 家厚於始也, 有家厚謹祭祀鬼神˳ 然而人徒多死, 六畜不蕃, 身湛於病, 吾未知夫子之道之可用也˳」子墨子曰: 「不然, 夫鬼神之所欲於人者多, 欲人之處高爵祿則以讓賢也, 多財則以分貧也, 夫鬼神豈唯擢黍拑肺之為欲哉˳ 今子處高爵祿而不以讓賢, 一不祥也˳ 多財而不以分貧, 二不祥也˳ 今子事鬼神, 唯祭而已矣, 而曰:『病何自至哉？』是猶百門而閉一門焉, 曰:『盜何從入？』若是而求福, 於有怪之鬼, 豈可哉？」

When i first came to your gate i had to wear short-sleeved jackets and eat vegetable broth. if i ate it in the morning, i could not have it again in the evening, and i had nothing to sacrifice to the ghosts and spirits. now

45 in the first story: 先生以鬼神為明知, 能為禍福, [為]善者富之, 為暴者禍之 (48: 109/19–20); variant in the second: 先生以鬼神為明, 能為禍福, 善者賞之, 為不善者罰之 (48: 109/29–30).


because of your teachings, my family is better off than we were in the beginning. that being the case, i can respectfully offer sacrifice to ghosts and spirits. Yet, still, many among my close followers have died, my six [types of ] domestic animals do not breed, and i have personally been plagued by ailments. i have yet to be convinced [therefore] that your way is after all to be adopted.

our Master Mozi replied: “this is not how things work, for the things ghosts and spirits desire of men are manifold. they would wish that when people enjoy high rank and salary, they would give up their position in favor of the worthy; and that someone with great wealth would share it with the poor. how then could ghosts and spirits merely desire to seize sacrificial grains or snatch away sacrificial lungs?46 now, you were enjoying high rank and sal-ary, yet you did not give up your position in favor of a worthy. this is your first misfortune. Being very wealthy you failed to share with the poor. this is your second misfortune. and so now you serve ghosts and spirits merely by offer-ing them some sacrifices while asking yourself, ‘Why do these diseases inflict themselves on me?’ this is like shutting one gate out of a hundred while wondering, ‘Where do these thieves enter from?’ in such a situation how can you seek blessings from these bewildered ghosts?”47 (49: 114/12–19)

Contra suggestions that Mohists are merely interested in perfunctory do-ut-des worship, the Mozi figure in this dialogue suggests that appeasing spirits through sacrifice without an underlying moral or ethical intent, or indeed, without putting a moral agenda into practice in daily life, is ineffective and lacking in substance. ghosts are not interested merely in the volume or quality of sacrificial offerings. they continue to watch and assess the conduct of the supplicant and value the integrity that under-pins the presentation of offerings, a message that appears to have escaped Mozi’s own disciple after three years of absence. the argument could be interpreted as a veiled criticism of the Confucian notion that one should respect and offer sacrifice to the spirit world in order to keep it at bay, or their insistence that one should serve spirits “as if ” (ru 如) they are present (祭神如神在). this passage is followed by an anecdote on a pig sacrifice that touches on the same theme and to which i will return in the final section of this essay.

to sum up, the Dialogues offer fertile ground for tracing debates on some of the central themes of Mozi 31 (note that Mozi 50 adds nothing

46 Liji 26 “Jiao te sheng” 郊特牲 suggests that lungs were valuable organs in sacrifice since they were thought to be rich in blood and qi.

47 the expression 有怪之鬼 is slightly puzzling. one could opt to emend it (e.g., John-ston, The “Mozi,” 716 n. 30, reads 靈 for 怪). But it can equally well mean ghosts that harbor suspicion for or that mistrust people who offer them only partial service—hence, ghosts that are “bewildered.”

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new). Yet nothing in the passages discussed above suggests that we are dealing with a direct commentary-type or discursive elaboration of the received Mozi 31. While the discussions are formatted more clearly as a Mo-Ru polemic, it is equally clear that not only may we have different Mozi personas in action but also that Mozi’s core thesis on spirits was the subject of various interpretations and even questioned by Mohists them-selves. Mozi’s position on ghosts appears to be controversial even among his own followers, and likewise, the explicit or implicit Ru counterargu-ments do not speak with one voice. Rather than a sustained commentary on a doctrinal maxim, what emerges is a picture of multiple arguments by multiple actors concerning a thesis that continuously requires clarifica-tion. to add further to this diverse polemical landscape, it is now time to bring the shanghai Museum fragment into our discussion.

The Shanghai Museum Fragment

a brief text fragment among the Chu bamboo slips held at the shanghai Museum could throw further doubt on one of the central theses in the received Mozi 31, namely the notion that ghosts will invariably punish the wicked and reward those who do good. While the fragment in question possibly adds a significant new dimension to the Mohist view of spirits, we also ought to be cautious not to extrapolate too much from what is, in essence, a very short manuscript consisting of only five slips and a total of 197 characters. the text was dubbed “guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 by Cao Jinyan 曹锦炎, its editor for the shanghai Museum series, and it is usually referred to by this working title since its publication in 2005.48 Cao Jinyan, asano Yūichi 淺野裕一, and several other scholars have linked this fragment to the received Mozi and postulate that it is part of the lost first two chapters in the “Ming gui” triad.49 Cao takes the text as evidence for the significant presence of Mohists in the state of Chu, a hypothesis, he

48 Cao Jinyan, “shanghai bowuguan cang Chu zhushu Mozi yiwen.” i will follow the text as transcribed by Cao Jinyan with emendations and variants suggested by others indicated in notes. For Cao’s text, see Shanghai bowuguan cang zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 5, 149–159 (plates), 307–320 (transcription). studies that include a transcription and annotations include asano Yūichi, “ ‘guishen zhi ming’ yu ‘Mozi: Ming gui’ ”; xu hua, “shang bo jian ‘guishen zhi ming’ yi wei ‘Dongzi’ yiwen”; li Rui, “lun shang bo jian ‘guishen zhi ming’ pian de xuepai xingzhi”; Wang Zhongjiang, “Guishen zhi ming yu Dong Zhou de ‘duo yuan guishen guan’ ”; nishiyama hisashi, “shang bo Chu jian Guishen zhi ming de sige bushi”; and Chen Wei, “shang bo wu ‘guishen zhi ming’ pian chu du.”

49 Cao Jinyan, “shanghai bowuguan cang Chu zhushu Mozi yiwen,” 57.


claims, that is strengthened by the discovery of a text fragment possibly linked to the Mozi from Chu tomb 1 at Changtaiguan 長台關 (xinyang 信陽, henan, excavated 1956).50 asano, who dates “guishen zhi ming” between 342 and 282 BCE, adduces it as proof for his thesis that the ten core doctrines are to be dated to the early Warring states period, that is, during the latter half of Mozi’s life.51

there are a number of good reasons for associating “guishen zhi ming” with a Mohist polemic, given its thematic similarities with some of the passages in the received Mozi described above. however, the question of whether or not this piece should be text-genetically linked to Mozi 31 can-not be answered conclusively. it is important not to infer a direct textual affiliation with Mozi 31 based on the provisional title assigned by Cao Jin-yan, which does not appear on the manuscript itself.52 scholars have sug-gested several other titles, but given that there is no evidence of an actual title on the physical manuscript itself, i will continue to refer to it simply as the shanghai Museum fragment.53 the opening part of the original text is missing (as is suggested by the connecting expression jin fu 今夫 at the beginning of the fragment). a dialogue setting seems likely,54 but no interlocutors are identified by name:

50 the fragment in question is referred to as the “shentu Di” 申徒狄 and contains a conversation between the Duke of Zhou and shentu Di, who famously committed suicide rather than live an immoral existence. its direct link to the Mozi, however, is controversial. see li xueqin, “Changtaiguan zhujian zhong de Mozi yi pian”; and Wang ning, “Mozi ji shentu Di shizheng.”

51 asano Yūichi, “ ‘guishen zhi ming’ yu ‘Mozi: Ming gui,’ ” 100–101.52 the preserved text runs continuously over five slips (complete slips measure ca. 53

centimeters and were tied together in three registers). While it is likely that some content (including, possibly, an actual title) preceded these five slips, the end of the fragment must coincide with the end of a pian since a new unit (entitled “Rong shi youcheng shi” 融師有成氏) follows on slip 5 and is marked off by a separation mark ▃ in black ink (see Shanghai Bowuguan cang zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 5, pl. 5, p. 156). translations by Erica Brindley and Ken Brashier appeared while my draft was with the editors. see Brindley, “‘the perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the problem of intellectual affiliations in Early China”; and Brashier, Ancestral Memory in Early China, 338–339. My translation broadly agrees but differs in detail and modalities.

53 liao Mingchun suggests that, given its central argument, the text should be known as “guishen you suo ming you suo bu ming” 鬼神有所明有所不明. see liao Mingchun, “Du ‘shang bo wu: guishen zhi ming’ pian zhaji.” Ding sixin simply dubs the text “guishen” 鬼神. see Ding sixin, “shang bo Chu jian Gui shen pian zhushi”; and Ding sixin, “lun Chu jian ‘guishen’ pian de guishen guan ji qi xuepai guishu.”

54 i concur with Erica Brindley, “ ‘the perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the prob-lem of intellectual affiliations in Early China,” that the style of the fragment does not fit the dialogical format of the Mozi–disciple exchanges in Mozi 48, but i would suggest that the fragment is simply too short to exclude the possibility that it is a dialogue altogether. self-reflective and expository moments can be embedded in a dialogue, as can rhetorical

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Slip 1

今夫鬼神又（有）所明又（有）所不明, 則（以）亓（其）賞善罰暴也˳ 昔者堯舜禹湯, （仁）義聖智, 天下灋 (法) 之˳ 此（以）貴爲天子,

now, there are things that ghosts and spirits are aware of but equally other things that they are unaware of, and this [can be derived from] their rewarding of the good and punishing of the wicked. in ancient times Yao, shun, Yu, and tang were benevolent and righteous and had sagely knowledge,55 and thus, all under heaven took them as a model. Because of this they were honored to become son of heaven,

Slip 2

富又（有）天下, 長年又（有） (譽),56 後世遂之˳ 則鬼神之賞, 此明矣˳ 及桀受（紂）幽厲, 焚聖人, 殺訐者, 賊百眚（姓）, 亂邦家 ˳—[此（以）桀折於鬲山, 而受（紂）首於只（岐）社],57 身不沒, 爲天下笑˳ 則鬼

questions. Regardless, the formula 今夫 suggests that the narrator here is disagreeing with a stance taken previously.

55 Cao Jinyan gives the gloss ren/*nin 仁 for based on the phonetic resemblance of *lhin 身 and *tshîn 千, 忎, the latter being an old form of 仁 in Shuowen jiezi 8a.2a. nishiyama hisashi, “shang bo Chu jian Guishen zhi ming de sige bushi,” suggests pairing renyi 仁義 and shengzhi 聖智 as binomes based on comparative use in Mozi 28, other Ru texts, and the zhuangzi. he argues that both binomes are stock expressions used by both Ru and Mo (and criticized in Daoist texts) and takes this as an element in favor of a close affiliation between the shanghai Museum fragment and the received Mozi (in which the binome 仁義 occurs more than twenty times).

56 i read as yu 譽 following liao Mingchun, “Du ‘shang bo wu: guishen zhi ming’ pian zhaji,” rather than ju 擧 as proposed by Cao Jinyan, although their meaning is similar.

57 the thirteen characters between square brackets were written on the bottom half of the back of the second slip and are inserted into the main text by Cao Jinyan; for the plate, see Shanghai bowuguan cang zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 5, 316. there is nothing that sug-gests that it was written by a different hand. Cao suggests that this is a case of haplography in which the scribe or copyist added on the back of the slip a part of the text overlooked while recording or copying the main text. the black ink mark ▃ could indicate where on the slip the omitted passage should be inserted. there is another possibility: what is written on the back of the slip may be an explanatory comment, almost equivalent to an example in a footnote, since the main text could make sense without the inserted thirteen graphs if one takes the phrase 身不沒 to apply to all four tyrants mentioned earlier.


were enriched with all under heaven,58 and lived out their long lives in praise,59 and later generations followed them. and so, that ghosts and spirits rewarded them is evident [from these examples].60 When we come to the kings Jie, Zhou, You, and li, they burned61 sages to death, killed those who exposed faults, robbed the hundred families, and inflicted chaos on the states. [Because of this, Jie was cut down on Mount li, and Zhou received his punishment at the Qi altar Mount.]62 their bodies did not die a natural death,63 and they became an object of ridicule to the world. and so, that ghosts

Slip 3

[神之罰, 此明]64 矣˳ 及五（伍）子疋（胥）者, 天下之聖人也, 鴟夷而死˳ 榮夷公者, 天下之亂人也, 長年而沒˳ 女（如）（以）此詰之, 則善者或不賞, 而暴

58 according to nishiyama hisashi, the phrase 貴爲天子, 富有天下, or variations thereof, is attested eleven times in the received Mozi, a statistic that could lend support to textual affiliation. see nishiyama hisashi, “shang bo Chu jian Guishen zhi ming de ‘gui wei tianzi, fu you tianxia.’ ”

59 the term chang nian 長年 occurs twice in the fragment. liao Mingchun and Cao Jinyan would like it to mean “a long time,” “many years,” in slip 2 and hence take it to have a slightly different meaning from that of “long life,” “old age,” on slip 3. Ding sixin and nishiyama hisashi opt for “long life” in both cases. the contrast here is clearly with the evil quartet that follows on slip 2, who failed to live to a natural old age.

60 one could take ming 明 here in its more pregnant meaning and translate: “this is due to their clear percipience.”

61 liao Mingchun, “Du ‘shang bo wu: guishen zhi ming’ pian zhaji,” emends fen 焚 (*bэn) to fen 僨, meaning jiang 僵, “to collapse dead” or, more generally, “to kill” (rather than burn to death). his gloss does not substantially change the meaning of the sentence. the reference here is most likely to the murder of Bi gan 比干 by King Zhou and Jie’s killing of guan long(p)feng 關龍逢, a loyal and upright minister. see han Feizi “nan yan” 難言 and “Ren zhu” 人主.

62 there appears to be no received record of Jie coming to his end at a Mount li 鬲 (*rêk) other than in another manuscript among the shanghai Museum corpus (“Rongcheng shi” 容成氏). a lost Shizi 尸子 fragment, however, states that Jie was banished to a Mount li 歷 (*rêk), which is a homophone. see Shizi yizhu 72 (no. 68, quoting Taiping yulan 太平御覽). Qi she 岐社 must refer to the mountain site (Qi shan 岐山) and geographical heart of the Zhou polity where the (Western) Zhou ancestral altars were located. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 152 (“Fei gong, xia”). see also li Feng, Landscape and Power in Early China, 46–47.

63 transcribed to read mo 没 following Shuowen jiezi 3B.19b, 11B.23a–b. i follow Cao’s suggestion here that it must mean failing to live out one’s life to the end, in contrast to the virtuous quartet above.

64 note that these five graphs have been added by the editors based on context; they are missing on the original slip.

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and spirits mete out punishment is evident [from these cases]. [however,] when we come to Wu Zixu, he was one of the world’s sage exemplars, yet he ended up in a leather sack and died. Yigong of Rong was one of the world’s troublemakers, yet he lived to old age and died a natural death.65 if one examines the issue66 based on these cases, then [one must con-clude that] among the good there are some who do not receive rewards, and among the wicked

Slip 4

[ 者或不罰˳ 古（故）]67 吾因加 68 “鬼神不明”, 則必又（有）古（故）˳亓（其）力能至（致）安（焉）而弗爲

65 Wu Zixu sought refuge in Wu in 522 BCE, when his father and elder brother were unjustly executed in Chu. Eleven years later he persuaded King helü 闔閭 of Wu (r. 514–496 BCE) to attack Chu to avenge his father and brother. after the death of King helü, Wu Zixu served the young King Fuchai(i) 夫差 (r. 496–473 BCE) and helped him win a war against King goujian 勾踐 of Yue (r. 496–465 BCE). he then fell from grace and was forced to commit suicide. the story occurs in many sources. see Johnson, “Epic and history in Early China.” the identity of the second figure in the manuscript is debated. Cao proposes Rong Yigong 榮夷公 (also known as Rong Yizhong 榮夷終), who is attested as an adviser who had a bad influence on King li 厲 of the Zhou (857/53–842/28 BCE). Mozi 3 refers to 榮夷終 (cf. sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 13, “suo ran” 所染); see also Lüshi chunqiu 2.95 (“Dang ran” 當染). others have suggested Duke 穆 of song 宋 (song Mu gong; r. 728–720 BCE). see Yang Zesheng, “shuo shang bo jian ‘song Mu gong zhe, tian xia zhi luan ren ye.’” in a recent article jointly authored with li Jiahao, Yang has reviewed his original identifica-tion on the grounds that (1) there are no clear references indicating that song Mu gong lived a long life, and (2) song Mu gong was not as famous as Wu Zixu. instead, Yang and li now propose that the individual mentioned on the slip is Duke Mu of Qin 秦穆(繆)公 (r. 659–621 BCE). to add weight to the relationship between the shanghai Museum frag-ment and Mozi 31, Yang and li present a philological hypothesis that could explain why Qin 秦 appears as Zheng 鄭 in the second witness account of test 1 in Mozi 31. to support their identification they adduce references that indicate that Qin Mu gong could have lived beyond the age of sixty-five and list four incidents on account of which Qin Mu gong could have been perceived to misbehave (as implied in the manuscript). see Yang Zesheng and li Jiahao, “tan shang bo zhushu ‘guishen zhi ming’ zhong de ‘song Mao gong.’”

66 i follow li Rui, nishiyama hisashi 西山尚志, Chen Wei 陈伟, and Wang Zhong-jiang in glossing 女 as the conditional 如; Cao Jinyan and asano Yūichi opt for the per-sonal pronoun 汝, which is possible (the modality of the clause is most likely an implied conditional anyway). note, however, that the second-person pronoun 汝 does not occur in the received Mozi except in a dubious quotation at Mozi 19: 34/25, 19: 34/27, and 19: 35/5. Whatever option one chooses, to infer that a 汝 reading sheds greater clarity on the agents in the dialogue here (吾 vs. 汝), let alone that we might have a dialogue here between a first-person Mozi or Mohist grand master and a disciple, is highly speculative. Cf. Ding sixin, “lun Chu jian ‘guishen’ pian de guishen guan ji qi xuepai guishu,” 409–412.

67 the first four graphs between brackets are missing and have been supplied by Cao Jinyan based on context; the lower 口 part of the fifth character 古 (= 故) is visible on the slip.

68 i have followed liao Mingchun, who suggests not to follow Cao Jinyan’s emendation to *krâi 嘉 (“to speak favorably of,” “to commend”) but instead to take 因加 as a binome,


唬（乎）？吾弗智（知）也; 意亓（其）力古（固）不能至（致）安（焉）唬（乎）？吾或 (又) 弗智（知）也˳ 此兩者枳（歧）˳ 吾古（故）

some do not receive punishment. therefore, when, based on these exam-ples, i advocate the possibility that “ghosts and spirits are not aware” then there certainly are good reasons [precedents] for this.69 Could it be pos-sible that the power of the spirits [to mete out rewards and punishments] is able to manifest itself, but that [spirits can choose] not to act upon events?70 this, i do not know. or71 is it a certainty that their powers are incapable of manifesting themselves? that i also do not know. these are two different scenarios [lit., “these two options branch out differently”]. and so when i

Slip 5

[曰: “鬼神又（有）]72 所明, 又（有）所不明˳”此之胃（謂）唬（乎）！

say, “ghosts and spirits are aware of some things but unaware of others,” this is what it refers to!

in addition to its core theme, the fact that the text invokes Yao, shun, Yu, and tang as archetypical sage-kings and Jie, Zhou, You, and li as their opposites could suggest a common milieu with the received Mozi. Yet it is also clear that the shanghai Museum fragment, if directly associated with the “Ming gui” triad, would make the received thesis on ghosts and spirits in Mozi 31 more complex since it offers two hypotheses that are not made explicit there: (1) ghosts and spirits have the power of moral judgment

meaning “to add another explanation” (to the thesis). nishiyama hisashi transcribes 加, as does Wang Zhongjiang. asano Yūichi follows Cao. li Rui proposes to emend to jie 解. see li Rui, “Du Guishen zhi ming zha ji.”

69 For Cao Jinyan, this is a rhetorical question: “how would i, because of this, speak favorably of . . .?”

70 安 (焉) expresses modality here rather than a real question. Ding sixin takes it as a pronoun equivalent to the direct object pronoun 之. Ding sixin and Wang Zhongjiang gloss 至 as transitive 致. asano Yūichi, xu hua, and nishiyama hisashi concur with Cao Jinyan’s intransitive 至, the subject of which should not be the implied guishen 鬼神 but rather qi li 其力.

71 Chen Wei convincingly glosses yi 意 as yi 抑, “or, alternatively, . . .,” and gives paral-lel occurrences in Mozi 31 and 48. see Chen Wei, “shang bo wu ‘guishen zhi ming’ pian chudu”.

72 these four graphs are missing on the strip and have been supplemented by Cao Jinyan based on context.

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but not necessarily always the intent to apply those powers to each and every case; and (2) ghosts and spirits could lack any sort of intervention-ist power at all, or there are occasions when they simply do not have the capability to punish or reward. in other words, when there is no obvious spirit response, is this because the spirits have the choice to ignore or act upon a certain case, or is it the case that their powers are intrinsically limited? the first is a choice argument, and the second questions the very possibility of moral judgment by the spirits. the spirits’ capacity to be percipient and omniscient is separated from their ability to exert these powers.

on that basis one could also question a direct link to the received Mozi, as Ding sixin 丁四新, li Rui 李锐, Erica Brindley, and others have done. the first line of the shanghai Museum fragment says that there are things spirits know nothing about, the implication being that there are moral flaws that escape their scrutiny. it therefore follows that the actions of spirits can be experienced as whimsical, unpredictable, and capricious. the shanghai Museum fragment appears to be taking a position differ-ent from both the received Mozi as well as what are purported to be Ru views: there are events that ghosts act upon, but there are also events that fall beyond their providential radar. the fragment adds nothing to the question of the existence of ghosts and spirits. their ability to mete out punishments and rewards selectively leaves the ontological question of their existence unaddressed. the shanghai Museum fragment, Wang Zhongjiang 王中江 points out, could suggest that a spirit response is not inevitable or even that it can simply be a coincidence.73 here we might have a debate between an interlocutor who takes the Mozi 31 position (ghosts are ming) and someone who questions this and argues that there are occasions when ghosts are not ming. the stance taken in the shanghai Museum fragment, then, is contra Mozi 31; its line of questioning, including the option that spirits can selectively apply their moral sanction, seems to be more in line with the skepticism seen in the dialogues in Mozi 48.74

73 Wang Zhongjiang, “Guishen zhi ming yu Dong Zhou de ‘duo yuan guishen guan,’ ” 50.74 this point has also been noted by okamoto Mitsuo 网本光生 in “shang bo Chu jian

‘guishen zhi ming’ yu ‘Mozi: gong Meng’ suo jian liangduan duihua” and, independently, by Brindley in “ ‘the perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the problem of intellectual affiliations in Early China,” 218 n. 19. note that comparisons based on direct textual par-allels with Mozi 31 are further complicated by the fact that the passage in Mozi 31 that introduces the expression guishen zhi ming 鬼神之明, at the beginning of test 3, occurs in a unit of twenty-one characters (是以莫放幽閒, 擬乎鬼神之明顯, 明有一人畏上誅


if parallels with the received Mozi come to mind, the acknowledg-ment in the shanghai Museum fragment that spirit powers have a limited reach resonates with the two specific dialogues in Mozi 48 mentioned above. in Mozi 48 Mozi indicates to his first interlocutor (the one failing to understand why he has not received blessings from the spirits despite years of dedicated service to Mozi) that humans may deceive themselves in thinking that they are morally accomplished. in the second dialogue Mozi acknowledges that even sages can suffer ill health because not all factors that cause bad luck can be attributed to the spirit world. the latter implies that spirits have only partial powers, a position that would tally with the manuscript’s suo bu ming 所不明 thesis and the proposition that being perspicuous (ming 明) is not necessarily the same as having the ability (neng 能) to act upon it (wei 爲). Ding sixin goes so far as to date the shanghai Museum fragment as contemporary to Mozi 48 on the basis of these similarities (i.e., for Ding it has to be later than Mozi 31 and Mozi 26–28 and datable to xunzi’s time, ca. 313–230).75

in sum, rather than postulate that the shanghai Museum fragment is a lost piece of the “Ming gui” triad, it might be safer to interpret this frag-ment as yet another example of the self-searching dialectics that surround the Mohist doctrine on ghosts and spirits. it could be evidence for the existence of differing views on spirits among different strands of Mohism. it could even reflect dissident views that were not exclusively Mohist. if the shanghai Museum fragment is Mohist, rather than associating it with Mozi 31, its tone suggests that it is more akin to the skeptical reflection in the dialogue passages of Mozi 48 and 49. as Benjamin Wong and hui-chieh loy point out in their reading of a central line in Mozi 31 before the publication of the shanghai Museum fragment, Mozi’s thesis is to a large extent an aspiration: he wishes he could make everyone in the world

罰) that is out of place or corrupt according to commentators. see sun Yirang, Mozi jiangu, 243–244.

75 Ding sixin emphasizes this potential filiation in “lun Chu jian ‘guishen’ pian de guishen guan ji qi xuepai guishu,” 417–422; and in “a study on the Dating of the Mo zi Dialogues and the Mohist View of ghosts and spirits,” 74–81, 84. the similarities that he finds between the shanghai Museum fragment and these two dialogues in Mozi 48 are not far-fetched. however, Ding overemphasizes the monovocal nature of Mohist views on spirits in the received Mozi and generally downplays the occurrence of skepticism in Mozi 31 itself. Ding too easily assumes clear-cut school affiliations as the basis of his argument, which forces him to conclude that the shanghai Museum fragment (1) is not Mohist, but (2) if it has to be Mohist, then it can only belong to a dissident Mohist group; (3) on the other hand, since Mozi 48 has conceptual similarities to Xunzi’s “tian lun” 天論, the manu-script could be “Ru,” but (4) it is not quite “Ru.”

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“conform to believe” (ruo xin 若信) that ghosts and spirits have the pow-ers to reward and punish, which is not the same as claiming that they already and invariably do so:

Mozi is not saying that people ought to believe that ghosts exist, but that “ghosts with the power to reward and punish the wicked” exist. Compare also his statement of the prevailing attitude towards ghosts: there are per-sisting doubts about their existence, and there is also a misunderstanding about their nature and power. this points at least to two different kinds of “unbelievers”: those who do not believe that ghosts exist, and those who believe that they exist but not that they have the power to reward the good and punish the wicked.76

Mozi’s ambition is not to prove the existence of ghosts but rather to promote the sociopolitical utility of a natural or indeed force-fed belief in their punishing and rewarding powers. his aim is first and foremost to demonstrate the utility of having a persuasive argument that favors their existence rather than to come up with ontological proof. Whether, as Wong and loy claim, this impulse to invoke the workings of the spirit world without seeking to prove that spirits exist necessarily constitutes a “challenge to classical Confucianism” is far less certain in my view. one might argue that an informed aporia on the question of the existence of spirits combined with a practical attitude to keep spirits at a distance or use them to one’s advantage tallies well with the Confucian tenet that one should sacrifice to spirits as if they are present (祭神如神在, Lunyu 3.12). Even Confucius’s ambition in the Lunyu to keep the spirit world at bay through ritual mimicry or discursive abstention hinges on the assumption that humans are able to influence the spirit world and prevent them from intervening in human affairs through deliberate neglect. leaving aside the thorny issue of what should be taken as the canonical basis for so-called Ru views of the spirit world, the implication could be that Mozi misun-derstands the Ru position on ghosts and spirits. the Ru nowhere deny the

76 B. Wong and loy, “War and ghosts in Mozi’s political philosophy,” 348. on the issue of “belief” Chad hansen comments that Mozi “does not literally argue for believing in spirits any more than Confucius does! . . . he especially worries about wasting the traditional mor-alizing literature that describes spirits redressing injustice. how, he asks, can it be appro-priate in this linguistic tradition to wu [無] spirits? after a string of such literature based arguments, Mozi concludes with an argument that pointedly stresses the pragmatic nature of the issue. he adopts a tone that suggests that he himself actually doubts that there are spirits. he is arguing that we have to adopt and follow this dao of you-wu. Because of the popular literature, folk beliefs, word of mouth, and so on, the proper and utilitarian guiding language will use you [有] of spirits.” see hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 118.


existence of the spirit world outright but rather leave the question open and merely propose an alternative method to deal with them. For the Ru, disengaged reverence will keep spirits at bay, and sacrifice therefore seeks to appease in a negative way (you want them to leave you alone); for Mozi, sacrifice forges a direct link with the spirits in a positive way (since they are there anyway, you may as well make sure they work for you).

if the figure bringing chaos to the world on slip 3 of the shanghai Museum fragment is in fact identified as Duke Mu of Qin, who, in the received Mozi 31, is granted an additional nineteen years of life, one pas-sage in the Lunheng 論衡 (Discourses Weighed in the Balance) might even suggest that the shanghai Museum fragment could be associated with a Ru tradition. the passage in question forms part of Wang Chong’s 王充 (27–ca. 100 CE) overall argument that heaven does not intervene either to extend or to curtail someone’s life span on account of his or her deeds:

a follower of the Ru (儒家) named Dong Wuxin 董無心 and a disciple of the Mo (墨家) named Chanzi 纏子 met each other and spoke about the Way. Chanzi praised the Mohist doctrine that one can rely on the assistance of ghosts and spirits, and in support he brought up the case of Duke Mu of Qin, who, because of his enlightened virtue, had been granted an additional nineteen years of life by shang Di. Dongzi77 objected to this because Yao and shun had not been granted extra years and because Jie and Zhou did not die young.

Yao, shun, Jie, and Zhou can be considered to belong to the distant past, but more recently, one could [equally] take the cases of Duke Mu of Qin or Duke Wen of Jin as examples to refute the [Mohist] thesis. a posthumous name is like a footprint of someone’s deeds. traces of one’s deeds during one’s lifetime form the basis for a posthumous name in death. Mu 穆 is a name that stands for error and chaotic conduct; Wen 文 is an expression of virtue and grace. is it the case then that heaven granted additional years to someone with erroneous and disorderly conduct, or that it took away the life of someone who behaved virtuously and with grace? the reign of Duke Mu did not surpass that of Duke Wen, and Duke Wen’s posthumous name is more beautiful than that of Duke Mu. Yet heaven did not extend the years of Duke Wen of Jin; it only granted extra years to Duke Mu. this means that heaven rewards misconduct and disorder, much the same way as Duke Mu himself did.78

77 note that the received text here says Chanzi but most commentators agree that it should be Dongzi (alternatively one could read “Chanzi’s argument was objected to on account of . . .”).

78 see Lunheng “Fu xu” 福虛.

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to be sure, the labeling of Duke Mu of Qin as an unworthy person because his posthumous name (or a variant thereof) can be decoded as such is an argument initiated by Wang Chong to support his own (Dongzi’s) belief that heaven behaves in a whimsical way. Yet this Lunheng passage also comes strikingly close to the contents of slip 3 of the shanghai Museum fragment, granted of course that the figure there is identified as Duke Mu of Qin. Wu Zixu in the shanghai Museum fragment provides the equiva-lent example of Duke Wen of Jin in the Lunheng passage. some scholars therefore take these parallels as evidence that might link the shanghai Museum fragment to the persona of Dongzi, who is distinctly identified as Ru.79 naturally, the similarities are there, yet this hypothesis is also problematic on several grounds: first, reading a han passage back into a fourth- or third-century BCE manuscript can be seen as Hineininterpre-tierung; second, the identification of the figure of Dongzi as a Ru in a han or tang source need not reflect a Warring states reality, especially when this figure is unattested in sources contemporary with the received Mozi.80 in short, these attempts by Chinese scholars to make a detour through the Lunheng with a view to attaching a “school” label to the shanghai Museum fragment illustrate the complexities involved when one infers conceptual resemblances based on fragmentary terminological parallels.

Many questions therefore remain. Without further evidence to help flesh out its context, the value of the shanghai Museum fragment lies primarily in that it should encourage us to refrain from labeling Mohist views on spirits as generically unified, uncontested, univocal, and, conse-quently, representative of some kind of “school.” if proven to be Mohist, at most this new piece of evidence suggests that there were voices ques-tioning the absolute nature of the Mohist thesis on certain spirit inter-vention. such criticisms could suggest a rivalry of ideas among different branches of Mohists, yet there is nothing that excludes the possibility that the skepticism and doubts expressed in the shanghai Museum fragment

79 see xu hua, “shang bo jian ‘guishen zhi ming’ yi wei ‘Dongzi’ yiwen” (who also adduces another similar dialogue between Chanzi and Dongzi preserved in Ma Zong’s 馬縂 [d. 823 CE] Yilin 意林 as evidence); Yang Zesheng and li Jiahao, “tan shang bo zhushu ‘guishen zhi ming’ zhong de ‘song Mao gong,’ ” 185; Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 198.

80 the bibliographical treatise in the Hanshu 漢書 mentions a work entitled Dongzi 董子 in one scroll. his name is given as Wuxin 無心 and he is identified as an opponent of Mozi. see Hanshu 30.1726. the same work is mentioned in the bibliographical treatises of the Suishu 隋書 (34.997) and Xin Tangshu 新唐書 (59.1510). xu hua suggests, on the basis of quotations, that it may have been in circulation until late Ming times. see xu hua, “shang bo jian ‘guishen zhi ming’ yi wei ‘Dongzi’ yiwen,” 105–106.


were uttered in a Ru context or in an environment that was not explic-itly identified as Mohist. at best the shanghai Museum fragment demon-strates that the idea of spirit intervention in response to human behavior was debated. My reading of this manuscript therefore concurs with and reinforces the assessments reiterated recently by li Rui and Erica Brind-ley: fragmentary conceptual parallels or the overlapping of terminology between received and excavated texts do not constitute sufficient evi-dence to attach a particular intellectual or “school” affiliation to a text, a concept that itself is problematic.81 Following the same logic, one should allow for the possibility of a similarly porous interplay and divergence of arguments within textual units of a received text. Reconstructing what is newly excavated should inspire us to deconstruct what is received.

Ghostly Demands versus Frugal Rituals

the ontological problem of the existence of a spirit world and questions surrounding the basis of their interventionist powers are not the only themes in Mozi 31 that are cast into doubt elsewhere in the received Mozi and beyond. Mozi 31 sits uncomfortably among other Core Chapters that advocate thrift in ritual expenditure. to argue that the spirit world looms permanently on the doorstep as a “supramundane surveillance system” of human conduct, to quote ian Johnston,82 but to support moderation and frugality in funerary or ritual expenditure elsewhere might be seen as inconsistent. several voices, past and present, have noted this apparent inconsistency, starting with the eponymous Mozi figure himself in Mozi 48, who compared rituals without spirits to throwing nets when there are no fish. Wang Chong takes Mozi to task on this issue at great length:

the Mohists (Mo jia 墨家) advocate thrifty burials yet also honor ghosts, so their Dao is perverse and stands in mutual contradiction to their deeds; it follows then that given this [contradiction], their teachings are hard to follow. Wherein now does the contradiction lie? suppose that it is not the case that ghosts are the seminal essence ( jing 精) of dead people, then they would not be aware of the fact that people honored them. now, the Mohists claim that ghosts are the essence of dead people; they treat a dead person’s essence [i.e., his ghostly manifestation] generously, yet treat a dead person’s

81 li Rui, “lun shang bo jian ‘guishen zhi ming’ pian de xuepai xingzhi,” 31–33; Brind-ley, “ ‘the perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the problem of intellectual affiliations in Early China.”

82 Johnston, The “Mozi,” lx.

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body tightfistedly. they are generous to their spirits (shen 神), yet are stingy in treating their bodies (ti 體). When stinginess and generosity do not can-cel each other out, and outward and inward do not assist each other, then [ghosts] will be furious and send down calamities. Even if one esteemed ghosts, in the end one [does this] because of the feelings of hatred [that might be harboured by] the dead. it is human nature to desire generous treatment and to despise ungenerous treatment; the same applies to the hearts of the spirits (shen xin 神心). if one uses the method of Mozi and serves ghosts to seek blessings, blessings will rarely come about but calami-ties will arrive frequently. and, ab uno dice omnes, the methods of the fol-lowers of Mozi are all like this. that their doctrines disappeared and were not transmitted has its basis in this.83

For Wang Chong, Mozi’s inconsistent stance results from a misunder-standing of the nature of death. his criticism, however, should be seen in the context of his own time, the han, and in the context of his own work, the Lunheng, which contains several chapters that are preoccupied with the nature of death and the moral continuity between the living and the dead. in contrast, in the received Mozi, the doctrine on spirits rarely involves theoretical discussion of the nature of death. the only noticeable exceptions are the witness accounts 1 and 3 in test 1 in Mozi 31, where the accused threaten that if the dead can be presumed to have conscious-ness (which is implicitly admitted), then they will take revenge upon their executioners within three years. Wang’s claim therefore that the declining popularity of Mohism in his own time was to be attributed to the inherent doctrinal contradiction he highlights in the passage above must be exag-gerated, or at least, internal contradiction can only be one among several factors that might explain why Mohist ideas had fallen into disfavor in his time.84

Modern scholars too have commented on Mozi’s, at first sight, para-doxical stance. Feng Youlan 馮友蘭 speaks of a “seeming inconsistency” in the positions of not only the Mohists but also the Ru, who insist on funerary and sacrificial rituals “yet did not believe in the existence of the spirits.” Feng reconciles these inconsistencies and calls them unreal on the grounds that Confucians perform sacrificial rituals as a “poetic” sentiment of respect toward the departed rather than as an affirmation of a religious

83 see Lunheng “an shu” 案書.84 Michael nylan cautions not to extrapolate too much from this Lunheng passage

about the fate of the Mohists in Wang Chong’s time. see nylan, “Kongzi and Mozi,” 3–4. on the problems of interpreting the paired reference to Ru and Mo in han, see also Chen Jinxia, “lun Shiji zhong han Wudi ‘yi guang Ru Mo.’ ”


belief in the existence of spirits. Mohists, for their part, Feng argues, are ultra-utilitarian in that they seek to prove the existence of spirits merely to support their core doctrine of universal love. they employ any theory that can be used to that end, including advocating economies in ritual expenditure.85 Zheng Jiewen 郑杰文 broadly concurs: logically speaking, Wang Chong’s criticism of the Mohist inconsistency is accurate, but it is not relevant since the main purpose of the Mohists is to use their stance on spirits as a service doctrine to promote impartial care, frugal burial, and so on.86 the implication here is that some of the doctrines in the Core Chapters would stand as independent tenets, while others merely serve to lend weight to these. it is not clear to me on what basis the “Ming gui” triad should be singled out to do just that.

Feng Youlan’s contention that the Ru do not believe in spirits, except perhaps in the form of an empathy toward ancestral spirits outside the common pantheon maintained through simple do-ut-des sacrifices, is equally problematic. it assumes that Ru sacrificial ritual distinguishes itself from “popular” or “common” religion because Ru ritual is inspired by an advanced moral program. it also implies that sacrificial practice in a Ru context should be seen as a manifestation of elite culture, while, by contrast, Mohist cultic activity can be reduced to a gift-giving dynamic popular among the masses, who are mostly concerned with the material aspects of cult expenditure or the question of whether humans can expect a direct and immediate return for their expressions of reverence.

this attempt to distinguish Mohist religiosity from Ru or “Confucian” attitudes on the basis of their views on ritual is tenuous. it also appears in the work of Benjamin schwartz, who, in his explanation of the notion of li 禮, distinguishes a secular sphere of “respectful manners” from “reli-gious rites of sacrifice.” schwartz speaks of a Mohist disbelief in the “magi-cal” spiritual-ethical function of ritual and music: “in carrying on religious sacrifices [the Mohist] does so out of gratitude towards the spirits and in order to please the spirits, not because ritual makes him a nobler person. in this sense, ritual is not ‘magic’ in Fingarette’s sense.”87 it follows that Mohist acts of service to the spirit world (i.e., the offering of sacrifice) do not transform the performer and, hence, are more “secular” (or a-reli-gious) than ritual and music as advocated by the Ru. Yet how useful is it to

85 Fung, A Short History of Chinese Philosophy, 57–58.86 Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 209–210.87 schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 152–153 (my italics).

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separate sacrificial cult from a category of high ritual and associate the for-mer with Mo and the latter with Ru? if ritual, as schwartz suggests, covers the sphere of basic etiquette, are we to assume then that, say, table man-ners are less “secular” and more morally transformative than the prepara-tion of sacrificial offerings? and does Mohist criticism of ritual imply that the Mohists are disinterested in ritual altogether? this is highly doubtful. More convincing in this respect is Mark Csikszentmihalyi’s suggestion that Mohist criticism was directed to ritual as practiced by the Ru (because it is inconsistent) rather than ritual in general. in the Mohist perspective, rituals can serve a utilitarian purpose provided that one adopts the right ones and is consistent in their application.88 this certainly appears to be a view held by han times, when the complexity of Ru ritual is highlighted as objectionable in the eyes of Mohists.89

in short, the Mohist advocacy for the simplification of ritual should not imply that Mohists considered ritual to be unimportant altogether. By the same token, it cannot be assumed that the so-called Ru conceived of ritual as devoid of utilitarian motives. indeed, offering sacrifice to keep the spirit world at bay and refraining from discourse about them (zi bu yu 子不語) equally serve a purpose. the Mohists indeed constantly weigh and nego-tiate the material requirements of ceremony, but so do most thinkers of the period. if we accept the premise that, as my internal analysis of the received Mozi shows, Mohist perceptions of the spirit world were dynamic, internally contentious, and evolving, there is no need to explain a Mohist belief in service to the spirit world and their advocacy of frugality in ritual as a doctrinal contradiction. putting together passages expressing doctrinal doubt in Mozi 31, exchanges preserved in the Dialogues, and the shanghai Museum fragment, a picture emerges of a Mohist landscape in which the polemic on spirits appears to be as much an internal debate as it is a discussion pitched against external parties. and if we refrain from assuming that Mohist views on the spirit world and ritual in general were exclusively formulated in the context of a polemic against an identifiable group known as Ru, the contradiction Wang Chong highlights might dis-solve. it is impossible to establish in each case who are understood to be the Ru in the received Mozi (e.g., none are mentioned in Mozi 31) and

88 Csikszentmihalyi, Material Virtue, 36–37.89 see, e.g., Huainanzi “Yao lüe,” which notes that Mozi found the rituals of Confucius

uselessly complicated and difficult (煩擾而不說).


whether or not the mentions of the Ru across the received Mozi all refer to the same group of people.

the apparent contradiction between ritual and materiality is not solved in the Mozi. the point the Core Chapters seem to make is that rituals, if performed inconsistently, could be a waste of time and resources, but the material requirements of ritual are not invariably rejected. at the end of Mozi 31, when the skeptics object to spending wealth (cai 財) on sacrificial offerings, Mozi counters their claim by insisting that such expense would be justified even if it only brings people together (31: 55/1–11). in the sec-ond test in Mozi 31, Mozi makes ritual expenditure part of an ontological proof for the existence of ghosts and spirits, or at least, he uses it to back up his claim that the ancients believed in them:

故曰: 官府選效, 必先祭器祭服, 畢藏於府, 祝宗有司畢立於朝, 犧牲不與昔聚群, 故古者聖王之為政若此˳

therefore, it was said that when the government offices provide the imple-ments, they must first ensure that the proper sacrificial vessels and robes are fully stocked in the warehouses, that the invocators of the ancestral temple and all other officials in charge [of sacrifices] have all been appointed in the court, and that the animals to be used as sacrificial victims are no lon-ger grouped together with the common herds. since the sages of antiquity conducted their government in this fashion, it must be the case [that they believed in the existence of ghosts and spirits]. (31: 53/2–3)

Moderation in ritual expenditure is not universally acclaimed across the received text. in a passage in Mozi 25 he argues that sumptuous funerary expenditure has a theological effect since it might deplete resources that could otherwise be used to maintain regular sacrifices:

今惟無以厚葬久喪者為政, 國家必貧, 人民必寡, 刑政必亂˳ 若苟貧, 是粢盛酒醴不凈潔也˳ 若苟寡, 是事上帝鬼神者寡也˳ 若苟亂, 是祭祀不時度也˳ 今又禁止事上帝鬼神, 為政若此, 上帝鬼神始得從上撫之曰: 「我有是人也, 與無是人也, 孰愈？」曰: 「我有是人也, 與無是人也, 無擇也˳ 」則惟上帝鬼神降之罪厲之禍罰而棄之, 則豈不亦乃其所哉˳

now, if one follows those who support elaborate funerals and lengthy mourning to conduct government, then the state will necessarily become poor, the people will become few, and the government will necessarily be in chaos. if the state is poor, then the sacrificial grains and wine will not be of the required purity. if the people are few, there will be few to serve shangdi and the spirits. and if the government is in chaos, then sacrifices will not be conducted at the appropriate times or in the appropriate mea-sure. if now one conducts government in such a way that one effectively

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prevents the proper services to shangdi and the spirits, they will be the first to look down from above and, considering how to soothe the people, might say: “What is better for us, to have these people exist or to have them not exist?” or: “Whether they exist or not does not make any difference to us!” Consequently, shangdi and the spirits will send down cruel punishments for the people’s misdemeanors and abandon them. and if they do so, would not that just be the appropriate thing to do! (25: 40/18–22)

lavish expenditure not only exhausts the state’s resources but, more importantly, incites discontent in the spirit world itself. indirectly Mozi here invokes the spirits themselves as moral arbiters of ritual expenditure. in Mozi 27 he draws on religious obligation to promote his views of an egalitarian society: social harmony and the impartial division of wealth ensure that the state will always have the necessary resources to provide offerings to the spirit world (27: 44/28–30). so the material basis of ritual obligation is firmly acknowledged by Mozi. it supports his ideal of the impartial society: a division of wealth leads to an equally shared burden in the sustenance of religious obligation, which, in turn, prevents ritual expenditure from undermining conventional economic productivity or burdening one social class more than another. to label the Mohist world-view, in this respect, as dominated by religious conservatism is therefore exaggerated.90

in its most basic form one would assume that the Mohist expects a return from the spirits that is proportionate to the generosity of his offer-ings. But Mozi takes a morally superior stance when, in a passage in the Dialogues (in Mozi 49), he insists that sacrifice should not degenerate into a calculated quest for blessings but must reflect moral conduct:

魯祝以一豚祭, 而求百福於鬼神˳ 子墨子聞之, 曰: 「是不可˳ 今施人薄而望人厚, 則人唯恐其有賜於己也˳ 今以一豚祭而求百福於鬼神, 鬼神唯恐其以牛羊祀也˳ 古者聖王事鬼神, 祭而已矣˳ 今以豚祭而求百福, 則其富不如其貧也˳ 」

a priest from lu offered one pig in sacrifice and asked for a hundred bless-ings from the spirits. our Master Mozi heard about this and said that this cannot be done. now, to give to others sparingly yet to expect much from them would cause them to be afraid of the gifts given to them. now, since one pig is offered and yet a hundred blessings are sought for from ghosts and spirits, they would be quite afraid if they received [an even more valuable] sacrifice of oxen and sheep. anciently, when the sage-kings served ghosts and spirits, they just offered sacrifice and that was all. Yet today, by offer-

90 see Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 1, 58, for an example of overemphasis on Mohist religious conservatism.


ing one pig while seeking a hundred blessings, one would be better off to remain poor than to become rich by it. (49: 114/21–23)

here a priest from lu (heartland Ru territory) is reprimanded for expect-ing a spirit response that is disproportionate to the value of the sacrificial offerings. sacrifice should be about moral intent rather than the quest for blessings from the spirits by means of gifts. the offering of sacrifice (do) should not necessarily come with an expectation of greater recom-pense (des). in emphasizing the role of human conduct Mozi’s attitude here could be comfortably construed as “classicist.”91 his exhortation to the priest of lu is that sacrifices should morally transform a person. in the analysis of Feng and schwartz, then, the Mozi figure in this passage would be the perfect Confucian.

in sum, despite the fact that in certain debates in the Mozi, Mohist views are clearly contrasted with those of the Ru, this dichotomy must be handled with care in our analysis of the text. in the case of views on the spirit world, it would be hard to claim that the Ru simply dismissed ghosts

91 Zheng Jiewen constructs a hypothesis to explain this seeming discrepancy and argues that these are debates that took place in the state of lu at a time when Mozi had yet to carve out a clear doctrinal niche. Mozi, according to Zheng, is still learning from the Ru and has yet to make up his mind. his sojourn in lu should therefore be seen as a dialecti-cal arena in which Mohist core doctrines gradually became distinct from Ru teachings. the implication for Zheng then is that the Core Chapters must be later than the Dialogues, which would represent an early phase, when Mohist ideas were in an embryonic and inar-ticulate state. see Zheng Jiewen, zhongguo Mo xue tongshi, 3, 22–23, 41–42, 46–47. Zheng’s scenario unfortunately is based on tenuous extrapolations, as is shown by the fact that he needs to rely on quotations on sacrifice from the “li qi” 禮器 chapter in the Liji 禮記 and commentaries by Zheng xuan 鄭玄 (127–200 CE) and Kong Yingda 孔穎達 (574–648 CE), texts and commentators dated centuries post factum. Zheng Jiewen’s summary of the Mohist position is extremely speculative on other fronts. First, the doctrinal doubts expressed by gongmeng suggest to Zheng that the theory of morally conscious spirits was established early on when the Mohists were setting themselves apart from the Ru. Zheng makes this argument with an overly simplistic analysis. according to Zheng, the “school” of the Ru does not like to talk about ghosts and spirits and prefers instead to concentrate on self-cultivation. Yet for the lower classes of the population, whose main concern is survival, such elevated doctrines are of little help. Mozi thus provides the common folk with ideas that they can connect with and that might assist in encouraging rulers to toe the line. second, Zheng speculates that the early Mohists insist on proving the existence of ghosts and their capacity to reward (and hence the need for sacrifices, etc.). later on, however, as the status of individual disciples changes, Mozi’s doctrine takes on a more social character in that its main focus lies in encouraging disciples to cultivate themselves and promote the selection of talented folk. it is unclear to me what basis Zheng draws on to make these claims. Finally, Zheng asserts that Mozi’s own disciples question his theories about providential spirits because of a disjuncture between his ideals on the one hand and on the other hand the social reality and spirit of the time, which was increasingly human centered. Underneath Zheng’s last hypothesis lurks again a narrative that echoes the so-called triumph of Confucianism.

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and spirits. their insistence on ancestral rituals illustrates an acute aware-ness of the spirit world. perhaps the reality was more complex. Rather than simply discrediting agnostic Ru and accusing them of hypocrisy when investing in rituals without believing in spirits, the Mohists may have sought to “democratize” the pantheon and divorce the notion of spirit power from its ancestral basis as emphasized by the Ru. the dif-fering views of the role of the spirit world by what are purported to be Mohist and Ru camps would therefore be not so much of substance but rather of degree: rather than being preoccupied with the question of the existence of spirits, their shared concern was to understand what aspects of the spirit world should be deemed spiritually potent and when. the Mohist would argue that ancestral spirits are partial and, therefore, that their spirit response fails to have universal or impartial relevance (unlike nonancestral spirits). Mozi 31 can then be read not merely as a chapter that seeks an imprimatur for sacrificial cult of the folk-religious type but also as a plea for a more inclusive spirit pantheon. the Mo-Ru disagree-ment hinges, not on whether or not spirits are potent, but rather on the question of what signs should be taken as significant and hence acted upon. Mohists would argue that the spirits should be monitored con-stantly since the spirit world is impartial in judging human conduct; the Ru instead assume that the spirit world is biased toward certain groups or individuals. For them the crux lies in deciding when to ignore signs from the spirit world and when to interpret them as socially significant. as a result, Mohists prefer to see cultic activity and expenditure dedicated to the entire pantheon so as to benefit as many as possible, whereas the Ru prefer to invest resources in cultic activity on behalf of those enti-ties that are of immediate concern to clan, lineage, or locality. Whereas Mohists want resources for the sustenance of the spirit world deployed for the benefit of the greatest common good (an attitude that could be construed as “moderate” or “utilitarian” ), the Ru do not object to the idea that resources can justifiably be concentrated and invested in a cause that is partial (and concentrating goods for use of the few can indeed be construed as “excessive”). at any rate, we must assume that many at the time were undecided on the efficacy of the spirit world, as the shanghai Museum fragment corroborates.

Conclusion

Evidence does not allow us to reconstruct the sociology of Mohism with sufficient detail. Yet there are elements both internal and external to the


received Mozi that suggest that the Mohist position on ghosts and spirits may not have been straightforward or internally uncontroversial. Mohist views on the spirit world were not static but evolving, or at least, they were more nuanced and subject to debate than scholars have suggested. i have shown that it is possible to arrive at a picture of a more polyphonic Mohist view of the spirit world. i also hope to have shown that the absence of all but one of possibly three original chapters that made up the “Ming gui” triad does not prevent us from doing so, and that a close reading of units at the subchapter level, as well as comparisons with passages in the other Core Chapters and the Dialogues and the shanghai Museum frag-ment, reveals a more complex picture. this picture suggests that there were Mohists who were skeptical about the prescience of the spirit world. it also reveals that the philosophical issue of the “existence” of ghosts and spirits, on the one hand, and the more pragmatically inspired question of whether or not the spirit world is capable of punishing and rewarding, on the other hand, were seen as separate issues. the first may have been an ideological or theological debate that occurred between Mozi and his crit-ics, the latter not necessarily identified as Ru in each and every case. the second concern may have been debated as part of what some perceived to be a “Mo versus Ru” polemic, with the latter advocating a fatalism far more detached from individual moral (or immoral) action than the for-mer. Yet even here, the interlocutors in these exchanges are not always clearly defined.

the question then arises as to what encourages scholars to continue to present the Mohist stance on spirits in the form of a terse and seemingly unproblematic acknowledgment that Mohists simply believed in ghosts? in this respect nicolas standaert has made the incisive observation that our reading of the Mohist Core Chapters has been overly influenced by the titles these chapters carry. given that the phrases used as chapter titles almost never occur in the text itself, standaert suggests that they were not conceived as part of the original chapters but that they may have been assigned by an editor who drew on the list that appears in a passage in Mozi 49. in that particular passage the doctrine on ghosts is referred to as shi gui 事鬼, “serving ghosts.”92 and so the relationship between a title and a chapter is not necessarily clear and, in fact, sometimes seems random. the case of Mozi 31 and the shanghai Museum fragment support standaert’s hypothesis, since one could argue that the ideas presented in

92 see standaert, “problems with titles.” For the passage on the ten doctrines, see Mozi 49: 114/7–10, quoted in the introduction to this volume.

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the received Mozi are very elastic and swing between moments when the theoretical issue of the spirits’ consciousness or existence is at play and moments when the texts seem to advocate nothing more than a generalist exhortation to respect ghosts (even if one is not convinced of their exis-tence). naturally, we do not know what title was assigned to the shanghai Museum fragment, if any. But the title assigned to Mozi 31, “Ming gui,” if taken as a verb–direct object phrase, “explaining ghosts,” does appear to be a weak choice if it was meant to reflect the core content of the chapter. in this respect a reading of ming as a stative verb (“percipient ghosts”) would be equally plausible.93

this, together with a seeming paradox between the vociferous advo-cacy of sacrifice and a criticism of ritual opulence, indicates that, when situating Mohist views on spirits in their context, we should also refrain from isolating these views as either uniquely Mohist or uniquely inspired by or crafted in opposition to Ru views. Furthermore, in approaching the Mozi, we may also have to be more careful in handling analytical concepts such as religion versus ritual and popular (folk, common) versus elite or indeed in assuming that we understand the contours of what “sacrifice” or “ritual” meant at the time. a much more systematic analysis of religious life in practice is required for the period in question. the anecdotal and often-dispersed nature of much of the discourse on ghosts and demons in Warring states texts indicates that debates on the spirit world rarely happened exclusively as a philosophical exercise. We may not be able to identify the voices in these discussions with certainty, but it is imperative that we remove expectations that their views can be readily pigeonholed in terms of a polemic between philosophical “schools.” Warring states debates on sacrificial practice and cult in general were rarely held in iso-lated ideological or theoretical terms, and practical utility seems to unite them all, whether the polemic is associated with Mohism or not. the intellectual and religious world of fourth- and third-century BCE China was certainly more complex than a dialectic described by herrlee Creel in 1951, in which “vulgar” or “superstitious” Mohists contended with “ratio-nal” Confucians.94

ironically, many of the strategies one sees at work in the polemics sur-rounding purported Mohist and Ru views on spirits in the Warring states period reappear a few centuries later among vociferous critics active in

93 Johnston allows for both readings; see Johnston, The “Mozi,” lvii–lviii.94 Creel, Confucius, 198.


the Eastern han. the writings of Wang Chong, Wang Fu 王符 (90–165 CE), and Ying shao 應劭 (ca. 140–204 CE) are peppered with ambiguities on the issue. although they appear to dismiss a preoccupation with ghosts and supernatural phenomena on the grounds that it is “superstitious” or vulgar (su 俗), at the same time the very existence of the spirit world is accepted or at best left unquestioned. ghostly activity is not discounted a priori but made subject to human response. Wang Chong does not deny the potential influence of the spirit world on human affairs, but like some of Mozi’s more skeptical interlocutors, he seeks to establish which forms of spectral involvement humans should accept as being of a genu-ine demonic nature. and a figure such as Ying shao stresses the dangers inherent in either an obsessive preoccupation with the spirit world or the absolute neglect of demonic appearances.95

it appears then that, in Warring states as in han China, disagreement arose not so much over the presumed appearance or status of ghosts and spirits or the impact of the divine on human affairs; rather, the debate focused on whether such signs from the spirit world were to be taken as genuinely ominous and hence socially or politically relevant and whether there were occasions when the spirit world could be responsibly neglected. But whereas in the Warring states period concern with these issues was often associated with the Mozi figure, by han times such questions had taken on a more general existence and their links to the world of the his-torical Mozi had faded.

95 the core arguments occur in the “Jie chu” 解除, “lun si” 論死, “si wei” 死偽, “Ding gui” 訂鬼, “si yi” 祀義, and “Ji yi” 祭義 chapters of the Lunheng; the “si dian” 祀典 and “guai shen” 怪神 chapters in the Fengsu tongyi 風俗通義; and the “Bu lie” 卜列 and “Wu lie” 巫列 chapters in the Qianfu lun 潛夫論.

Mozi’s ReMaking of ancient authoRity

Miranda Brown

use the past to serve the present 古為今用chairman Mao

Why is this age worse than earlier ages?anna akhmatova (1919)

the Janus-faced quality of Mo Di (ca. 479–381) is something of a puzzle. in his more familiar guise, Mo Di, or Mozi (“Master Mo”), is presented as a radical: an outsider battling aristocratic privilege, a utopian demand-ing the dissolution of hereditary barriers, an iconoclast calling for the overhaul of tradition.1 no doubt, such features have endeared the thinker to twentieth-century interpreters who see Mohist thought as offering an alternative to the more staid and orthodox voices that later dominated the tradition. angus graham, for example, extols Mo Di and his follow-ers as “vigorous independent thinkers who submit all traditional moral-ity to the test of social utility” and as “challengers of traditional values.”2 thomas Metzger argues that the Mohist challenge to tradition provided “lasting contributions to the pattern of chinese thought.” such challenges, Metzger notes, introduced the seeds of reflexivity to philosophical dis-course and transformed the assumptions of “tradition” into debatable “claims.”3 and heiner Roetz characterizes the Mozi by its “radical detach-ment” from tradition and custom, a detachment that represents the height of iconoclasm during the axial age in china. as Roetz sums it up, “Mo Di stands up against all established customs.”4 at the same time, Mo Di and his followers presented a conservative, and indeed, one might argue, reac-tionary, face. the Mohists rail about the decline of morality, as well as the prevalence of warfare and lavish spending, in their own time.5 “the ancient kings of the three Dynasties are no more,” the Mohists complain, “and

1 for accounts that present Mo Di as a social revolutionary, see gu Jiegang, “shanrang chuanshuo qi yu Mojia kao.”

2 graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 4.3 Metzger, “some ancient Roots of ancient chinese thought,” 63–64.4 Roetz, Confucian Ethics of the Axial Age, 242.5 Lewis, Writing and Authority, 112.

144 miranda brown

all under heaven is at a loss as to what is proper” 三代聖王既沒, 天下失義 (25: 38/26 and 25: 40/10–11). though they presumably knew better, the Mohists did not refrain from making appeals to ancient authority when it suited them.6 to take a central issue in the Mozi, the text named after Mo Di, why should men accord with the will of heaven? one must accord with the will of heaven because, the Mozi tells us, “the ancient sage-kings of the three Dynasties, yu, tang, Wen, and Wu, accorded with the intentions ( yi 意) of heaven and were rewarded” 昔三代聖王禹湯文武, 此順天意而得賞者也 (26: 43/9–10). a similar appeal (in almost identical phrasing) is repeated in virtually every chapter of the Mozi. so, geoffrey Lloyd has concluded that the Mohists seem to be no exception to the rule that early chinese thinkers harkened back to—or, better still, carped on—the teachings of sage-kings.7

What do we make of the numerous appeals to ancient sages in the Mohist corpus? certainly, one could argue that such references were just for “form’s sake.”8 conceivably, the Mohists mentioned these sage-kings not because they especially believed in them but because they were mind-ful of the expectations of their audience. indeed, something along these lines has been suggested by graham, who maintains that the Mohists judged doctrines “primarily” by their practical consequences, thereby lending the impression that appeals to sage-kings amounted to little more than an afterthought. Mo Di and his followers, graham adds, “comb[ed] supporting questions however dubious, like a Protestant sectary using and misusing scripture.”9

alternatively, the references to sage-kings might be interpreted as a conservative lapse—a sign, in other words, that Mo’s revolution was still incomplete. something like this has been proposed by tan yuquan, and for good reason.10 Later traditions insinuate that Mo Di had been a fol-lower of confucius—hence, the suspicion that Mo Di was unable to fully extricate himself from the tradition he later rejected. at the same time, however, appeals to sage-kings seem to be more than lapses. Looking at the problem from the perspective of numbers, no fewer than 191 references

6 Metzger, “some ancient Roots of ancient chinese thought,” 82; Loy, “the Moral Phi-losophy of the Mozi ‘core chapter,’ ” 138–143.

7 Lloyd, Adversaries and Authorities, 26. 8 ibid. 9 graham, Later Mohist Logic, Ethics, and Science, 11–12.10 tan yuquan, Mozi sixiang pinglun, 161–208, esp. 173, 180, 204.

mozi’s remaking of ancient authority 145

to sages (sheng 聖) and 121 to sage-kings (sheng wang 聖王) appear in the Mozi. if we restrict our gaze to the core chapters, the picture is largely unchanged: we have 102 references, or one occurrence of “sage-kings” for every 481 words (see table 1). i am not the first to notice the Mohist pre-dilection for citing the authority of the sage kings. Mark edward Lewis has observed of the Mohist canon that it “routinely, indeed obsessively, inscribes its social programs in an imaginary antiquity and appeals to the authority of past writings.”11

table 1. Distribution of the terms “sage,” “sage-king,” and “former king” in zhou texts

title of work and approximate date

sage (sheng 聖)

sage-king (sheng wang)

former king (xian wang 先王)

Book of Odes (from ca. 5th c. Bce)

9 0 3

early Book of Documents (pre-5th c. Bce)

6 0 23

Analects (from ca. 5th c. Bce?) 8 0 2total for Mozi 191 121 40Mozi core chapters (8–37;

ca. 5th–4th c. Bce)137 102 31

Mozi opening chapters (1–7; ca. 4th–3rd c. Bce)

23 12 5

Mozi Dialogues (46–49/50; ca. 4th–3rd c. Bce)

19 7 8

Daodejing 道德經 (from 4th c. Bce)

33 0 0

Mencius 孟子 (4th–3rd c. Bce)

48 1 10

Zuozhuan 左傳 (from ca. mid-4th c. Bce)

26 3 48

Liji 禮記 (Record of Rites; 4th c. Bce)

75 10 48

Mu Tianzi zhuan 穆天子傳 (The Tradition of Mu, Son of Heaven; ca. 350 Bce)12

1 0 5

11 Lewis, Writing and Authority, 111.12 Mathieu, “Mu t’ien-tzu chuan,” 342; Mathieu cautions that portions of the text (juan 5)

might be later.

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table 1 (cont.)

title of work and approximate date

sage (sheng 聖)

sage-king (sheng wang)

former king (xian wang 先王)

Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Annals by Lü Buwei; ca. 239 Bce)

117 26 60

Xunzi 荀子 (3rd c. Bce) 43 39 49Guanzi 管子 (4th c. Bce; core,

ca. 250 Bce)13185 45 79

Han Feizi 韓非子 (3rd c. Bce) 107 9 42Guoyu 國語 (4th c. Bce)14 44 9 80Shangjun shu 商君書 (Book of

Lord Shang; 4th–3rd c. Bce?)

50 5 11

Zhuangzi 莊子 (3rd c. Bce) 0 0 0Shenzi 慎子 (350?–275? Bce)15 16 3 3Yinwenzi 尹文子 (Warring

states?) 20 1 0

Heguanzi 鶡冠子 (Pheasant Cap Master); late Warring states?)

81 6 8

Guiguzi 鬼谷子 (late Warring states?)

31 0 3

Yanzi chunqiu 晏子春秋 (Spring and Autumn Annals by Master Yan; late Warring states)16

0 0 0

13141516

still other explanations merit consideration: appeals to ancient sage-kings were arguably more than formal. an examination of the pre-Mohist corpus reveals a paucity of references to the two-character compound “sage-king” (sheng wang). no references occur in the several thousand bronze inscrip-tions of the Western zhou (ca. 1045–771 Bce) or in the Book of Odes (com-piled ca. 1000–600 Bce). the compound is furthermore absent from the portions of the Book of Documents that predate the imperial unification of 221 Bce. More surprisingly still, the term does not appear even in the

13 for the dates of the Guanzi, see Rickett, “introduction,” 15. Rickett argues that none of the text predates the fourth century and that the core chapters coalesced around 250 Bce.

14 Dates are based on schaberg, A Patterned Past, 8.15 thompson, “Shen tzu,” 399.16 Durrant, “Yen tzu ch’un chiu,” 487.


Analects, a text believed by most scholars to have a core that predates the fourth century Bce. all this coincides with broader changes identified by gu Jiegang 顧頡剛: whereas in the Western zhou, antiquity represented the recent past, in the Warring states period (453–221 Bce), it came to include an increasingly remote or “mythic” past.17 given this context, the appeals to sage-kings in the Mozi appear less as an old counterrevolution-ary slip than a possible Mohist innovation. although we cannot be sure, it seems then that the iconoclast may have been responsible for shaping and popularizing the rhetoric of the archconservative.

this essay investigates whether the concept of sage-king was in some sense a Mohist innovation. Before providing a roadmap of arguments to come, a couple of disclaimers are in order. the fragmentary nature of the early textual record defies any effort to create ironclad chronologies. nev-ertheless, by piecing together textual clues with the secondary literature, this essay assumes that we can arrive, not at incontrovertible truths, but at hypotheses with a relative degree of probability. Moreover, new dis-coveries continually change and complicate our understanding of textual chronologies. some of my arguments thus may be subject to revision. finally, my understanding of textual chronologies is indebted to the work of other scholars. for example, i assume that the Mozi, like the Analects and Documents, was the result of centuries of accretion—and, more cru-cially, that there is an early core, which has been identified correctly. such a move—which flies in the face of the demands of parsimony—will no doubt have its detractors. though most scholars agree that early chinese texts changed over time, less of a consensus exists about how to date the various strata. in recognition of this problem, i abide by the consensus view when feasible, noting differences of opinion where relevant.

to answer the question of what role the Mohists played in shaping the notion of the exemplary past—a notion central to the development of chinese traditions of thought—i compare the vocabulary and rhetorical strategies of the Mohist core with other early chinese texts. in addition, close attention will be paid to the differences between the various strata of the Mozi. after providing a brief introduction to the major terms and texts of this essay, i examine the vocabulary of sagehood in early china. i show that the paucity of references to the term for sage-kings in the pre-Mohist corpus cannot be explained away as a historiographical illusion,

17 gu Jiegang, “yu Qian Xuantong xiansheng lun gushishu,” 102. for more recent itera-tions of this view, see Poo, “the formation of the concept of antiquity in early china.”

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the consequence of accidents of survival. as a result, i conclude that the early Mohists were probably the first to refer to ancient authorities as a collective group or abstract category. from this discussion of vocabulary, i move to the subject of rhetorical strategy: did the Mohists merely coin a new term or did they also transform the practice of making appeals to ancient authority? By tracing earlier references to the six figures held up by the Mohists as sage-kings, i demonstrate that, while the Mohists did not invent either appeals to the past or the six figures, they were the first to put distant figures and zhou founders into a single class of model rulers. in closing, i ask why the Mohists defined the nature of ancient authority. i show that the invention of the sage-kings as a class reflected rhetorical strategy; the expanded and abstract notion of a class of sage-kings lent Mohist argumentation both force and flexibility. consideration of the evidence thus suggests that the invention of the ancient sage-kings represents an important but overlooked legacy of the Mohists.

Setting the Stage

Because this essay presents a number of challenges to the uninitiated reader, i provide a brief survey of the periods, sources, and major figures of this study. in addition, the present discussion aims to lay bare some of my basic assumptions about my sources.

the early Mohists were in the habit of mentioning earlier periods, which they referred to in a variety of ways. in broad terms, the Mohists spoke of antiquity (xi 昔; gu 古) or the “three Dynasties” (san dai 三代). the three Dynasties included the Xia 夏 dynasty (or yu-Xia 虞夏),18 and the two historical dynasties, the shang 商 (or yin 殷) dynasty, and the zhou dynasty. By zhou, Mo Di was usually referring to the Western zhou. in addition, the Western zhou was seen as closely associated with the noble houses that served as the de facto rulers of many states in Mo Di’s own time.

Pre-Mohist sources can be divided into two classes: those that are archaeologically recovered and those transmitted through the ages. the former class includes tens of thousands of inscriptions on bronze that have been discovered in the tombs and caches of the Western zhou elite. in addition, there are the manuscripts recovered from two tombs in hubei. the first set of manuscripts was discovered in 1993 in tomb 1

18 see Mozi 31: 52/27 (“Ming gui, xia”) and 37: 63/3 (“fei ming, xia”).


at guodian, Jingmen and was possibly composed during the second half of the fourth century.19 the second set of manuscripts was looted from a tomb (or tombs?) before being bought by the shanghai Museum from hong kong.20 the shanghai Museum manuscripts are generally thought to be contemporaneous with the guodian manuscripts.

transmitted texts make up the majority of the sources for this study; three such sources, discussed below, contain fragments or chapters that predate the Mozi. the Book of Odes (Shijing 詩經) is a collection of some three hundred odes, some of which may have existed orally by the fifth century Bce. the Book of Documents, or Shangshu 尚書 (also known as the Classic of History, or Shujing 書經) mostly contains speeches attrib-uted to ancient sage-rulers: while the so-called old text or archaic script (gu wen 古文) was collated in the 4th century ce, on the basis of older material, the new text or Modern script ( jin wen 今文) version was col-lated in the 2nd century Bce, also on the basis of various circulating texts (shu 書). this version can be further divided into different temporal strata. Michael nylan has tentatively suggested the following tripartite division: (a) five chapters from the early zhou, (B) eighteen chapters dating from the late Western or early eastern zhou, and (c) six chapters that date much later, closer to the unification of china in 221 Bce.21 in this essay, i will refer to the a and B sections of the new text version as the “early” Book of Documents, and to the c section as the “late” chapters. as quota-tions from the Mozi reveal, the present form of the Documents is clearly different from what the early Mohists called “documents”.22 and finally, the textual history of the Analects, which purports to record the teachings of confucius and his disciples, is the subject of much debate. in this essay, i follow scholars such as arthur Waley, Bruce Brooks and taeko Brooks, and Bryan Van norden, who agree that the text was compiled over centu-ries, perhaps even well into the Western han dynasty (206 Bce–25 ce). opinions are divided as to which chapters or passages represent the authentic core of the Analects.23

19 as yuri Pines points out, although the tomb was probably closed in the late fourth or early third century (ca. 300–278 Bce), the manuscript contents are likely to be older. see Pines, “subversion unearthed,” 161 n. 8.

20 allan, “not the Lun yu,” 116.21 nylan, Five “Confucian” Classics, 135–136.22 for discussions of the missing citations, see zheng Jiewen, “Mozi yin Shu yu lidai

Shangshu zhuanben de bijiao.”23 an alternative view is that the Lunyu was collated in the Western han dynasty, possibly

on the basis of existing quotes. for a variation of views, see e.g Van norden, “introduction”

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as for the Mozi, most scholars agree that there is an early core including chapters 8–37, of which twenty-three survive. some disagreement exists as to the dates of the core chapters. graham and the Brookses argue that the chapters are the work of Mo Di’s fifth- and fourth-century followers, positing that the earliest stratum dates to 390 and the latest to 280 Bce.24 Watanabe takashi sees a somewhat longer period of evolution, with the earliest chapters being written in the fourth century and the latest around 221; he posits four stages or strata of evolution: chapters that date to (1) the early fourth century Bce, (2) the second half of the fourth century Bce, (3) the late fourth century Bce to mid-third century, and (4) the late third century Bce and beyond.25 the claim that the latest stratum dates to the late third century, however, now seems questionable with the pub-lication of the shanghai Museum manuscript titled “guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 (ghostly Percipience) by its editors. the manuscript refers to ancient figures such as yao 堯 and shun 舜, a feature that Watanabe saw as a sure sign of a late third-century date. as a result, the manuscript suggests that the latest stratum of the core chapters of the Mozi could very well be earlier than the late third century.26 the rest of the Mozi—which includes the opening chapters (chapters 1–7) and Dialogues (chap-ters 46– 49/50)—is regarded as the work of disciples writing in the fourth and third centuries Bce. My discussion will largely focus on the core chapters, whose authors i refer to as the “early Mohists.” Where appro-priate, i discuss later developments as presented in the opening chapters and Dialogues and refer to these texts as “later” chapters.

as much discussion revolves around six figures extolled in the Mozi as sage-kings, it is worth introducing them here. Before providing a capsule description of the six, i should mention that the Mozi associates all six with the three Dynasties. for example, the Mozi repeatedly refers to the

to Confucius and the “Analects”; csikszentmihalyi, “confucius and the Analects in the han”; and John Makeham, “the formation of Lunyu as a Book.”

24 for graham, see Disputers of the Tao, 36 and graham, Divisions in Early Mohism Reflected in the Core Chapters of “Mo-tzu”. for the Brookses, see the summary of their pre-publication essays in Desmet, “the growth of compounds in the core chapters of the Mozi,” 102. the prepublications have been unavailable for some time. some of them have now been published in the Warring States Papers.

25 Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 2, 27–31. Watanabe argued that these four stages or strata could be roughly placed into three periods, the last two stages sharing one period. see the introduction to the present volume.

26 Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 5, 307; Ding sixin, “shang bo chu jian Gui shen pian zhushi.” for an opposing view, see Brindley, “ ‘the Perspicuity of ghosts and spirits’ and the Problem of intellectual affiliations in early china.” for Watanabe takashi’s reasoning for why the chapter on ghosts is late, see Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 2, 30–31.


six figures as “the sage-kings of the three Dynasties, yao, shun, yu, tang, Wen, and Wu” 昔三代聖王堯舜禹湯文武 (e.g., 9: 11/2, 9: 12/20). yao and shun, who often appear together, probably never existed. although these figures are said to be the most venerable of the six sage-kings, references to them occur after the fifth century Bce. in these accounts, yao chose shun, a worthy man of humble origins, over yao’s own son as successor.27 yu is not only the founder of the Xia dynasty but also associated with various flood myths of early china. accounts vary, but the thrust of the competing legends is clear: yu dredged channels to serve as outlets for the floodwaters. yu was later appointed by shun to succeed him as heir, thus continuing the practice of bypassing sons in favor of worthies. By some accounts, yu intended to continue the tradition of appointing worthy heirs as the son of heaven and preferred Bo yi 伯益 (sometimes referred to as yi). yet such a move was thwarted, in some legends by yu’s son, the evil Qi 啓. thus, the practice of shanrang 禪讓 (abdicating in favor of a meritorious heir) came to an end and so began the age of hereditary suc-cession.28 tang, who is also known as chengtang 成湯, is associated with the overthrow of the Xia and the founding of the shang dynasty. Because of this, tang is thought to have inaugurated the dynastic cycle, whereby one ruling house was replaced by another. the last two, Wen (r. 1099–1050 Bce) and Wu (r. 1049/45–1043 Bce), are historical figures; they are known as the founders of the zhou dynasty. king Wen (“the cultured”) is thought of as the actual founder of the zhou. he is said to have begun the conquest of the shang but died without seeing it to completion. king Wu (“the Martial”) oversaw the actual conquest of the shang and the estab-lishment of zhou rule. Legend has it that he died several years after the conquest and was succeeded by a child, king cheng 成 (r. 1042/35–1006 Bce). the child king was aided by a number of uncles, including the virtu-ous Duke of shao 邵 and Dan 旦, also known as the Duke of zhou.29

Where Did All the Sage-Kings Go?

With these preliminary remarks, we are now ready to tackle the ques-tion posed in the introduction: is the scarcity of references to the term “sage-king” in the pre-Mohist corpus actually meaningful? arguably, the

27 on abdication, see Pines, “subversion unearthed”; Pines, “Disputers of abdication.”28 allan, The Heir and the Sage, 55, 68–74. for various myths of yu, see Lewis, Flood

Myths of Early China. for more favorable accounts of Qi, see allan, The Heir and the Sage, 73–74.

29 see shaughnessy, “Western zhou history,” 308–311.

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appearance of Mohist novelty could be an illusion. after all, our discus-sion has focused on a single compound, sheng wang (sage-king). More importantly, the limited nature of our archive—and particularly the various strata within the Mozi—need to be considered. in recognition of these problems, three competing explanations will be evaluated: internal evidence that suggests that the practice of appealing to sage-kings was pervasive before the early Mozi, the scenario that sheng wang appears only in the latest stratum and thus reflects a third-century convention, and lastly, the possibility that equivalents for sheng wang can be found in earlier texts. through this method of inquiry, i conclude that my ini-tial hypothesis still represents the most plausible explanation: the early Mohists appear to have been among the earliest to use the term sheng wang.

We begin with the first scenario: the early Mohists were not the first to appeal to the authority of the sage-kings. as most readers familiar with the Mozi know, Mohist authors depict their own contemporaries making appeals to the “sage-kings.” a few chapters in fact present objections on the grounds that Mohist proposals were contrary to the way of the ancient sage-kings. for example, one chapter on warfare (“fei gong, xia” 非攻下) depicts opponents as protesting the Mohist proposal to eliminate offen-sive warfare on the grounds that such attacks were carried out by the very men extolled by Mo Di as sage-kings. “of old, yu had attacked the Miao, and tang had attacked Jie,” the opponents wrote, and “king Wu had attacked zhou, and yet all of these men have been set up as sage-kings” 昔者禹征有苗, 湯伐桀, 武王伐紂, 此皆立為聖王 (19: 34/17).30

although the passage could be interpreted as evidence of a pre-Mohist discourse on sage-kings, this is probably not the most compelling argu-ment. for a start, the aforementioned example comes from the later strata of the Mozi. Watanabe takashi dates “fei gong, xia” 非攻下 to the third stratum of the Mohist core, that is, the late fourth to mid-third century. a second instance of Mozi’s contemporaries appealing to the authority of the sage kings, which appears in “fei ming, zhong,” is dated by Watanabe to the fourth stratum, in the late third century. such an assessment is con-sistent with that of the Brookses. in addition, the fact that the comments recorded were imaginary deserves attention. in each of these chapters, the Mozi deploys a range of different (sometimes contradictory) statements in

30 Watanabe takashi dates this chapter to stratum 3.


favor of the Mohist position.31 after each argument, an imagined objec-tion—one framed in identical terms to the Mohist argument—is duly presented before a counterargument is provided. in both of these cases, the Mozi goes on to argue against the objection by adducing further his-torical examples and adding more nuanced explanations. interestingly, this pattern is not unique to arguments involving sage-kings; a similar tack is actually taken with other arguments, for example, in discussing social benefit (li 利). the imaginary proponents of offensive warfare argue against the view that offensive warfare is detrimental to the health of the state.32 this larger rhetorical pattern of presenting objections and rebut-tals in the Mozi suggests that a literal reading of the text is untenable; if anything, the early Mohists were not responding to existing criticisms as much as forestalling them.

having considered the internal evidence, we move to the second sce-nario; a combination of internal and external evidence suggests that the term “sage-king” was not in wide circulation before the fourth century. however, the fact that the compound sheng wang does not appear in pre-Mohist texts means not that the Mohists necessarily invented or popular-ized the word, but only that the Mozi dates to a time in which the term was already in use. certainly, this scenario should be taken seriously, since several factors point to this possibility. to begin with, a few texts with pos-sible fourth-century parts refer to sheng wang (see table 1). these include the The Zuo Tradition (Zuozhuan 左傳, compiled in the mid-fourth cen-tury from older archival material), the Record of Rites 禮記, and the Elder Dai’s “Record of Rites” (Dadai “Liji” 大戴禮記).33 furthermore, the Mozi itself was composed over as much as two centuries, with some parts dat-ing possibly to the mid- or late third century—a period in which the term “sage-king” (sheng wang) was already used.

31 Loy, “Justification and Debate,” 455.32 see, e.g., Mozi 19: 33/12–15.33 some of the textual fragments that make up the Record of Rites and the Elder Dai’s

“Record of Rites” have been discovered in fourth-century tombs. see, for example, Guodian Chu mu zhujian, 129–131 (this corresponds to “ziyi pian” 緇衣篇); Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 2, Min zhi fumu 民之父母, 151–175 (this partly corresponds in part to the “kongzi xianju” 孔子閒居 chapter). for the textual resources of Elder Dai’s Record of the “Rites,” see Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 4, Nei li 內豊, 219–229 (this corresponds to “zengzi lixiao” 曾子立孝); Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 7, Wuwang xianzuo 武王踐阼, 147–168 (this corresponds to the chapter of the same title). in addition, Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhanguo Chu zhushu, vol. 6, Jinggong nüe 兢公瘧, 159–191, corresponds very roughly to material found in the Yanzi chunqiu 晏子春秋 and Zuozhuan 左傳.

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yet two factors militate against this second explanation. aside from the Mozi, references to “sage-kings” are rare in other fourth-century texts, a fact that works against the idea that the Mohists were merely follow-ing prevailing convention. the Zuozhuan, a lengthy chronicle, contains just three references. Most strikingly, the term does not appear in any of the excavated material found at the guodian tomb or retrieved by the shanghai Museum. this in itself is striking, given the range of genres and philosophical orientations represented in these collections, and one work that invites comparison with the Mozi chapter on ghosts. Moreover, if we compare the dates assigned to these chapters, the possibility that the term appears only in the latest stratum seems unlikely. in fact, “sage-king” is missing from only three core chapters: chapters 14, 17, and 18 (see table 2). to be sure, Watanabe takashi dates chapters 14 and 17 to the first stratum, but the term appears in chapters that he has dated to the second stratum. the Brookses’ chronology suggests that sheng wang appears in an early stratum of the core chapters (their period 3, presumably the mid-fourth century). Besides, the paucity of references may reflect factors other than the nonexistence of the term, for chapters 14 and 17 are the briefest of the core chapters. they number only 563 and 426 characters respectively, significantly less than the average length of a chapter (1,600 characters).

We turn now to the final scenario, the possibility that the abstract notion of ancient sage-kings existed but under a different guise. in this connection, several passages seem to suggest that the term “former kings” (xian wang 先王) could be used as a near equivalent to “sage-kings” (sheng wang). for example, the text declares, “Making music is wrong. how do we know that this is so? i say this because of the documents of the former kings” 為樂非也˳ 何以知其然也？曰: 先王之書. (32: 57/15–17)34 the chapter on elevating worthies also notes: “Moreover, to take elevating worthies as the root of governance, how could this just be the doctrine of our master Mo? this is the way of the sage-kings and it is the doctrine contained in the records of the former kings, in the words of ‘Junian’ ” 且以尚賢為政之本者, 亦豈獨子墨子之言哉˳ 此聖王之道, 先王之書《距年》之言也. (9: 12/8–9)35 Worth noting here is the fact that sheng wang (sage-kings) is used in the same sense as xian wang (former

34 Watanabe takashi dates “fei yue, shang” to stratum 3.35 Watanabe takashi dates “shang xian, zhong” to stratum 4. some debate exists as to

the meaning of the two characters junian 距年. By some accounts, it refers to a title, but other commentators have interpreted the term more literally as meaning something like yuannian 遠年 (long ago). on this point, see Mozi jiaozhu, 85 n. 58.


kings). in another chapter, in fact, the authors speak of the “documents of the sage-kings” 聖王之書 (31: 55/7–8).

this use of “former kings” as a near synonym for “sage-kings” presents problems for my hypothesis: pre-Mohist authors conceivably spoke of the sage-kings but in different terms. indeed, a scan of the vocabulary of ear-lier texts alerts us to such a possibility: references to the former kings (xian wang) appear with some frequency. in the Book of Documents, we find twenty references in the new text portions of the work, three in the Book of Odes, and two in the Analects (see table 1). While most of these references refer to royal ancestors,37 the Analects comes closest to

36 for these strata, see Desmet, “the growth of compounds in the core chapters of the Mozi,” 102. each of the strata has a date from 390 till 280 Bce.

37 for the use of “xian wang” 先王 to mean “royal ancestor,” see “tianbao” 天保, ode 166 (Xiaoya), “zhaomin” 召旻, ode 265 (Da ya), “yi” 抑, ode 256 (Da ya). since the text is

table 2. Distribution of sage-kings in the Mozi

chap. no.

title Brookses stratum36

Watanabe takashi stratum

total no. of characters

Sheng wang

frequency

8 尚賢上 5 2 819 2 4099 尚賢中 7 4 2,337 10 234

10 尚賢下 9 4 1,495 3 49811 尚同上 4 4 797 1 79712 尚同中 7 4 2,398 7 34313 尚同下 10 4 1,872 7 26714 兼愛上 2 1 563 0 015 兼愛中 5 2 1,307 2 65416 兼愛下 8 3 2,720 2 1,36017 非攻上 1 1 426 0 018 非攻中 5 2 1,276 0 019 非攻下 7 3 2,012 4 50320 節用上 3 2 596 6 9921 節用中 4 3 572 10 5725 節葬下 7 3 2,811 11 25626 天志上 5 4 1,362 4 34027 天志中 8 4 2,302 2 1,15128 天志下 9 4 2,284 3 76131 明鬼下 8 4 3,406 17 20032 非樂上 6 3 1,540 3 51335 非命上 4 1,473 3 49136 非命中 4 992 3 33137 非命下 8 4 1,436 2 718

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anticipating the Mohist usage of “former kings”—namely, as a term that conveys the general sense of ideal ancient rulers rather than royal ances-tors. admittedly, the compound for “former king” occurs only twice in the Analects, and one of those references, a late addition, seems to retain the older sense of a deceased royal ancestor.38 the second occurrence is ambiguous and may suggest that “former kings” could be used to refer to a group broader than royal ancestors. for example, we hear the master saying, “in deploying the rites, one should put the emphasis on harmony. this is what was considered good in the Way of the former kings and from which follow the large and small” (Analects 12.19). While it is clear that the former kings refer to moral exemplars, too little context survives to know which former kings the master had in mind. Were they the for-mer kings of the zhou or recent rulers of confucius’s home state, Lu? or did the former kings encompass a broader group of worthy kings, as they would in the Mozi? still, the ambiguity is meaningful. earlier references to the former kings used the term in a parochial sense; in contrast, the Analects seems to have divorced the notion from the immediate context of ancestral veneration—a sign, perhaps, that the authors of the Analects had begun to imagine ideal rulers as a general group.

i have asked to what extent the impression of Mohist novelty is an illu-sion, one caused by the fragmentary nature of our sources. admittedly, the nature of our archive requires that we accept a high level of uncer-tainty; yet my investigation, which has cast a broad net, suggests some tentative conclusions. granted, the Mohists did not invent the idea of ancient sages ex nihilo. at least one early text—the Analects—hints that they may have adjusted existing vocabulary. yet by the same token, my examination indicates that the term “sage-king” (sheng wang) was not in wide circulation in the fourth century. in fact, there is little evidence to suggest that, outside the Mozi, the term was commonly used before the third century Bce.

Investigating the Sextet

having looked into the background of Mohist vocabulary, we are now ready to move to the second stage of my argument and ask a related

corrupt, kong yingda’s explanation of zhuhao 諸蚝 is necessary. for a general discussion of how the past in Western zhou texts is conceived of in terms of recent ancestors, see Poo, “the formation of the concept of antiquity in early china,” 88.

38 Lunyu 16.1. for a similar interpretation, see Lau, The Analects, 172.


question: was the Mohist innovation limited to changes in terminology or did the Mohists reimagine the past? clearly, the six figures that make up the Mohist sextet appear in earlier texts. although references to yao and shun emerge only in the Analects, pre-zhou figures such as yu and tang can be found in the Documents and Odes (see table 3). Moreover, a bronze inscription dating to the Western zhou relates yu’s efforts in tam-ing a flood, although the term “sage-king” is not used.39 Because of these issues, a thorough examination of all six figures extolled as sage-kings in the Mozi is in order. While appeals to the authority of the past certainly predate the Mozi, the early Mohists appear to have been the first to treat both pre-zhou figures and zhou founders as a model for the present.

naturally, Mohists did not invent arguments based on ancient prec-edent. crucially, the early chapters of the Documents invoke the examples of ancestral figures, particularly former zhou rulers. as Michael nylan puts it, “the ancestors’ good example must be perpetuated and the ancestors’ will be obeyed, for the ideal king, in point of fact, rules by virtue of his ancestors’ charisma.”40 yet early appeals to the past differ from those in the Mozi insofar as they primarily concern zhou ancestors. the early core of the Documents provides a prime example of this phenomenon. Pre-zhou figures such as tang and yu appear (the latter only in passing).41 the precedent is usually the speaker’s own ancestor, a zhou founder. this is not to say that the early authors of the Documents failed to acknowledge the merits of pre-zhou rulers. in some chapters, the virtues and example of king tang of shang are duly noted (particularly in speeches addressed to the defeated shang). for example, in the “Proclamation on Wine” (Jiugao 酒誥), king cheng supposedly observed, “in ancient times, the former wise kings of the yin [e.g., shang] and the hundred surnames were fearful and reverent toward heaven’s Mandate and so kept to the path of virtue and held to the way of wisdom. from the reign of chengtang [i.e., tang] down to yi, the kings were still able to inspire awe and respect in their ministers.”42 still, such praise for tang, however sincere, does not imply that the Documents envisioned the shang founder as a model for

39 Li Xueqin, “Lun Xian gong xu ji qi zhongyiyi.” see also Qiu Xigui, “Xian gong xu ming wen kaoshi”; zhu fenghan, “Xian gong xu ming wen chushi”; Li Ling, “Lun Xian gong xu faxian de yiyi”; cf. Lewis, Flood Myths of Early China, 29.

40 nylan, Five “Confucian” Classics, 139.41 yao and shun appear only in the late chapters of the Documents. yu appears only in

a passing reference as a distant cultural hero.42 Jinwen Shangshu kaozheng, “zhou shu,” 15.324. 王曰: 「封˳ 我聞惟曰, 在昔殷先哲

王, 迪畏天, 顯小民, 經德秉哲˳ 自成湯咸至于帝乙, 成王畏相˳

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table 3. Distribution of the sextet in zhou texts

text Date Yao Shun Yu Tang Wen Wu

Book of Odes from ca. 5th c. Bce

0 0 6 4 38 11

Book of Documents (a and B sections)

Pre-5th c. Bce

0 0 2 8 27 24

Analects from ca. 5th c. Bce?

4 7 5 2 3 3

Mencius 4th–3rd c. Bce 60 100 30 36 35 10Zuozhuan from ca. mid-

4th c. Bce 8 10 15 6 37 16Liji from ca. 4th

c. Bce 6 13 7 16 34 24Mozi opening

chaptersca. 4th–3rd c. Bce 4 3 4 8 2 7

Mozi Dialogues ca. 4th–3rd c. Bce 1 2 6 10 3 2

Lüshi chunqiu ca. 239 Bce 67 67 46 89 60 47Xunzi 3rd c. Bce 45 46 54 48 17 19Guanzi 4th c. Bce; core,

ca. 250 Bce15 13 9 24 5 19

Han Feizi 3rd c. Bce 84 78 17 38 23 15Guoyu 4th c. Bce 39 33 44 30 61 45Shangjun shu 4th–3rd c. Bce? 11 8 2 14 1 2Zhuangzi 3rd c. Bce 63 46 28 22 13 0Shenzi 350?–275? Bce 6 4 3 2 0 0Yinwenzi Warring states? 5 3 2 5 1 0Heguanzi Late Warring

states?8 3 1 5 3 0

Guiguzi Late Warring states?

0 0 0 2 2 0

Yanzi chunqiu Late Warring states

1 7 1 9 0 0

the zhou king. Whereas the zhou kings are called upon to imitate their ancestors and to continue the good works of their forebears, only passing mention is made of good shang kings. for the most part, the latter appear in the Documents as foils to the deposed shang ruler, reminders of the contingent nature of heaven’s Mandate.43

43 for discussions of the shang in connection with the Mandate, see ibid., 15.325–27, 17.339–42, 11.364–71, 11.325–26.


a close look at the Analects reveals a picture consistent with that of the Odes and Documents. We find few early references that treat pre-zhou figures as model rulers. to be sure, some passages in the Analects present yao and shun as the coequals of kings Wen and Wu. for example, it is stated, “shun was able to bring order to the world with five ministers; king Wu said that he required only ten capable ministers” (Analects 8.20). in this instance, it is clear that the master thought of shun and Wu as being in the same class of ideal rulers. yet there are reasons to doubt that the pas-sage necessarily anticipates the Mozi. as table 4 reveals, Waley, Van norden, and the Brookses treat this passage and other references (e.g., Analects 20.1) to pre-zhou figures as late interpolations. the Brookses even propose that the passage in question dates to the mid-third century Bce.

of course, this discussion raises the question of what role pre-zhou fig-ures played. in this connection, i would argue that such figures present mythic ideals: they are gods and cultural heroes who explain the existence

44 Van norden, “introduction,” 16.

table 4. the sextet in the Analects, analyzed by strata

Referent Passage no.

Date by Brookses

Date by Waley

Dates by Van norden

yao and shun 6.30 262 Bce oldest stratum

interpolation44

yao and shun 8.18 262 non-Ru additions

external tradition

yao 8.19 262 non-Ru additions

external tradition

yao and shun 8.20 262 non-Ru additions

external tradition

yu 8.21 260 non-Ru addition

external tradition

tang 12.22 326 Later portions Later stratayao and shun 14.42 262 Later portions Later stratayu and Lord Millet 14.5 310 Later portions Later stratashun 15.5 305 Later portions Later stratayao, shun, and tang 20.1 253 no connection

to the coreLater strata

Wen 9.5 405 core coreWen and Wu 19.22 253 Later portions coreWuding (gaozu) 14.6/7 298 Later portions Later strata

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of civilization but whose achievements are singular and defy imitation. to demonstrate this, let us turn to the Odes, which is the only pre-Mohist text that presents any sustained description of yu or tang. there, yu and tang are depicted as possessing divine or superhuman qualities. certainly, we find no hint yet of the myth of yu’s extraordinary birth from his father’s belly,45 but yu is linked with the great Deluge and the Lord Millet, who is described in the Odes as the product of a divine union. as anne Birrell notes, this presentation of yu and tang as mythic figures is consistent with lore about yu being “the god who demarcated all the earth’s land, the god of tilling, and the god who regulated watercourses and so ended the world deluge.”46 similarly, the divine origin of tang—the descendant of a child born of a woman and a dark bird that dropped an egg into her mouth—is also alluded to in the Odes.47 as with yu, tang is depicted as receiving a divine mandate. though he does not bring order after the deluge, he is nevertheless credited with the monumental task of partition-ing the frontier. as one ode explains, “heaven ordered a dark bird / to descend and give birth to the shang / to dwell in the vast shang lands. / of old the Lord on high ordered tang / to demarcate the borders in the four directions.”48 here, the parallelism of the ode suggests an equiva-lence between tang and the divine bird. Just as the bird gave birth to the shang, tang was responsible for demarcating the realm of the civi-lized from the uncivilized—and thus for bringing order to human society. indeed, tang and yu are different from kings Wen and Wu. yu’s efforts to tame the flood and to mark divisions between the land and water are responsible for the creation of human society. such feats, needless to say, lie outside the powers of a human king. Little wonder, then, that we see so few injunctions to imitate yu by reshaping the landscape! By the same token, the conquest of the Xia and the concomitant division of civilization from wilderness is treated as a singular moment, a one-time event that demands commemoration rather than emulation.49

in fact, few texts before the Mozi even mention the distant figures in the same breath as the zhou founders. two odes that contain references to king Wen and a more distant figure illustrate this point. the first ode

45 allan, “not the Lun yu,” 140.46 Birrell, “the four flood Myth traditions of classical china,” 241.47 “Xuanniao” 玄鳥, ode 303 (shangsong).48 ibid.49 on mythic heroes, see Boltz, “kung kung and the flood,” 142; Puett, To Become a

God, 188–196.


mentions zhou founders and their lords in relation to a watercourse built by yu, and so yu is not associated with the zhou founders as part of a larger class of ancient rulers.50 the second presents a more complicated example, and so let us look at two stanzas:

是生后稷 and so hou Ji was produced降之百福 and the hundred blessings were brought down [by heaven?],黍稷重穋 the varieties of millet, the millet planted early but late

ripening, the millet planted late but early ripening,稙稚菽麥 early-planted grain and late-planted grain, of wheat and soy.奄有下國 taking control of all under heaven,俾民稼穡 hou Ji instructed the people in sowing and reaping.有稷有黍 and so there was millet for sacrifices and millet for drink.有稻有秬 there was rice and there was black millet.奄有下土 taking control of the earth,纘禹之緒 he thus became the inheritor of yu’s legacy.

后稷之孫 the descendant of hou Ji實維大王 Was truly the great king居岐之陽 installed on the southern side of Mount Qi.實始翦商 Verily he began cutting off the shang至于文武 in the era of Wen and Wu.纘大王之緒 [the zhou rulers] continued the enterprise of the great king.51

the connection between Wen and Wu, on the one hand, and yu, on the other, is convoluted. three steps stand between yu and king Wen: yu is mentioned in conjunction with hou Ji, who is then linked to the great king, who was reportedly the grandfather of king Wen. More importantly, the organization of the stanzas does not suggest equivalence between yu and the zhou founders. yu is the peer of hou Ji, and both are cultural progenitors. in contrast, Wen and Wu are said to be the peers of the great king.52 Just as the great king “cut off ” the shang, Wen and Wu defeated the shang at Muye. if anything, the organization of the stanzas highlights the differences between yu and the zhou founders.

My analysis has shown that earlier texts differ from the Mozi in at least two regards: pre-zhou figures are not held up as imitable examples,

50 “Wenwang you sheng” 文王有聲, ode 244 (Da ya); cf. Waley, The Book of Songs, 241–242.

51 “Bigong” 閟宮, ode 300 (Lusong); cf. Waley, the Book of songs, 313–314.52 sarah allan has noted that the image of yu as a cultural progenitor is often distinct

from his place in myths that concern the founding of dynasties. see allan, The Heir and the Sage, 57.

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and they are rarely associated with the zhou founders. But when did the Mohists begin associating pre-zhou figures with the zhou founders? if indeed the six figures are presented as a group only in the later stra-tum, this leaves open the possibility that the Mohists were responding to the conventions of the late fourth century—a time when zhou founders were commonly treated as the peers of yao, shun, yu, and tang.53 the shanghai Museum manuscripts contain one such example: the “zigao” 子羔 compares the zhou founder’s appointment of meritorious ministers to the anointment of the worthy heir by both yao and shun.54

Doubts aside, an analysis of the earliest strata within the Mozi reveals that distant figures were associated with zhou founders. granted, table 5 shows that the earliest stratum (chapters 14 and 17) does not contain refer-ences to the sextet. in addition, we must wait until the later strata to find all six figures mentioned in the phrase “the sage kings of old, yao, shun, yu, tang, Wen, and Wu.” at the same time, the Mohists clearly associated Wen and Wu with more distant figures by the second stratum: chapter 8 contains references to all members of the sextet except for king Wu, and chapter 15 cites yu, Wen, and Wu as exemplars.

a close reading of the earliest stratum reveals that zhou founders not only were mentioned in the same breath as yao and shun but also rep-resented a collective standard for the early Mohists. consider the follow-ing excerpt, which comes from the chapter “shang xian, shang” 尚賢上 (elevating the Worthy, upper), dated by Watanabe takashi to the second stratum:

故古者堯舉舜於服澤之陽,55 授之政, 天下平˳ 禹舉益於陰方之中, 授之政, 九州成˳ 湯舉伊尹於庖廚之中, 授之政, 其謀得˳ 文王舉閎夭、泰顛於罝罔之中, 授之政, 西土服˳

in ancient times, yao raised up shun from the north shores of fuze, award-ing him the task of governance, and so all under heaven was pacified. yu raised up [Bo 伯] yi from yinfang, awarding him the role of chief minister, and so the demarcation of the nine continents was completed. tang raised up yiyin from the kitchens, awarding him the task of governance, and so

53 the “Rongcheng shi” 容成氏 is one example of a text that mentions all six of the sage-kings. see Shanghai bowuguan cang Zhangguo Chu zhushu, vol. 2, 256, 259, 263, 267, 277, 288.

54 allan, “not the Lun yu,” 138.55 see sun yikai, Mozi quanyi, 21. he reads yang as a reference to the north shores (bei

an 北岸).


his aims were achieved. king Wen raised up hongyao and taidian from the hunters and fishers, awarding them the task of governance, and so the west-ern regions were subdued. (8: 10/6–8)

at least two points deserve discussion. to begin with, the element of recy-cling should be obvious. Most of the figures are in fact familiar; yao and shun are found in the Analects; yu, tang, and Wen appear in the Odes and Documents. Moreover, the tactic of citing ancient precedent is hardly novel. as we have seen, Wen was invoked in the Documents as a source of authority, an example to be imitated by future kings. instead, the dif-ference lies with the fact that yu and tang are now associated with later figures. instead of representing some distant mythic ideal, such a depic-tion reveals that tang and yu were to be treated as the coequals of Wen, which brings us to my second point: the association of zhou founders

table 5. Distribution of the sextet in the Mozi core chapters

chap. no.

title Brookses stratum

Watanabetakashi stratum

yao shun yu tang Wen Wu

8 尚賢上 5 2 2 2 2 2 1 09 尚賢中 7 4 3 3 4 4 2 2

10 尚賢下 9 4 6 7 6 7 4 511 尚同上 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 012 尚同中 7 4 0 0 0 0 0 013 尚同下 10 4 0 0 0 0 0 014 兼愛上 2 1 0 0 0 0 0 015 兼愛中 5 2 0 0 2 0 3 216 兼愛下 8 3 0 0 7 6 7 317 非攻上 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 018 非攻中 5 2 0 0 0 0 0 019 非攻下 7 3 0 0 5 6 1 520 節用上 3 2 0 0 0 0 0 021 節用中 4 3 1 0 0 0 0 025 節葬下 7 3 3 3 3 2 2 226 天志上 5 4 0 0 3 3 3 327 天志中 8 4 2 2 2 2 3 228 天志下 9 4 2 2 2 2 5 331 明鬼下 8 4 1 1 4 4 5 832 非樂上 6 3 0 0 1 0 0 035 非命上 4 0 0 0 4 4 336 非命中 4 0 0 0 3 0 337 非命下 8 4 0 0 3 6 2 6

total 20 20 44 51 42 47

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with earlier figures not only appears to have been unprecedented but also requires thinking of the earlier figures such as yao, shun, and yu in a dif-ferent light. in fourth- and third-century texts, yao and shun bypassed the principle of hereditary transmission, something of which the Mohists appear to have been aware. though they appointed worthy ministers, tang and king Wen passed on their throne to their sons. the differences between the yu-Xia and later dynasties, however, are downplayed by the presentation. the Mohists instead gloss over the significant differences between the practice of anointing worthies as heirs and appointing them as ministers, instead focusing on the more basic principle of elevating the worthy, a principle blithely summed up as “following the way of yao, shun, yu, and tang” 祖述堯、舜、禹、湯之道 (8: 10/11–12).56

“Jian ai, zhong” 兼愛中 (inclusive care, Middle), which is also dated by Watanabe takashi to the second stratum, provides one final example of an early Mohist attempt to create equivalence between the distant and recent zhou past. it presents both the zhou founders and distant figures as an imitable standard. consider the following description of the feats of yu:

古者禹治天下˳ 西為西河漁57竇, 以泄渠孫皇之水; 北為防原泒, 注后之邸, 嘑池58之竇˳ 洒為底柱, 鑿為龍門˳ 以利燕、代、胡、貉與西河之民 . . . 昔者文王之治西土, 若日若月, 乍光于四方于西土˳ 不為大國侮小國˳ 不為眾庶侮鰥寡˳ 不為暴勢奪穡人黍、稷、狗、彘˳

in ancient times, yu governed all under heaven. to the west, he dredged the West River and the huai in order to drain the waters of the Qu, sun, and huang. to the north, he dredged the waters of the fang, yuan, and han in order to divert the waters to the shao basin and to hutuo. he sepa-rated the flow from Mount Dizhu and opened up Mount Long. in this way, he benefited the people of yan, Dai, hu, he, and the Western River. . . . of old, king Wen governed the western territories, where he was like the sun and moon spreading light to the four directions in the western territories. he did not humiliate small states on account of the fact that his was large. he did not humiliate the few on account of his numbers. and he did not steal the millet and livestock of the peasants just because he possessed force or the means for violence. (15: 26/17–22)

56 for Pines’s comment on the passage, see Pines, “Disputers of abdication,” 249–251.57 following sun yirang in reading yu 漁 as wei 渭.58 according to Mozi jiaozhu, 169 n. 47, chi 池 is a variant for tuo 沱; hence, it is read

hutuo here.


the excerpt presents several points of interest. for a start, the more human face of yu is emphasized. notice, for example, that the great Del-uge is never mentioned; the various hydraulic projects are rendered in positive terms, as efforts to bring economic benefits to the world rather than as a response to a disaster of superhuman scale. the understated tone of the description indicates that yu’s engineering projects were no different from those undertaken by larger states in the Warring states period—projects that require careful coordination and planning rather than any larger-than-life qualities. in addition, the de-emphasis on sin-gular qualities is consistent with the second part of the excerpt, where yu is juxtaposed with the more proximate figure of Wen. although the achievements of the men were different, the Mozi argues that they express the same principle, impartiality ( jian 兼). Just as yu had sought to benefit “all under heaven,” Wen embraced the same goals of bringing prosperity to the world. all this brings us to our final point, namely, why the Mohists went to the trouble of presenting the achievements of yu in a more under-stated fashion and juxtaposing yu with Wen. for the Mohists, the fact that the sage-kings of old were united in their pursuit of impartiality meant that such values were timeless and that similar policies should be adopted by rulers of the present.

“fei gong, xia” (against Military aggression, Lower) provides a final example of an effort to highlight the unity of the past and of past rul-ers. to see this, let us return momentarily to the discussion of offensive warfare. as we have seen above, the imaginary opponents of the Mohists argue that the example of the sage-kings of the past militates against the Mohist position (19: 34/16–17). unfazed, the Mohists retort that their opponents do not have a clear grasp of the historical record and fail to realize that the sage-kings of the past went to war only with authoriza-tion from heaven. in support of this view, they cite the cases of the three sage-kings, the very three named by the opposition. the example of yu’s attack on the Miao opens the rebuttal. heaven expressed its displeasure with the Miao, the Mohists argue, through inauspicious omens, includ-ing three days of bloody rain, the sighting of dragons in the ancestral temples, and howling dogs in the marketplace. heaven then communi-cated its will to yu directly. amid thunder and lightning, a “spirit with the face of a person and the body of a bird” 有神人面鳥身 appeared to yu (19: 34/21). the Mohists then proceed to explain that such authoriza-tion was seen not only in the case of yu but also with tang. as with the Miao, heaven chose to express its displeasure through celestial portents and monstrosities: “the sun and moon lost their periodicity, hot and cold

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weather arrived out of order, . . . spirits wailed in the capital, and cranes cried out for more than ten days” 日月不時, 寒暑雜至 . . . 鬼呼於國, 鶴鳴十夕餘 (19: 34/24). heaven furthermore sent down a sign to tang by means of a spirit. a similar pattern is evident in the case of king Wu of zhou. the imminent fall of the shang was announced through unseason-able weather and strange sightings: “a woman became a man, and heaven rained down flesh” 有女為男, 天雨肉 (19: 35/2–3). as with earlier figures, heaven also made its will manifest to king Wu. a red bird supposedly appeared before the king with a message from heaven that the zhou were to attack the shang and to take control of the state.

in many regards, the counterargument in Mozi (19: 34/16–35/8) resem-bles those i have adduced earlier on at least two counts. for a start, the references to the cases of yu, tang, and Wu are intended to refute point by point the objections posed by the Mohist interlocutors. additionally, the symmetry between the three cases works to amplify the point made by the Mohists about the unrighteousness of offensive warfare. such sym-metry arguably also reinforces the impression that the principles that guided and motivated the conduct of sage-kings exhibited consistency.

My examination of the six figures suggests a picture consistent with the discussion of terminology. although legends about the six figures existed prior to the Mozi, and the strategy of appealing to past rulers had long been part of the cultural repertoire, the way in which the Mohists deployed the six figures appears to have been novel. through a process of relabeling, old figures acquired new meanings and functions. yu was now the peer of Wen and Wu rather than a mythic figure that brought order to the world. By the same token, Wen and Wu no longer presented the only standard of kingship; they were kings on a par with the sages of time past, a group that included predynastic figures such as yao, shun, and yu. this move to create equivalence between distant antiquity and the zhou may be seen as an effort to create an undifferentiated past, one independent of the genealogical pretensions of a reigning dynasty.

Explaining the Mohist Creation of Sage-Kings

the foregoing discussion leaves us with a final question: why did the early Mohists go so far as to create a more expansive and abstract category of sage-kings? to better understand why the authors did this, we need to consider the aims of the Mohists. as seen below, the move to relabel the sage-kings and to expand the number of potential historical examples


was a function of strategy. By elaborating the examples of various peri-ods of the past, the Mohists were able to highlight the unity of the past, which in turn lent rhetorical force to their arguments. With the strategy of recasting distant figures, the Mohists moreover expanded the number of precedents they could cite. such flexibility allowed the early Mohists to imagine a past that was more congenial to their arguments and to bypass potential objections based on evidence from better-documented periods.

What evidence exists that the decision to include distant figures among the sage-kings was strategic? certainly, if we imagine that the sage-kings were already a concept in wide circulation, the Mohists would not have had much choice in pointing to specific figures when arguing on the basis of authority. yet interestingly, a careful look at variations in terminology and rhetorical strategies between chapters reveals diverging uses of the past within the Mozi core. as we have seen above, the term “sage-kings” or its near equivalent “former kings” appears in all but three core chapters (14, 17, 18). Moreover, seven chapters—from both early and late strata of the core chapters—do not contain any mention of specific sage-kings, even though the collective authority of the ancient sage-kings is invoked (see table 5). of these, three are the chapters that lack references to the terms sheng wang and xian wang, and the remaining four include the chapters titled “shang tong, shang, zhong, xia” 尚同上, 中, 下 (conform upward) and “Jie yong, shang” 節用上 (Moderation in expenses).

the chapter “Ming gui, xia” 明鬼下 (explaining ghosts, Lower) pro-vides the most explicit evidence of strategic considerations. the chapter opens by arguing for the existence of ghosts on the basis of the testimony of innumerable people, citing anecdotes from centuries past as evidence of such beliefs. at this point, the imaginary interlocutor interjects, claim-ing that the testimony of the multitudes fails the test of reliability. the Mohists respond by offering the evidence of the “sage-kings of the three Dynasties of old: yao, shun, yu, tang, Wen, and Wu” (31: 52/20). the Mohists then proceed to relate the words of king Wu of zhou, which they argue provides clear evidence that the sage-kings believed in the existence of ghosts. the Mohists then stop as if to anticipate the objections of their opponents, explaining that evidence for the existence of ghosts is not to be found merely in the words of king Wu. a similar position can also be inferred from the deeds of the ancient kings of the three Dynasties, the yu-Xia, shang, and zhou. the Mohists then continue at length, provid-ing further evidence for belief in the existence of ghosts on the part of the virtuous rulers of the Xia before raising another potential objection: “if ghosts appear only in the Documents of Shang, but not in the Documents

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of Xia, this would be insufficient for establishing the standard [for proving the existence of ghosts]” 且《商書》獨鬼, 而《夏書》不鬼, 則未足以為法也 (31: 53/17). the comment, which provides a segue to greater docu-mentation, reveals that the author feels the collective authority of the past to be stronger than the evidence from any one dynasty. such a presump-tion may very well have reflected a simple additive logic, whereby the more testimony is adduced, the better. at the same time, the selection and sequence of examples appear to have been more strategic than this. the Mohists clearly did not think that examples drawn from recent cen-turies were in themselves enough to make a forceful argument. the ten-dency to move backward in time and to provide evidence from each of the three Dynasties points to a more basic pattern in their thinking: namely, the immutability and unity of the exemplary past.

We have seen how appealing to the examples of specific sage-kings could work to the benefit of the Mohists, but questions may be raised as to whether such a strategy necessarily was advantageous. it could be argued that such a strategy actually created constraints on Mohist argumentation insofar as it limited where appeals to the past could be made. after all, it was conceivable that the past did not always lend itself to the sort of categorical statements that the Mohists were fond of making.

our evidence, however, suggests that, aside from rhetorical weight, the expansion of the exemplary past allowed the Mohists to simultane-ously invoke the collective weight of the past while exercising choice with respect to historical exemplar. “shang xian, xia” (elevate the Wor-thy, Lower) provides a case in point. in the previous section, we saw how the upper (shang) version adduced four specific events in support of the Mohist position: yao’s anointing of shun, yu’s appointing of Bo yi as his chief minister, tang’s selection of yi yin, and king Wen’s decision to raise the status of two worthies. though the Mozi claims that all these cases embodied the same principle of elevating worthies, the fact remains that the way of “yao, shun, yu, and tang,” it could be argued, was not neces-sarily one and the same; some of the sage-kings chose only to appoint worthies to high positions rather than to anoint them as successors. in this regard, the selection of Bo yi is a potential sticking point; as noted above, some versions of the legend have it that yu’s efforts to transmit the throne to Bo yi were thwarted by Qi, yu’s son. for this reason, the case of Bo yi potentially disrupts the appearance of the unity between the three Dynasties.

though we cannot say for certain whether the authors of the Mozi were aware of potential problems with their examples, this much seems implied


by the Lower (xia) and Middle (zhong) versions of “shang xian,” which are reportedly later. in the Lower and Middle versions, the examples seem to have been chosen with greater care, a move that suggests some awareness of the potential conflicts introduced by the original choice of sagely exem-plars. in the Lower version, we hear that “yao had shun, shun had yu, yu had gao yao 皋陶, tang had yi yin, and king Wu had hongyao and taidian” (10: 14/19–24). in the Middle version, we similarly learn that shun was discovered by yao in a rustic location and then subsequently made son of heaven; yi yin was discovered by tang and anointed as chief minis-ter; and fu shuo 傅說 was discovered by king Wuding 武丁 of the shang (9: 12/12–15). in both cases, the earlier reference to Bo yi, the worthy that yu reportedly preferred to his own son Qi, is omitted (the Lower version includes yu but redirects attention to yu’s relationship to gao yao, a man who was never slotted to be the next son of heaven). to be sure, the dif-ferences are more suggestive than definitive; still, readers will notice that the omission of Bo yi minimizes the potential dissonance created by the differences between the myths from the yu-Xia and later dynasties. as a result, the transition from the distant reaches of antiquity to more recent dynasties is smoothed, and the impression that the lessons of the three Dynasties are identical is preserved.

to be sure, too much should not be made of any single example; fortu-nately, other chapters suggest that the Mohist practice of relabeling gave them considerable flexibility in their deployment of the collective past. consider, for example, the arguments against music found in the one surviving version of “fei yue” 非樂 (against Music). as usual, a range of arguments is deployed, including those made on the basis of precedent. interestingly, though the ancient sages are invoked, the Mozi is unusually sparse on details and historical examples when it comes to the words or deeds of the sage-kings on music, a vagueness that suggests the authors’ awareness that they were treading on thin ice—or, worse still, as one com-ment reveals, that the evidence for aristocratic traditions of recent centu-ries might be used to support the contrary. We hear, for example, that the enjoyment of music—dismissed as a sensual pleasure—fails “to accord with the affairs of the sage-kings” 中聖王之事 (32: 55/24). a little while later, we also learn that while the sage-kings levied taxes on the popula-tion, they did so, not for the purpose of increasing their own pleasure, but rather for the benefit of the population. With the examples of the sage-kings thus firmly in sight, the Mohist authors sprinkle evidence from the exemplary past. only one anecdote is cited, a lost section of the Book of Documents, in which readers are reminded that king tang had prohibited

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dancing in the palace and fined perpetrators. “the constant dancing in the palace,” the Documents notes with disapproval, “represents sorcery (wu 巫)! the gentlemen should be punished with a fine of two bundles of silk” 其恆舞于宮, 是謂巫風˳ 其刑, 君子出絲二衛 (32: 57/17–18).

as the early Mohists were circumspect about their choice of historical example, we can only guess why they chose tang. the larger historical context, however, provides a key. the authors appear here to be mak-ing something less than a general statement about music. in fact, there is reason to think that the early Mohists did not take issue with the Odes or other music of the masses (which they seem to cite). instead, as Watanabe takashi points out, the early Mohists were primarily attacking the music of the aristocrats.59 indeed, archaeological evidence supports Watanabe’s reading: tombs reveal that spring and autumn period (771–453 Bce) elites were sometimes buried with very costly musical instruments.60 Viewed from this perspective, one might understand the choice of shang exem-plars. at the very least, tang did not bear the uncomfortable associations that we find with zhou founders, who were closely identified with the noble families of eastern zhou and thus might claim to preserve the way of the zhou sage-kings. By diverting attention away from the zhou, one could argue, the Mohists were able to move the discussion to more neu-tral territory.

the chapter on mourning and burial arguably provides the best evi-dence for the strategic advantages gained by creating a class of sage-kings out of the sextet. to see this, we must trace the various arguments advanced in this chapter against the elaborate burials and long mourning periods of elites. as usual, ancient precedent is cited, though this time, the pitfalls of such a line of reasoning are acknowledged. Right after the early Mohists claim that moderation in burial was the way of the sage-kings, an imaginary opponent presents an objection: lavish burials and three-year mourning periods may very well fail the test of social utility; but “they represent the models of the sage-kings” and so must be practiced (e.g., 25: 40/24–26). as attentive readers will notice, the opponent’s objec-tion is suspiciously—and unusually—thin on details; in other chapters, the opponents point to specific historical examples. certainly, the lack of specificity does not indicate the weakness of the objection. although no sage-king is specified as advocating three years of mourning or lavish

59 Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai,” part 2, 23.60 Rawson, “Western zhou archaeology,” 429–30.


burials, the imaginary opponent presumably had the zhou in mind. We know not only that the spring and autumn elite who claimed ties to the zhou court, practiced lavish burial rites but that such burials can be traced back to the shang.61 the wearing of mourning for prolonged peri-ods or “three years’ mourning” was also an old practice by Mo Di’s time. if we trust various Warring states chronicles, such a practice was observed by the noble rulers of the spring and autumn period.62 More problemati-cally, it was supported by Mo Di’s Ru opponents, who claimed to have a strong connection to the traditions of zhou.63 all this did not escape the attention of the Mohists; in one later chapter, “gongmeng” 公孟, a proponent of three years’ mourning declares that he “models himself after the zhou” 法周.64

the authors’ response to the objection reveals the importance of hav-ing some flexibility in the choice of exemplar and, indeed, the option to cite the example of men who lived in periods that had less documenta-tion. Watch here as they outmaneuver their opponents through a rhetori-cal sleight of hand:

昔者堯北教乎八狄, 道死, 葬蛩山之陰, 衣衾三領, 榖木之棺, 葛以緘之˳ 既栈65 而後哭˳ 滿埳無封˳ 已葬, 而牛馬乘之˳ 舜西教乎七戎, 道死, 葬南己之市, 衣衾三領, 榖木之棺, 葛以緘之˳ 已葬, 而市人乘之˳ 禹東教於越,66 道死, 葬會稽之山, 衣衾三領, 桐棺三寸˳ 葛以緘之, 絞之不合, 通之不埳˳ 堀地之深, 下毋及泉, 上毋通臭˳ 既葬, 收餘壤其上, 壟若參耕之畝, 則止矣˳

of old, yao edified through his instruction the eight Di [barbarian groups] to the north. When he died on the road, he was buried on the dark side of Mount Qiong, wrapped in three layers of burial shroud with the wood of a paper mulberry tree for an inner coffin and a kudzu vine to tie it. after he was interred, the mourners wailed for him. they filled the grave pit but did not create an embankment [i.e., a tumulus]. afterward, the horses and cows rode on top of the grave. shun edified through his instruction the seven Rong [barbarian groups] to the west. When he died on the road, he

61 ibid., 368–449; von falkenhausen, Chinese Society in the Age of Confucius, 51, 71–111. for the shang period, see keightley, “the shang,” 264–270.

62 on the roots of three years of mourning, see knapp, “the Ru Reinterpretation of Xiao.”

63 see, e.g., Analects 18.18, 1.11, 4.20.64 on gongmeng’s position vis-à-vis the zhou, see Mozi 48: 107/20–23; for mourning

and burial, see Mozi 48: 108/20–21.65 following sun yirang in reading this graph as bian 窆.66 other scholars, including sun yirang, read jiuyi 九夷 (the nine yi) for yue 越. see

also Mozi jiaozhu, 284 n. 115.

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was interred in the market of nanji in three layers of burial shroud and an inner coffin made of the wood of a paper mulberry tree with a kudzu vine to tie it. after he was buried, the townsmen drove over the grave. yu edi-fied through his instruction the yue [the nine yi?] to the east (?). When he died on the road, he was interred on Mount kuaiji in three layers of burial shroud and a wooden coffin of parasol wood three inches thick. there was only a kudzu vine to fasten the coffin, but the top and bottom of the coffin were not sealed. the grave pit was not so deep as to reach the springs nor so shallow that the stench came through. after he was interred, the mourn-ers gathered some soil for the top, creating a ridge comparable to a plot just three feet wide. (25: 40/29–41/3)67

it should be noted that the passage concludes by repeating that modera-tion was the way of all “the ancient sage-kings yao, shun, yu, tang, Wen, and Wu.” But what is striking is the discrepancy between the slogan—a slogan that presumes the unity of the sage-kings—and the selection of only three as actual examples; interestingly, the shang and zhou founders tang, Wen, and Wu are missing from the descriptions of the past. cer-tainly, it might be argued that these figures were omitted for the sake of economy. after all, why repeat oneself if fewer examples are sufficient to make the point? While this explanation might make sense for other clas-sical authors, it seems less plausible in the case of the early Mohists, who are notorious for belaboring a point, with the chapter on burial being a particularly flagrant example. Readers familiar with the passage will notice that the description of yu’s burial repeats verbatim the description of the “model of the sage-kings” given only several paragraphs before. the quiet omission of shang and zhou examples appears deliberate and arguably deflected attention away from the weaknesses in argument. By carefully choosing the “representative” examples, the Mohists moved the argument into distant antiquity, which had the advantage of lighter documentation. through this trick, they could avoid acknowledging a larger problem: the fact that the past was not univocal and that the evidence of more recent dynasties worked against them.

seen from this perspective, the Mohist reinvention of the six figures appears to have been a strategic move. as we have seen, appeals to antiq-uity were in a sense ill suited for attacks on aristocratic institutions, insti-tutions that had the weight of history and tradition behind them. Rather than forgo arguments based on precedent, the Mohists devised a new ploy: they expanded the number of historical precedents at their disposal

67 for the meaning of sangeng zhi mu 參耕之畝, see sun yikai, Mozi quanyi, 334.


by reaching beyond the zhou and even shang. in this way, they could selectively choose their representatives of antiquity, without having to acknowledge either the diversity of the past or the existence of inconve-nient precedents.

Conclusion

i opened this essay with the question of whether the two faces of Mo Di could be reconciled. i investigated whether our sources really indi-cate that the early Mohists created the very terms for and image of the sage-kings, and why. Looking at the textual evidence, i conclude that the Mohist view of the ancients was indeed different from that found in other extant works. While they were not the first to make appeals to past rul-ers, the early Mohists nevertheless played a hand in creating the image of the three Dynasties as a golden age. such a vision, i further argue, was motivated largely by rhetorical necessity. as we have seen, invocations of the sage-kings bolstered, rather than undermined, the Mohist attack on aristocratic traditions on several fronts. to begin with, such invocations deflected attention away from the inconvenient evidence of more recent ages. in addition, they were endlessly flexible, for the sage-kings could be chosen selectively to represent antiquity.

it remains to say a word about the legacies of the Mohists. Many of the proposals wrapped in Mohist arguments about antiquity were ineffec-tive. if later traditions provide any indication, Mohist calls for moderate expenditures for burials were largely ignored. the archaeological evidence reveals that aristocrats continued to enter the hereafter with great pomp and ceremony. although Mohist ideas did not catch on, their rhetorical strategies provide another lens by which to examine their influence. as table 1 reveals, the term “sage-king,” was commonplace in the third cen-tury Bce. in addition, the Mohist impact can be felt in terms of which past was deployed. a scan of later texts of the Warring states—with the excep-tion of the Record of Rites (Liji 禮記), which promotes zhou customs, par-ticularly of mourning and burial—reveals a pronounced preference for the distant over the recent past. the Mencius (late fourth century) pro-vides a prime example of this trend. interestingly, yao and shun appear with the greatest frequency, but the pre-zhou founders yu and tang still occur more often than the zhou founders, even when the references to the Duke of zhou are considered (see table 3). no doubt, further research is necessary for fleshing out the connections between the early Mohists

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and the later tradition. such a study would require that a host of factors be considered. We would need to know much more about, for example, later thinkers—how they came into contact with Mohist works and modes of argumentation, how they deployed the past in their works, and what specific aims they had in so doing. indeed, such research may reveal the impact of the Mohist remaking of ancient authority.

The eThics of The MohisT Dialogues*

chris fraser

The Mohist Dialogues are four chapters of the Mozi (46–49) consisting of brief conversations between Mozi and various disciples, opponents, and rulers or officials. The first two also present sayings attributed to Mozi.1 The Dialogues reflect the Mohists at the height of their influ-ence as a sociopolitical reform movement. They depict Mozi traveling to various states and receiving audiences with their rulers, to whom he dispenses moral and political advice. he discusses doctrinal issues with students and outsiders, including several Ru (confucians, “erudites,” “classicists”), an opponent named Wumazi 巫馬子,2 who defends an

* an earlier version of this essay was presented at the conference “The Many faces of Mozi: a synchronic and Diachronic study of Mohist Thought,” held at the university of leuven, 25–28 June 2009. i am grateful to the conference participants for helpful com-ments, especially Roman Malek (the discussant for the paper). i am also indebted to the editors of this volume, carine Defoort and Nicolas standaert, for many useful comments.

1 The content of the four chapters can be summarized very roughly as follows. chapter 46, “geng Zhu,” 耕柱 is a mixed collection of anecdotes, conversations, and sayings touch-ing on a variety of themes in Mohist thought. The chapter is named after geng Zhuzi 耕柱子, a Mohist disciple who appears in its opening anecdote. chapter 47, “gui Yi 貴義 (Valuing Morality), focuses loosely on moral psychology and moral instruction and comprises mainly sayings ascribed to Mozi. chapter 48, “gongmeng,” 公孟 mainly pres-ents Mohist criticisms of the Ru. (The chapter takes its title from gongmengzi 公孟子, a Ru depicted in several conversations with Mozi.) chapter 49, “lu Wen” 魯問 (Ques-tions of lu), relates conversations tied in various ways to the state of lu, including several between Mozi and the ruler of lu. aside from these general themes, however, chapters 47, 48, and 49 all contain other miscellaneous material as well. on the whole, the Dialogues are organized only very loosely, although their content is doctrinally fairly coherent. a fifth chapter, chapter 50, “gongshu” 公輸, is sometimes also counted among the Dialogues. This chapter contains a single, extended anecdote about Mozi convincing the king of chu 楚 to call off an attack on song 宋 by explaining how song defense tactics could counter all nine means of attack invented by gongshu Pan 公輸盤, a brilliant military engineer employed by chu. since, unlike chapters 46–49, this chapter is not a collection of short passages treating doctrinal issues, for the purposes of this essay i will not treat it as part of the Dialogues.

2 commentators such as su shixue 蘇時學 have suggested that Wuma was a Ru, either a student of confucius named Wuma Qi 巫馬期 or his son. see Mozi jiaozhu, 647. how-ever, in the Dialogues, Wuma is not treated as a representative of the Ru (as, e.g., gong-mengzi 公孟子 is), and he expresses no distinctively Ru views. Moreover, he criticizes the practice, shared by both the Mohists and the Ru, of praising the “former kings” as moral exemplars (46: 101/1–10). These points suggest that he was probably not a Ru.

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ethic of self-interest, and a critic named Wu lü 吳慮, who opposes moral activism, advocating instead self-sufficient living off the land.3 The Mohist “school” is depicted as a flourishing, disciplined organization that attracts and trains students, recommends them for official posts or dispatches them on military assignments, and is supported by donations from them once they are employed. it is difficult to say to what extent the sayings and events that these texts associate with Mozi, are grounded in historical fact and to what extent they are retrospective embellishments, projections backward from the status and doctrines of later generations of Mohists. The doctrines and prose style of the Dialogues are more polished than those of the earliest Mohist essays, such as Mozi 11, 14, and 17, which may record the words of Mo Di himself. unlike the essays in the “Triplets”—the ten sets of three essay-length “chapters,” or pian 篇, that form the core chapters of the Mozi (chapters 8–37)4—one passage in the Dialogues explicitly arranges the ten core Mohist doctrines into a systematic, coher-ent platform addressing a range of social and political problems, one or another of which Mohist teachers are to select for initial presentation to a ruler on the basis of the particular problems his state faces (see below). This discussion implies a context in which not only Mozi but his senior disciples have sufficient reputation and social status that they routinely succeed in approaching rulers from “the four quarters”—all parts of the early chinese world—to offer policy advice. given the Mohists’ plebeian origins, it seems unlikely that they could have achieved this level of influ-ence within Mozi’s lifetime. so i tentatively suggest that the Dialogues represent the status and doctrines of the movement some time after—perhaps several generations after—Mozi’s death.5 some of the conversa-

3 outwardly, Wu lü’s dao (49: 113/13–29) resembles that of the “agriculturalists,” a movement devoted to economic self-sufficiency. see graham, Disputers of the Tao, 64–74. he may not be aligned with them, however, since instead of mentioning their patron god the Divine farmer (shen Nong 神農), he claims to emulate the sage-king shun. his posi-tion overlaps with some Daoist views, since he advocates a simple lifestyle and opposes the dissemination of explicit moral teachings.

4 four of the ten Triplets are incomplete, as seven of these thirty chapters are lost. The core chapters are sometimes also considered to include a pair of texts entitled “fei Ru” 非儒 (against the Ru), one of which is lost. The surviving member of the pair is devoted entirely to criticizing the Ru; its first half resembles a debate handbook recording stock rebuttals of Ru teachings. since, unlike the core chapters, this text is not organized as a coherent presentation of a specific Mohist doctrine, i place it in a separate category from the core chapters.

5 a pair of correspondences between the Dialogues and the confucian Analects offer intriguing hints but no conclusive information as to the Dialogues’ chronology. one pas-sage appears to cite the exchange in Analects 13.16 between confucius and Zigao, Duke of

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tions they record might go back to Mozi himself, but we probably have no way of determining to what extent they do.

This essay will argue that the ethics of the Dialogues is largely con-sistent with that of the middle and late chapters of the core chapters,6 but that the Dialogues develop characteristic Mohist ethical ideas in sev-eral interesting ways. first, they clarify the Mohist conception of yi 義 (morality, duty, right) as norms that can be explicitly expressed in yan 言 (statements) and publicized and consistently followed by all with good consequences. second, they present a series of views on moral worth that tie it to agents’ character and intentions. Third, they fill out the Mohist view of moral motivation and suggest how the Mohists might approach issues related to weakness of will. finally, they present a new, demanding ideal of moral sagehood. The following sections explore the continuity between the Triplets and the Dialogues and then consider each of these four developments in turn.

Continuity with the Core Chapters

The ethical doctrines of the Dialogues are in many respects continuous with doctrines found in the core chapters, particularly the later strata.7 as in most of the Triplet essays, the standard of right teachings and action is what benefits heaven (tian 天), the ghosts, and the common people:

she 葉公子高, concerning good government—“the nearby are pleased, and the distant come”—and criticizes it for offering no concrete policy proposals (46: 101/20–21). another passage (48: 108/26–28) ridicules the defense of the Ruist three-year mourning ritual in Analects 17.19. The Analects explains that the three-year mourning ritual reciprocates the three years of care that infants receive from their parents; the Mohist reply is that the Ru apparently know no better than an infant how to conduct themselves.) These parallels seem to place the Dialogues in the same intellectual milieu as the second, later half of the Analects. (see also e. Bruce Brooks and a. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects, 259–262, who explore a more extensive series of potential parallels, some relatively speculative.) in particular, since Analects 17.19 probably falls within the very late strata of that text, one might appeal to it to assign a similarly late date to the corresponding Mozi passage. (e. Bruce Brooks and a. Taeko Brooks, The Original Analects, 161, propose a date of ca. 270 Bce for Analects 17.19.) however, the absolute dates of the Analects passages are difficult to determine, and rather than the Mozi passage on the three-year mourning responding directly to the text of the Analects, conceivably both might reflect a preexisting, widely circulated Ru saying.

6 The twenty-three surviving essays in the Triplets fall into several chronological strata. for an overview, see the supplement “Texts and authorship” in fraser, “Mohism.”

7 for an overview of the ethics of the Triplets, see fraser, “Mohism,” sec. 7.

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子墨子曰: 「凡言凡動, 利於天鬼百姓者為之˳ 凡言凡動, 害於天鬼百姓者舍之˳ 凡言凡動, 合於三代聖王堯舜禹湯文武者為之˳ 凡言凡動, 合於三代暴王桀紂幽厲者舍之˳ 」

our Master Mozi said, “in all statements and actions, do what is beneficial to heaven, ghosts, and the common people. in all statements and actions, renounce what is harmful to heaven, ghosts, and the common people. in all statements and actions, do what conforms to the sage-kings of the Three Dynasties, Yao, shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu. in all statements and actions, renounce what conforms to the tyrants of the Three Dynasties, Jie, Zhou, You, and li.” (47: 104/15–17)

as this passage shows, the Dialogues also follow the middle and later Triplets in commending the sage-kings as moral exemplars or models by which to distinguish what is right.8 other passages further extol the value of the sage-kings’ teachings:

巫馬子謂子墨子曰: 「舍今之人而譽先王, 是譽槁骨也˳ 譬若匠人然, 智槁木也, 而不智生木˳ 」子墨子曰: 「天下之所以生者, 以先王之道教也˳ 今譽先王, 是譽天下之所以生也˳ 」

Wumazi said to our Master Mozi, “To set aside people of today and instead praise the former kings, this is to praise rotten bones. it’s like a carpenter who knows rotten wood but not living wood.” our Master Mozi said, “That by which the world lives is through the teachings of the dao (Way) of the former kings. Now praising the former kings, this is praising that by which the world lives.” (46: 101/9–11)

子墨子曰: 「古之聖王欲傳其道於後世˳ 是故書之竹帛, 鏤之金石, 傳遺後世子孫, 欲後世子孫法之也˳ 今聞先王之遺而不為, 是廢先王之傳也˳ 」

our Master Mozi said, “The ancient sage-kings desired to pass their Way on to later generations. so they wrote it on bamboo and silk and engraved it on metal and stone in order to pass it down to their descendants, desiring that their descendants would emulate it. Now to hear what was passed down from the former kings but not practice it, this is to discard the traditions of the former kings.” (47: 105/16–17)

as in most of the core chapters, benefit (li 利)—the criterion of what is morally right—is understood to comprise wealth, population, and social order (zhi 治). Where the Triplets typically include state security within

8 on the role of the sage-kings, see Miranda Brown’s essay in this volume.


the scope of social order, a passage in the Dialogues treats it as a separate item:

子墨子曰: 「和氏之璧, 隋侯之珠, 三棘六異, 此諸侯之所謂良寶也˳ 可以富國家, 眾人民, 治刑政, 安社稷乎？ . . . 今用義為政於國家, 人民必眾, 刑政必治, 社稷必安˳ 所為貴良寶者, 可以利民也, 而義可以利人˳ 故曰: 義, 天下之良寶也˳ 」

our Master Mozi said, “The jade of he, the pearl of sui, and the nine caul-drons—these are what the various lords call ‘precious.’ can they enrich the state, increase the population, bring order to the government, and bring security to the state? . . . Now, if one governs a state by employing yi [morality], the population will surely be large, the government will surely be orderly, and the state will surely be secure. The reason we value precious things is that they can benefit people, and yi can benefit people. so i say, yi is the most precious thing in the world.” (46: 101/14–18)

consistent with many of the Triplets, a person with moral wisdom or know-how obeys heaven, sacrifices to the ancestral ghosts and nature spirits, cares about others, and moderates expenditures:

子墨子曰: 「夫知者必尊天事鬼, 愛人節用, 合焉為知矣˳ 」

our Master Mozi said, “a wise person must respect heaven, serve ghosts, care about others, and moderate expenses. combining these constitutes wisdom.” (48: 107/27)

like many of the Triplet essays, the Dialogues oppose wars of aggression, profligate spending, extravagant burial and mourning practices, luxurious entertainment, and fatalism. several exchanges with rulers of different states depict Mozi condemning military aggression, as in the following:

子墨子謂魯陽文君曰:「攻其鄰國, 殺其民人, 取其牛馬粟米貨財, 則書之於竹帛, 鏤之於金石, 以為銘於鐘鼎, 傅遺後世子孫曰:“莫若我多”˳ 今賤人也, 亦攻其鄰家, 殺其人民, 取其狗豕食糧衣裘, 亦書之竹帛, 以為銘於席豆, 以遺後世子孫曰:“莫若我多”˳ 亓可乎？」魯陽文君曰:「然吾以子之言觀之, 則天下之所謂可者, 未必然也˳ 」

our Master Mozi said to lord Wen of luyang, “[Warlike rulers such as your-self] attack neighboring states, kill their people, seize their oxen and horses, food, and goods, and then write their deeds on bamboo and silk, engrave them on metal and stone, and inscribe them on bells and cauldrons to pass on to their descendants, saying, ‘No one’s achievements equal mine.’ Now suppose a commoner were similarly to attack neighboring families, kill their people, seize their dogs and pigs, food, and clothing, and similarly write his deeds on bamboo and silk and inscribe them on vessels and dishes to pass on to his descendants, saying, ‘No one’s achievements equal mine.’ how

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could this be permissible?” lord Wen of luyang said, “so if i view it on the basis of your statement, what all the world calls permissible is not necessar-ily so.” (49: 112/14–18)

This passage is also significant because it emphasizes the distinction, introduced in “Jie zang” (Moderation in Burials), between prevailing cus-toms and objective moral norms: what “all the world” considers permis-sible might nevertheless be morally wrong (25: 41/18–27). another passage depicts Mozi castigating a minister of Wei 衛, a small state surrounded by wealthier, more powerful rivals, for spending resources on luxuries and a harem rather than defense, which would be of greater benefit:

今簡子之家, 飾車數百乘, 馬食菽粟者數百匹, 婦人衣文繡者數百人˳ 吾取飾車食馬之費, 與鏽衣之財以畜士, 必千人有餘˳ 若有患難, 則使百人處於前, 數百於後˳ 與婦人數百人處前後, 孰安？

Now, if we examine your house, there are hundreds of decorated vehicles, hundreds of grain-fed horses, and hundreds of women clothed in finery. if we took the cost of decorating the vehicles and feeding the horses and the materials needed for the fine clothing and used them to maintain soldiers, surely they would exceed a thousand men. if there were a crisis, you could station several hundred in the front and several hundred in the rear. com-pared with stationing several hundred women in the front and rear, which would be more secure? (47: 105/26–28)

The “fei ming” 非命 (against fatalism), “Jie yong” 節用 (Moderation in expenditure), and “fei yue” 非樂 (against Music) triplets phrase their condemnation of fatalistic beliefs, excessive funeral practices, and waste-ful entertainment generally, directing them at what are depicted as wide-spread views and customs that the Mohists see as detrimental to the general welfare. By contrast, the Dialogues incorporate these points—along with a criticism of their supposed impiety—into an attack targeted specifically against the Ru:

儒之道足以喪天下者, 四政焉˳ 儒以天為不明, 以鬼為不神, 天鬼不說˳ . . . 又厚葬久喪˳ 重為棺槨, 多為衣衾, 送死若徙˳ 三年哭泣, 扶後起, 杖後行, 耳無聞, 目無見˳ . . . 又弦歌鼓舞, 習為聲樂˳ . . . 又以命為有, 貧富壽夭, 治亂安危有極矣, 不可損益也˳ 為上者行之, 必不聽治矣; 為下者行之, 必不從事矣˳

The Way of the Ru includes four policies that are each enough to ruin the world. The Ru treat heaven as insentient and the ghosts as inanimate, and so heaven and the ghosts are displeased . . . They also conduct rich burials and prolonged mourning. They have several inner and outer coffins and many layers of shrouds, and their funeral processions are like moving house. for


three years they cry and weep, until they cannot stand up without support or walk without a cane, their ears unable to hear and their eyes unable to see. . . . They also sing to the accompaniment of strings and dance to drums, practicing songs and music. . . . and they take fate to exist, holding that pov-erty or wealth, longevity or early death, social order or disorder, security or danger have been fixed and cannot be increased or decreased. if rulers practice this, they will surely neglect to govern; if their subjects practice it, they will surely neglect their work. (48: 109/4–8)

The subtext of these criticisms is that the Way of the Ru fails to promote the benefit of all and is thus morally wrong. Ru practices displease heaven and the spirits, waste resources, and interfere with economic production and good social order.9

an interesting difference between the Dialogues and the core chap-ters, then, is the emergence of the Ru as rivals whose doctrines and prac-tices the Mohists explicitly denounce, often in face-to-face discussions with individual Ru. Many essays in the middle and later chronological strata of the Triplets condemn practices such as rich burials or elabo-rate musical performances and rebut criticisms of Mohist doctrines, but without identifying particular opponents or rival groups by name. The “fei Ru” 非儒 (against Ru) chapter attacks the Ru by name, but its status as a core chapter is debatable: although its chronological relationship to the Triplets is not entirely clear, stylistic and thematic features suggest it is of later origin than the early and middle strata, and its content has more affinities with the Dialogues.10 By contrast, the Dialogues confront opponents such as Wumazi and Wu lü and direct a series of scathing criticisms at the Ru.11 one explanation for this difference may simply be the different genres or purposes of the two sets of texts. The core chap-ters focus on promulgating and defending Mohist doctrines, not refuting rivals. Where they attack harmful practices or answer criticisms, their purpose is not to diminish particular opponents so much as to justify the Mohist Way. By contrast, the Dialogues have broader aims and a more diffuse focus. Besides promoting Mohist doctrines, they depict exchanges

9 Besides the points in the quoted passage, the Dialogues also criticize the Ru for their excessive conservatism (46: 102/19–20, 48: 107/20–23) and their passivity (48: 106/25–31, 48: 107/5–9), two attitudes that in the Mohists’ view squander opportunities to benefit the world.

10 see n. 4 and the introduction to this volume. 11 among the individual Ru mentioned in the Dialogues are confucius, an unnamed

follower of confucius’s student Zixia 子夏 (46: 101/5), gongmengzi (chapter 48, passim), and chengzi 程子 (48: 109/4).

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in which Mozi debates and criticizes opponents, answers disciples’ questions, provides moral coaching or other practical advice, and offers various observations or words of wisdom. another explanation for the greater prominence of the Ru in the Dialogues may be that when most of the core chapters were composed, the Ru did not strike the Mohists as especially significant rivals.12 The Ru movement may have developed in parallel with Mohism, such that the Ru became prominent adversaries for the Mohists only after the bulk of the Triplets were produced.

as mentioned in the introduction of this essay, one of the Dialogues explicitly organizes the ten core Mohist teachings into a platform com-prising five pairs of doctrines targeted at a range of social problems:

子墨子游魏越, 曰: 「既得見四方之君子則將先語？」子墨子曰: 「凡入國, 必擇務而從事焉˳ 國家昏亂, 則語之尚賢尚同; 國家貧, 則語之節用節葬, 國家說音湛湎, 則語之非樂非命; 國家淫辟無禮, 則語之尊天事鬼; 國家務奪侵凌, 則語之兼愛非攻˳ 故曰擇務而從事焉˳ 」

our Master Mozi visited Wei Yue, who said, “having been granted an audi-ence with the rulers of the four quarters, what would you expound first?” our Master Mozi said, “Whenever you enter a state, you must select a task and work on it. if the state is in disorder, expound to them ‘promoting the worthy’ and ‘conforming upward’; if the state is impoverished, expound ‘moderation in expenditure’ and ‘moderation in burial’; if the state over-indulges in musical entertainment, expound ‘against music’ and ‘against fatalism’; if the state is dissolute and indecorous, expound ‘revering heaven’ and ‘serving ghosts’; if the state is devoted to aggression and intimidation, expound ‘inclusive care’ and ‘against military aggression.’ so i say, select a task and work on it.”13 (49: 114/7–10)

This passage underscores the consistency between the Dialogues and the Triplets. it suggests that the writers of at least some parts of the Dialogues were consciously concerned to provide clear, concise reformulations of key doctrines from the Triplets, along with guidance for Mohist adherents in applying them.

let me now move beyond these points of continuity to explore devel-opments in the ethics of the Dialogues.

12 for a detailed discussion of the identity of the early Mohists’ opponents and the significance of the Ru for the Mohists, see Robins, “The Moists and the gentlemen of the World.”

13 for a summary of the ten doctrines, see fraser, “Mohism,” sec. 2; and the introduc-tion to this volume.


Role of Statements

a cornerstone of Mohist ethics is the conviction that the proper moral and political “Way” (dao 道) can be expressed and transmitted explic-itly in verbal formulations as statements, doctrines, or teachings ( yan 言). such yan are treated as dicta or instructions that guide action. like many early chinese texts, the Mozi frequently pairs yan conceptually with xing 行 (conduct, practice).14 People’s conduct is expected to correspond to their yan, and those who endorse contrasting yan can be expected to act in contrasting ways (e.g., 16: 28/4–5).15 as illustrated in the Mohist doctrine of “conforming upward” (shang tong 尚同), people are expected to follow their rulers’ yan (11: 16/19–23), and moral education involves emulating the yan and xing—in effect, the words and deeds—of worthy political leaders. a major aim of the core chapters is to present the yan of Mozi, which the texts propose as a guide to right conduct. opponents’ objections to Mohist doctrines are characterized as yan (e.g., 16: 27/28, 25: 40/28), as are views that the Mohists seek to refute concerning funerals, the nonexistence of ghosts, and the existence of fate (e.g., 25: 38/26–39/6, 31: 55/7, 35: 58/15–16). The Mohists specifically identify the pernicious yan of the fatalists as a cause of poverty, inadequate population, and social disorder, since applying this yan to guide conduct leads to economically and politically harmful negligence (35: 60/7–10):

子墨子言曰:「古者王公大人, 為政國家者, 皆欲國家之富, 人民之眾, 刑政之治˳ 然而不得富而得貧, 不得眾而得寡, 不得治而得亂˳ 則是本失其所欲, 得其所惡˳ 是故何也？」子墨子言曰:「執有命者以雜於民閒者眾˳」執有命者之言曰:「命富則富; 命貧則貧; 命眾則眾; 命寡則寡; 命治則治; 命亂則亂; 命壽則壽; 命夭則夭˳ 命雖強勁何

14 in various contexts, the pairing yan and xing may correspond roughly to the english “word and deed,” “theory and practice,” or “principle and application.”

15 of course, people sometimes endorse yan that they fail to carry out completely, as the Mohists complain concerning officials’ failure to practice their doctrine of “promoting the worthy”: “Now, the officer-gentlemen of the world in their personal lives and state-ments all promote the worthy. But when it comes to public administration and ruling the people, none know to promote the worthy and employ the capable. Thus, we know that the officer-gentlemen of the world understand minor things but not major ones” (10: 14/6–7). as the Mohists see it, officials know enough to practice the doctrine in minor, personal matters, as when they insist on hiring an expert butcher to cut up an ox or an expert tailor to make a suit of clothes, but not in major affairs such as selecting appointees for government office, when they instead practice nepotism or favoritism. such cases are an example of partial incompetence in following teaching or the Way. Notice that the criticism is that officials do not “know” to employ the capable in government. i discuss the Mohists’ views on such partial incompetence further below.

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益哉？」上以說王公大人, 下以駔百姓之從事˳ 故執有命者不仁˳ 故當執有命者之言, 不可不明辨˳

our Master Mozi stated ( yan), “ancient kings, dukes, and grandees in gov-erning the state all desired that their state be wealthy, their population large, and their government orderly. however, they obtained not wealth but poverty, not a large population but a small one, not order but disorder. This is failing to get what they originally desired and instead getting what they detested. What is the reason for this?” our Master Mozi stated, “There were many fatalists mixed in among the people.” The yan [statement] of the fatal-ists says, “if fated to be wealthy, then wealthy; if fated to be poor, then poor. if fated to be many, then many; if fated to be few, then few. if fated to be orderly, then orderly; if fated to be disorderly, then disorderly. if fated to be long-lived, then a long life; if fated to be short-lived, then a short life. given fate, even if one devotes great effort, of what advantage is it?” above, they persuaded kings, dukes, and grandees of this; below, they interfered in the work of the common people with it. so the fatalists are morally bad. so as to the yan [statements] of the fatalists, we cannot fail to clearly distinguish them.16 (35: 58/13–18)

The link between statements and conduct is what makes promulgating incorrect yan not merely intellectually misguided but morally despicable. since people tend to act on yan, the Mohists deem it crucial to establish explicit, reliable criteria for evaluating “the distinctions between shi 是 [this/right] and fei 非 [not/wrong] and between benefit and harm” with respect to yan (35: 58/19–20). The major criteria they propose are their “three models” (san fa 三法): yan should be “rooted” (ben 本) in or “tested” (kao 考) against the deeds of the ancient sage-kings (i.e., they should have some historical precedent); they should have a “source” in what the com-mon people can hear and see (they should have some empirical basis); and they should be successful in “application” ( yong 用)—specifically, when applied as a basis for government administration and penal law, they should benefit the state, clan, and common people (35: 58/19–22).17

The Dialogues underscore and develop this conception of correct state-ments as an expression of and guide to the Way. Yan that are effective in guiding or improving conduct are to be made regular or “constant” (chang 常)—that is, repeated frequently and promulgated widely (and,

16 That is, we should apply objective models or criteria to “clearly distinguish” whether they are shi (right) or fei (wrong).

17 one version of the theory refers to the three models as the three “markers” (biao 表) (35: 58/19). another substitutes “documents of the former kings” for what people hear and see as the “source” and adds “the intent of heaven and ghosts” as part of the “root” (36: 60/19–20).


presumably, followed consistently). Regularly uttering yan that are of no use in guiding conduct is “verbal depravity” (dang kou 蕩口):

言足以復行者, 常之, 不足以舉行者, 勿常˳ 不足以舉行而常之, 是蕩口也˳

as for statements that are adequate to repeatedly guide conduct, make them constant [repeat them regularly]. Those not adequate to prompt con-duct, do not make them constant. To make constant those not adequate to prompt conduct, this is verbal depravity. (46: 101/30–31; and nearly identical 47: 104/19–20)

in another passage (46: 102/24–103/1), Mozi accuses Wumazi of “verbal depravity” because his yan is of “no benefit.” Benefit (li 利), of course, is the third of the three models for distinguishing statements that are cor-rect from those that are wrong.18 The statement in question is apparently Wumazi’s slogan “for me there is killing others to benefit myself, but not killing myself to benefit others” 我有殺彼以利我, 無殺我以利彼, which Mozi refers to as “your yi” (zi zhi yi 子之義) and Wumazi himself calls “my yi” (wo yi 我義)—that is, “my norm” or “my standard of right,” probably referring to what is morally correct. Mozi refutes Wumazi’s yi by show-ing how publicizing it would have self-defeating consequences: those who endorse it would be inclined to kill Wumazi to benefit themselves, while those who reject it would be inclined to kill him to stop the spread of his malicious statement. either way, although his proposed yi (norm) aims to protect or promote his interests, publicizing it is instead likely to bring him harm. The implication is that besides benefiting society, an adequate yi or yan must meet a publicity condition and, most likely, a universaliz-ability condition. Yi or yan can be justified only if they can be publicized and regularly followed by all without negative or self-defeating conse-quences. These conditions probably also follow from the idea that an effec-tive action-guiding statement should be made “constant” (46: 101/30), or widely and regularly promulgated, combined with the Mohists’ expectation that people normally act on the statement they promulgate and endorse. The import of Mozi’s refutation of Wumazi is that the latter’s slogan, and thus his yi, cannot consistently and effectively be made “constant.”

The dialogue with Wu lü, the opponent who criticizes Mozi’s activism, presents a justification for the Mohists’ devotion to promulgating their ethical and political yan (49: 113/13–29). Wu is a rural recluse who spends

18 strictly speaking, the third model is that a yan applied as a basis for government administration and penal law should benefit the state, clan, and people.

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the winter making pottery and the summer farming. he compares himself to the sage-king shun 舜, also traditionally said to have worked in the fields. he probably takes his eremitic way of life to be the sagely way, and he apparently takes the Mohists’ activism to be misguided. challenging Mozi, Wu claims that one should simply do what is yi (morally right), without promulgating yan (statements) about it:

義耳義耳˳ 焉用言之哉？

Be yi, that’s all; be yi, that’s all. What’s the use of making yan about it? (49: 113/14)

however, at Mozi’s prompting, Wu assents to the consequentialist view that what is yi yields material benefit for others. so Mozi responds by defending moral activism on the grounds that—in the prevailing circum-stances, at least—for him, Mozi, to research and promulgate the “Way” and “statements” of the sage-kings ultimately benefits the world more than directly producing food or clothing. as a single, individual worker, his economic output would necessarily be limited, but promoting the Way could potentially bring about extensive benefit: if rulers follow his yan, they will bring order to their states, and if the common people follow them, they will improve their conduct. Moreover, Wu agrees as well that teaching or encouraging others in a worthy activity is a greater contribu-tion than simply performing it oneself. Many people know little about morality ( yi), Mozi claims, so why not disseminate teachings ( yan) about it? Promulgating teachings or statements to reform people’s conduct is thus morally justified on the grounds of its good consequences.

in their treatment of yan, the Mohists define a seminal position on what became one of the core issues of early chinese philosophy: the role of explicitly formulated models or guidelines in directing action. adopting a stance later shared by Xunzi, hanfei, and others, they contend that the most effective way to promulgate the Way and lead people to follow it is to set forth explicit guidelines articulated through statements. This is the mainstream stance that parts of the Daodejing, Mencius, and Zhuangzi reject in various ways.19 each of these texts expresses a skeptical stance

19 for instance, Daodejing, chapter 2, describes the sage as practicing an “unstated” (bu yan 不言) teaching, Mencius privileges the heart over yan in guiding action (2a.2), and the Zhuangzi, chapter 4, advocates “fasting the heart” (xin zhai 心齋) rather than directing action by explicit guidelines.


concerning whether explicit models or statements can guide action effec-tively and, in the case of the Daodejing and Zhuangzi, about whether such yan should be actively disseminated.

Moral Worth

The Dialogues also include several interesting passages addressing moral worth, an issue not explicitly treated in the core chapters. These texts are significant because they tie moral worth to action-guiding attitudes, such as intentions and commitments, and to robust, stable aspects of agents’ character. The Dialogues thus provide strong evidence against the view that Mohist ethics concerns only outward compliance with the Way and neglects issues of character, motivation, and moral worth.20

according to the Dialogues, the moral worth of agents’ actions and character rests on their “intentions” ( yi 意, also “aims”) or “intent” (zhi 志, also “commitments”).21 To evaluate people’s character, we must deter-mine their intent by observing the results of their conduct over the long term. observation of only limited or restricted instances is not enough, for others could be merely luring us into trusting them:

魯君謂子墨子曰:「我有二子˳ 一人者好學, 一人者好分人財˳ 孰以為太子而可？」子墨子曰:「未可知也˳ 或所為賞與為是也˳ 魡者之恭, 非為魚賜也˳ 餌鼠以蟲, 非愛之也˳ 吾願主君之合其志功而觀焉˳」

The lord of lu said to our Master Mozi, “i have two sons. one of them is keen on study; one of them is keen on sharing wealth with others. Which would be acceptable as the crown prince?” our Master Mozi said, “We can’t yet know. Perhaps they act this way for the sake of reward or praise. The bowing motion of a fisherman, it’s not done for the sake of expressing grati-tude to the fish; baiting rats with worms, it’s not done out of care for the rats. i hope your lordship will observe them to see how their intents match up with their results.” (49: 113/6–8)

short-term observation cannot yield reliable knowledge of people’s motives. Virtues such as moral goodness (ren 仁) comprise stable traits

20 for examples of such interpretive views, see D. Wong, “Mohism,” 454, and schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 147.

21 The concepts of yi 意 (intentions, aims) and zhi 志 (intents, commitments) largely overlap. Zhi may tend to refer to relatively long-term commitments. however, as illus-trated below in the dialogue about feeding versus extinguishing a fire (46: 100/20–23), yi can refer to either the intention to perform a particular act (such as extinguishing a fire) or a long-term commitment (such as benefiting the world).

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and associated patterns of conduct. acting properly in a few cases does not qualify one as morally good, just as temporarily standing on tiptoe does not make one tall:

二三子復於子墨子曰:「告子勝為仁˳」子墨子曰:「未必然也˳ 告子為仁, 譬猶跂以為長, 隱以為廣˳ 不可久也˳」

several disciples reported to our Master Mozi, saying, “gaozi excels in being good.” our Master Mozi said, “it’s not necessarily so. gaozi’s being good is analogous to standing on tiptoe to make oneself taller or spreading one’s shoulders to make oneself broader. it cannot be made to last long.” (48: 111/10–11)

These examples concern long-term evaluation of motives or character. But the texts extend this view to cover individual actions as well. Moral worth lies in intending to do what is right (yi), even if the good consequences of one’s conduct have yet to materialize:

巫馬子謂子墨子曰:「子兼愛天下, 未云利也; 我不愛天下, 未云賊也˳ 功皆未至, 子何獨自是而非我哉？」子墨子曰:「今有燎者於此˳ 一人奉水將灌之, 一人摻火將益之˳ 功皆未至, 子何貴於二人？」巫馬子曰:「我是彼奉水者之意, 而非夫摻火者之意˳」子墨子曰:「吾亦是吾意, 而非子之意也˳」

Wumazi said to our Master Mozi, “You inclusively care for everyone in the world, but have yet to benefit them; i do not care about everyone, but have yet to injure them. Both sides having yet to achieve results, why do you deem yourself alone right and me wrong?” our Master Mozi said, “suppose something is burning. one person is carrying water to pour on it; one person is holding fuel to add to the fire. Both sides having yet to achieve results, which of the two people do you value more?” Wumazi said, “i deem the intention of the one carrying water right and the intention of the one hold-ing fire wrong.” our Master Mozi said, “i likewise deem my intention right and yours wrong.” (46: 100/20–23)

one aspect of moral worth is to pursue moral ideals regardless of the pros-pect of reward or punishment:

巫馬子謂子墨子曰:「子之為義也, 人不見而助, 鬼不見而富, 而子為之˳ 有狂疾˳」子墨子曰:「今使子有二臣於此˳ 其一人者見子從事, 不見子則不從事˳ 其一人者見子從事, 不見子亦從事˳ 子誰貴於此二人？」巫馬子曰:「我貴其見我從事, 不見我亦從事者˳」子墨子曰: 「然則是子亦貴有狂疾者˳ 」

Wumazi said to our Master Mozi, “as to your practicing what’s morally right, people do not see and assist you, the ghosts do not see and reward you, yet you do it. You’re crazy.” our Master Mozi said, “suppose you have two


servants. one of them works when he sees you and doesn’t work when he doesn’t see you. one of them works whether he sees you or not. Which of the two do you value more?” Wumazi said, “i value the one who works whether he sees me or not.” our Master Mozi said, “so then you too value craziness.” (46: 100/30–101/3)

another aspect is that the virtuous agent takes the initiative to pursue what is right. This is a point on which the Mohists contrast their way with that of the Ru. in one passage, gongmengzi cites a Ru saying to the effect that a gentleman offers counsel only when asked:

公孟子謂子墨子曰:「君子共己以待˳ 問焉則言, 不問焉則止˳ 譬若鐘然˳ 扣則鳴; 不扣則不鳴˳」

gongmengzi said to our Master Mozi, “The gentleman folds his hands on his chest and waits. When asked, he speaks; when not asked, he ceases. he is like a bell. When struck, it chimes; when not struck, it does not chime.” (48: 106/25–26)

Mozi responds that this maxim applies only to predicaments in which a violent ruler is unlikely to heed counsel. in other cases, as when the state is endangered or the ruler is contemplating harmful military action, the gentleman should step forward with advice: “Though not struck, one must chime” (48: 106/31). elsewhere, the Dialogues reiterate this point with respect to the virtue of loyalty (zhong 忠). a loyal minister is proactive in serving his ruler’s interests:

魯陽文君謂子墨子曰:「有語我以忠臣者, 令之俯則俯; 令之仰則仰˳ 處則靜; 呼則應˳ 可謂忠臣乎？」子墨子曰:「令之俯則俯, 令之仰則仰, 是似景也˳ 處則靜, 呼則應, 是似響也˳ 君將何得於景與響哉？若以翟之所謂忠臣者, 上有過, 則微之以諫˳ 己有善, 則訪之上, 而無敢以告˳ 外匡其邪, 而入其善˳ 尚同而無下比˳ 是以美善在上, 而怨讎在下˳ 安樂在上, 而憂慼在臣˳ 此翟之所謂忠臣者也˳」

lord Wen of luyang said to our Master Mozi, “someone explained to me his view of a loyal minister: if you command him to bow, he bows; if you command him to bend backward, he bends backward. if standing by, he is quiet; if called, he responds. can this be called a loyal minister?” our Master Mozi said, “if you command him to bow, he bows; if you command him to bend backward, he bends backward—this resembles a shadow. if standing by, he is quiet; if called, he responds—this resembles an echo. of what use are a shadow and echo to you? as to what i call a loyal minister, when his superior is at fault, he observes and warns. When he has a good idea, he advises his superior without announcing it to others. outside, he corrects his own flaws, while he brings his good points inside. he identifies with his superior and does not ally with other subordinates. Thus, all that is excellent

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and good is attributed to the superior, and complaints and grudges go to the subordinates. The superior is at ease and happy, while the ministers handle the worries and troubles. This is what i call a loyal minister.” (49: 112/ 30–113/3)

Though morally worthy agents take the initiative in pursuing the good, not everyone need contribute to morality in the same way. There may be a division of labor on the basis of people’s different abilities:

「為義孰為大務？」子墨子曰:「譬若築牆然, 能築者築, 能實壤者實壤, 能欣者欣, 然後牆成也˳ 為義猶是也˳ 能談辯者談辯; 能說書者說書; 能從事者從事, 然後義事成也˳ 」

“in practicing morality, what is the greatest task?” our Master Mozi said, “it is like building an [earthen] wall. Those who can build it up, build it up; those who can refill the earth, refill the earth; those who can measure, mea-sure; and eventually the wall is completed. Practicing morality is like this. Those who can discuss and argue, discuss and argue; those who can explain texts, explain texts; those who can work, work; and eventually the work of morality is completed.” (46: 100/16–18)

although the core chapters treat issues pertaining to moral worth less directly, i suggest that they too devote attention to agents’ motivation and character rather than merely their conduct. The Triplets are con-cerned not only with modifying what people say and do, but with devel-oping the evaluative, action-guiding shi-fei attitudes that motivate proper statements and conduct. according to the Mohist theory of “identifying upward,” for instance, people are to emulate virtuous political superiors in order to acquire evaluative attitudes that conform to unified norms for distinguishing right from wrong. Villagers, for example, are instructed to model themselves on the virtuous official who governs their district:

凡里之萬民, 皆尚同乎鄉長˳ . . . 鄉長之所是, 必亦是之; 鄉長之所非, 必亦非之˳ 去而不善言, 學鄉長之善言; 去而不善行, 學鄉長之善行˳

The myriad people of the village will all identify upward with the district head. . . . What the district head deems right, you must also deem right; what the district head deems wrong, you must also deem wrong. eliminate your bad statements and learn the good statements of the district head; elim-inate your bad conduct and learn the good conduct of the district head. (12: 18/9–10)

agents who have learned to distinguish right from wrong properly exer-cise their moral know-how (zhi 知) by reliably doing what is moral and refraining from what is not. failing to distinguish right from wrong prop-erly yields grounds for concluding that they do not really “know the differ-


ence” between right and wrong (17: 31/1–4). The authors seem to assume that to have appropriate right-versus-wrong (shi-fei) attitudes is to have the right sort of motives and that to possess reliable moral know-how is to have a virtuous character. The aim is for people to acquire the rel-evant right-versus-wrong distinctions and normative responses so that they acquire a stable, reliable disposition to respond properly to morally pertinent situations.22 This aim dovetails with the Dialogues’ position that agents’ moral worth is to be evaluated on the basis of their attitudes and conduct over the long term and that temporary or strained adherence to moral norms does not qualify as virtue.

Moral Psychology

a third area of development in the Dialogues is moral psychology. sev-eral essays in the Triplets touch on issues in this area, especially when describing people’s conduct in a state of nature or how people can be motivated to practice the Mohist norm of inclusive care ( jian ai 兼愛). among the major claims the different essays advance are that even in a political state of nature people generally are spontaneously motivated to act on what they deem right (shi) or moral ( yi) (11: 16/10); that they tend to reciprocate beneficial or detrimental attitudes and conduct (15: 26/10–12, 16: 29/23–24); that they are inclined to follow political lead-ers (15: 25/22–26/9, 16: 29/25–30/4), though they may resist if the latter are not perceived as acting in the public interest (12: 20/2–3); and that they are motivated by community approval and discouraged by disapproval (12: 20/5–8).23 on the whole, however, the Triplets devote relatively little direct attention to moral psychology, since their major focus is normative doctrines and policy proposals. The Dialogues flesh out the Mohists’ views on moral psychology and develop their positions on several points.

The Dialogues’ core psychological generalization resonates with the account of people in a state of nature presented in the Triplets entitled “conform upward.” These essays as well as the Dialogues hold that people tend to be strongly committed to morality and will generally act on their conception of it. according to “conform upward, upper,” for instance, prior to the establishment of government and universal moral education,

22 i discuss these points in more detail in fraser, “Mohism and Motivation.”23 for further discussion of these points, see fraser, “Mohism and self-interest,” and

fraser, “Mohism and Motivation.”

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people all “deemed their conception of morality right, on that basis deemed others’ conception of morality wrong, and so deemed each other wrong” 是以人是其義以非人之義, 故交相非也 (11: 16/10–11). The motivational force of these convictions is so strong that they lead to violent social tur-moil. The Dialogues reiterate the idea that people are generally motivated by their conception of yi, at least when its demands are not too strenuous. anyone would help someone struggling with a heavy load, for instance, because doing so is morally right:

今有人於此, 負粟息於路側˳ 欲起而不能˳ 君子見之, 無長少貴賤, 必起之˳ 何故也？曰: 義也˳

suppose there is a man carrying grain who is resting by the roadside. he wants to get up but cannot. on seeing him, whether old or young, of high rank or low, gentlemen would surely help him up. Why? i say, because it is yi.24 (47: 106/4–5)

indeed, people value yi even more than life. They would never sacrifice a limb for a piece of clothing, nor their life to rule the world, but they will fight to the death over yan (statements, doctrines) that they think violate yi:25

子墨子曰:「萬事莫貴於義˳ 今謂人曰: 予子冠履, 而斷子之手足, 子為之乎？必不為˳ 何故？則冠履不若手足之貴也˳ 又曰: 予子天下而殺子之身, 子為之乎？必不為˳ 何故？則天下不若身之貴也˳ 爭一言以相殺˳ 是貴義於其身也˳ 故曰: 萬事莫貴於義也˳」

our Master Mozi said, “Nothing is more valuable than yi. suppose we said to someone, ‘i’ll give you a hat and shoes but cut off your hands and feet. Will you do it?’ surely he wouldn’t do it. Why? it is because a hat and shoes are not as valuable as hands and feet. and suppose we said, ‘i’ll give you the empire but take your life. Will you do it?’ surely he wouldn’t do it. Why? it is because the empire is not as valuable as one’s life. Yet people will kill each other fighting over a single statement. This is valuing morality more than one’s life. so i say, nothing is more valuable than morality.” (47: 103/23–26)

24 Passages such as this one refute skepticism about whether the Mohists ascribe to people any sort of morally worthy motivation. Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 83, and ivanhoe, “Mohist Philosophy,” sec. 4, for instance, seem to think that for the Mohists there is no such thing as virtuous motivation. contemporary New confucian writers have expressed similar views. see cai Renhou, Mojia zhexue, 83.

25 This statement is comparable to Mencius’s claim that people will generally give pri-ority to yi, even when doing so conflicts with the only available means of preserving their lives. even a beggar, Mencius suggests, would not accept food given with a deliberate show of disrespect. see lau, Mencius, 6a10.


Moreover, people like to think of themselves as moral: they are pleased to be praised for it even when the praise is unmerited and they see them-selves as needing no help to achieve it.

子墨子曰:「世俗之君子, 貧而謂之富則怒˳ 無義而謂之有義則喜˳ 豈不悖哉！」

our Master Mozi said, “The gentlemen of the age, if they are poor and you say they are rich, they are angry. But if they are immoral and you say they are moral, they are pleased. isn’t it perverse!” (46: 102/11)

子墨子曰: 「世之君子, 欲其義之成, 而助之修其身則慍, 是猶欲其牆之成, 而人助之築則慍也, 豈不悖哉！」

our Master Mozi said, “The gentlemen of the world want to become moral, but if you help them cultivate themselves, they resent it. This is like wanting to build a wall but resenting it if people help you build it. isn’t it perverse!” (47: 105/13–14)

These passages are two of many in the Dialogues that criticize “the gentle-men of the age” 世(俗)之君子 for failing to understand and pursue cor-rect moral norms—often while paying lip service to morality—and even opposing the Mohists’ moral activism. on the one hand, anyone would help the man carrying grain to lift his load, because it is the right thing to do. But on the other hand:

今為義之君子, 奉承先王之道以語之, 縱不說而行, 又從而非毀之˳ 則是世俗之君子之視義士也, 不若視負粟者也˳ 」

Now, gentlemen who practice morality carry on the Way of the former kings and expound it, but not only are [the gentlemen of the age] not pleased to practice it, but they even condemn and slander it. This is the gentlemen of the age holding the moral person in less regard than a carrier of grain. (47: 106/5–7)

although people tend to be motivated by their conception of morality, their grasp of morality is often inadequate, and so society falls short of Mohist moral ideals. The Dialogues are optimistic about people’s commit-ment to the general idea of morality, but they also express deep frustra-tion with—and even alienation from—the actual moral attitudes of many “gentlemen of the age” (47: 106/4). given society’s low moral standards, proper moral, social, and political order can be achieved only through active dissemination of correct moral doctrines—a stance which con-verges with that of the core chapters.

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according to the Dialogues, people are inclined not only to act on what they take to be moral but to respond positively to others who practice morality. if treated with care and respect, people feel close to and identify with others; without care and respect, they can easily become estranged. in one story, the famous inventor gongshuzi 公輸子 challenges Mozi to explain whether his moral norms have “hooks and rams” analogous to those gongshu developed for naval warfare, which can stop the retreat or block the advance of enemy boats. Mozi replies:

我義之鉤強, 賢於子舟戰之鉤強˳ 我鉤之以愛, 揣之以恭˳ 弗鉤以愛則不親; 弗揣以恭則速狎˳ 狎而不親, 則速離˳ 故交相愛交相恭, 猶若相利也˳ 今子鉤而止人, 人亦鉤而止子; 子強而距人, 人亦強而距子˳ 交相鉤交相強, 猶若相害也˳ 故我義之鉤強, 賢子舟戰之鉤強˳

The hooks and rams of my morality are superior to yours for naval battles. i hook people with care and push them with respect. if you do not hook them with care, they will not be close to you; if you do not push them with respect, they will quickly become contemptuous. if they are contemptu-ous and not close to you, they will quickly leave you. so caring about and respecting each other amount to benefiting each other. Now, if you forcibly hook people to stop them, they too will hook and stop you; if you forcibly ram them to repel them, they too will ram and repel you. hooking and ram-ming each other amount to harming each other. so the hooks and rams of my morality are superior to yours for naval battles. (49: 115/15–19)

This passage echoes two important psychological generalizations found in the Triplets. one is that people generally reciprocate each other’s atti-tudes and conduct (15: 25/24–25, 16: 29/23–24), a tendency that for the Mohists helps explain why the norm of all-inclusive care for everyone ( jian ai) is practically feasible. The other is that people—specifically, competent officials—will not feel “close” (qin 親) to, and will hesitate to serve, a leader who fails to show them appropriate care and esteem—specifically, by paying them well and delegating genuine responsibility to them (9: 11/13–16). a significant feature of this passage is that it introduces an explicit concept of respect (gong 恭) for others, a notion absent from the core chapters.26 in their emphasis on the comparatively proactive moral attitude of care (ai 愛), which involves a positive inclination to benefit others, the Triplets tend to overlook the more neutral moral atti-

26 a passage in one of the “elevate the Worthy” essays states that to recruit talented personnel for employment in government, one should show them reverence ( jing 敬) (8: 9/16). But none of the Triplets mention respect for others as a core moral attitude on a par with care (ai 愛) for others.


tude of respect, which—for contemporary moral philosophers, at least—might involve only an inclination to treat others fairly and avoid harming them. having introduced the notion of respect, however, the Dialogues do not go on to develop a distinctive theoretical role for it.27

“gui Yi” 貴義 (Valuing Morality), the second chapter of the Dialogues, contains a series of remarks providing advice on personal moral discipline, a topic that receives little attention in the core chapters.28 a likely expla-nation for its inclusion here is that the Dialogues may have been directed primarily at Mohist followers rather than the broader audience addressed by the Triplets, many of which explicitly appeal to the entire hierarchy of government officials, along with other “gentlemen of the world.” Where the core chapters resemble a series of public-advocacy pamphlets, the Dialogues may be more comparable to a handbook for Mohist adherents, which treats the concrete practice of the Mohist Way. among other points, the Dialogues urge their audience to engage only in statements and actions that benefit all (47: 104/15–17); to repeat, or “make constant,” statements that improve conduct while refraining from those that do not (47: 104/ 19–20); and to persevere in the path of morality even if they fail occasion-ally (47: 104/22–23).

This last remark is of particular interest, for it suggests an intriguing approach to weakness of the will that coheres with, but is not articulated in, doctrines presented in the Triplets. as i mentioned above, the Mohists consider the ability to draw and act on right-versus-wrong distinctions properly a form of competence or know-how, akin in some respects to the ability to perform a skill. accordingly, their primary explanation for an agent’s failure to act morally is that the agent lacks the relevant know-how. as they understand it, such failure is typically due not to insufficient motivation, but to ignorance or incompetence in distinguishing right from wrong and responding accordingly. Mohist texts depict three overlapping types of cases of such ignorance or incompetence. The first occurs when the agent simply does not know how to distinguish right from wrong

27 This point is unsurprising, given the Mohists’ tendency (discussed further on) to emphasize increasingly stringent moral standards. Moral norms that emphasize respect for all are typically less demanding than those that seek to promote everyone’s welfare, as the Mohist Way does.

28 Two illustrations of such personal moral discipline that we do find in the Triplets are the gentleman and the ruler depicted practicing inclusive care in the arguments intended to show that inclusive care is practically “applicable” (16: 27/28–28/10). Both guide their conduct by reciting to themselves statements about how an exemplary gentleman or ruler is as committed to the good of his friends and subjects as to his own.

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properly, as when people fail to distinguish wars of aggression as wrong and even deem them morally right (17: 30/27–31/3, 28: 49/7–8). The texts especially call attention to cases of partial incompetence, in which peo-ple distinguish right from wrong properly in some but not all relevant instances. one example is when they rightly condemn theft and murder but wrongly approve of unprovoked warfare aimed at seizing the wealth and slaughtering the populace of other states.

子墨子謂魯陽文君曰:「世俗之君子, 皆知小物而不知大物˳ 今有人於此˳ 竊一犬一彘, 則謂之不仁˳ 竊一國一都, 則以為義˳ 譬猶小視白謂之白, 大視白則謂之黑˳ 」

our Master Mozi said to lord Wen of luyang, “The gentlemen of the age all know minor things but not major ones. suppose there is a man here. if he steals a dog or pig, they call him morally bad [not-ren]. if he steals a state or a city, they take him to be morally right. it’s like seeing a small amount of white and calling it white, yet seeing a large amount of white and calling it black.” (49: 112/20–22)

another example is when they apply a norm such as “employing the capa-ble” properly in some cases, as when hiring a professional bowyer to repair a bow or veterinarian to cure a sick horse, but not others, as when they appoint an inexperienced relative to an official post (10: 14/6–16). such cases represent a failure fully “to know the distinction between moral and not-moral” (17: 31/3).

The second type of ignorance or incompetence is when the agent ver-bally draws distinctions correctly but then fails to act properly. an agent may mouth the right words about morality, yet lack the practical know-how to reliably distinguish and choose what is right and reject what is wrong (19: 33/15–17). These are cases in which agents’ conduct fails to con-form to their statements.

子墨子曰:「今瞽曰: 鉅者白也, 黔者黑也˳ 雖明目者無以易之˳ 兼白黑, 使瞽者取焉, 不能知也˳ 故我曰瞽不知白黑者, 非以其名也, 以其取也˳ 今天下之君子之名仁也, 雖禹湯無以易之˳ 兼仁與不仁, 而使天下之君子取焉, 不能知也˳ 故我曰天下之君子不知仁者, 非以其名也, 亦以其取也˳」

our Master Mozi said, “Now if a blind person says, ‘What’s bright is white, and what’s dark is black,’ even the clear-sighted have no basis for chang-ing this claim. But combine white and black things together and make the blind select among them, and they cannot know them. so as to my saying that the blind do not know white and black, it’s not on the basis of their naming; it’s on the basis of their selecting. Now, as to how the gentlemen of the world name ren [moral goodness], even [the sage-kings] Yu and Tang


have no basis for changing it. But combine ren and not-ren things together and make the gentlemen of the world select among them, and they cannot know them. so as to my saying the gentlemen of the world do not know ren, it’s not on the basis of their naming; it’s on the basis of their selecting.” (47: 105/4–7)

To count as having moral know-how, the agent must respond to right-versus-wrong distinctions not just by making the appropriate sort of state-ments but by reliably performing appropriate actions.

a third type of incompetence is when an agent endorses the Way and undertakes to act on it, yet fails to do so. The agent commits to the Way, and presumably has some grasp of the distinctions and responses it entails, but falters in carrying it out, perhaps because of doubt or confu-sion about what to do, a lack of self-confidence, or motivational inertia. in the Mohist theoretical scheme, this sort of failure to follow a Way that one endorses is comparable to akrasia, or weakness of will, since it amounts to a failure to do what one intends or deems best. however, rather than framing the problem as a failure to act on one’s best judgment or to carry out one’s intention to perform some discrete act, the Mohists view it as a lack of ability or competence in following a course that one has embarked on. The core chapters do not treat this issue explicitly, but a passage from the Dialogues addresses it as follows:

為義而不能, 必無排其道˳ 譬若匠人之斲而不能, 無排其繩˳

if you undertake to practice yi [morality] but are not able, you must not abandon the dao. To give an analogy, a carpenter who saws [a straight edge] but is not able does not abandon the marking line. (47: 104/28)

The emphasis on ability (neng 能), paired with the carpentry analogy, suggests that—as in the second type of case above, when people say the right things but then fail to act properly—the Mohists ascribe this sort of akratic failure to a form of incompetence, not insufficient motivation.29

29 This interpretation is consistent with passages in the core chapters that discuss whether the Mohist norm of inclusive care is too difficult. according to the last two of the three “inclusive care” chapters, the major obstacles to the widespread practice of inclusive care are “just that rulers do not adopt it as a basis for government and officers do not adopt it as a basis for conduct” 特君不以為政而士不以為行故也 (15: 26/12) and that “no rul-ers delight in it” 無有上說之者 (16: 30/4). Both texts claim that people can be brought to practice inclusive care through their inclination to conform to their ruler’s wishes. The key problem is not that it is difficult but that rulers have not promulgated it as their society’s Way and accordingly people have not adopted it as a norm. of course, the ruler’s approval, along with any rewards and punishments he institutes, will contribute to people’s motivation

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This incompetence is analogous to a defect in performing a skill, such as sawing a straight edge. so they probably see the remedy for akratic failure as analogous to that for ineptitude in a skill: the agent should continue training himself to recognize and act on evaluative distinctions properly, with the Way as his guide, until he can do so reliably—just as the novice carpenter should keep practicing his sawing technique, with the marking line as his guide, until he masters his craft. for the carpenter, the eventual outcome is skill mastery; for the moral agent, it is virtue.30

Sagehood Ideal

The fourth development in the Dialogues is an explicit ideal of personal moral sagehood not found in the core chapters. on the whole, the Dia-logues present a more demanding view of the moral life than the Triplets do. The main requirement the core chapters place on the typical member of society is to conform to the norms of moral rightness, which, if generally followed, would promote the benefit of all. These norms include inclusive care; refraining from war, theft, oppression, and exploitation; sharing sur-plus labor, knowledge, and surplus resources; performing one’s social role conscientiously, thus contributing to social order and economic prosper-ity; helping to provide for orphans and the childless elderly; and exercis-ing the relational virtues of kindness toward subordinates, loyalty toward superiors, compassion toward one’s children, filial devotion toward one’s parents, and fraternal love toward one’s siblings.31 By today’s standards, all this adds up roughly to being a caring and considerate family member, a responsible member of society, and a decent neighbor willing to offer others a helping hand. Being moral lies largely in playing one’s part in a system that promotes the benefit of all.32

to practice it. But the chief reason that they fail to practice it is not a lack of motivation; it is that the ruler has not established it as a norm, and so people have not acquired the relevant competence. for a detailed discussion of Mohist views on motivation, see fraser, “Mohism and self-interest,” and fraser, “Mohism and Motivation.”

30 This sketch rebuts Nivison’s claim that the Mohists have no explanation of akrasia beyond “sheer perversity” on the agent’s part. see Nivison, The Ways of Confucianism, 84.

31 for particularly clear examples, see Mozi 26: 43/7–8, 26: 43/25–27, 27: 44/26–45/2, and 28: 48/23–28.

32 Besides the minimal requirement of yi (moral rightness), the core chapters also present a more stringent ideal of ren (moral goodness). The mark of ren people is that they “take as their business promoting the benefit of the world and eliminating harm to the world” (15: 24/26–27), an end potentially much more demanding than the basic norms of yi. But ren may simply have been a virtuous attitude rather than a standard of conduct, and the Triplets do not suggest that people are generally expected to go beyond


The Dialogues, by contrast, suggest that morality lies largely in helping others, as Mozi seems to imply when he asks Wu lü whether what he calls moral is, as for Mozi, a matter of “having strength to work for others and wealth to share with others” 有力以勞人, 有財以分人 (49: 113/14–15).33 Moreover, if morality does not prevail in the world, one can only work even harder to achieve it, whether or not others do their share:

子墨子自魯之齊, 即過故人, 謂子墨子曰:「今天下莫為義˳ 子獨自苦而為義˳ 子不若已˳」子墨子曰:「今有人於此, 有子十人˳ 一人耕而九人處, 則耕者不可以不益急矣˳ 何故？則食者眾而耕者寡也˳ 今天下莫為義, 則子如勸我者也, 何故止我？」

Traveling from lu to Qi, our Master Mozi passed an old acquaintance, who said to him, “Now no one in the world practices yi. You alone toil to practice yi. You’d be better off quitting.” our Master Mozi said, “suppose there was a man with ten sons. one worked the fields while nine sat around. Then the one who worked the fields could not but work even more urgently. Why? Those who eat are many, while those who work are few. Now, if no one in the world practices yi, you should encourage me. Why stop me?” (47: 103/28–104/1)

here we find hints of the self-sacrificing extremism that, according to the Zhuangzi “Tianxia” 天下 (under heaven) chapter, became preva-lent among some Mohist factions late in the movement’s history. in this respect, the Dialogues may reflect a general tendency as Mohism devel-oped to shift toward more demanding norms of conduct,34 eventually culminating in the legendary selflessness of late Warring states Mohist militias.35

the demands of yi and dedicate themselves to directly pursuing the benefit of all. a person who lives up to the requirements of yi, without directly seeking to promote the benefit of the world, is not blameworthy.

33 Precursors of this characterization of yi can be found in several Triplets. according to one passage, heaven desires that “people who have strength work for each other, who have dao teach each other, and who have wealth share with each other” (27: 44/28). This ideal echoes the description of social disorder in the first two “conform upward” chap-ters, which claim that as order breaks down, people cease to share surplus labor, surplus wealth, and “good dao” (11: 16/12–13, 12: 17/18; see also 10: 15/16–17). By implication, when society conforms to yi, people are expected to share surplus labor and wealth. Two key differences from the Dialogues are the qualifiers “each other” and “surplus.” The sharing is depicted as reciprocal rather than purely altruistic, and in the “conform upward” chapters it is specifically surplus labor and goods that are shared, not all labor and goods.

34 later versions of the doctrine of inclusive care, for instance, seem more demanding than earlier ones. see the essay by carine Defoort in this volume.

35 The dedication and heroism of these bands of Mohists are vividly depicted in Lüshi chunqiu 19/3.4 “shang de” 上德 and Huainanzi “Tai zu” 泰族. see Knoblock and Riegel, The Annals of Lü Buwei, 487–488, and Major et al., The “Huainanzi,” 818.

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among the remarks on personal moral discipline in the Dialogues is a striking passage that advocates eliminating the influence of emotions and other potential sources of bias and dedicating oneself wholly to yi, so as to become a sage or moral saint:

子墨子曰: 嘿則思, 言則誨, 動則事˳ 使三者代御, 必為聖人˳ 必去六辟, 必去喜, 去怒, 去樂, 去悲, 去愛而用仁義˳ 手足口鼻耳, 從事於義, 必為聖人˳

our Master Mozi said, “When silent, ponder; when speaking, instruct; when acting, work. Make these three alternate one after the other and you will surely be a sage. You must remove the six biases: you must remove happi-ness and anger, joy and sorrow, fondness [and dislike], and apply ren and yi. Your hands, feet, mouth, nose, and ears being employed for yi, you will surely be a sage. (47: 104/22–26)

The “six biases” are affective attitudes or passions—happiness, anger, joy, sorrow, preferences, and aversions. The text takes these as unreli-able grounds for guiding action and urges us to reject them in favor of guidance by moral goodness (ren) and moral rightness ( yi). This passage has been cited as evidence that the Mohists advocate guiding action by “dispassionate intellect” instead of “unreasoned attachment.”36 i suggest, however, that such a reading imports a Western concern with the contrast between reason and passion that is alien to the Mozi. The Mohists them-selves draw no clear distinction between intellect and emotion,37 nor do they employ any concept that corresponds directly to that of reason. The text mentions only applying ren and yi, not “dispassionate intellect,” and its argument is that the other attitudes are prone to bias, not that they are “unreasoned.” Nor, i think, does the passage entail that we should become wholly dispassionate or emotionless. Ren and the relational virtues of hui 惠 (benevolence), zhong 忠 (faithfulness), ci 慈 (compassion), xiao 孝 (filial devotion), and ti 悌 (brotherliness)—which many of the Triplet essays count among the goods that constitute yi (morality)—are likely to include affective components, though these may be calmer or less intense than happiness, anger, joy, and sorrow. The text’s point is rather that con-duct should be guided by the virtue of moral goodness and the objective,

36 see D. Wong, “Mohism,” 453.37 i argue for this point in fraser, “Mohism and Motivation.”


impartial norms of moral rightness rather than by easily biased emotions and preferences.38

The Mohist stance on the passions here is defensible, insofar as the six attitudes the text mentions are indeed highly susceptible to bias. even when they do align with correct moral judgment, they alone cannot prop-erly be the basis for conduct, but must be checked against moral norms. still, the passage invites several lines of criticism. one could argue that the passions are part of human life and, in some cases at least, are a modality through which we more fully appreciate the moral status of certain events or situations. The torture of innocent children, for instance, is not merely wrong but horrendous. The passage proposes that the path to moral sage-hood lies in setting aside our personal, potentially biased passions and acting on moral goodness and rightness alone. an important alternative view, one sometimes associated with the Ru, is that sagehood might lie instead in integrating the passions with ren, so as to bring them into line with correct moral judgments. instead of ignoring joy and sorrow, for instance, we would seek to feel joyful about things that are morally good or right and sorrowful about those that are bad or wrong. one might argue that this latter view more adequately recognizes the place of emotions in moral life. in the Mohists’ defense, however, the passage is not describing the psychology of the sage or the morally good person but advocating an approach to personal moral development. The Mohists might agree that the sagely person feels joy about the good and sorrow about the bad. But this is irrelevant to the text’s claim, which is that to become such a person, we should set aside the bias-prone emotions and preferences we feel now and in their place “apply ren and yi. ”

another question is whether the distinction between preferences and shi-fei distinctions grounded in our conception of moral rightness is as sharp as these instructions for sagehood assume.39 The Mohists them-selves are committed to the view that to distinguish something as right or wrong is at the same time to approve or condemn it, and thus to have

38 The passage thus presents an interesting contrast with Mencius, who holds that some emotions, such as our alarm at seeing an infant in danger, naturally align with cor-rect moral norms and morally worthy motivation, and that personal moral development lies in “extending” these or “filling them out” appropriately. Mencius’s chief point is that such passions show we are “capable” (neng 能) of being morally good. he is vague about the criteria for discriminating morally relevant passions from irrelevant or bad ones, but the two he clearly thinks especially important are care for parents and respect for brothers. see lau, Mencius, 7a15.

39 see griffin, Value Judgement, 19–36.

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a preference for or against it.40 of course, the point of the passage is that we should eliminate subjective bias, not all preferences. But a more defen-sible way to make this point might be to advocate bringing our prefer-ences into line with objective norms, rather than simply “removing” (qu 去) them.

These quibbles aside, the most striking aspect of the passage is its ideal of total dedication to morality. one is to devote every thought, utterance, and action to ren and yi, setting everything else aside. No room is left for any activity without positive moral value, derived, according to Mohist normative theory, from contributing in some way to the benefit of all. Morality here is not merely a constraint on our conduct, a normative status our actions should have, or one good among others. it is an all-encompassing end in itself. The sage ideal presented here is thus con-siderably more demanding than the moral doctrines of the Triplets, which require only that everyone live by norms whose collective practice pro-motes the benefit of all.

To grasp the place of this passage in Mohist thought, however, i suggest that again we need to consider its likely audience. as i proposed above, the Dialogues may be directed at committed Mohist followers, who have already dedicated themselves to promoting the benefit of all—to becom-ing paradigmatic ren people who “take as their task promoting the ben-efit of the world and eliminating harm to the world” (15: 24/26–27). The passage may thus present a supererogatory ideal, not a basic moral norm that all are obliged to follow. given the religious character of the Mohist movement, the injunction to purge the “six biases” and devote oneself wholly to moral goodness and rightness should probably be compared not to a general moral guideline, such as “Do not harm the innocent,” but to the strict norms of self-discipline adopted by members of an ascetic reli-gious order. in this context, the conception of sagehood presented here is understandable, even admirable. it is easy to imagine, in a world of scarcity and turmoil such as the Mohists’, people choosing to organize their lives around the project of bringing about a morally more satisfactory state of affairs—such as by working, as the Mohists did, to prevent war and allevi-ate poverty. in the context of Mohist religious beliefs, this commitment to sagehood can also be regarded as a profound expression of spiritual-ity or religiousness.41 for devoted Mohist believers, the sagehood ideal

40 see fraser, “Mohism and Motivation.”41 i thank Roman Malek for suggesting this point.


would have represented a way of more directly conforming to the intent of heaven and thus in effect achieving a form of unity with the divine. indeed, the pursuit of such moral and religious ideals may have been among the few constructive life choices open to many Mohists (especially if, as generally thought, they came largely from the lower classes of soci-ety). These ideals may have seemed all the more attractive and empower-ing because of the chance they offered to make a difference in the world. given the adverse, war-ravaged economic and political circumstances in which Mohism arose, it is hardly surprising that some people might have been inspired to emulate the heroic altruism of the fabled sage-king Yu, as the Zhuangzi reports some dedicated Mohists sought to do.

absent a comparable religious background or a similarly harsh his-torical and economic context, however, this ideal of sagehood is difficult to justify. indeed, to secular, contemporary readers, it is bound to seem narrow and impoverished. We view moderate indulgence of passions or preferences as compatible with the demands of yi, and we cannot easily see yi filling up all of life in the way the sagehood ideal implies. indeed, it is difficult to envision how yi should or even could come to dominate life in this way unless we were to share two things with the Mohists: a con-sequentialist view in which morality lies in the promotion of a narrowly specified set of goods, and a historical setting in which securing those goods is immensely difficult.

Conclusion

To sum up, the ethics of the Dialogues is in many respects consistent with the views promoted in various Triplets, but the Dialogues present at least four important extensions of Mohist ethical ideas. They eluci-date the Mohist conception of morality or the Way as norms that can be promulgated through explicit statements or teachings and “constantly” followed by all with beneficial, self-consistent consequences. They clar-ify an interesting stance on moral worth that ties it to agents’ character and intentions. They develop the Mohist view of moral motivation and indicate an intriguing approach to cases of action failure comparable to weakness of the will. They also set forth a stringent ideal of personal moral sagehood. on the whole, the Dialogues present a more demand-ing conception of the moral life than the Triplets do. This difference may be due partly to a general tendency in later generations of the Mohist movement to embrace increasingly stringent ethical norms. But it may

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also be explained by the different audiences to which the two sets of texts are directed. Whereas most of the Triplets are explicitly addressed to rulers, officials, and gentlemen, few of whom would have been Mohist adherents, the Dialogues appear to be addressed primarily to committed Mohist disciples. indeed, they may be comparable to a handbook or com-monplace book of teachings for adherents, as in many places they discuss the concrete practice of Mohist doctrines or issues that might arise in dialogue with opponents. hence in places they may depict ideals adopted specifically by devout followers rather than norms the Mohists advocated for the typical member of society.

From “ElEvatE thE Worthy” to “IntImacy WIth oFFIcErs” In thE Mozi*

hui-chieh loy

the traditional attitude toward the first chapter of the received Mozi text, titled “Qin shi” 親士 (Intimacy with officers),1 has been mixed. on the one hand, it seems clear enough that the ideas presented in the chapter are akin to a type of counsel found in each of the three versions of “shang xian” 尚賢 (Elevate the Worthy) in the Mozi core chapters. Briefly put, this counsel enjoins the princes to employ worthy and capable people in government whatever their social status and whatever their kinship, or lack thereof, with the ruler. the same type of recommendations, while less extensively elaborated upon, appears in “Qin shi.” It is probably with this in mind that y. P. mei writes in a footnote to his translation of the

* the first version of this essay was presented at the conference “the many Faces of mozi: a synchronic and Diachronic study of mohist thought,” held at the University of leuven, 25–28 June 2009. I thank the discussant Karel van der leeuw and the various par-ticipants—especially Kwong-loi shun, michael nylan, carine Defoort, nicolas standaert, and chris Fraser—for their comments and discussions, and miranda Brown, who, in addi-tion, read and commented upon a subsequent draft. additional and extensive comments were also given later by carine Defoort, nicolas standaert, Griet vankeerberghen, sara vantournhout, yuri Pines, chad hansen, chong-ming lim, and mingde yuen.

1 the term shi is notoriously untranslatable. as hsu cho-yun reminds us, it refers to the lowest-ranking members of the Zhou aristocracy, a status just barely above that of the common people. these were “a class of men similar to the samurai of medieval Japan. originally serving as soldiers, often itinerant, by the end of the spring and autumn period they would develop into a distinct social and cultural elite.” the crucial thing to note is that “a shi having the status of a common gentleman in the Zhou aristocracy nominally received an education in the six fields: ritual, music, archery, charioteering, writing, and mathematics. In principle, shi were prepared to be not just robust warriors, but also gentle-men with good manners and minds.” see loewe and shaughnessy, Cambridge History of Ancient China, 566, 583. yuri Pines further notes that shi “were largely excluded from politi-cal processes in their states” up to the early Warring states period, as “the highest positions in the state hierarchy were firmly occupied by leading members of a few noble lineages, who effectively prevented outsiders from entering the inner circle of power-holders”; con-sequently, “shi made their living largely as retainers and stewards of the noble lineages, and only under truly exceptional circumstances could they gain national prominence.” see Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 117–118. Given the above, translations of the term have ranged from “knights,” “gentleman,” “officer,” “man of service,” to “scholar.” I use “officer” throughout this essay purely as a matter of convenience. the reader should keep in mind that “officer” refers to someone from the class that supplies low-ranking men of service, as opposed to an “official,” someone with an actual position in government.

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chapter: “the content of this chapter is nothing more than an appendix to the three synoptic chapters vIII–X,”2 namely to “shang xian.”

yet, on the other hand, certain elements within “Qin shi” have sug-gested to some scholars a non-mohist provenance for the chapter. mei reports “the common opinion of critics” that the chapter (along with the next two) is “utterly spurious” and “perhaps the work of some well meaning confucianist who tried to reconcile the . . . rival schools.”3 Both views—that “Qin shi” is a mere appendix to the core chapters and that it has a non-mohist provenance—are also reported by sun yirang 孫詒讓 (1848–1908), whose magisterial commentary on the Mozi text, the Mozi jiangu 墨子間詁, remains one of the great achievements of chinese tradi-tional philology, and is extensively relied upon by mei.4 sun further adds that it is only because the chapter’s “high-minded and upright” theses are “close to the doctrines of the confucians” that later generations chose to put it at the beginning of the Mozi corpus.5

modern scholars tend to the opinion that all seven chapters of the first part of the Mozi are composed rather late in relation to the rest of the corpus.6 In this regard, “Qin shi” bears various clues suggesting its relative lateness, some of which will be discussed later. this essay will take for granted the modern opinion. But even given the fact that “Qin shi” is com-posed later than the core chapters in general and than the three versions of “shang xian” in particular, questions remain as to how the contents of the former relate to the latter. For instance, is “Qin shi” an “appendix” to or an “epitome” or “digest” of “shang xian”?7 Does the former simply repeat (with or without condensation or elaboration) the points made in

2 mei, The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, 1 n. 1.3 mei, Motse: The Neglected Rival of Confucius, 52–53. see also mei, The Ethical and

Political Works of Motse, 1 n. 1.4 see mei, The Ethical and Political Works of Motse, preface, xii.5 see sun yirang, Mozi jiangu, 1. the relevant line from sun is “[Because] the discourse

of this chapter is largely an appendix to the ‘shang xian’ chapters, it does not seem appro-priate to have it as the first chapter. [But] because the theses it maintains are high-minded and upright and similar to the doctrines of the confucians, later generations eventually chose to put it first” 此篇所論, 大抵尚賢篇之餘義, 亦似不當為第一篇。後人因其持論尚正, 與儒言相近, 遂舉以冠首耳。

6 For the relative lateness of the first seven chapters of the Mozi (compared with the rest of the corpus), see Mozi jiaozhu, 1025–1026; Johnston, The “Mozi,” xxxi–xxxii; and Fraser, “mohism.”

7 “appendix” is from mei (see n. 1 above), probably translating sun yirang’s term yuyi 餘義 (see n. 5 above). Durrant, “a consideration of Differences in the Grammar of the mo tzu ‘Essays’ and ‘Dialogues’ ” speaks of the seven as “epitomes,” while Graham, Divisions in Early Mohism, prefers “digests.” see also the introduction to the present volume.

from “elevate the worthy” to “intimacy with officers” 207

some or all the versions of “shang xian”? or does it contradict, go beyond, or otherwise qualify the latter?

to anticipate: I will argue that “Qin shi” improves upon “shang xian” in that it provides a more sophisticated construal of the motivations of those targeted by the counsel that one should employ worthies in government. If the worthies are portrayed as motivated by a somewhat mercenary pur-suit for wealth, honor, and power in “shang xian,” they are presented as acting from apparently nobler motivations in “Qin shi.” In fact, they come across as taking on attitudes that are reminiscent of the characterization of the gentleman ( junzi 君子) in such texts as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi. When in the fullness of time the ideas in these other texts became identified with a distinctive “confucian” outlook and in that guise became widely championed by the intellectual classes of traditional china, it was only natural that later scholars would take “Qin shi” to espouse theses that are “high-minded and upright” because they were judged to be “similar to the doctrines of the confucians.”8

But as we shall also see, the writer of “Qin shi” (and, likewise, those of the versions of “shang xian” ) by no means endorses without qualification the attitudes of the worthies he promotes. nonetheless, the point of “Qin shi” is precisely that worthies who embody that nobler, more gentlemanly perspective regarding political service—while all the more potentially troublesome to the ruler on that account—are also the most capable of benefiting the state. the crucial concern is for the ruler to have a proper understanding of what motivates them and thus be able to deal with them effectively.

shang Xian: Motivating the Prince

since part of my aim is to relate the ideas in “Qin shi” and “shang xian,” let us begin by highlighting certain salient points regarding the latter. as men-tioned earlier, the three versions of “shang xian” agree in offering certain advice to the princes. they argue for the efficacy of this counsel by refer-ring to the actions of the sage-kings and tyrants of high antiquity. many of the specific proposals are said to be things done by the ancient sage-kings when they ruled the world—an argumentative device that pervades large

8 on the problems with identifying the outlooks of the Warring states ru with “confu-cianism” as we have come to understand that latter term, see, e.g., nylan and csikszent-mihalyi, “constructing lineages and Inventing traditions.”

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parts of the core chapters. the counsel is consistently referred to across the versions with the phrase “elevate the worthies” (shang xian) (e.g., 8: 9/11, 9: 10/18, 10: 13/24), from which the title of the chapter is derived. another characteristic phrase is “utilize the capable (ones)” (shi neng 事能) (8: 9/11) and the related “employ the capable (ones)” (shi neng 使能) (9: 11/13, 10: 14/6–7). the proposal itself enjoins the princes to employ people variously called the “worthies” (xian 賢, xianzhe 賢者) (9: 10/24, 10: 15/3), “worthy people” (xian ren 賢人) (9: 10/30), or “worthy and good officers” (xianliang zhi shi 賢良之士) (8: 9/11–12) in the state’s govern-ment. the call is that princes employ such people whatever their social status: “even though they are from among the farmers or artisans” 雖在農與工肆之人 (8: 9/30) and whether or not they are related to the ruler (9: 10/20, 10: 14/18). those to be employed are defined primarily in terms of their possessing certain skills or other qualities useful to the running of the state. But at the same time, the expectation is that suitable candi-dates will come from among the officer (shi) class since these men were educated, even though “largely excluded from political processes in their states” by the higher nobility.9

note that by highlighting the above points, I am eliding various differ-ences between the “shang xian” versions. on the basis of these differences, contemporary scholarship has come to the probable conclusion that the three chapters display an evolution of thinking and that the Upper version (shang) was composed first, then the lower version (xia), followed by the middle version (zhong).10 nonetheless, despite the differences between the three “shang xian” versions, they share a line of thinking—a crucial commonality or overlap on a set of specific issues—which I have summa-rized in the previous paragraph. the crucial thing to note is that this com-monality exists whatever the specific position taken regarding the relative chronology of the three versions; we should not ignore its existence even though we should also not allow it to blind us to the differences between the versions. It is precisely when we consider what the three versions say about the implications of and conditions for the successful implementa-tion of what is ostensibly the same counsel, that the doctrinal develop-ment between them (and “Qin shi”) comes into sharper relief.

In the remainder of this section and in the next I will discuss two sets of issues in “shang xian” about the conditions for the successful implementa-

9 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 117–118; see also n. 1 above.10 see the introduction to this volume.


tion of the advice to elevate the worthy. the first set of issues relates to how the authors motivate their princely audience to adopt their counsel and their implied understanding of how the princes might fail to properly follow their counsel. the second concerns what they say or imply about the motivations of the worthies.

on the first point, while the counsel in each version of “shang xian” is broadly meritocratic in character, it is presented, in the first instance, as a way for the princes to achieve their own desire for political success.11 the counsel is not consistently presented as a principle of social justice, which is how meritocracy is often discussed today.12 Instead of arguing that the princes should do as counseled because giving the worthies posi-tions in state government and rewarding them richly are what they justly deserve (or, more broadly, what social justice requires), the surface formu-lations of the arguments mainly appeal to the rulers’ own interests. Both the Upper and lower versions begin by saying that the rulers of the day all desire ( yu 欲) that their own states be wealthy, populous, and orderly, and then go on to argue that rulers can fulfill this desire only if they heed the counsel to elevate the worthy (8: 9/7, 10: 13/23). While the beginning of the middle version—probably the last of the three to be written—speaks more broadly of the rulers’ “desire to preserve stability and avoid failure” 欲脩保而勿失 (9: 10/17), the ending refers more grandiosely to the rulers’ desire to “rule all under heaven and govern the various lords” and oth-erwise realize their ambition to have their way in the world and leave a name for all generations 欲王天下、正諸侯, 將欲使意得乎天下, 名成乎後世 (9: 13/17–18). In short, the authors of the “shang xian” chapters do not shrink from advertising the efficacy of their counsel for advancing the rulers’ own interests and ambitions, even while there is variation among them regarding the exact scope of those interests and ambitions.

the point is not to say that nothing at all concerning social justice is implied by the contents of the versions, only that it is not the first thing

11 see, e.g., schwartz, The World of Thought in Ancient China, 153; and lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Utopia, 83. the doctrine bears a resemblance to the mod-ern idea of “careers open to talents” and, more generally, of “meritocracy” as a principle of government. the term “meritocracy” was first coined by michael young in his book Rise of the Meritocracy, 1870–2033, to describe the dystopia of an imagined British society of the future in which social and economic benefits are distributed strictly on the basis of objective merit (measured in terms of intellectual achievement): “For hundreds of years society has been a battleground between two great principles—the principle of selection by family and the principle of selection by merit” (24).

12 see, e.g., Daniels, “merit and meritocracy”; and miller, Principles of Social Justice, esp. chap. 9, “two cheers for meritocracy.”

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emphasized in the versions’ attempts to persuade the princes. the point is also not that the ruler’s interests and ambitions are necessarily selfish or contrary to the public good—they might but need not be. rather, the rhetorical payoff for arguing in the above manner is that if the argument is taken to be sound, the rulers would be acting against their own interests should they fail to elevate the worthies. In other words, they would be acting irrationally.

this point is especially highlighted in the middle and lower versions (9: 11/25–26, 10: 14/7–15). they point out that rulers do not hesitate to turn to skilled professionals such as tailors and butchers when they need a coat made or an ox or lamb slaughtered. But when it comes to the seri-ous business of ruling the state, they turn to their relatives or those they favor because of physical attractiveness, with no regard for whether these people have the know-how to do the tasks to which they are appointed. as the lower version sarcastically observes, it is as if the rulers hold their states less dearly than their bows, horses, coats, and animals (10: 14/14–15), suggesting that such actions are clearly irrational even when judged purely by the standards of the rulers’ own interests.

It also follows from the above that a proximate obstacle to the imple-mentation of the elevation of worthies lies in a sort of cognitive-practical deficiency on the part of the rulers: either they are ignorant of the general principle that tasks should be fitted to people with suitable know-how—a possibility belied by their ability to act upon the same principle in trivial matters—or they act irrationally.

But for rulers to successfully employ the worthies so as to achieve polit-ical success, it is not enough that they not fall prey to this sort of practi-cal irrationality. the Upper and middle versions highlight the same three additional conditions necessary for any proper implementation of the policy: the worthies must be incentivized to come forward and also kept in fruitful government employment by (1) the conferment of honor in the form of titles and ranks, (2) substantial emoluments, and (3) unambigu-ous granting of genuine authority (8: 9/30–10/1, 9: 11/4). the reason behind these conditions is that if the rank is not high, the people (min 民) will not respect the officeholder; if the emoluments are not substantial, they will not have confidence in him; and if the appointment does not confer actual authority, they will not fear him (8: 10/1–2, 9: 11/5). Presumably, all this becomes especially crucial when the worthies come from among the farmers and artisans (i.e., low backgrounds), and thus more is needed to make sure that the people at large recognize the worthies’ newly granted authority. In other words, by conferring rank, emoluments, and authority


upon the worthies, the ruler effectively signals to the people at large that he is serious about employing these people and that his appointments have the backing of his power. In this regard, both versions also empha-size that the outlay is not for rewarding the worthies as if such were their just deserts but so that the policy will be effective (8: 10/1–2, 9: 11/5).

shang Xian: incentivizing the Worthies

the discussion of what is required not only to encourage the worthies to come forward but also to retain them in fruitful employment brings to light a second set of issues: the motivation of the worthies themselves. as they are presented in each version, the worthies appear primarily moved to enter government service and to remain at their posts by the prospect of wealth, honor, and power. this characterization is vividly suggested by the analogy of the archery contest found in the Upper and lower versions (8: 9/15–18, 10: 13/25–27). In these chapters, the process of increasing the number of worthies who can be employed in government is presented as analogous to getting more people in the state to become skillful at archery: hold a contest, richly reward and honor the winners, and people will work hard at archery and come forward. the lower version even speaks prag-matically of “enticing” (you 誘) them by the promise of reward (10: 13/27). to the extent that the archery example is meant to be an analogy for how the worthies are to be encouraged to come forward, the latter are being presented as motivated by the prospect of wealth, honor, and power.

In one especially striking passage, the Upper version even talks about the ancient sage-kings promising to reward the righteous (yi 義) with wealth, honor, and intimacy with the ruler and threatening to withhold these benefits from the unrighteous. the result of this policy was that people competed to conduct themselves righteously (8: 9/20–26).13 the parallel passage in the middle version does not speak of the sages pro-claiming that they will reward righteousness and penalize unrighteous-ness but speaks only more generally of the sages elevating the worthy and employing the capable without considering kinship, social status, or appearance (9: 10/19–21). But it, too, concludes with a similarly striking

13 scott lowe found the idea of “people competing to be righteous in order to gain rewards and avoid punishments” ironical and expressed surprise that the writer of the chapter failed to see that irony. see lowe, Mo Tzu’s Religious Blueprint for a Chinese Uto-pia, 81.

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note that “people were all encouraged by the rewards and intimidated by the penalties, and followed each other in being worthy” 是以民皆勸其賞, 畏其罰, 相率而為賢 (9: 10/21). What is most interesting in these pas-sages is that whether or not the ancient sage-kings aimed to incentivize righteousness or worthiness with the promise of material benefits, the tar-gets of their policy are presented as being so motivated. more generally, while passages exist in the versions that say or imply that the worthies are incentivized by the prospect of material benefits, there are none that present them as being motivated by, for instance, a desire or conviction to serve the common benefit. this is so even though once they come forward and are employed, they are presented as working hard at activities that do serve the common benefit (see 9: 10/26–11/2).

In light of the above considerations, the middle version’s discussion of modern rulers’ failure to give the worthy a high enough emolument even while they grant him a high rank (9: 11/13) takes on an added significance. the ostensible problem is that the people will not have confidence in the appointed official because of the ruler’s mixed signals (9: 11/4–5). taken by itself, the passage (and the parallel in the Upper version at 8: 9/30–10/2) need not be construed as saying anything about the motivation of wor-thies. But the same chapter, just a bit further down, also has the worthy faced with a high rank that is not matched by the appropriate emolument, deliberating and saying to himself: “this is not to genuinely care about me, but to make use of me upon a pretext” 此非中實愛我也, 假藉而用我也 (9: 11/13–14). In other words, his concern is framed not in terms of the proper fulfillment of his duties nor of the common benefit—even though these are the concerns expressed by the writer of the chapter—but that “he himself ” has not been properly treated.14

14 yuri Pines comments: “mozi supplies . . . a more sophisticated justification for enrich-ing and empowering shi [officers]: these measures are needed not just to attract the wor-thies but also to clarify to the general populace that these persons of humble origin are really entitled to lead the people. Plausible as it is, this justification does not deny personal interest of the shi in riches and ranks; rather it provides an additional reason to satisfy their desires.” see Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 141–142. Pines notes that the “sober estimation of shi [officer] inclinations is certainly not exceptional to mozi. It was generally shared by the major genii of Zhanguo administrative thought, such as shang yang, shen Buhai, han Feizi and the authors of several Guanzi chapters.” In this regard, he singles out the zhanguo ce 戰國策 as “a precious repository of a frequently hidden side of the noble self-image of the shi.” one especially candid passage from it categorically states that “the shi [officers] of all under heaven . . . just seek riches and honor for themselves” and com-pares them to dogs, which, if the ruler throws them a bone, “will easily rise and bite each other” over the bone (Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 142; see also 142–144).


nonetheless, the counsel of “shang xian” calls exactly for the employ-ment of a type who can be incentivized toward “righteousness” (Upper version) or “worthiness” (middle version) by the prospect of material ben-efits, just like the archers who can be “enticed” (lower version) by the promise of rewards to train hard and come forward. In fact, as far as the versions are concerned, the employment of such people is the necessary condition for the maintenance of a flourishing state. the authors of the different versions of “shang xian” do not seem to consider that the mer-cenary motivation of the worthies might stand in the way of a successful implementation of the counsel to improve the governance of the states. If anything, their confidence in the effectiveness of their proposals (e.g., relating to how the numbers of worthies employed might be increased) depends upon them construing the targets of their proposals as being so motivated. the primary point of potential failure is ostensibly the ruler’s inability to effectively incentivize the worthies given their motivation.

having said the above, we should not hastily identify the perspective of the worthies as it is presented in “shang xian” with the perspective of the writers of those chapters, or see the latter as endorsing without qualification the motivations of the very people who are supposed to be incentivized by their proposals. In this regard, consider the following curi-ous passage in the Upper version: after recounting how the ancient sage-kings promoted righteousness through the promise of material benefits and the threat of penalties, with the result that all people competed to be righteous, the writer asks, “What was the reason for this?” 是其故何也. to answer this question, he makes the following cryptic remark:

上之所以使下者, 一物也; 下之所以事上者, 一術也。譬之富者, 有高牆深宮, 牆立既, 謹上為鑿一門。有盜人入, 闔其自入而求之, 盜其無自出。是其故何也？則上得要也。

there is one thing by means of which superiors employ their subordinates; and there is one craft by means of which subordinates serve their superiors. this is analogous to the case of the rich man who built his walls high and left only one gate. If a burglar should enter, the man can close the gate and search for him, and the burglar has no way to escape. What was the rea-son for this? It is because the superior controls [lit., “got”] the vital point. (8: 9/26–28)

notice that the section ends with another “What was the reason for this?” the answer there is that “the superior controls the vital point.” But the whole story of the rich man and the burglar is framed to answer the initial question: why were the ancient sage-kings able to accomplish what they did—having people compete to be righteous? a first answer to the initial

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question can now be stated: because the ancient sage-kings also controlled the vital point. the explanation of what that means is supposed to be found in the story of how the rich man successfully dealt with the burglar. this connection is also signaled by the fact that something in the story about the rich man and the burglar is supposed to be an analogy for that “one thing by means of which superiors employ their subordinates,” “one craft by means of which subordinates serve their superiors.” and since the account of the ancient sage-kings itself continues a discussion on how the worthies in the employ of the ruler can be made more numerous (8: 9/11–18), the story of the rich man and the burglar is thus, presumably, supposed to throw light on that larger issue as well.

so what is it about the rich man and the burglar that somehow throws light on the successful policies of the ancient sage-kings? It seems to be something like this: the rich man has an understanding of what the burglar wants and his likely courses of action given that motivation. he consequently shapes the physical environment within which the latter operates so as to be in a position to counteract the actions of the burglar and protect his own interests. the combination of high walls and only one gate serves both to keep the burglar out and also to channel him toward a predetermined path should he manage to enter. By analogy, the ancient sage-kings, likewise, had a vital understanding of what people want and their likely courses of action given that motivation. they consequently shaped the incentive regime within which the latter conduct their lives so as to be in a position to advance their interest in encouraging good behav-ior in people. the advertisement of the promise to reward righteousness with wealth, honor, and intimacy with the ruler, and the threat to penal-ize unrighteousness by withholding those same favors, serve both to deter undesired forms of behavior and also to channel people’s energies toward desired forms of behavior.

now, understanding the logic of the passage does not require that we think of the people who competed to be righteous before the ancient sage-kings (i.e., candidate worthies in the context of the larger discussion of the chapter) as so many burglars. the point of the analogy is, presumably, primarily to instruct the ruler about the vital point that has to be grasped if he is to successfully control people. nonetheless, the fact remains that the worthy and the burglar are meant to be analogies for each other in their respective scenarios, and that the rich man’s success is meant to throw light on the ancient sage-kings’ success. In light of this, the choice of analogy is singularly unflattering to the worthy. one wonders if the writer is hinting that getting the worthies to apply for positions and then


fruitfully employing them for the benefit of one’s state is like catching a thief—someone attempting to steal from you—and turning him around to work for you instead. and if not that, the passage is at least a subtle reminder that the worthy—as with the burglar—has his own motivations which, given a suitable situation and when not properly channeled, may very well bring him into conflict with the interests of the ruler or the com-mon benefit of the community. yet the wise ruler may not need to reform those motivations. rather, what is needed is that these motivations be given play within a properly arranged context that is constructed on the basis of a proper understanding of those motivations, so that they result in behavior conducive to the ruler’s interests and the common benefit of the community.

Be intimate with the officers: An overview

let us turn now to “Qin shi.” the following discussion will not cover every possible detail in the chapter; however, given its relative brevity, all parts of it will be touched upon. the focus will be on those aspects of the chap-ter’s argument especially relevant to exposing the evolution in thinking that occurred between its writing and the writing of “shang xian.” that “Qin shi” advocates elevating the worthy (as previously defined) is sig-naled in the opening lines:

入國而不存其士, 則亡國矣。見賢而不急, 則緩其君矣。非賢無急, 非士無與慮國。緩賢忘士, 而能以其國存者, 未曾有也。

If, upon coming to rule in [lit., “entering”] a state, one fails to be attentive to its officers, then one will lose the state. and if, upon seeing the worthies, one is not anxious to use them, then they will disregard the ruler. Except for worthies, there are none the ruler should be anxious to use, and except for officers, there are none with whom the ruler should discuss matters of state. someone who, while disregarding the worthies and neglecting the officers, is able to preserve his state: there has never been such a one. (1: 1/5–6)

the passage crystallizes in an explicit way the claim made in “shang xian” that the policy of elevating the worthy is a “fundamental of governance” 政之本 (8: 10/13, 9: 13/18, 10: 13/24). It is not just that the policy will benefit the state: being solicitous toward the worthy officer is a necessary condi-tion for the ruler to preserve his rule in his state at all.

this is not to say that—even in the opening lines—“Qin shi” merely repeats the basic counsel of “shang xian” without any change of focus or emphasis. after all, the main point of these first lines is not exactly that

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princes employ the worthies and utilize the officers; rather, what is neces-sary is for the ruler to have a certain anxiety (or solicitousness)—or, as the chapter title implies, that he should seek intimacy with the worthies. this seems to go beyond enacting certain policies so that the worthies are suitably elevated, honored, and rewarded, and so motivated to serve the state. Exactly what this anxiety requires remains to be seen.

another important shift in focus or emphasis lies in the relative lack of elaboration of the counsel to elevate the worthy. at one point, the writer speaks of how not even familial closeness and prior ties should be allowed to trump the need for positions and emoluments to match the compe-tence and accomplishments of the appointees (1: 1/25–26). this alludes to the notion that in employing the worthy and capable, the ruler ought to disregard the candidates’ kinship relationship (or lack thereof ) with him, but the point is here made without that elaborate discussion of how this is the rational thing to do, or how doing the converse is irrational, that one finds in “shang xian.” all in all, the basic counsel to elevate the worthy does not seem to be something that the chapter intends to argue for as much as it is something already assumed. In the same way, the writer will speak of the “Way of the impartial king” 兼王之道 (1: 1/29–2/1)—prob-ably referring to the doctrine of the “Jian ai” 兼愛 chapters15—without any further explanation or argument, as if he is assuming that the ideal of such a Way is uncontroversial. he seems to assume that his audience possesses a background in the rudiments of mohist doctrine.

all in all, the chapter seems to belong in a milieu where some version of the basic counsel that the princes employ the worthy and capable with-out regard to their background and kinship relationship is no longer as controversial as it might have been when the different versions of “shang xian were composed. this suggests that “Qin shi” was composed later than the core chapters in general and “shang xian” in particular.16 It also suggests that “Qin shi” is probably not a “summary” or “digest” of “shang xian”—the chapter is not concerned to recapitulate the doctrine of elevat-

15 see, e.g., Johnston, The “Mozi,” 9; Zhou caizhu and Qi ruiduan, Mozi quanyi, 9; and tan Jiajian and sun Zhongyuan, Mozi jinzhu jinyi, 5.

16 “after the middle Warring states period, it appears that many if not most rulers had firmly internalized the notion of the indispensability of the ‘worthy and good shi’ for their states’ well-being. . . . the idea of ‘elevating the worthy’ and, more importantly, the end of the pedigree-based social order became a reality in most of the Warring states. . . . While certain thinkers continued to criticize the principle of ‘elevating the worthy’ . . . none suggested reestablishment of the pedigree-based social order.” see Pines, Envisioning Eter-nal Empire, 122–123.


ing the worthy. rather, as we shall see later, it meant to further develop the thinking relating to that doctrine.

another indication of a later date of composition for “Qin shi” is the occurrence of two probable anachronisms in the chapter: the references to meng Ben 孟賁 and Wu Qi 吳起 (1: 1/22). commentators identify meng Ben with the meng yue 孟说 briefly mentioned in sima Qian’s Shiji, “Basic annals of Qin.” the man served King Wu of Qin 秦武王 (r. 310–307 BcE) and was put to death after being involved in an accident that led to the king’s death.17 Given the dates involved, sun yirang notes that the ref-erence was “probably inserted by a later hand”—that is, someone from after the time of mozi (ca. 480–390 BcE). a similar case can be made for the reference to Wu Qi (ca. 440–381 BcE), who served King Dao of chu 楚悼王 (r. 401–381 BcE) and was murdered shortly after his patron’s death.18 commentators estimate that Wu Qi died more than a decade after mozi, and consequently surmised that the reference was probably added by mozi’s disciples.19 In both cases, the traditional commentators presuppose that the historical mozi was the author of at least part of “Qin shi.” But once this assumption is dropped—as it is by modern critics—the anachronisms fit in with the notion that the chapter as a whole is a later composition.20

Finally, there is also the suggestive fact that all the positive historical examples in the chapter are from the more recent history of the spring and autumn and Warring states periods rather than the high antiquity of the ancient sage-kings. In fact, the chapter as a whole never appeals to the words and deeds of the ancient sage-kings as sanctioning or ground-ing the effectiveness of its proposals, which forms a sharp contrast with the core chapters as a whole and “shang xian” in particular. this is, again, consistent with the overall impression that the chapter was composed later rather than earlier in the Warring states period, by which time the

17 see sun yirang, Mozi jiangu, 5; the reference is in Shiji, 1.209; see also Watson, Sima Qian: Records of the Grand Historian, 28.

18 For Wu Qi, see Shiji, 7.2165–2169; and Goodrich, “ssu-ma ch’ien’s Biography of Wu ch’i 吳起.” a useful collection of anecdotes about Wu Qi can also be found in sawyer, The Seven Military Classics of Ancient China, 193–202.

19 this is the opinion of Wang Zhong 汪中 (1745–1794) and su shixue 蘇時學 (1814–1874), recorded in sun yirang, Mozi jiangu, 5; sun himself demurs.

20 For example, on reasoning analogous to that of Wang and su (see previous note), Zhang chunyi 張純一 (1871–1955) concludes that this chapter was not written by mozi himself; see Wang huanbiao, Mozi jigu, vol. 1, 19.

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existence of multiple and incompatible narratives of the past had “dimin-ished the appeal of the ‘Way of the sage-kings.’ ”21

returning to the contents of the chapter: if arguing for the basic counsel that princes elevate the worthy does not appear to be the main point of “Qin shi,” then what is the main point? Fortunately, the writer of the chap-ter explicitly stated his thesis and, in a sense, even organized his chapter around this thesis. about three quarters through the text, he says:

良才難令, 然可以致君見尊。

a good talent is hard to command but can make his ruler respected. (1: 1/27)

two distinct points are being made here. First is the observation or con-cession that the princes will find it difficult to deal properly with “good talent,” referring to the worthies whom they are being asked to employ by the basic counsel. second is the insistence that employing such people is what the princes should do if they want to achieve success. the discus-sion in the next two sections will propose a closer reading of the part of the chapter leading up to this central, twofold thesis: for it turns out that much of it can be seen as a sustained argument in support of the thesis. In the remaining roughly one quarter of the chapter (1: 1/26–2/5), the writer continues to drive home this main point and exhort his princely audience to take the lesson to heart.

as we shall see below, investigation of the chapter’s main argument reveals both continuity with “shang xian” and also a divergence from or development of the latter. the counsel of “Qin shi” is presented on the assumption that rulers should be intimate with and employ the worthies precisely because doing so will benefit their government and, beyond that, help them achieve fame. the underlying assumption regarding the rulers’ motivation is thus continuous with that in “shang xian.” With this in mind, much of the chapter can be seen as offering advice to the rulers on what they need to do or keep in mind if they are to profitably employ worthies. It is in the implied analysis of the worthies’ motivation that “Qin shi” departs from “shang xian.” this analysis is meant to ground the chap-ter’s advice to rulers regarding how best to treat worthies given that the benefits from employing them are proportionate to the sheer difficulty of doing so.

21 Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 124. the classical statement of the skepticism regarding appeals to the sagely past because of conflicting appeals to incompatible narra-tives about that past is in Han Feizi, chap. 50; see liao, The Complete Works of Han Fei Tzu, vol. 2, 298–299. see also miranda Brown’s essay in the present volume.


Be intimate with the officers: The Capacity to Endure Humiliation

after opening the chapter with the strong claim that rulers need to be solicitous of the worthies if they are to preserve their rule at all, the writer cites the examples of three rulers from history: lord Wen of Jin 晋文公 (r. 636–628 BcE), lord huan of Qi齊桓公 (r. 685–643 BcE), and King Goujian of yue 越王句踐 (r. 496–465 BcE):

昔者文公出走而正天下, 桓公去國而霸諸俟, 越王句踐遇吳王之醜, 而尚攝中國之賢君。

Formerly, lord Wen was exiled but came to rule the world; lord huan left his state but came to be hegemon over the various princes; King Goujian of yue met with humiliation at the hands of the king of Wu but still overawed the worthy rulers of the central states. (1: 1/8–9)

Perusing the traditional accounts regarding these rulers, it seems intuitive that the writer of “Qin shi” should want to present them as worthy of emu-lation: all had been out of power at one point in their lives and in exile from their home states; but all (re)gained their states and even achieved fame as successful and powerful rulers who were able to conquer foes and impose their will upon their neighbors. most importantly, the three were well known for having befriended and greatly profited from the service of talented and loyal followers from the officer class (i.e., the “worthies” in the context of the discussion).22 since the princely audience of “Qin shi” would probably have agreed that the three were successful rulers whose hegemonic achievements they themselves found desirable of emulation, it follows that the writer of the chapter would have good reason to high-light the three as positive examples. the above considerations might be implied, but are not explicitly voiced in the text at all. Instead, the explicit lesson drawn from mentioning the three is as follows:

22 For lord huan and his most prominent minister, Guan Zhong 管仲, who was instru-mental in the rise of Qi as a great power, see rosen, “In search of the historical Kuan chung”; and John Knoblock’s useful summary of the sources in his Xunzi, vol. 2, 53–56. as Knoblock puts it: “the significant accomplishment of Duke huan’s career was to recognize the uncommon merits of Guan Zhong” (54). For lord Wen and the company of talented men (and women) who accompanied him into exile or assisted his return to power, see zuozhuan, lord Xi 23.4–6; and Watson, The “Tso Chuan,” chaps. 11–12. a helpful collection of the early sources for Goujian and his loyal supporters Wen Zhong 文种 and Fan li 范蠡 is cohen, Speaking to History, chap. 1, “the Goujian story in antiquity.” this is not the only instance in the Mozi where a series of historical examples are not cited in chronologi-cal order; see, e.g., 16: 29/25–30 (cf. 15: 26/1–7). But the writer of the chapter is probably less interested in the exact details of the careers of these three men as rulers than he is in appealing to them as stock examples of rulers who turned misfortune into success.

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三子之能達名成功於天下也, 皆於其國抑而大醜也。

the reason these three men were able to extend their names and become successful in the world is because they all endured repression and great humiliation in their states. (1: 1/9)

the overt—as opposed to merely implied—explanation for the success of the three is not the fact that they employed worthy and capable people but that they “endured repression and great humiliation.”

Indeed, the traditional accounts regarding the three rulers record that they suffered various indignities when out of power. lord Wen, for instance, in his wanderings from state to state encountered rulers who treated him without ritual propriety (including one who spied on him when he was bathing) and was even once offered a clod of earth by some peasants when he begged for food. If tradition is to be believed, King Goujian suffered the worst humiliations of the three. after having been defeated by his rival King Fuchai of Wu 吳王夫差 (r. 495–473 BcE), he and his wife served the latter as slaves for three years before they were allowed to return to their home state of yue. to curry favor with the king of Wu to secure his release, Goujian went so far as to taste the king’s stool to diagnose the latter’s sickness when he fell ill.23 so one thing that the text could be saying with the examples is that the three rulers achieved their success because they were able to bide their time while enduring great humiliations, waiting for an opportune time to make their come-back.24 on this reading, it is their ability to endure repression and humili-ation that is worthy of emulation by the ruler who aspires to great things. But this cannot be the whole story.

a minor point first: the inconveniences that lord huan underwent were hardly “repression and great humiliation”—a brief sojourn of about a year in a neighboring petty principality before the murder of the ruler (his cousin) allowed him to return with an armed escort to claim the throne. Even if the previous explanation works for the cases of King Gou-jian and lord Wen, it does not work in his case. more importantly, the text speaks of the rulers enduring “repression and great humiliation in their states”—with the probable implication that they were in power at the time—whereas most of the indignities the three experienced were

23 note that Goujian’s supposed sojourn as a slave in Wu may be a later invention, which also means that if the chapter is alluding to those supposed events at all, it has to have been composed later in the Warring states period. I thank yuri Pines for this observation.

24 see Wang huanbiao, Mozi jigu, 4.


suffered when they were outside their states and out of power. Finally, consider the next line of the text:

太上無敗, 其次敗而有以成, 此之謂用民。

Greatest is to have never been defeated; next is to be defeated yet use that to become successful. this is what is meant by “[properly] employing the people.” (1: 1/9–10)

taken on its own, the phrase “[properly] employing the people” (yong min 用民) gives the impression that it is all about the rulers’ ability to marshal and use “the people at large” in their states. this seems to be the predominant sense of the phrase as it is used in other texts of the period.25 But if the chapter so far hangs together at all, and unless we want to say that the text is introducing a wholly different topic of discussion at this point, it seems much more plausible to see the phrase as referring to the rulers’ employment of the worthies.26 It might be the case that, for the author, “the proper employment of the worthies” is but a specific applica-tion of the more general category of “employing the people.” the phrase might also relate to the claim in the Upper version of “shang xian” that princes should promote capable individuals even if they are from among the farmers and artisans (8: 9/30).27 Whatever the case may be, there is supposed to be some connection between a ruler’s ability to befriend and use talented people—to successfully employ the worthy—and his abil-ity to endure repression and great humiliation in his state. the previous explanation does not account properly for this connection.

leaving aside the above interpretive puzzle for now, consider the next part of the chapter. the text shifts to talking explicitly in the first person and adds a new character to the discussion: the gentleman 君子.

25 the phrase yongmin 用民 is also found in such texts as the Guanzi, zhuangzi, Shangjun shu, Han Feizi, and Lüshi chunqiu. It is also the title of a whole chapter in the Lüshi chunqiu, 19.4. But as far as I can tell, the occurrence in “Qin shi” (also the sole occur-rence in the Mozi) is the only one that comes close to demanding an interpretation saying that it is not about the employment of the people in general but about the employment of the shi in particular. In the Lüshi chunqiu chapter, for instance, Guan Zhong, a shi employed by lord huan, is cited as an example of someone who knew how to yongmin. see Knoblock and riegel, The Annals of Lü Buwei, 490.

26 see also Zhou caizhu and Qi ruiduan, Mozi quanyi, 4 n. 7, which explains the phrase as “to employ worthy talented people” 任用賢才. sun yirang tries to have it both ways: “this is to say that because they were intimate with the officers, they were able to employ their people.” see sun yirang, Mozi jiangu, 2.

27 thanks to carine Defoort for suggesting this possibility.

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吾聞之曰:「非無安居也, 我無安心也。非無足財也, 我無足心也。」是故君子自難而易彼, 眾人自易而難彼。君子進不敗其志, 退究其情, 雖雜庸民, 終無怨心。彼有自信者。

I have heard it said: “It is not for lack of a peaceful abode, but because I lack a peaceful heart. It is not for lack of sufficient wealth, but because I lack a satisfied [lit., “sufficient”] heart.” and so the gentleman is hard on himself but easy on others, while the man of the multitude is easy on himself but hard on others. the gentleman when advancing [in the world] does not compromise his aspirations; when retreating he investigates the facts of the matter, and even if he might be mixed up with the vulgar, he remains with-out resentment in his heart to the end. For that one is someone who has confidence in himself. (1: 1/10–12)

one crucial interpretive question to be answered is who is the “I” that speaks in the above passage? he seems to be identified with the gentle-man who appears in the passage. this identification is suggested by the use of the same “I have heard . . . and so . . .” (吾聞 . . . 是故 . . .) formula to introduce the manifesto and describe the characteristic conduct of the hypothetical actors in the “caretaker” and “ruler” thought experiments in the lower version of “Jian ai.”28 In other words, the lines following the initial “I have heard it said” constitute the manifesto of the gentleman, and the lines after the “and so” describe his characteristic conduct. the question now becomes: who is this gentleman?

In the Mozi core chapters “gentleman” and sometimes “officer-gentleman” 士君子 normally refer to a social position rather than (as in the case of, e.g., the Mencius) an ethical category; these individuals are not always

28 In making this point, I am taking the quotation of what the gentleman said as end-ing with 我無足心也. this is not the only possible punctuation, since the quotation could also end further down—for instance, with 彼有自信者. (thanks to michael nylan for pointing this out to me.) nonetheless, my preferred punctuation follows that adopted by sun yirang. It is also suggested by the parallel construction in the lower version of “Jian ai” introducing the manifestos and describing the characteristic conduct of various hypo-thetical actors in the “caretaker” and “ruler” thought experiments (see 16: 27/29–28/4 and 16: 28/13–19). let us take one particular example: the jian shi 兼士 (“impartial officer”; 16: 28/1–4). as with the gentleman in “Intimacy with officers,” the text here introduces his manifesto by a 曰 and even has him begin it with the same 吾聞. after presenting that manifesto (“I have heard that the one who is a superior officer of the world will surely care for the well-being of his friend as he does his own . . .”), the text then introduces a description of his conduct with 是故, as in the case of “Intimacy with officers” (“and so when he sees that his friends are hungry, he feeds them . . .”). the passage also takes pains to insist that “as the words [ yan 言; “maxim”] of the impartial officer are such, such is his conduct” and that his “words and conduct fit together like the two halves of a tally.” the labels “caretaker” and “ruler” were assigned by van norden in his “a response to the mohist arguments in ‘Impartial caring.’ ”


distinguished from the other members of the aristocratic elite.29 the terms are also often used in a sarcastic sense—which was how the “officer-gen-tleman” appeared in the lower version of “shang xian” (see 10: 14/6–7, 10: 14/15–16), for instance. In contrast, the gentleman here in “Qin shi” seems to be the bearer of an ideal set of attitudes and pattern of behavior—that laid out in his manifesto and characteristic manner of conduct. With this in mind, the earlier question “Who is the gentleman?” might be better framed as “Whose perspective is the gentleman’s manifesto and charac-teristic conduct supposed to represent as an ideal to which that person aspires or ought to aspire?”

one option would be to see the gentleman’s point of view as represent-ing the ideal to which the princes do (or so the writer pretends) or, more likely, are invited to aspire. such an interpretation would preserve the flow of the chapter so far—there would be no shift in focus that demands special explanation since everything in the chapter up to this point can be read as addressed by the writer to his princely audience.30 But there are incongruities. For instance, it would be hyperbolic for the gentleman’s predicament to be spoken of in terms of the ruler’s having to “endure repression and great humiliation in their states” mentioned earlier. It is also odd to think of the likes of Wen, huan, Goujian, and those who aspire to their achievements as people who seek to be “gentlemen,” who do not resent being “mixed up with the vulgar,” as opposed to, for example, peo-ple who desire to “rule all under heaven and govern the various lords” and “have their way in the world and leave a name for all generations” (recall 9: 13/17–18).

What about the worthies and officers mentioned at the beginning of the chapter? that is, the perspective described by the gentleman’s mani-festo and characteristic conduct is meant to represent the ideal to which these people aspire (i.e., if they count as worthy at all). If so, then the ideal presented in the gentleman’s manifesto and characteristic conduct is not what we might have come to expect of the worthies given the way they were portrayed in “shang xian,” that is, people whose loyalty and service are incentivized by the prospect of such worldly goods as wealth, honor,

29 hsu cho-yun comments that the shift in what it means to be a shi (see above, n. 1) “parallels a similar transformation” in the term junzi, “which originally meant ‘son of the lord,’ but which gradually came to refer to any person of moral refinement.” see hsu cho-yun ,“the spring and autumn Period.”, 583 n. 113.

30 see, e.g., Wang huanbiao, Mozi jigu, 6; and Zhou caizhu and Qi ruiduan, Mozi quanyi, 4–5.

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and power. neither “a peaceful abode” nor “sufficient wealth” is enough to give the gentleman of “Qin shi” a peaceful or satisfied heart: he aspires to higher things. In fact, neither worldly success nor its opposite will cause him to compromise on his commitments to his ideals. and in all these, the gentleman holds himself to a mode of conduct that sets him apart from—and above—the majority of men.

Interestingly, the gentleman in “Qin shi”—taken as representing the ideals of the worthies—bears a certain resemblance to a type that has, over the course of time, become associated with the teachings of confu-cius and his successors. like the gentleman of the Analects, he is not satis-fied with material comforts (Analects 1.14) and refuses to look upon mere emoluments and, by extension, worldly rewards in general as proper moti-vation for political service (Analects 15.32). he does not resent it when his abilities are unacknowledged and not put to use (Analects 1.1). and much like the idealized officer of the Mencius, he is also distinguished from the common run of men, who can be expected to compromise and go astray unless supported by a constant livelihood (Mencius 1a7). Instead, like the mencian “Great man” (da ren 大人), he appears to enjoy a degree of moral self-sufficiency and even a sense of moral superiority to both the common people and (implicitly) the rulers (Mencius 3B2). Finally, he is also reminiscent of Xunzi’s description of the gentleman as noble though without rank, wealthy though without emolument, flourishing though abiding in poverty, and contented though alone.31 this resonance between the gentleman’s manifesto and characteristic conduct and a cer-tain ideal type found in such texts as the Analects, Mencius, and Xunzi is very likely the reason, as sun yirang and y. P. mei report it, that later scholars considered the contents of “Qin shi” to be “close to the doctrines of the confucians.”32

But leaving aside the question of how later generations came to see “Qin shi” as having a “confucian” provenance, let us return to the interpre-tive hypothesis that the perspective described by the gentleman’s mani-festo and characteristic conduct is meant to represent the ideal to which the worthies aspire. I believe that this is the hypothesis that makes the best overall sense of the text. In fact, this hypothesis will also allow us to make sense of the as-yet-unexplained connection between the successful

31 see the listed passages in, e.g., lau, The “Analects”; lau, Mencius; and Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 2, 74 (“the teachings of the ru,” 8.6).

32 see also Pines, Envisioning Eternal Empire, 125–127, 130–131, 145–152.


ruler’s ability to employ the worthy and his ability to endure repression and great humiliation in his state. But rather than argue for the truth of the above hypothesis directly, let us consider how the chapter as a whole reads given this hypothesis. For given the self-presentation of the worthies in the guise of the gentleman as an interpretive hypothesis, the earlier com-ments about the three successful rulers can now be seen in anew light.

Be intimate with the officers: The Difficulties of Employing Talent

one implication of adopting this interpretive hypothesis is that the ruler who wants to employ worthies—people who, while “mixed up with the vulgar,” nonetheless see themselves as aspiring to be gentlemen—needs to possess a certain adroitness that goes beyond what is required of the ruler in “shang xian.” In those chapters, the crucial problem was that the ruler may find it difficult to part with wealth, honors, or power, and this might be the reason that the writers of those chapters take extra pains to reassure him that being liberal with certain worldly goods is conducive to the advancement of his own interests and ambitions. the difficulty facing the ruler highlighted in “Qin shi,” in contrast, concerns the self-esteem of the rulers pitted against the pride of the gentleman.

By insisting that he is above the prospect of material rewards, ranks, or even the possession of political power, the gentleman proclaims his deeply felt superiority vis-à-vis both common people and ruler. that the gentleman is presented as deeply self-aware is highlighted not only by the comment that he “has confidence in himself ” (zi xin 自信) but also by, for instance, the explicitly self-referential nature of his manifesto: note the multiple first-person personal pronouns in its formulation (1: 1/10–12). the writer builds into his presentation of the gentleman the self-image of someone who thinks of himself as a gentleman or at least is aspiring to be one: this self-aware moral superiority is the basis of his “confidence in himself.”

the above suggests that the ruler who wants to fruitfully employ and motivate such a person will have to treat him with a degree of deference, which is not just a matter of showering him with material benefits, even if those prerequisites are assumed: he is dealing with one who sees himself as above such incentives. In fact, the ruler will have to treat him with a defer-ence that implicitly concedes the latter’s sense of his own superiority and has to be perceived as such by the worthy. concrete illustrations of what such deference demands are, in fact, suggested by the immediate sequel:

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是故為其所難者, 必得其所欲焉。未聞為其所欲, 而免其所惡者也。是故偪臣撟33 君, 諂下傷上。君必有弗弗之臣, 上必有詻詻之下。分議者延延, 而支苟者詻詻, 焉可以長生保國。臣下重其爵位而不言, 近臣則喑, 遠臣則唫, 怨結於民心, 諂諛在側, 善議障塞, 則國危矣。桀紂不以其無天下之士邪？殺其身而喪天下。故曰: 歸國寶, 不若獻賢而進士。

and so one who undertakes that which he regards as difficult is bound to get what he desires therein. I have never heard of one who does what he desires yet avoided what he abhors. thus, pushy ministers set straight the ruler, but fawning subordinates damage their superiors. a ruler must have a naysaying minister, and a superior must have plainspoken subordinates. When those who engage in open debate are persistent in presenting their views and those who privately advise34 are plainspoken, then can the lives of people be prolonged and the state protected. If ministers hold their rank and positions dear and so do not speak out, or if ministers close by are silent and those more distant sigh, or if resentment builds up in people’s hearts, or toadying and flattery abide by [the ruler’s] side while wise counsels are obstructed, then the state is in danger. Did not Jie and Zhou lose the support of the world’s officers? they lost their own lives and all under heaven. thus, it is said: presenting treasures worthy of a state is not as good as recom-mending the worthy and advancing officers. (1: 1/14–18)

the employment of worthy officers preserves the state: which is why their service is more valuable than mere “treasures.” this is so presum-ably because the worthies often possess wisdom capable of correcting the erroneous conceptions of their ruler, which, if left unchecked, could lead to policy mistakes. But such wisdom can be effective in bringing about successful governance only to the extent that the officers who possess it are willing to speak their minds in counseling the rulers, and the rulers are willing to accept their correction.

With respect to the first, the writer points out that ministers and sub-ordinates who put great store by their own personal advantage—rather than, say, subscribe to the high-minded gentlemanly ideal described earlier—are likely to keep silent rather than brave the ruler’s ire in offer-ing frank counsel. the second point implies that the ruler will at times have to defer to subordinates who are not shy of disagreeing with him. While the text here does not speak directly of the sort of attitude that rulers ought to take, its extended description of the useful subordinates’ behavior—“pushy” (rather than “fawning”), “naysaying,” “plainspoken,”

33 Following Zhang chunyi (in Wang huanbiao, Mozi jigu, 8) in emending 傷 to 撟.34 the line is obscure; my translation follows Zhou caizhu and Qi ruiduan, Mozi

quanyi; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” 5.


and “persistent in presenting their views”—and the crucial insistence that it is only when such behavior is given free play that the state can flourish, reveal much about what the ruler has to put up with if he wants to profit from employing the worthies.35 consider also the next series of analogies and historical examples:

今有五錐, 此其銛, 銛者必先挫。有五刀, 此其錯, 錯者必先靡。是以甘井先竭, 招木先伐, 靈龜先灼, 神蛇先暴。是故比干之殪, 其抗也; 孟賁之殺, 其勇也; 西施之沈, 其美也, 吳起之裂, 其事也。故彼人者, 寡不死其所長。故曰「太盛難守」也。

now suppose there are five awls and this is the most pointed one—the most pointed one is bound to be the first to be broken. suppose there are five blades and this is the keenest—the keenest one is certainly the first to be dulled. For the same reason the sweet well is the first to be used up, the attractive tree is the first to be felled, the efficacious tortoise is the first to be burned, and the magical serpent is the first to be dried in the sun. and so Bi Gan’s being cut into pieces was due to his unbending ways; meng Ben’s death was due to his bravery; Xi shi’s drowning was due to her beauty; Wu Qi’s being torn asunder was due to his [successful] conduct of affairs. hence, among those people [i.e., like those just mentioned] there are few who did not die because of what they were good at. thus, it is said that “the zenith is difficult to maintain.” (1: 1/20–23)

Bi Gan 比干 was an upright minister serving King Zhou 紂, the notorious last ruler of the shang 商 dynasty, already mentioned in the previous quo-tation. Bi was cruelly put to death by the king for remonstrating against the excesses of his ruler.36 meng Ben 孟賁, or meng yue 孟说 as he is known from the “Basic annals of Qin,” was a man noted for his physi-cal strength and served King Wu of Qin, himself “a powerful man who loved feats of strength” (see above). the king died after injuring himself in a cauldron-lifting contest with meng yue, and as a result, meng and his family were put to death. Xi shi 西施 was the famed beauty whom King Goujian presented to King Fuchai of Wu as part of a stratagem to weaken the latter. according to an ancient tradition, she was drowned (or perhaps committed suicide by drowning) on the order of Goujian after he success-fully destroyed Wu.37 Finally, Wu Qi 吳起 was a capable military strate-gist and statesman credited with reforming the state of chu under King

35 similar arguments can be found in the Xunzi, 13.2 “the Way of the minister,” which also cites the example of Bi Gan.” see Knoblock, Xunzi, vol. 2, 198–199.

36 see, e.g., lau, Mencius, appendix 4, “ancient history as Understood by mencius”; and Lüshi chunqiu 2/5.5, 13/5.1, 23/4.1b.

37 see Mozi jiaozhu, 7 n. 32; and Johnston, The “Mozi,” 7 n. iii.

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Dao. Because those reforms strengthened the position of the royal house against the old aristocracy, Wu Qi incurred considerable hatred. he was murdered by the old aristocracy after the death of his patron king.38

although I am unable to conclusively determine exactly how each of the characters mentioned is supposed to feature in the context of the argument of the passage, the overall point of the stories is clear enough since the conclusion is explicitly stated: these people all died because of what they excelled in. Just as it is the sharpest awl that—being most use-ful and thus repeatedly used—is the one to be broken first, and so on, so Bi Gan died a cruel death precisely because of his virtue of principled obstinacy in remonstrating against the excesses of his ruler, and Wu Qi was murdered by the old aristocracy because the highly effective reforms he initiated incurred their wrath.

Within the context of the main argument of the chapter, one point of the passage is to emphasize that the likes of Bi Gan and Wu Qi are the human equivalents of well-honed instruments and prized natural resources—in the parlance of modern management science, they are human resource assets—that the ruler should learn to carefully husband. But there is also an implied dis-analogy as well: the deaths of the four are not exactly like the sharpest awl getting broken or the sweetest well becoming dry because of heavy use. rather, the four were put to death because the very manifestation of their abilities brought about deadly resentment in the ruler or other members of the ruling elite. (though, to be fair, the exam-ples of Bi Gan and Wu Qi make this point better than the other two do.) this is a chilling reminder that in the opposition between the ruler and his “pushy,” “naysaying,” “plainspoken” officials who are “persistent in pre-senting their views,” the ruler often has the final say in the sense that he can always put a stop to further remonstration by force. But since a ruler who readily does such things can expect to have only subordinates who would rather keep silent than brave the ruler’s ire in offering frank coun-sel (1: 1/16) and can expect to eventually “lose the support of the world’s officers” (1: 1/17), the enlightened ruler will have to desist if he truly wants to derive a profit from the employment of his human resource assets. In

38 note, however, that according to sima Qian (Shiji 7.2168), the aristocrats shot Wu Qi with arrows. the author of the chapter may have confused Wu Qi’s mode of death with that of shang yang, who was put to death by being dismembered by chariots (7.2237). If that is the case, then this is yet another sign that the writer is somewhat hazy about the actual events, an indication of the lateness of the chapter. I thank yuri Pines for the observation.


fact, he will have to do more than desist: he will have to encourage and live with the very pushiness, naysaying, plain-speaking, and persistence that moved King Zhou to order Bi Gan’s heart removed.

We are now in a better position to appreciate not only what the writer is asking the ruler to do in undertaking what the latter “regards as dif-ficult” so as to “get what he desires therein” (1: 1/14) but also the extent of the solicitousness that is being demanded of the prince in the opening lines of the chapter (1: 1/5–6). more importantly, the above also throws light on how the successful ruler’s employment of worthy and talented people gets connected with his having to endure “repression” and “humili-ation” in his own state (1: 1/8)—the writer was merely being candid.

here, keep in mind also the assumption throughout that the perspec-tive described by the gentleman’s manifesto and characteristic conduct (1: 1/10–12) is meant to represent the ideal to which the worthies aspire: that portrayal can now be seen as implying an explanation as to why the worthy is both so “hard to command” (1: 1/27) and a true human resource asset. the thought is that, on the one hand, the worthy’s self-confident sense of his own moral superiority makes him, as someone who thinks lightly of mere personal advantage, more capable and willing to brave the ruler’s ire in offering frank counsel. But, on the other hand, that same self-confidence, especially when expressed in uncompromising remonstration opposing the ruler’s wishes, can often generate deadly resentment in the heart of a ruler unwilling or unable to “endure repression and humiliation in his own state.”

all of the above leads inexorably to the punch line:

良弓難張, 然可以及高入深; 良馬難乘, 然可以任重致遠; 良才難令, 然可以致君見尊。

a good bow is hard to draw but can reach high and pierce deep; a good horse is hard to guide but can carry a heavy load and travel far. [so like-wise] a good talent is hard to command but can make his ruler respected. (1: 1/26–27)

the references to the “good bow” and the “good horse” as analogues of the “good talent” continue the motif that the worthy is the human equiva-lent of well-honed instruments and prized natural resources that the ruler should learn to carefully husband. as the writer of the chapter has been arguing, properly utilizing these assets is a difficult thing that goes against the natural inclination and pride of the ruler. But as the series of analogies now emphasizes, the usefulness of these assets is directly proportionate to the difficulty of using them.

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It is precisely the good bow’s resistance to being drawn that makes it a powerful device capable of propelling a projectile with great force: the greater that resistance (the “draw weight”), the greater the amount of stored potential energy when drawn and the greater the amount of kinetic energy imparted to the arrow when released. the analogy of the good horse is rather more forced than that of the bow, but the main point seems clear enough: to the extent that a horse is good—capable of carry-ing a heavy load and possessing great endurance—it will also be one that is not for the neophyte rider, unable to control and make proper use of the great strength of the beast. and so it is likewise with the “good talent,” the worthy who sees himself as aspiring to be a gentleman: the reason why employing such a person benefits the ruler, is also the reason why it is so hard to command him. and conversely, only the ruler capable of commanding the worthy—enduring repression and great humiliation in his own state in the process, if it comes to that—can look forward to the greatest success and deserve the greatest praise.

as mentioned early on, the remaining roughly one quarter of the chap-ter (1: 1/26–2/5) is mostly concerned with driving home the main thesis of the chapter’s argument and exhorting the princely audience to take the lesson offered to heart. here, two practical matters present themselves. First, the ruler, if he truly aspires to the ideal of being an “impartial king” ( jian wang 兼王), cannot afford to listen only to those who already agree with him; he must be ready to accept the advice and opinion of those who disagree with him (1: 1/29–2/1). the point is already implied by earlier arguments (1: 1/14–15). second, the ruler is encouraged to spread his kingly generosity and favor “beyond the confines of the palace” lest he prove unable to influence the wider world of his state (1: 2/5). Within the con-text of the chapter, the point is probably that worthy and capable people who are able to benefit the state can hardly come only from among those who are already close to the ruler (e.g., from among his close kinsmen). the wise ruler will cast his net widely.

But apart from the above more practical points, one way to think about the burden of this part of the chapter is to understand the writer as say-ing: given the conclusion of my main argument (worthies are hard to employ, but employing them is the way to successful rule), the following are things you ought to keep firmly in mind. one is the thought that just as “it is because the yangtze and yellow rivers do not despise the little streams that fill them that they can become great” (1: 1/27), so likewise, the ruler cannot afford to make light of the contributions that the worthies can make to further the power of his state. But more important is the


converse point: to the degree to which the employment of the worthies has enlarged the power of his state, the ruler’s own part will necessarily diminish. that is, the ruler needs to be fully aware that the successful state is the work of many hands and his own part will only be just that, a part of a much larger whole—just as the water of the great yangtze and yellow rivers does not come from a single source, and the lavish fur garment is not made from the white fur of a single snow fox (1: 1/28–29).

Finally, as if to reassure his audience that a ruler who follows the counsel of the chapter will not thereby detract from his princely prerogatives, the writer points out that even the things that are uncontrovertibly great—“heaven and Earth,” “Great Waters,” “Great Fires”—need not always mani-fest their greatness in obvious and visible ways; so likewise “kingly virtue” need not always appear exalted (1: 2/3). one wonders if, having already made the more shocking point that the proper employment of the wor-thies ultimately requires that rulers learn to “endure repression and great humiliation in their states,” the writer now feels the need to pull back a lit-tle so as to make his counsel more palatable. that is, what is being asked of the prince is not really “repression and humiliation” but, rather, “kingly virtue” manifested in a more subtle, less obvious way.

Conclusion

as indicated above, if the perspective described by the gentleman’s mani-festo and characteristic conduct is meant to represent the ideal to which the worthies aspire, then it would seem that the worthies of “Qin shi” are a rather different sort than their counterparts in “shang xian.” the latter appear moved to enter government service and to remain at their posts primarily by the promise of honor, wealth, and power. In fact, the recom-mendations made in those chapters relating to how the rulers could best attract them to service depend upon construing the targeted people as being so motivated. consequently, the primary point of potential failure is supposed to be the rulers’ practical irrationality. In contrast, the primary point of potential failure in “Qin shi” is the rulers’ pride: their resentment at having to put up with the worthies’ outspokenness, an outspokenness that is all the more galling because it is fueled by their self-confident sense of moral superiority. this shift regarding what might cause rulers to fail to properly elevate the worthy is itself grounded in a change in the way the worthies are construed: they are now people who see themselves as living according to high ideals that cannot be compromised by the mere prospect of worldly goods.

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I believe that the changes constitute an improvement on the part of “Qin shi” over “shang xian” in the sense that the former’s construal of the worthies’ motivation explains more. consider the worthies’ dedication to promoting the common benefit of the state. For instance, according to the middle version of “shang xian”:

賢者之治國者也, 蚤朝晏退, 聽獄治政 . . . 賢者之長官也, 夜寢夙興, 收歛關市、山林、澤梁之利, 以實官府 . . . 賢者之治邑也, 蚤出莫入, 耕稼樹藝, 聚菽粟.

as for how the worthies govern the state: they start early and retire late hearing lawsuits and attending to the government. . . . as for how the wor-thies administer their offices: they go to sleep late and wake up early col-lecting taxes from the passes, markets, and produce from mountains, woods, waters, and land to fill the official coffers. . . . as for how the worthies manage the districts: they go out before sunrise and return after sunset [probably: “supervising the activities of ”] plowing and sowing, planting and cultivating, and gathering harvests of grains. (9: 10/26–28)

the result is that the state’s criminal-justice system is orderly, the court’s coffers are full, the people are wealthy, and even heaven and the spir-its benefit (see 9: 10/28–30). the Upper and lower versions of “shang xian” do not enlarge upon the dedication of the worthies to serving the state, but unless something similar is being assumed, it is mysterious why employing them in government would result in the state being wealthy, well populated, and well ordered (8: 9/7, 10: 13/23). and yet why the wor-thies behave consistently in the described manner—working for the good of the state at the expense of some cost to personal comfort and well-being—is not something any of the versions of “shang xian” discuss. In fact, the worthies’ dedication and willingness to sacrifice their personal comfort and well-being is somewhat puzzling if they were really as mer-cenary in motivation as they are presented in these chapters.

In contrast, the worthies of “Qin shi,” motivated as they are by their high gentlemanly ideal, seem more plausible candidates for the sorts who would be willing to dedicate themselves to the service of the common benefit in the way described in “shang xian.” the insight that the writer of “Qin shi” is urging can thus be phrased in the following manner: pre-cisely if the basic counsel propounded by “shang xian” is to lead to the advertised benefits as presented in those chapters—wealth and order for the states (8: 9/7, 10: 13/23), fame for the ruler (9: 13/17–18)—“shang xian” has at best given an incomplete, if not defective, understanding of what it takes for the counsel to work. the analysis of “Qin shi” constitutes an improvement over “shang xian” in the sense that it presents a more sophisticated (and more realistic) understanding of the psychology of the


worthies, on the basis of which it puts forward a more nuanced way to effectively implement the basic counsel to elevate the worthy.39

In light of the above, “Qin shi” cannot be properly considered a “sum-mary” or “digest” of “shang xian.” as mentioned earlier, the former takes for granted the cogency of the policy to elevate the worthy so much so that it never bothers to directly argue for that policy. We have also seen how the worthies as they are presented in this chapter are rather different from their counterparts in “shang xian.” In addition, I have also suggested several arguments concerning its content that indicate the chapter’s late date. rather than an “appendix” to “shang xian” or a chapter of non-mohist provenance, “Qin shi” presents a striking further development in mohist political thought. Its vision of a worthy who is reminiscent of a “confucian gentleman” suggests the interaction of the authors of the chapter with other schools of thought, interactions that may also explain some of the impetus for the development in mohist ideas. nonetheless, this is a development that is meant to further the mohist goal that rulers adopt the basic policy that is expounded so forcefully in “shang xian.” the more complex understanding of the motivations of the worthies is in the service of a more effective way to implement the basic counsel to elevate the worthies.

there are also other lines of continuity with ideas in the larger mohist corpus. although the gentlemen of “Qin shi” differ from the worthies in “shang xian,” there are still interesting points of contact between the two. consider that neither the worthy of “shang xian” nor his gentlemanly counterpart of “Qin shi” act straightforwardly from a desire to bring about the impartial benefit of all; that is, neither acts from a commitment to the call to be impartially concerned for the welfare of people without distinc-tion of self and others, associates and strangers (as advocated in the “Jian ai” chapters). the former is moved by the promise of wealth and honor; the latter acts from a deeply felt concern to live up to a certain self-image that forms the basis of his confidence in his own moral superiority vis-à-vis both common people and ruler. this is to say, not that the gentleman of “Qin shi” so described does not care about other people, but that any concern he has (and it is a very strong one) is mediated by an underlying concern that he lives up to that self-image.

39 Given the tradition that there were different sects of mohists, it is also possible that this development is a result of internal disagreements among mohists. I thank miranda Brown for pointing this out to me.

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In this regard, it is thus fitting that the writer of “Qin shi” should con-clude the statement of the gentleman’s manifesto and the associated description of his characteristic conduct by referring to the gentleman with the pronominal bi 彼 (1: 1/12), “that one,” as if distancing himself from him. It is “that one” who has “confidence in himself.” a subtle distinction between the point of view of the writer and the perspective of the gentle-man he is talking about is thus maintained. In maintaining that distinc-tion, the writer hints at a crucial point of continuity between the subtexts of his chapter and of “shang xian”: there is an aspect of the mohist prac-tical political project whose success does not straightforwardly depend upon people becoming doctrinal mohists or adopting mohist attitudes. What matters is that they come to—or are incentivized or manipulated to—do the right thing. this general point is candidly articulated in the following story from the Dialogues in the Mozi:

有游於子墨子之門者。身體強良, 思慮徇通, 欲使隨而學。子墨子曰:「姑學乎, 吾將仕子。」勸於善言而學。其年, 而責仕於子墨子。子墨子曰:「不仕子。子亦聞夫魯語乎？魯有昆弟五人者。亦父死, 亦長子嗜酒而不葬。亦四弟曰:『子無我葬, 當為子沽酒。』勸於善言而葬。已葬而責酒於其四弟, 四弟曰:『吾未予子酒矣。子葬子父, 我葬吾父。豈獨吾父哉。子不葬, 則人將笑子。故勸子葬也。』今子為義, 我亦為義豈獨我義也哉？子不學, 則人將笑子。故勸子於學。」

there was a man who traveled to master mozi’s school. he was strong in body and sharp in mind, and the master wanted him to stay and study. master mozi said: “If you study for a while, I shall make you an official.” the man was persuaded by these fine words and became a student. after a full year had passed, he demanded an official position from master mozi. master mozi said: “I haven’t got you an official position. But have you not heard the story of the men of lu? In lu, there were five brothers. their father died, but the older brother loved wine and would not attend to the funeral. his four younger brothers told him that if he carried out the funeral for them, they would definitely buy him wine. he was persuaded by these fine words and carried out the funeral. after the funeral, he demanded wine from his four younger brothers. But the four younger brothers said to him: ‘We will not give you wine. you buried your father and we buried our father. Was he only our father? If you had not buried him, people would have laughed at you. therefore, we persuaded you to bury him.’ now you are righteous and I am also righteous. am I the only one who is righteous? If you had not studied, people would have laughed at you. therefore, I persuaded you to study.” (48: 110/5–10)40

40 translation from Johnston, The “Mozi,” 691–693, slightly emended.


From the point of view of the mozi in the story—and that of the four younger brothers in the story within the story—there is something that someone ought to do (the strong man ought to study with mozi; the eldest brother ought to bury his father). yet both mozi and the younger brothers understood from the start that the person who needs to do the required thing is unlikely to do it without suitable inducements: in one case it is the prospect of an official position, with the unspoken implication of wealth and honor attached, and in the other case, the prospect of wine.

now, presumably, just as the younger brothers did not think that the reason one ought to bury one’s dead father was so that one could then have a good drink, the mozi of the story did not think that the reason one ought to study was so that one could become an official. they would thus have to concede that their (mozi, the younger brothers) concerns were not shared by their opposite numbers (the strong man, the elder brother). nonetheless, neither mozi nor the younger brothers tried to convince the strong man or the elder brother that they ought to have the proper con-cerns. Instead, they made promises which turned out to be insincere but achieved the desired result of motivating the required behavior on the part of the strong man and the elder brother. and these promises were effective because they were based upon a realistic appreciation of what would actually move their targets to action.

the crucial thing is that as far as mozi and the younger brothers were concerned, the strong man and the elder brother did not need to share the right perspective on things so long as they could be made to do the right thing—if necessary, by lies and manipulation. Whether and how often such tactics really do result in good outcomes (and whatever our own opinion concerning their moral acceptability), the point made in the passage is that the ends justify the means: the mozi of the story unabash-edly referred to what he did (manipulating the strong man) as “righteous.” returning to “shang xian” and “Qin shi,” the implication is that with the right sort of incentives, those who are otherwise primarily interested in wealth, rank, and power can be put to useful work for the benefit of the state; and even one who would later come to be known as a confucian gentleman, can do his part in a mohist scheme of things to advance the common benefit, provided that the ruler can handle him with the requi-site adroitness.

But it is not just that the writer of “Qin shi” maintains a distance between his point of view and the point of view of his gentleman: one wonders if ultimately he can only be ambivalent about the latter’s attitude. From the

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point of view of a commitment to impartially promote the benefit of the world and to eliminate the harms to the world, the moral scruples of the gentleman as he is presented in “Qin shi” constitute at best unnecessary squeamishness and, at worst, a potential obstacle to that conjunction of talent and political power that is necessary for the proper ordering of the world. one cannot help but wonder if, from the perspective of the impar-tial benefit of all, the self-focused attitude of the moral gentleman is but another form of that preference for one’s own well-being that can bring about great harm to the world.

Heaven as a standard

nicolas standaert*

the concept of tian 天 (Heaven) is often considered to be one of the key concepts in Mozi’s thought. seen from a diachronic perspective, however, there is a clear evolution in its use throughout the Mozi. For instance, while the concept is nearly absent in the oldest triplets of the Core Chap-ters, in the youngest it is very often explicitly adopted in the argumenta-tion. It is as though Mozi adduces Heaven as the ultimate argument in defense of his core ideas. this is confirmed by chapters 26, 27, and 28, the “tian zhi” 天志 (Will of Heaven) triplet, which we believe is among the youngest of the triplets.1 apparently the editors of the Mozi consid-ered the theme of Heaven important enough to devote one triplet to it. that the “tian zhi” triplet belongs to the youngest triplets can possibly be explained by the fact that the increasing criticism directed toward the Mohists boosted the need for an all-encompassing foundation, which they found in Heaven. In addition, in these Core Chapters, Heaven is increas-ingly considered a “standard” ( fa 法). as a result, Mozi appears to be the first ancient Chinese master to express in a more or less systematic way his vision of Heaven.

at first sight, this vision is confirmed by the Opening Chapters, which are usually dated later than the Core Chapters. One of them, chapter 4, “Fa yi” 法儀 (standards and norms) is commonly presented as a “summary” of the “tian zhi” chapters. In it, Heaven is closely linked with the idea of a “standard.” Which stage in Mohist thought does this chapter represent? What are the similarities and differences with the Core Chapters? What evolution is there in the relationship between the concepts of tian and fa? these are the questions that the present contribution will address. I shall

* I thank Carine defoort for her comments on earlier drafts, and the participants at the conference “the Many Faces of Mozi: a synchronic and diachronic study of Mohist thought” held at the University of Leuven, 25–28 June 2009, especially Miranda Brown, for their valuable suggestions.

1 For the sequence of the Core Chapters, I follow Watanabe takashi, “Bokushi shohen no chosaku nendai”; desmet, “the Growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi”; and desmet, “all Good things Come in threes.” In the case of the “shang xian” 尚賢, “shang tong” 尚同, and “tian zhi” 天志 triplets, the chronological order is shang 上, xia 下, zhong 中. My own structural and content analysis of the “tian zhi” chapters corroborates their analyses.

238 nicolas standaert

first discuss the notion of fa, then tian, and finally ‘Heaven as a standard.’ Before doing so, I shall present a translation of the “Fa yi” chapter.

The “Fa yi” Chapter

By way of introduction, a brief statistical analysis of the key terms in the Mozi is quite revealing. If one excludes not only the compound tianxia 天下 but also tianzi 天子, tiandi 天地, and tianrang 天壤 (the latter three each occur only occasionally), “Fa yi” is the only chapter of the Opening Chapters in which tian 天 occurs, twenty-two times in total (see table 1). this is a high number, far higher than in any of the Core Chapters except the “tian zhi” triplet. another character that appears often in “Fa yi” is fa 法: it appears twenty-eight times. this is by far the largest number of occurrences of fa in any of the Mozi chapters. the combination fa yi 法儀 appears only in the “Fa yi” chapter, twice at the beginning of the text (excluding the title). this occurrence at the beginning explains the title of the chapter. the combination yi fa 儀法 appears merely three times in one of the Core Chapters, namely in “tian zhi, xia” (chapter 28).

table 1. Frequency of the terms Tian 天, Fa 法, and Ren 仁 in the Mozi

ICsChap.no.

Chap. no.

title 天天子天地天命法仁

1.1 1 親士 1

1.2 2 脩身

1.3 3 所染 1 1 2

1.4 4 法儀 22 1 28 9

1.5 5 七患 1 1 1

1.6 6 辭過 2 3 4

1.7 7 三辯

2.1 8 尚賢上

2.2 9 尚賢中 12 2 2 6

2.3 10 尚賢下 2 1 2 1

3.1 11 尚同上 5 10 3

3.2 12 尚同中 10[4] 19 4 1

heaven as standard 239

table 1 (cont.)

ICsChap.no.

Chap. no.


3.3 13 尚同下 3 9 1

4.1 14 兼愛上

4.2 15 兼愛中 1 3 4[1]

4.3 16 兼愛下 3 1 3[1] 3

5.1 17 非攻上 3

5.2 18 非攻中

5.3 19 非攻下 17[1] 2 1 4 1 2

6.1 20 節用上 3

6.2 21 節用中 5

6.3 22 節用下闕

6.4 23 節葬上闕

6.5 24 節葬中闕

6.6 25 節葬下 2 13[1] 14

7.1 26 天志上 36[3] 9 1 1

7.2 27 天志中 88[2] 11[1] 5 13

7.3 28 天志下 44[2] 10[1] 7 8

8.1 29 明鬼上闕

8.2 30 明鬼中闕

8.3 31 明鬼下 8 4 5

8.4 32 非樂上 2[1] 1 3

9.1 33 非樂中闕

9.2 34 非樂下闕

9.3 35 非命上 5 1 1

9.4 36 非命中 5 2 5

9.5 37 非命下 6 1 2 3 2


ICsChap.no.

Chap. no.


9.6 38 非儒上

9.7 39 非儒下 1 7

10.1 40 經上 3 1

10.2 41 經下 1 1

10.3 42 經說上 6 1

10.4 43 經說下 1 2 3

11.1 44 大取 4 1 1 3

11.2 45 小取 2

11.3 46 耕柱 1 2

12.1 47 貴義 2 2 1 5

12.2 48 公孟 4[1] 3 2 11

13.1 49 魯問 10 5

13.2 50 公輸 1 1

14.1 52 備城門 4

14.2 53 備高臨

14.3 56 備梯 2

14.4 58 備水

14.5 61 備突

14.6 62 備穴

14.7 63 備蛾傳 2[1]

15.1 68 迎敵祠 1

15.2 69 旗幟 3

15.3 70 號令 5

15.4 71 雜守 2

note: numbers between square brackets refer to the occurrences of characters indicated in the Mozi zhuzi suoyin as being reconstructed.

table 1 (cont.)


as far as the framework of “Fa yi” is concerned, the two concepts of fa (standard) and tian (Heaven) structure the whole. In fact, this chapter can be divided into two parts, each composed of two sections, and a connect-ing section between them: the first part (sections 1 and 2) discusses fa, and the second part (sections 4 and 5) is about tian. the term tian does not appear in the first part; and fa does not appear in the second. the two parts are connected by a transition passage at the center (section 3), in which both fa and tian appear. this results in the following structure:

[1] Part 1: Fa (4: 4/8–12)子墨子曰: 天下從事者, 不可以無法儀。無法儀而其事能成者無有也。雖至士之為將相者, 皆有法。雖至百工從事者, 亦皆有法。百工為方以矩, 為圓以規, 直以繩, 衡以水, 正以縣。無巧工、不巧工, 皆以此五者為法。巧者能中之, 不巧者雖不能中, 放依以從事, 猶逾己。故百工從事, 皆有法所度。今大者治天下, 其次治大國, 而無法所度, 此不若百工辯也。

[1] Our Master Mozi said:those in the world who perform tasks cannot be without standards and

norms.and those who are able to succeed in their task without standards and

norms do not exist.even gentlemen serving as generals and ministers all have standards.even artisans performing tasks all have standards too.artisans form squares with a square, circles with a compass,straight lines with a string, surfaces with a level, and vertical lines with a

plumb line.all artisans, whether skilled or unskilled, take these five as standards.the skilled can conform to them exactly;as to the unskilled, though they cannot conform to them exactly, if they

follow them in performing tasks, they still surpass what they can do on their own.

so artisans in performing tasks all have a measurement by standards.now, the greatest is to order the world, the next is to order great states, but

they are without a measurement by standards;in this they are less discerning than artisans.


[2] Part 1: Fa (4: 4/14–18)然則奚以為治法而可？當皆法其父母, 奚若？天下之為父母者眾, 而仁者寡。若皆法其父母, 此法不仁也。法不仁不可以為法。當皆法其學, 奚若？天下之為學者眾, 而仁者寡。若皆法其學, 此法不仁也。法不仁不可以為法。當皆法其君, 奚若？天下之為君者眾, 而仁者寡。若皆法其君, 此法不仁也。法不仁不可以為法。故父母、學、君三者, 莫可以為治法。

[2] this being so, then what is acceptable as a standard for order?How would it be if everyone took one’s parents as a standard?those in the world who are parents are many, but those who are humane

are few.If everyone took one’s parents as a standard, then this is taking the inhu-

mane as a standard.taking the inhumane as a standard is not acceptable [as a standard].How would it be if everyone took one’s teachers as a standard?those in the world who are teachers are many, but those who are humane

are few.If everyone took one’s teachers as a standard, then this is taking the inhu-

mane as a standard.taking the inhumane as a standard is not acceptable [as a standard].How would it be if everyone took one’s rulers as a standard?those in the world who are rulers are many, but those who are humane

are few.If everyone took one’s rulers as a standard, then this is taking the inhumane

as a standard.taking the inhumane as a standard is not acceptable [as a standard].so then neither parents nor teachers nor rulers are acceptable as the stan-

dard for order.

[3] transition (4: 4/20–24)然則奚以為治法而可？故曰: 莫若法天。天之行廣而無私, 其施厚而不德, 其明久而不衰。故聖王法之。既以天為法, 動作有為, 必度於天。天之所欲則為之,


天所不欲則止。然而天何欲何惡者也？天必欲人之相愛相利, 而不欲人之相惡相賊也。奚以知天之欲人之相愛相利, 而不欲人之相惡相賊也？以其兼而愛之, 兼而利之也。奚以知天兼而愛之, 兼而利之也？以其兼而有之, 兼而食之也。

[3] What then is acceptable as the standard for ordering?Hence, I say: [there is] nothing better than taking Heaven as a standard.Heaven’s conduct is expansive and impartial;its gifts are generous and not obliging;its brightness endures without fading.thus, the sage-kings took it as a standard.since they took Heaven as a standard, they necessarily measured every

action and enterprise by Heaven.What Heaven desired they carried out;what Heaven did not desire they refrained from.now, what is it that Heaven desires, and what is it that it hates? Certainly Heaven desires to have human beings care for one another and

benefit one another and does not desire to have them hate one another and hurt one another.

How do we know that Heaven desires to have human beings care for one another and benefit one another and does not desire to have them hate one another and hurt one another?

Because it cares for them inclusively and benefits them inclusively. How do we know that it cares for them inclusively and benefits them

inclusively?Because it possesses them inclusively and accepts offerings from them

inclusively.

[4] Part 2: Tian (4: 4/24–29)今天下無小大國, 皆天之邑也, 人無幼長貴賤, 皆天之臣也；此以莫不犓[牛]羊、豢犬豬, 絜為酒醴粢盛, 以敬事天, 此不為兼而有之, 兼而食之邪？天苟兼而有食之, 夫奚說以不欲人之相愛相利也？故曰: 「愛人利人者, 天必福之。惡人賊人者, 天必禍之。」曰: 「殺不辜者, 得不祥焉。夫奚說人為其相殺而天與禍乎？是以天欲人相愛相利, 而不欲人相惡相賊也。」


[4]now, all states in the world, small or large, are cities of Heaven, and all human beings, young or old, noble or humble, are subjects of

Heaven;for they all graze sheep and oxen, feed dogs and pigs, and prepare clean

wine and millet cakes in order to revere and serve Heaven.does this not mean that it claims them inclusively and accepts offerings

from them inclusively?since Heaven claims them and accepts offerings from them inclusively,what then can make us say that it does not desire that human beings care

for one another and benefit one another? thus it is said:

“those who care for others and benefit others, Heaven will certainly bring fortune upon them.

those who hate others and hurt others, Heaven will certainly bring disaster upon them.”

For it is said:“He who murders the innocent will be visited by misfortune.How else can we explain the fact that human beings who murder each

other meet disaster by Heaven?thus, [we know that] Heaven desires human beings to care for one

another and benefit one another, and it does not desire them to hate one another and hurt one

another.”

[5] Part 2: Tian (4: 5/1–5)昔之聖王禹、湯、文、武, 兼愛2天下之百姓, 率以尊天事鬼。其利人多。故天福之, 使立為天子, 天下諸侯皆賓事之。暴王桀、紂、幽、厲, 兼惡天下之百姓, 率以詬天侮鬼。其賊人多。故天禍之, 使遂失其國家, 身死為僇於天下；後世子孫毀之, 至今不息。故為不善以得禍者, 桀、紂、幽、厲是也。愛人利人以得福者, 禹、湯、文、武是也。愛人利人以得福者有矣, 惡人賊人以得禍者亦有矣！

2 the character ai 愛 was added by Bi Yuan.


[5]the ancient sage-kings Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu cared for the people of the

world inclusively, leading them to revere Heaven and serve the ghosts.Manifold were their benefits to human beings.thereupon, Heaven brought fortune upon them,establishing them as sons of Heaven;and all the feudal lords of the world showed them respect and served

them.the wicked kings Jie, Zhou, You, and Li hated the people in the world inclu-

sively,leading them to revile Heaven and insult the spirits.Great was their hurt to human beings.thereupon, Heaven brought disaster upon them,depriving them of their states and homes, and in life and death they were

dishonored in the world;and their sons and grandsons of later generations condemned them unceas-

ingly to this day.Jie, Zhou, You, and Li, then, are those who did what was not good and

obtained disaster.and Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu are those who cared for human beings and

benefited human beings and obtained fortune. thus, we have those who obtained fortune because they cared for human

beings and benefited them,as well as those who obtained disaster because they hated human beings

and hurt them.

The Use of Standards

Before showing the link between tian and fa, it can be helpful to inves-tigate the different meanings of fa in “Fa yi,” the other Opening Chap-ters, and the Core Chapters.3 different translations could be given for fa: “model,” “law,” “standard,” and so on. Here I will consistently translate fa as “standard.” the artisan analogy, mentioned at the beginning of the chapter (see section 1) but also mentioned at other instances, is obviously fundamental for this interpretation of fa.

What Are the Main Characteristics of a Standard?

“Fa yi” starts with the statement that “those in the world who perform tasks cannot be without standards and norms ( fa yi 法儀)” and refers to

3 For recent studies on fa, see Fraser, “Mohism”; and Hansen, “ ‘Fa’ (standards: Laws) and Meaning Changes in Chinese Philosophy.”


the fact that artisans performing tasks have standards. this example is further developed: all artisans, whether skilled or unskilled, use squares, compasses, strings, levels, and plumb lines. this analogy in “Fa yi” makes clear that a significant characteristic of standards is that they are a uniform reference or model to make things square, round, straight, flat, or verti-cal. In other words, they are objective and not supposed to be subject to interpretation: in all circumstances they should remain the same. another major characteristic is that one can measure (duo 度) with standards.4 to “measure” has two meanings that are closely connected: the examples of squares, compasses, and so on refer to instruments and norms with which one can measure or evaluate the shape or relative position of an object; but the same instruments are also often used to measure or count how long, wide, etc. an object is—that is, properties that are expressed in figures on a measurement scale.

thus, standards are objective and therefore in principle infallible. the aim is that the skilled artisan should “conform exactly to,” “fit precisely,” or “hit right in the middle” (zhong 中) the standard.

Who Uses Standards?

according to “Fa yi,” the standards are not the same for all people, but all people should use standards. In the artisan analogy, all artisans, skilled or unskilled, use them. In other words, the text does not foresee the pos-sibility of an artisan having attained a level of skill such that he no longer needs a standard. this need of a standard is extended to everyone who performs tasks (cong shi 從事), extending even to the ordering of the states and the world. thus, generals and ministers have standards, and also the ancient kings used a standard; in this they are analogous to the skilled artisan.

What Can Function as a Standard?

starting from the artisan analogy one can distinguish a range of standards, from concrete to more abstract. the utensils used by the artisan, such as squares and compasses, are the most concrete standards. But these instruments lead to a wider set of concrete standards, as discussed in the

4 Later texts, such as Shuowen jiezi 說文解字, confirm the close link between fa, yi, and du(o). In Shuowen jiezi, yi is explained as du, and du as fazhi: 儀, 度也。度, 法制也; the figurative explanation of du is a person taking a fa in his hands.


“Jie yong” 節用 and “Jie zang” 節葬 chapters. In the latter fa seems to describe the stipulations for funerals. though some would translate fa as “code of laws,” “law,” “legal requirements” (Mei Y.P.), or “rules” (Watson), it is significant that some of the instructions set out for burials concern quasi-artisanal “measurable” aspects, such as the thickness of the coffin, the depth of the grave, and the number of shrouds to cover the body. as such they always seem to carry an association with “standards,” as in the following fragment from “Jie zang, xia”:

故古聖王制為葬埋之法, 曰:「桐棺三寸, 足以朽體。衣衾三領, 足以覆惡。以及其葬也, 下毋及泉, 上毋通臭。壟若參耕之畝, 則止矣。死則既以葬矣, 生者必無久喪, 而疾而從事, 人為其所能, 以交相利也。」此聖王之法也。

therefore, the ancient sage-kings established a standard regarding the burial of the dead, which stated: “the coffin shall be three inches thick, sufficient to hold the decaying body. as to shrouds, there shall be three pieces, ade-quate to cover the ugliness. It shall not be buried so deep as to reach water or so shallow as to allow the odor to ascend. three feet in size shall be big enough for the mound. after the deceased has been buried, the living shall not engage in extended mourning but shall speedily return to work and pur-sue what each one is able to do to mutually benefit each other.” such are the standards of the sage-kings. (25: 40/24–26)

the basis of the standard is in the first place what is useful with regard to a good coffin, but it is extended to being beneficial (li 利) to the people involved. as such it is a “measurement-like utility standard.”5 Moreover, in the final sentence the conventional aspect of “standard” is resolved by appeal to “the sage-kings.” the expression “standards of the sage-kings” is used five times in the Mozi. In “Jie yong, shang” it occurs twice, where it pertains to another rather concrete stipulation, in this case the instruc-tions for marriage, where the age of marriage can be “measured” in terms of the exact number of years.6

5 Hansen, A Daoist Theory of Chinese Thought, 467.6 昔者聖王為法曰:「丈夫年二十, 毋敢不處家; 女子年十五, 毋敢不事人。」此

聖王之法也。聖王即沒, 于民次也, 其欲蚤處家者, 有所二十年處家。其欲晚處家者, 有所四十年處家。以其蚤與其晚相踐, 後聖王之法十年。“In ancient times, the sage-kings made the following standard: ‘no man of twenty should dare to be without a family; no girl of fifteen should dare to be without a master.’ such were the standards of the sage-kings. now that the sage-kings have passed away, the people have taken to following (their own desires). those who like to have a family early sometimes marry at twenty. those who like to have a family late sometimes marry at forty. When one averages the late marriages and the early ones, it is still later than the standards of the sage-kings by ten years” (Mozi 20: 36/19–21).


In the two other cases the “standard of the sage-kings” refers to a much more abstract principle, which is not “measurable” in the same way as the previous cases. the first occurs in “Fei gong, xia” 非攻下, where it is used to refer to what is sometimes called the “three levels of benefit” (san li 三利). this refers to an idea mentioned explicitly in “shang xian, xia” 尚賢下 and in the “tian zhi” triplet stipulating that any human action should ultimately “benefit Heaven, the spirits, and human beings.” In “Fei gong, xia” this is considered precisely the standard of the sage-kings:

子墨子言曰: 今天下之所譽善者, 其說將何哉？為其上中天之利, 而中中鬼之利, 而下中人之利, 故譽之與？意亡非為其上中天之利, 而中中鬼之利, 而下中人之利, 故譽之與？雖使下愚之人, 必曰:「將為其上中天之利, 而中中鬼之利, 而下中人之利, 故譽之。」今天下之所同義者, 聖王之法也。

Our Master Mozi said: “Well, concerning that which the world praises as good, what is the reason for it? Is not an act praised because it matches per-fectly the benefit to Heaven on high, the benefit to the spirits in the middle sphere, and the benefit to the people below? Or is it praised because it fails to match perfectly the benefit to Heaven on high, the benefit to the spirits in the middle, and the benefit to the people below? even the stupid would say that it is praiseworthy when it matches perfectly the benefit to Heaven on high, the benefit to the spirits in the middle, and the benefit to the people below. Well, what the world agrees on as righteous7 is the standard of the sage-kings.” (19: 33/12–15)

the last reference to the “standard of the sage-kings” summarizes another core idea of the Mozi: “inclusively caring for each other and mutually ben-efiting each other” ( jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li 兼相愛, 交相利). “Jian ai, zhong” 兼愛中 mentions this core idea once as “standard of the sage-kings” and twice as “a standard”:

是故子墨子言曰:「今天下之士君子, 忠實欲天下之富, 而惡其貧, 欲天下之治, 而惡其亂, 當兼相愛, 交相利。此聖王之法, 天下之治道也, 不可不務為也。」

therefore, our Master Mozi said: “If the officer-gentlemen of the world sincerely desire the world to be wealthy and dislike it to be impoverished, desire to have it orderly and dislike it to be chaotic, they should care for each other inclusively and benefit each other mutually. this is the standard of the sage-kings and the way for order in the world, and one cannot but work hard at it.” (15: 26/28–27/2)

7 another version has yang 養 (foster) instead of yi 義.


the second fragment is from the same chapter, rejecting “exclusiveness 別,” which is the opposite of “inclusiveness.”

既以非之, 何以易之？子墨子言曰:「以兼相愛交相利之法易之。」然則兼相愛交相利之法將柰何哉？

since we reject it [exclusiveness], with what can we replace it? Our Master Mozi said: “One can replace it with the standard of caring for each other inclu-sively and benefiting each other mutually.” But what is the standard of caring for each other inclusively and benefiting each other mutually? (15: 25/10–11)

the abstract principle of caring for each other has without doubt practical consequences for Mozi. One may, however, notice a shift in accent: the artisan’s tools are not only concrete but are also in principle capable of measuring objectively. Yet, with abstract principles one cannot necessar-ily make such an objective evaluation. By linking these principles to the metaphor of the tools, Mozi creates the idea that even an abstract prin-ciple can be a measurable and objective standard. the type of standard depends on who uses it: concrete instruments for artisans, more general principles for rulers. But in the eyes of Mozi, both standards should be infallible. as such, the accent shifts from the instrument of measurement, in the case of the artisan’s tool, to the person who uses the standard, in the case of the abstract principle.

Besides concrete instruments, concrete norms, and more abstract prin-ciples, even people can function as standards. “Fa yi” (section 2) presents three examples: parents, teachers, and rulers. there is a case for translating fa here as “role model” or “prototype.”8 However, “Fa yi” expects even this fa (model) to be without failure, just like the artisan’s tools; yet, the three prototypes are not without failure, because they lack perfect humaneness (ren 仁, see discussion below). since not all parents, teachers, and rulers are perfect, they cannot really function as a “standard” to inspire perfectly humane conduct. In contrast, in another passage of “shang tong, zhong” 尚同中 the son of Heaven is considered the most humane (ren ren 仁人) in the world. the rhetorical question that follows shows that in principle taking such a person as a standard should lead to a world in perfect order (government):

天子者, 固天下之仁人也。舉天下之萬民以法天子, 夫天下何說而不治哉？

8 expressions used by Fraser, “Mohism.”


For the emperor is naturally the (most) humane person in the world. If all the peoples of the world take him as a standard, how then can the world9 be described as disorderly? (12: 18/22–23)

thus, even though people cannot be measurably objective standards in the same way that artisanal tools can, the people held up as standards should be infallible. Finally, there is again reference to the ancient authorities as a collective group. these ancient sage-kings not only use standards but are worthy to be standards themselves. In this case the appeal to ancient authority characteristic of Mozi functions as ultimate proof that even abstract principles can be put into practice.10 this appears from “Ming gui, xia” 明鬼下:

子墨子曰: 若以眾之耳目之請, 以為不足信也, 不以斷疑, 不識若昔者三代聖王堯舜禹湯文武者, 足以為法乎。故於此乎？自中人以上皆曰:「若昔者三代聖王, 足以為法矣。」若苟昔者三代聖王足以為法, 然則姑嘗上觀聖王之事。

Our Master Mozi said: “If the senses of hearing and sight of the multitude are thought to be untrustworthy in resolving a doubt, we may ask if such men like the sage-kings of the three dynasties, Yao, shun, Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu, are worthy to be a standard. about this all people above the medio-cre will say that such men like the ancient sage-kings of the three dynas-ties, Yao, shun, Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu, are worthy to be a standard. If the ancient sage-kings of the three dynasties are worthy to be a standard, we may review for a moment the deeds of these sage-kings.” (31: 52/19–22)

the concept of persons as standards is closely linked with what they do. Mozi stresses “deeds,” “tasks,” or “actions” (shi 事), and in that sense stan-dards are concrete (see, e.g., the first lines of section 1 of “Fa yi”). the concrete deeds of the sage-kings can set an example and thus become the standard. One example can be found in “Jian ai, xia,” where in four successive instances the inclusiveness ( jian 兼) of the ancient sage-kings becomes a standard for Mozi’s concept of it:

即此文王兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者, 於文王取法焉。

this is the inclusiveness of King Wen. even what our Master Mozi called “inclusive” was taken from the standard (model) of King Wen. (16: 29/2–3)

即此禹兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者, 於禹取法焉。

this is the inclusiveness of Yu. even what our Master Mozi called “inclusive” was taken from the standard (model) of Yu. (16: 29/6–7)

9 another version has tianzi 天子 (son of Heaven) instead of tianxia 天下.10 see Miranda Brown’s essay in this volume.


即此湯兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者, 於湯取法焉。

this is the inclusiveness of tang. even what our Master Mozi called “inclu-sive” was taken from the standard (model) of tang. (16: 29/10–11)

即此文武兼也。雖子墨子之所謂兼者, 於文武取法焉。

this is the inclusiveness of Wen and Wu. even what our Master Mozi called “inclusive” was taken from the standard (model) of Wen and Wu. (16: 29/ 14–15)

One finds an echo of this idea in the last part (section 5) of “Fa yi,” where the ancient sage-kings Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu are said to have cared for the people of the world inclusively, “leading them to revere Heaven and serve the ghosts, and their benefits to the people were manifold” (cf. the “three levels of benefit”); as a result they were established as sons of Heaven. Given the context of the previous sections, their concrete deeds were put forward as examples.

How to Use a Standard?

according to “Fa yi,” standards are used when “performing tasks” (cong shi 從事) (section 1), by which it is implied that one uses them for shaping and determining one’s own actions, whether making an object or con-ducting a government. But standards also have a hermeneutical function: in the just-quoted passage of “Jian ai, xia,” sage-kings and their deeds are not only a standard to follow but also a standard by which to judge a doctrine. the term is used in a similar way in the well-known passage of what is often translated as “three tests” (san fa 三法)11 in “Fei ming, zhong” 非命中. the reference to the skilled artisan and the rejection of the unreliable judgment made by using a potter’s wheel (which seems to be an allusion to metaphors also used in Zhuangzi) show how much Mozi is presented as someone who is searching for standards that are certain and stable, measurable and infallible.

子墨子言曰: 凡出言談, 由文學之為道也, 則不可而不先立義法。若言而無義, 譬猶立朝夕於員鈞之上也。則雖有巧工, 必不能得正焉。然今天下之情偽, 未可得而識也, 故使言有三法。三法者何也？有本之者, 有原之者, 有用之者。於其本之也, 考之天鬼之志, 聖王之事。於其原之也, 徵以先王之書。用之柰何？發而為刑政。此言之三法也。

11 Or san biao 三表 in “Fei ming, shang” 非命上.


Our Master Mozi said: “to make any statement or to write down any doc-trine, there must first be established some standard of judgment. to discuss without a [standard of] judgment is like determining the directions of sun-rise and sunset on a revolving potter’s wheel. even skillful artisans would not achieve correctness in that way. now the truth and error [of a doctrine] in the world is hard to tell; therefore, in making a statement, there are three standards. What are the three standards? that there be a basis; that there be an origin; and that there be a use. With regard to its basis, examine the will of Heaven and spirits and the deeds of the sage-kings. With regard to its origin, verify it through the books of the ancient kings. What of its use? this comes out in the administration of justice and government. these then are the three standards of a statement.”12 (36: 60/17–21)

this also confirms the double use of a standard: a standard is not only used to determine one’s own actions but is also to evaluate or judge the actions of others on the basis of objective criteria. In doing so, the shift pointed out in the previous section is strengthened: by using standards that should function as measurably objective norms, which in fact they are not, there is a shift of emphasis to the one using these standards and pretending that these are measurable, objective, and infallible.

Why Does One Need A Standard?

the Mozi does not seem to give an extensive argument for why one needs standards. “Fa yi” starts with the fact or observation that people use stan-dards. the most important reason given (still in section 1) is that, as in the case of an unskilled artisan, a standard helps one to perform better (“surpass oneself ” yu ji 逾己) than when one does things without one. the fact that one surpasses oneself stresses the fact that a standard is not an autonomous norm decided by the people themselves but a heterono-mous norm, which is external to them. this idea of “beyond the self ” is also clearly developed in “tian zhi, shang” and “tian zhi, xia.” In these two chapters distributive righteousness ( yi 義) is proposed as bringing about order and correct government (zheng 正 or 政). It is immediately added that this is never realized by the lower levels in society ordering the higher levels, but by the higher levels ordering the lower levels. next,

12 Concerning the use of books as standards, see also “Ming gui, xia”: 明鬼下: 且《周書》獨鬼, 而《商書》不鬼, 則未足以為法也。“If there are testimonies of spirits only in the books of Zhou and none in those of shang, it could still not be a standard” (Mozi 31: 53/17). 且《商書》獨鬼, 而《夏書》不鬼, 則未足以為法也。“If there are testimonies of spirits only in the books of shang and none in those of Xia, it is still not a standard” (31: 53/23).


the text develops the idea that order is “never (or not quite) attained by following oneself ” 未/不得次己而為政/正, a sentence occurring eleven times with variations.13 therefore, every layer of a society needs to refer to the higher level and ultimately to Heaven. according to these chapters, one cannot limit oneself to personal cultivation, but one has to refer to a standard beyond oneself.

In this respect it appears that Mozi is not satisfied with the self- cultivation of virtues as proclaimed by the contemporary elite. His starting point is people who can measure a board with a ruler, draw a perpendicu-lar accurately with a square, and find a vertical with a plumb, and who are likewise in search of guiding principles that are outside themselves in order to help them lead a moral life beneficial to others. the solution offered consists of principles, persons, and behaviors that can function as infallible standards. the ultimate and seemingly perfect standard is Heaven, a claim that opponents can hardly oppose.

One can observe a twofold evolution concerning this need for standards in the Mozi. On the one hand, as appears from the statistical analysis (see tables 1 and 2), the concept of fa is nearly absent in the earlier chapters of the triplets but is mentioned in later chapters. thus, there seems to have been an increasing need for finding arguments based on the use of stan-dards. On the other hand, this evolution is parallel to the increasing need to ground new ideas in Heaven. a good example of the latter is the triplet “Fei gong,” where in the first two versions the notion of tian is absent. In the last one, however, Heaven is drawn into the discussion. there it is argued that “aggressive warfare” (gong 攻) does not benefit Heaven, while only “punishments” (zhu 誅) are supported and sometimes even ordered by Heaven.14

the two evolutions of an increasing need for standards and for a foun-dation in Heaven are connected by the fact that Heaven itself becomes a standard.15 the “shang xian” triplet is the clearest example in this regard: in “shang xian, shang” (chapter 8), there is no mention of tian; in “shang xian, xia” (chapter 10), which, we believe, is the second in date, there is sporadic reference to tian.16 In the last sentence there is a reference to the

13 see Mozi 26: 42/27–29, 26: 43/1, 28: 47/24–26.14 see also Paul van els’s essay in this volume.15 this can be observed from the other occurrences of fa in the Core Chapters: there

is a certain parallelism between the frequency of fa and tian in these chapters (except for the “Jie yong” 節用 and “Jie zang” 節葬 chapters, where there is no mention of tian; see table 1).

16 see desmet, “Pleidooi voor een volmaakt bestuur.”


“three levels of benefit” (san li): when one employs the most virtuous man, this is also considered beneficial to Heaven:

尚賢者, 天鬼百姓之利, 而政事之本也。

now, elevation of the worthy is for the benefit of Heaven, the spirits, and the people, as well as the foundation of government. (10: 16/2–3)

“shang xian, zhong” (chapter 9) goes even further: the whole idea of pro-moting the best candidate finds its foundation in Heaven, which functions as a standard:

故古聖王以審以尚賢使能為政, 而取法於天。雖天亦不辯貧富、貴賤、遠邇、親疏; 賢者舉而尚之; 不肖者抑而廢之。

table 2. Chronological Frequency of Tian 天, Fa 法, and Ren 仁 in the Mozi

兼愛上:0t, 0F, 0r

非攻上: 0t, 0F, 3r

尚賢上: 0t, 0F, 0r

兼愛中: 1t, 3F, 4[1]r

非攻中: 0t, 0F, 0r

兼愛下: 3t, 3[1]F, 3r

非攻下: 17[1]t, 1F, 2r

尚同上: 5t, 0F, 3r

尚同下: 3t, 0F, 1r

天志上: 36[3]t, 1F, 1r

尚同中: 10[4]t, 4F, 1r

天志下: 44[2]t, 7F, 8r

尚賢下: 2t, 2F, 1r

?法儀: 22t, 28F, 9r

天志中: 88[2]t, 5F, 13r

尚賢中: 12t, 6F, 0r

Source of scheme: desmet, “the Growth of Compounds in the Core Chapters of the Mozi,” 118.Note: t = tian; F = fa; r = ren. For specific dating, see p. 15 of this volume.


and the reason the ancient sage-kings were able to take the elevation of the worthy and the employment of the capable as their policy was because they took their standard from Heaven. even Heaven does not discriminate among the poor and the rich, the honorable and the humble, the distant and the near, and the related and the unrelated; the virtuous were promoted and exalted; the vicious were kept back and banished. (9: 12/17–18)

a similar evolution can be found in the “tian zhi” triplet (see below). In “Fa yi” the two concepts of Heaven and standard are also clearly joined together.

In short, the “Fa yi” chapter corresponds to a later stage in the evolu-tion of Mohist concepts, one that calls for greater reliance on standards. It presents a concept of a standard that is objective, infallible, measurable, and outside oneself.

The Notion of Heaven

In “Fa yi” the first part on fa (sections 1 and 2) and the second part on tian (section 4 and 5) are joined by a transition passage (section 3) in which both terms occur. this passage gives two reasons why tian should be used as a standard. the first is an intrinsic reason related to some characteris-tics of Heaven:

莫若法天。天之行廣而無私, 其施厚而不德, 其明久而不衰, 故聖王法之。

there is nothing better than taking Heaven as a standard. Heaven’s actions are expansive and impartial; its gifts are generous and not obliging; its brightness endures without fading. thus, the sage-kings took it as a stan-dard. (4: 4/20–21)

the depiction of these traits, in both their positive and their negative expression (wu 無, bu 不), does not appear elsewhere in the Mozi. the traits are related to the dimensions of space (guang 廣), density (hou 厚), and time ( jiu 久). It refers not only to the infallibility of Heaven but also to its inclusiveness, while human models such as parents, teachers, and rulers are not always perfect. the second reason is linked to the first: sage-kings used Heaven as a standard. this argumentation corresponds to one of the three “tests” according to which the deeds of the sage-kings can be used as a standard.17

17 see also Miranda Brown’s essay in this volume.


While the formulation of these reasons as such is unique to the Mozi, some of the ideas expressed in these reasons are not unfamiliar in the Mozi. the fact that Heaven’s “actions are expansive and impartial” and also that it is “bright” (ming 明), for instance, corresponds to a statement at the beginning of “tian zhi, shang” in which it is said that after having offended their parents or rulers, people may possibly escape from them to other shelters, but they can never escape the clear sight of Heaven.

且語言有之曰:「焉而晏日焉而得罪, 將惡避逃之？」曰:「無所避逃之。夫天不可為林谷幽閒無人, 明必見之。」

as the saying goes: “Committing a crime in broad daylight, whither can one flee?” really there is nowhere to flee. For Heaven clearly sees it even if it be in the woods, valleys, or solitary caves where there is no one. (26: 42/14–15)

and the idea of Heaven’s generosity expressed by the term hou 厚 can also be found in the substantiality, density, or intensity of Heaven’s care for people. For instance, in the chapter “tian zhi, zhong” Mozi repeats successively how he “knows why Heaven’s care of the people is substan-tial” 所以知天之愛民之厚者. (27: 45/21; 27: 46/1; 27: 46/3; 27: 46/3–4).18

after the transition section, “Fa yi” proceeds with further characteristics of Heaven and arguments for its use as a standard. Generally speaking, these characteristics correspond to a large extent to those that are typical for the Mozi. Before proceeding with further analysis of this chapter, I will first give a brief overview of some characteristics of Heaven as they appear in the “tian zhi” triplet in order to compare them with those given in the “Fa yi” chapter.

Characteristics of Heaven in the “Tian zhi” Chapters

the “tian zhi” chapters reveal human traits as the most noteworthy char-acteristic of Mozi’s image of Heaven. Compared with older texts of the Warring states period, the Mozi is an exception in this regard. Many of the characteristics of Heaven in, for example, the Documents, the Odes, Lunyu, and Laozi are more connected with nature: tian is clear (ming 明) like the sky, while earthquakes and other natural disasters mark the violent terror (wei 威) of tian. Only exceptionally does one find human

18 且吾所以知天之愛民之厚者有矣。(Mozi 27: 45/21); 且吾所以知天愛民之厚者, 不止此而已矣。(27: 46/1); 此吾之所以知天之愛民之厚也。(27: 46/3); 且吾所以知天之愛民之厚者, 不止此而已矣。(27: 46/3–4).


characteristics attributed to Heaven in these texts.19 In the “tian zhi” trip-let, however, human qualities dominate. For instance, Heaven is consid-ered “eminent and wise” (gui zhi 貴知), analogous with the eminent and wise sovereign. But the attribution of human traits goes further. Heaven, for example, “sees” ( jian 見) everything, even in “woods, valleys, or solitary caves,” as was the case in the previous excerpt from the beginning of “tian zhi, shang.” along with seeing them, Mozi’s Heaven also addresses people in words. the traditional notion of “mandate” or “command” 命 certainly has to do with the use of “words” (ming 名), but in early texts the words of Heaven or shangdi are almost never in the form of a direct address. In “tian zhi, shang,” Heaven, or more precisely the will of Heaven, addresses itself in the first person (wo 我) to the human being. to the question why the ancient rulers Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu were rewarded, Mozi provides the following answer using the notion of “three levels of benefit”:

子墨子言曰:「其事上尊天, 中事鬼神, 下愛人。故天意曰: 此之我所愛, 兼而愛之; 我所利, 兼而利之。愛人者此為博焉, 利人者此為厚焉。」

Our Master Mozi said: “In the highest sphere they revered Heaven, in the middle sphere they worshiped the spirits, and in the lower sphere they cared for the people. Hence, the will of Heaven declared: ‘all those whom I care for they also inclusively care for, and all those whom I benefit they also inclusively benefit. their care for others is expansive and their benefit to others is most substantial.’ ” (26: 43/11–12)20

such words from Heaven are very exceptional in the early Chinese corpus;21 even in the Mozi they are unique.

another projection of human characteristics can be found in the use of affective terms. these are often, but not always, terms that later acquired a “heart” radical (心 or 忄). In the Documents and Odes, such terms appear only very rarely in descriptions of Heaven;22 even the Lunyu and Laozi are conservative in this respect. Mozi’s use of such terms is striking: like

19 For a more extensive analysis of the Book of Documents and Book of Odes, see stan-daert, The Fascinating God, chaps. 6 and 7.

20 there is a negative formulation in Mozi 26: 43/14–16: 故天意曰:「此之我所愛、別而惡之, 我所利、交而賊之。惡人者此為之博也, 賊人者此為之厚也。」

21 the only exception for direct speech I have found so far is Odes 241.5 (“Huangyi” 皇矣; Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, 452), yet without the use of the first person: 帝謂文王、無然畔援、無然歆羨、誕先登于岸。“God said to King Wen: ‘Be not like those who reject this and cling to that; be not like those who are ruled by their likings and desires.’ ”

22 For exceptions, see standaert, The Fascinating God, 101–102, 113–114.


the human being, Heaven can also “desire” ( yu 欲) and “hate” (wu 惡). In response to the question “what does Heaven really desire and what does it hate?” 天亦何欲何惡 in “tian zhi, shang,” Mozi answers, “Heaven desires righteousness and hates unrighteousness” 天欲義而惡不義 (26: 42/18); and the whole passage that follows connects human and Heavenly desire and hate.

Other human keywords associated with Heaven in the Mozi, especially in the “tian zhi” chapters, are ai 愛 (to care for) and the closely connected notion of li 利 (to benefit). In the above quotation of “tian zhi, shang,” for instance, the will of Heaven says about the model kings that “all those whom I care for they also inclusively care for, and all those whom I benefit they also inclusively benefit” (26: 43/11–12). Moreover, by doing good, the human being himself also favors Heaven, who is one of the three benefi-ciaries in the “three levels of benefit.” these values are those used by Mozi to describe government under a good ruler in one of the few passages that in its wording is nearly identical in the three “tian zhi” chapters:

子墨子言曰: 處大國不攻小國, 處大家不篡小家。強者不劫弱, 貴者不傲賤, 多詐者不欺愚。此必上利於天, 中利於鬼, 下利於人。三利無所不利。故舉天下美名加之, 謂之聖王。

Our Master Mozi says: “He who is in a large state does not attack small states; he who is in a large house does not molest small houses. the strong does not plunder the weak; the honored does not disdain the humble; the clever does not deceive the stupid. this is beneficial to Heaven above, ben-eficial to the spirits in the middle sphere, and beneficial to the people below. Being beneficial to these three, it is beneficial to all. so the most excellent name is attributed to such a man, and he is called sage-king.” (26: 43/25–27; cf. 27: 46/10, 三利無所不利, 是謂天德, and 28: 48/26, 三利而無所不利, 是謂天德)

this attitude is even called “Heavenly virtue” (tian de 天德) (28: 48/26). the human being and Heaven thus take part in one great project that is beneficial to everyone.

the most prominent term with a heart radical is “will” (zhi 志) in the title of the triplet “Will of Heaven” (天志). Mozi actually more frequently refers to yi 意 (intent, intention), with the expression 天(之)意, although it is difficult to discern the difference between the two terms tian zhi and tian yi.23 By employing the concept “will of Heaven,” Mozi stresses that

23 For an attempt to find some subtle differences, see radosav, “Lun Mozi zhexue de ‘tianyi,’ ” 431–432.


such a will exists outside and beyond the human being. It is not just a man-date intended for an individual but a will that the ruler, the gentleman, and everyone else must obey. Mozi repeatedly points out how the human being “must follow (shun 順) the will of Heaven” and not “go against” ( fan 反) it. the central concept in these chapters is, after all, “justice” or “righ-teousness” ( yi 義), for which Mozi makes a fervent plea in these three chapters. Yi is one of the concepts that was close to Confucius’s heart as well, but for him it meant something more like “appropriate behavior” or “duty”: that which one is expected to do given one’s position, such as to honor and take care for one’s parents. the Mohists remove yi from this traditional and relational discourse and give it a somewhat new meaning in the direction of distributive justice: benefit for all. this “righteousness actually originated in Heaven” 義果自天出矣 (27: 44/14, 27: 44/22–23; 28: 48/1).

In general, the “tian zhi” chapters attribute to Heaven all the traits that form the core of Mozi’s own moral teachings: namely, “care for everyone and benefit everyone.” Mozi not only implores people to care for everyone but believes that Heaven itself does so and that Heaven expects the same of human beings. Heaven sees to this through rewards and punishments. Caring for others by benefiting them will thus also result in personal ben-efit; not caring for others and thus injuring them will result in personal injury. the person who follows the will of Heaven receives rewards (shang 賞); the person who opposes it meets punishment ( fa 罰).

Comparing “Fa yi” to the “Tian zhi” Triplet

Generally speaking, several essential elements in “Fa yi” appear in the “tian zhi” chapters, albeit in a much more succinct way. In “Fa yi,” care and benefit also occupy the central place (sections 3–5): Heaven wants people to care for one another and benefit one another and does not want them to hate one another and harm one another, because Heaven itself cares for them inclusively and benefits them inclusively. this is proven by the fact that Heaven receives offerings from everybody and then gives fortune to the good and sends harm to the evildoer, as is shown by histori-cal examples.

In comparing the “Fa yi” and the “tian zhi” chapters in more detail, one can first point at differences: some key notions of the “tian zhi” chapters do not appear in “Fa yi.” First, “Fa yi” does not make reference to yi 義, which is a core concept in the “tian zhi” chapters. except for the shortness


of the chapter, no obvious reason can be found to explain this. second is the absence of the terms tian zhi and tian yi in “Fa yi.” this absence, however, should not be considered exceptional, because the term tian zhi hardly appears in the whole Mozi book, including “tian zhi.”24 thus, the fact that it, or even tian yi, does not appear in “Fa yi” is in itself not exceptional. there are also some differences in emphasis: the second part of “Fa yi,” on the topic of Heaven, is preceded, in section 3, by a clarifica-tion of what it means that the ancient sage-kings measured every action by Heaven: “What Heaven desired they carried out; what Heaven did not desire they refrained from.” next follows a series of three questions. the first is about what Heaven “desires” and “hates,” which are also keywords in the “tian zhi” triplet. the answer focuses on the core ideas of “care” and “benefit”: “Certainly Heaven desires to have human beings care for one another and benefit one another and does not desire to have them hate one another and hurt one another.” this idea, characteristic of the “Jian ai” chapters, receives a foundation in Heaven in the “tian zhi” trip-let. While this is a familiar idea, the exact formulation in “Fa yi” (xiang ai xiang li 相愛相利 and xiang wu xiang zei 相惡相賊) does not occur elsewhere in the Mozi. In “tian zhi, shang” one finds the expression jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li 兼相愛、交相利 (inclusively caring for each other, mutually benefiting each other), which is also characteristic of the “Jian ai, zhong” chapter, where it is considered a fa (see above).25 the reason “Fa yi” uses the shorter expression xiang ai xiang li can possibly be found in the two answers that follow: we know that Heaven desires and expects this from human beings because Heaven itself “cares for them inclusively and benefits them inclusively.” and we know the latter because Heaven “pos-sesses them inclusively and accepts offerings from them inclusively.” thus, Heaven wants human beings to care for each other because Heaven itself cares for them and this is confirmed by Heaven accepting their offerings. Yet, the keyword in the “Jian ai, zhong” passages is jian 兼 (inclusively). Xiang ai xiang li in “Fa yi” applied to human beings stands in contrast with the inclusive jian (and not the reciprocal jiao or xiang), which is applied to Heaven in “Jian ai, zhong,” in a parallel sentence with ai and li.

the importance attached to jian in the “Fa yi” chapter shows that the idea of inclusiveness is closely linked to the idea of an infallible fa and to

24 see the introduction to this volume.25 see defoort, “the Growing scope of Jian 兼,” and her essay in this volume.


the reason for choosing tian as fa. In section 2 of “Fa yi” it was explained that there are only few parents, teachers, and rulers who are ren, and that therefore taking parents, teachers, and rulers as standards would be simi-lar to conforming to a standard that is often “inhumane” (bu ren). Heaven, on the contrary, is jian. One finds a similar reasoning in the “tian zhi” chapters, especially “tian zhi, zhong,” which is chronologically the latest of that triplet. In it, the focus shifts from the parents or ruler not being ren to the other pole of the five relationships: the son or the subject not serving his parents or ruler and thus being not ren.

且夫天下蓋有不仁不祥者。曰當若子之不事父, 弟之不事兄, 臣之不事君也。」故天下之君子, 與謂之不祥者。今夫天兼天下而愛之, 撽遂萬物以利之。若豪之末, 末非天之所為也, 而民得而利之, 則可謂后矣。然獨無報夫天, 而不知其為不仁不祥也。此吾所謂君子明細而不明大也。

In the world there are those who are inhumane and are unfortunate. I speak of a son who does not serve his father, a younger brother who does not serve his elder brother, or a subordinate who does not serve his superior. then all the gentlemen of the world will call him unfortunate. as for Heaven, it cares for everything in the world inclusively, quickly ripens all things to benefit them. since even the tip of an autumn hair is made by Heaven, and people get to benefit from it, it can be said to be really substantial. Why then do they not compensate Heaven, and do they not know this to be inhumane and unfortunate? this is why I say that the gentlemen understand things on a small scale but not on a large scale. (27: 45/16–19)

this reasoning is then further developed by stating that one knows that Heaven’s care for the people (min 民) is substantial because Heaven orders sun, moon, and stars for them, regulates the four seasons, sends frost, rain, and dew, grows grain and silk, and provides hills, rivers, metal, and animals for the people. Contrary to the son who, after being taken care of by his father, does not return the same care to his father and is thus considered bu ren, Heaven’s care is always inclusive.

In many regards, “tian zhi, zhong” extends the ideas that have been developed in the earlier chapters. although yi 義 remains the core con-cept, it is noteworthy that “tian zhi, zhong,” more than the other chapters, considers following Heaven as a basis of humaneness (ren). the use of this term in the Mohist texts is rather exceptional. Moreover, as appears from tables 1 and 2, the term appears only in the later chapters, usually in combination with yi. this is also clear in the “tian zhi” chapters, which are all to be dated quite late. Within the triplet there is a gradual increase in the use of ren: it occurs once in “tian zhi, shang”, eight times in “tian


zhi, xia,” and twelve times in “tian zhi, zhong.” this apparent evolution and the later date suggest that in their debates with contemporaries, the Mohists increasingly were searching for a foundation for the whole moral conduct of human beings, including the key notion of ren. On the one hand, they adopted the term as a positive value, which was then also used to evaluate the conduct of opponents. On the other hand, they found the term unsatisfactory and preferred ai. In “Fa yi” the term ren is prominent (nine times), but it is used three times in succession in the same construc-tion: it is because the humane among the parents, teachers, and rulers are few that these cannot be considered standards. Heaven, on the contrary, is able to fulfill this role.

the content of “Fa yi” can further be related to the growing scope of jian and to the idea of reciprocity, as developed by Carine defoort in her essay in this volume. By establishing reciprocity between Heaven and all human beings, “Fa yi” extends the meaning of jian. though the term “people” (min) does not occur in “Fa yi,” all states in the world, large or small, are cities of Heaven (tian zhi yi 天之邑),26 and all human beings, young or old, noble or humble, are subjects of Heaven (tian zhi chen 天之臣).27 this is strengthened by the certainty of reward for all human beings who care for and benefit others. “Fa yi” does not, however, radicalize the moral stance to the extent that reciprocity becomes a duty toward Heaven rather than something to be expected from others.

not only does Mozi indicate that Heaven cares inclusively for people, but he also offers reasons for it. “Fa yi” in fact advances two major arguments. the first reason is that Heaven claims human beings inclusively and accepts offerings from them inclusively; this aspect of offerings is further developed in the final sections of “Fa yi.” the second reason is that in Mozi’s opinion, Heaven, in an automatic and perfect way, brings fortune to anyone who takes care of and benefits others and brings disaster to anyone who hates

26 the same expression occurs once more in “Fei gong, xia”: 意將以為利天乎？夫取天之人, 以攻天之邑, 此刺殺天民, 剝振神之位, 傾覆社稷, 攘殺其犧牲。則此上不中天之利矣。“Is this intended to benefit Heaven? Yet one has gathered together the men of Heaven to besiege the cities of Heaven; so they are massacring the people of Heaven, driving out the spirits of their ancestors, overthrowing their altars of the soil and grain, and slaughtering their sacrificial animals. It is then not a benefit to Heaven on high” (Mozi 19: 33/28–29). see also “tian zhi, shang”: 天有邑人, 何用弗愛也？“since Heaven possesses all the cities and the people, how could it fail to take care of them?” (26: 43/20–21). In this sentence, Bi Yuan emended 色 into 邑.

27 this is a unique expression in the Mozi.


or hurts others. there is a close link between these two arguments. those who make offerings to Heaven are in turn taken care of by Heaven.

these ideas can also be found in the Core Chapters on the will of Heaven. several sentences in “Fa yi” are in fact very similar to sentences in the chapters “tian zhi, shang” and “tian zhi, xia”28, which are the two “tian zhi” chapters that are closest to each other. this seems to indi-cate that the editor of “Fa yi” had access to at least one of these texts (or maybe, less likely, that the editor of the two “tian zhi” chapters had access to the text of “Fa yi”). One can notice a development in the argumenta-tion in the course of these two chapters. In “tian zhi, xia” the reciprocity between offering sacrifices and caring for others is much more developed: in the same way that the lords of Chu and Yue accepted offerings from all within their borders and therefore also cared for the people of Chu and Yue, Heaven inclusively receives offerings from all under Heaven, and therefore, Heaven inclusively cares for all the people under Heaven. the similarity in wording between “Fa yi” and “tian zhi, zhong,” which is the latest chapter in the triplet, is more limited. the latter mentions the preparation of clean wine and millet cakes for offerings in a different context and contains a statement that is only somewhat similar to the statement in “Fa yi” that “he who murders the innocent will be visited by misfortune” 殺不辜者, 得不祥焉. (4: 4/28)29

these different aspects can throw some light on the dating of the “Fa yi” chapter. Instead of being considered a late “forgery” or merely a “sum-mary” of the “tian zhi” chapters,30 it may be a step in a process or evo-lution of ideas. various elements indicate that “Fa yi” could be situated chronologically between “tian zhi, shang/xia” and “tian zhi, zhong,” the latter being very structured. On the one hand, “Fa yi” contains several

28 Compare 4: 4/23–26 with 26: 43/19–20 and 28: 48/4–6; compare also 4: 5/1–2 with 28: 48/14–17.

29 Compare 4: 4/28 with 27: 46/1 and also with 26: 43/21, 28: 48/11.30 Most of the early discussions on the seven “summaries” focused on the question

of whether they were “genuine or forgeries” 真, 偽—that is, whether or not they were written by Mo di 墨翟 (or the Mojia 墨家). Wu Yujiang 吳毓江, “Mozi gepian zhen wei kao,” 1012–1013, gives an overview of the opinions of Bi Yuan 畢沅, Wang Zhong 汪中, sun Yirang 孫詒讓, Hu shi 胡適, and Liang rengong 梁任公 (= Liang Qichao). to this one can add the early writings of, for instance, Huang Jianzhong 黃建中, Luan tiaofu 欒調甫, and Fang shouchu 方授楚. they vary in opinion over whether these chapters or some of them are genuine or not, chapters 1–3 being more likely to be “forgeries,” and chapters 4–7 belonging to the Mozi school rather than to Mo di. But they usually agree on the fact that these are late chapters. the evolutionary analysis is less concerned about whether they are written by Mo di himself and more with the place they occupied in the chain of textual production.


sentences similar to those in “tian zhi, shang/xia.” On the other hand, it stresses the importance of ren, a theme that is more prominent in “tian zhi, zhong”; and it also does not include the theme of reciprocity as a duty to Heaven, an idea that is fully developed in “tian zhi, zhong.”

“Fa yi” affirms the certainty with which Heaven brings fortune or disas-ter in reaction to human behavior. this is also in line with the “tian zhi” chapters, but once more it is formulated in a unique way, using the expres-sions “bring them fortune” ( fu zhi 福之) and “bring them disaster” (huo zhi 禍之); in the “tian zhi” triplet “reward” (shang 賞) and “punish” ( fa 罰) are commonly used. the idea of fortune and disaster is developed in the last section (section 5) of “Fa yi,” which presents successively the posi-tive and negative historical examples of such an automatic retribution: respectively, the sage-kings Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu, and the evil kings Jie, Zhou, You, and Li. the sage-kings inclusively took care of all in the world and also benefited them, and that is why Heaven instituted them as sons of Heaven and why they were respected as such; the wicked kings were counterexamples. the sage-kings are also quoted in the “tian zhi” chap-ters, with Yao and shun added in the two last chapters (“tian zhi, xia” and “tian zhi, zhong”). they are proposed as examples of following the will of Heaven and of inclusiveness. the “Fa yi” description corresponds mostly to an argumentation that can be found in “tian zhi, xia”.31

Heaven as a Standard in the “Tian zhi” Triplet

the core idea of “Fa yi” is that Heaven should be the ultimate standard of human conduct. Likewise, the “tian zhi” chapters not only describe Heaven but also consider it a standard. the increasing need for a standard and for Heaven as being that standard, as was pointed out above, can also be observed within the three “tian zhi” chapters. as in “Fa yi,” Heaven and standard come together.

there is, however, also an evolution with regard to this idea throughout the three chapters, which may help to clarify the specificity of “Fa yi.” In the first chapter of the “tian zhi” series, fa appears only once—in the very last sentence. It is preceded by a reference to artisans’ tools—the compass and the square—with which the will of Heaven is compared. some word-ing is similar to “Fa yi” (e.g., the use of zhòng 中 “to fit precisely,” “to hit

31 see 4: 5/1–2 and 28: 48/14–17.


the mark”), but the analogy is used in a different way: the primary pur-pose is not to use a standard for something that the carpenter is making himself but to “measure all the square and circular objects in the world.” Likewise, Mozi is measuring with his standard the conduct and doctrines of the gentlemen in the world and concludes that they are far from exem-plifying humaneness and righteousness.

子墨子言曰: 我有天志, 譬若輪人之有規, 匠人之有矩。輪匠執其規矩, 以度天下之方圜, 曰: 中者是也, 不中者非也。今天下之士君子之書, 不可勝載, 言語不可盡計。上說諸侯, 下說列士, 其於仁義則大相遠也。何以知之？曰: 我得天下之明法以度之。

Our Master Mozi said: “the will of Heaven to me is like the compass to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. the wheelwright and the car-penter use their compass and square to measure what is circular and square in the world and say: ‘What fits is right and what does not fit is wrong.’ the writings of the officer-gentlemen of the world of the present day cannot all be loaded [in a cart], and their doctrines cannot be exhaustively enumer-ated. they endeavor to convince the feudal lords, on the one hand, and the scholars, on the other, but from humaneness and righteousness they are far off. How do we know? Because I have the clearest standard in the world to measure them with.” (26: 44/1–4)

In this quotation the measuring is a value judgment of “right” (shi 是) and “wrong” ( fei 非). this use of a standard to evaluate the conduct of others is characteristic of the “tian zhi” chapters. Mozi’s standard became an increasingly powerful instrument, not only to measure one’s own conduct, but to measure and criticize the conduct of opponents.

the chronologically second chapter in the series, “tian zhi, xia,” has several references to fa and tian. In a paragraph that is very similar to the final section of “Fa yi,” the historical proof is presented of the sage-kings being rewarded and installed as sons of Heaven as a result of their caring for and benefiting the people. specific to this passage, however, is that the sons of Heaven were installed to “serve as a standard.” thus, not only is Heaven a standard, but Heaven installs others as standards as well:

故昔也三代之聖王堯舜禹湯文武之兼愛之天下也, 從而利之。移其百姓之意焉, 率以敬上帝山川鬼神。天以為從其所愛而愛之, 從其所利而利之, 於是加其賞焉, 使之處上位, 立為天子以法也, 名之曰「聖人」。以此知其賞善之證。

anciently, the sage-kings of the three dynasties, Yao, shun, Yu, tang, Wen, and Wu, cared for the world inclusively and proceeded to benefit it. they converted the intentions of the people and led them to worship the High Lord, hills and rivers, and the spirits. Heaven was pleased because they cared for those whom it cared for and benefited what it would benefit,


and [Heaven] bestowed rewards upon them, placing them on the throne, installing them as sons of Heaven to serve as the standard, and calling them “sages.” Here we have the proof of reward of the good. (28: 48/14–17)

the next reference in the same chapter includes the expression yifa 儀法, the inverse expression of the title “Fa yi.” this expression occurs only in “tian zhi, xia” (three times), which could be a further indication of the chronological closeness between “Fa yi” and “tian zhi, xia.” Here the artisan analogy is used in a way similar to the one in “tian zhi, shang”—namely, to judge others:

故子墨子置立天之, 以為儀法, 若輪人之有規, 匠人之有矩也。今輪人以規, 匠人以矩, 以此知方圜之別矣。是故子墨子置立天之, 以為儀法, 吾以此知天下之士君子之去義遠也。

Hence, our Master Mozi established the will of Heaven as his norm and standard, just as the wheelwright uses his compass and the carpenter uses his square. now, the wheelwright with his compass and the carpenter with his square can know the difference between what is square and what is circular. similarly, having established the will of Heaven as the norm and standard, I [Mozi] can know that the gentlemen of the world are far from righteousness. (28: 49/1–3)32

this theme is likewise used in the concluding sentences of the chapter. to convey this message, a line from the Shijing is quoted.33 In addition, the will of Heaven is also described as the jing 經 of righteousness, which seems to function as a synonym for fa.

故子墨子置天之, 以為儀法。非獨子墨子以天之志為法也, 於先王之書《大夏》之道之然: 「帝謂文王, 予懷明德, 毋大聲以色, 毋長夏以革。不識不知, 順帝之則。」此誥文王之以天志為法也, 而順帝之則也。且今天下之士君子, 中實將欲為仁義, 求為上士, 上欲中聖王之道, 下欲中國家百姓之利者, 當天之志, 而不可不察也。天之志者, 義之經也。

therefore, our Master Mozi established the will of Heaven to be the norm and standard. not only did our Master Mozi establish the will of Heaven

32 still another use: 有書之竹帛, 藏之府庫, 為人後子者, 必且欲順其先君之行, 曰: 何不當發吾府庫, 視吾先君之法義? “they recorded it on bamboo and silk and kept them in the archives so that the descendants would imitate their royal ancestors, saying: ‘Why not let us open up the archives and let us learn of the standards and righteousness of our ancestors?’ ” (Mozi 28: 49/10–11).

33 Odes 241.7 (“Huangyi” 皇矣); see Legge, The Chinese Classics, vol. 4, 454. In “tianzhi, shang” there is no quotation from classical texts, in “tian zhi, xia” there is one, and in “tian zhi, zhong” there are three: two from the Shijing, one from the Shujing. this shows the growing need to argue on the basis of classical texts.


to be the standard, it is also the theme of an ode in the “da ya” 大雅 (Great Odes) among the books of the ancient kings: “the Lord said to King Wen, ‘I cherish your intelligent virtue. It was not proclaimed with much noise or gesture. It was not modified after the possession of the empire. It happened without consciousness of effort, following the scheme of the Lord.’” this is to proclaim that King Wen used the will of Heaven as a standard and followed the Lord’s scheme. If the gentlemen of the world really desire to practice humaneness and righteousness and be superior men, seeking to attain the Way of the sage-kings, on the one hand, and to procure blessings to the people in the state, on the other, they must not neglect to examine the will of Heaven. the will of Heaven is the immutable norm of righteous-ness. (28: 50/4–8)

a final step is made in the last chapter of the series, “tian zhi, zhong.” this is in fact one of the most structured chapters of the Mozi and clearly had a different editor than the other two “tian zhi” chapters. In its conclusion fa is again prominently present.34 Here some similarities and differences with the previous chapters appear. the conclusion starts with the artisan analogy:

是故子墨子之有天之,35 辟之無以異乎輪人之有規, 匠人之有矩也。今夫輪人操其規, 將以量度天下之圜與不圜也, 曰: 「中吾規者謂之圜, 不中吾規者謂之不圜。」是以圜與不圜, 皆可得而知也。此其故何？則圜法明也。

therefore, the will of Heaven is to our Master Mozi like the compass to the wheelwright and the square to the carpenter. the wheelwright uses his com-pass to measure what is circular and not circular in the world, saying: “that which fits my compass is called circular. that which does not is called not circular.” therefore, whether an object is circular or not can all be known. Why is this so? Because the standard of circularity is clear. (27: 46/27–29)

the same description is repeated for the wheelwright. the reason for con-fidence in the standard is that it is “clear” or “bright” (ming 明), the same word used in the description of Heaven in “Fa yi” when it was said that Heaven’s “brightness endures without fading” (section 3). next “tian zhi, zhong” states that Mozi similarly measures with the will of Heaven the jurisdiction and government of the lords in the world, on the one hand, and the doctrines and teachings of the multitudes in the world, on the

34 One other use of fa in the same chapter: 帝善其順法則也, 故舉殷以賞之, 使貴為天子, 富有天下, 名譽至今不息。“Because he was obedient to God’s scheme, he rewarded him with Yin and honoured him by making him emperor and enriched him with the empire” (Mozi 27: 46/14–15).

35 Following the variant 志 for 之, as indicated in the Mozi zhuzi suoyin.


other, in order to check whether they correspond to what he calls “good” (shan 善) or “bad” (bu shan 不善). Here, as was noticed before, one can observe a further evolution of the shift from the instrument of measure-ment to the person who uses the standard. Mozi claims that, like an artisan estimating his material on the basis of a fixed norm, he judges all men in the world, including kings and ministers, against the yardstick of the “will of Heaven.” He calls their behavior good or bad. thus, one recognizes in him a tendency to place himself above actual politics by means of the power of language and through reference to Heaven.

subsequently, the “tian zhi, zhong” chapter summarizes Mozi’s opinion in a very succinct way. First, similar to the previous chapters, it is stated that the will of Heaven is used as a standard to evaluate “humane” (ren) and “inhumane” (bu ren). the author has full confidence in this method, as they are as distinguishable as “black and white.” this highlights the infallibility of any standard in the eyes of Mozi.

故置此以為法, 立此以為儀, 將以量度天下之王公大人卿大夫之仁與不仁, 譬之猶分黑白也。

With this as the standard and with this as the norm, whether the lords and the ministers are humane or not humane can be measured as [easily as] distinguishing between black and white. (27: 47/5–6)

the conclusion repeats a key sentence that can be found elsewhere in “tian zhi, zhong.” the chapter started with a question about the source of righteousness, and “tian zhi, shang,” “tian zhi, xia,” and also other chapters served as preparation for what is developed in “tian zhi, zhong.” But the arguments receive another structure and a more compact form in “tian zhi, zhong.” Characteristic of this structure is that each of the four main arguments is closed by the same approving words of Mozi, which also appear at the end of the chapter:

是故子墨子曰: 今天下之王公大人士君子, 中實將欲遵道利民, 本察仁義之本, 天之意不可不順也。

therefore, our Master Mozi said: “If the rulers and the gentlemen of the world really want to follow the Way and benefit the people, they have to investigate fundamentally the basis of humaneness and righteousness, and the will of Heaven can only be followed.” (27: 47/8–9)

now, however, as a final climax, this synthetic statement itself is consid-ered a standard, since the following is added:

順天之意者, 義之法也。

to follow the will of Heaven is the standard of righteousness. (27: 47/9)


Conclusion

the “Fa yi” chapter may have been one point in an evolution of the Mohist doctrine, not necessarily the final one. In the course of the Mozi texts one can notice a growing need to ground the core ideas: promotion of the worthy, repudiation of aggressive warfare, caring for and benefiting each other, and so on. the basic idea of this foundation is a need for certainty, for which the analogy of the tools of artisans, such as the compass and square, is the best example. In using these instruments, the artisan has a standard that is objective, measurable, infallible, and presumably out-side his own will. this is taken as a metaphor for the use of standards for human behavior: the rather abstract standards (such as inclusive care of each other and mutual benefit to each other) and the personalized ones (such as the ancient sage-kings) should all function in the same way: objectively, measurably, infallibly, and outside one’s own will. the ulti-mate standard is Heaven because it is absolutely inclusive. this reasoning also reflects another evolution: the shift from the concrete tools of the artisan to the more abstract standards for human behavior results in a shift of focus from the standard to the one who is using the standard. this becomes even clearer in yet another evolution: standards assist in shaping and evaluating not only one’s own conduct but also the conduct of others. While the Mohists seem to come closer to their contemporaries by adopting their language (such as ren and the citation of classical writ-ings), they gradually intensify their claim to possessing the standards for moral behavior and good government. the fact that in this discourse they even take Heaven as the ultimate standard must have been frightening for their opponents.

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All fragments are quoted using the Chinese text in D. C. Lau’s Mozi zhuzi suoyin 墨子逐字索引 (A Concordance to the “Mozi”): the first number refers to the chapter, the second to the page in Mozi zhuzi suoyin, the third to the line. What follows is the reference in this volume.

1. “Qin shi” 親士 (Intimacy with Officers)

RefeRenCes tO the Mozi

1: 1/5–6 215, 2291: 1/8 2291: 1/8–9 2191: 1/9 2201: 1/9–10 2211: 1/10–12 222, 225, 2291: 1/12 2341: 1/14 2291: 1/14–15 2301: 1/14–18 2261: 1/16 228

1: 1/17 2281: 1/20–23 2271: 1/21 1141: 1/22 2171: 1/25–26 2161: 1/26–2/5 218, 2301: 1/26–27 2291: 1/27 218, 229–2301: 1/28–29 2311: 1/29–2/1 216, 2301: 2/5 230

4. “fa yi” 法儀 (standards and norms)

4: 4/8–12 2414: 4/14–18 2424: 4/20–21 2554: 4/20–24 60 n. 62, 2424: 4/23–26 263 n. 28

4: 4/24–29 2434: 4/28 2634: 5/1 25 n. 71, 27 n. 764: 5/1–2 263 n. 28, 264 n. 314: 5/1–5 114, 244

5. “Qi huan” 七患 (seven Misfortunes)

5: 5/17–24 114

8. “shang xian, shang” 尚賢上 (elevate the Worthy, Upper)

8: 9/7 209, 2328: 9/11 2088: 9/11–12 2088: 9/11–18 2148: 9/15–18 2118: 9/16 194 n. 268: 9/20–26 2118: 9/26–28 213

8: 9/30 208, 2218: 9/30–10/1 2108: 9/30–10/2 2128: 10/1–2 210–2118: 10/6–8 1638: 10/11–12 1648: 10/13 215

282 references to the mozi

9. “shang xian, zhong” 尚賢中 (elevate the Worthy, Middle)

10. “shang xian, xia” 尚賢下 (elevate the Worthy, Lower)

9: 10/17 2099: 10/18 2089: 10/19–21 2119: 10/20 2089: 10/21 2129: 10/24 2089: 10/26–11/2 2129: 10/26–28 2329: 10/30 2089: 11/2 1519: 11/4 2109: 11/4–5 2129: 11/5 210, 2119: 11/13 208, 212

9: 11/13–14 2129: 11/13–16 1949: 11/25–26 2109: 12/8–9 1549: 12/12–15 1699: 12/17–18 2559: 12/17–22 60 n. 629: 12/20 1519: 12/20–28 1119: 12/21 279: 12/22 25 n. 719: 13/17–18 209, 223, 2329: 13/18 215

10: 13/23 209, 23210: 13/24 208, 21510: 13/25–27 21110: 13/27 21110: 14/6–7 208, 22310: 14/6–16 19610: 14/7–15 21010: 14/14–15 210

10: 14/15–16 22310: 14/18 20810: 14/19–24 16910: 14/24–25 11110: 15/3 20810: 15/16–17 199 n. 3310: 16/2–3 254

11. “shang tong, shang” 尚同上 (Conform Upward, Upper)

11: 16/10 19111: 16/10–11 192

11: 16/12–13 199 n. 3311: 16/19–23 183

12. “shang tong, zhong” 尚同中 (Conform Upward, Middle)

12: 17/18 199 n. 3312: 18/9–10 19012: 18/22–23 250

12: 18/30–19/2 11112: 20/2–3 19112: 20/5–8 191

14. “Jian ai, shang” 兼愛上 (Inclusive Care, Upper)

14: 24/18–19 48 14: 24/22 46

15. “Jian ai, zhong” 兼愛中 (Inclusive Care, Middle)

15: 24/26–27 198 n. 32, 20215: 25/6–7 5015: 25/10–11 24915: 25/19 4115: 25/21 5015: 25/22 51

15: 25/22–24 5215: 25/22–26/9 19115: 25/24–25 51, 19415: 26/10–12 19115: 26/11–12 5115: 26/12 197 n. 29

references to the mozi 283

15: 26/14 41, 50, 44 n. 2615: 26/17–22 16415: 26/21 52, 60 n. 6115: 26/22 54 n. 44, 62 n. 70

15: 26/24 5215: 26/25 52 n. 3915: 26/26 5215: 26/28–27/2 248

16. “Jian ai, xia” 兼愛下 (Inclusive Care, Lower)

16: 27/8–9 53 n. 4016: 27/13 5316: 27/14 5316: 27/14–16 5416: 27/16–17 54 n. 4316: 27/18 5416: 27/24–25 5416: 27/28 41–42, 18316: 27/28–28/10 195 n. 2816: 27/29 4216: 27/29–28/4 222 n. 2816: 27/31–28/1 5516: 28/1–4 222 n. 2816: 28/3–4 5516: 28/4–5 18316: 28/8–10 5516: 28/12 4116: 28/13–19 222 n. 28

16: 28/15–16 5516: 28/18 5516: 28/21–23 5516: 28/29–29/1 116: 29/1–3 6016: 29/2 3716: 29/2–3 25016: 29/6–7 25016: 29/10–11 42, 25116: 29/14–15 25116: 29/15 4116: 29/17 5616: 29/19–21 5716: 29/23–24 57, 191, 19416: 29/25–30/4 19116: 30/4 197 n. 2916: 30/7 44

17. “fei gong, shang” 非攻上 (Against Military Aggression, Upper)

17: 30/17–24 7517: 30/18 45 n. 3017: 30/26–28 7517: 30/27–31/3 196

17: 30/28–29 7617: 31/1–4 19017: 31/3 196

18. “fei gong, zhong” 非攻中 (Against Military Aggression, Middle)

18: 31/9–10 7918: 31/12–17 8018: 31/21–22 81

18: 31/24–25 8118: 32/4–7 8218: 32/17–23 8

19. “fei gong, xia” 非攻下 (Against Military Aggression, Lower)

19: 33/12–15 85, 153 n. 31, 24819: 33/15–17 19619: 33/17–21 8619: 33/23–27 8619: 33/26–27 56 n. 5419: 33/28–29 89, 262 n. 2619: 33/28–30 11219: 34/16–17 16519: 34/16–35/8 166

19: 34/17 15219: 34/18 8619: 34/21 16519: 34/23–35/1 8819: 34/25 124 n. 6619: 34/27 124 n. 6619: 35/2–3 16619: 35/5 124 n. 66


20. “Jie yong, shang” 節用上 (Moderation in expenses, Upper)

20: 36/19–21 247 n. 6

25. “Jie zang, xia” 節葬下 (Moderation in Burials, Lower)

25: 38/26 14425: 38/26–39/6 18325: 39/9 101 n. 1925: 40/1–8 11225: 40/10–11 14425: 40/18–22 136

25: 40/24–26 170, 24725: 40/28 101 n. 19, 18325: 40/29–41/3 17225: 41/18 101 n. 1925: 41/29–30 113

26. “tian zhi, shang” 天志上 (Will of heaven, Upper)

26: 42/14–15 25626: 42/18 25826: 42/27–29 253 n. 1326: 43/1 253 n. 1326: 43/2–4 11026: 43/7–8 198 n. 3126: 43/7–12 63 n. 7226: 43/8 62 n. 6826: 43/9–10 14426: 43/9–14 11026: 43/11 25, 27

26: 43/11–12 257, 25826: 43/14–16 257 n. 2026: 43/15 62 n. 6826: 43/18–23 11026: 43/19–20 263 n. 2826: 43/20–21 262 n. 2626: 43/21 263 n. 2926: 43/25–27 198 n. 31, 25826: 43/26 42 n. 2226: 43/28 42 n. 2226: 44/1–4 265

27. “tian zhi, zhong” 天志中 (Will of heaven, Middle)

27: 44/14 25927: 44/17–20 11027: 44/22–23 25927: 44/26–45/2 198 n. 3127: 44/28 199 n. 3327: 44/28–30 13627: 44/29–30 11027: 45/16–19 26127: 45/16–46/25 63 n. 7227: 45/17–19 6327: 45/21 256

27: 45/25–29 6327: 46/1 256, 263 n. 2927: 46/3 25627: 46/3–4 25627: 46/10 25827: 46/14–15 267 n. 3427: 46/23–24 11027: 46/27–29 26727: 47/5–6 26827: 47/8–9 26827: 47/9 268

28. “tian zhi, xia” 天志下 (Will of heaven, Lower)

28: 47/24–26 253 n. 1328: 48/1 25928: 48/1–4 6128: 48/4 2728: 48/4–6 263 n. 2828: 48/4–8 11028: 48/6–7 89 n. 2228: 48/6–8 62

28: 48/8 2728: 48/10–21 6228: 48/11 263 n. 2928: 48/14–15 6228: 48/14–17 263 n. 28, 264 n. 31,

26628: 48/15, 2728: 48/23–24 61 n. 65

references to the mozi 285

28: 48/23–28 198 n. 3128: 48/26 25828: 49/1–3 266

28: 49/7–8 19628: 50/4–8 267

31. “Ming gui, xia” 明鬼下 (explaining Ghosts, Lower)

31: 50/25–26 9931: 50/26–27 10031: 51/8–9 10131: 51/11–13 10131: 51/23–24 10131: 51/26–27 10131: 52/5–6 10131: 52/13–14 10131: 52/19–22 25031: 52/20 16731: 52/23 8731: 52/27 148 n. 1831: 53/2–3 135

31: 53/17 168, 252 n. 1231: 53/23 252 n. 1231: 54/11 10331: 54/11–12 10331: 54/17–18 10431: 54/27 10431: 55/1–2 10631: 55/1–11 13531: 55/5–6 10631: 55/5–7 10531: 55/7 18331: 55/7–8 155

32. “fei yue, shang” 非樂上 (Against Music, Upper)

32: 55/24 16932: 57/15–17 154

32: 57/17–18 170

35. “fei ming, shang” 非命上 (Against fatalism, Upper)

35: 58/13–18 18435: 58/15 101 n. 1935: 58/15–16 18335: 58/17 101 n. 1935: 58/19 184 n. 1735: 58/19–20 18435: 58/19–22 18435: 59/2 101 n. 1935: 59/4 101 n. 19

35: 59/5–6 11335: 59/7–8 25 n. 7135: 59/9 2735: 59/17 101 n. 1935: 59/21 101 n. 1935: 60/7 101 n. 1935: 60/7–10 18335: 60/8 11335: 60/13 101 n. 19

36. “fei ming, zhong” 非命中 (Against fatalism, Middle)

36: 60/17–21 252 36: 60/19–20 184 n. 17

37. “fei ming, xia” 非命下 (Against fatalism, Lower)

37: 63/3 148 n. 18

39. “fei Ru, xia” 非儒下 (Against the Ru, Lower)

39: 64/19–26 106 n. 24


46. “Geng Zhu” 耕柱 (Geng Zhu)

46: 100/7–14 11646: 100/16–18 19046: 100/20–21 2846: 100/20–23 187 n. 21, 18846: 100/30–31 11646: 100/30–101/3 18946: 101/1–10 175 n. 246: 101/5 181 n. 1146: 101/9–11 178

46: 101/14–18 17946: 101/20–21 176 n. 546: 101/26–28 9246: 101/30 18546: 102/11 19346: 102/19–20 181 n. 946: 102/24–103/1 18546: 103/5–9 91

47. “Gui yi” 貴義 (Valuing Morality)

47: 103/23–26 19247: 103/28–104/1 19947: 104/6–7 11647: 104/15–17 178, 19547: 104/19–20 185, 19547: 104/22–23 19547: 104/22–26 20047: 104/28 197

47: 105/4–7 19747: 105/13–14 19347: 105/16–17 17847: 105/26–28 18047: 106/4 19347: 106/4–5 19247: 106/5–7 193

48. “Gongmeng” 公孟 (Gongmeng)

48: 106/25–26 18948: 106/25–31 181 n. 948: 106/31 18948: 107/5–9 181 n. 948: 107/20–23 171 n. 62, 181 n. 948: 107/27 25 n. 71, 26, 17948: 108/1–3 11748: 108/17–18 11748: 108/20–21 171 n. 6248: 108/26–28 176 n. 5

48: 109/4 181 n. 1148: 109/4–5 11748: 109/4–8 18148: 109/19–20 118 n. 4548: 109/29–30 118 n. 4548: 109/30 11848: 110/5–10 23448: 111/7 25 n. 71, 2648: 111/10–11 188

49. “Lu wen” 魯問 (Lu’s Questions)

49: 111/23 25 n. 71, 2649: 112/6–14 9349: 112/14–18 18049: 112/18 9349: 112/20–22 91, 19649: 112/30–113/3 19049: 113/6–8 18749: 113/13–29 176 n. 3, 18549: 113/14 186

49: 113/14–15 19949: 113/27 8749: 114/7–10 25, 18249: 114/8–10 37 n. 1049: 114/9 25 n. 7149: 114/12–19 11949: 114/21–23 13749: 115/15–19 19449: 115/18–19 28

sUBJeCt InDex

bao 報 (repay, compensate) 57, 62–63, 66, 261

“Bei ti” 備梯 (Preparing against Ladders; chapter 56) 70

benefit. See li 利Bi Gan 比干 123 n. 61, 227–229Bi Yuan 畢沅 2, 26 n. 74, 27 n. 76, 99

n. 17, 244 n. 2, 263 n. 30bie 別 (exclusive, partial; opposite of

jian 兼) 41, 53, 65Bilsky, Lester 96Bingfa 兵法 (Art of War) 81Book of Documents. See ShangshuBook of odes. See ShijingBrindley, erica 20 n. 59, 121 nn. 52, 54,

126, 131Brooks, Bruce 108, 149–150, 152, 154–155,

159, 163, 176 n. 5Brooks, taeko 4 n. 15, 7, 9–10, 12–14, 16,

25, 38 n. 13, 40, 45 nn. 28, 30, 60 n. 63, 70 n. 3, 71 n. 4, 108, 149–150, 152, 154–155, 159, 163, 176 n. 5

Brown, Miranda 7, 32, 143bu ke sheng shu 不可勝數 (countless)

73, 80, 82burial. See funerals

calculate. See ji 計Cao Jinyan 曹锦炎 120–121, 122

nn. 55–57, 123 n. 59, 124 nn. 66–70, 125 n. 72

capable. See neng 能care, caring. See ai 愛Changtaiguan 長台關 121chaos. See luan 亂Chen Wei 陈伟 124 n. 66, 125 n. 71“Ci guo” 辭過 (eschewing faults; chapter

6) 7, 238Classic of History. See Shangshucompounds 9, 16, 71 n. 6, 87 n. 18, 108“Compromising” 10–11, 39, 41, 44–45,

108conduct. See xing 行Confucius. See Kongzicong shi 從事 (perform tasks) 25, 57, 113,

181–182, 184, 189–190, 200, 241, 246–247, 251

ability. See neng 能ai 爱 (care, caring, concern) 45, 49–50,

53, 65, 179, 194, 212, 233, 244 n. 2, 245, 251, 260, 265, See also jian 兼ai ren 愛人 (care for others) 26–27,

46–48, 244, 257, 259, 263scope of care 30, 45, 47–51, 53, 56–58,

60–61, 65xiang ai 相愛 (care for each other)

37, 46, 65–67, 243–244, 260, 269zi ai 自愛 (care for oneself) 29, 36,

46–47, 65Analects. See Lunyuanalogy 43, 47–48, 66, 75–77, 117, 211, 214,

228–230, 257artisan 32, 197, 245–246, 250, 265–267,

269ancestors 48, 56, 89, 106, 110, 155, 157, 262

n. 26, 266 n. 32ancient sages. See sheng wang 聖王Annals by Lü Buwei. See Lüshi chunqiuantiquity 52 n. 39, 62–63, 99, 117, 135, 145,

147–148, 166, 169, 172–173, 207, 217appendices. See Opening Chapters

(chapters 1–7)argumentation and argumentative

strategies 9, 30, 41–42, 52–53, 69, 71, 73, 94, 102, 148, 167–168, 172–174, 237, 253, 255, 263–264

economic argument 30, 73, 78–79, 80–81, 84, 91–92, 94, 112, 136, 165, 181, 183, 186, 198

moral argument 73–75, 77–78, 94religious argument 30, 63–64, 73,

84–85, 89–92, 94, 136Asano Yūichi 淺野裕一 108 n. 26,

120–121, 124 nn. 66, 68, 125 n. 70attack. See gong 攻audience 4, 8, 25, 30, 46–47, 49, 59,

71, 73, 94, 144, 182, 195, 202, 204, 209, 216, 218–219, 223, 230–231, See also interlocutor(s)

authority 1, 7–9, 12, 17, 39, 99, 102, 102 n. 20, 110, 116–117, 144–145, 148, 152, 157, 163, 167–168, 174, 210, 249

authorship 4, 8, 16–19, 23, 28, 37, 64, 150, 217, 233

288 subject index

Core Chapters (chapters 8–37) 1 n. 1, 2 nn. 6–7, 10, 3–7, 8–9, 10 nn. 32, 35, 11–17, 19–22, 24–30, 32–37, 39–40, 43 n. 24, 57–58, 60, 70 n. 3, 71 n. 6, 85 n. 16, 91, 94, 98–99, 101–102, 105–109, 113–114, 116–117, 131, 133, 135, 137 n. 91, 139, 145, 150, 154, 163, 167, 176–178, 181–183, 187, 190, 193–195, 197–198, 205–206, 208, 216–217, 222, 237–238, 245, 253 n. 15, 254, 263

count. See shu 數countless. See bu ke sheng shu 不可勝數Creel, herrlee 140crime. See zui 罪critics. See opponentsCsikszentmihalyi, Mark 134

dao 道 (way), 66, 85, 119, 154, 164, 178, 180, 183, 193, 197, 216, 248, 252, 268

Daodejing 道德經. See LaoziDaozang 道藏 (Daoist canon) 2, 26

n. 74, 98 n. 13dating of chapters 3 n. 14, 4, 6, 8 n. 26,

11 n. 37, 12, 14, 15 n. 46, 16, 28, 40 n. 16, 64 n. 75, 71 n. 6, 87 n. 18, 102, 107–109, 114, 121, 127, 145, 147, 149–150, 152–154, 162, 164, 176 n. 5, 208, 217, 233, 237, 253, 261–263, 266

Defense Chapters. See Military ChaptersDefoort, Carine 1, 7, 29–30, 35, 98 n. 13,

108, 262Desmet, Karen 9, 10 n. 33, 16, 29 n. 80,

35, 71 n. 6, 98 n. 13, 108, 109diad. See dupletDialectical Chapters. See Mohist CanonDialogues (chapters 46–49/50) 2 n. 7,

3, 5–7, 9, 10 nn. 32, 34, 17, 25–28, 32, 33, 39 n. 14, 91, 98, 100, 105–114, 119, 127 n. 75, 134, 136, 137 n. 91, 139, 145, 150, 158, 175–182, 184, 187, 189, 191–195, 197–200, 202–204, 206 n. 7, 234

Die Bi 跌鼻 118digests. See Opening Chapters (chapters

1–7)Ding sixin 丁四新 6 nn. 19, 21, 29 n. 78,

34, 121 n. 53, 123 n. 59, 125 n. 70, 126–127Ding Weixiang 丁为祥 38, 40, 58disciples 4, 6, 8, 17, 50 n. 37, 114–115, 137

n. 91, 149–150, 175, 182, 188, 204, 217disorder. See luan 亂Du Bo 杜伯 99Duke Jian of Yan 燕簡公 99Duke Mu of Qin 秦穆公 99, 124 n. 65,

129–130Duke Wen of song 宋文公 100Duke Zhuang of Qi 齊莊公 100

duo 度 (measure) 111, 241, 243, 246, 249, 253, 260, 265, 267–268

duplet 5, 7, 13Durrant, stephen 2 n. 2, 6 n. 21, 7 n. 22,

9, 10, 44 n. 25, 98 n. 13, 206 n. 7

editor(s) 8, 16, 18, 19 n. 55, 20 n. 59, 22, 30, 37, 40, 64, 71, 98, 120, 121 n. 52, 123 n. 64, 139, 237, 263, 267

epitomes. See Opening Chapters (chapters 1–7)

ethics 32, 35, 64, 95–96, 175, 177, 182–183, 187, 203

evolution 3–4, 6, 9, 11–12, 14–17, 29–30, 32, 33, 36, 38, 40–42, 43 n. 24, 44–45, 54–55, 58, 60, 65, 150, 204, 208, 215, 233, 237, 253, 255, 262–264, 268–269

evolution theory 10, 14–17, 39, 42, 108exemplary past 32, 147, 168–169expenditure 25–26, 80, 105, 117, 131, 133,

135–136, 138, 179, 182

fa 法 (standard, method, model) 33, 49, 237–238, 241–243, 245characteristics of 245–255distribution in the Mozi 238, 254fa yi 法儀 (standard and norm) 238,

245sage-kings as standards. See sheng wang 聖王

standards of sage-kings. See sheng wang 聖王

yi fa 儀法 (norm and standard) 238, 266

“fa yi” 法儀 (standards and norms; chapter 4) 7, 27 n. 76, 33–34, 114, 237–238, 241, 245–246, 249, 250–252, 254–256, 259–260, 262–267, 269

faber, ernst 2family 44, 48–49, 54 n. 43, 56, 59, 80, 106,

119, 198, 209 n. 11, 227, 247 n. 6fang shouchu 方授楚 9, 109 n. 32, 263

n. 30fatalism 21 n. 62, 24–25, 139, 179, 182fei 非 (be against) 24“fei gong” 非攻 (Against Military

Aggression; chapters 17–19) 5, 7, 11, 13, 15, 22, 30, 70–71, 85, 87, 91, 94, 112 n. 37, 238, 253, 254“fei gong, shang” 非攻上 (chapter 17)

11, 16, 30, 45 n. 30, 49 n. 34, 71–74, 76–79, 87, 90–91, 112 n. 38

“fei gong, xia” 非攻下 (chapter 19) 71–73, 79, 84, 89, 90 n. 23, 92, 111–112, 152, 165, 248

subject index 289

“fei gong, zhong” 非攻中 (chapter 18) 71–73, 78, 90, 92, 112 n. 38

“fei ming” 非命 (Against fatalism; chapters 35–37) 5, 11, 13, 14 n. 44, 15, 22, 24 n. 67, 107, 238, 180“fei ming, shang” 非命上 (chapter 35)

27, 113, 251 n. 11“fei ming, zhong” 非命中 (chapter 36)

152, 251“fei Ru” 非儒 (Against the Ru; chapter

39) 5, 13, 9 n. 30, 24 n. 67, 100, 176 n. 4, 181, 238

“fei yue” 非樂 (Against Music; chapter 32) 5, 11, 13, 15, 22, 24 n. 67, 109, 113, 169, 180, 238

feng Youlan 馮友蘭 132filial. See xiao 孝forke, Alfred 2, 9, 15 n. 47, 35 n. 2, 98

n. 13, 107former kings. See xian wang 先王fraser, Chris 7, 9, 25, 32–33, 40, 71 n. 5,

96 n. 2, 98 n. 13, 99, 175, 249 n. 9funerals 25, 95, 106, 112–113, 116–117, 131,

133, 135, 170–173, 179–180, 182–183, 234, 247

“Geng Zhu” 耕柱 (Geng Zhu; chapter 46) 6, 115, 175 n. 1, 238

gentleman. See junzi 君子ghosts. See gui 鬼; see also shen 神golden age 32, 102, 173gong 攻 (to attack) 72, 77–78, 80, 82,

86–87, 89–93, 152, 165, 253“Gongmeng” 公孟 (Gongmeng; chapter

48) 6, 9 n. 30, 175 n. 1, 238Gongmengzi 公孟子 26, 115–116, 175

nn. 1–2, 181 n. 11, 189“Gongshu” 公輸 (Gongshu Pan 盤;

chapter 50) 6, 175 n. 1, 238Gou Mang 句芒 99Graham, Angus C. 2, 3 n. 12, 4 n. 15, 7

n. 22, 9–12, 14, 16–17, 37 n. 9, 39–45, 69 n. *, 70 n. 3, 71 n. 5, 95 n. 1, 96–97, 98 n. 13, 107–108, 143–144, 150

Gu Jiegang 顧頡剛 143 n. 1, 147Guan Zhong 管仲 219 n. 22, 221 n. 25Guanzi 管子 146, 158, 221 n. 25gui 鬼 (ghosts) 17, 27–28, 30, 32, 73, 86,

87 n. 18, 88, 91, 95, 96, 97, 112 n. 37, 123, 128–129, 137 n. 91, 139–141, 150 n. 25, 154, 167–168, 177–183, 184 n. 17, 188demands versus frugal rituals 131–132,

135–137in “Ming gui” 明鬼 (chapter 31) 100,

102–106

in “Guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 (shanghai Museum fragment) 122–123, 125–128

in the Core Chapters (chapters 8–37) 109–113

in the Opening Chapters (chapters 1–7) and Dialogues (chapters 46–49/50) 113, 115–120

shi gui 事鬼 (serve the ghosts) 25–27, 37 n. 10, 110, 139, 182, 245, 251

“Gui yi” 貴義 (Valuing Morality; chapter 47) 6, 116, 175 n. 1, 195, 238

Guiguzi 鬼谷子 146, 158“Guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明 (Ghostly

Percipience) 98, 108, 120–121, 150, See also shanghai Museum fragment

Guodian manuscripts 21, 149, 153 n. 32, 146, 154, 158

Guoyu 國語 146, 158

h group. See “Compromising”hai 害 (harm) 51, 56, 65–66, 111, 178, 184,

194, 202, 236, 259Han Feizi 韓非子 64 n. 77, 146, 158, 218

n. 21, 221 n. 25“xian xue” 顯學 (eminent Learning;

chapter 50) 10harm. See hai 害harm others. See kui ren 虧人hate. See wu 惡heaven. See tian 天Heguanzi 鶡冠子 (Pheasant Cap Master)

146, 158hurt. See zei 賊

inclusive(ness). See jian 兼interlocutor(s). See also audience

100–101, 109, 114, 116, 118, 121, 126–127, 139, 141, 166–167

Ivanhoe, Philip 2, 97 n. 8, 192 n. 24

J group. See “Reactionary”ji 計 (to calculate) 30, 73, 79–80jian 兼 (inclusive, universal, for all;

opposite of bie 別) 36, 41, 44, 47, 50–56, 58–59, 65, 138, 233, 236, 250–251, 260its applicability 42jian ai 兼爱 (universal love, inclusive

care, concern for everyone) 9, 14, 23, 25–27, 30, 35–38, 44, 46–47, 49, 55, 57–60, 62–65, 182, 191, 194, 195 n. 28, 197 n. 29, 199 n. 34

jian er ai 兼而愛 (caring inclusively) 27, 61, 243, 257, 259

290 subject index

jian er li 兼而利 (benefiting inclusively) 243, 257, 259

jian xiang ai 兼相愛 (inclusively caring for each other) 27, 30, 33, 37–38, 46, 48–49, 52, 55, 248–249, 259–260

jian yi yi bie 兼以易別 (with inclusiveness replace exclusiveness) 30, 37, 52

of heaven. See tian 天scope of jian 45, 48, 50, 53, 58, 60–61,

262“Jian ai” 兼愛 (Inclusive Care; chapters

14–16) 5, 7, 11, 13, 15–16, 18 n. 54, 22, 27, 29–30, 35–40, 42, 44–46, 54, 57–58, 60, 61 n. 64, 62, 64–66, 108, 111, 216, 222 n. 28, 233, 238, 254, 260“Jian ai, shang” 兼愛上 (chapter 14)

11, 30, 37–45, 47–49, 53–54, 56–59, 65–66

“Jian ai, xia” 兼愛下 (chapter 16) 30, 37–39, 41–45, 52–56, 58–60, 65–66, 222, 250–251

“Jian ai, zhong” 兼愛中 (chapter 15) 30, 37, 39, 41–45, 48–53, 55–60, 65–66, 162, 164, 248, 260

jian xiang ai, jiao xiang li 兼相愛, 交相利. See jian 兼 and li 利

jiao 交 (each other, reciprocity; opposite of zi 自) 53, 65, See also li 利, 260

“Jie yong” 節用 (Moderation in expenses; chapters 20–21) 5, 11, 13, 15, 22, 112, 180, 238, 247“Jie yong, shang” 節用上 (chapter 20)

11, 167, 247“Jie zang” 節葬 (Moderation in Burials;

chapter 25) 5, 11, 13, 15, 22, 109, 112, 180, 238, 247

Johnston, Ian 2, 5 n. 17, 7 n. 22, 8 n. 25, 34, 36 n. 4, 131, 140 n. 93

junzi 君子 (gentleman) 51, 59, 63, 170, 189, 192–193, 204, 205 n. 1, 207, 221, 222 n. 28, 225, 229–231, 233–236, 241, 261shi junzi 士君子 (officer-

gentleman) 41, 44, 51–52, 61, 183 n. 15, 222–223, 248, 265

shisu zhi junzi 世俗之君子 (gentleman of the age) 91, 193, 196

tianxia zhi junzi 天下之君子 (gentleman of the world), 41, 74–76, 78, 90, 195–197, 248, 261, 265, 266–268

King Dao of Chu 楚悼王 217, 228King fuchai of Wu 吳王夫差 83, 124

n. 65, 220, 227

King Goujian of Yue 越王句踐 83, 124 n. 65, 219–220, 227

King helü of Wu 吳王闔閭 83, 124 n. 65King Jie 桀王 of the xia dynasty 23

n. 65, 62, 88, 104, 111, 117, 123, 125, 129, 141 n. 95, 152, 178, 226, 245, 264

King Wen 文王 of the Zhou dynasty 32, 37, 52, 59–60, 62, 110, 144, 151, 158–164, 167–168, 172, 178, 245, 250–251, 257, 264–265, 267

King Wu of Qin 秦武王 217, 227King Wu 武王 of the Zhou dynasty 32,

52, 62, 86–87, 103–104, 110, 144, 151–152, 158–163, 166–167, 169, 172, 178, 245, 250–251, 257, 264–265

King xuan of Zhou 周宣王 99King Zhou 紂王 of the shang

dynasty 104, 110–111, 117, 123, 125, 129, 152, 178, 226–227, 229, 245, 264

Kongzi 孔子 (Confucius) 26, 46, 77, 95, 103, 115–116, 128, 134 n. 89, 144, 149, 156, 175 n. 2, 176 n. 5, 181 n. 11, 224, 259

kui ren 虧人 (to harm others) 73–75

Laozi 老子 21–22, 145, 186–187, 256–257Lau, D.C. 劉殿爵 34Legge, James 2, 36 nn. 4–5, 50Lewis, Mark 8, 102 n. 20, 145li 利 (benefit, beneficial, profit) 26,

28, 38, 45–46, 48–49, 51–54, 56–57, 59, 61–63, 65–66, 89, 99–100, 103–104, 111–113, 138, 153, 164–165, 169, 178–181, 184–186, 188, 194–195, 198, 202, 207, 212–213, 215, 218, 225, 227–228, 230, 232–233, 235–236, 244–245, 251, 254, 257–262, 264–265benefits of military campaigns 30,

73–74, 81–82, 84, 90jiao xiang li 交相利 (mutually benefit

each other) 27, 30, 33, 37–38, 49, 52, 55, 248–249, 259–260

three levels of benefit: heaven, spirits, people (san li 三利) 85, 177, 248, 251, 254, 257–258, 262 n. 26

xiang li 相利 (benefit one another) 243–244, 260, 269

Li Rui 李锐 124 nn. 66, 68, 126, 131Liang Qichao 梁啓超 36 n. 5, 64, 263

n. 30Liao Mingchun 廖名春 121 n. 53, 122

n. 56, 123 nn. 59, 61, 124 n. 68Liji 禮記 (Record of Rites) 137 n. 91, 145,

153, 158, 173Lin Qingyuan 林清源 20, 21 n. 60

subject index 291

Liu xiang 劉向 22 n. 64, 37 n. 9Liu xin 劉歆 37 n. 9Logical Chapters. See Mohist CanonLord huan of Qi 齊桓公 219–220Lord Wen of Jin 晋文公 219–220Lord Wen of Luyang 魯陽文君 91–94,

179–180, 189, 196Loy, hui-chieh 7, 33, 87 n. 18, 90, 112

n. 37, 127–128, 205“Lu wen” 魯問 (Lu’s Questions; chapter 49)

6, 23–24, 26, 28, 37, 118, 175 n. 1, 238luan 亂 (chaos) 25, 43, 45–48, 53, 99–100,

123, 129, 135, 181–184, 199 n. 33Luan tiaofu 欒調甫 9, 12 n. 41, 107, 263

n. 30Lunheng 論衡 (Discourses Weighed in the

Balance) 129–130, 132, 141 n. 95Lunyu 論語 (Analects) 6, 46, 97, 106, 128,

145, 147, 149–150, 155–159, 163, 176 n. 5, 207, 224, 256, 257

Lüshi chunqiu 呂氏春秋 (Annals by Lü Buwei) 145, 158, 199 n. 35, 221 n. 25

Maeder, erik 1 n. 1, 2 n. 6, 5 n. 16, 7 n. 22, 8 nn. 26–27, 17, 40 n. 17, 43 n. 24, 98 n. 13, 109

Mawangdui manuscripts 21measure. See duo 度Mei Yi-pao 梅貽寳 2, 7 n. 22, 34, 61

n. 67, 69 n. *, 205–206, 224, 247Mencius. See MengziMencius. See MengziMeng Ben 孟賁 217, 227Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) 2 n. 4, 64, 77,

186 n. 19, 192 n. 25, 201 n. 38 Mengzi 孟子 (Mencius) 145, 158, 173, 186,

207, 222, 224meritocracy 209Metzger, thomas 143military aggression 30, 69–70, 73–74, 76,

78, 80, 82, 84–85, 90, 93–94, 179, 182. See also gong 攻 and war, warfare

Military or Defense Chapters (chapters 52–71) 3, 70

min 民 (people) 27, 63, 81, 86, 89, 92, 111–113, 135, 161, 164, 179, 184, 190, 194, 210, 212, 221–222, 226, 250, 256, 261–262, 268

“Ming gui” 明鬼 (explaining Ghosts; chapter 31) 5, 7, 11, 13, 15, 22, 25, 28, 30, 98–99, 107–109, 120, 125, 127, 133, 139–140, 167, 238, 250, 252 n. 12

Mo Di 墨翟 1, 3, 6 n. 21, 8 n. 25, 95, 143–144, 148, 150, 152, 171, 173, 176, 263 n. 30

moderation 25–26, 114, 131, 135, 138, 170, 172–173, 179, 182

Mohist canon 墨經 or Dialectical Chapters (chapters 40–45) 2 n. 9, 3, 145

moral psychology 175 n. 1, 191moral worth 33, 177, 187–188, 190–191,

203motivation 16–18, 22, 51, 66, 190–192, 195,

197, 201 n. 38, 207, 209, 211–215, 218, 224, 232–233

moral motivation 33, 212, 232, 177, 187, 191–193, 203

motto(s) 19, 21, 24, 26–28, 37, 46Mu Tianzi zhuan 穆天子傳 (The Tradition

of Mu, Son of Heaven) 145music 24–25, 95, 113, 116–117, 133, 154,

169–170, 181–182, 205 n. 1

neng 能 (ability, capable) 126–127, 195–197, 205, 208, 210–211, 216, 220–221, 228, 255

nishiyama hisashi 西山尚志 122 n. 55, 123 nn. 58–59, 124 nn. 66, 68, 125 n. 70

nivison, David 70 n. 2, 95, 192 n. 24, 198 n. 30

Okamoto Mitsuo 网本光生 126 n. 74Opening Chapters (chapters 1–7) 2 n. 7,

3, 6–7, 13, 17, 32–33, 98, 113–114, 145, 150, 158, 237, 238, 245

opponents 4–6, 8, 12, 17, 36, 41–45, 48, 50, 54, 56–58, 71 n. 6, 74, 76, 77 n. 11, 78, 82–87, 91, 93–94, 114, 139, 152, 165, 167, 170–171, 175, 181–182, 204, 253, 262, 265, 269

parents 48, 56–58, 82, 104, 176 n. 5, 198, 201 n. 38, 242, 249, 255–256, 259, 261–262

people. See min 民Pines, Yuri 205 n. 1practicability 49, 51–52, 54, 59, 70, 144,

199Puett, Michael 35, 96punish. See zhu 誅“Purist” 10–11, 39, 41, 44–45, 108–109

“Qi huan” 七患 (seven Misfortunes; chapter 5) 7, 114, 238

“Qin shi” 親士 (Intimacy with Officers; chapter 1) 7, 33, 114, 205–208, 215–219, 221 n. 25, 223–225, 231–236, 238

Qin Yanshi 秦彦士 12

292 subject index

radicalization 10, 16, 29, 33, 36, 38, 45, 58, 60–61, 65, 107–108, 262

“Reactionary” 10–11, 39, 108–109reciprocity. See xiang 相 and jiao 交Record of Rites. See Lijiren 仁 (humane, moral goodness) 17,

26, 54, 73, 187, 196–197, 200–202, 249, 261–262, 264, 269distribution in the Mozi 238, 254

reward and punishment. See shang fa 賞罰

ritual(s) 95–96, 105, 117, 128, 131–136, 138, 140, 176 n. 5, 205 n. 1, 220

Robins, Dan 8, 49 n. 34, 59 n. 59, 76, 182 n. 12

Roetz, heiner 143Ru 儒 (the classicists, erudites,

Confucians) 5–7, 24, 35, 38, 95–96, 98, 100, 106, 109, 115–117, 120, 126, 127 n. 75, 128–131, 133–135, 137–140, 171, 175, 180–182, 189

sacrifices 38, 89, 95–97, 103–106, 107 n. 25, 109, 110–119, 128–129, 133–137, 140, 161, 179, 232, 263

sagehood ideal 33, 147, 177, 198, 201–203sage-kings. See sheng wang 聖王“san bian” 三辯 (three Arguments;

chapter 7) 7, 238san biao 三表. See “three tests”san fa 三法. See “three tests”Schmidt-Glintzer, Helwig 40, 105 n. 23Schwartz, Benjamin 96, 133–134, 137sequence theory 10, 12, 14, 70shang fa 賞罰 (reward and

punishment) 63, 65, 85, 96–97, 99–100, 103, 117, 120, 122, 125–126, 128–129, 139, 144, 187–188, 211–212, 214, 259, 264, 266

shang tong 尚同 (conform upward, identify with superiors) 25, 182–183, 189–190

“shang tong” 尚同 (Conform Upward; chapters 11–13) 5, 11, 13, 15, 22–23, 28, 167, 191, 199 n. 33, 237 n. 1, 238, 254 “shang tong, shang” 尚同上 (chapter

11) 191, 199 n. 33“shang tong, zhong” 尚同中 (chapter

12) 16 n. 48, 111, 199 n. 33, 249“shang xian” 尚賢 (elevate the Worthy;

chapters 8–10) 5, 11, 13, 14 n. 44, 15, 22–23, 28, 33, 205–209, 213, 215–218, 221, 223, 225, 231–235, 237 n. 1, 238, 253–254“shang xian, shang” 尚賢上 (chapter 8)

213, 253

“shang xian, xia” 尚賢下 (chapter 10) 199 n. 33, 213, 248, 253

“shang xian, zhong” 尚賢中 (chapter 9) 14, 16 n. 48, 27, 213, 254

shanghai Museumfragment 32, 98, 108, 114, 116, 120–121,

122 n. 55, 124 n. 65, 125–127, 129–131, 134, 138–139, 140, 150, See also “Guishen zhi ming”

manuscripts 120, 123 n. 62, 149–150, 154, 162

Shangjun shu 商君書 (Book of Lord Shang) 146, 158, 221 n. 25

Shangshu 尚書 (Book of Documents) 55, 103, 104 n. 22, 145–147, 149, 155, 157–159, 163, 169–170, 256, 257, 266 n. 33

shen 神 (spirits) 30, 32, 73, 80, 85–86, 87 n. 18, 89–91, 95–98, 107 n. 25, 110 n. 34, 112 n. 37, 125–126, 127 n. 75, 128–131, 134, 137 n. 91, 138–141, 166, 179, 181, 232, 245, 248, 252, 254, 257–258, 262 n. 26, 265demands versus frugal rituals 131–133,

135–138in “Ming gui” 明鬼 (chapter

31) 99–100, 103–106in “Guishen zhi ming” 鬼神之明

(shanghai Museum fragment) 120, 122–128

in the Core Chapters (chapters 8–37) 109–113

in the Opening Chapters (chapters 1–7) and Dialogues (chapters 46–49/50) 113, 115–120

sheng wang 聖王 (sage-kings, ancient sages) 1, 7, 27, 32–33, 43, 55, 60, 62, 85–86, 89–90, 110–111, 117, 125, 135–136, 144, 146–148, 152–156, 172–173, 178, 184, 186, 196, 207, 211–214, 217–218, 252, 255as a standard 245, 250–251, 255,

264–265, 269as sextet (Yao, shun, Yu, tang, Wen,

Wu) 150–151, 156–159, 162–163, 165–168, 170, 172

distribution in the Mozi 144–145, 155, 167, 264

in Zhou texts 145, 154, 156Mohist creation of 166–170, 172standards of 243, 247–250, 255, 260

Shenzi 慎子 146, 158shi fei 是非 (right versus wrong) 24, 28,

41, 55, 57, 184, 188, 190–191, 195–197, 201, 265

subject index 293

Shijing 詩經 (Book of odes) 103, 145–146, 149, 155, 157–160, 163, 170, 256–257, 266 n. 33, 267

shu 數 (to count) 30, 73Shujing 書經. See Shangshushun 舜 32, 58 n. 58, 62, 111, 122, 125,

129, 150–151, 157–159, 162–164, 166–169, 171–173, 176 n. 3, 178, 186, 250, 264–265

singlets 7, 13slogan(s) 19, 24–28, 50 n. 35, 55, 60, 172,

185spirits. See shen 神; see also gui 鬼standaert, nicolas 1, 7, 29 n. 80, 33, 139,

237standard. See fa 法sterckx, Roel 7, 30, 32, 95summaries. See Opening Chapters

(chapters 1–7)sun Yirang 孫詒讓 2, 22 n. 64, 34, 37

n. 9, 50 n. 36, 64 n. 76, 80 n. 13, 88 n. 20, 99 n. 17, 112 n. 36, 113 n. 40, 164 n. 55, 171 nn. 63–64, 206, 217, 221 n. 26, 222 n. 28, 224, 263 n. 30

sunzi 孫子 81“suo ran” 所染 (What has Been Dyed;

chapter 3) 7, 238

tang 湯 (Cheng tang 成湯) 32, 42, 62, 86, 88, 104, 110–111, 122, 125, 144, 151–152, 157–160, 162–170, 172–173, 178, 196, 245, 250–251, 257, 264–265

ten central dogmas 5, 25, 27–28, 35, 37, 70, 100, 121, 176, 182

three tests (san biao 三表 or san fa 三法) 99, 101–103, 105, 107–108, 184–185, 251

three-sects theory 10, 12, 14, 17 n. 50, 39–40, 44 n. 25, 70, 107–108

tian 天 (heaven) 17, 19, 30, 63, 73, 85–87, 90–91, 93–96, 100, 105, 110–112, 116, 129–130, 165–166, 177–181, 232, 237, 248, 253–254, 258as a standard 33–34, 60, 65, 89–90,

122, 237–238, 243, 253–256, 264–269

as foundation 16, 21, 33, 62, 85, 90, 237, 253–254, 260–262, 269

characteristics of 61–63, 65, 255–260, 267

distribution in the Mozi 73, 238, 254inclusiveness (jian 兼) 30, 60–64, 89,

114, 256, 259–264tian de 天德 (heavenly virtue) 258tian di 天地 (heaven and earth) 86,

231, 238

tian min 天民 (heaven’s subjects) 89, 112

tian ming 天命 (Mandate of heaven) 88–91, 97, 104, 157–158, 160, 238, 257

tian yi 天意 (intention of heaven) 21, 93, 144, 203, 258, 259–260, 263

tian zhi chen 天之臣 (subjects of heaven) 243, 262

tian zhi ren 天之人 (heaven’s men) 89, 112

tian zhi yi 天之意 (intention of heaven) 61, 258

tian zhi yi 天之邑 (cities of heaven) 89, 112, 243–244, 262

tian zhi zhi 天之志 (will of heaven) 21

tian zhi 天志 (will of heaven) 20–21, 93, 110, 144, 252, 258

tian zi 天子 (son of heaven) 26–27, 86, 110–111, 122, 151, 169, 238, 245, 249, 251, 264–266

tianxia 天下 (All under heaven) 60, 72 n. 8, 122–123, 144, 161–162, 164–165, 209, 223, 226, 263

zun tian 尊天 (revere heaven) 21, 25–28, 37 n. 10, 110, 182, 245, 251

“tian zhi” 天志 (Will of heaven; chapters 26–28) 5, 11, 13, 15, 20–22, 25, 28, 33, 38, 60 n. 63, 63, 65, 107, 110, 237, 238, 248, 254–261, 263–265, 267“tian zhi, shang” 天志上 (chapter 26)

20, 71, 109, 252, 256–258, 260–261, 263–264, 266, 268

“tian zhi, xia” 天志下 (chapter 28) 20, 27, 238, 252, 262–266, 268

“tian zhi, zhong” 天志中 (chapter 27) 16 n. 48, 110, 256, 261–264, 267–268

title(s) 2 n. 7, 4–6, 19–26, 28–30, 35–37, 39, 53, 55 n. 49, 65, 70, 104 n. 22, 120–121, 139–140, 150, 153 n. 32, 154 n. 34, 175 n. 1, 208, 216, 221 n. 25, 238, 258, 266

triads. See tripletstriplets 5, 9, 18–19, 28–29, 33, 176

characteristics 5, 18, 70, 107, 178–179, 181–182, 190–191, 194–195, 198, 200, 202–204, 237, 253

differences between chapters 9–10, 12, 14, 18, 24, 30, 38–41, 44, 70–73, 261, 264

sequence of the chapters 14–15, 16, 40, 71, 177 n. 6, 237 n. 1

titles 5, 20–23, 28, 36–37

294 subject index

utilitarian 38, 58, 95, 99, 103, 105–106, 109, 128, 133–134, 138, 140, 143, 170, 247

van els, Paul 7, 29 n. 80, 30, 35, 69, 112Van norden, Bryan 2, 97 n. 8, 149, 150

n. 23, 159, 222 n. 28

Waley, Arthur 149, 159Wang Chong 王充 129–134, 141Wang fu 王符 141Wang niansun 王念孫 2, 25 n. 69Wang Yinzhi 王引之 2, 25 n. 69, 61

n. 66Wang Zhong 汪中 263 n. 30Wang Zhongjiang 王中江 124 nn. 66, 68,

125 n. 70, 126war 12, 48, 77, 79, 81, 83, 84, 89, 92, 94,

165, 202warfare 9, 30, 52, 69–70, 72–74, 76–83,

87–89, 91–93, 111, 143, 152–153, 165, 196, 253

Watanabe takashi 渡邊卓 4 n. 15, 9–10, 14–16, 40, 49 n. 34, 60 n. 63, 107, 108 n. 26, 109, 150, 152, 154–155, 162–164, 170, 237 n. 1

Watson, Burton 2, 34, 69 n. *, 96, 247will of heaven. See tian 天Wong, Benjamin 90, 112 n. 37, 127–128wu 惡 (hate) 51, 57, 62 n. 68, 65, 243–245,

258–260, 262Wu Lü 吳慮 176, 181, 185, 199Wu Qi 吳起 217, 227–28Wu Yujiang 吳毓江 34, 263 n. 30Wumazi 巫馬子 27–28, 115–116, 175, 178,

181, 185, 188, 189

xi shi 西施 227xian 賢 (worthy) 119, 169, 205, 208, 212,

214–216, 220–221, 225–227, 229–233shang xian 尚賢 (elevate the

worthy) 25, 182, 183 n. 15, 209, 211, 215–216, 218, 231, 233, 254–255, 269

xian wang 先王 (former kings) 112, 145, 154–155, 175 n. 2, 178, 184 n. 17, 193distribution in the Mozi 167in Zhou texts 155–156

xiang 相 (each other, reciprocity; opposite of zi 自) 30, 38, 45, 47–48, 50–51, 53, 56–58, 60–63, 65, 194, 260, 262–264, See also ai 愛, jian 兼 and li 利

xiao 孝 (filial, filial piety, filiality) 42, 48, 56–58, 82, 100, 104, 106, 113, 198, 200

xing 行 (conduct, practice) 50, 52, 183–187, 190–191, 194–196, 199–202, 211, 222

“xiu shen” 脩身 (Cultivating the self; chapter 2) 7, 238

xunzi 荀子 64 n. 77, 127, 186, 224Xunzi 荀子

“tian lun” 天論 (About heaven) 19, 21, 22 n. 64, 127 n. 75, 146, 158, 207, 224

Y group. See “Purist”yan 言 (statements, teachings) 177–178,

183–187, 190, 192, 195, 197, 203Yang Zhu 楊朱 2 n. 4, 38Yanzi chunqiu 晏子春秋 (Spring and

Autumn Annals by Master Yan) 146, 153 n. 32, 158

Yao 堯 32, 62, 111, 122, 125, 129, 150–151, 157–159, 162–164, 166–169, 171–173, 178, 250, 264–265

yi 義 (morality, right, distributive righteousness) 17, 21, 28, 54, 73, 75, 177, 179, 185–186, 192, 197, 198 n. 32, 199–203, 211, 213–214, 234–235, 252, 258–259, 261, 268

Ying shao 應劭 141Yinwenzi 尹文子 146, 158Yoshinaga shinjirō 吉永真二郎 15 n. 46,

38 n. 13, 40, 45 n. 28, 46, 58Yu 禹 32, 52, 62, 86, 110–111, 122, 125, 144,

151–152, 157–169, 171–173, 178, 196, 203, 245, 250–251, 257, 264–265

Yu Yue 俞樾 2, 9, 10 n. 34

zei 賊 (hurt) 28, 57, 62, 65–66, 112, 123, 188, 243–245, 260, 262

Zheng Jiewen 郑杰文 2 n. 3, 6 n. 21, 9 n. 31, 104 n. 22, 107 n. 25, 133, 137 n. 91, 149 n. 22,

zhu 誅 (to punish) 87, 90, 92–93, 112, 253

Zhuang Ziyi 莊子儀 99zhuangzi 莊子 64 n. 77, 69, 122 n. 55,

146, 158, 186–187, 199, 203, 221 n. 25, 251“tianxia” 天下 (the World; chapter

33) 10zi 自 (oneself; opposite of xiang 相, jiao

交). See ai 愛zui 罪 (crime) 73–79, 91, 101, 256zun tian 尊天. See tian 天zuozhuan 左傳 145, 153–154, 158

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