9/11 and the Transformation of NATOâ€™s Identity in the post-Cold

University of Bremen/ Jacobs University Bremen

MA in International Relations: Global Governance and Social Theory

Term paper

9/11 and the Transformation of NATO’s Identity

in the post-Cold War Context

Author: Dzintars Kalnins

Latvia

2010

1

Abbreviations

AF - Afghanistan;

ANA - Afghan National Army;

ANSF - Afghan National Security Forces;

ASG/DS - Assistant Secretary General for

Defense Support of NATO (Norman

Ray);

ASG/PA - Assistant Secretary General for

Political Affairs of NATO (Gebhardt

von Moltke);

ASG/PD - Assistant Secretary General for

Public Diplomacy of NATO(Jean-

François Bureau);

CAN - Canada;

CH - Switzerland;

CJTF - Combined Joint Task Forces;

CMC - Chairman of Military Committee of

NATO (Gen. Klaus Neumann);

coop. - cooperation;

CW - Cold War;

DCI - Defense Capabilities Initiative;

dem-c - democratic;

DSG - Deputy Secretary General of NATO

(Sergio Balanzino, Alessandro Minuto

Rizzo);

EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

EG - Egypt;

enl. - enlargement;

ESDI - European Security and Defense

Identity;

ESDP - European Security and Defense

Policy;

ESF - European Science Foundation;

EU - European Union;

FRY - Former Republic of Yugoslavia;

GE - Georgia;

HR - Croatia;

ICI - Istanbul Cooperation Initiative;

IL - Israel;

int. - international;

IO - international organization;

IPTF - International Police Task Force;

IR - international relations;

ISAF - International Security Assistance

Force;

JO - Jordan;

KFOR - Kosovo Force;

KZ - Kazakhstan;

MA - Morocco;

MAP - Membership Action Plan;

MD - Mediterranean Dialogue;

NAC - North Atlantic Council;

NACC - North Atlantic Cooperation

Council;

NATO – North Atlantic Treaty

Organization;

org. - organization;

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-

operation in Europe;

PA - NATO Parliamentary Assembly;

PfP - Partnership for Peace;

PJC - NATO-Russia Permanent Joint

Council;

rel. - relations;

RUS - Russia;

SEE - South East Europe;

SFOR - Stabilization Force (in Bosnia and

Herzegovina);

SG - Secretary General of NATO (Javier

Solana, Lord Robertson, Jaap de Hoop

Scheffer, Anders Fogh Rasmussen);

SM - NATO Spokesman (James

Appathurai);

UA - Ukraine;

UNSC - United Nations Security Council;

US or USA - United States of America

WEU - Western European Union;

WMD - weapons of mass destruction;

9/11 - September 11, 2001.

1

Table of Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................ 1

1. The Theory of Constructivism ............................................................................................... 2

2. Theorizing the methodological approach............................................................................... 4

2.1. Discourse......................................................................................................................... 4

2.2. Adjusting Ted Hopf’s approach....................................................................................... 5

3. Reconstruction of NATO’s post-Cold War identity ............................................................... 8

3.1. Pre-9/11 identity of NATO.............................................................................................. 9

3.2. Different perspectives towards assessing NATO after 9/11 .......................................... 11

3.3. Identity of NATO after 9/11 .......................................................................................... 13

Conclusion................................................................................................................................ 17

Bibliography............................................................................................................................. 19

Appendix .................................................................................................................................. 24

1

Introduction

“(...) the problematic of memory destabilises the possibility of straightforward knowledge and this is

important for analysing the construction of a particular 'we' through distinguishing between 'us' and

'them' and the construction of September 11 as something exceptional. These constructions work

together not only to make possible responses which are mere technical fixes, but also to undermine

what may be said to constitute the identity of the West, other than as an entity under attack. (..) It is

in addressing the problematic of memory and, as a result, in considering such alternatives that we

may find the affirmation of our identity that we currently seem unable to find.“

--Maja Zehfuss, 2003

“(...) on both sides of the Atlantic, pundits are writing epitaphs for the "post-Cold-War era" and birth

notices for "the age of terrorism." Horrifying as September 11 undoubtedly was, it does not in my

view warrant this bleak analysis. We do those who lost their lives no service at all by adopting a

victim mentality. Yes, we have suffered a great blow. But we have not lost our ability - or our will -

to shape events. If this is indeed to become the "age of terrorism", then we will be as much at fault

as Osama Bin Laden. I say this because I have been enormously heartened by events since

September 11, in NATO and beyond. And because it is already possible to identify a strategy not

only to defeat Bin Laden, but to ensure that any terrorist successors remain confined to the margins

of history.”

--Lord Robertson, NATO Secretary General, 2001

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the patriarch of neorealism Kenneth Waltz asked a

question (Waltz 1993: 76) that every loyal adherent to this theory should have asked: “How can

an alliance endure in the absence of a worthy opponent?” Since the Soviet threat was gone, there

were no reasons to keep an alliance, and therefore Waltz gave an answer (1993: 76): “NATO’s

days are not numbered, but its years are.” As vague as the term “years” is, one should consider

almost two decades as a sign that his prediction did not come true.

NATO not only survived another decade without an adversary, but also reshaped itself

and carried out an enlargement process, which still has not reached its finality. A day after the

September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the USA NATO´s members invoked the Article 5 of the

treaty (that stipulates mutual defense guarantee) for the first time since the establishment of the

alliance in 1949 (Gordon 2001: 1). In addition to engaging in the Operation Active Endeavour

(anti-terrorist patrol in the Mediterranean) and International Security Assistance Force in

Afghanistan, NATO has undergone substantial changes in its normative as well as organizational

structure.

September 11 affected NATO’s short-term action. In this paper I investigate the

implications of 9/11 more thoroughly. The fact that the Secretary General of NATO in 2006

condemned terrorist attacks in India, but in 1995, when the Oklahoma bombings, the biggest

terrorist attack on US soil until 9/11, took place, NATO did not issue a similar press release,

implies that something has changed. The differences in reactions might mean that a perception of

NATO officials has altered. The central question of this paper therefore is: did the September 11

terrorist attacks lead to a change in NATO's identity?

I argue that 9/11 significantly influenced the change in NATO's identity by creating an

2

enemy image. In broader terms, this research, effectively, is a case of an identity change in

international organizations.

To answer the question, a specific research framework is developed. The basic premise is

that of the theory of constructivism – social and material worlds are distinct, but interrelated

dimensions of human life. I use the methodology that is developed by Ted Hopf. He advocates

for the interpretive approach – induction and phenomenology – as a tool of acquiring knowledge.

I adjust his state-orientation (that he applied to investigating identity’s role in Russian foreign

policy) to the focus on international organizations. Thus, using induction and phenomenology I

analyze the discourse of NATO officials in order to reconstruct the identity of the organization.

After completing the research I produce two identity maps: the first one for the period previous

to 9/11, and the second one for the period that followed it. I do not focus only on finding traces

of words like “terrorism” in the discourse of NATO officials, but I rather attempt to reconstruct

the whole identity, which can be captured from the discourse.

In the first chapter I briefly review the constructivist theory of international relations. In

the second chapter I build a research design based on Ted Hopf’s methodological approach. I

reconstruct NATO’s pre-9/11 and post-9/11 identity in the third chapter.

1. The Theory of Constructivism

For more than twenty years international relations, as a considerably new discipline of

social sciences, has experienced a lively development. The school of constructivism in IR has

successfully established itself as a challenger to the continuing domination of the discipline by

neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, both of which are adherents of rationalism (Hopf

1998: 171). Stefano Guzzini (2000: 148) holds that this is not because constructivism “seized”

the middle ground1 between rational approaches and interpretive approaches, but rather because

“it was allowed” to take the vacant place. Whichever of the interpretations one may choose, it is

clear that constructivism is here to stay and, as Jeffrey Checkel puts it (2003: 2), ”constructivism

is trendy”.

When asked to briefly introduce the core of the constructivist approach in IR, a frequent

and now already well-worn but still accurate answer one might get is the phrase coined by

Alexander Wendt (1992): “Anarchy is what states make of it.” By saying that there is no pre-

given and unchangeable structure and nature of anarchy, Wendt proposes to view institutions (in

this case – anarchy and its meaning) as social constructs. Indeed, constructivists in their research

focus on the role of ideas, norms, knowledge, culture, and argument in politics, stressing, in

1 As it is claimed by Emanuel Adler (1997).

3

particular, the role of collectively held or “intersubjective” ideas and understandings on social

life (Finnemore/Sikkink 2001: 392). Checkel (1998: 325) points out that constructivism is not a

theory but rather an approach “to social inquiry based on two assumptions: 1) the environment in

which agents/states take action is social as well as material; and 2) this setting can provide

agents/states with understandings of their interests (it can “constitute” them).” The first

assumption relates to the view that material structures or objects are subjugated to social

context.2 The second one depicts the constructivist view that agents interact with the structure.

Thus “the ontology is one of mutual constitution, where neither unit of analysis – agents or

structure – is reduced to the other3 and made ‘ontologically primitive.’” (Checkel 1998: 326)

Constructivism is not a solid approach, mainly because it is still in a process of

development. Although several authors (Adler 1997, Checkel 2003, Haas 2001, Cederman,

Daase 2003 and others) have proposed to identify different subcategories of constructivism, this

paper adheres to the taxonomy proposed by Ted Hopf. He distinguishes (2002: 278) between

three types of approaches: normative constructivism (focusing on international norms and

agent’s adherence to them), systemic constructivism (accounting for interstate identity

structures), and social constructivism (paying attention to domestic socio-cognitive roots of state

identity). Hopf is an advocate of the social constructivist approach and in the current research

paper the concept is used only in this sense.

I have chosen the social constructivist approach to investigate the change in NATO’s

identity due to its comprehensive understanding of relations between knowledge, identity of a

collective actor, and its action. Social constructivism assumes that a state’s foreign policies

(relations to the external world) are the consequential effects of the identity of its citizens.

Identities are constructed not only “at home”, but also in interaction with external “Others” that

are meaningful for the state (Hopf 2002: 288). Thus neither context – domestic or international –

will dominate that construction of state identity. “From a social constructivist perspective,

interaction need not involve the copresence of two actors, such as an international meeting. It is

the relationship between knowledge each has of the other, not physical colocation, that drives the

construction of identity.” (Hopf 2002: 289) In the next section I use the idea of social

2 For example, only due to socially constructed intersubjective knowledge we regard a green piece of paper a

banknote, which can be exchanged in the USA for a certain amount of goods or services. The same accounts for

understanding and interpreting other members of society and their amity or enmity towards us. Social threats are not

natural, they are constructed. Wendt exemplifies (1992: 405) this with hypothesizing the first communication

between people and aliens. If the first gesture of the members of an alien civilization, when coming into contact with

human civilization, would be to appear with a thousand spaceships and destroy New York, we would define the

situation as threatening and respond accordingly. Our reaction would be different, if they would come with peace.

“This process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a “social act” and begins the process of creating

intersubjective meanings.” (Wendt 1992:405) 3 This view basically is in line with Anthony Gidden’s theory of structuration: “The concept of structuration

involves that of the duality of structure, which relates to the fundamentally recursive character of social life, and

expresses the mutual dependence of structure and agency.” (1979: 69) (emphasis in original)

4

constructivism as a foundation for establishing a methodological perspective of my research.

2. Theorizing the methodological approach

I ground the research on methodology developed by Ted Hopf (2002), which I adjust to

fit the analysis of NATO. Hopf has developed a comprehensive discourse-based methodology for

analyzing identities of states. I take the core of his methodology and show that it is possible to

apply it to international organizations, in this case NATO.

Individuals have multiple identities, which appear in a collection of discursive practices

(e.g. communication, physical behavior, customs, habits etc.). Some identities appear in more

than one discourse, but there exist identities, which are hardly ever exposed. “Every society is

bounded by a social cognitive structure within which some discursive formations dominate and

compete. An individual’s identities contribute to the creation and recreation of discourse and

social cognitive structure; at the same time, those identities are constrained, shaped, and

empowered by the very social products they have a hand in creating (Hopf 2002: 1).” In Hopf’s

model identities operate like cognitive devices or heuristics. In order to make sense of herself

and others, an individual needs identity. “The Self and the Others4 are mutually necessary and so

are their identities (Hopf 2002: 5).” According to Moscovici, people’s need to understand is the

basis for simplifying, homogenizing or putting other people, objects or events in categories and

thus making the unfamiliar familiar in terms of Self (Moscovici cited in Hopf 2002: 6).

Ted Hopf does not support the view of other constructivists regarding decision-making

logics. He offers a new concept – logic of the everyday –, which consists of the logic of

intelligibility, the logic of thinkability, and the logic of imaginability5 (Hopf 2002: 13). “People

want to do the right thing, but not in the normative sense. They want to be accurately

understood.” (Hopf 2002: 15) In the next two sections I touch upon the discourse analysis as a

way to interpret these social meanings and means to reveal identities.

2.1. Discourse

It is important to turn to the discussion on discourse, a concept that is used in social

theory and analysis that shows how the language affects societal processes. Michel Foucault

4 Identities are always related to Others, but they are rarely oppositional. Ted Hopf in his book (2002) empirically

refutes the widely held idea that someone’s relevant Other must be another person, rather than a thing, idea, image,

or history. He also disagrees with the assumption that relationships of binary opposition (also suppression or

assimilation) must necessarily entail an inevitable conflict or violence (Hopf 2002: 264). 5 “The logic of intelligibility assumes that individuals choose language and actions designed to effectively

communicate with others, with the hope that they will be understood.” (Hopf 2002: 14) The logic of thinkability

refers to the probability of a particular interpretation of another person or event, given an individual’s identities and

social context (Hopf 2002: 13).

5

linked discourse to power relations, but for him discourse is also central in constituting identities

and social beliefs (Larsen 1997: 14). According to Foucault (cited in Larsen 1997: 15) “we find

discursive formations around certain societal themes such as madness, sexuality, grammar

etc.”(emphasis in original). These formations (constituted by concepts, statements, thematic

choices etc.) are to be noticed by a certain regularity, order, transformation or position. A

discourse is

“(…) a group of statements in so far as they belong to the same discursive

formation…it is made up of a limited number of statements for which a group of

conditions of existence can be defined. Discourse in this sense is not ideal,

timeless form…it is, from beginning to end, historical – a fragment of

history…posing its own limits, its divisions, its tranformations, the specific modes

of its temporality…” (Foucault quoted in Larsen 1997: 16).

Thus identity, discourse, structure, decision maker, and other actors are glued together in

a discursive formation.6 In the next section I turn to Hopf’s method of analyzing discourse and

its connection to revealing an identity.

2.2. Adjusting Ted Hopf’s approach

In his book, Hopf recovers identities and discursive formations that constitute the social

cognitive structure by using induction and phenomenology, both of which epistemologically are

tools of interpretivist approach.7 A phenomenological approach suggests that the social world is

primarily a product of the universe of meanings held by individuals. This is in contrast to

addressing the issue deductively, focusing on structures external to individuals (Larsen 1997:

11). For Hopf, phenomenology implies letting the subjects speak through their texts, but

induction involves the recording of their identities as atheoretically as possible. The

(unachievable) ideal of interpretivists is to try not to categorize (which involves theorizing) the

meanings as long as possible, because to grasp an identity, it is imperative that meanings remain

what they mean and do not serve the researcher for testing a hypothesis. “Induction promises the

capacity to conduct research while we are ‘out of our minds’, that is, without our feeling

compelled to test theories in the first instance or to theorize reality according to some well-

known templates.” (Hopf 2002: 26)

Hopf does not apply semiotic or speech act theory (Hopf 2002: 37) but employs a

6 Hopf does not view Foucault’s explanation as superior to others, rather he points out that Foucault’s concept of

discursive formations is very similar to Bourdieu’s habitus, Clifford Geertz’s web of meaning, and Edmund

Husserl’s life-world (Hopf 2002: 5). 7 Hollis and Smith (1990) have presented the distinction between Explaining and Understanding in social sciences.

Research focus on behavior leads to such IR version as Behavioralism, whereas, if the meaning is central, then one

should adhere to the interpretive tradition in social thought – hermeneutics (the word comes from Greek hermeneus,

meaning an interpreter) (Hollis/Smith 1990: 71).

6

technique that resembles narrative analysis of texts. He recovers identities, firstly, by inductive

process of reading and relating texts, secondly, by establishing the intertextual meanings of

identities, and, thirdly, by using a more theory driven approach – aggregating them into

discursive formations (Hopf 2002: 27). “The contextualization at a higher level of social and

textual aggregation involves the employment of a kind of qualitative factor analysis. After the

identities are gathered, named, and categorized, it appears as if some of them cluster together and

others never associate. If this appearance survives our going back through all the raw identity

material, we can make an aggregative claim that these clusters constitute analytically separable

discourses. Separability generally implies meaningful difference, although discourses need not

be at odds on everything.” (Lincoln cited in Hopf 2002: 26)

Before continuing with the research part, it is necessary to bring Hopf’s theory to another

level, that is, adjust his state-orientation to the focus on international organizations.

In contrast to the economistic logic (neorealism, liberal institutionalism), which treats

IOs as “empty shells” (Barnett/Finnemore 1999: 704) or impersonal entities that are used only

for the realization of states’ interests, Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore argue (1999:

705) that empirical research on IOs does not confirm this assumption. While, of course, being

affected by states, IOs are not passive mechanisms without their own agendas. They can be

treated as actors with their own interests and capabilities, as long as the researcher is aware that

research requires “a priori theoretical specification of what IOs want” (Barnett, Finnemore 1999:

705). This research is going to unveil NATO’s identity presented in the discourse of its

(institutional) representatives, which, in fact, will let us understand more of what its interests8

are. Just as state officials, when approaching international politics, already have a comprehensive

and elaborate appreciation of the world, which is rooted in meaning that is produced by domestic

political and cultural context (Weldes 1996: 280), also representatives of IOs are projecting the

identity of the organization, which is to a large extent affected by institutional knowledge9. The

identity and performance of individual agents in an organization is affected by “internal setting”

(Baaz 2002: 212) that organizes the internal social structure. Agents within the particular societal

structure continually reproduce the collective patterns of activities and ideas (Baaz 2002: 215)

and these can be also traced in the discourse.

2.3. Research strategy and its limits

I, firstly, attempt an inductive empirical reconstruction of the topography of NATO’s

8 “The relationship between identity and interest implies that any individual, because of her understanding of herself

through Others, necessarily has interests that are social cognitive products.” (Hopf 2002: 17) 9 “Institutional knowledge is social knowledge shared by the members of an institution or organization, and in

general satisfies the strategic criteria of group and discourse.” (Van Dijk 2005: 79)

7

identity. In this stage I try (although it is not absolutely achievable) to stay “out of the mind”

(Hopf 2002: 26) and not to find any particular identities, but rather all that are represented in the

discourse. Secondly, I synthetically create discursive formations that bring various dimensions of

NATO’s identity together in a more coherent structure.

I look (unsystematically) only at the discourse of NATO’s officials that can be found in

its online archive.10

This approach still, however, satisfies the need to look at a set of speeches

given by different representatives (Milliken 1999: 233) of the organization. The texts are chosen

from a diverse range of topics and occasions (e.g. keynote speeches, press conferences, bilateral

meetings etc.)

Further, I reconstruct NATO’s identity for two periods – before 9/11 and after it.

Regarding the first period, I look at texts from the whole year of 1997 and the year 2001 until

September 11. The choice of the particular starting year can be justified by assuming that the

first post-Cold war shock after the dissolution of NATO’s main adversary – the Soviet Union –

was not at its very extreme, the organization had regrouped11

and survived. This date includes

the new, although just briefly and symbolically successful (Frye 2001: 93), turn in relations with

Russia, which were exemplified by NATO-Russia Founding Act of 1997 and the NATO-Russia

Permanent Joint Council, as well as the invitation for Hungary, Czech Republic and Poland to

join the organization. Regarding the period after 9/11 I look at the time from 9/11 2001 until the

end of 2001, as well as the whole year of 2009. Such a two-step approach should indicate not

only the immediate changes (if there were any) in the identity of NATO after the 9/11 terrorist

attacks, but also how persistent they have been in the long run, and which identity dimensions

are rather entrenched.

The research framework in this paper thus involves analyzing discourse of NATO

officials. It is assumed that the discourse entails meanings that represent the organizations

institutional identity, and it is possible (via inductive approach) to reconstruct the image of the

identity of NATO. In the next chapter I look in detail at the results of my research.

10

It is located in the online library page of NATO’s website under “Speeches & statements,” which provide key

speeches and transcripts of news conferences given by the NATO Secretary General and other NATO Officials

(http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/index.html). 11

NATO’s involvement in four successive waves of armed conflict in the breakup of the Yugoslavia was perhaps

way more effective re-arranger of its image than all the political and military reforms undertaken by the alliance to

absorb Eastern partners and accommodate European aspirations (Moens, Cohen & Sens 2003: xxi).

8

3. Reconstruction of NATO’s post-Cold War identity

The qualitative research is based on reading and analyzing 44 texts, the majority of which

are speeches, given by the Secretary General12

of NATO at different venues and different

contexts. In addition to the discourse of the NATO representatives ranking the highest (judged by

the status of the position), there are particular speeches given by NATO Spokesman (James

Appathurai), Deputy Secretary General (Sergio Balanzino, Alessandro Minuto Rizzo), Assistant

Secretary General for Public Diplomacy (Jean-François Bureau), Assistant Secretary General for

Political Affairs (Gebhardt von Moltke), Assistant Secretary General for Defense Support

(Norman Ray), as well as the Chairman of Military Committee (Gen. Klaus Neumann).

Although, naturally, the SG is invited to give speeches and, indeed, gives them more frequently,

this variety, which includes diversity of people within the same job position, can be considered

as sufficiently constituting discourse of NATO.

The Research Matrix can be found attached in the end of the Appendix. It depicts the

very process of putting identity together piece by piece. While the approach is based on Hopf’s

technique, it is modified. In addition to the three categories of “Others” defined by Hopf

(namely, the External Others, the Historical Others, and Internal Others13

), I use the fourth one –

the Self-Now. The former three relate to binary relations to the “others” (that may be not only

people or countries, but even abstract notions or events. The latter is chosen as an additional tool,

with which to reconstruct the identity. It helps to capture the self-reflections of NATO officials at

the moment, when a particular speech is given (e.g., NATO’s willingness to be friends with

Russia or the statement that the organization is founded on certain values). Only NATO-relevant

“others” are noted down. The strategy, in this case, goes in hand with the former name of

constructivism – reflectivism.

Although intentions, normative expressions, whishes and future forecastings and

predictions are important, they are only sometimes used to construct the identity. The majority of

the time the researcher must analyze the reflective part of discourse, where the speaker expresses

evaluation or judgment. Of course, for example, the normative expression “Russia should

cooperate with NATO”, implies the evaluation or depiction, the meaning of which can be

grasped in the context of speech. If it is said that Russia should be cooperative, this means that at

the present moment we cannot say that it is, in other words, now Russia is uncooperative.

Identifying the “others” is not the only task, when analyzing discourse. It is also

12

The research covers different years, during which the position of Secretary General has been held by Javier

Solana, Lord Robertson, Jaap de Hoop Scheffer, and Anders Fogh Rasmussen. 13

Internal Others represent actors, institutions, or policies that constitute NATO and help to define it (e.g., “Allies”,

“NATO Defense College”, or “the Membership Action Plan”).

9

necessary to evaluate NATO’s disposition towards a concept, state, etc., which is assumed to be

part of its identity. I have put explanations for symbols, which I use in the Research Matrix in the

Appendix, prior to the matrix itself. Double plus sign (++) means that NATO positively

associates with the phenomenon or actor, while double minus (--) signifies the opposite (for

example, “piracy--“ means that NATO negatively identifies itself with piracy, that is, piracy is

considered to be its enemy, problem to be dealt with, or a phenomenon, with which it does not

want to be associated). I use the sign “^” to symbolize neutral or mixed attitudes toward the

object/ phenomenon. While capturing the “others” and evaluating speaker’s attitudes towards

them, I supplement the identity formation with key words or succinct explanation in square

parenthesis.

In the next chapter I elaborate on NATO’s identity prior the 9/11 terrorist attacks on the

US.

3.1. Pre-9/11 identity of NATO

After collecting extensive analytical data from the discourse of NATO officials, I have

reconstructed a map of the organization’s identity. The map is depicted in Figure 1 and it is

presented in the next page.

Every level (as well as color) represents one subgroup, where the discursive formations

were analyzed. It must be mentioned that the map does not involve absolutely all of the elements

that had been recorded. This map shows not only how NATO perceived itself and others before

the 9/11 attacks, but it can also reveal the values and the direction, where the organization was

heading.

The central green arch represents the part of identity that deals with self reflection and

that does not necessarily need to have or need to be aware of the “otherness”. Of course, it may

be intertwined with other elements of identity, but, in general, one can observe that NATO is

aware of its symbolic existence, which is a kind of end in itself. NATO assumes that it is a

“symbol of the Atlantic community” and a “cornerstone of European security”. It is interesting to

notice that, although after the Cold War the security question is not downplayed, NATO has not

identified any particular sources of threat to its security – it has even been stressed several times

that there is no external (state-like) threat to NATO whatsoever. The security of European

members could be disrupted by “crisis” on European soil. This is the role and impact of Balkan

region, from which the instability could possibly spill-over to a greater part of the continent.

10

Figure 1. Map of NATO’s identity,

1997 – September 11, 2001

Abbreviations: EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council; ESDI - European Security and Defense Identity;

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; PfP – Partnership for Peace;

SFOR – Stabilisation Force (in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Symbols:

o Plus signs (++) indicate that the identity is present or positively valued by the discourse

o Minus signs (--) indicate that the identity is negatively valued by the discourse

o The sign “^” indicates a mixed evaluation of that identity within the discourse

An important role within NATO’s identity is played by Russia. The relationship between

NATO and its former adversary in the post-Cold War context could be described as being comic,

if there would not be any serious security implications for countries outside NATO. As depicted

in the discourse, NATO wants to establish a constructive dialogue and productive cooperation

with Russia, but, at the same time, realizes that Russia responds only selectively to the offer of

engagement. NATO is constrained by its previous pledges, deeds and, indeed, identity, which

does not allow the organization to turn a blind eye on Russia’s occasional detours from norms of

international law or human rights. This is exemplified by a speech of the Secretary General

Javier Solana (1997a), who pointed out that the ability to cooperate was proven in Bosnia, where

11

in early 1996 Russia joined NATO. At the same time, NATO officials have noted (Robertson

2001j) that Russia’s anachronistic “zero-sum approach” does not help to build mutually

beneficial relationship. In spite of the inactivity from the Russian part, NATO is ready at any

time to engage with it, even despite the disagreements (which in pre-9/11 years stem from

NATO’s willingness to enlarge the organization to the East).

The new member countries and “partners” are significant “external others” to the identity

structure of the military alliance. It associates itself with these actors, which leads to the idea that

enlarging the security community of NATO during the 1990s was one of the main aims of it,

with the exception of securing stability in the Balkans.

The inner part of the identity map amplifies NATO’s identity as stressing cooperation

mainly due to the different multilateral initiatives (PfP, SFOR, as well as ESDI, on whose

development it is working on). The “historical others” are mostly connected to the Cold War

legacy, although the mission in Bosnia is also entrenched in the perception of NATO officials – it

is the epitome of transnational cooperation.

Even though after the end of the Cold War NATO’s main adversary was gone, NATO still

perceived itself as the backbone of Europe’s security. The discourse continued to involve the

security question in Europe, where the main threat was the potential instability in the Balkans. In

addition to this, NATO’s pre-9/11 identity was consistent with the organization’s endeavor to

expand its borders.

3.2. Different perspectives towards assessing NATO after 9/11

Even if one does not draw a map of the identity of NATO, depicting its various

dimensions, it could be expected that at least some things are different with NATO than they

were ten years ago.

At least a slight difference between pre- and post-9/11 NATO can be noticed, if one

briefly goes through the titles of speeches and remarks found on NATO’s e-library. Prior to 9/11

NATO officials did not pay attention to terrorist attacks. Oklahoma bombing was an act of

terrorism (Oklahoma City National Memorial 2006) on the soil of NATO, but the organization

did not react to it in any official sense (at least there has not been any official condemnation

posted on the Internet archive). On the other hand, after 9/11 NATO condemns terrorist attacks

that have taken place outside its mainland (e.g. in Egypt or Pakistan). Egypt is not Afghanistan,

Iraq, Bosnia or their neighboring countries, where NATO troops are on mission.14

This reflects

14

The argument could be developed also from a different angle. One might say that NATO has reacted to the

terrorist bombings in Egypt because it is NATO’s partner in the framework of the Mediterranean Dialogue. But still,

12

the fundamental change in the organization’s perception of threats and their sources. It also

reflects NATO’s understanding of its own role – it realizes that it has to respond to such events.

It is important to mention that some scholars have argued that 9/11 did not change

anything, or did not change as much as claimed by the president of the USA George W. Bush,

e.g. that it has fundamentally changed world politics (Frederking 2003: 363). Brian Frederking

argues,

“the dominant trend of the post-cold war world is the gradual institutionalization

of global collective security rules. As in earlier struggles to punish states violating

human rights rules, the international community is now struggling to punish both

states and ruthless nonstate actors that violate terrorism and weapons

proliferation rules.” (Frederking 2003: 363)

He notes that prior to 9/11 similar debates on international level had been taken place in

connection to former Yugoslavia. He argues that “U.S. foregin policy, although tremendously

important, cannot unilaterally construct a war social arrangement through declarations of a ‘war

on terrorism’ or even by invading Iraq. (...) while the international community clearly prefers

collective security rules over a unilateral U.S. war on terrorism.”(Frederking 2003: 377)

Another, though similar, view is presented by Peter Howard, who suggests that the

impact of September 11, firstly, was used to justify invasion (as deterrence of terrorism) in Iraq

and, secondly, “reduced Americans’ skepticism about almost any promises to decrease their

personal security fears. [Thus] September 11 was used to promote a preventive war against an

opponent unrelated to the original provocation.” (Howard 2004: 46)

I agree that 9/11 did allow a lot of things to be justified in front of the public (be it

domestic population for the US or international society for NATO), but, if this was the only case,

then all the “opportunities”, which 9/11 created for the US and NATO, should have been used in

those first post-attack months of shock, panic and disorientation. The discourse of NATO

officials even after nine years of the attacks reveals that 9/11 did, indeed, change the identity of

the organization. If Lord Robertson, Secretary General of NATO, during the summer of 2001

assured (2001e) that “there is no ‘other side’” that would pose a threat to the Allies, then a little

more than two weeks after the 9/11 he firmly stated (2001l) that NATO has acquired a “new kind

of enemy”. Interestingly, the concept “new enemy” consisted of rogue states and terrorism, both

of which cannot be extensively found in the discourse of NATO officials prior to the seminal

attacks.15

this would not explain, why NATO did not offer any condolences to the USA. This research paper contributes to

explaining this disparity. 15

Only during one (from the analyzed) speech prior to 9/11 the person referred to “terrorism”. Chairman of the

Military Committee General Klaus Naumann (1997), when pondering the potential risks to the Alliance, referred to

what he calls the "Arc of Instability" from Morocco to India. “It is here where one notes attempts to acquire

weapons of mass destruction and one can see proliferation and a preparedness to use terrorism on the rise. It is for

13

Apropos of externalities of 9/11, some stress the importance of scholarly discourse. For

example, Antonio Marquina not only agrees with Frederking and Howard, but also elaborates on

the issue of terrorism within the field of International Relations.

“We [scholars] should really take more care in measuring the impact of certain

events and ideas, because if we make a fuss and say they change our world, they

will actually end up doing so.(…) Our job is to rationalize international events in

political terms, and what we say can influence politicians. So we better make sure

we know exactly what the influence of events is, and how we define reality.”

(Marquina 2009)

I believe that the academia should try to understand, describe and explain reality as good

and precise as it can. Scholar’s normative approach or an active involvement in politics does not

let her in any case intentionally depict the reality in perverse way. Of course, one could argue

that 9/11 has caused an unnecessarily big fuss, but this is not the only unprecedented moment of

history that has attracted public and academic attention to it. When looking from social

constructivist lenses, one must acknowledge that mass media have an impact on society and

global politics, because by continuously reiterating certain discursive formations, it can affect the

world-view of society. Here, it does not matter how exaggerated, fictional or far from truth the

events depicted by media (for example, terrorist attacks) are. It is, exactly, the task of scholars

from the whole scientific spectrum to try to comprehend, what effects have the terrorist attacks

of 2001 had.

The reaction to the 9/11 terrorist attacks by some scholars have been viewed as an event

in international relations that has not had an important effect on how global politics function. In

the next section I present a view that September 11 significantly influenced NATO’s identity and

that means it has also had an effect on broader global security questions.

3.3. Identity of NATO after 9/11

Similarly as it was in the chapter 3.1., in this one I present the post-September 11 identity

of NATO. The Figure 2, which is put in the next page, depicts it on an identity map. When

comparing to the identity of pre-9/11 period (see page 10), one may notice that this has become

more complex and multidimensional. A lot of new concepts, notions and phenomena have come

into the new structure, but at the same time several have kept their “place”. This attests the

significance and the deep-rootedness of these elements into NATO’s post-Cold War identity.

The most tenacious “Historical Others” of both periods are the Soviet Union and the

these and other reasons why NATO focuses considerable attention on the Mediterranean area and why NATO's

Southern Region is, from a military point of view, regarded as NATO's most endangered region.” (Naumann 1997)

14

zero-sum approach. The former, naturally, is the easiest way to quickly revoke into memory the

previous adversary. NATO’s present focus on promoting a multilateral approach in global

governance and cooperation in crisis exemplifies the win-win philosophy, which is the opposite

of the Cold War win-lose model of relationship among global stakeholders. What regards the

Internal Others, two discursive formations are noticeable – USA and Partnership for Peace.

Figure 2. Map of NATO’s identity,

September 11, 2001 – 2010

Abbreviations: ANA - Afghan National Army; CW – Cold War; EAPC - Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council;

ISAF - International Security Assistance Force; KFOR – Kosovo Force; MD - Mediterranean Dialogue;

OSCE - Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe; PfP – Partnership for Peace.

Symbols:

o Plus signs (++) indicate that the identity is present or positively valued by the discourse

o Minus signs (--) indicate that the identity is negatively valued by the discourse

o The sign “^” indicates a mixed evaluation of that identity within the discourse

The post-9/11 identity regards the US less positively (due to changes in the discourse),

which could be due to its unilateral approach on the international level. NATO’s internal issue,

15

though, for a long time has been the burden sharing between the US and the rest of NATO

members.

Partnership for Peace has been the instrument to engage with the potential future

members and partner countries that still have a long way to go to even receive an invitation for

accession. It is also a tool for boosting cooperation with countries that do not want to join the

Alliance (e.g. Russia).

The aim of this paper is to find out whether terrorist attacks on the USA in 2001

somehow influenced a change in the identity of NATO. In order to further elaborate on this, it is

essential to add the following Deputy Secretary General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo’s (2001)

quote:

“Two months ago, when hi-jacked planes destroyed the World Trade Center,

some were quick to argue that this ended an era that we used to call ‘post-Cold

War’. They saw the dawn of a dramatically new era: ‘the age of terrorism’. Of

course, only time will tell if we are really on the threshold of a dramatically

different new era, and if the future is as ominous as these pundits would like us

to believe. But there is no reason to doubt the ability of the international

community to face up to this new challenge, just as it has addressed equally

daunting and seemingly insoluble questions in the past.”

It seems, Secretary General Lord Robertson has been aware of the issue that discourse

and attitudes towards 9/11 count, namely, we, ourselves, would be as responsible as Osama bin

Laden, should this become the "age of terrorism" (Robertson 2001a). He also has pointed out

(2001a) that we should not acquire “victim mentality”, but at the same time his speeches served

to regenerate the discourse, which he criticized. A number of his post-9/11 speeches began with

announcements that the world has completely changed due to the terrorist attacks. In addition to

this Secretary General Lord Robertson has also colored introductions of speeches by evoking

and even creating unpleasant associations with 9/11. The following statement exemplifies this:

“Since 11 September, our world has been rendered unfamiliar. The mundane has become

dangerous. Who can ever look up again at an airliner or go to work in a high-rise office building

without, at the back of their minds, recalling the horrific images of the World Trade Centre?”

(Robertson 2001a) These comments have been complemented with comparing the situation with

Pearl Harbor and fighting Nazism, when referring to the coalition.

The normative awareness of Lord Robertson about how we should and should not

depict or perceive terrorism can be found in speeches by other officials as well. Deputy Secretary

General Alessandro Minuto Rizzo notes that one should not talk about a “clash of civilizations”,

the idea advocated by Samuel P. Huntington, but he still continues elaborating the topic as if it

actually was the mentioned clash. Muslims were not mentioned in any previously analyzed

speech by a NATO official. Although Kosovo has been mentioned a lot of times, religion was

16

never specifically highlighted, as in the speech of November 24, 2001, when Minuto Rizzo

stressed that Kosovo was a campaign to defend Muslims. He also mentioned the Middle East

Peace Process, which has been an “obstacle to normalizing Western relations with the Arab

world.” (Minuto Rizzo 2001) First of all, the discourse of Minuto Rizzo is mixing a lot of things

together thus not making it easier for people to understand what NATO’s position is. Arab world

and Muslim world are two different notions.16

After 9/11 it was noticeable that NATO, as many people in the developed countries, was

frustrated and disoriented. Lord Robertson’s speech (2001l), which stressed the “uncertain”

future is one of the examples. The initial phase of NATO’s reaction towards terrorism was

carried out in such an unpredictable and frustrating way. In one occasion NATO was said not to

lead military action against Taliban (Robertson 2001a), in other occasion it was described as

central element of the collective response to terrorism (Robertson 2001i).

It is understandable that just a few months after the terrorist attacks, it was hard to come

up with a coherent and clear plan. But the absence of a plan, actually, was not important for this

research, since it looked at the discourse. The analysis revealed that virtually every speech after

9/11 made by a NATO official was at least partially connected to the topic of terrorism, which is

an enormous shift in the discourse. The Picture 1 in Appendix depicts the percentage of

electronic global news, which have mentioned the word “terrorism” in their article. The chart

speaks for itself. It depicts the topic of “terrorism” skyrocketing among the news on 9/11, but it

has not declined to the previous state, meaning, the topic is still discussed and it is still part of

our discourse thus affecting our perception and identity.

The discourse of NATO officials after September 11 includes terrorism in a whole

different level in comparison to the one before the seminal attacks on the USA. This lets one

assume that NATO’s identity has changed, which is interrelated to interests and actions of this

security organization.

16

It is even exemplified by such a simple fact that the worlds largest Muslim population is not in any of the Arab

countries, but rather in Indonesia, which population comprised more than 206 million in 2009 (Citywest 2009)

17

Conclusion

With this paper I attempt to show how a change in an international organization’s

identity can be noticed by analyzing the discourse of its officials. I argue that the September 11

terrorist attacks on the USA influenced the alteration of NATO’s identity.

The newly sworn in Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen during his first NATO

speech gave a clear idea on what the main priority of NATO is. According to Fogh Rasmussen

(2009a) it is “to help prevent Afghanistan from becoming again the Grand Central Station of

international terrorism”. During the speech he solidly uraveled the frustration of Lord Robertson:

“Let me be clear. I say ‘LEAD’ responsibility for the Afghans. NATO must and will be there in

support. Let no Taliban propagandist try to sell my message as a run for the exit – it is not. We

will support the Afghan people for as long as it takes – let me repeat that, for as long as it takes.”

(Fogh Rasmussen 2009a) Whether one likes it or not, NATO has engaged in a fight against an

unconventional, even abstract enemy – terrorism.

I conducted the research within the framework of social constructivism, a type of

constructivism that pays attention to domestic socio-cognitive roots of state. I adjusted it to fit

the analysis of international organizations. As the basis of the methodology I used the model

developed by Ted Hopf, who employed it when conducting research on Russian identity and its

implications on foreign policy of Russia. In his model identities operate like cognitive devices or

heuristics. Essential components in identities are concepts of the Self and the Others, which are

mutually necessary. Identities as well as discursive formations are recovered by using induction

and phenomenology, both of which epistemologically are tools of the interpretivist approach. In

this sense phenomenology implies letting the subjects speak through their texts, but induction

involves the recording of their identities as atheoretically as possible.

This model, which is meant for applying to states and their societies, was adjusted for

analysis of an international organization. This could be done due to the concept of institutional

knowledge, which is a certain type of socio-cognitive environment, in which the identity and

performance of individual agents in an organization is affected by the “internal setting”. Agents

within the particular societal structure continually reproduce the collective patterns of activities

and ideas and these can be also traced in the discourse.

At first, I inductively reconstructed the topography of NATO’s identity. During this

process no particular identities were searched for, but rather all of those that were represented in

the discourse. Secondly, I synthetically created discursive formations that bring various

dimensions of NATO’s identity together in a more coherent structure, also known as the identity

map.

After the research, I created two identity maps (see pages 10 and 14), which revealed the

complexity of NATO’s identity – the one after 9/11 was more complex. The discourse of NATO

18

officials even nine years after the attacks proves that 9/11 did, indeed, influence a change in the

identity of the organization because the analysis revealed that virtually every speech after 9/11

made by a NATO official was at least partially connected to terrorism, which is an enormous

shift in the discourse. Only one speech (from those that were analyzed) that was given before the

tragic event referred to terrorism.

19

Bibliography

Literature:

Adler, Emanuel (1997): Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics. In:

European Journal of International Relations, 3 (3), 319-363.

Baaz, Mikael (2002): A meta-theoretical foundation for the study of international relations in a

global era: a social constructivist approach. Göteborg: Dept. of Peace and Development

Research, Göteborg Univ.

Barnett, Michael N./Finnemore, Martha (1999): The Politics, Power, and Pathologies of

International Organizations. In: International Organization, 53 (4), 699-732.

Cederman, Lars-Erik/Daase, Christopher (2003): Endogenizing Corporate Identities: the Next

Step in Constructivist IR Theory. In: European Journal of International Relations, 9 (1),

5-35.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (1998): Review: The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory;

National Interests in International Society; The Culture of National Security: Norms and

Identity in World Politics; Norms in International Relations: The Struggle against

Apartheid. In: World Politics, 50 (2), 324-348.

Checkel, Jeffrey T. (2003): Social Constructivism in Global and European Politics. ARENA.WP

15/03(http://www.arena.uio.no/publications/working-papers2003/papers/wp03_15.pdf).

Finnemore, Martha/Sikkink, Kathryn (2001): Taking stock: The Constructivist Research

Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. In: Annual Review of

Political Science, 4 (1), 391-416.

Frederking, Brian (2003): Constructing Post-Cold War Collective Security. In: The American

Political Science Review, 97 (3), 363-378.

Frye, Alton (2001): The New NATO and Relations with Russia. In: Carpenter, Ted Galen (ed.):

NATO enters the 21st century. London u.a.: Cass, 92-110.

Giddens, Anthony (1979): Central problems in social theory: action, structure and contradiction

in social analysis. London u.a.: Macmillan.

Gordon, Philip H. (2001): NATO After 11 September. In: Survival, 43 (4 - Winter 2001-2002), 1-

18.

Guzzini, Stefano (2000): A Reconstruction of Constructivism in International Relations. In:

European Journal of International Relations, 6 (2), 147-182.

Haas, Ernst B. (2001): Does Constructivism Subsume Neo-functionalism? In: Christiansen,

Thomas (ed.): The social construction of Europe. London u.a.: Sage.

Hollis, Martin/Smith, Steve (1990): Explaining and understanding international relations.

Oxford: Clarendon Press.

Hopf, Ted (1998): The Promise of Constructivism in International Relations Theory. In:

International Security, 23 (1), 171-200.

Hopf, Ted (2002): Social construction of international politics: identities & foreign policies,

Moscow, 1955 and 1999. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.

Howard, Peter (2004): Why Not Invade North Korea? Threats, Language Games, and U.S.

Foreign Policy. In: International Studies Quarterly, 48 (4), 805-828.

Larsen, Henrik (1997): Foreign policy and discourse analysis: France, Britain and Europe.

London u.a.: Routledge.

20

Milliken, Jennifer (1999): The Study of Discourse in International Relations: A Critique of

Research and Methods. In: European Journal of International Relations, 5 (2), 225-254.

Moens, Alexander/Cohen, Lenard J./Sens, Allen G. (2003): Introduction: NATO in Transition.

In: Moens, Alexander/Cohen, Lenard J./Sens, Allen G. (eds.): NATO and European

security: alliance politics from the end of the Cold War to the age of terrorism. Westport,

Conn.: Praeger, xix-xxx.

Oklahoma City National Memorial (2006): “History and Mission”. Memorial and Museum.

Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.oklahomacitynationalmemorial.org/secondary.php?section=1&catid=193).

Van Dijk, Teun A. (2005): Contextual knowledge management in discourse production. In:

Wodak, Ruth/Chilton, Paul Anthony (eds.): A new agenda in (critical) discourse analysis

: theory, methodology, and interdisciplinary. Amsterdam u.a.: Benjamins, 71-100.

Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993): The Emerging Structure of International Politics. In: International

Security, 18 (2), 44-79.

Weldes, Jutta (1996): Constructing National Interests. In: European Journal of International

Relations, 2 (3), 275-318.

Wendt, Alexander (1992): Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power

Politics. In: International Organization, 46 (2), 391-425.

Zehfuss, Maja (2003): Forget September 11. In: Third World Quarterly, 24 (3), 513-528.

Speeches:

Appathurai, James (2009): “Weekly Press Briefing”. NATO On-line library, January 14.

Retrieved February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_50111.htm).

Balanzino, Sergio (1997a): “A Workable Security Architecture”. At the Antalya Conference on

Security and Cooperation. NATO On-line library, September 26. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970926b.htm).

Balanzino, Sergio (1997b): “Keynote Speech”. Fourth NATO-Japan Security Conference. Tokyo,

NATO On-line library, March 18. Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970318a.htm).

Bureau, Jean-Francois (2009):”Conference on ‘Intangibles of Security’”. NATO On-line library,

April 22. Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_53407.htm).

Citywest (2009): “Muslim Population by Country”. CIA World Factbook. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.factbook.net/muslim_pop.php).

De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2009a): “Welcoming Remarks”. At the opening of the Plenary meeting

of the EAPC Security Forum, NATO On-line library, June 25. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_55879.htm).

De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2009b): “Speech”. At the International Conference “Ten Years in

NATO: A Decade of Security”, Budapest, NATO On-line library, March 11. Retrieved

February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_51769.htm).

De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2009c):”NATO Secretary General condems terorist attack in Turkey”.

NATO On-line library, April 30. Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_53633.htm).

21

De Hoop Scheffer, Jaap (2009d):”Statement”. On the Terrorist Attack in Cairo, NATO On-line

library, February 23. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009a): “First NATO Press conference”. NATO On-line library,

August 3. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009b): “Monthly Press Conference”. NATO On-line library, October

7. Retrieved February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_57912.htm).

Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009c): “NATO and Russia: A new Beginning”. At the Carnegie

Endowment, Brussels, NATO On-line library, September 18. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009d): “NATO Secretary’s Statement on Open Door”. NATO On-line

library, December 4. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009e): “New Challenges – Better Capabilities”. At the Bratislava

Security Conference, Bratislava, NATO On-line library, October 22. Retrieved February

6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_58248.htm).

Fogh Rasmussen, Anders (2009f): “Statment”. On the inauguration of President Karzai, NATO

On-line library, November 19. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Marquina, Antonio (2009): Antonio Marquina on the Deceit of Globalization, Energy Security

and Challenges to European Foreign Policy. Theory Talks.(http://www.theory-

talks.org/2009/01/theory-talk-25.html).

Minuto Rizzo, Alessandro (2001): “NATO and the Mediterranean”. At the NATO Defence

College, Rome, NATO On-line library, November 24. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Naumann, Klaus (1997): “A New NATO for new Century”. To the Konrad Adenauer Stiftung

Group 1990-2030 hrs, Brussels, NATO On-line library, October 15. Retrieved February

6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971015b.htm).

Ray, Norman (1997): “Security through NATO in the 21st Century: Vision to Reality”. At the

SACLANT/RUSI International Security Symposium. London, NATO On-line library,

October 9. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001a): “An Attack to Us All: NATO’s Response to Terrorism”. At the Atlantic

Council of the United States, National Press Club, Washington, NATO On-line library,

October 10. Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s011010b.htm).

Robertson, Lord (2001b): “Is NATO up the Challenge?” At the “Welt am Sonntag Forum”,

Berlin, NATO On-line library, October 1. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001c): “NATO in the New Millenium”. Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture,

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin. NATO On-line library, January 25. Retrieved

February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010125a.htm).

Robertson, Lord (2001d): “NATO in the New Millennium”. Manfred Wörner Memorial Lecture

Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung, Berlin, NATO On-line library, January 25. Retrieved

February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010125a.htm).

22

Robertson, Lord (2001e): “NATO’s Challenges: Illusions and Realities”. At the Chicago Council

of Foreign Relations, Chicago, NATO On-line library, June 19. Retrieved February 6,


Robertson, Lord (2001f): “New Security and Defense Challenges in the Euro-Atlantic Area”.

Centro Caixa, Barcelona, NATO On-line library, May 10. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001g): “Press Availability”. NATO HQ, Brussels, NATO On-line library,

September 20. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001h): “Security Challenges in South-East Europe: Perspectives from the

Region”. Rome, NATO On-line library, March 26. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001i): “Speech”. To the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Ottawa, NATO On-

line library, October 9. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001j): “Speech”. Moscow State Institute of Foreign Relations (MGIMO),

NATO On-line library, February 21. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Robertson, Lord (2001k): “Speech”. NATO Parliamentary Assembly Spring Session, Vilnius,

NATO On-line library, May 31. Retrieved February 6, 2010

(http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010531b.htm).

Robertson, Lord (2001l): “Speech”. On the 50th

Anniversary of NATO Defense College, Rome,

NATO On-line library, September 28. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997a): “NATO –Russia Relations at the Turn of the Century”. At the Konrad

Adenauer Foundation, Berlin, NATO ON-line library, November 7. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s971107a.htm).

Solana, Javier (1997b): “NATO Beyond Enlargement”. To the UK Atlantic Council, London,

NATO On-line library, November 19. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997c): “Opening Statement”. EAPC Foreign Ministers Meeting, Brussels,

NATO On-line library, December 17. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997d): “Remarks”. Change of Command Ceremony. NATO On-line library, July

30. Retrieved February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970730a.htm).

Solana, Javier (1997e): “Secretary General’s Council Welcoming Remarks”. NATO HQ.

Brussels, NATO On-line library, January 29. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997f): “Secretary General’s Remarks”. Signing Ceremony of the NATO-Russia

Founding Act. Paris, NATO On-line library,May 27. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997g): “Speech”. At the “Ukraine House”. Kyiv, Ukraine, NATO On-line

library,May 7. Retrieved February 6, 2010


23

Solana, Javier (1997h): “Speech”. Atlantic Treaty Association Council. NATO On-line

library,February 19. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997i): “Speech”. Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.

London, NATO On-line library, March 4. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997j): “Statement to Press”. Following the meeting of the Euro-Atlantic

Partnership Council in Defense Minister Session. Brussels, NATO On-line library, June

13. Retrieved February 6, 2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970613i.htm).

Solana, Javier (1997k): “Statement to the Press”. Visit to Sarajevo. NATO On-line

library,September 12. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Solana, Javier (1997l): “Statement”. Press Conference following the meeting of the Council in

Ministerial Session. Brussels, NATO On-line library, February 18. Retrieved February 6,


Solana, Javier (1997m): “The New NATO and the European Security Architecture”. Federation

of Austrian Industries. Vienna, NATO On-line library, January 16. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1997/s970116a.htm).

Solana, Javier (1997n): “Transcript: Press Conference”. 1400 Hours Coalition Press Information

Centre Holiday Inn. Sarajevo, NATO On-line library, June 23. Retrieved February 6,

2010 (http://www.nato.int/sfor/trans/1997/t970623a.htm).

Von Moltke, Gebhardt (1997): “Political Implications of NATO Enlargement”. NATO Defense

College/North Atlantic Assembly Symposium on the Adaptation of the Alliance. Rome,

NATO On-line library,April 28. Retrieved February 6, 2010


Appendix

Picture 1. “Terrorism” news articles

Source: google.com

Symbols for the Research Matrix

o Plus signs (++) indicate that the identity is present or positively valued by that discourse

o Minus signs (--) indicate that the identity is negatively valued by that discourse

o The sign ^ indicates a mixed evaluation of the identity within the particular discourse

Research Matrix

No Date Who? Text External Others Historical Others Internal Others Self-now

1

1997.01.16 SG

The New

NATO and the

European

Security

Architecture

EU++[working together; same

strategic interests];

Europe++[growing

integration]; Russia^[former

adversary;hope for solid

relations;European stability is

also for RU;enlargement not

against it; paradox - against

NATO enl.,but keeps

distance]; International

society++[cooperation in

Balkans to secure peace] ;New

membercountries++[talks]; All

Partners++[PfP;consultation;

coordinate];

Ukraine++[developing rel.;

significant for European

future;]; non-

members++[cooperation]; CEE

new democracies++[we must

help to have open society; for

enlargement; embrace

democratic reforms];

International press^[doubt

enlargement]; neutral

countries++ [Sweden,

Switzerland, Austria];

emerging crisis--; Open-

mindend Russian

observers++[know NATO is not

anti-RUS]

Cold War--[divided

Europe;unfree

countries]; Single

mission^[collective

defense];

Command

structure^[reform;new

mission-crisis

management];

Allies++[awaited to

participate in reforming

ESDI;committed to

enlargement]; Europeans--

[should not count always on

US; must develop ESDI]

Motor of European

Security cooperation++;

catalyst for political

change++; Open

organization++; Not a

threat to Russia++; serves

Russian

interests++[engaging];

consolidator of

international peace++

2

1997.01.29 CMC

Military

Dimensions of

NATO

Enlargement

New members^(must share the

burden - no freeride); Russia--

(will not affect NATO's enl.

And internal decisions;wants

NATO's concessions;wants

meaningless NATO);

Military structure^[under

revision];Alliance

staff++[multinational];

Security enhancer in

Europe++; bedrock of

European new security

system++;no intention to

deploy nuclear weapons in

new member

territories;NATO

standards++; credible

org.++;

3

1997.02.18 SG

Press

Conference

following the

meeting of the

Council in

Ministerial

Session

Russia^[remain differences,but

we could work jointly];

Ukraine++[agreement]

4

1997.02.19 SG

Speech at

Atlantic Treaty

Association

Council

Russia^[isolationistic;would

cooperate in future; good

effecect from IFOR and SFOR

partnership]

security

environment^[more

diverse now];

Bosnia [successful

mission]

PfP++ [most successful

cooperation mechanism];

5

1997.03.04 SG

Speech, Royal

Institute of

International

Affairs,

Chatham

House

regional crisis--;

Partners++[27]; Moldova++;

Caucasian countries++; Central

Asian Republics++; New

members++; Ukraine++

[working on relationship];

Russia^[does not understand

the new NATO; great power;

great power interests; wants

and deserves a full place in

Europe; will eventually

understand that it is beneficial

to cooperate with NATO

Yalta security

order--; win-lose

game in Europe--

[now win-win

possible];

Collective defense++[the

heart of alliance; command

structure^[now is too big];

PfP++; enlargement++ [way

of uniting Euro-Atlantic

community];

open org.++; no "do

nothin" option++[org.

Must change];

6

1997.03.18 DSG

Keynote

Speech,

Fourth NATO-

Japan Security

Conference

Japan++; Russia^[difficulties

remain, but hopefully will

agree on cooperation]; crisis--

[such as in Bosnia];

7

1997.04.28 ASG/P

A

"Political

Implications

of NATO

Enlargement",

NATO Defence

College/North

Atlantic

Assembly

Symposium

on the

Adaptation of

the Alliance

Euro-Atlantic area++[spirit of

cooperation]; (absence of)

aggressive external threat++;

local crisis and conflicts--

[main threat for stability and

security]; UN++[platform for

cooperation]; CEE++["moving

West"]; potential

members++[speeding up dem-c

reforms]; Partners++[affirm

dem-c vector];

Russia^[anxious of enl.;

misunderstands NATO]

NATO that does

not cooperate--

[e.g.with

RU,UA,SE,PL,HU,

RO,FIN];

Bosnia++[example

of int.coop.,

including

coop.with RUS];

European security

environment^[diffe

rent]

ESDI++[NATO developing

it for security in Europe];

PfP++[creates common

culture with the Partners];

enlargement++[enhancing

network of coop.; not

threatening, but reassuring;

not expansion, but

integration; limiting

individual action; increasing

stability and security for

Europe, including RUS not

a threat to RUS];

representative of Atlantic

community++; stabilizes

relations between its

members++; open org.++;

friendly to

RUS++[common

interest,recognizing the

differences; no intentions

to place nuclear weapons

in the new member states];

new NATO++[serves new

RUS]; not a single-

purpose/action org.++

8

1997.05.07 SG

Speech At the

"Ukraine

House"

UA++[coop.;friend; Partner;

unique place in European

security order;]; European

security++[based on

recognition of territorial

integrity; political

indepencence of states];

Russia^[concerned;

Bosnia and

Herzegovina++[exa

mples of

multilateral coop.]

defense alliance++["has

never been a threat to

anyone"]; org.based on

new security

concept++[more coop.];

recognize RUS's concerns;

9

1997.05.27 SG

Remarks,

Signing

Ceremony of

the NATO-

Russia

Founding Act

Yeltsin++; Primakov++;

Russia++[coop. in Bosnia]

10

1997.06.13 SG

Statement to

the Press by

Secretary

General

following the

meeting of the

Euro-Atlantic

Partnership

Council in

Defence

Minister

Session

Russia++[coop.] open org.++

11

1997.06.23 SG

Transcript:

Press

Conference,

SFOR

Bosnia++[example of int.

coop.]; Bosnian

authorities^[not sufficiently

safeguarding freedom of

press/movement];

IPTF++[coop.]

SFOR++ not an org. to do police

tasks^;

12

1997.07.30 SG

Remarks,

Change of

Command

Ceremony

SFOR++[firm and fair civil

reconstruction of country;

ready to take military

action;]; General

Crouch++[job well done];

13

1997.09.12 SG

Statement to

the Press,

Visit to

Sarajevo

OSCE++[working to establish

dem-c institutions in Bosnia];

SFOR++[do not tolerate any

violence or threat,

determined to help OSCE to

have fair elections]

14

1997.09.26 DSG

A Workable

Security

Architecture

European Security

Architecture++[on ther right

track, but still to be

developed]; crisis and

conflicts--; crisis in Europe--

conflict in Bosnia^;

IFOR++[first

int.operation;

coop.with RUS];

Bosnia^[example

of the need for

multilateral coop.]

NATO-Russia

Council++[distinct from

North Atlantic Council;

RUS will not have big

impact on NATO's

policies]; Euro-Atlantic

Partnership

Council++[place for coop.];

Turkey++[crucial for

European and the Alliance

security]; new

members++[PL,HU,CZ;

adding military clout];

enlargement++[more pros

than cons];

symbol of Atlantic

community++; one of the

most successful coop.

Projects of the century++;

listening to RUS and its

concerns++;

15

1997.10.09 ASG/

DS

"Security

through NATO

in the 21st

Century:

Vision to

Reality"

Partners++[cooperation;];

challenges to NATO's security-

-; instabilities--; EU++;

WEU++; OSCE++; new

cooperative security order++;

European security

integration++[NATO one side

of it]; CH++[coop. within PfP];

Russia++[cooperation]

previous security

order^[strategic

balances;

adversarial

postures]; less

complex/ less

interactive world^

humanitarian missions^;

SFOR++[successful

example of cooperation];

PfP++[opportunity for

greater interoperability for

the partners]; peacekeeping

and humanitarian

operations++; ESDI++;

enlargement++[continuing

process-not a one time

event];

survived

transition++[&flourishing

under new conditions];

org. willing to coop.

multilaterally; open

org.++; epitomization of

the Atlantic community;

16

1997.10.15 CMC

A New NATO

For A New

Century

no state as enemy^; "Arc of

Instability" from Morocco to

India--[there one notes

attempts to acquire WMD];

NATO's Southern Region--

[terrorism used as means];

Russia++;Ukraine++

Washington Treaty

was based on

Article 51 of UN

charter++[collectiv

e defense]; founded

on 2 principles:

1)attack on one

member, is an

attack on all;

2)USA and CAN

security linked to

the one of

W.Europe++;

Warsaw Pact

countries--; PfP

used to be "meet

and greet" events^

[now - full-scale

combat

manouvres];

Bosnia++[collectiv

e experience];

Easern neighbors--

[confrontation and

mistrust]

EAPC++; PfP++[crucial

element of Euro-Atlantic

security architecture];

Turkey^[link between

cultures; most endangered

member]; CJTF++[response

for crisis; instrument for

contingency opperations;];

ESDI++[illustrates NATO's

commitment to

strenghtening relations with

Europe]; USA^[too

developed in respect to

other Allied countries]

able to adapt to the

changing world++; org. for

crisis management,

deterrence and defence++;

door remains open++;

willing for genuine coop.

with Russia and

Ukraine++; anchor for

stability in Europe++;

factor for stability far

beyond Alliances

territories++; cornerstone

of European security

architecture

17

1997.11.07 SG

"NATO-Russia

Relations at

the Turn of

the Century"

Russia^[supplier of gas for

Europe;has scientific potential;

strongest single military power

in Europe; has a chance to

engage with Europe and

NATO as never before];

arms race--;

ideological

confrontation--;

Russia-adversary--;

Bosnia++[exemplif

ies that possible

coop. with RUS]

18

1997.11.19 SG

"NATO Beyond

Enlargement" new security order in

Europe++[based on peace,

democracy, rule of law,

individual liberty; takes RUS

into account]; UA++; security

challenges in Europe--;

international community++

a threat of general

war--;

Bosnia++[example

of int. coop.;

solidarity and unity

of the Allies];

IFOR++ [example

of int. Coalition for

peace];

PfP++[building coop.

security in Europe];

EAPC++[step to more

inclusive NATO]; NAC

remains autonomous++[no

RUS influence];

Britain++[one of the

staunchest supporters of

NATO]; PL, CZ,

HU++[able to meet NATO's

responsibilities];

enlargement++[increase of

strenght and security in

Europe];

Article 5 remains the

benchmark of the force

structure++; doors

open++; key to

modernising RUS++

[making it more dem-c;

supporting market

economy reforms]

19

1997.12.17 SG

Opening

Statement,

EAPC Foreign

Ministers

Meeting

EAPC++[coop.]

20

2001.01.25 SG

"NATO in the

New

Millennium"

Russia^[coop. in Bosnia,

Kosovo; not completely

successful relations - RUS

didn't help stopping Milosevic;

realizes that NATO is here to

stay; Bosnia++[slowly

progressing towards self-

sustainable peace]; FRY^[not

enemies];

NATO's role -

"business-as-

usual"^[stately

management of the

CW]; "NATO's

out-of-area

syndrom"--[in early

1990s]; ending the

slaughter in

Kosovo++[risk that

paid off];

Milosevic--;

Unied Germany++[key

member of NATO]; PfP++;

EAPC++; Europe^[must

make greater contribution to

NATO];

doors open++; (NATO -

unthinkable without)

Partnership++; not a threat

to RUS++

21

2001.02.21 SG

Speech,

Moscow State Russia^[transforming; zero-

sum approach; ready again to

work on coop.; hesitates to join

PfP; engaging in Chechnya

only militarily]; OSCE++

Cold War--;

Dayton Peace

Agreement++[exa

mple that NATO

and RUS can

deliver together];

Milosevic--;

humanitarian

tragedy in Kosovo-

-[worsened

relations with

RUS;]; zero-sum

game--

PJC++[coop.; venue of

consultations];

enlargement++[transcends

the lines that divided

Europe; not anti-RUS];

EAPC++;

ready to engage RUS++;

does not understand RUS

concerns over enl.^

22

2001.03.26 ASG/P

A

"Security

Challenges in

South-East

Europe:

Perspectives

from the

Region"

SEE++[area seeing progress;

becoming normal, stable,

prosperous]; Yugoslavia++[on

the dem-c track]; Kosovo++[in

transition to consolidating

peace]; ethnic Albanian

extremists--;

KFOR++[maintaining

security in Kosovo]

23

2001.05.10 SG

"New Security

and Defence

Challenges in

the Euro-

Atlantic Area"

Balkan region^[unstable];

Russia^[a major power];

globalisation^; regional

conflicts--; new security

environment^; post-Cold War

world^[changes more quickly]

Spain++[contribution to

ESDP; central player in

Euro-Atlantic security];

military dimension

important++; dem-c

alliance++; our territories

not directly under

threat++;

24

2001.05.31 SG

Speech, NATO

Parliamentary

Assembly

Spring

Session

Lithuania++[special place in

21st century, ]; Bosnian Croat

extremists--

Milosevic-- USA++[vital role in Europe,

crisis manager in Balkans,

stabilising power in Europe;

not going to solve all the

European crisis]; ESDI++;

PA++; enlargement++

[more security]; MAP++

25

2001.06.19 SG

NATO's

Challenges:

Illusions and

Realities

press--[depicting NATO

falsely; judge NATO by the

yardsticks of the CW]; crisis in

Europe--; EU++; there is no

"other side"++;

Russia^[warnings to Poland

about enl.; using outdated CW

concepts, such as "buffer

zones"

NATO-passive

Alliance--; single

purpose--

[deterrence of

major conflict];

ESDI++;

enlargement++[community

building; overcoming the

divisions]

crisis management++;

moved from "being" to

"doing"++; when it comes

to crisis solution: "NATO

or nothing"++; not anti-

RUS++

26 2001.09.20 SG

Press

Availability International community++;

terrorism--; USA++

27

2001.09.28 SG

Speech on the

50th

Anniversary of

the NATO

Defence

College

UA and Russia++[both crucial

for long term peace and

stability in Europe]; security

environment^[changes fast];

new kind of enemy--[facing

major threats from non-state

actors, rogue states];

globalization^[opportunities

for prosperity; makes society

vulnerable]; uncertain future--;

EU++; OSCE++; private

NGOs++[coop.]; academic

community++[has time and

capacity to research the new

challenges]

CW security

environment--;

post-CW security

environment^;

NATO spending on

security in CW++

NACC++; PfP++; EAPC++;

USA++[NATO ready to

assist in fight against

terrorism]

open org.++; Article 5++;

org. founded on common

values and interests++;

28

2001.10.01 SG

Is NATO up to

the

Challenge?

terrorism--[as slavery in 19th

century];UN++; OSCE++;

9/11--[didn't invalidate

NATO's prior agenda];

Russia^[views Article 5 as

anti-RUS;]; suicide terrorists--

[cannot be deterred]; terrorist

leaders--[are not willing to

die]; rogue states--; terrorists--

[blur the line between criminal

and combatant]

NAC++[reacted to 9/11

after just 6hours];

DCI++[tool to face the new

challenges];

enlargement++[9/11 proves

the need for it];

EAPC++[coop.to fight

terrorism];military-civilian

agencies++[more coop.]

not the lead org.combating

terrorism^; want

partnership with Russia++

29

2001.10.09 SG

Speech To the

NATO

Parliamentary

Assembly,

Ottawa

terrorism--; Osama bin Laden--

; Taleban--[Osama's backers];

terrorists--[commit crimes

against humanity];

9/11^[transformed completely

the world we live];

international community++;

fight against terrorism++[no

similar coalition, since fight

against fascism]; new

Partners++[offering support,

military assistance];

Russia^[increasingly sees

NATO as security partner, not

threat; supports NATO's view

regarding terrorism, but -

violates human rights in

Chechnya]; Afghanistan--[safe

haven for terrorists; does not

have viable state structure;

"black hole"]; Balkans--

[potential "black hole" at the

doorstep of Europe];

during the CW

Europe faced the

greatest threat of

attack--[now-

everyone, including

USA]

US++[turned to NATO for

assistance; tougher burden

sharing approach]; Article 5

[invoked in different - not

anti-RUS - context ];

PA++[communicate with

society approve military

action];

not to lead military action

against Taleban^; central

to the collective response

to terrorism++; determined

to defend the common

values++

30

2001.10.10 SG

An Attack on

Us All:NATO's

Response to

Terrorism

9/11^[has changed the world;

has set in our consciousness

like attack on Pearl Harbor];

Osama bin Laden--; Taleban--

[Osama's backers];

Balkans^[crisis]; terrorism--;

Afghanistan--[safe haven for

terrorists; no viable state

structures; "black hole"];

Balkans--[potential "black

hole" at the doorstep of

Europe]; terrorists--[blur the

line between criminal and

combatant];

[Russia^[increasingly sees

NATO as security partner, not

threat; supports NATO's view

regarding terrorism, but -

violates human rights in

Chechnya]

zero-sum thinking-

-;

US++[keeps allies up to

date; tougher burdensharing

approach];

interoperability++; joint

training++;

victim mentality--; would

be as responsible as bin

Laden, should this become

"age of terrorism"; not to

lead military action against

Taleban^; central to the

collective response to

terrorism++;

31

2001.11.24 DSG

NATO and the

Mediterranean new security

environment^[requires for

NATO to adjust its agenda];

9/11^[vindicates NATO's role

in Balkans]; stable, multi-

ethnic states++[best insurance

against terrorism]; terrorism--;

Mediterranean

reagion++[plurality; crucial for

European security];

Muslims++[Kosovo campaign

in their defense]; Al-Qaida--

[network in Afghanistan];

Middle East Peace

Process^[obstacle to

normalising Western relations

with the Arab world];

EU++[economic coop.]; non-

NATO Mediterranean

countries++; EG, JO, MA++

[coop. in Bosnia and Kosovo];

Mediterranean

Dialogue++[part of NATO

attempt to create secure Euro-

Atlantic area];

bipolarity--; US^[unilateral operation

outside Europe];

Europe++[more

responsibility on their own];

NATO Defense College++

the leader against

terrorism--;

33

2009.01.14 SM

Weekly press

briefing environmental disasters--;

terrorism--; JO++[coop.];

UNSC++; IL++[anti-terrorism

cooperation]; AF^; Afghan

insurgents--; ANSF++[coop.];

HR++[coop in fight against

terrorism., NATO future

member]; ANA++

Iron Curtain-- NAC++; ISAF++; role to resolve Gaza

conflict--; warring in

AF++; respect for Afghna

culture and Islam++;

34

2009.02.23 SG Statement on

the terrorist

attack in Cairo

EG++[coop. in fight against

terrorism]; terrorism--;

Mediterranean Dialogue++

35

2009.03.11 SG

Speech at the

International

Conference

“Ten Years in

NATO: A

Decade of

Security” in

Budapest,

Hungary

candidate countries++; EU++;

Albania++; HR++; AF^;

Kosovo^; ANA++;

international community++;

terrorism--; Russia^[wants

trustful coop.; war in Georgia;

common interests - fight

against terrorism, counterint

the proliferation of WMD];

piracy--[serious global security

challenge]; CEE countries++;

end of

CW++[justice

triumphed]; 1999

enlargement++[enh

anced European

security];

enlargement++[ongoing

process]; CZ, HU, PL++

[well integrated new

members; team spirit;

contributing to NATO's

missions]

adaptive++

36

2009.04.22 ASG/P

D

Conference on

“Intangibles of

Security”

ESF++[common goals - to

analyze, counter, and prevent

threats to security];

37

2009.04.30 SG

NATO

Secretary

General

condemns

terrorist

attack in

Turkey

terrorism--; terrorists--; Turkey++

38

2009.06.25 SG

Welcoming

remarks at

the opening of

the Plenary

meeting of the

EAPC Security

Forum

KZ++ [the most active partner

in the Central Asian region;

interoperability; hosts annual

excercises; does not suffer

from nuclear legacy, because

after the CW gave all nuclear

weapons to Russia];

Cold War^; Soviet

Union--

EAPC++ engaged in civil coop.

projects++

39

2009.08.03 SG

First NATO

Press

conference

UN++[gave mandate in AF];

Aghanistan^[former "Grand

Central Station of international

terrorism"]; terrorism; EU++;

OSCE++; Afghan police++;

ANA++; Taliban--; Russia^

[common interests - AF,

counter-terrorism, piracy, non-

proliferation of WMD, piracy;

does not respect its

international obligations, e.g.

territorial integrity and political

freedoms of its neighbors; war

with Georgia]; piracy--; MD

and ICI countries++ [mutual

respect, understanding;

common challenges -

terrorism, proliferation,

dangers of failed states];

Balkans^;

KFOR++[successful end of

mission in forseeable

future]; ISAF++; France++;

the most successful aliance

in history++; community

of

democracies++[common

values: freedom, peace,

security]; ultimate

insurance policy for 900m

people++; pillar of global

security; willing to coop.

with RUS++; anti-piracy

role++; doors open++;

open and inclusive policy

development++; Article 5

is the core++; new

Strategic Concept++

40

2009.09.18 SG

'NATO and

Russia: A New

Beginning''

Russia^[common interests,

challenges in 21st century -

terrorism, non-proliferation of

WMD, missile defense, AF,

counter narcotics, maritime

security; perceives NATO as

threat; great European power;

has own point of view,

interests, which often do not

coincide with NATO's; war in

GE; fears being marginalized

from European security

architecture]; international

security environment^[RUS-

Cold War^; after

CW -RUS and

NATO developed

unrealistic

expectations of

each other^[still a

problem]

Allies++ [common culture];

enlargement++; ISAF++;

NATO-RUS

Council++[opportunity to

identify and coop. on the

new challenges];

doors open++; hope that

RUS sooner rather than

later will recognize that

coop.with NATO is in its

interest++

NATO coop. is a matter of

necessity]; EU++; terrorism--;

terrorists--; Al-Qaeda--;

Western Balkans^

41

2009.10.07 SG

Monthly press

conference Taleban--; Al-Qaeda--;

terrorists--; international

community++; ANSF++;

extremism--; Russia^;

Muslims++[good that some

countries participate in AF,

thus showing that it is not

about religion, but rather fight

against terrrorism and

extremism]

non-US Allies^[are not

contributing enough in AF,

but should]; NATO-RUS

Council++;

NL^[contributing, but about

to withdraw from AF];

need strong coop. with

Pakistan++

42

2009.10.22 SG

"New

Challenges -

Better

Capabilities''

Al Qaeda--;

Afghanistan^[NATO's priority

No.1]; terrorism--; climate

change--[e.g.,security

implications of global

warming]; Russia^[have

common interests; but also

different views]; private

military companies^ [could be

used, but generally NATO's

interest more - governmental

approach]; EU++

Slovakia++[special role];

Madeline Albrigh and 12

experts++[working on the

recommendations for the

new Strategic Concept]

new Strategic

Concept++[development -

open and inclusive]; must

incorporate the

"Comprehensive

approach"++[economic,

political, other measures

that are beyond NATO's

capabilities in coop.with

int.org-s]

43

2009.11.19 SG

Statement on

the

inauguration

of President

Karzai

Afghan people++; ANSF++ ISAF++

44 2009.12.04 SG

Statement on

Open Door Montenegro++; Bosnia-

Herzegovina++

MAP++

Date post:	12-Sep-2021
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	1 times
Download:	0 times

9/11 and the Transformation of NATOâ€™s Identity in the post-Cold

Documents