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Self-Regulation Failure: An OverviewAuthor(s): Roy F. Baumeister and Todd F. HeathertonSource: Psychological Inquiry, Vol. 7, No. 1 (1996), pp. 1-15Published by: Taylor & Francis, Ltd.Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/1449145

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Psychologicalnquiry1996, Vol. 7, No. 1, 1-15 Copyright996byLawrenceErlbaumAssociates,Inc.

TARGET ARTICLE

Self-Regulation Failure: An OverviewRoy F. BaumeisterDepartmentof PsychologyCase WesternReserveUniversity

Todd F. HeathertonDepartmentof PsychologyDartmouthCollege

Themajorpatterns of self-regulatoryailure are reviewed.Underregulationoccursbecause of deficient standards, inadequate monitoring, or inadequate strength.Misregulationoccursbecauseoffalse assumptionsor misdirectedefforts,especiallyan unwarrantedemphasis on emotion. The evidence supports a strength(limitedresource)modelof self-regulationandsuggests thatpeople oftenacquiesce in losingcontrol.Loss of controlof attention,ailure of transcendence,andvarious lapse-ac-tivatedcauses all contribute o regulatory ailure.ModernAmerican ocietysuffers romabroad angeof problems hat have self-regulationailure as a com-mon core. Crime, teen pregnancy, alcoholism, drugaddiction,venerealdisease, educationalunderachieve-ment,gambling,and domesticviolence areamongthesocialproblems hatrevolvearoundheapparentnabil-ity of manyindividuals o disciplineand controlthem-selves. Althougheconomic,political, andsociologicalcauses may be relevant to such issues, the proximalimportanceof self-regulation ailureto manycases isundeniable.Moreover, herearemanyadditionalprob-lems with self-regulation hatcause considerablesuf-feringto individualseven if theydonotmenacesocietyatlarge(e.g., eating binges,spendingsprees,procrasti-nation,andinappropriate oal setting).Researchers n the psychology of the self have re-centlybegunto recognizethatone of themostelusive,important, nddistinctivelyhuman raits s thecapacityof humanbeings to alter their own responsesandthusremove them from the direct effects of immediate,situational timuli.Anunderstandingf self-regulationfailure would therefore have considerable value not

only for its applications o widespreadsocial andper-sonal problems, but also to basic research and theconstructionof an adequate theoretical account ofhumanselfhood.Although conceptions of volition and self-controlhave long been of philosophical, religious, and legalinterest,only recentlyhave psychologists focused ontheextenttowhichpeopleinfluence,modify,orcontrol

their own behavior.Pioneers such as Mischel (1974)and Bandura 1977) proposed and demonstrated hathumanbeings do seem to have the unique capacitytoalter their own responses. Over the past 2 decades,theoryandresearchhave advancedthe understandingof self-regulation considerably (Carver & Scheier,1981;Kanfer& Karoly,1972) andmodels of self-reg-ulationhave beenapplied n diverse areas(e.g., educa-tion, drug treatment, emotional control, and taskperformance). Despite the substantial progress instudying how self-regulationcan function, however,relatively ittle effort has beendevoted to directexam-inationof failuresatself-regulationcf. Kirschenbaum,1987).The purposeof this article is to offer a theoreticaltreatmentof self-regulation ailure.We have recentlyreviewedthemultiple iteratures ealingwiththemanyspecific spheresof self-regulationailure(Baumeister,Heatherton,& Tice, 1994), and in this article we artic-ulatesome of our main conclusions. Because the em-pirical literatureon these topics is extensive, we citeevidence here only to illustratekey points. A com-prehensive review of currentresearchknowledge isbeyondthescopeof thisarticle,and interestedreadersarereferred o the book.

Self-regulations a complex, multifacetedprocess,and so it can break down in several different ways.Therefore, t is notpossible to identifya single cause orcausal sequencethatwill explain all instancesof self-regulation ailure.Instead,there areseveral mainpat-

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terns, any one of which can produce self-regulationfailure ndependently.The most basic distinction s betweenunderregula-tion andmisregulation e.g., Carver& Scheier, 1981).Underregulation ntails a failure to exert self-control;often,thepersondoes not botherordoes notmanage ocontroltheself. Incontrast,misregulationnvolves theexertionof controloveroneself, butthiscontrol s doneinamisguidedorcounterproductiveashion,andso thedesiredresult s notachieved.Atpresent, here s moreresearch vailable nunderregulationhanonmisregula-tion,and t alsoappears hatunderregulations themorecommonsortof problem.After abriefdiscussionof thenatureof self-regulation,we examineunderregulationfirst andthenproceedto misregulation.

Three Ingredients of Self-RegulationFeedback-loopmodels of self-regulation, uch as theoneelaboratedbyCarverandScheier(1981, 1982;alsoCarver,1979), indicate three mainingredientsof self-regulation,and thesesuggestthreemainpossible path-ways for self-regulation ailure.The firstingredient sstandards,which are deals,goals,orotherconceptionsof possible states. Without clear andconsistent stan-dards,self-regulationwill be hampered.Therefore,ei-

thera lack of standardsor a dilemma of conflicting,incompatiblestandards an preventeffective self-reg-ulation. There is indeed evidence thatsuch innercon-flicts can impair action and undercut efforts atself-regulatione.g.,Emmons&King,1988;VanHook& Higgins, 1988). Moreover, nappropriatetandards(i.e., those thataretoohighortoo low) canalsohamperand thwart self-regulation (Heatherton& Ambady,1993).The second ingredient is monitoring. The "test"phaseof feedback-loopmodelsinvolvescomparing heactualstate of the self to the standards,and to do thatthepersonmust monitorhim-or herself.Keepingclosetrackof one's actions and states is often vital to suc-cessful self-regulation, and so when people cease tomonitorthemselves they tend to lose control.Eatingbinges, for example, seem to occur when the personceases to keep track of what he or she is eating (for areview, see Heatherton& Baumeister,1991; Polivy,1976). A particularly mportant actor is alcohol con-sumption,which reduces self-attentionand thereforemakespeople less able or less willing to monitor hem-selves (Hull, 1981). Alcohol consumptionhas beenfoundtopromoteself-regulatoryailure nmanydiffer-ent spheres (Baumeister et al., 1994; Steele &Southwick, 1985). The failureto judge one's abilitiesaccuratelymayalso impedesuccessfulself-regulation.

Forinstance,people who underestimateheir abilitiesmayfail to initiateattempts o achieve theirgoals.The third ngredientof self-regulation s containedin the operatephaseof the feedbackloop. The idea isthatwhen the test phase reveals that the currentstatefalls short of the standards,some process is set inmotion to changethe current tate.Past theories havenot devoted a great deal of attentionto how theseprocesses actually function to bring about change,partly because they may have seemed complex andheterogeneous.Still, it is clearthatself-regulation ail-ure can occur despite clear standardsand effectivemonitoring, simply because the person is unable tobringaboutthe desiredchange.We havefound it useful to conceptualizesuchoper-atechanges n termsof one internalprocessoverridinganother.Certainresponsesare set in motion,eitherbyinnateprogramming, earning,habit,or motivation-andself-regulationnvolves overriding hem.In otherwords, a great many instances of self-regulationin-volve a responsethatis initiatedby a combinationoflatent motivationsandactivatingstimuli;self-regula-tion is a matterof interruptinghatresponse andpre-venting t fromrunning o its normal, ypicaloutcome.Forexample,a beercommercial(an activatingstimu-lus) may bringto the fore one's liking for alcohol (alatent motivation) andcreate an impulse to consumealcohol; however, the person who is trying to reducehis or her drinkingwill seek to overridethe responsesequenceandprevent t fromleadingto the consump-tion of such a beverage.1In manycases, impulses areautomatic n the senseof being beyondaperson'svolitionalcontrol.Thus,theterm mpulsecontrol s misleading.Self-regulations acontrolled process that overrides the usual conse-quences of an impulserather hanpreventingthe im-pulse from occurring.The problemis not thatpeoplehaveimpulses;rather,t is thatthey acton them.

Self-RegulatoryStrength: A LimitedResourceWe turnnow to the issue of whatenables apersontooverridea habitualor motivatedresponse sequence.How does thepacifist urn he othercheekandhow doesthe dieterrefrain romeatinghis or her fill? It is clear

'We use the termimpulse o referto an inclination to performaparticular ction on a particular ccasion.Thus,impulsesarehighlyspecificin contrast o motivations,whichmaybe generalorabstract.Impulsesarise when motivationsencounter pecific,activating tim-uli in a particular ituation. For example, hunger is a motivation,whereas the wish to devour one of those fragrant, izzling cheese-burgerson the grill is animpulse.

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that impulses and motivations vary according tostrength,and the weaker ones arethose thatareeasiertocontroland stifle. If theimpulseshavestrength,henwhatever tifles them mustpresumably onsist of somegreaterstrength.Our own research Baumeisteret al.,1994) led us to concur with other scholars such asMischel (in press) who have suggestedthat strengthmodels are apt and useful for self-regulationtheory.Underregulation s thus often a matterof the inade-quacy of one's strength to override the unwantedthought, eeling, orimpulse.Moreprecisely,our over-view of theself-regulationiteratureuggeststhateachperson's capacity for self-regulation appearsto be alimitedresource,which is renewableovertime andcanbe increasedor decreasedas a result of gradualdevel-opmentsorpractice.Onecannotregulateeverythingatonce.

Adopting a strengthmodel of self-regulationhasseveral importantcorollaries for understanding elf-regulationfailure. Therewill be important ndividualdifferences nself-regulatorytrength,whichshouldbeconsistent across a varietyof spheres.There is someevidence to support his view. Thus, individualdiffer-ences in the capacity to delay gratificationpredict avarietyof interpersonalraitsand behaviors hatreflectself-control(Funder,Block, & Block, 1983) andcanevenpredictacademicperformance ver a decade ater(Mischel, Shoda, & Peake, 1988; Shoda, Mischel, &Peake,1990).Also, thesame ndividuals howself-reg-ulatorydeficits across a broadspectrumof bothlegalandillegal behavior.A typical criminal,for example,will not specialize in one particularkind of illegalactivity,but ratherwill commita varietyof crimes,andhe or she will also be proneto smokecigarettes,spendimpulsively (thereby dissipating any financial gainsfrom crime),become involved in unwantedpregnan-cies, fail at marriage,abuse alcohol anddrugs, havehighabsenteeismat workorschool,andengage n otherbehaviors ndicativeof poorself-regulation Gottfred-son & Hirschi, 1990).The second implicationof a strengthmodel is thatapersoncan become exhausted rommanysimultaneousdemandsand so will sometimes ail at self-controlevenregarding hings at which he or she would otherwisesucceed. As alimitedresource, elf-regulatorytrengthcan betemporarily epleted.Atany giventime,agivenpersonwill only be able to regulateso much of his orher behavior, and so when strengthis depleted bydemands in one sphere, self-regulatorybreakdownsmayoccurin others. Inparticular,atigueor overexer-tion will depletetheperson'sstrengthandhence under-mine some patternsof self-control.The evidence regardingsuch short-termdepletionsis notextensivebut t is broadandconsistent.Inpartic-

ular,manypatterns f self-regulationbreakdown whenpeople are understress,presumablybecause the stressdepletes their self-regulatorycapacities. People be-comemoreemotionaland rritable,heyaremore ikelyto increasesmoking,breakdiets orovereat,abuse alco-hol or other drugs, and so forth when under stress.Glass, Singer,andFriedman 1969) found thatcopingwith stress seemed to have a "psychiccost" that tookthe form of lowered self-regulatorycapacity, as mea-suredby subsequent apacitiesto make oneself persistin thefaceof frustration nd oconcentrate n adifficulttask.

Likewise, if we assume that people are generallyfatigued late in the evening, then self-regulationshould breakdown more at such times than at others.Evidence about the timing of such self-regulatoryfailures is consistent with the fatigue hypothesis (al-though some of these effects are confounded by thefact that people are more likely to have consumedalcohol late in the day and alcohol impairs monitor-ing, thereby also weakening self-regulation). Dietsare most often broken ate in theevening; sexual actsthat one will laterregretare likewise most commonthen;people smoke anddrinkmostheavily late in theday; most violent and impulsive crimes are commit-ted between 1:00 and 2:00 a.m.

These first two implicationsof the strengthmodelfurnish a basis for predicting the intercorrelationsamongindicationsof self-control n multiple spheres.If there are individual differences in self-regulatorystrength, hen over the long runtherewill be positivecorrelationsbecause strongpeople will tend to haverelativelyhigh levels of self-control n all spheres.Ontheotherhand, n the shortrun thecorrelationswill benegativebecausedevotingone's self-regulatory ffortsto one sphere will take away what is available forcontrollingoneself in otherspheres.Researchers nter-estedinoverlapsbetweenself-regulatoryffectivenessin different pheresmayneedto be alert o theseoppos-ing empirical endencies.The third implication is just as it is possible toincreasestrengthby regular xercise,so self-regulationshould become easier the more one does it. This hasbeen assertedby James (1890/1950) andmany otherobserversof humanbehavior but we do not know ofstrongempirical ests of thehypothesis.In this connec-tion,it is of considerable elevancethat new programsforprisoners e.g.,"bootcamps")nvolvemilitary-styletraining, n which anattempts made to instill self-dis-cipline by meansof enforcingexternaldiscipline. Al-thoughthe effectiveness of these programshas yet tobe decided,we predictthattheir success at rehabilitat-ing prisonerswill be in proportion o their success atstrengthening elf-regulatory apacities.

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Oneimplicationof the notion of increasingstrengthis thatpeople maybecome betteratpracticing elf-de-nial orimpulsecontrolovertime.Ironically, his couldmean thatpeoplewhorepeatedlyquit smokingorgo ondiets may graduallybecome more effective and suc-cessful. Schachter(1982) contended thatpeople im-proveatquittingsmokingwithpractice.Prochaska ndDiClemente (1984, 1986) arguedthatpeople becomebetter at quittinga varietyof addictionswhen they doit multiple times. Of course, the fact that they arequittingagainmeans that hepriorefforttoquitwas nota permanentsuccess but it may be the case that onelearns to quit through successive approximations.There could be several reasons for progressive im-provementat impulse control but one of themclearlyis thepossibilityof increasingstrength.

Inertia and AttentionA fairamountof evidence suggeststhatpsycholog-ical responsesare markedby somethingakinto inertia,whichmakesthem difficult to interrupt.The term ner-tia is borrowed romphysics, in whichit referred o the(now discredited) heory hatbodiesinmotionacquireda force thatsustained hem in motion.Weproposethatpsychological processesdoacquire

a kindof inertia unlikephysicalprocesses).Indeed, helongeraresponsehasgoneon the more nertia t seemsto have and hence the moredifficult it is to override.This theoretical principle is not new (indeed, theZeigarnik ffect involved theprinciple hat nterruptingan activity becomes more strenuous as it nears itscompletion)but its importance orunderstandingelf-regulationhas beenneglected.Effective self-regulationoften seems to involve in-terveningas earlyaspossible.Forexample,if thegoalof self-regulation s the preservationof chastity,it isoftenmore effective to interruptexual activitiesat thefirstkiss rather hanafteran hour's worthof escalatingphysical contact. The effectiveness of early interven-tionmaywell reflect theoperationof inertia:To mini-mize inertia, self-regulatory efforts may be mostprofitably focused on the very first stages of all re-sponse sequences.Most models of the cognitive control of behaviorbegin with attentionbecausenoticing something s bydefinition the firststagein informationprocessing.Asa result, one would expect that managing attentionwould be importantn manyor all spheresof self-reg-ulation,and,as a corollary, he loss of attentional on-trolwill be a common firstharbinger f self-regulatoryfailure. Our review of multiple, empiricalliteraturesconfirmedthesehypotheses.Over andover, we found

that managing attention was the most common andoften themosteffectiveformof self-regulationandthatattentional roblemspresagedagreatmanyvarietiesofself-regulationailure.Withcontrolling houghts,emo-tions andmoods, task-performance rocesses,andap-petites and impulses, the effective management ofattentionwas a powerful and decisive step, and self-regulatory ailureensued when attentioncould not bemanaged(Baumeisteret al., 1994; see also Kirschen-baum,1987;Wegner,1994).Forourpurposes, hekey point s that heimportanceof attention s at least partlyattributable o the inertiaprinciple.Effectivemanagementof attentioncan pre-vent the unwantedresponse sequence from starting,which makes t relativelyeasy to prevent heunaccept-able outcome.In contrast, f attentionescapes controlit can set the unwantedresponsesin motion,and oncethey acquire nertiathey are more difficult to control.In simpleterms, t is easier to avoidtemptation hantoovercome t.

TranscendenceOneparticularlymportantorm of attentioncontrolis transcendence.Transcendences a matterof focusingawarenessbeyond the immediate stimuli (i.e., trans-

cendingthe immediatesituation).This does not neces-sarilymean gnoring he immediatepresentso much asseeing it in the context of more distal concerns (e.g.,values, goals, and motivations). Phenomenologistshave emphasizedtranscendenceas a particularly m-portant apabilityof humanconsciousness.Dieting offers a clear example of transcendence.Humanbeings maybe theonly species on theplanet nwhich hungry individuals will voluntarily refuse toconsume readily available, appealingfood. Effectivedietingdoes, however,require hepersonto transcendtheeffectsof the immediatestimuli.By contemplatinglong-rangegoals andconcerns, such as how one willlookinabathing uitnextsummer,peopleareavailableto frame he attractive ood as aproblematicordanger-ous obstaclerather han as an appealingmorsel.Therefore, one proximal cause of self-regulationfailure is the failureof transcendence.When attentionslipsoff of long-rangegoalsandhighideals and nsteadbecomes mmersedn the immediate ituation, elf-reg-ulation is in jeopardy. Whateverfunctions to directattention o the here andnow will tend to weaken thecapacity for self-regulation.This may include bothsituational nddispositional actors.Situational actorsincludethose thatpromotedeindividuation.There arealso individualdifferences n the extentto whichpeopleare influenced by environmentalcues. Schachter's

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(1971) influentialexternality heoryof obesityarguedthatsome individuals(i.e., theoverweight)wereespe-cially prone to be influenced by externalcues abouteating.The capacity to delay gratificationis one of theimportant ootsof self-regulation heory.A successfuldelay of gratification requires the person to foregoimmediately available rewards n favor of largerbutremoterones, andkeepingoneself fromthinkingaboutthe immediate rewards is often a vital part of thatsuccess(Mischel, 1974;Rodriguez,Mischel,&Shoda,1989). Karnioland Miller(1983) showed thatself-reg-ulatoryfailure(in this case, the failure to choose thedelayed gratification)is often preceded by shifts inattention o the immediatereward.This shift in atten-tion to the immediate situation s a form of transcen-dence failure.Transcendence s often a vital aspect of emotionregulation.People overcomeanger,frustration, rdis-appointmentby looking beyond the immediate situa-tion.Theyimaginehowthingscould havebeenworse,conjureup possiblepositive outcomesthatmayderivefrom the currentsetback,or speculateaboutpossiblybeneficial motives that the other (offending) personmayhave had. Emotionis typicallylinked to a partic-ularvaluejudgmentabouta particular vent or situa-tion;by transcendinghesituation,onecanescapefromthe emotion that s linked to that valuejudgment.Indeed, it is plausiblethatthe contributionof emo-tional distressto self-regulation ailure is often medi-ated by effects on transcendence.The interrelationsamongemotion, attention,andself-regulationarenotwell understoodandso commentsmust be speculative,but we propose the following: Emotionincreases thesalience of whateverproducesthe emotion and so at-tentionwill tendtofocusonwhateverhaspromptedheemotion.Mostcommonly, something n the immediatesituation s thecause and so emotion tends to have theeffect of concentrating ttentionn thehereand now-therebythwarting ranscendence ndmaking self-reg-ulation more difficult. Violent behaviorprovides animportant llustrationof sucheffects of emotion. Vio-lence typically results because the person becomesangryat some pressing stimulus-a rival who insultsone, a child who criesexcessively, a spousewho frus-tratesone's wishes (e.g., Berkowitz, 1989). Theangerkeeps attentionconfined to the immediate,provokingsituation and so efforts to restrainone's violent im-pulses are made more difficult. In their discussion ofthe role of self-control failure in causing crime,Gottfredsonand Hirschi(1990) pointedout that ong-rangeconsiderationswouldoftenmilitateagainstvio-lence. Thus, most murdersbringfar more harmthanbenefit otheperpetratorshemselves,and ndeedmany

murderers an hardlyrecall even the next day whatmade them so violent. However, in the heat of themoment i.e., the short-term ttentionalocus causedbyhigh emotion),people fail to consider long-rangeim-plications and act in responseto short-term oncerns,whichmayincludewinningthedisputeatall costs andby violent means.A second mechanismby which emotional distressmaythwart ranscendenceandimpair self-regulationoccurs when the source of emotional distress is notpresentin the immediatesituationbutis highly avail-able in memory (e.g., just after one has received amajor rejection or failure experience). Under suchcircumstances, people will seek to distract them-selves to preventthemselves fromthinkingabout theupsetting event; immersion in powerful, short-termstimuli may be an effective means. Unfortunately,some of the most compelling short-termstimuli areprecisely the things that the person is otherwise try-ing to control (e.g., alcohol, sweet foods, or drugs).A great deal of binge behavior, whether it be shop-ping, gambling, eating, drinking, or having sex,seems to result whenpeople areseeking to keep theirattentionfocused on immediate, concrete stimuli asa means of keeping it away fromsome threateningorupsettingthoughts.Tobesure,emotion s not nvariablybadforself-reg-ulation.Some emotions,such as guilt, may even helpself-control (e.g., Baumeister, 1995; Baumeister,Stillwell,&Heatherton, 995).Still, these nstancesareconsistentwith the general argumentsabout transcen-dence becausetheyreferto cases in which theemotionfacilitatesself-regulationby actuallypromotingtran-scendence.A dose of anticipatoryguilt may help thepersonrealizethat whathe or she is aboutto do maycause damage to important,desired relationshipsorhave otherunwantedconsequences,and so the personmay interrupt he pursuitof some short-termgoal orreward.By calling attentionto distal outcomes andmeaningful implications, guilt helps the individualtranscend he immediatesituationandits temptations,therebyaidingself-control.Transcendence s even relevant to some aspectsoftask performance,which is an importantsphere forself-regulation.In particular,persistenceat difficult,boring,andunpleasant asks is a challenge that is en-demic to many forms of work, and such persistenceoften requiresthe person to transcend he immediatesituation, which on its own merits would seeminglyfavorquitting.Sansone, Weir,Harpster,andMorgan(1992) showedthatpersistenceonboring asksis facil-itatedby mentallytransforminghem into more inter-esting processes. Indeed, studies of blue-collarmanufacturingworkershave shown thatsuch workers

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tend to restructureheirtedious, repetitioustasksintoelaborategames; when they are successful, they be-cometotally engrossed n thesegamesto the extentthattheycontinue otalkabout hemevenduringbreaksandlunchhours Burawoy,1979).By extension,whenpeo-ple are unable to effect such transcendentreconcep-tions of these tasks, they are more likely to quit,which canbe a severely problematicformof self-reg-ulation failure.We notedearlier hatalcohol was implicatedas onecause of a great manyvarietiesof self-regulation ail-ure.Althoughwe suggestedthatalcohol's impairmentof self-monitoringmay be one mechanismby whichalcoholhas theseeffects, it is plausible hatanotheroneis through heimpairment f transcendence.Steele andJosephs (1990) coined the term alcohol myopia todescribethe way alcohol limits attentionand restrainsitto a few proximalstimuli.Theirargument anreadilybe extended to say that alcohol impairs the sort oflong-range,abstract,meaningful,or mentallyflexiblethinking nvolved in transcendence and,in fact, alco-holdoes seem to increase heresponsivity oimmediatestimuliranging rom violent to sexual to appetitive).Thus,self-controlofteninvolves seeing the immedi-ate situation n termsof long-rangeconcerns, values,andgoals (see also Carver& Scheier, 1981;Rachlin,1995;Vallacher&Wegner,1985).Theabilityto main-tain attentionand ocuson theselong-termssuesis oneingredientof self-regulatory trength.In general,fac-torsthatbind attention o the immediatesituationandpressingstimuliwill tend to contribute o self-regula-tionfailure.

Acquiescence and OverridingOne of the most important et controversialaspectsof self-regulationailure s thequestionof the extentto

which people acquiesce in it. The question can beappreciatedby considering two contrary images ofself-regulationfailure. Both of them depict a personwho feels animpulseto act in a waythatrunscontraryto his or her normal standardsof proper, desirablebehavior.Self-regulation ailure meansactingoutthatimpulse and thus violating the person's standards. noneimage,thewell-intentionedperson s overwhelmedby an irresistible mpulsethat no normalpersoncouldrestrain. ntheother,thepersonsimplydecidesto givein to theimpulserather hango through he exertionandfrustrationhat would accompanyself-restraint.Thus,is self-regulationfailure a matter of lazy self-indul-gence (i.e., heedlessly giving in to temptation)oris it amatterof being overcome by powerful, unstoppableforces?

This questionhas important mplications.One setconcernsbasic theoreticalquestionsof conscious con-trol and intrapsychicconflict. Anotherconcerns legalissues: Are violent crimes the productof irresistibleimpulsesor deliberatechoices? Politicalissues suchaswhetheraddicts,alcoholics, spouseabusers,andothersshould be treatedas needy victims or as criminalde-generatesalso revolve around hisquestion.Given thesweep of these implications, it is not surprisingthatthere are ample argumentson both sides in both theprofessional journals and in the popular and massmedia.We think that an additionalreason for theexis-tence of both sides of the argument s that there is infact a large, gray area. In our view, self-regulationfailure is rarely a matter of deliberate,premeditatedchoice, butthenagainit is not oftena matterof irresist-ible impulseseither.Duringtheperiodwe spentreadingaboutandstudy-ing self-regulation,we grew increasinglyskepticalofthe irresistible mpulsenotion.By definition,suchim-pulses cannot be resisted and so they refer to thingspeople would do even if someone were holding a gunto their heads andthreatening o kill them if they didthe forbiddenacts.Despitethepopularityof the notionof irresistible impulses in courtroomsettings, it isreadily apparent hatpeople could and would refrainfrom most behaviors f their lives dependedon it. Thevastmajorityof impulsesareresistible.Thus,thepopular mageof the passive victimover-come by powerful,irresistible mpulses cannot be ac-ceptedexcept in a few rareandextremecases (e.g., thefact that people cannot indefinitely postpone certainbiologicalfunctionssuch asfalling asleep,urinating, rbreathing-all things that people will eventually doeven despite a gun to the head). In reviewing theempirical iterature nself-regulationailure,we foundover and over that there was significantevidence ofdeliberate,volitionalparticipationby the individual nthe forbiddenactivity.These findings andpatternsdonot rule out thepossibilitythat herearepointsat whichpeople feel helpless andpassive and are overcome bystrong mpulses.Theydo,however,suggestthat he fullepisode of self-regulationfailure usually involves atleast some elements of activeacquiescence.Let us consider some examples in which there isevidence of acquiescence in self-regulationfailure(Baumeisteret al., 1994). Cigarettesmokingis a goodexamplebecause in the contemporaryUnited States itis typically inconvenient, if not outrightdifficult, tosmoke. The would-be smoker must obtain cigarettesand then find a time andplace where smoking is stillallowed. Thepersonmust thengo through hemotionsof lightingupand nhaling.Smoking s well recognizedas a powerful addiction and as a source of strong

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cravings andunpleasantwithdrawalsymptoms,all ofwhich may be beyondthe smoker'scontrol;however,smoking s not a matterof simply going limp, becomingpassive, andlettingit happen.Consumingalcohol (ortakingotherdrugs) s subjectto a similaranalysis.Despitethe undeniableaddictive-ness of alcohol, anddespite popular mages thatmanypeoplecannotcontrol heirdrinking, t is clear hatmostpeople who drinkalcohol are actively acquiescingintheprocess. Orderingor pouringa drinkandraisingaglass to one's lips aredeliberate,volitional acts.Bingeeaters likewise often describe their eating as out ofcontrol,yet inmanycases thepersonmustacquiescetotheextent of orderingorpreparing ood,putting t intoone's mouth,andchewing andswallowing it.Procrastination s another common self-regulationproblem andprocrastinatorsmay often feel like pas-sive, helpless victims, especially duringthe eventualcrisiswhenthe deadline ooms and theremaining imeis inadequatefor the task. Procrastination,however,often involves activelydoingother hings nsteadof thedeferredactivity.Back when there was ampletime tobeginworkon thetask,thepersonwashardlyovercomeby an irresistible mpulseto go out for a beeror watchtelevision instead.Rather,the person actively partici-patedin theseother activities.If procrastinationnvolves a failure to get started,performance s also affectedby whetherpeople persistorquit,and so the matterof decidingwhento quitcanbe animportantaspectof theself-regulationof perfor-mance.Althoughthereareoccasionallycasesin whichsheer exhaustion forces the personto stop (e.g., whenmarathonrunnerscollapse and are carriedaway onstretchers),usually the decision to quit is much morefluidandnegotiableand thepersoncould havegoneona littlelonger. Quittingduring askperformance suallyoccurs well before the point of full exhaustion. Theperson somehow selects a point at which to quit andthengoes anddoes somethingelse.Delay of gratificationis one of the prototypesofimpulsecontrol;yet, in manystudiesof delayof grati-fication, the participantmust make some active re-sponse to obtain the immediate reward.Makingthatresponseis oftena matterof deliberateaction. Outsidethelaboratory, ailures o delaygratificationmayofteninvolve even more extensive and obvious forms ofactiveacquiescence(e.g., when thepersondropsoutofcollege oremptiesa savings account).Thereare of course instances in which theperson'sacquiescence is even more extreme.People do some-times seem to arrange o lose control. Marlatt 1985)described the case of a compulsive gamblerwho wasplanninga tripfrom SanFrancisco o Seattle and atthelastminute(andfollowing an argumentwith his wife)

changedthe plannedrouteto pass throughReno, Ne-vada,whichhe claimed wouldbe morescenic. (Seattleis northof SanFrancisco;Reno is east of it.) In Reno,he neededchange for a parkingmeter and so enteredthenearestbuilding,which usthappened obe a casino.While in thecasino,he decided to place a single bet totest his luck. The ensuing 3-day gamblingbinge wasperhapsnot deliberately planned in advance but thedecisions thatbroughthimthereseemdisingenuous.Insimilar ashion,peopledopick fightsinwhichtheylosecontrol, manufacture easons for consuming alcohol,place themselvesin temptingsituations,andengage inotherpatterns hat seem as if they were conspiringtothwart heirown self-regulatoryprograms.Apart romsuchextremecases, it would usuallybeinappropriateo say that thepersonplannedandengi-neered he entirescenario nadvance; nfact,thepersonmayoften bequite chagrinedby theeventualoutcome.To simply say that the self-regulationfailures reflectdeliberate free choice would therefore be somewhatmisleading. On the other hand, the stereotypeof thehelpless,passivevictimoverwhelmedagainsthis or herwill by uncontrollable mpulsesis not accurateeither.The person did participate,more or less freely anddeliberately, n the actionsthatconstitutedheself-reg-ulation ailure.Inorder o resolvethe issueof acquiescence, t is firstnecessaryto appreciate hatthere are often costs anddisadvantagesoself-control.Foregoingan mmediate,desiredpleasure s only one of them.Frustration,with-drawal, and feelings of deprivation may be acute.Moreover, f ourhypothesisof self-regulatory trengthis correct,then maintainingself-control and resistingtemptation an be a tiringanddrainingexperiencethatcan even consume resourcesthatmay be needed forotheractsof self-control.

Resistingtemptations thus, nmanycases,anongo-ing(orperennial)andunpleasant xertion.Itsdifficultyis likely to fluctuateas a function of the strengthandsalience of the competing mpulseandof the self-reg-ulatorycapacity.An irresistiblempulseis hardlynec-essary for self-regulationfailure; rather,a momentduringwhich theimpulse s especially strongor attrac-tive, while the self-regulatory trength s temporarilydepleted,maybe sufficient.Atsomepoint,perhaps, hecosts of exerting control may simply seem too high,whereas heanticipatedbenefitsmay seem too remoteor uncertain or simply too small and so the persongives in.

Wearethusportrayingheabrogation f self-controlas a deliberate hoice,but t is one that s made n averynarrowsphere and is strongly influenced by internaland external factors, to which we shall returnin amoment.Apparently,however,peopleoftenregard he

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decision as a single event that s notto bereconsidered,at least not until much ater.Oncethepersondecidestostarteating, drinking,smoking, having sex, ventingemotion, spendingmoney, or assaultingsomeone, thepersonwill often go ahead andparticipateactively intheprocess.There is thus an importantasymmetry n the waymany people confront internalconflicts surroundingself-regulation.Maintaining elf-control s treatedasanongoing process of negotiationand the fact that oneresistedtemptationa few minutesago does notneces-sarily free one from facing a similardecision again.However, abandoningself-control is treatedas if itwere a single decision that is not subject to furtherreconsideration.

Why do people fail to reconsidera decision to goahead and indulge themselves,abandoningrestraint?Several reasons can be suggested.Theperiodof inde-cision is likely to have been one of anxietyanduncer-taintyand, ncontrast, hedecisionto go ahead s likelyto be markedby relief (andoftenpleasure).To returnvoluntarily rom a state of relief andpleasure o one ofanxiety and uncertaintywould certainlybe an unap-pealingtransition.Moreover, heunpleasantness f thestateof denial andinnerdebate wouldbe enhancedbyguiltorotherformsof anxietyresulting rom the initialindulgence.

As anexample,onemayconsiderahypothetical aseof a dietertemptedto enjoy an appealingdessert. Thephaseof confrontingandresisting emptations proba-bly anunpleasantone, markedby the internaleffort ofself-denial and salientthoughtsof the foregone plea-sure,as well as an ongoing innerdebate.Finally thepersondecides to go ahead andhave the dessert afterall, possibly under the influence of some availableexcuse (e.g., so as not to offend the hostess). Thisdecision most likely bringspleasureandrelief, and asthepersonenjoys thefirst few bites,the ideaof recon-sidering-of returning o self-denial or even of justrenewingthe innerdebate aboutwhetherone oughttobeeatingthis-would be mostunappealing.Toresumeself-denial whilehalfwaythrough hedessertwould beunpleasantnseveralrespects: twould meanabandon-ing a verysalientpleasure n order o return o thestateof deprivation, it would require a strenuous act ofself-regulation,and even if one succeeded in puttingdown the spoonone would alreadyhave earnedsomeremorse(e.g., guilt or shame) because of the portionone alreadyate.

Self-regulation ailurecanthusoccur whenever thepersonexperienceseven a very briefperiodin whichthe costs seem to outweigh the benefits.The popularimage in which a momentof weaknesscanunderminemonths or years of virtuousself-denial is somewhat

accuratebecause people tend to treat the decision toabandon ontroland ndulge hemselves asirrevocable.The evidence thatpeople acquiesce in self-regula-tionfailure,as well as theanalysisof self-controlas anongoinginnerdebatethat s shapedbyperceivedcostsandbenefits,has one moreimportantmplication:Cul-turalandsituationalactorscanexertconsiderable ub-tle influence on self-regulation.To putit anotherway,thepointatwhichpeoplelose (orabandon) elf-controlis one that can be moved aroundwithin a wide grayarea,andso manyfactorscaninfluenceself-controlbymovingthatpoint.Theself-regulation f violent,aggressivebehavior sagoodexample.Manyviolentacts areexperiencedanddescribedbyperpetrators sepisodesof losing control.Consistent with this, it is clear that most people areusuallyable topreventanger romresulting nphysicalviolence. The very high contributionof alcohol to in-tensifyingviolent responsesto provocations s partlydue to the fact thatit underminespeople's capacitytoregulate heirbehavior, o theyactoutviolentimpulsesmore frequentlyandextremely(Bushman& Cooper,1990;Steele & Southwick,1985).Despite the appearancethat violent behavior in-volves loss of control, there is evidence of acquies-cence: People could control their behavior if theywantedto do so. Most people do stop shortof lethalviolence even whenthey areextremelyangry (Tavris,1989).AmongtheMalays,thepattern f runningamokinstitutionalized generalbelief thatprovocationspro-ducedangerthat led to uncontrollableaggression;butwhenthe Britishtook overandinstituted everepenal-ties forrunningamok,thepracticediminished ubstan-tially, indicatingthat the young men could control itafterall (Carr& Tan, 1976). Berkowitz's (1978) studyof men in prison for violent assault in GreatBritaincontained the same mixed message. These men didapparently ose control (often underthe influence ofalcohol) and beatsomeone else upto theirown disad-vantage hencetheir mprisonment), uttheyhad man-agedto restrainhemselves fromgoing even farther. none memorableanecdote,one of Berkowitz's partici-pants described a violent attackon his wife's loverduringwhichhe wastotallyenragedandseeminglyoutof control.At one pointin theattack,he tookholdof abottlebythe neckand broke toff to useas aweapon-but thenhereconsidered hat f he used thatweaponhewould most likely have killed the other man, whichwould have had serious consequences for him. As aresult,he putdown thebrokenbottleandresumedtheattackwith hisfists,beating heothermansenseless butnotkilling him.Thereis thus an undercurrent f control in the lossof controlof violent behavior.At some point, people

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SELF-REGULATIONAILUREallow themselvesto lose control.Thedetermination fthatpointis subjectto a great manysubtleinfluences.Theories aboutaggressiononce exploredthe notionof a "subculture f violence."According o that heory,certainsubculturesplaced a positive value on aggres-sive behaviorand so people soughtto gainesteem andprestigeby actingaggressively.This view was largelydiscreditedby accumulating vidence thatviolentpeo-ple did not apparently eek to win approvalor esteemby violent acts (e.g., Berkowitz, 1978) and thatmem-bersof thesupposedlyviolent subcultures idnotreportthat they placed positive values on violent acts (seeTedeschi& Felson, 1994).Wethink,however,that he notionof asubculture fviolence may deserve to be reconsideredin anotherform:Subculturesor ndeedcultures)can nfluence hepoint at which people believe it is appropriateo losecontrol over aggressive impulses. Such collective be-liefs can exert considerable nfluence over thepointatwhich people believe it is appropriate, easonable,oreven desirable to abandon self-control.Thus, manyassaults and homicides occur in direct response toverbal nsults,but most insults do not lead to physicalviolence. It takes cultural norms to prescribewhichinsults, in which settings, will cause the person toretaliatewith physical aggression.Studies and inter-views with teen gang members, for example, oftenreport hatthe young menandwomen say that violentretaliation is appropriateand even necessary in re-sponse to certain nsults (e.g., Anderson, 1994; Bing,1991; Currie,1991; Jankowski, 1991). Likewise, theAmericanSouthhas higherhomicide ratesthan otherpartsof the countrybutonly for homicides related toarguments,which suggeststhat Southernculturesup-portsthe view that certainprovocationsrequireone tolose control of violent, retaliatory mpulses (Nisbett,1993).Indeed, moving the point at which one loses con-trol may be a major way thata culture can influenceself-regulation.From ourperspective, various forcesin modern American culture have exerted a broadinfluence to shift this point in ways thatmakepeoplemore likely to abandonself-control. The pervasive-ness of self-regulationproblems in modernAmericamaybe less a resultof character laws ordeficienciesthan a result of a social climate that encouragespeople to regardmany situationsas ones in which anaverage, reasonable person would supposedly losecontrol. The notion of irresistible impulses may beweak and dubious as a scientific hypothesis butas asocial doctrine (and as a legal defense strategy) itmay be powerful and influential. Once it becomeswidely accepted, it is likely to operateas a self-ful-filling prophecy.

MisregulationWe turn now to examine a very differenttype ofself-regulation failure, namely misregulation. Al-thoughunderregulationmay providethemost familiar

and vivid instances of self-regulatory ailure, not allinstances itinthatcategory. nunderregulation,eopleendup beingunableorunwillingto exert therequisitecontrol over themselves. In misregulation,however,the cause of failurelies in the use to which the effortsare directed.Theperson mayeven be quitesuccessfulat exerting controlover him- or herself but the endresult s failurebecause the efforts aremisguidedor arewastedin otherways.Ourreview of theempirical literatureyielded threemain causes of misregulation: (a) misunderstoodcontingencies, (b) quixotic efforts to control the un-controllable, and (c) giving too much priority toaffect regulation. Let us examine each of these inturn.

The firstcause involves false beliefs about the selfand the world (particularlyabout the contingenciesbetween them). Well-intentioned and well-executedefforts at self-regulationmay end in futility becausetheywere basedon falseassumptions boutwhatwouldyield desirable results. Thus, underthe influence ofinflatedegotismandemotionaldistress,people maysetunrealisticallyhigh goals that will increasethe likeli-hood or costliness of failure(Baumeister,Heatherton,&Tice, 1993;Ward&Eisler,1987;Wright&Mischel,1982).As Heatherton ndAmbady 1993) argued,peo-ple who areproneto overly optimisticself-views maybe especially vulnerable o this form of self-regulationfailure.

Unwarrantedoptimism may also cause excessivepersistence in futile endeavors and although thechancesof success were minimal all along, thepersis-tenceincreases he costs (e.g., time,effort,andmoney)thataccompanythe failure(Rubin& Brockner,1975;Staw, 1976). Increased rustration ndotheremotionalcosts may result from such failures due to excessivepersistence;indeed, in unrequited ove, people oftenpersistpastthepointof rationaloroptimalhopeandtheresultsof suchpersistencencludeconsiderabledistressandinconvenience for boththe aspiring over andthetarget(Baumeister,Wotman,& Stillwell, 1993). Onestudyshowed thatfutilepersistenceis often mediatedby false expectations;when people were educatedaboutcommon patternsof excessive, fruitlesspersis-tence, they were less likely to makethe same mistakethemselves (Nathansonet al., 1982). Anothershowedthat if people areencouraged o makecarefulcalcula-tionsabout theprobabilities,contingencies,andlikelypayoffs, they are less likely to fall into the trapof

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excessive persistence(Conlon & Wolf, 1980), whichalso indicates that false assumptionsand misguidedexpectations play a crucial role in this form ofmisregulation.False assumptionscontribute o anotherpatternofmisregulation n thetask-performanceealm nvolvingspeed-accuracy radeoffs.Onmanytasks,speedis in-creased at the expense of accuracyand vice versa,buttherelation s far from linear and therearemanycasesin whichreducingspeedwill fail to yield greateraccu-racy. Moreover,people may assume falsely thattheycan increasespeed withoutsubstantialosses of accu-racy. HeckhausenandStrang(1988) showed that ath-letes attemptingo achieve a recordperformance n anexperimentaltask tended to increase speed dramati-cally but the loss of accuracyoutweighed the gainsbroughtby the increasedspeed. The role of false as-sumptionswas evident:The athletesin thatstudybe-lieved thattheycouldmaintainhigh accuracyathigherspeeds.Misregulation an alsoresult romfalseassumptionsaboutemotions. Many people believe that t is helpfulto venttheirangeror otherformsof emotionaldistressbuttheyfindthatsuchacts oftenmake hemmoreratherthan less upset (e.g., Tavris, 1989). Affect misregula-tion is markedby many patternsof misregulation nwhichpeople incorrectlyassumethatwhat worksonceor with one emotion will workwithothers too. Thus,consumingalcohol often makespeople feel good andso theymaydrinkas a wayof self-medicating or theirowndepression;however,theyoften findthat ntoxica-tion makes the depression worse ratherthan better(Doweiko, 1990). Likewise, because socializing withfriends is often effective at curinga sad or depressedmood, people may try it to cure angrymoods, but inmany cases they end up reciting theirgrievances orproblems to these friends and rekindlingtheir ownanger(Tice & Baumeister,1993).

The secondgeneralpattern f misregulationnvolvesthequixoticeffortto controlthingsthatarebeyondthescopeofpotentialcontrol.Therearemanyautomatic rinnatelypreparedprocessesthatpeople simplycannotalterand theireffortsto control hemdirectlyare ikelyto backfire. One ratherclear example is that mostemotionalandmood statescannotbe altereddirectlybysheer act of will (hence the pervasivenessof indirectstrategiesfor affect regulation).If people try to altertheirmoods directly,theyare ikelyto be unsuccessfulandindeed the failure of their effortsmay make themfeel worse.Thought suppression is a good example of suchquixotic misregulation. People often seem to believethat they can directly control their thoughts and sothey believe that unwanted thoughts can be driven

out of theirminds.Researchhas shown thatsuch effortsatthought uppressionareat bestonly partlysuccessfulandtheycreatestrongvulnerabilities o resurgencesofthe unwanted hought(Wegner,Schneider,Carter,&White, 1987); indeed, efforts to suppress undesiredthoughtsmay ironicallycreatea "syntheticobsession"withthosethoughts Wegner,1992, 1994).Performance can be impaired by this form ofmisregulation oo andindeed one of the most familiarandfrustratingkinds of performancefailure-chok-ing underpressure-is a classic case of it. Choking,which is defined as performing below the level ofone's ability despite situational incentives and sub-jective wishes and efforts to do one's best, arisesbecause the person consciously overrides well-learned patterns of skilled response in the hope ofmaximizing performance-but then finds that thedeliberate, controlled processes cannot perform asefficiently and effectively as the overlearned, auto-matic ones (Baumeister,1984). In a typical case, theperson has achieved a level of overlearning (i.e.,skill) so thatperformancecan flow with a minimumof conscious direction. However, on a particularlyimportant occasion, the pressure and desire to dowell cause thepersonto wantto payspecial attentionand therefore to oversee the performance processconsciously. This conscious oversight overrides theautomaticqualityof skilled performance;sadly, con-trolled processes cannot match the automatic skillsfor eitherspeed or accuracy.For example, the typistor pianist who underpressure seeks to consciouslymonitor every finger movement quickly discoversthat both speed andaccuracy suffer.

Choking s thusa paradigmaticnstance of this sec-ond form of misregulation.The person successfullyoverrides the normal, habitual,overlearnedor auto-matic response but the person cannot make him- orherselfperformeffectively withoutusing those skills.The result s thatthepersonends up performingworsethanusualas a directresult of effortsto performbetterthanusual.The thirdbroadpatternof misregulationinvolvesaiming one's self-regulatoryefforts at a tangential,peripheral,or irrelevantpart of the problem. Manyproblemsthat confrontpeople have multiple aspectsandself-regulatory fforts can be focused on any partof them.If thepersonselectsthewrongaspectof his orher behavior oregulate, heproblemwill not besolvedandmayeven get worse.

Themost commonpattern f misregulation nvolvesemphasizing(short-term)affect regulationat the ex-pense of some other,more lastingandsubstantiveas-pect. Often a particular problem consists of bothpracticalobstaclesor difficultiesandsubjective,emo-

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tional distress,andwhen people respond by focusingtheirefforts on emotional regulationthey neglect themore fundamental,practical aspects, thereby leavingthe problem unsolved or even compoundingit. Bygivingpriority o affectregulation, heyallow the causeof theproblemto get worse and so in thelong runtheyendupworseoff. Oftentheyendupfeelingworseeventhoughaffectregulationwas theirtop priority.This form of misregulationcan be seen in somepatterns fprocrastination. personmayhave aprojectdeadline but working on the project causes anxiety,possibly because the project s importantandbecausethepersonwants to do very well. Puttingoff workingon theproject husbecomesaneffectivemeansofaffectregulation n the shortrunbecause one escapes fromanxiety each time one elects not to workon the task;the cumulativeeffect of such decisionsmakestheprob-lem considerably worse because the time until thedeadlinegrows shorter,makingit ever harder o do agood job. As the deadline looms, the panic responsebecomes ever better ustified.Giving top priority o affectregulationmay also bea factor behind many destructivepatternsof failedimpulse control. Many consummatoryresponses areaffectively pleasantandso peoplewill indulgein themas a way of regulating their emotions. People maysmoke cigarettes, abuse alcohol, take drugs, go onshoppingsprees,engageinpromiscuous ex,orgambleaway their money as a way of escaping from a badmood,buttheconsequencesof such actionscan beevenworsethanwhat causedthebad moodin the firstplace.Thus,eatingordrinkingbinges mayoccur becausetheperson thinks thateating or drinkingwill remedytheemotional distress. Shilts (1987) cited some surveyevidence that when the AIDS epidemic was firstspreading,many gay menbecamedistraught ndupsetover the dangerandrespondedby going out to engageinpromiscuous,unprotectedmale-malesex togettheirminds off those stressful thoughts.Although thatre-sponse may have been effective as self-distraction,ttendedto increasetheunderlyingproblem.Thus, the category of misregulationencompassesseveralformsof the misuse or ineffective use of self-control.People mayfail atself-regulationbecausetheyaretryingto controlthewrongaspectof theprocessorbecause they are trying to control somethingthat isessentially immune to control. False beliefs and as-sumptionsaboutthecontingenciesbetweenone's ownactsand one's outcomesoftenplay animportant ole.

Lapse-ActivatedResponsesAlthoughconsiderable esearchhasfocused onwhatcauses people to violate theirstandardsor otherself-

regulatorypatterns, t is important o realize that themajorityof such violations are inherently trivial. Asingle cookie may violate a weight-loss plan, but theimpactof that cookie on the diet is probablyminimal.Thesocially importantnstancesof self-regulationail-ure tend to involve large-scale breakdownssuch asbinges. To be sure, a binge may begin with a singlelapse, but to understand he lapse is not sufficient toexplainthebinge.Ourreview concluded thatin manycases a secondandimportant et of causes of self-regulationfailureonly entersthepictureafteran initiallapse, andindeedas a resultof that apse.We use the term apse-activatedcauses to describe these factors. This concept wasanticipated n addiction researchby Marlatt(1985),whose termabstinenceviolationeffectreferred o thetendency orpeople to respond o an initialindulgenceinalcoholor otheraddictivebutforbidden ubstancebyconsumingmore. The categoryof lapse-activatedre-sponsesincludesabstinenceviolationeffects as well asother, conceptuallysimilarpatternsthat are not con-cernedwithabstinence.An early clear demonstrationof lapse-activatedmisregulationwas by Hermanand Mack (1975), whotermedtheireffects counterregulatory ating. In theirstudy,dieterswho had beenpreloadedwith food actu-ally went on to eat morethandieterswho hadnot hadsuch a preload,contraryto what nondieters do (andwhat commonsense wouldprescribe).Subsequentre-searchhasdemonstratedhata person'sbeliefs are theprimarydeterminantsof this disinhibitedeating. Forinstance,dieterswill engage in counterregulatory at-ing when they have eaten very small amounts of per-ceived high-calorie foods (e.g., a small bite ofchocolate)butwill be able tomaintain heirdietsif theybelieve they have not brokentheir diets (even if theyhave consumedan incrediblyfattyCaesarsalad).Thedieter's initial minor transgression leads to suchthoughtsas, "What he hell, I have blown it, so I mayas well eat the whole darn hing."The ironyis that thesmallamountof fattening ood in the initiallapsedoesnot constitutea serious threat to the dieter's goal ofweight loss-but the subsequent binge eating doessabotage hatgoal.Marlatt 1985) documented his lapse-activatedpat-tern across a numberof addictive and problematicbehaviors, ncludingsmoking,alcoholism, andheroinaddiction.Marlatt'smodel suggests that lapses oftenarise in high-risk situations in which a person hasdifficulty coping. Marlattarguesthat a lapse becomesa relapselargelybecauseof theperson's commitmentto complete and absolute abstinence.Performingtheforbiddenbehavior eadsto unpleasantdissonanceandself-attributions f weakness andfailure.The attribu-

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tion of failure to the self diminishestheperson'ssenseof self-controland he or she abandonsattempts o reinin subsequentbehavior.Thus,a minortransgressionsseen as a catastropherather han a small slip and thisperception nduces the personto abdicateall self-con-trol.Marlatt'sresearchhas led to a therapyknown asrelapseprevention,which consistsprimarilyof cogni-tiverestructuringo helptheaddictcope withhigh-risksituationsand withlapses.For ourpurposes, hekeypointis thatseveralcausalfactors come intoplay as a result of an initial lapse inself-controlandthesecanundermine elf-controlsub-sequently.Moreover, t is oftenthe subsequentbreak-down in self-control that has the most severe anddisastrous results. There are several mechanisms oflapse-activatedpatterns,as follows.

One important mechanism is that people maycease monitoring themselves after an initial lapse,possibly because it would be distressingto attend totheirbehavior when they have already failed to liveupto standards,andpossibly because the initial lapsemay provide such pleasure or intense sensation thatthey focus narrowly on it (i.e., loss of transcen-dence). Polivy (1976) showed that dieters who hadbeen preloaded with food apparentlyceased to keeptrack of how much they ate, as indicatedby errors nretrospective self-reports of subsequent consump-tion. More generally, eating binges seem to bemarkedby an immersionin sensation and acessationof monitoring one's own behavior (Heatherton&Baumeister, 1991).

Spiralingpatternsof distressmay also be a form oflapse-activated causes of misregulation. An initiallapsemayoccur becausethepersonwassuffering romsome form of distress.Thelapsemay,however,gener-ate guilt, fear, anxiety, or other forms of distress,therebymakingthe personfeel worse. The escalatingdistress may contributeto a furtherabandonmentofself-control.Distress is of course not theonly emotionthatcan beactivatedby a lapse and contribute o furtherbreak-downs in self-regulation.Lawson (1988) noted thatmanypeoplewill initiallyengage nextramaritalex ontheassumption hat t will be acasual,isolatedepisodethat will not affect or threaten heir marriage.Somefind, however, that they begin to experience love orother ormsof intimateattachmento their llicitpartnerand these feelings maycausetheextramaritalnvolve-ment to escalate, even to the point at which it doesbecome a threat o themarriage.As we noted, some lapse-activatedpatternshavelittle to do with abstinence violations. Performanceeffects may provide one instance.Underpressuretoperformwell, people may experiencesomeimpairment

of skilled performance(i.e., they may choke). Theresult of this impairmentmay be to increasethe pres-sure on them to performwell so as to overcome theproblemscausedbythe initialchoking.As thepressureincreases, heymaychoke even more.Schlenker,Phil-lips,Boniecki,andSchlenker 1995) showed thathometeams in championship inal baseball games tend tomake errorswhentheyfall behind,presumably n partbecausetheyaretrying oovercome their nitialdeficit.Althoughmoresystematicdata areneeded, the recentSuperBowl gameshaveprovidedvivid illustrationsofsuchspiraling ailures,as theBuffalo teams havemademoreandmoremistakesoncetheybeganto fall behind.Likewise, testanxietyseems to conform to the patternin whichthepersonbecomes preoccupiedby ruminat-ing over an initial failure (to know an answer) andbecause of this preoccupationbecomes unable to con-centrateon subsequentquestions(see Wine, 1971).Destructivepatternsof persistencealso have ele-ments of lapse-activated ausality.Inmanycases,peo-ple must invest time and energy as well as otherresources e.g., moneyorprestige) n some decision.Ifit goes bad,peopleare reluctant o cuttheir osses, andindeed the more they invest the more difficult it be-comes for them toacceptthatcourse of action is futile,and so the eventual losses continue to mount (e.g.,Bazerman,Giuliano,&Appelman,1984;Staw, 1976).In Teger's (1980) phrase, people become "too muchinvested to quit"and so they invest-and lose-con-siderablymore.There are of course also interpersonalaspects tomanyself-control ituations,andthese can be activatedby lapses so as to contribute o escalatingfailures ofself-regulation. The most obvious example wouldprobably nvolve violent episodes. An initial aggres-sive outburstmaybe a momentary apsein self-controlbut tmayhave astingeffectsif someoneelse is harmedorprovoked.Anaggressiveresponsebyothers oreventhe formationby others of an expectation that theindividual is prone to violent outbursts)may lead tofurtherviolence.

Ironically, omefactors hataidself-regulationuptothe point of an initial lapse may turn nto factorsthatproducemisregulationas the result of such a lapse.Most prominent among these are zero-tolerancebe-liefs. Suchbeliefs,whichare common n somespheres,catastrophizehe initial apseas a wayof preventing t.People areencouraged o believe thathaving a singledrink,committinga single sexual indiscretion,or tak-inga singledose of adrugon one occasionwill lead todisaster(see also Marlatt,1985). Undoubtedly suchbeliefs discourage people from allowing a lapse tohappen.If a lapse does occur, however, such beliefsmay help produce apse-activatedncreasesin the un-

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wanted behavior.The personmay feel that a catastro-phe has occurred and that there is no use in makingfurther fforts at self-control.Alternatively, hepersonmayfindthat the predictedcatastrophic onsequenceshave not materializedand concludethat the fears andwarningswere entirelyunfounded.Zero-tolerancebe-liefs can be compared o a militarystrategyof puttingalltroops nthe front ine, whichwill indeedstrengthenthe front line butwill leave the armywith no reservesto use if the front ine is breached.

ConclusionSelf-regulationis a complex mechanism that canbreakdown in many differentways. Underregulationoccurs because people lack stable, clear, consistent

standards,becausetheyfail to monitor heiractions,orbecausetheylackthestrengthooverride heresponsestheywish to control.Misregulation ccursbecause heyoperateon the basis of false assumptionsabout them-selves andabout theworld,becausetheytryto controlthings that cannot be directlycontrolled,or becausethey give priorityto emotions while neglecting moreimportant ndfundamental roblems.We haveproposedthat the evidence aboutself-reg-ulatoryfailures conforms to a strengthmodel; thatis,thecapacityto regulateoneself is a limited,renewableresource. When stress or fatigue depletes anindividual's strength,self-regulatory ailures becomemore ikely. Capacities or self-controlarean mportantrealmof stable,long-term ndividualdifferences.The control of attention s centralto self-regulationand oss of attentional ontrol s a decisiveprecursor fmany forms of self-regulationfailure. In particular,effectiveself-regulation ftenrequires heindividual obe ableto transcend heimmediate ituationbyconsid-ering long-termconsequencesand mplications.Whentranscendence s weakenedby anythingthat binds at-tentionto the here andnow, thechancesof self-regula-tion failure are increased.

Many spheresof self-regulation ailureshow signsof lapse-activated auses. Thatis, an initial and seem-inglyminorbreakdownn self-controlmayset off othercauses and factors thatpreventthe reassertionof self-control and cause the breakdown o snowball.Indeed,the initiallapsemayoftenbe trivial,whereas hebingeis catastrophic, nd so theselapse-activatedactors hatproducea snowballingeffect are what deserveempha-sis in theory,research,and intervention.Thedegreeof volitionandacquiescence n self-reg-ulatory ailure s a controversialssue with mplicationsthatgo farbeyondpsychology. Our review has led usto rejectthe model thatself-regulatory ailureis typi-cally the result of irresistibleimpulses. Although it

wouldbe excessive to say thatpeople freelychoose tolose control,theydo seem to show considerableactiveparticipationand acquiescence in the behaviors thatconstituteself-regulatoryfailure. We suggested thatself-regulationoften involves anunpleasant nnercon-flict markedby competing wishes and uncertainty. fthe person decides even briefly to relax self-control,typicallyhe or she will not considerreinstating t andso a brief abdicationof self-regulatoryeffortcan leadtoaserious,protracted reakdown. ncolloquialterms,the popular mage of a moment of weakness is moreaccurate than the image of the irresistibleimpulse.Moreover,culturecan exert considerable nfluencebyteachingpeoplewhich circumstancesmake tappropri-ate to abandon ontrol.

Unfortunately, he norms and forces thatcurrentlydominatemodernWesterncultureseemgenerallycon-duciveto weakeningself-control.As long as this is thecase, it seems likely that our society will continuetosufferfrom widespreadand even epidemic problemsthathave self-regulatoryailureas a common core.

NoteRoyF.Baumeister,Department f Psychology,CaseWesternReserveUniversity,Cleveland, OH 44106-

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