~a~ · 2010-06-18 · Donald J. Keigher, Los Alamos, NM (Member Emeritus) Walter W. Maybee,...

Report of the Committee on

Fire Protection for Nuclear Facifities

Leonard R. Hathaway, Cha/r M&M Protection Consultants, GA [I]

Wayne D. Holmes, Secretary HSB Professional Loss Control Inc., CT [I]

Marlo A. Antonetti, Gage-Babcock & Assn. Inc., NY [SE] Jack Balla, New York Power Authority, NY [U] William G. Boyce, U.S. Dept. of Energy, DC [U] Harry M. Corson, IV, Cerberus Pyrotronics, NJ [M]

Rep. Nat'l Electrical M_frs. Assn. Donald A. DieM, Alison Control Inc., NJ [M] Paul H. Dobson, Factory Mutual Research Corp., MA [I] Stewart M. Fastman, American Ins Services Group Inc., NY [I] Franklin D. Garrett, Arizona Public Service Co., AZ [U]

Rep. Nuclear Energy Inst. PaulGiaccaglla, American Nuclear Insurers, CT [I] Charles L. Girard, Sandia Nat'l Laboratories, NM [U]

Rep. NFPA Industrial Fire Protection Section Arie T. P. Go, Bechtel Corp., CA [SE] LeRoyJ. Hill, McDermott Inc., VA [M] L. S. Homa, Underwriters Laboratories Inc., IL [RT] Donald J. Kohn, Kohn Engr, PA [SE] Thomas J. Kramer, Schirmer Engr Corp., IL [SE] Robert S. Levlne, U.S. Nat'l Inst. of Standards and Technology, MD

[RT] Patrick M. Madden, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, DC [El AnthonyJ. Mascena, Stone & Webster End, Corp., NJ [SE] David P. Notley, Science Applications Int I Corp. (SAIC), VA [SE] Mark Henry Salley, Tennessee Valley Authority, TN [U] Jcack Siegel, Gerling America Insurance, NY [I]

lifford IL Sinopoli, II, Baltimore Gas & Electric, MD [U] Rep. Edison Electric Inst.

Wayne R. Sohlman, Nuclear Mutual Ltd, DE [I] Raymond N. Tell, Los Alamos Nat'l Laboratory, NM [U] Rupert M. H. "Mike ~ Terrier, Virginia Electric & Power Co., VA [U] Lynn IL Underwood, Wausau HPR Engr, WI [I]

Rep. The Alliance of 2Mnerican Insurers Steven F. Vieira, Tyco Int'l, Ltd., RI [M]

Rep. Nat'l Fire Sprinkler Assn., Michael J. Vitacco, Jr., 'Westinghouse Savannah River Co., SC [U]

Alternates

James B. Bigglns, M&M Protection Consultants, IL [I] (Alt. to L. R. Hathaway)

Edward A. Connell, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission, DC [E] (AIt. to P. M. Madden)

Edgar G. Dressier, American Nuclear Insurers, CT [I] (/kit. to P. Giaccaglia)

John J. Foley, Gage-Babcock & Assoc. Inc., GA [SE] (AlL to M. A. Antonetti)

L. Paul Herman, Professional Loss Control, Inc., IL [I] (Alt. to W. Holmes)

Neal W. Krantz, Simplex Time Recorder Co., MI [M] (Alt. to H. M. Corson)

Armando M. Lonrenco, Schirmer Engr Corp., VA [SE] (Alt. to T.J. Kramer)

J immyJ. Pierce, Tennessee Valley Authority, TN [U] (Alt. to M. H. Salley)

Ronald Rispoli, Entergy Corp., AR [U] (Alt. to F. D. Garret t )

Thomas At. Storey, Science Applications Int'l Corp. VA [SE] (/kit. to D. P. Notley)

Brian D. Tomes, Wausau HPR Engr, TX [I] (Alt. to L. K. Underwood)

Leland T. Warnick, Virginia Power Go., VA [U] (Alt. to R. M. H. Terrier)

Nonvoting

Donald J. Keigher, Los Alamos, NM (Member Emeritus)

Walter W. Maybee, Botheil, WA (Member Emeritus)

Staff Liaison: Richard P. Bielen

This list re~resents the membership at the time the Committee was balloted on the text of this edition. Since that time, changes in the membership rnc 0 have occurred. A hey to classifications is found at the front of the book.

Committee Scope: This Committee shall have primary responsibility for documents on the safeguarding of life and property from fires in which radiation or other effects of nuclear energy might be a factor.

This portion of the Technical Committee Report of the Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities is presented for adoption.

This Report on Comments was prepared by the Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities and documents its action on the comments received on its Report on

~a~ osals on NFPA 801-1995, Standard for Facilities Handling oactive Materials, as published in the Report on Proposals for

the 1997 Fall Meeting.

This Report on Comments has been submitted to letter ballot of the Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities, which consists of 30 voting members. The results of the balloting, after circulation of any negative votes, can be found in the report.

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(Log #12) 801- 1 - (1-5 Fire Brigade): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Depar tment of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete text as follows:

SUBSTANTIATION: The term "Fire Emergency Organization," which has been adopted in the draft, obviates the need for this term. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Delete the definit ion of Fire Brigade. Modify the definition of Fire Emergency Organization to: "As used in this standard, refers to those facility personnel t rained

to respond to facility fire emergencies which may include in plant fire-fighting operations. For more information refer to NFPA 600, Standard on Industrial Fire Brigades, and NFPA 1500, Standard on Fire Depar tmen t Occupational Safety and Health Program." COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The definitions were r edundan t and the definitions were combined. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

(Log #13) 801- 2 - (2-3.2): R e j e c t SUBMITTER: Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Depar tment of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"For existing facilities, a documen ted fire hazards analysis shall be per formed as reuuired bv the Authorltv Having Jurisdict ion and shall address ~ a l l fire areas of the facility." SUBSTANTIATION: A requ i rement for an FHA "for all areas '° (note defini t ion of FHA) is at least confusing and, at most, unnecessary for small, insignificant areas. Suggested text clarifies intent and permits a "graded/ r i sk based approach" to FI-IAS. C O M M I T ~ E ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Authority Having Jurisdict ion can always modify the requi rements of the document . Also the FHA is requi red for all parts of the facility. NUMBER OF COMMrI'WEE MEMBERSELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Sailey, Tell, Underwood

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: GARRETT: Facilities where radioactive materials are stored,

handled, or used, can be very large and multi functional. Fire protect ion requiremenls , within the scope of this standard, should only be applied to the bui ldings/s t ructures that could potentially impact the risk of fire as it pertains to radioactive material. Currendy, there is no specific definit ion of ~facilities ~ (2-3.2) or ~locations" (1-1.1) which could result in the application of fire hazards analysis (FHA) with no reduct ion in risk of fires as it

~ ertains to radioactive materials. For example, a DOE facility may ave office, maintenance, and warehouse buildings which have no

potential to adversely impact radioactive materials.

(Log #11) 801- 3 - (2-4(b)): Accept in Principle SUBMYI~rER: Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operat ions COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise Section 2-4(b) as follows:

(b) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I . . . . v . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,

":acrc^~c .~r¢ h~--~a.~. Facilitv inspections in tended to locato ~jnnecessary transient combustibles, identifv uncontro l led i~nition sources, and de tec t obstructions to the means of ecwess. Tlae inspections shall be ne r fo rmed monthly, and the remedial actions n e e d e d to correct unsafe condit ions shall be documented . SUBSTANTIATION: The in tent o f Section 2-4(b) is too vague. The revised wording establishes the intent of the fire prevention inspect ions. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Add: "Facility insDections are in tended to locate unnecessary transient

combusfibles[ identify uncont ro l led i~rnition sources, and detect obstructions to the means of e~ress." -to the appendix as A-2-4(b).

Change to combine sentences because as written the 1st sentence did no t have a verb. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The commit tee added the proposed words in the appendix as examples of what is required. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #14) 801- 4 - (2-4(b)): Reject SUBMITTEI~ Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Depar tment of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

"(b) Documented facility fire inspections conducted at a f reauencv and scone as de te rmined by the anthoritv havina Jurisdiction !taut men+~h!y. Such inspections should i n d u d e i + g provisions for remedial action...". SUBSTANTIATION: The term "inspection" is presently undef ined and, therefore, could result in unnecessary confusion. A comprehensive fire inspect ion is unnecessary on a monthly basis. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commit tee clarified the scope of inspections to those items found in the appendix as added in C ommen t 801-3 (log #11). See C ommen t 801-3 (log #11). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #23) 801- 5 - (2-4(b)): Reject SUBMFrTER: Leo Derder ian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add new text:

"Documented facility inspections conduc ted at least quarterly, including.. .".

Remainder of text unchanged. SUBSTANTIATION: The monthly inspections w o u l d p u t an undue burden on resources which are already s t r e t ched too thin in the DOE system. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commit tee clarified the scope of inspections to those items found in the appendix as added in Comment 801-3 (log #11). See Comment 801-3 (Log #11). NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLETO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Unde rwood

(Log #22) 801- 6 - (2-4(e)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Leo Derder ian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Reword text as follows:

"Control o f ignition sources including, but no t l imited to, grinding, welding, cutting and any other ho t work. All hot work should include of fire watch and adequate personnel protective clothing." SUBSTANTIATION: A recent fatality at Oak Ridge indicates inadequate fire watch and personnel protective clothing. The repor t which is due out shortly may contain o ther r ecommenda t ions which could be incorporated, however, it has no t been issued at this writing. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise to read as follows and move to the appendix: A-2-4(e). A fatality occurred to a welder whose

ant icontaminat ion clothing ignited. Contributing factors included unt rea ted cotton clothing, the lack of a fire watch, and the welder's senses limited by the use of a respirator and welding mask. Therefore appropria te precautions should be taken for workers pcerforming ho t work unde r these conditions.

OMMITTEE STATEMENT: The Commit tee did no t wish to make this a mandatory requ i rement for all cases. It should be considered for each specific case. For fur ther information, a full repor t can be obtained at the following website, http://nattie.eh.doe.gov:80/web/eh2/acc_inv.html.

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NUMBER OF COMMITrF~ MI~IBP,]~ ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: S0 VOTE ON COMMrrTEE ACTION:


(Log #~5) 0 ~ 1 ~ ) : Reject

Dennis Kuhicki, U.S. Department of Energy C O M M E N T O N P R O P O S A L N O : 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Dele te text as follows:

su~¥Z,,]T-UFTI'-5+.." :his p ~ , - ~ h (2-+.]) is redund~t to the next paragraph (2-5.2). C O ~ ACTION: Reject. COMMITYEE STATEMENT: This paragraph is needed to address testing and impection for new tmtailations. See Committee Comment 801-8 (Log #CC1). NUMBER OF COMMrrrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: S0 VOTE ON COMMrrTEE ACTION:

AFF/RMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

(Log #c_,cl) 801- 8 - (2-5.1): Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nuclear Facilities COMMENT ON PROPOSAL N O : 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Reinstall wording to read:

"2-5.1 "Upon installation, all..." The paragraph now reads: "Upon installation, all fire protection systems and features shall

be i l l u m e d and tested in accordance with the applicable documents referenced in Chapter 4." SUBSTANTIATION: This wording was inadvertently left out. New iustaHatiom need to be inspected and tested. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMrr rEg MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: S0 VOTE ON COMMrrrEE ACTION:


(Log #2) 801- 9 - (2-5.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITrFAu C ~ g P. Christeuson, U.& Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add the followin~ text to 2-5.2:

-Fire alarm system comnonents sha]l~be tmoected, tested, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 'PL Na~tional Fire Alarm Code." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed 801 standard addresses imtailation requirements for a fire alarm system, however, Sections 2-5 and 4-8 do not cite inspection, testing, and maintenance criteria for the a]ann system componentL COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Change 2-5.2 to read as follows: After "and the" add "testing, inspection and maintenance

requirements of the'. T h e paragraph now reads: "Fire protection systems and equipment shall be periodically

impected, tested, and maintained in accordance with NFPA 25, Standard for the Inspection, Testing and Maintenance of Water- Based Fire Protection Systems, and the testing, inspection and maintenance requirements of the applicable documents referenced

~ o C h M ~ STATEMENT: The Committee also added the references of the other standards listed in chapter 4 as they are all

VOTE ON COMMn' IT~ ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

(Log #;0)

Dennis Knli~ti, U~. Department of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add text as follows:

(c) Determination of needed ~ fire protection and fire re prevenu revention measures. svSSTA~rrmTiON: The added term d=mes t~ t measures are necemry to compensate for the impairment. COMMrr rEg ACTION: Accept NUMBER OF COMMn'TEE MEMBE]~ ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMrFrEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIV~ 26 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

(Log #4) 801-11 - (2-7): Accept SUBMITYE]~ Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Change the text in 2-7 as follows:

2-7* Fire Emergency Acdon Plan. S ~ A N T I A T I O N : Most of the requirements cited in the proposed Section 2-7 are redundant to the OSHA criteria for an Emergency Action Plan. Since the OSHA and NFPA required plans have the same intent, the NFI'A standard should utilize terminology that is comistent with the code of federal regulatiom. COMMrrTEE ALWION: Accept.

In addition, change "Fire Emergency Plan" to Wire Emergency Action Plan" everywh~e it appears in the standard. C O M M 1 T r ~ STATEMENT: This change appears in other parts of the standard. NUMBER OF COMMlTrgg MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


CLog #cc~) 801- 12- (2-8.3): Accept SUBMrrTER: Technical Committee on Fire Protection for Nudeac Facilities COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2

[ RECOMMENDATION: Add new sentence as follow~ "Drills shah I be critiqued and documented." to the end of the paragraph. | The paragraph now reads: I "Facility fire emergency orga~.'zation training requirements and [ drill frequencies necemmy to oemomtrate proficiency shall be [ implemented in accordance with the fire emergency plan in I Section 2-7. Drills shall be critiqued and documented."

SUBSTANTIATION: This was added because there are usually lessom learned for foUn'e training and drills that should be documented and critiqued to capture this history. COMMITTEg ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMrrrEE ACTION:


COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE: SIEGEI~. New wording includes "..dire emergency plan ...'. Per Comment 801-11, this would change to ...emergency iigtion

plan."

(Log #17) 801- 13 - (2-9.3): Accept in Principle • L~MITrF.R: Dennis Kubicki, U ~ . Department of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Revise text as follows:

Prefire plans shall be develotmd with the amistance of tothe facility fire emergency organization and shall be made available to them and nuhllc fire denartmentL SU]~TANTIATION: As written, the facility/ire emergency organization would not be involved in the develo]pment of pre- plans. Pre-plam would also not be given to off4~te responder~ COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept inPrindple.

[ Add new appendix items as follow~ [ A-2.9.1 Prefire plans should be developed with the assistance of I the facility fire emergency organization.

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A-2.9.3 Prefire plans should be made available to offsite fire departments as appropriate. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The recommendation may not be possible to accomplish at all times. This is good guidance and was moved to the appendix. NUMBER OF COMMITrF~ MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #18) 801- 14- (3-4): Reject SUBMITTER: Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Department of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete text as follows:

Fire Area Determination. The facility shall be subdivided into separate fire areas : : ~ctcr=-::.cd ~7 ~ e fire ~a~ar~ =nr27:': for the

~ urpose of limiting the spread of fire. UBSTANTIATION: This will avoid confusion with Section 2-3.

As written, Section 2-3 requires an FHA for all (fire) areas. Section 3-4 requires that fire areas be determined on the basis of the FHA. This is mutually exclusive. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: Traditional building codes approaches to fire area partitioning requirements rely on much more superficial assessments of the contents and hazards of each area. Where a FHA is performed, there is a much more accurate understanding of the risks involved, therefore a more sound basis to define appropriate fire area boundaries. It is unlikely that fire areas as def inedby a FHA would be less stringent than what the codes currently require. Furthermore, fire zones in building codes aPs~eroach hazardous areas from the point of view of fire and life

ty only, and are "blind" to the radiological concerns. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 24 NEGATIVE: 2 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: GARRETT: This comment, which is intended to avoid

confusion, is in support of Comment 801-2 (Section 2-3.2), Log #13. See reason stated for negative vote on Log #18.

SIEGEL: Comment is well taken. "As determined by FHA" has been grossly overused as a catch all, and in fact could be inserted in every section of the document that stipulates a required fire protection feature. Either it be used everywhere or not. Since we already have a section that requires an FHA and identifies its purpose(s), there is no need to keep reiterating "as determined by" over and over.

This is a chicken or egg issue that keeps coming up. One use an FHA to determine fire areas, but you do not have to. One may select fire areas in other ways and perform a FHA to support and document the validity of the determination. The key to 3-4 is to limit fires to acceptable limits.

The committee statement regarding radiological concerns is not germane to the existing wording or the recommended change.

801- 15 - (3-9.6.2): Reject (Log #19) SUBMrVrER: Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Department of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Provide new Appendix C which includes fire protection guidelines for HEPA filtration systems.

14 Nuclear Filter Plenum Fire Protection. 14-1 Purpose and Scope. 14-1.1 Much of the information pert inent to fire protection for

very high efficiency air cleaning filter plenums for nuclear applications is contained in technical papers, limited distribution reports, and job specifications that are often not readily available to DOE designers, facility managers, and fire protection engineers. This section provides personnel responsible for filter installations with practical fire protection guidelines for nuclear air cleaning final filter plenums. Collectively, this section summarizes findings from technical papers and job specifications currendy used at DOE sites and information obtained from filter manufacturers to provide the user with the "best" methods and state of the art fire protection for protection of exhaust plenum final filter installations.

14-1.2 Although the guidelines in this section are specifically applicable when only high efficiency particulate air (HEPA) type

filters serve as the final means of effluent cleaning in a nuclear air cleaning ventilation system, the guidelines can be applied with engineering discretion to other types of filtration andcleaning systems and their configurations.

14-1.3 This section does not include specific definitive fire protection design requirements for High Efficiency Metal Fiber filter systems, Radioiodine Adsorber air cleaning systems, Deep Bed Fiberglass filter systems, of Deep Bed Sand Filter systems (See ASME AG-1-1994, "Code on Nuclear Air and Gas Treatment" for definitions. Refer also to Appendix A). This section does not include the protection of HEPA type filters utilized in a clean room application. (Refer to NFPA 318.)

14-2 Filter Plenum Construction. 14-2.1 HEPA Filters° All HEPA filters used in nuclear ventilation

exhaust systems should meet the requirements for HEPA filters in ASME AG-1, Section FC, and be listed as a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter Unit as tested in accordance with UL 586. (Note: For operating temperatures of HEPA filters, see Appendix B).

14-2.2 Duct Entrance and Prefilters. All nuclear duct entrance filters and prefilters located upstream or made part of final HEPA filter exhaust plenums should be listed as Class 1 Air Filters unit as tested in accordance with UL 900.

14-2.3 Filter Framing. Filter framing systems may be constructed of combustible material provided that the material has a flame spread rating of 25 or less and smoke developed rating of 50 or less.

14-2.4 Number of Final HEPA Filters Required. When nuclear of HEPA filters serve as the final means of effluent cleaning, a minimum of two stages of HEPA filters should be arranged in series in the final filter plenum. In existing HEPA installations, one of the two stages of final HEPA filters may be located upstream from the final filterplenum.

14-3 Location of Final Filter Plenum Ventilation System Equipment.

14-3.1 Final Filter Plenums Located Inside Process Buildings. Filter plenums located inside process buildings and other buildings should be separated from all parts of the building and be enclosed by 2-hour fire-rated construction. Buildings should be provided with fire protection (i.e., smoke detector, sprinkler systems) for the appropriate particular hazards within the building.

14-3.2 Final Filter Plenums Located in Separate Building. 14-3.2.1 Separate buildings which house filter plenums should be

of minimum 2-hour fire-rated construction when located less than 5 ft (1.5 meters) from an adjacent building.

14-3.2.2 Filter plenum housing should be a minimum of 1-hour fire-rated construction when located more 5 ft (1.5 meters), but not more than 20 ft (6.1 meters) from an adjacent building.

14-3.2.3 Filter plenum housing located greater than 20 ft (6.1 meters) from an adjacent noncombustible building may be of unprotected noncombustible construction provided that no unprotected openings occur in the adjacent buildingo

14-3.2.4 Filter plenum housings need not be fire-rated or separated from an adjacent building if the adjacent building wall is of minimum 2-hour fire-rated construction with no unprotected openings.

14-3.3 Filter Plenums Located Near Combustible/Flammable Liquids. Filter plenums located near combustible or flammable liquid storage buildings or tanks should be located not less than 50 ft (15m) away from the buildings or tanks and be housed in minimum 2-hour fire-rated construction.

14-3.4 Small Filter Plenums. Small Filter plenums that serve as a final filter and have a leading surface area of 16 sq ft (1.50 sq meters) or less need not be separated by fire-rated construction from other parts of a building or be located in a separate fire-rated enclosure if the filter plenum is located in a building provided with an automatic fire sprinkler system, designed and installed in accordance with NFPA 13, and the filter plenum is provided with an automatic water spray system as described herein.

14-3.5 Existing Plenums. Plenums that have already been built and are in service before issuance of these guidelines are not required to be upgraded with a fire-rated enclosure or minimum separation distance unless there is a significant hazard that endangers building occupants, the public, or the environment, as determined by an FHA per DOE orders or is required by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

14-4 Protection of Openings in Fire-Rated Construction. Fire protection features should be designed to maintain the integrity of containment systems as reflected in the SAIL

14-4.1 Ratings Required for Doors. 14-4.1.1 Door openings into 2-hour rated filter plenum housings

should be 1 1/2-hour minimum fire-rated.

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14-4.1.2 Door openings into 1-hour rated filter plenum housings should be 3/4 hour minimum fire-rated.

14-4.2 Fire Damper Ratings. 14-4.2.1 Listed 1 1/2-hour fire-rated dampers should be installed

where ventilation ducts, not required to continuously function as part of a confinement system, penetrate 2-hour fire-rated construction.

14-4.2.2 Fire dampers are not required when ducting penetrates 1-hour fire-rated construction. The duct should pass through the wall and extend into the area to be considered. The areas on either side of the wall should be completely protected by automatic sprinklers in order to eliminate the dampers. Transfer grills and other similar openings ~4thout ducting should be provided with an approved damper.

14-4.2.3 Fire dampers in duct work should not be utilized when penetrating the fire-rated construction where the ducting is an integral part of the nuclear air filter system equipment that is required to continuously function as part of the confinement system. Such duct material penetrating fire-rated construction without fire dampers should:

• be made part of that fire-rated construction by either wrapping, spraying, or enclosing ~ e duct with an approved material, or by other means of separating the duct material from other parts of the building with equivalent required fire-rated construction; or

• be qualified by an engineering analysis for a 2-hour fire-rated exposure to the duct at the penetration location where the duct maintains integrity at the duct penetration with no flame penetration through the fire wall after a 2-hour fire exposure. (See Appendix D for a discussion of this type of analysis.)

14-4.2.4 Dampers in the air cleaning system for the purpose of controlling pressure, direction, or volume of air flow and for isolation of filters during change out or inspection are permitted in the ventilation.

14-4.3 Other Penetrat~ions and Openings in Fire-Rated Enclosures. All mechanical and electrical penetrations made into fire-rated plenum enclosures should be fire stopped by listed materials meeting the requirements of ASTM E-814 with a fire rating not less than the rated enclosure.

14-5 Materials and Special Hazards Inside Plenums. 14-5.1 Combustibles Located Inside Filter Plenum Enclosures.

Filter plenum enclosures should only be used for ventilation control equipment. The storage and accumulation of combustible materials as well as combustible and flammable liquids in any quantity should not be permitted. In addition, the storage of spare filters inside the filter p'lenum should not be permitted.

14-5.2 Material. 14-5.2.3 Processes Suhjecting Final Filter Plenum to Flammable

and Combustible Vapors. 14-5.3.1 When operations or processes involve flammable or

combustible liquids that: produce vapors, the concentration of the gases or vapors inside the final filter plenum should not exceed 25 percent of their lower fl!ammable limit inside the filter enclosure.

14-5.3.2 Fixed combustible gas analyzers should be provided in the final filter enclosure when the process involves gases or vapor with analyzer alarms set to sound an alarm at 25 percent of the lower flammable limiL These alarms should be transmitted to a continuously manned location.

14-5.4 Processes Subjecting Final Filter Plenum to Pyrophoric Dust Particles. When operations of processes involve pyrophoric materials that may subject the final filter plenum to the pyrophoric dust particles, a method to remove the dust particles before reach, in~ the final filter enclosure, such as a prefilter, should be requtreo.

14-5.5 Processes Subjecting Final Filter Plenum to High Dust Loading, High Moisture Air, Acid, of Solvent Environments. Operations sometimes may involve processes that may subject the final filters to airstreams carrying high moisture content, high dust loading, acids, and solvents that may rapidly degrade, plug or disintegrate the final filter medium or separators. When operations involve these sorts of airstreams, preventive methods should be utilized to stop the degradation impact on the final filters. These can include, but are not limited to, more frequent filter change outs, prefilters, scrubbers or traps, filters rated for the particular environment, and the use of alternative chemicals. When chemical degraders to HEPAs are utilized, including hydrogen fluoride (HF), nitric acid (HNOs), and perchloric acid (HCLO4), processes should include scrubbers, traps, or other methods to remove the chemical before the final HEPA filters.

14-6 Prefilters and Duct Entrance Filters, and Fire Screens. 14-6.1 Prefilters and Duct Entrance Filters. Protection of the final

filter plenum from dust and particulate loading should be

accomplished by using duct entrance filters or prefilters or a combination of both as follows:

14-6.1.1 All gloveboxes, hot cells, and fume hood connected to containment ventilation systems should be provided with at least moderately efficient (30 to 45 percent atmospheric dust spot efficiency based on ASHRAE 52-76) duct entrance filters.

14-6.1.2 High efficiency (at least 80 percent atmospheric dust spot efficiency based on ASHRAE 52-76 test method) prefilters should be provided in the ventilation system to protect the final HEPA filters from (1) particles with diameters larger than 1 or 2 microns; (2) lint; and (3) dust concentrations greater than 10 grains per 1,000 cubic ft (30 cubic meters). High efficiency prefilters not only provide a degree of fire protection to the final HEPA filters but can also extend the operational life of the HEPA filters.

14-6.1'.3 Prefilters that could be located in final filter plenums enclosures should be high efficiency ipreffiters)at least 80 percent ASHRAE atmospheric dust spot efficiency). These preffiters should be located at least 36 in. (91 centimeters) upstream from the final HEPA filters.

14-6.1.4 Where airborne materials are known to be combustible (such as metal powders), replaceable prefilters should be located as near the source as possible. However, prefiiters should not be located where there is an unacceptable radioactive hazard to personnel in changing the preflilters.

14-6.2 Fire Screens for Filter Plenums. 14-6.2.1 Fire screens should be located upstream from the

prefilters and final filter plenums. 14-6.2.2 Fire screens with metal meshes from 8 to 16 openings

per in. should be provided and located at least 4 to 5 ft (1.2 to 1.5 meters) upstream from all prefiiters and at least 20 ft (6.1 meters) upstream from all final filter plenum enclosures. 1

14-6.2.3 Where prefilters are located in final filter enclosures, fire screens should be located at least 20 ft (ft.1 meters) upstream from the prefilters.

14-6.2.4 Duct entrance filters may not require fire screens unless a significant amount of combustible materials are present in the exhaust stream exiting the duct.

14-7 Detection Systems. 14-7.1 Detectors Required. 14-7.1.1 Automatic fire detectors should conform to NFPA 72,

"National Fire Alarm Code." 14-7.1.2 Detectors should be rate compensated type heat

detectors. 14-7.1.3 Detectors should be approved for the specified use. 14-7.1.4 Detectors should be of the 190°F (88°(3) temperature

range unless operations require higher temperature air flows (see Appendix B for maximum filter operating temperatures).

14-7.1.5 Existing detectors that are supe-rvised, with suitable, equivalent, and reliable methods of detection (as determined by the Authority Having Jurisdiction) that are not rate compensated type or not listed may continue to be used while they remain serviceable.

14-7.2 Detector Location. 14-7.2.1 Heat detectors or pilot sprinkler heads should be

~ rovided in ducting prior to final filter enclosures. Airflow should e considered when determining detector or pilot head location. 14-7.2.2 Heat detectors or pilot sprinkler heads should also be

provided in the final filter enclosures. 14-7.2.3 If filter plenum automatic deluge spray systems are actuated by pilot sprinkler heads, heat detectors are not required in the ducting or the filter enclosure unless specified by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

14-7.3 System Arrangement. 14-7.3.1 The detection system of pilot system should be arranged

to detect a rise in air flow temperatures, actuate automatic fire suppression systems, when required, and transmit an alarm to the responding fire department or constantly attended proprietary station. The fire alarm system should be installed per NFPA 72.

14-7.3.2 A pilot operated system should only be used when automatic water deluge spray systems are required under Section 14-8.

14-7.3.3 Control units and signaling alarm systems connected to the heat detectors should be listed for their intended purpose.

14-7.3.4 Existing detection systems or pilot systems that provide equivalent and reliable methods of detection and alarm signaling transmission (as determined by past performance arid/or engineering analysis) that are electrically superched but are not listed may continue to be used while they remain serviceable.

14-7.4 Detection Testing Capability. 14-7.4.1 Detector installations should be engineered and installed

so that they can be tested during the life of the detector. Remote testing should be provided for detectors that are not accessible due

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to unacceptable hazards. One method of providing remote testing is to provide detectors with heating strips or coils that can be energized by a separate control unit. If a line-type heat detection system is used, a heat testing pad should be provided ou~ide the p lenum for operability testing of the system.

14-7.4.2 Where high contamination levels do not exist, detectors may be installed so that the detector can be removed from the plenum enclosure and tested externally.

14-8 Deluge Spray Suppression Systems. 14-8.1 Where Deluge Spray Systems are Required. 14-8.1.1 Automatic a n d m a n u a l water deluge spray systems

should be provided inside all final filter plenums for protection of the filters where they have a leading filter surface area greater than 16 square ft (1.4 square meters).

14-8.1.2 Automatic water deluge spray systems should be provided inside all final filter plenums having a leading surface area of 16 square ft (1.50 square meters) or less when the filter plenum is not separated by fire-rated construction.

14-8.1.3 Plenums that have already been built and are in service before issuance of these guidelines are no required to be backfitted with automatic or manual water deluge spray systems unless there is a significant hazard that endangers building occupants, the public, or the environment, as determined by an FHA or as required by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

14-8.1.4 The design of water deluge spray systems should reflect the potential for filter failure mechanisms, such as filter media damage resulting from weakened media due to water absorption and excessive differential pressures during water discharge. Such failure mechanisms can be significantly mitigated by throttling back fan controls to reduce the filter pressure o r b y providing redundant filters.

14-8.2 Demister Requirements. 14-8.2.1 Where automatic deluge spray systems are installed in

filter plenum enclosures that do not contain prefilters, metal demisters should be installed downstream of the automatic deluge spray sprinkler heads and upstream of the first series HEPA filter.

14-8.2.2 Demisters should have a nearly 100 weight (wt) percent efficiency for water drops 50 microns and larger. They should have an efficiency greater than 99 wt percent for 1 to 50 microns with air flow velocities of 500 to 600 ft (153 to 183 mete r s )pe r minute, or at operating air flow velocities with operating water flow deluge spray delivery rate.

14-8.2.3 Demisters should be located as far away as possible from the HEPA filters (a minimum of 36 in. [91 centimeters]) and approximately 6 in. (15 centimeters) from the deluge spray sprinkler heads.

14-8.2.4 When automatic deluge spray systems are installed in final filter ~plenum endosures that contain prefilters, water spray deluge sprinkler heads should be located upstream from the prefilters. In this configuration, the prefilters act as a demister.

148.3 Design of Automatic Deluge Spray Systems 14-8.3.1 Automatic deluge spray systems should be designed pe r

the applicable provisions of NFPA 13 and NFPA 15, and as follows (see Appendix G):

• Density. Water spray density should be 0.25 gpm per sq. ft. over the entire filter area or l gpm per 500 cfrn air flow (0.13mS/sec air flow/50OmS/sec air flow), whichever is greater.

• Sprinkler head type, Spray sprinkler heads should be deluge type sprinkler heads.

• Location from prefilters or demisters. The spray pattern of the deluge sprinkler head should be in the form of a downward vertical water curtain approximately 6 in. (15 centimeters) in f lont of the prefilter or demister. In addition, deluge sprinkler heads should be spaces so that each sprinkler head does not exceed 4 lineal ft of curtain coverage.

• Activation by detection. Deluge spray sprinkler system should operate upon activation of fire alarm system heat detectors or pilot sprinkler heads located in either the final ducting or filter plenum housing. Manual activation should be provided as well.

148.$.2 Automatic water spray system equipment should be listed for its intended use as required by NFPA 13 and NFPA 15.

148.3.3 Existing automatic deluge spray systems that provide equivalent and reliable fire protection for plenum filtration systems (as determined by past performance a n d / o r engineering analysis) may continue to be used while they remain serviceable.

148.4 Design of Manual Deluge Spray Systems 14-8.4.1 Manual spray systems should be designed per NFPA 15

and modified as follows (see Appendix C): • Density. Water spray density should be 0.25 gpm per sq. ft over

the entire filter area.

• Spray pattern and nozzle type. Nozzles should be deluge spray nozzles that form a full circle solid cone discharge.

• Location from filters. Spray nozzles should be horizontally directed at the face of the first series HEPA filters so that all areas of the first stage filters and framing support system are wetted.

• Activation by manual operation only. Activation should be by manually activating deluge valve or opening a normally closed Outside Screw & Yoke gate valve. Control devices to activate the spray nozzle deluge valve should be provided in the process operators control room or other locations accessible to fire fighters. When a deluge valve is utilized, manual activation may be provided at the deluge valve as well.

14-8.4.2 Manual water spray system equipment should be listed for their intended use as required by NFPA 13 and NFPA 15.

14-8.4.3 Existing manual deluge spray systems that provide equivalent and reliable fire protection for plenum filtration systems are acceptable.

14-8.5 Water Supply Requirements 14-8.5.1 Water for the deluge spray systems should be provided by

two separate water supply connections for reliability. (One may be a fire department connection if acceptable the Authority Having Jurisdiction.)

14-8.5.2 Automatic and manual water spray system water supplies should be hydraulically calculated and capable of supplying a simultaneous flow of the automatic and manual water spray systems as well as the overhead ceiling automatic fire sprinkler systems for the fire area providing air to the plenum for a min imumper iod of 2 hours. A minimum 2-hour water supply is not requi redwhen a limited water supply, system, discussed below, is justified and provided for criticality event reasons.

14-9 Special System Requirements. 14-9.1 Water Drains. 14-9.1.1 Water drains with traps and a means to eliminate drain

trap evaporation should be provided in plenum floors to provide liquid run off control.

14-9.12 Plenum drains should be piped to either a process waste system or to collection tanks.

14-9.1.3 Process waste systems and collections tanks should be of sufficient capacity to capture all liquid from the water deluge spray systems for the densities and durations required herein.

14-9.1.4 Criticality safety should be observed in all drainage and storage systems where the potential for impacting fnsile materials is encountered.

14-9.2 Limited Water Supply Systems. 14-9.2.1 Limited water supply systems for the deluge water supply

should be permitted when a documented criticality potential exxsts in the final filter plenum.

14-9.2,2 A documented criticality potential should be provided showing criticality calculations a n d t h e total amount of water allowed in the plenum enclosure before a limited water supply system is permitted.

14-9.2.3 Limited water supply can be accomplished by either limited capacity water tanks or system water flow control valves.

14-9.3 Maximum Air Temperatures Permitted. 14-9.3.1 When normal operating temperatures of final filter

enclosure are expected to exceed 200°F (94°C) or when operating temperatures of the final filter enclosure exceed the manufacturer's limited continuous service temperature rating, a method should be provided to cool the ventilation air stream (for filter operating temperatures see Appendix B).

14-9.3.2 Normal operating temperatures do not include high temperatures associated with fire conditions.

14-9.3.3 High operating temperatures in the final filter enclosure can be minimized by lon~, runs of ducts preceding the final filter enclosure, by intake of dilution air from streams from other spaces, or by water cooling systems inside the ducts.

14-9.4 Stainless Steel and Corrosion Resistant Equipment. 14-9.4.1 Stainless steel or noncombustible corrosion resistant

equipment should be provided for all ventilation metal parts required for fire protection where components in the ventilation ~iysestem are exposed to corrosive atmospheres. They should be

igned either with stainless steel or other non-reactive materials to ensure their resistance to the harmful effects of corrosion.

14-9.4.2 Stainless steel water spray heads and nozzles, piping and fittings in the plenum, piping hangers in the plenum, demlsters, and teflon coated heat detectors are recommended.

14-9.4.3 Where a corrosion resistant or stainless steel fire protection product is required and that product is not available as a listed product from any manufacturer, the substitution of one product for another is acceptable provided that the replacement product is equivalent, b a sedon an engineering analysfs.

14-9.5 Lighting and Window Viewing Ports

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14-9.5.1 Lighting should be provided inside the filter p lenum in f ront or between the filter banks in the area where automatic and manual heads and nozzhm are located. Such lighting may be provided with an on and off switch provided that the switch is located outside the p l enum at an accessible location.

14-9.5.9 Window viewing ports made up of ei ther wire glass, laminated lead safety glass, or fire-rated glass should be provided for viewing inside the filter p lenum. The window viewing ports should be provided at each locat ion where fire protect ion spray system heads and nozzles are located and should be placed in such a way with enough windows so all heads and nozzles are visible f rom outside the filter plenum.

14-10 Fire Hazard Analysis. It is no t the in tent of this Standard to prevent the application of

alternative methods that provide equivalent or superior fire protect ion for nuclear final filter plenums. Therefore, equivalencies f rom fire protect ion guidelines provided in this section are permit ted. However, equivalendes should only be permit ted when a documen ted f i r ehaza rd analysis has been

e r formed in accordance with DOE Orders (See also the DOE re Protect ion Program Implementa t ion Guide and the DOE Fire

Protect ion Handbook.) :and the FHA is reviewed and approved by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

Appendix A. Nuclear Filtration and Air Cleaning Systems Other types of nuclear filtration systems and air cleaning systems

men t ioned in this document :

High Efficiency Metal Fiber Filter Systems v

This type of filtering ha~; only been commercially available in the Uni ted States since the mid-1980s. High Efficiency Metal Fiber (HEMF) filters are made of s intered stainless steel fibers that are welded into steel housiE~gs and steel frames. HEMF filters are generally no t disposed of when they b e c o m e p l u g g e d or "loaded" like HEPA filters because they can be c l e a n e d b y following a manufacturer ' s cleaning procedure. After cleaning a dirty, used HEMF filter, there is little or no effect in the filter 's efficiency and structural integrity whev~ compared to that filter's original efficiency and structure.

In contrast to HEPA filters, metal fiber filters are no t weakened by moisture impingement . Also, HEMF filters can operate for longer and hot ter t ime periods than HEPA filters because the metal filters contain no f lammable components and they are inherent ly resistant to high temperatures (a~though the finely divided filter media in a metal filter will no t resist a direct flame impingement) . The resistance of it to moisture and hea t make this filter attractive for fire protect ion purposes. Since the use of HEMF filters is relatively new to the DOE community, little fire protect ion design data based on actual fire testing are currently available.

Radioiodine Adsorber .adr Cleaning Svstems

Although much discussion in the nuclear community has been ~.enerated for the past 40 years as to fire protect ion of adsorbers, /ittle consensus and few conclusions as to the proper me thod of ext inguishment of adsorber fires involving combustible materials has been achieved. Some methods include utilizing a combinat ion of manual and automatic water spray systems, limiting air flow to the adsorbers, and the utilization of alternative non-combust ible adsorber medias such as silver zeolite. Adsorber air cleaninlg systems are often utilized in nuclear reactor emergency ventilation conf inement systems where they are often referred to as charcoal or carbon type filters (but o ther inorganic adsorber materials are available for adsorber media such as silver oxide, silver nitrate, a luminum silicate, and silver zeolite). Al though the nuclear industry has exper ienced less than six known adsorber fires in its history, it is generally accepted that as a minimum, adsorbers should be provided with fire detect ion equipment .

For carbon type filters an insurance carr ie~ for nuclear power plants r ecommends the following fire protection:

a. A hydraulically des igned automatic water spray system, utilizing directional solid-cone spray nozzles control led by an approved deluge valve, with r emote suitable located manual actuation stations, should be prox~ided for charcoal filters.

b. The spray nozzles for horizontal beds or drawers should be or iented above each bed or drawer and be of such design to distribute water evenly across the top of each bed or drawer at a m in imum density of 0.25 gallons per m i n u t e p e r square foot-

c. The spray nozzles for vertical beds s h o u l d b e oriented at the top of the bed and be of such design to distribute water evenly across the top of the bed at the rate of 3.2 gal per minute per cubic foot o f charcoal bed.

d. A supervised fixed tempera ture detect ion system should be • provided and connec ted to an annuncia tor in the control room.

The detectors should be located on the down stream side of the charcoal bed for automatic operat ion of the spray systems.

e. The spray system should be equipped with a local alarm and connec ted to an annuncia tor in the control room.

f. The air flow should terminate (fan shut off) upon water activation.

g. For the pressure vessel type charcoal filter, where a shut-off by- pass a r rangement is employed a round each tank, an automatic water spray system is no t required. We [the insurance carrier] r e c o m m e n d a hose connect ion be available on the side of the tank to allow the introduct ion of water.

Deed Bed Fiberglass Hlter Systems

One m e t h o d investigated to extinguish fiberglass filter fires was water spray systems. Early designs of deep bed fiberglass filters did no t address filter media replacement , and over a per iod of years, the fiberglass filters plugged to the extent that the systems could not mee t ventilation airflow requirements . Water sprays and steam were applied to the filters for cleaning the plugged filters, but with little success. It is generally accepted that water applied to this type of filter media in the event o f fire could extinguish the f i re . However, accumulat ion of radioactive material p resent in the filter media would still be released to the envi ronment when the water is applied.

Since the goal of ventilation systems is to continue to perform their safety functions effectively under all conditions by confining radioactive or o ther potentially dangerous materials and the efficiency of deep bed fiberglass filter systems is generally no t adequate, these type of filters must be accompanied by additional downstream filters such as a HEPA.

Deed Bed Sand Filter Systems

For the most part, sand filters are fire resistant, chemically inert, and require no special fire protect ion systems. Sand filters are usually accompanied by HEPA filters. W h e n a sand filter is used in series with HEPA filters it should be upstream of the HEPA. In this position, the sand filter can protect the HEPA filters that provide the final conta inment barrier.

Self-Cleaning Viscous Liuuid Filters

These types of filters utilize a viscous liquid for cleaning purposes. They should be avoided for uses where radioactive materials are handled because they produce radioactive sludge that requires disposal. These types of filters would also require special fire protect ion systems because of the combustible nature of the liquid.

Moving Curtain Single Pass Rolling Prefilters

One noteworthy type of prefilter is the moving curtain single pass rolling prefilter. This type of prefilter involves f lesh filter media being manually or automatically fed across the face of the filter, while the dirty media is rewound onto a take-up roll. When the roll is exhausted, the take up media is disposed of and a new media roll is then installed. Fire tests involving this type of prefiitering were per formed in 1980 by Lawrence Liveilnore National Laboratory utilizing a modif ied commercial moving curtain filter. The purpose of testing this type of filter was to f ind a way to limit the amount or eliminate aerosol smoke that may be dPrOduced in a fire that can plug a final HEPA filter. The tests

emonstrated that prefilters o f this type could limit aerosol plugging of HEPA filters p roduced dur ing fire. However, the subject final test repor t stated that prefilters of this type were an "experimental prototype" and that this type of prefilter "would have limtted application as a pure fire protect ion device" for conta inment ventilation systems in current use. 4

Electrostatic Precipitator Prefilter

Another type of prefil ter that has been udlized at DOE facilities is the electrostatic precipitator (ESP)pref i l ter . This prefilter imparts an electrical charge to particles in the air flow stream, caus ing the particles to adhere to collector plates. The ESP prefilter has b e e n used to extend the life of final HEPA filters when processes involve larger d iameter airflow particles. A certain level o f fire protect ion could be achieved with an ESP prefilter during a fire if the particles expected as products of combust ion can be properly collected on the filter th roughout the fire for the particular air flow capacity of

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the process. Most commercially available ESP prefilters cannot catch the smaller airborne particles and smoke particles associated with a burning fire. However, more work needs to be done on ESP preffiters to understand what particle sizes associated with fire an ESP can effectively filter out. When ESP prefilters are used they should be made of noncombustible materials and, as with any

refilter, careful attention should be directed to prevent dust adingon it during its use. Also, ESP prefilters should not be

used where explosive concentrations of gases or dusts are present

Appendix B. Operating Temperatures for HEPA Filters

To be listed by Underwriters Laboratories under UL-586 as a High Efficiency Particulate Air Filter Unit, HEPA filters are required to: (1) withstand 750°F (402°C) air for 5 minutes at rated airflow capacity and have greater than 97 percent DOP efficiency, and (2) withstand a spot-flame test in which a Bunsen burner flame is placed on the filter core with no after burning when the flame is removed.

However, it can be noted that there is a rapid decrease in the tensile strength of the filter media at about 450°F (234°C), and when temperatures get above 800°F (450 °) the fibers in the filters begin to break and curl up leaving pinholes in the filter media. Extended exposure to temperatures above 800°F (450°C) will cause destruction of the case in wood-cased filters and warping of the case in steel-cased filters, resulting in bypassing of unfiltered air.

Although HEPA filters can withstand 7500F (399°C) temperature for a very limited time duration, they should not be subjected to indefinite exposure temperatures higher than 275°F (135°C). Longer filter life and more reliable service as well as an operational safety factor can be obtained when normal operating temperatures are below 200°F (94°C) and high temperature extremes are avoided.

Continuous operation of HEPA filters at higher temperatures is limited primarily by the filter sealant, used to seal the filter core into the filter case. At higher temperatures, the sealants lose their strength, causing filter failure. For example, standard urethane seals are suitable for service at 250°F (122°C), while some silicone seals can withstand 500°F (262°C).

Since different sealants are available and different filter manufacturer's rate their filters of different temperatures, the best practice is for ventilation system designers and operators to determine the manufacturers limiting continuous service temperature if continuous operation at high temperatures are necessary.

n A l ~ v~Bm i ~ l p t w t

Appendix C. General Summary Table and Plan Diagram

Table G.1 General Criteria Summary Table Required by this Document

General Criteria Existing Plenum

Newplenums New Plenums <16sq. f t >16 sq. ft.

(1.4 sq. (1.4 sq. meters) meters)

Combustible filter frame allowed? Yes Yes Yes Rated enclosure or separation required? No I No ~ Yes Fire detection or pilot sprinklers required in intake ducting? Yes Yes Yes Water spray systems required? No t No ~ Yes

1Unless required by Authority Having Jurisdiction. ~Separation not required if ceiling sprinklers provided in plenum location and in plenum.

SProvided that filters are separated by fire construction.

Appendix D. Discussion on Evaluating Duct Openings When Penetrating 2-Hour Fire Walls

It is recognized by fire protection practices that fire dampers are not required in all cases when HVAC ducting penetrates fire-rated construction. In NFPA 90A, Standard for the Installation of Air Conditioning and Ventilating Systems, 1989 Edition, Section 3-3.1, fire dampers are not required when ducts penetrate fire-rated barriers that have a resistance rating less than 2 hours.

However, NFPA 90A (Sections 3-3.1.1 and 3.4.1) requires 1 1/2 hour fire-rated dampers in ducts which penetrate fire barriers of 2 hours fire resistance or greater (but less than 3 hours). Section 3. 4.2 of NFPA 90A requires 3.hour fire-rated dampers in ducts which penetrate barriers having a fire resistance of 3 hours or more.

v ~ t * v ~ s

~ T L "

FIGURE C.I Plan Diagram of Filter Plenum F'we Protection (Diagram for reference purposes only. See written criteria for actual requirements)

1Water supply may be a limited water supply. Secondary supply may not be required. ~Pipe drains to either a process waste system or collection tanks. SMinimum two stages of HEPA filters required. Additional stages of HEPAs are permitted. ~Pilot sprinkler heads may be used to activate deluge system. Heat detection also required in final filter enclosure.

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N F P A 801 - - F9 7 R O C

The listing criteria for fire dampers, specified in UL 555, requires fire dampers to be tested in an assembly with a standard time temperature fire exposure. The criteria for a damper passing the UL 555 test requires that the damper remains closed during the duration of the fire test following a hose stream test where no flaming on the damper materials and no through openings that would allow flames to penetrate the fire wall occur.

In the UL 555 test, no duct work is connected to either side of the fire wall where the damper is tested because it is assumed that in a worst case situation the duct work will structurally fail, fall away from the damper, and only the fire damper and housing will remain.

Using the passing criteria defined in UL 555, researchers s'6 have Pdroposed equivalent protection of duct openings with no fire

amper installed where the duct remains intact near the wall opening creating a barrier to flames passing through the opening at the end of a 2-hour fire test.

The research has demonstrated that the most important factors in maintaining the integrity of the ducting that prevents flaming through the duct opening after a one hour fire exposure is the quality of the duct construction and installation, a design which prevents gaps between the fire wall opening and the duct, and the design and protection of the duct hangers so that the ducts are supported throughout the fire period and hose stream test near the waUopening where the penetration occurs.

Full scale fire testing ]has demonstrated that specific size and design detailed for both rectangular and roundducts, installed per HVAC Duct Construction Standards, Metal and Flexible, will remain in place over a 2-hour standard time temperature fire ex osure.

~IPl~e cited research addresses other methods to analyze duct penetrations in fire walls where fire dampers are excluded so that qualified engineers and designers can assess and qualify by engineering analysis other design scenarios for ducts not tested in the full scale tests performed by the researchers. The research did not rely on trade-offs such as sprinkler protection as a method for qualif3ing the ducts. It was based on quantitative engineeringequations and tools and fire test data. The research is not applicable to ducts that contain combustible loading and did not address protection of openings in smoke barriers.

Users of the design criteria found in this Standard are encouraged to utilize the information obtained from the cited research for qualifying ducts for a 2-hour fire-rated exposure when a fire damper is not desirable in a confinement ventilation system. However when qualifying duct configurations not fire tested by the research, users are cautioned to apply the research results only when applicable designs are supported by engineering calculations performed by qualified, engineers competent in the technology.

1Numerical data obtained from: Lee, H.A., Final report-Program for Fire Protection, Caves,

Canyons, and Hot Ceils, ARH-ST-104, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, August 1974, pp. 59, 60.

Lee, H.A., Guide to Fire Protection in Caves, Canyons, and Hot Cells, ARH-3020, Atlantic Richfield Hanford Company, Richland, July 1974, pp. 33, 35.

Burchsted, C.A.,J.E. Kahn and A.B. Fuller. 1976. Nuclear Air Cleaning Handbook, ERDA 76-21. Oak Ridge National Laboratory. Oak Ridge, Tennessee, pg. 227.

Hill, AJ., Fire Prever~tion and Protection in Hot Cells and Canyons, DP-1242, Savannah River Laboratory, Alken, South Carolina, April 1977, pg 12. aj.j. Carney, ANI's Recommendations for Carbon Filters, American Nuclear Insurers, C.3.], September 1977. 4Alvares, N., D. Beason, W. Bergman, J. Creighton, H. Ford, and A. Lipska* 1980. Fire Protection Countermeasures for Containment Ventilation, UCID-18781, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Livermore, California. SGewain, R., J. Shanh;y, P. DiNenno, J. Scheffey, B. Campbell. August 1991. Evaluation of Duct Opening Protection in Two-hour Fire Walls and Partitions, Fire Technology, National Fire Protection Association, Quincy, Massachusetts. SGewain, 1L G., B. G. Campbell, J. H. Shanley, Jr., J.L. Scheffey, May 1990. Protection of Duct Openings in Two-hour Fire Resistant Walls and Partitions, ASHRAE JOURNAL, American Society of Heating, Refrigerating and Air-Conditioning Engineers, Inc~, Atlanta. SUBSTANTIATION: Doe has completed 3 years work developing guidelines of fire prote.ction for HEPA filtration systems. NFPA 801 can benefit from this work. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: As written, this comment was too specific to DOE facilities. The Committee has not seen the entire

document and did not have time to fully examine the comment. The Committee did feel the information is worthwhile and suggest the submitter petition the NFPA to develop a new standard on this subject. NUMBER OF COMMI'Iq'EE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #24) 801- 16 - (3-9.6.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Leo Derderian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text:

"ff fixed fire suppression systems are required to be tested for flow; their flow period shall be minimized to account for the need to protect filter media from being wetted and dried." SUBSTANTIATION: The alternate wetting and drying of AEPA filters causes a loss of strength which is not accounted for in the life of the filters. Fire suppression needs are served more efficiently if the flow period is minimized to confirm nozzle clear conditions. Our object is to test for flow not to weaken the filter media; which is what is happening now. COMMITTEEACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: There is flexibility in the existing codes and standards to allow testing of these systems. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #25) 801- 17 - (3-9.6.2): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Leo Derderian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Add new text to read as follows:

"The paragraph is unduly restrictive to "thermal" detectors. Consideration should be allowed for other detection activation methods. For example a fire with low heat by high smoke would not be adequately detected until the thermal trap point of the detector." SUBSTANTIATION: None. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

Revise 3-9.6.2 as follows: "3-9.6.2 HEPA filtration systems shall be provided with fire

detection when required by the FHA." Add new 3-9.6.3 as follows: "3-9.6.3 Fixed fire suppression shall be provided when required

by the FHA." Add new appendix item as follows: "A-3.9.6.3 Where the detection system activates a suppression

system, the selection of the detectors shall minimize false actuations." COMMITrEE STATEMENT: The submitter did not supply a recommendation but the Committee did agree with the submitters concept. The Committee action reflects the submitters intent. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #26) 801- 18- (4-2.2.2): Reject SUBMITTER: Leo Derderian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Change text to read as follows:

"Fire pumps shall be automatic-starting with manual shutdown. The manual shutdown can occur at the pump controller or at the central control room." SUBSTANTIATION: In the event of inadvertent flooding events; the requirement unduly restricts the operator to the pump controller thus requiring added time to affect a safe alignment. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: The comment is in conflict with NFPA 20. Also the recommendation may allow inadvertent shutdown of the fire pump. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30

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VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION: AFFIRMATIVE: 25 NEGATIVE: 1 NOT RETURNED: 4 Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE: SIEGEL: If operators in a control room are given the

responsibility to control operation of radiological safety significant equipment for protection of the site and the public, we should be confident enough in their ability to permit control of f i repump shutdown when a radiological release concern overrides the NFPA 20 requirement.

However, caution must be exercised to assure that any control wiring to accomplish remote pump shutdown is protected against a fire induced spurious stop signal.

(Log #27) 801- 19- (4-2.2.4): Reject SUBMITTER: Leo Derderian, EH-34 Nuclear Facility Safety COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Change text to read as follows:

"Where water tanks are used, they shall be filled from a source capable of replenishing the supply for fire protection needs at a rate greater than the largest usage rate anticipated." SUBSTANTIATION: An 8 hr period may not be sufficient for very large areas of demand. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: This recommendation imposes undo requirements on facilities where they do not have an adequate supply. NUMBER OFCOMMrrTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #3) 801- 20- (4-5.1): Accept SUBMITTER: Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENTON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Change the text in 4-5.1 as follows:

"Standpipe and hose systems as reouired bv the fire hazards shall be installed in accorda]ace with NFPA 14, Standard

for the Installation of Hose Systems." SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed wording implies that a standpipe system is required for every facility. Also, the NFPA 14 standard does specify the types of hazards of conditions that require a standpipe system. Since Section 4-5.1 does not specify a requirement for particular standpipe class, the need for a standpipe system should be based upon the results of the fire hazards analysis. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #21) 801- 21 - (5-2): Accept SUBMITTER: Jim Biggins, M&M Protection Consultants COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2

J RECOMMENDATION: Return revised text referencing NFPA 99 forgeneral requirements for hospitals to Appendix. SUBSTANTIATION: 1. Requiring that hospitals comply with another NFPA document is not within the scope of the committee. The material is appropriate, as advisory material in the Appendix..

2. There was no specafic proposal made to make the Appendix material from 801-1995 a requirement of the standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: NFPA 99 references NFPA 801 for fire protection in facilities handling radioactive materials. The committee can reference other standards outside their scope. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 22 NEGATIVE: 2 ABSTENTION: 1

NOT RETURNED: 5 Kassawara, Levine, Pierce, Vieira, Vitacco EXPLANATION OF NEGATIVE:

DOBSON: Compliance with NFPA 99 is advisable but the Committee cannot mandate compliance in areas of the hospital that do not handle radioactive materials. The revised text in the

~ roposal referencing NFPA 99 for general requirements for ospitals should be re turned to theAppendix. HOLMES: With respect to the revised Committee Action to

change the prior Committee Action from "Reject" to "Accept" 801- 21, I vote to reject that revised action. That is, I vote to uphold the original action to Reject 801-21. The original Committee Statement, "The Committee can reference other standards outside their scope" is correct and should be upheld.

I believe that the Committee Action on Log #21 is entirely appropriate and not outside of the scope of the Committee. Committee Scope

The NFPA Regulations Governing Committee Projects not only recognizes that committees may reference other standards, it also defines how those standards are to be referenced in Sections 2-3.6.2 and 2-3.7.1 of the Regulations. There is nothing in the Regulations that would preclude or prevent the committee from referencing NFPA 99 for hospitals that handle or use radioactive materials. If, for some reason, there is a perceived question regarding the Committee on Atomic Energy's responsibilities with regard to specifying requirements for hospitals using radioactive materials, there is a process for establishing intercommittee coordination through the Standards Council as defined in 2-3.5.5 of the Regulations. That, again, would not preclude the Committee on Atomic Energy from including a reference to NFPA 99 in our draft of NFPA 801.

The scope of the Committee on Atomic Energy includes the safeguarding of life and property from fires in which radiation or other effects of nuclear energy might be a factor. The fact is that radionudides may be used throughout many parts of a hospital facility and, unlike power plants, radioactive materials are not isolated to specific areas of the facility. As such, fire protection for the general hospital facility should be in conformance with the NFPA Standard for Health Care Facilities. Limiting Fire Protection to Defined Nuclear Areas

Fire safety is a very broad discipline. It is not good fire protection practice to specify spot fire protection for a specific area while exempting other areas that may expose areas containing radioactive materials from implementing good fire protection practices and systems. That is precisely why the requirements of NFPA 99 should be direcdy referenced in 5-2 of NFPA 101.

Would it make good sense for NFPA 801 to require sound fire protection for, say, a radiopharmacy while, allowing, an adjacent X- ray film storage area to be non-conforming with the consensus fire protection requirements of NFPA 99? I think notl

NFPA 801 will require that the general provision for emergency lighting and interior finish be in accordance with NFPA 101. It will require HVAC in accordance with NFPA 90A. It will require lightning protection in accordance with NFPA 780. Effective implementation of all of these systems requirements is dependent upon the conformance of all of the adjacent hospital areas with the requirements. Or is it the intent that compliant lighting, HVAC, and lightning protection be provided only to isolated areas where they may be some radionuclides present at some time? I also think not. To do so would not meet the implied performance requirements for firesafety in facilities where radiation may have an effect on safeguarding life and property.

Areas of hospitals that will not handle or use radionuclides are not well defined. Even if they could be defined in specific instances, they are not likely to be well separated from areas that might handle or use radioactive materials. Fire protection in "non- nuclear" areas may affect the nuclear handling areas. It is appropriate to have the hospital comply with NFPA 99. NFPA 804 Implications

It is not appropriate to exclude "non-nuclear" areas from being provided with good fire protection. If the Committee on Atomic Energy is to take that ill-advised approach, then there are many areas in NFPA 804 that must be revisited. In advanced light water reactors, there are many areas of the plant that have no direct bearing on nuclear safety for which NFPA 804 requires protection. For example: flammable liquids storage areas must comply with NFPA 30, temporary sheds and trailers must be non-combustible, turbine bearings must be protected, outside hydrogen storage must comply with NFPA 50A, records storage must comply with NFPA 232, warehouses must be sprinldered, aux boilers must comply with NFPA 8501 or NFPA 8502, etc. All of these occupancies and systems are outside of the primarily nuclear occupancy and may

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no a t tempt to limit its scope for power plants to exclude "non- nuclear" areas. The same s h o u l d b e true for hospitals. Commit tee Correlat ion

I cannot imagine why the Commit tee on Health Care would

~ ct to the m a n d a t o r / r e f e r e n c e to their consensus document , A 99, for hospitals using radioactive materials. There is

no th ing in the proposed reference to NFPA 99 from NFPA 801 that would cause any conflict with the existing NFPA standard for heal th care facilities that may also handle or use radioactive substances. I believe that the Commit tee on Atomic Energy made a sound action in requir ing NFPA 99 for fire protect ion throughout all parts of a hospital in which radionuclides are used. We should no t reverse the committee direct ion at the committee ballot level. The action agreed upon dur ing our Lake Buena Vista meet ing should go forward for general public consideration. If the commit tee obtains any comments then we should reassess the

revious action. mmary

I suppor t the original Commit tee Action to Reject Log #21. The revised text for 5-2 provides for sound fire protect ion in conformance with the consensus standard, NFPA 99, and such a mandatory reference is within the scope of the Commit tee on Atomic Energy for "safeguarding of life and proper ty form fires (in hospitals) in which radiat ion or o ther effects of nuclear energy might be a factor." COMMENT ON AFFIRMATIVE:

NOTLEY: My voted i,~ based on my unders tanding of the sentence at the bot tom of Angie Murphy's 7/29/97 memo that affirmative means accepting the original proposal by J im Biggins (Log #21) to "Return revised text re terencing NFPA 99 for general requirements for hospitals to the Appendix." EXPLANATION OF ABSTENTION:

SIEGEL: Issue became unclear due to the many changes.

(Log #20) 801- 22- (5-4.1): Reject SUBMITTER: Dennis Kubicki, U.S. Depar tment of Energy COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Provide new Appendix D which includes fire protect ion guidel ines for gloveboxes.

15 GLOVEBOX FIRE PROTECTION 15-1 Scope. 15-1.1 Gloveboxes and Hot Cells. 15-1.1.1 This section provides fire protect ion requi rements for

the design and construction of all new gloveboxes. It also addresses extinguishing methods, ventilation protect ion features, and general operating safeguards.

15-1.1.2 This s tandard is no t in tended for ho t cells, a l though some design pr inciples in this documen t may prove useful if similar hazards are present. Consult a qualified fire protect ion engineer before applying these criteria to ho t cells.

15-1.1.3 If the use of the glovebox is to change or the glovebox is removed f rom service, an FHA should b e p e r f o r m e d to evaluate the potential fire hazards associated with the change.

15-1.2 Existing Glovebox Installations. These criteria apply to existing glovebox installations when an FHA demonstrates condit ions that warrant their application, or when de te rmined by the Authority Having Jurisdiction.

15-1.3 Table-Top Gloveboxes. Sections 15-3 and 15-5 do not apply to single, table-top, or mobile-type gloveboxes unless the potential fire hazards associated with these units warrant applying these sections to those installations.

15-1.4 Automatic Fire Protect ion Required. An automatic fire suppression or inert ing system is required in all new gloveboxes unless an FHA concludes that such a system is no t warranted~ and except as no ted in 15-1.3 above.

15-2 Glovebox Construction. 15-2.1 Noncombust ible Materials Required. 15-2.1.1 Gloveboxes should be constructed of noncombust ib le

materials. The most common materials used are stainless steel and glass.

15-2.1.2 If the a tmosphere a n d / o r process within the glovebox is incompatible with the construction material of the box, and epoxy resin with inorganic fillers may be used to coat the interior metal surfaces of the glovebox. Where plastic linings are used for this purpose, the glovebox enclosure should be protected by either an automatic fire suppression system or an iner t a tmosphere system in accordance with the applicable NFPA Standard as supp lemented by this standard.

15-2.1.3 All radiation shielding material added to the glovebox should be noncombust ible . If combustible material must be used, it should be encased with a noncombust ib le material.

15-2.2 GIovebox Windows. The n u m b e r of glovebox windows should be limited to that required to provide the visibility necessary to ensure that safe operations, cleanup, and main tenance activities can be performed.

15-2.2.1 Window Materials. * Giovebox windows should be constructed of wire glass, fire-

ra ted glass, or laminated safety glass. The window gasketing material should be noncombust ible , f ire-retardant treated, or heat resistant. A comparison of glovebox window material is provided in Appendix 1.

• If laminated safety glass is used in locations where radiation levels may be high enough to cause yellowing of the plastic, a cerium additive should be specified to prevent yellowing of the plastic laminate.

• If ei ther the glovebox a tmosphere or operations require that an alternate window material be used, fire-retardant t reated

~ olycarbonate may be used. If fire re tardant polycarhonate must e used, it should be sandwiched with noncombust ib le material

(such as wire or t empered glass) whenever possible. As an alterative, the exterior side of the polycarbonate should be protected with a noncombust ib le material to guard against the effects of exposure fires.

15-2.3 Gloveports. 15-2.3.1 Gloveports should be installed in the stainless steel sides

of the glovebox, ff this is no t possible, the gloveports should be installed using laminated safety glass or a fire retardant polycarbonate plastic and the quantity of plastic used should be limited only to that required to safely moun t the gloveports.

15-2.3.2 Metal covers should be provided for each of the glove openings. Covers should be constructed of stainless or carbon steel. The covers should be he ld in place by a latch or o ther device constructed of noncombust ib le material suitable for the application. Utilization of the glovebox covers serves to protec t against loss of integrity at a gloveport due to either internal or external fire exposure.

15-2.3.3 Noncombust ible covers or plugs should be used to seal gloveport openings if the gloves have been removed.

15-2.4 Gloves. 15-2.4.1 Glovebox gloves should be selected based on the

chemicals present in the glovebox. Generally, hypalon 2 or neoprene gloves are used where permeat ion from the chemicals present is no t a consideration. An additional outer cover may be provided if required for operational or personnel safety needs.

15-2.4.2 Gloves should be at least .030 in. (.076 centimeters) thick and should be of one-piece construction.

15-2.5 Methods for Containing Fire Spread. 15-2.5.1 Glovebox ventilation duct ing should he provided with

separat ion/ isolat ion dampers or doors to minimize fire propagation. Fire barriers should also be provided between individual or groups of gloveboxes and within glovelines where warranted by the FI-IA.

15-2.5.2 The separat ion/ isolat ion dampers or doors should shut by a fusible device. Where the glovebox is protected by an automatic fire suppression or detect ion system, the dampers or doors should be equipped to close upon activation of the system in lieu of providing conventional fusible devices. In the case of fire detection systems, precautions such as heat detectors or dual zone smoke detectors should be utilized so as to avoid inadvertent operation and subsequent shutdown of the glovebox ventilation system.

15-2.5.3 Fire hazards analysis in combinat ion with o ther ventilation and contaminat ion control analysis should be used to de termine where these separations are required. While specific guidance cannot be given due to the variety of glovebox applications, fire separation features should be considered for the following glovebox locations/situations:

• Where required in conjunction with automatic fire suppression systems.

• At the connect ion point between the gtovebox and its ventilation exhaust duct.

* At the connect ion point between a glovebox and a gloveline.

* Between gloveboxes or banks of gloveboxes which are connected in series, particularly where the glovebox run crosses physical barriers which would serve a as fire stop to prevent fire propagat ion

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• Unique situations where it is desirable to prevent fire propagation within a group of gioveboxes, or between a giovebox(s) and other areas.

• The contents of gioveboxes and the need to limit contamination spread due to a fire is an important consideration in determining the number and location of separation devices.

15-2.6 Criticality Safety Provisions. 15-2.6.1 Floor drains should be provided for all gloveboxes in

which a criticality, process safety, or other similar engineering analysis determines that operations within a giovebox can create the potential for a criticality incident.

15-2.6.2 Where criticality is a concern and a drain system

]] rovided, the glovebox drain system design should provide for quid collection/containment. Containment methods may

include tanks, diked floors, etc. In addition, the drain piping and liquid collection systems/equipment should be designed to avoid cntcality incidents.

15-2.7 Glovebox Utilities and Services. 15-2.7.1 All electrical components in the glovebox design should

comply with the applicable sections of NFP~. 70, Nat iona l Electrical Code.

15-9.7.2 Utilities (e.g., water, air, gas, etc.) serving gloveboxes should be provided with shutoff or isolation valves for use in the event of an emergency. These valves should be located so as to permit rapid operator action while simultaneously protecting the operator from the emergency itself in or adjacent to the glovebox.

15-2.7.3 All heating devices used inside gloveboxes (such as hot

~i lates, furnaces, etc.) should sted/aproved and equipped with automatic high-temperature

shutoff switches. Where the presence of hazardous conditions warrant, the FHA should consider the need for high temperature alarms to be transmitted to a constantly attended location.

15-3 Automatic Fire Suppression and Inerting Systems. 15-$.1 Inerting Systems. 15-3.1.1 General. • Gloveboxes should be provided with inert atmospheres when: (a) combustible or pyrophoric metals are in use in significant

quantities as determined by the Authority Havingjurisdiction; and (b) required by the FHA or SAIL

• Glove box inerting may be used in lieu of an automatic fire suppression system when conditions warrant.

15-3.1.2 Inerting System Design Requirements. • The system should be designed and installed in accordance

with the applicable industry standards as supplemented by DOE criteria.

• When required or when used as a substitute for other required automatic fire suppression systems, gloveboxes should be purged with an inert gas (commonly argon or nitrogen). The level of inerting provided should be sufficient to prevent ignition of the material(s) present. A safety factor should be included in establishing the inert gas design concentration. The safety factor compensates for errors in instrumentation or other conditions which might lead to an increase in oxygen level. For deflagration prevention, the flammable/combustible concentrations should be maintained at or below 25 percent of their lower flammable limit. For combustible and pyrophoric metals, the oxygen concentration should not exceed 25 percent of the level required for combustion. (Note that some combustible metals (e~g., aluminum powder) will burn in atmospheres other than air. Thus it is important for the designer to select an appropriate inert gas and establish a design concentration based upon the hazard.)

15-5.1.5 Oxygen Monitoring. Where inert gas purging systems are installed, oxygen monitors

should be provided to ensure the necessary concentration of inert gas is maintained.

ff an alarm (excess oxygen) condition is reached in the glovebox, the oxygen monitoring system should:

• shut down the operations and electrical power to the glovebox, when warranted by the FHA, provided this action does not create an additional hazard; and

• activate a local audible alarm (as a minimum) and, if high noise levels or other conditions warrant, cause a local visual alarm to be activated.

The designer and fire protection engineer should also evaluate gloveboxes equipped with inert gas purging systems to determine if:

• an emergency purge or pressure relief system should be installed; and

• the hazard justifies providing annunciation at a continuously staffed location.

NOTE: The designer must analyze the consequences of curtailing operations after an oxygen alarm and establish the procedure necessary to shut down and stabilize conditions in the glovebox following an alarm.

15-3.1.4 Oxygen Deficient Atmospheres. Where justified by the hazards analysis, equipment to continuously monitor oxygen levels should be provided for working areas of facilities which are or may be occupied by personnel and which are equipped with gioveboxes or glovehox lines having inerted or oxygen deficient atmospheres. This should include pit or below grade areas where glovebox inerting gases may concentrate.

15-$.2 Automatic Fire Suppression Systems. 15-3.2.1 System Types and Selection. Automatic sprinkler or

other approved fire suppression systems (foam water, dry chemical, dry powder, gaseous, water mist, etc.) should he provided for gloveboxes in which flammable/combustible liquids, oxidizers, or waste characterization operations are involved, except where an inerting system isprovided per this standard. All systems should be designed, installed, acceptance-tested, and maintained in accordance with the applicable NFPA standards (see Section 3.0).

The following considerations apply: • Limited water supply sprinkler systems may be used if criticality

is a potential (see Appendix H). • Gloveboxes should be provided with liquid runoff control if

automatic sprinkler protection is provided. • Restricted orifice sprinkler heads may be used.

• In designing the distribution system for dry chemical system, nozzles should be so oriented as to direct the discharge away from exhaust filters. This design step prevents direct loading of the filter by the dry chemical discharge.

• The extinguishing systems should sound local alarms and transmit remote alarms to a continuously attended location for the purpose of initiating emergency action.

Listed/approved "on-off" sprinklers may be used. 15-3.2.2 Design Considerations. In selecting the type of

automatic fire suppression system for installation in a giovebox under this standard, the designer should, as a minimum, consider the following:

• potential for criticality;

• potential for contamination spread;

• effectiveness of the fire extinguishing agent on the anticipated type of fire;

• impact of the fire extinguishing agent on HEPA filters;

• potential for overpressurizing the glovebox due to activation of the extinguishing system;

• anticipated changes in glovebox use or operations which will increase the level of fire hazard; and

• potential for inadvertent operation and the anticipated consequences.

15-3.2.3 Existing Halon Fire Suppression System. Existing halon fire suppression systems which protect gioveboxes may continue in service if all of the following criteria are met:

o The system is considered "essential" under Environmental Protection Agency regulations. (see also the Guidance of the DOE Facility Phaseout of Ozone-Depleting Substances, October 1995.)

* The glovebox is required to have an automatic fire suppression system.

o The system complies with NFPA Standard 12A.

• The system is designed for automatic operation. The detection method should be desi~__ed to prevent inadvertent operation. (The use of "deadman abort switches is acceptable.)

• Existing halou fire suppression systems which do not meet the above criteria should be replaced with a suitable automatic fire suppression system.

15-3.3 Multiple Hazard Gloveboxes. If a giovebox involves multiple hazards (such as pyrophoric metal and flammable/combustible liquids), the FHA should determine the fire protection system design that provides the best overall protection.

15-3.4 Special Hazards. Gloveboxes in which other special hazards are present (such as biohazards, medical or industrial toxins, flammable solids, water reactive materials, etc.) should be

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equipped with fire protect ion as de te rmined by the FHA. At a minimum, this pro tec t ion should consist o f an automatic fire detect ion system complying with NFPA Standard 72 and the guidelines in Section 15.5 of this standard.

15-3.5 Gloveboxes removed f rom Service. 15-3.5.1 Fire suppress;ion and inert ing systems are no t required to

be mainta ined in gloveboxes which are removed f rom service provided that the following provisions are met:

• All combustible materials are removed from the glovebox.

• Electrical power arm f lammable /combust ib le utilities are isolated and tagged "out-of-service."

• The glovebox is tagged "out-of-service." 15.$.5.2 Resumpt ion of activities within the glovebox should only

be allowed after appropriate fire pro tec t ion features have been reactivated on the basis of an updated FHA.

15-4 Manual Fire Suppression. 15-4.1 Manual Fire Fighting Protection Required for All

Gloveboxes. 15-4.1.1 All glovebox designs should include provisions for

manual fire fighting. The extinguishing agent(s) selected should be appropriate for the hazards.

15-4.1.2 Where the potential for metal fires is present, an appropriate fire extinguishing agent (e.g., magnesium oxide sand, copper metal powder 1'.30 - 60 mesh) , cargon microspheres) in sufficient quantity should be provides. (Refer to Appendix G for an illustration of a mount ing concept for a dry powder container.) In selecting the fire extinguishing agent consideration should be given to the ease at which the metal can be separated from the agent. This is particularly relevant in the case of plutonium.

15-4.1.3 Where the fire potential is f rom other (non-metal) combustibles, dry cheraicai extinguishers are r ecommended . CO 2 extinguishers may also be considered if class A combustibles are no t a hazard in the glovebox. If g rouped cables are present and water does not create the possibility of a criticality, then water should be used.

15-4.1.4 In selecting l~he type of manual fire extinguishing unit and the application of extinguishing agent within the glovebox, the designer should consider:

• the potential for glovebox overpressurization;

* the effect of fire extinguishing agent on filter; and

. the potential for increased contaminat ion spread. 15-4.2 Quick-Disconnect Couplings. 15-4.2.1 Where manual suppression is the primary fire

suppression method, for the glovebox., pre-pi ed dischar, e oints equipped with qmck-connect couphngs sho~c~ be provl~eedP~o facilitate the use of portable fire extinguishers. These couplings should be installed so that the extinguisher discharge is di rected away f rom the exhaust filtration. (Tests have shown that a single disconnect coupling supplied by a 5 lb. [2.25 kilograms] dry chemical extinguisher can cover approximately 18 square ft [1162 square meters] .) Details of a quick connect coupling are provided in Appendix F.

15-4.2.2 If access is a problem, extension tubes or pipes that extend to accessible areas should be used top rov ide coverage for areas where it is difl]cult to reach the quick disconnect couplings.

15-4.2.3 Fire extinguishers with bayonet-type connectors may be used when it is no t fe~Lsible to install quick-disconnect couplings. However, the designer should documen t the basis for no t installing quick-disconnect couplings in the design report .

15-5 Fire Detection Systems. Gloveboxes should be provided with an automatic fire detect ion system. (Refer to Appendix E for examples of glovebox :fire detect ion systems.) A separate detect ion system is no t required if the glovebox is equipped with an automatic fire suppression system that includes alarm features or an iner t ing system with alarm features.

15-5.1 The type of fire detect ion system to be used should be de te rmined based on the hazards associated with the glovebox and operational needs. Air flow patterns within the glovebox should be considered when selecting and locating devices.

15.5.2 Fire detect ion systems should be designed, installed, acceptance-tested, and mainta ined in accordance with the applicable NFPA Standards.

15-5.3 If used, spot-type heat detectors should be installed not more than 8 ft (2.4 meters) apart.

15-5.4 Heat detection-type systems should be provided with remote testing capabilities.

15-5.5 A means should be provided to safely perform required inspection, testing and maintenance on the fire detect ion system installed in the giovebox.

15-5.6 Detection systems should sound local alarms and transmit remote alarms to a continuously a t tended location to initiate emergency action.

15-6 Glovebox Ventilation. The criteria of this section are no t gloveboxes and glovebox

exhaust connections. For criteria for filter p lenums and ventilation systems beyond the gloveboxes, refer to Section 14 of this standard.

15-6.1 Ventilation Design to Include Fire Protect ion Factors. 15-6.1.1 Glovebox ventilation requi rements should be based, in

part, on the results o f the hazards analysis. Glovebox ventilation systems should be protec ted against the effects of fire.

15-6.1.2 Where feasible, glovebox ventilation should incorporate a downdraft design (that is, the ventilation inlet opening should be near the top of the box and the exhaust opening should be near the bot tom of the box). Studies have shown that downdraft construction is best f rom a fire protect ion viewpoint, and it should be used unless operational features dictate otherwise.

15-6.2 Exhaust Filters and Screens. Glovebox primary exhaust openings should be provided with prefilters and fire screens to reduce vapor mist and fire propagation. The fire screens should be stainless steel screens (8-16 mesh) or a perforated stainless steel plate using the same mesh opening sizes. The screens should be installed at the primary exhaust openings.

15-6.3 Flow rate Considerations. 15.6.3.1 Glovebox ventilation flow rates in gloveboxes having an

air a tmosphere and in which f lammable liquids or gases are used should be sufficient to prevent the a tmosphere from reaching 25 percent of the lower flammable limit of the material in use. Maintaining oxygen concentrat ions at or below 25 percent of the lower flammability limit provides a safety factor against equipment malfunctions, accidental leaks, etc., which could lead to increases in the glovebox oxygen concentration.

15-6.3.2 Where ho t plates or o ther heat sources are used in the glovebox, flow rates higher than that stipulated above may be required in order to prevent unacceptable overheating of the glovebox enclosure. Temperature increases which do not exceed 15 degrees above ambient room temperatures are, generally, acceptable.

15-6.4 Ventilation Exhaust. Exhaust air from gloveboxes containing f lammable or other hazardous a tmospheres should be discharged to the outdoors. Such emissions should comply with applicable Federal and State emissions requirements.

15-6.5 Ventilation Overpressure Protection. The designer should evaluate whether "dump valves" or o ther control equipment are required to prevent glovebox over-pressurization if the primary exhaust system fails, if there is a breach in the glovebox, internal pressurization or similar event occurs. Rapid changes in a tmospher ic condit ions may also result in over- or under- pressurization of the glovebox (see Appendix J).

15-6.6 Multi-Unit Exhaust Manifolds Forbidden. Glovebox exhaust ventilation lines should be des igned so each box has its own exhaust port. The purpose of this criterion is to prevent flame or hot fire gases from traveling from one glovebox to another through a common header or in terconnect ion arrangement .

15-6.7 Noncombust ib le Materials Required. Noncombust ible materials should be used for glovebox ventilation ducts regardless of duct type (rigid or flexible). Insulation materials used to wrap/cover ventilation ducts should also be of noncombust ib le material such as fiberglass.

Appendix E. Example Glovebox Fire Detection Systems.

This appendix provides examples of detect ion devices that may be useful for glovebox fire detect ion systems.

Figure 1 is a wiretype line heat and fire detector. The system uses two, individually encased actuators in a heat sensitive material. The actuators are twisted together to impose a spring pressure between them and then wrapped with a protective tape and f inished with an outer covering. A smal le lect r ic current passes continuously through the lines. At the critical or operating temperature, the heat sensitive jacket yields to the pressure and allows the actuators to contact each other, tr iggering the alarm.

Figure 2 shows a thermal detector. These may be purchased as f ixed-temperature or rate-compensated. Thermal detectors are also available for explosion-proof and weatherproof applications. For glovebox applications, thermal detectors with all-welded stainless steel shells should be used.

Figures 3 and 4 are examples of two design devices used for remote testing of standard, stem-type heat detectors moun ted in gloveboxes.

Tests were recently per formed for DOE's Rocky Fiats Environmental Technology Site to de termine what t ime lag would be exper ienced as a result of the heater and clamp assembly used

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N F P A 801 - - F97 R O C

for testing the detectors (Figure 3). In the tests, the unmodif ied, stem-type de tec tor had a response time index (RT1) of 40 and the modif ied uni t (with the heater and damp) had and RTI of 100. For the modif ied uni t to operate satisfactorily, the installation should be on an 8-ft (2.44-meter) spacing (rather than l l - foo t [3.36-meter] spacing as permi t ted for the unmodif ied unit). The unit shown in lvigure 4 has no t been tested.

Figure 5 illustrates a ~ e l l - t y p e " temperature detector. Note that this is no t considered a "fire d e t e c t o r " i n the conventional sense, a l though it is credi ted unde r certain circumstances with a fire warning capability.

F'~,ure 1.

Magnum UL Urea 8paclng b ~0'x 50

lho rr~nol i~eck~s am cmlgn~l kx um ~ ~ asalm~ tim o~nn t~tm~..It~ (: le~ecla.e~nt In ol mo~Ws b ~I/m~odng anw (Xomanon. lho deC~lcm M~cc~" can ~ umd ~¢rn on~ ~m a~m c~u~ @ ccq ~ ~no o~n ci~u~ n~c~ ~ ~S~ un~ the ~ rmx:lels o~ '~mbh~ Mlt~ ~ads ~ough o r ~ c I/2 Inch NPI hub that m Irdo o ~ancla~ ~n0~oo( Imclon l:ox c o ~ the tt~l b e~cw¢ ooa~cl and o ~ mmg reeW~n~ to co~m~ mnoa~m~ Ck]l~god models om UL llsled ~x c l ~ L 9,OUl~ C and O, clam I, g~OUlOS F.. F and G Mmn Imlalm fn o i n a exi:lo~on i~o~' lunctlon box. nm ~ models mouk:l hal be Imlalod In ouldoor ~ olhor wst ~

, i,, ,_

F~gure 2.

E " .~mom ~anO um~x A~nao ~ - ngum 3

, ' r

Baml~to

Heat.Daoc~r

~pe Elm,mr

Hoar De~ckx .~r r4o ly & i'~slalagon

2-3/16"

~-am'r 0 "' lc~ ~ - ~ J, I " ~ , Id-11~

~ " 1 1 / 1 6 ° D l a ,

\,.\ \ 4-1/4" "3/32" 131o.

2Ho/ Do0cCo~r ~

F~xure 3.

132

NFPA 801 - - F97 ROC

Appendix E

m ~ ~sc:mu~ ,--...O-Igr, g 7 f f ,l~'r--.~nrm~m

_ / / . . . . . . 7 / , /11 ./~"--:~

C o t ~ m , l ~ copses.

_ - . _ ! F -

Gk~aggoxOvofog~Doq~lotg~to~onDgtol

Figure 4.

4 • 11/16" Sek~am x 2 . llg" ~

r ~

1/2" CerO.~ -.--.-,~ ~ 3/~" ~W~lm sme

T ' N / :1 II ~ / - - - ~ d ~ . , -

~ or c - ~ - - 7/8' F.lde

SlolHat ~ Woa Nooel

P~,se I

"Vnmo¢l O.D.

~ d o Face of

POam2

F ' tgure 1 a n d 2.

A~nd~ G

I:~'ray (oe" Um In GR~cOome ~ m , tt~ Potent~ ~ ' M ~ I F4ms F.x~

F i g u r e 5. Figure G.

133

N F P A 801 - - F9 7 R O C

Appendix H. Limited Water Sprinkler Design

This design is one method that may be used to provide limited water supply automatic sprinkler ~rotectlon for gloveboxes. As an assembly, the design is not "listed or "approved," but the individual components are all listed for fire protection application. Use of this system should be approved by the DOE Authority Having Jurisdiction.

The system consists of pressurized-water portable fire extinguishers (with the number varying depending on criticality requirements) piped to a common manifold and then to the discharge point. A lowpressure switch activates a fire alarm when the system discharges. Restricted orifice sprinkler heads are used and a fill port is provided for charging the system.

Appendix 1. Glovebox Window Material Comparison

Windows can be the most challenging part of glovebox designs. It is often hard to find a material that satisfies operational requirements and the fire protection and atmosphere compatibility criteria. This chart was developed by Factory Mutual Research Corporation with information from other sources (a few changes were made to the chart such as trade names were relabeled using the material's chemical name). Materials were rated in terms of how well they preformed in the areas listed in the left column; materials were judged to be excellent, good, fair, medium, poor, or to have no capability for that criterion. A newer material (developed after these tests), that may be useful as a window material, is fire-rated glass. Note that these are for information

~ urposes only. Window design requirements are provided in ection 4 of this standard.

Wired glass is strongly recommended for all windows, where visibility through the wire layer is tolerable. Otherwise, laminated safety glass (from sheet or plate stock) is recommended. Where hydrofluoric acid exposure is serious, where workability of the window material is important, or where the fire hazard is considered not serious, a polycarbonate is recommended.

H ]

= - x - T . V..,' / g I

, [ ] U

/ I... I I I I I ~ J /

~lev'atk~n- Notta ~ t ~

O~l~ ~" 162" NPTx lt4" ~

,- 1~ t~t~ ~rt lulttm ~1 / - l W Nrtx ~4"

~ U "-- air coo~ ~

pllm : l~l tO ~lllo

Figure 1, 2 a nd 5.

Testing Areas Glasses

Optics Combustibility exc.

Laminated Tempered Wired PMMA x ext. exc fair exc~

~ o n e none poor

Plastics

PMMA SE-3 ADC ~ exc. exc. fair fair

P.C. S

good fmr

b I I I *~.t m i g t ,~ . ' t k't ~. t * t i t ~ t | .bDXl 4[tltI! ~lml*Iv ~ l * X t l v m ~[tItI! ~i~ t

lil I [ i.I I l l [ ~ I ~ ' ~ I.*'( i~, 111 [ l i l i m i.~O ~ - q{~:-- qt'~t ~ ' I | I * I* ~.'~| l t I * I I :X*II i,

3 ~ ,ql ilt' ,1,I,I ~ ,ImI*] "h'~ l'. ~'I*:; ~ ~'~ I :~*I,.

~ B ~ h ~ , ,l,m ~ l , l , m ?i~ --:oi,i, ~,i,i, ..ox.v

Notes: 1 Polymethylmethacrylate ~Allyl diglycal carbonate SPolycarbonate 4Except to hydrofluoric acid 5If non-browning glass (cerium added)

134

NFPA 801 - - F97 ROC

AppendixJ . Glovebox Overpressure Protection Valves

These diagrams demonstrate the basic operating principles of dump/re l ie f valves. These valves may be useful in avoiding

~ ovebox pressurization and maintaining exhaust ventilation. The ocky Flats Environmental TechnologySite has used these valves in

their glovebox lines for this purpose.

AOpo~lx J

Flgm~ ~ Ple~z g:]omm~ (PIk~ O~on)

Peeillvo Pmmmum l~mlml l~Nillvo ISmMun; Rohf

. ~ p ~ u n m ~ t ~ b ~ o m d~h. a / n y a w amL ~ ~ p ~ ~ m l n m t l a ~ a o ~ a m ~ t m j m

IIm~ I~ un~mt~ anm ~ l ~ mWa ~

~ ar~l tno mine e.am~ ammmnmm t~

• 11~ eoR pilot ~ i , Mid ~ o ~ d dudnO I ~ m ~ t~e i~ mpeno ioed m 9 n ~ Im Ul~a~M fo~ mcSnO ~ IM emmm

I m W w ~ l m m ~ m d l ~ a a m ~ l ~ I ~ t ~ n g ~ d . t ~ I ~ t aeat Bta ~ a ~ m a m d l m m mo ~o t Na~ hm.

* TM e t n / l ~ ~ t ~ a ~ a ~ m m ~ m u m a a m m t m d m ~ a la ~ t~amammm d N

. l"ds i ~ m m ~ l u t ~ n cmel~ a WOe mt

(mam*m ~q~m ab

~ u n t $ ~ . r i d ~ P , ~ e v , . P , , m m . n d ~

k ~ / R h d ,d.- k.4 k ~ o ~dua lm la immwo m W . ' ~ n ~ 4 q m p . Flew k'voqll~ lira main ~ m em~lnum unell e)~lnm p~mmm ~ N m m d u ~ l m o u ~ m Ir, a ~mm #mn~ Imemmlm m emmm m m~ ~mg~ mmmt~mmmIL

• .,v -..- p k ~ ~ ~a~. Ihe ~ ,- .* p m ~ , m ~ ~ e,* Vka,al~m a4mlm~.adr~* d e o ~ a ~

• 1~o mine mvlb, i ~ m u m i n n k ~ m m o W . , . . ,~ la ,m a o m ~ l ~lmla0 , d , "

• Wah ~ ~ m m a , ~ ;he j q ~ n m4a I M 4omo ~ mg gw meln ~ k ~ u M ~oow. lemmwm miam Io l lmm m m m in ~gm~ 1.

~ ' ~ m ~ Ihe ~ mVng IV~e ,m 1he ~

immure ~ ecme me v a ~ l e Immdmm a4uoma~ odeoe. ~ m a ~ o4F~ a4mmmm

Ha

~ 4

vmwummwf wpmmm m Nmdy w~ mmm m pmlllw pmmum mlld ~--lelmm

• A emfnO lamJlm mlllINId ~ lamclmo lhe IMIm a--~ ~ vdlh a I ~ Cpwlwllm lhe k~ i ~ umwlke NeL

• In lhe~ oonmow~ mmmpimle imomm m ~ h ~ N d k i ~ H a ~ b ~ I N K ~ i m N

• ~ .,., ~ ate, ,,,tdve ~ ~ s'~ aome ~ ~ m i m e t , e m vemmp..

• ~ i ~ ~

. ~ p, ,~.m. ~ l ~ ~ , ~ m ~ am vowdmm ~ m n d time ~ l ~ C l o M o ~ w ~ w k ~ ,

Figure $ and 4.

F'tgure I and 2.

Appendix FL Glovebox Fire Protection Survey

This table shows the results of a survey taken of various DOE sites to determine where gloveboxes were in use and what type of fire protection was provided.

Site Inhalation Toxicology

Research Institute Pantex Pleat

Mound Plant

Kansas City Plant

Los Aiamos National Laborator¢

Pinellas Hant Sandia National

Laboratories, Albuquerque Sandia National

Laboratories, Livermore Uranium Mill "Failings Remedial Action Site

Waste Isolation Pilot Plant Rocky Fiats Environmental

Technology Site

AMES Laboratoly

Glovebox Use Radiological and

toxicolohdcal Pu, lasers and explosive

components Tritium, Pu, and U

Calcium Chloride?

PU and chemical

Radiolo#cal Radiological and chemical

Tritium and U

None

Freon decon unit (mobile) Pu, beryllium, Pu waste and

low-level waste material

Pu and chemical

Window Material Glass and polycarbonate

Polycarbonate

Safety pla e glass, a few with po ~carbonate

Don' t know

Wire glass and safety glass

Polycarbonate Not sure

Glass

NA

Plastic Lead glass, wire glass &

some polycarbonate

Wire Glass, PMMA'

Fire P ro t . / I n box / Some with halon

N~ purge

Tritium-N~ purge Pu & U-haion

N~ purge, but not installed for fire protection

Pu-inert, dry air & A.S. or detection. Chemical - A.S. No protection No protection

Tritium-purge during experiment, H.D. U- no protection

NA

No protection Pu-N~/Ar purge, H.D. beryllium- H.D. Pu waste- dry chemical Low-level waste

mater.- A.S. No protection

135

N F P A 801 - - F9 7 R O C

Site Argonne National

Laborator),-East

~ onne National borator~-West

Brookhaven National Laborator)~

Environmental Measurements Laboratory

Fermi National Accelerator Massachusetts Institute of

Techno lo~ Ohio University

Princeton Plasma Physics Laboratory

Rensselaer Pol~tech. Institute Solar Energy Research

Institute University of Notre dame

University of Utah Washington University

Yale University Morgantown Energy Technoloh~,¢ Center Pittsburgh Energy

Technolos~ / Center EG&G-Idaho

Mse, Inc.

Glovebox Use Radiological and chemical

Pu, radiologicai and waste characterization

Low radiological and biological

Chemical/toxicological ~box made of fiberglass)

Lithium, no longer in use. Chemical, pyrophoric

materials and biolol~ical None

Sandblasting (very small, portable) Biolop[ical

Lithium and sodium

Chemical Radiolo~ical

Chemical Radiolosical

Toxic chemicals

Chemical and toxicological

window Material Plastic

Safety glass & plastic

Glass and polycarbonate

Safety glass

NA Polycarbonate, PMMA &

safety ~lass NA

Plastic

Pol},carbonate Plastic

Plastic Plastic

Safety ~lass Not sure

Plastic

Not sure

Fire Prot.Qn box 1 COp

Pu- Ar purge others- H.D.

No Protection

No protection

N~ pur~e when operatin~ Pyrophoric mater.- Ar or N~ purge

Others- no protection NA

No protection

No protection As-purge

N? purge No protection AS or N? pur~e No protection No protection

No protection

None NA NA None NA NA

Glovebox Use Window Material Site Rockwell-Idaho

Westin~house-ldaho West Valley Demonstration

Project UNC ~eotech

WEC Bettis Atomic Power Laboratory

Portsmouth Gaseous Diffusion Plant

K-25, Oak Ridge Oak Ridge National

Laboratory Paducah Gaseous Diffusion

Plant Y-12, Oak Ridge

Fernald Environmental Manal~ement Project

Re)tnoids GE-Vallecitos

Rockwell - Cano~ra Park, CA Stanford

Berkeley

LLNL

None U

Radiological and chemical

None Radiological, chemical and

U U oxide and U hexafluoride

None Radiological and chemical

Radiological and Chemical (not in use)

U, lithium, and beryllium

None

None None

Chemical None

Radiological

Radiological and biomedical

NA Glass and plastic

Not sure-probably glass

Fire Prot./in box) NA

H.D. No protection

NA NA Lead glass COp

Polycarbonate and PMMA No protection

NA Glass and PMMA

NA A.S. (limited water)

Plastic? No protection

Polycarbonate & PMMA

NA

NA NA

PMMA NA

PMMA & lead glass (boxes are made of )lywood or

fiberl~l ass) Wire glass, safety glass &

polycarbonate

U-At purge, H.D. activte. Lithium/beryll.- N 2 purge NOTE: 1 classified box has/LS, with a purl~e

NA

NA NA

No protection NA

No protection

Radiological- inert some with H.D.

Site University of CA. (LA.)

University of CA. (SAN.) Savannah River Site

Hartford Site

GIovebox Use Tritium carcinosens

Ionization Radiological and a few

biolo}~ical Pu, Pu Waste,U, chemical,

and neptunium

Window Materials Plastic

Lead ~lass Fire-rated glass & PMMA

Polycarbonate. wire glass, safety glass, PMMA

Fire Prot./in box / No protection No protection

Halon

Pu- MgOp sand, halon Pu waste- A.S. (limited water) or dry chemical

Neptunium-H.D. U- H.D. or halon chemical- A.S. (limited water) or H.D.

1 Polymethalmethacrylate NOTE: When halon is discharged in gloveboxes with combustible metals such as plutonium, the halon is not intended to extinguish a metal fire but rather to extinguish or prevent ignition of adjacent combustible materials that may also be present. PTrademark of E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Company.

136

N F P A 801 - - F 9 7 R O C

SUBSTANTIATION: DOE has completed 3 years work developing guidelines on fire protection for gloveboxes. NFPA 801 can benefit from this work. COMMITTEE ACTION: Reject. COMMITTEE STATEMENT: As written, this comment was too

ecific to DOE facilities. The Committee has not seen the entire cument and did not have time to fully examine the comment.

The Committee did feel the information is worthwhile and suggest the submitter petition the NFPA to develop a new standard on this subject. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #8) 801- 23 - (A-2-3(14)): Accept in Principle SUBMITTER: Oaig P, Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following from A-2.3:

yZ?ZITyZV X-Z/;y~L2"..ZS 32" ~fi3".'L'Z ".. ZLW~Z.~fiW2-Z_TZZ:_

SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed standard contains acceptance test requirements that are already discussed in the system design standards (e.g., NFPA 13, NFPA 20, NFPA 24, NFPA 79 etc.). The fire hazards analysis should focus on identifying and evaluating fire hazards, as well as thoroughly discussing how those hazards are managed by engineering and administrative controls. System acceptance tests, while very critical to the success of the fire protection program, are not substantially relevant to the process for preparing a fire hazards analysis. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept in Principle.

[ Delete the first sentence and revise the second sentence of A-2- [ 3(14) as follows: "Evaluate the inspection, testing and maintenance ] needed to maintain fire protection systems integrity considering the i effects of radiation."

COMMITTEE STATEMENT: System integrity is important even in areas of radiation and this should be kept in mind. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:

AFFIRMATIVE: 26 NOT RETURNED: ,t Hill, Salley, Tell, Underwood

Z.~2CZ.~'Z727Z."'2~':Zti~L~,~.T',~2f T"7. Y.Y..'Z'Z;22-2Y-Y.L.~ 72~ . . . . . l g . . . . . . / . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 " . . . . . . . . . 1 " . . . . . . . . . 1 " " ~ O . . . . . . .

~ c =Femti==.g f~e'!'-3". SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed Item (16) is too subjective with respect to personnel qualifications. While the fire hazards analysis should be prepared by aqualif ied fire protection engineer, the evaluation of personnel qualifications are not substantially relevant to the process for preparing a fire bazards analysis. The fire hazards analysis should focus on identifying and evaluating fire hazards, ff the committee believes that personnel qualifications are critical, then perhaps Section 2-3 should be revised to identify specific qualifications for the individual performing the fire hazards analysis. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITIT.E ACTION:


(Log #6) 801- 26 - (A-2-3(7)): Accept SUBMITTER: Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENTON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following from A-2.3:

x'/ . . . . . . . . . . . " l . . . . . . . . ~ . . . . ! ~ " t " . . . . . . . . . .

* ~ - - ^ : - - . - : - - - - - - l : - - I . I - - ^ 1 ^ ~ . ~ ^ * ^ ^ ~ : . . . . . 4 . . . . . . . . . : . . . . . . ^ ~ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . , . . . . . [ " V . . . . . . . . I . . . . . ~ "

SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed Item (7) is too subjective with respect to personnel qualifications. Personnel qualifications and testing frequendes are not substantially relevant to the process for prepanng a fire hazards analysis. The fire hazards analysis should focus on identifying and evaluating fire hazards. Also, NFPA 25 and 72 already cite the periodic inspection and maintenance frequencies for systems, ff the committee believes that personnel qualifications are critical, then perhaps Section 2-5 should be revised to identify specific qualifications above and beyond those already cited in other NFPA standards. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #9) 801- 24- (A-2-3(15)): Accept SUBMITTER: Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following from A-2.3:

7_'Z ": -g-" 2"L 732" "r3 "Z:;~ j 2 y2Z~.~';;?-.k"A2~'273~yyT.yZ2"~'~.p_

i . . . . 0 . . . . . 0 - " I L l l ~ . . . . . . . . . . . O . . . . . . ; ~ r . . . . . . .

SUBSTANTIATION: The proposed Sections 2-8.3 and A-2-7. e reference NFPA 1500 and OSHA 1910.155. These documents already provide specific requirements for firefighter competency. The fire hazards analysis should focus on identifying and evaluating fire hazards. The issues discussed under item (15) are not substantially relevant to the process for preparing a fire hazards analysis. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITrEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


801- 95 - (A-2-3(16)): Accept SUBMITFER: Craig l,. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-9

[ RECOMMENDATION: Delete the following from A-2.3:

(Log #7)

(Log #CC4) 801- 27 - (A-2-3.2): Accept SUBMITTER: Technical Committee on Az,,i~.~c Eu~.gOv COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2

I RECOMMENDATION: Revise to read as follows: F~ThAe.,,~. Fire Risk Analysis should be considered to supplement the

SUBSTANTIATION: A fire risk analysis is a valuable tool in assisting the fire protection engineer. A fire risk analysis will quantify the fire hazards. C O M M r r r E E ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMrrTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 3() VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #10) 801- 28 - (A-2-4(0 and Figure A-2-4(f) ): Accept S U B M I ~ Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENTON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2 RECOMMENDATION: Delete Figure A-2-4(f) Sample fire report, and change the following in Section A-2-4(f):

A-2-4(f) P.-~er ~c .~g~'re A 2 a(.~. See f:g'.:'re =.~.e:;~ c:= p~ge ~ 9 . See NFPA 902M. Fire Reoortin~ Field Incident Manual. SUBSTANTIATION: The NFPA 902M manual provides a more thorough and consistent method of reporting fire losses than is described in the proposed text. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept.

Note: Add the reference to NFPA 902 to A-2-4(f). "For further information, refer to NFPA 901, Standard Classifications for

137

N F P A 8 0 1 m F9 7 R O C

Incident Reporting and Fire Protection Data and NFPA 902, Fire Reporting Field Incident Guide." NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. Editorial, the correct reference is 29 CFR 1910.38. Also in A-2-

7(e) the correct reference is 29 CFR 1910.156 NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


(Log #5) 801- 29- (A-2-7): Accept SUBMITTER: Craig P. Christenson, U.S. Dept. of Energy, Richland Operations COMMENTON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2

I RECOMMENDATION: Add the following text to A-2-7: A-2-70SHA 1910.$8 should be consulted for additional

information. SUBSTANTIATION: 29 CFR 1910 should be referenced in A-2-7, since the proposed document contains additional requirements that are pert inent to an Emergency Action Plan.

(Log #1) 801- 30- (C-1-2.3): Accept SURMITTER: Stanford E. Davis, PA Power & Light Co. COMMENT ON PROPOSAL NO: 801-2

[ RECOMMENDATION: Delete reference C-1.2.3. SUBSTANTIATION: The reference is not used within the standard. COMMITTEE ACTION: Accept. NUMBER OF COMMITTEE MEMBERS ELIGIBLE TO VOTE: 30 VOTE ON COMMITTEE ACTION:


138

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