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A ;REPORT ON ITS RGNZATION AND FUNCTION

BASED ON. GERMAN.' NAVAL STAFF: DOCUMENTS

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JO0INT COMMAND

A REPORT ON ITS ORGANIZATION AND FUNCTION

BASED ON GERMAN NAVAL STAFF DOCUMENTS

SummaryJoint Command 1919 to 1938Memorandum by General v. Brauchitsch on Joint Command,1938Counter Proposal by Admiral RaederMemorandum by the Chief of Staff, Armed Forces High Command,1938Hitler's Directive on Joint Command Organization and Function.Examples of Joint Command Organization in World War II

a. Authority and Responsibility on International Levelb. Joint Command in the Mediterraneanc. Joint Command in Occupied Territoriesd. Joint Command on a Divisional Level

Pg. 1Pg. 1Pg. 3Pg.11Pg.12Pg.13Pg.15Pg.15Pg.16

Pg.17Pg.18

Chart I:Chart II:Chart III:Chart IV:Chart V:

"Armed Forces Office", outlined by General Keitel 1937"Armed Forces High Command", outlined by Gen. Keitel 1938"Kriegsspitzengliederung" proposed by Gen. von Brauchitsch"Kriegsspitzengliederung" proposed by Admiral Raeder"Armed Forces High Command" (OKW); Organization as of 1941

DIVISION OF NAVAL INTELLIGENCEOP 23-E

1 July 1946

54293

I.II.III.IV.V.VI.VII.

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GERMAN DOCUMENTS RELATING TO THE PROBLEM OFJOINT COMMAND ("KRIEGSSPITZENGLIEDERUNG")

(1) The German Army, Navy, and Air Force entered World War II undera Supreme Commander (Hitler) and "Armed Forces High Command ("OKW").This joint command was not the result of an over-all legislation butof a gradual development and remained subject to modifications infunction and authority at all times. It was based on a Hitlerdirective of 13 June 1938.

This directive was the outcome of a discussion which started when inFebruary 1938 Adolf Hitler took over "direct and personal command ofall armed forces" and at the same time set up the "Armed Forces HighCommand" (OKW). This new office was sharply attacked by the C-in-C,Army, General von Brauchitsch in a memorandum on "The Organization ofthe Armed Forces". Comments to this memorandum were submitted by theC-in-C, Navy, Admiral Raeder and by the Chief of the "OKW", GeneralKeitel. Adolf Hitler ended the discussion by issuing the abovementioned directive.

The following gives a translation of several documents from the filesof the German Naval Staff, related to this development.

A summary of documents detailing preliminary developments is givenunder (II).

The memorandum by General von Brauchitsch is given under (III).

A summary of the counter-proposal made by the Commander in Chief,

Navy, Admiral Raeder is given under (IV),

The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command, General Keitel, set forthhis answer to the Army and Navy High Command criticism and suggestionsin a memorandum dated 26 April 1938, Its principles are given under (V).

Hitler's directive of 13 June 1938 is given under (VI).

Documents illustrating the function of joint armed forces organizationin four specific cases during World War II are given under (VII):

Appendix I gives an organization of the German "Armed Forces Staff",in 1937, the predecessor to the "OKW" ,

Appendix II gives a chart drawn up by General Keitel in March 1938and outlining the functions of the "OKW", as he saw it.

Appendix III gives the organization of the "Kriegsspitzengleiderung"(Joint Command) as proposed by General Brauchitsch in his memorandumof March 1938.

Appendix IV gives the organization of the "Kriegsspitzengliederung"as suggested in the counter proposal by Admiral Raeder.

Appendix V gives a chart of the German Armed Forces High Command ("OKW")as it functioned in September 1941.

(II) Developments up to February 1938

1. Article 47 of the Weimar Constitution stated: "The ReichPresident holds the Command over all armed forces". The Defense Lawof 23 March 1921 declared: "The Reich President is the Commander inChief ("Oberbefehlshaber") of all armed forces ("Wehrmacht").

As central authority for Army and Navy the Republic, established theReich Ministry of Defense ("RWM"). Under the authority of the RWMcommand was exercised for the Navy by the Chief of Naval Command("Chef der Marineleitung") and for the Army by the Chief of the ArmyCommand ("Chef der Heeresleitung")

2.. In 1934 an "Armed Forces Office" ("Wehrmachtsamt") was setup under the Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, 1l "with allgeneral questions of equipment and warn~ ', .* Keitel wasnamed as chief of this off j 1

54293

3. Article 3,1, of the Defense Law of 21 May 1935 stated:"Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces ("Oberster Defehlshaber derWehrmacht") is the Fuehrer. Under his authority the Reich Ministerof War exercises the command over the Armed Forces". By this law,which proclaimed general conscription, the name of the Reich DefenseMinistry was changed into Reich War Ministry. The Chiefs of theArmy and Navy Command became "Commander in Chief" of their respectivearms. The air force, secretly organized since 1933, was officiallyestablished but remainedlunder the jurisdiction of the Reich Minister

for Air, Goering, who became simultaeously Commander in Chief, Air.

4. By 1 November 1935 extension of the functions of the "ArmedForces Office" (see 2) was announced in a "Directive for the Co-

ordination of all preparations for the National Defense", by the Reich

War Minister and Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, General von Blom-

berg. It stated:

"1. In accord with the orders of the Fuehrer and ReichChancellor, the national defense is prepared by:

a, the Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief of

the Armed Forces who is responsible for:

the armed forces, the armament industry, and all

activities of the top-level government offices which do not operate

under the authority of the "Deputy General for the War Industry"

("Generalbevollmaechtigte fuer die Kriegswirtschaft"-Goering):

b. the Deputy General for the War Industry is re-

sponsible for:

all those fields which fall under his jurisdiction

according to the Reich Defense Law and the (secret) government

directive of 21 May 1935.

"2. The Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief of the

Armed-Forces is responsible for the coordination of all national

defense efforts of all government agencies concerned. This coordi-

nation is administered by the "Reich Defense Committee" ("Reich-

sverteidigungsausschuss").

"The Reich Defense Committee consists of:

a. The representatives of the Armed Forces in accord

with the orders of the Reich Minister of War and

Commander in Chief, Armed Forces;

b. the representatives of the Deputy General for War

Industry;

c. representatives of all government offices concerned

with national defense.

"The Chief of the "Armed Forces Office" ("Wehrmachtsamt"-see

(2) is the Chairman of the Reich Defense Committee as permanent re-

presentative of the Reich War Minister and Commander in Chief, Armed

Forces, Deputy to the Chairman and responsible for all current

business is the Chief of the Section "National Defense" ("Landesver-

teidigung") of the Armed Forces Office. All military authorities

responsible for the national defense have to submit reports to the

Chief of the Armed Forces Office".

5. On 1 August 1937 the Chief of the "Armed Forces Office",

Gen. Keitel, sent a memorandum to the Personnel Offices of Army, Navy,

and Air Force, in which he reported on a planned reorganization in the

"Armed Forces Office". The memorandum stated in part:

"On the basis of the experiences gained so far, the Field

Marshall (Reich War Minister v. Blomberg) has decided to review the

Armed Forces joint command ("Kriegsspitzengliederung") so as to give

it definite form. This has resulted in a decision to continue with

the following policies:

"The present Armed Forces Office ("Wehrmadhtsamt") will gra-

dually be developecd a nr "Wehrmachtsstab").

.. .i ' ̂ ̂ ^,, 1 ' M-2- sS '~,-i o "' 54295

The Armed Forces StakMI iLred P7 to matters of basic and mutual

character and it will become an administrative authority for the

Armed Forces ("Federfuehrung der Wehrmacht").

"The Armed Forces Staff will have to be reorganized. At

present too many sections depend directly on the Chief. This will be

eliminated by forming the sections into several groups. There will

be the following departments:

a. Armed Forces Operational Department ("Wehrmachts-

Fuehrung"), composed of the sections National Defense,

Secretary of the National Defense Council, Foreign Countries,

Inspector of Armed Forces Communications, Intelligence

("Abwehr" ).

b, Armed Forces General Department, composed of the

sections Inland, Law, Supply, Budget, and Administration;

c. War Economy".

Attached to this memorandum was a chart (Appendix I) which

showed the "Armed Forces Office" as Chief of Staff of the

Armed Forces" under the immediate authority of the Reich War

Minister.

6. On February 1938, Adolf Hitler, having dismissed the Reich Minister

of War and Commanderin Chief of the Armed Forces, General von Blomberg,

issued a directive which stated: "The Command over all armed forces

henceforth is exercised by me directly and personally". In taking

over the function of Reich Minister of War, Hitler changed this

ministry into the "Armed Forces High Command" ("OKW"). The Chief of

the "Armed Forces Staff" Gen. Keitel was made Chief of Staff of this

new "Armed Forces High Command".

The creation of this joint command office for all German armed forces

was opposed immediately by the Commander in Chief, Army, and the

Commander in-Chief, Navy.

III The Memorandum by General von Brauchitsch on "The Organization of the

Armed Forces"

A detailed memorandum stating the view of the Army High Command with

regard to the newly created "Armed Forces High Command" was sent by

General von Brauchitsch to General Keitel on 7 March, 1938. The

memorandum was accompanied by an organization chart (Appendix III),

and by a letter to General Keitel which stated: "The Commander in

Chief, Army, requests a conference in this subject at convenience. He

intends afterwards to take up this matter with the Fuehrer personally".

The Brauchitsch memorandum reads as follows:

1. Background of the Problem.

"Every state is facing today the problem of how to organize

a joint command for its armed forces.

"As long as this was only a question of the right person,

the problem of a supreme command for time of war was of no great im-

portance. The King-Warlord was either capable of handling all

problems involved personally, or, if he did not feel qualified to be

his own supreme warlord, he was able to choose a supreme commander

from his generals. Frederick the Great and Napoleon are outstanding

examples for the first method. History knows only few examples in

which the second method was tried successfully.

"With the beginning of the 19th century, warfare developed

a complexity where even a genius was no longer able to survey the

whole political and military field in detail, and to direct the state

while commanding the army. Now it became a question whether the

political or the military Chief should direct affairs, and a new form

of state leadership developed, For this period which ended with World

War I, history knows only of one fully satisfactory case: the conduct

of the wars of 1866 and 1870. Only in this one case Povidoleace gav

the state at one and the same time a:political and a. military genius(Bismarck and Moltke) and put over both these men a true sovereignwho built up his own army and whose authority was strong enough tolead the military as well as the political genius. Thus he was ableto balance the political and the military leadership.

"Today, this problem of balance between political and militaryleadership no longer exists, at least not in those state's which aregoverned on an authoritarian basis.. However, following the firstWorld War f, new problems of military leadership developed.

"With the growth of the air force from a new weapon of the armyinto a new branch of the Armed Forces, the question of armed forcesleadership arose. Never before has this problem existed in a similarmanner, since the other two branches, Army and Navy, have at alltimes operated in theaters separated from each other.

"This problem of a joint leadership for the armed forces is onlyone of the new developments. Side by side with it ranges the problemof the "Organization of the Fighting Nation" which arose when it be-came evident that for the successful conduct of the war it is notsufficient to organize an army, navy, and air force, but that it isof equal importance to reach and organize all the energies of the

whole nation.

"In summing up, the present need for the organization of a jointcommand of all armed forces developed from the following two factors:

a. Today, not only the armed forces participate in war, but

it is the strength of the whole nation which must be mobilized.

b. The air force has developed into a fully-grown third

branch of the armed Forces.

2. The presentGertan solutiot-.

"With the creation of an Armed Forces High Command ("Oberkommando

der Wehrmacht") whose chief is the Supreme Commander of the Armed

Forces ("Oberster Befehlshaber der Wehrmacht") and at the same time

Minister of War ("Reichskriegsminister"), Germany chose the theoreti-

cally.. most advanced methods.

"However, this Armed Forces High Command has by no means worked

smoothly. On the contrary, whenever a military problem of over-all

leadership arose, friction developed, especially between the Armed

Forces and the Army Commands. There can be no doubt that in the event

of war considerable difficulties would develop in the field command.

In this connection it must be pointed out that the past frictions were

not caused by personal differences nor by an inclination on the part

of the branches of the army to oppose as something new the creation

of an armed forces command.

"The branches of the armed forces have at all times accepted the

concept of the consolidation of all military command in the hands of

one Supreme Commander as sound and logical. Whether this Supreme

Commander should be the -Minister .of War, a Generalissimo, or the Chief

of State himself will depend on the actual personality and on the

given political situation. In any event, from the military point of

view the most favorable solution is represented by a unified. armed

forces command which is closely linked to the political authority of

the state.

"Therefore, the friction can not have resulted from the organ-

ization of a Supreme Command ("Oberste Spitze") but only from the

organization of a Supreme Command Department (Spitzenbehoeade").

"The experience of the past years has proven:

"l. It is not practical to combine in time of war the militaryleadership with the organization of the national defense in all fields

of the national life.

"Both the military command of the war andthe\iQrganization of

the Fighting Nation" are func tis vhi(or i. veryieat amount of

responsibility and effor i \ chief oofe carry out these

54295

two duties simu1ta2 'sly without osi4 l the over-all view orthe necessary knowledge of the detailslii d,

"2. Notwithstanding the full equality of the three branches ofthe armed forces it is nevertheless one branch which in everycountry must play the decisive role to assure final victory. Thecommand of this one branch must not be divided from the over-allcommand.

"3. It is not possible to keep the three branches of the ArmedForces under the command of fully responsibly Commanders in Chief, ifabove these Commanders in Chief there is created not only a SupremeCommander, but also a Supreme Command Department.

"To 1,

"It is sound to unite on the highest level all command in theperson of the Supreme Commander to whom all most essential problemsare submitted for decision. Yet it is impossible to combine all thework in one department under the responsibility of one department chief.To understand this one has only to look at the multitude of.functionsand at the amount of responsibility with which the Armed Forces HighCommand is faced today.

"Formerly, military command was the only task andissue. Today,the armed forces command is responsible for two entirely differentfunctions:

"(a). The strategic direction of armed forces operations:.

"(b). The organization of the war; that is the mobilizationof the full strength of the state as to create a "Fighting Nation".,Formerly, the only decisive factor was - or at least appeared to be-the command in the field. Today the organization of the war on thehomefront is obviously of at least equal importance.

"One. underestimates grossly the task of the Armed Forces Commandif one believes that in time of war one department could handle theorganization of the war, of the "Fighting Nation", and the overallcommand of the war.

"The Supreme Commander who iS dealing only with decisions oftop-level importance, may very well be one person. But never can theorganization of the war and the command of the war be united in thehands of one department and one department chief, There is no oneoffice and no one man capable of mastering these two fields with alltheir details to the requisite extent. It is impossible to organizewith the one hand the "Fighting Nation" and.to make strategy as asideline with the other - or vice versa. Such an experiment wouldlead only to results whereby the chief of the department overcome withthe countless details of the manifold fields, either will lose theover-all view, or will be forced to rely upon the judgment of his sub-ordinates to an extent not in accord with his responsibility.

"Accordingly, under the authority of the Supreme Commander, histwo functions should be divided into the Organization of the Fighting.Nation, and the over-all command of the Armed Forces.

'For the first task a War Secretary ("Reichskriegs-Sekretaer") isneeded, for the second a Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander("Reichsgeneralstabschef").

"To 2.:

"At presentthe Armed Forces High Command is organized with theconcept that it is !.possible to set a joint command staff over thethree branches of the armed forces just as one puts one Army GroupCommand over three Army Corps. It is thought that in this manner theright solution for the problem of the armed forces command has beenfound. However, such a solution does not consider the fact that inevery country there is one branch of the armed forces which in spiteof the full equality of' all three branches holds a decisive position,.

iQ1 ~ i' ~ : F:\

0-5 54293

"For England this decisive branch is even today the Fleet. For

Italy it may well be her air force. France has looked upon her armyas the decisive branch and has been combining in time of war her armycommand with her armed forces command for this reason.

"No matter how essential the contribution of the Navy and the Air

Force may be for a final victory, there can be no doubt that in Germany

the Army is the decisive branch of the armed forces. One reason for

this is the fact that numerically the Army represents three fourths of

all our armed forces.

"In addition there are the following decisive and uncontradictablearguments:

"a. The outcome of a future war will depend in the end on

success or failure of the army. Nobody will deny that for a final

success it is absolutely essential that the Navy keep our sea lanes

open, and that the air force protects our homeland against air attacks.Nor can it be doubted that the army will not reach a final victory with-

out the decisive cooperation of the air force,

"However, our country can be defended only by the army, and the

country is the basis for the whole conduct of the war. Moreover,other countries can be conquered only by the army. Military thought

centers more and more on the likelihood of a war in the East with the

aim of territorial conquest. During such a war an undestructable wall

would be erected at our western border. With the increased attention

given this concept it becomes more evident from day to day that the

success of the army will decide in the end whether such a war will be

won or lost. It should be added that, as far as our eastern adver-

saries are concerned, neither Russia nor Poland can be wounded

mortally by an attack from the sea or the air. In the event that the

large cities and industrial centers of Czechoslovakia were destroyed

she might well agree to the cessation of certain districts, but never

would she be forced by such air offensive alone to surrender com

pletely her sovereignty. One will in the end always have to conquer a

country if one desires to annex it and to finally crush all resistance.

"b. The command of the army is subject to special conditions

and limitations which must constantly be kept in mind by the over-all

command.

"The Navy will always fight in its own theater of war more or

less independently of the other branches and of the strategic

situation which determines military operations.

"The Air Force by its speed and flexibility can strike today at

one front, tomorrow at another, knowing no limitations in this regard.,

From a peace force it can turn immediately to war action. To maintain

it ready for action, the high command is obliged only to keep this

force in good condition,

"The situation for the army is different. This arm must first be

mobilized and take up positions. It can not swing its forces from one

front to another within 24 hours. 1It is always tied down by time and

space, and it must carry out extended operations, while the air force

is in a position to select a new target every day.

"Accordingly the rhythm of the over-all strategy of the war onland must be synchronized with the army's limitations as to time and

space, limitations,unknown to the air force to a similar degree.

"Therefore, it is impossible that a Command of the Army and a

Command of the Armed Forces should function side by side. This has

been overlooked in the past and thus friction has developed.

"To 3:

"If an Armed Forces High Command is set up in manner by which

this department functions as a link between the Supreme Commander and

the three Commanders in Chief, the responsibility of the Commanders in

Chief is limited to an intolerable degree.' The Su reme Commander him-

self must in all probability reach t e n on on the problems

of the preparation and te iopni ! ' i |he final aims of

a war, and the task alloed to a eabh of nches. Yet the

-6- 54293

responsibility-which res t ommander in Chief is so greatthat he must be able to represent the interests of his branch directlyto the Supreme Commander. An organization, which sets up betweenSupreme Commander and Commander in Chief a department like the Chiefof the Armed Forces Command, will not work. In addition, if theDepartment of the Armed Forces is permitted to exercise the authorityof the Minister of WJar, then the Commanders in Chief are put on alevel more or less equal to that of an Inspector General. This hasbeen demonstrated in the past in the controversy regarding the MilitaryDistrict Commanders ("Wehrkreiskommandeure"). If the Armed ForcesCommand is exercising also the (administrative) duties of the Ministryof Var, it will be overburdened with work, It addition"- it may be'added in passing - a double organization is created since no branch of

the armed forces can do entirely without its own administrativeorganization.

III. Remedies

"To solve the problem of the Armed Forces Command in a satisfactorymanner, three points must be observed:

"1. Separation of responsibilities:

Command in time of war (Chief of Staff to the Supreme

Commander -^eichsgeneralstabschef ")

Organization of the fighting nation (Reich War Secretary)

"2. Unified direction of Army Command and Armed Forces Command

must be secured.

"3. The immediate responsibility of each Commander in Chief to

the Supreme Commander must be safeguarded,

S"To 1:

"A Reich War Secretary ("Reichskriegs-Sekretaer") is to be appointed.

He is to be charged with the organization of the war and the forming

of the "fighting nation", that is, with the mobilization of all forces

and all means of the state and the nation for the war.

"Under the authority of the War Secretary are to function:

"a. A Reich Defense Council ("Reichsverteidigungsrat") which

coordinates the activities of all branches of government for the war

effort;

"b. An office of War Economy ("Wehrwirtschaftsamt") whichreorganizes the economy according to the needs of war.

"c. A War Office ("Wehramt") which is to deal with thosemilitary problems which transgress the authority of one single branch

of the armed forces and affect the life of the whole nation (war

legislation), and with all those questions which must be treated by

the branches of the armed forces in a similar manner ( military law,

supply problems ).

"d. To secure the coordination of all resources of the

nation, the Reich War Secretary in time of war should have executive

power. This power could be exercised through a Reich Security Office

("Reichssicherheitsamt") to be set up under his jurisdiction, or through

the normal channels of government. This executive power would make the

Reich VWar Secretary Commander in Chief of the national area an4 the

military districts would come under his jurisdiction.

"To 2:

"The strategic planning and the over-all command of the var

("Fuehrung") is to be vested in a Chief of Staff to the Supreme

Commander ( "Reichsgeneralstabschef") who is the adviser to the Supreme

Commander in all top-level problems concerning the conduct of the war.

In this connection it must be stated that Army Command and Armed

Forces Command can not function side b L. me of war,

54293

"A General S 1~Bs~ Pe Armed Forces can not be organized as tofunction next to the General Staff of the Army, since such an approachwould lead only to continous conflicts and end up with a situationwherein the two factions in the top command oppose each other. TheCommander in Chief of the Army can not be expected to win his victoryaccording to the conception of somebody else. And an Armed ForcesCommand which does not at the same time have immediate command overthe army would not be able to make decisions concerning the army,since it will never fully understand the conditions at the front andthe daily changes of the situation.

"As far as the land warfare is concerned, command of the armyand command of the armed forces cannot be separated. The officer whois Chief of Staff to the Armed Forces, or responsible adviser for theArmed Forces to the Supreme Commander, must at the same time exercisethe army command.

/A Joint General Staff superior to the three Commanders in Chiefwould be either a meaningless bureaucratic institution, or it wouldlimit the command of the army so severely that not one but two re-sponsible persons would try to command - an untolerable situation.

"This leaves open the way for one solution only, and that is thatthe Commander in Chief of the Army becomes simultaneously the re-sponsible adviser to the Supreme Commander for all questions concerningthe general conduct of the war.

"In this connection, the following factors should.be remembered:

"l. Over-all command of war ("Gesamtkriegsfuehrung") is not amatter of operational command. A joint command office can not issueday by day orders. It must limit itself to the following activities:

"a. Planning for the three branches.

"The basic plans for the Navy are predetermined. Herrole is to keep open the sea lanes.

"Air Force operations are dictated in their mostessential parts by the general needs, especially with regard to theprotection of the Reich territory; any planning in this field can bedone independently.

"b. Establishing of rules for armed-forces cooperationduring an operation. The need for such cooperation will be mostimmediate between army and air force. Here the limitations of thearmy will be opposed to the unlimited radius of action of the airforce, and from this divergency the conditions of cooperation must beevolved.

"The Armed Forces Operations Section ~perationsabteilung-Wehr-macht") the Intelligence ("Abwehr") Section, and the Chief, of theArmed Forces Communication Section ("Wehrmachts-Nachrichtendient")should function under the authority of the Chief of Staff to theSupreme Commander, since these officers are organs of the Armed ForcesCommand.

"To 3.:

"a. The independence of the three branches of the armedforces should be made distinct by vesting in the three Commanders inChief the authority of the Ministry of War. The Armed Forces Command.asan organ of the Supreme Commander has to retain full authorityonly in those fields where a uniform regulation for all three branchesis desirable, or where as in the case of defense laws, the interestsof the whole nation are seriously affected. The Armed Forces Commandwill have to handle in addition those responsibilities which originatefrom the authority of the Supreme Commander as Supreme justice of theArmed Forces ("Oberster Gerichsherr").

I In all other fields the authority of the Mi ~ister of War shouldbe transferred to the Comrander in Chi.. nt the Commander inChief, Navy. This would create ~f a situation cor-responding to the autho riiy,^l 4 Commander in Chief,Air %% %

54293

"With the hand rs which concern all threebranches but which main burden of actual work on one branchonly, this one branch should be charged ("im Auftragswege").Accordingly, the army will continue to deal with matters pertaining toreserves. The air force will continue to deal with all anti- air problemsin the national territory, even where anti-air problems of otherbranches of the armed forces are concerned.

"b. Of greater importance than such single problems is thenecessity to safeguard the full responsibility by the Commanders inChief of the three arms. The Commander in Chief is responsible for thereadiness of his arm and for the accomplishment of the military taskassigned to it. No authority can be permitted to stand between theSupreme Commander and the Commander in Chief in dealing with followingsubjects:

the over-all organization of the armed forces;

the balance of strength and supply to be maintained be-tween the three arms;

the preparation for war in the field of politics (allies,neutrals);

the decision at which moment the war should be startedpolitically and militarily;

the definition of the total military aims of the war, and thetask assigned to each arm to attain these aims.

"The final decision in these fundamental matters naturally restswith the Chief of State who at the same time holds the post of SupremeCommander. However, only the Commanders in Chief can advise theSupreme Commander in matters pertaining to their respective branch ofthe Armed Forces.

"Accordingly, it will be advantageous to establish for the dis-position of the Supreme Commander a "Supreme War Council" ("ObersterKriegsrat")composed of the three commanders in chief. This councilshould be set up to deal with the basic problems mentioned above. Itshould not be charged with the actual conduct of the war. Yet thethree Commanders in Chief on the basis of their responsibility shouldprepare for the Supreme Commander decisions in the above mentionedessential problems which as a rule will have to be made before theactual beginning of war. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commanderwill have to represent in this councilthe interests connected withthe over-all conduct of the war. The Reich War Secretary will be re-quested to give advice in matters pertaining to his authority.

"c. If in the course of war the Supreme Commander should de-sire to lighten his burden of purely military matters, a Generalissimoshould be nominated within the frame work of this organization. TheGeneralissomo should be nominated either for the full field of authorityof the Supreme Commander, or for the strategic conduct of the war only,or only for one specific operation. In any case, he will act underthe authority vested in him as representative of the Supreme Commander.

"IV. Proposals for the organization of the Armed Forces Command

"1. The Fuehrer is.the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces.Directly under his authority act^the Commanders in Chief of thebranches of the armed forces;

the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander (serving alsoas C - C,?Army); the Reich War Secretary,

"If the Fuehrer in the course of the war appoints a Generalissimo,this representative of the Supreme Commander ywill take up his .post inaccord with his special orders which may assign to him supreme commandof all armed forces, or command for one military operation over all oronly two branches of armed forces.

~~54293

-9-

"2. The ef of the Army, Navy, and AirForce are responsi le for readiness of their respective arm to theFuehrer. They exercise the authority of Reich Ministers.

"In time of war they exercise independent command over theirbranch in accordance with the directives of the Supreme Commander.

"The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander can call together a "SupremeWar Council" composed of the three Commanders in Chief, to preparetop-level decisions regarding the following questions:

"a. The overall organization of the armed forces, and themaintenance of the necessary balance between the three branches withregard to personnel and material, as well as the balance betweenarmed forces and national economy:

"b. the military and the political preparations for war( problems regarding allies and neutrals; setting of a date for theopening of hostilities );

"c. the definition of the final military aims, and of thespecific task assigned to each arm.

"3. The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander is the adviserto the Supreme Commander for all questions pertaining to the armedforces during ,time of war. In the Supreme War Council he is chargedwith representing considerations of over-all strategy. He issimultaneously Commander in Chief of the Army, so as to safeguard theunity of Armed Forces-Command and Army'Command.

"By order of the Supreme Commander and in accord with the decisionsreached by the Supreme War Council, the Chief of Staff to the SupremeCommander issues the directives for the cohduct of the war. Thesedirectives will be limited to:

a. Definition of the over-all goal of the operations;

b. Regulations concerning the cooperation of the three arms;

c. Preparations necessary for (a) or (b) in time of peace.

"The Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander is assisted bySaspeeial'staff the i"Cmmand. Sectibn""("Fuehrungsabteilung"). Thisb-Cemmand Section is to function simultaneously as the secretarial officefor the 8Supreme.War Council". The Command Section is to be attachedto the offices of the Army General Staff. The Intelligence Section("Abweli" aid the Armed Forces Chief of Communications operate also

under the authority of the Chief of Staff to the Supreme Commander,

"4. The Reich War Secretary is responsible for the organizationof the Fighting Nation that is for mobilization and organization of all

the strength and all the means of state and nation essential for theconduct of the war.

"Under his authority function:

the Reich Defense Council which assures the coordination of all

branches of the government for the war effort; the Office forWar Economy which assures the organization of economy for the

war effort;

the Defense Office, which deals with military legislation and

such fundamental problems which either concern all three branches

of the armed forces simultaneously, or which touch upon vital

interests of the nation but are not of a purely military nature.

"In time of war executive powers may be vested in the Reich War

Secretary. Thereby he will become Commander in Chief of the national

territory, and Commanders of the Military Districts will act under his

orders.

54293

-10-

"The Reich ryholds the post of a ReichMinister.

Signed

v. Brauchitsch."

(IV) The Navy Counter-Proposal

The Navy gave immediate attention to the Brauchitsch memorandum.Several sections of the Naval Staff submitted comments to theCommander in Chief, Admiral Raeder. While these comments differed tothe organization proposed, there was general agreement that in time ofwar the Navy would have to function under the authority of a jointcommand. However, such an authority would be exercised either by abody truly representative for the three arms, or by an offspring of theArmy General Staff. Accordingly, attention should be given now to theorganization of the joint ;command in order to prevent the army fromassuming the full function of joint command.

On the basis of such consideration a memorandum was drafted for thesignature of the Commander in Chief, Navy. The memorandum entitled"The Organization of the Armed Forces", was sent on 11 March 1938 tothe "OKW", (Gen, Keitel), with carbon copies to the Commander in Chief,Army, and the Commander in Chief, Air.

Attached to the memorandum were several organization charts. An excerptof these charts is given in Appendix IV.

"The most desirable solution for the organization of the ArmedForces Command" was outlined in the Navy memorandum as follows:

"1. Duties and Rights of the Commanders in Chief with regard tothe Reich Government.

"1. In all matters concerning their arms the Commanders inChief of the Army, Navy and Air Force are responsible directly and ex-clusively to the Fuehrer.

"2. Accordingly, the Commanders in Chief are:

a. the highest administrative and operational authorityfor their branch, having the authority of minister of war, and ex-ercising full authority to issue orders, regulations, and commands forall personnel and offices of their arm;

b. holders of the authority of a top-level Reich office/with all the rights and duties vested in such an office.

"3. The Commanders in Chief are of equal rank with the ReichMinisters and represent government offices on a level equal with theministries. An exception to this equality in rank may occur whenspecial working relations are established between Commander in Chiefand Minister. The Commanders in Chief are members of the Reich Cabinet.

"II. Regulation of such problems of the Armed Forces which call fora common treatment by the three arms.

"1. The three Commanders in Chief form a War Council (Kriegsrat)or a Supreme Command Staff ("Oberster Fuehrungsstab") to deal with allfundamental problems of the armed forces, In these problems theCommanders in Chief are the sole responsible adviser to'the Fuehrer.

"2. Fundamental problems of the Armed Forces are among others:

a. The final military aims of war;

b. The particular task assigned to each of the three arms;

c. Problems of organization affecting all arms;

d. Allocation of financial nT a omc sources;

54295

e. Mutu problems of the inner life of the three arms.

"3. The Armed Forces High Command ("OK ") is the organ of theFuehrer for all questions of armed forces command. It is composed of:

a. The War Council ("Kriegsrat"). This office is the re-sponsible representation of all armed forces to the Fuehrer andadvises him directly. The Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces HighCommand ("0KW") is appointed Chief of Staff of the War Council ("Krieg-srat"). In addition he is to exercise the authority of a Reich WarSecretary ("Reich Kriegssekretaer"), He takes part in the conferencesof the War Council in an advisory capacity.

"4. In his capacity as Reich War 'Secretary, the Chief of Staffof the Armed Forces High Command represents the interests of the armedforces in all relations with non-military government offices and inall those matters which are not primarily military in character. Heacts in accord with directives issued by the Fuehrer on his own in-itiative or on suggestion from the War Council. He holds the rank of

a Reich Minister.

"5. All matters of joint command are dealt with for the ArmedForces High Command by the General Staffs of the three arms. Thestaffs will act under the immediate responsibility of the Commander

in Chief most directly concerned. Usually a specific plan will be

worked out by the General Staff of that arm which is most directly con-

cerned. To this plan the other arms will add their contribution. Re-

sponsibilty for the execution of such added details rests with the

Commander in Chief who made the addition.

"6, All other armed forces matters are to be dealt with for the

Armed Forces High Command by the arm most directly concerned. Where

this method does not seem feasible a subordinate office under the

authority of~ the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command will

deal with the matter. Execution of such matters will be supervised

jointly by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces High Command and by

the Chief of Staff of that branch which is most directly concerned."

(V) Answer by the Chief, OKW.

On 26 April 1938, the "Chief of the Armed Forces High Command", Gen.

Keitel (referred to by the Army and Navy command as "Chief of Staff

of the Armed Forces High Command") sent a letter to the Commander

in Chief, Navy, Admiral Raeder. This letter stated:

"Enclosed is a memorandum of the Armed Forces High Command (0KW)

which was handed on 25 April to the Commander in Chief, Army, in

answer to his memorandum".

The Keitel memorandum, which represented the answer of the Chief, OKW,

to the criticism voiced by Army and-Navy alike against this new

command office, was entitled "Conduct of War as Problem of Organization".

A lengthy theoretical study on the war of the future served as back-

ground for the sketch of a -highly centralized organization for armed

forces planning and command. Attached to the memorandum was an organ-

ization chart which is given in translation as Appendix II.

With regard to the organization of the Armed Forces Command the mem-

orandum made the following points:

"1. "To assume that it is possible to separate from each

other the command of the armed forces, the coordination of propaganda

and economic warfarewith the military aims, and the "Organization of

the Fighting Nation", means to disregard the principles of total war.

"2, The joint command of the war of the future calls for the full

coordination of all these issues in the hands of one military commander

and in the office of one staff serving this commander and being re-

sponsible to him alone. Any effort which aims to separate the strategic

direction of the armed forces from the organization of the nation for

the support of this strategy, will lead us back to the unfortunate

dualism which existed- in World War I between Ministry of War and General

Staff.

S5295

-12-

"3. "The army not possible toorganize the fightin same time to make strategy asa side line. I believe that it is very well possible to develop over-all strategy with the support of the command staff of the "OKW" as aprimary task. Simultaneously, and with the assistance of other staffs,the fighting strength of the nation and the capacity of the armedforces can be increased. To carry out both these tasks, the armedforces commander must limit himself to the truly decisive issues. Hemust not be burdened with a large command staff such as it is neededfor the command of army operations.

"4.. "The needfor an Armed Forces High Command functioning abovethe Army High Command is not only indicated but it is as vital as theneed of an Army High Command in charge of several Army groups. It wouldbe absurd to give to the commander of an army group engaged in themost decisive sector, command over all other army groups.

"5. The strategic directives which have been issued (by "OK W")in the past and which will be forthcoming in the future give theCommander in Chief, Army, all the latitude that is necessary to directthe army operations according to his own best judgment and under' hispersonal'full responsibility. However, the directives do not allowfor an individual political and strategical conception since these aredeveloped uniformly for all the armed forces by the Fuehrer and ReichChancellor.,

"6. In the last great war our naval strategy was not fully co-ordinated with the over-all strategy. The Chief of the Naval Staffdid not accept the Army High Command as authority for the over-allproblems, but only the Emperor, Since the Emperor did not commandand, in the absence of a staff, could not command, we conducted a warat land and a war at sea. Unified strategical directives were lacking,Since by Germany's geographical situation land warfare and naval iar-fare are not as closely connected as land warfare and air warfare, thissituation may still have been tolerable. With the creation of anindependent Air Force, a unified command has become a dire necessity.

"7. It is impossible to give the command'over all armed forcesto the commander of one of the arms. Nobody can be expected to be sounselfish as not to give preference to his own arm when it comes tothe distribution of personnel and supplies.

"8. Clausewitz has said:

"War is an instrument of policy. Therefore, war has apolitical nature; it measures with political yardsticks. In the endall warfare is directed by policy which has exchanged the pen for thesword, but which therefore no less thinks in political terms.''

"No other organization of the armed forces command can more fullysatisfy this thought of Clausewitz then the organization 'hich hasbeen ordered by the Fuehrer directive of 4 February 1938, The ArmedForces High Command (0KW) operating directly under the Fuehrer andacting in accord with this directive is preparing the war on the basisof a unified command now in time of peace.

'"9 This solution has found a warm respn'e in the nation and inthe ranks of the officers corps. In my opinion, the present org-anization of the Armed Forces Command represents most logical andmost efficient solution for an authoritarian state. All that is neededis to recognize these facts and to adopt them in a harmonious manner.

Keitel. "

VI. Hitler's Directive outlining the function of the "OKW"

The discussion between Army, Navy, and Armed Forces High Commandwas brought to a temporary conclusion by a directive which Hitler issuedon 13 June, 1938. This directive was entitled "Executive order forthe Preparation of National Defense in all Fields" and outlined theduties and responsibilities of :the newly created "Armed Forces HighCommand" ("OKW"), It made only short mention of the duties and rightsof the Commanders in Chief and of their relation to the 0Ki;'

,; , -' i ' ' , i' : .j'^ , 'i'''* t. A

and function ,of the Chief,OKW.

The directive nevertheless served as the basis on which the OKWoperated during World War II. A chart which shows the OKW organizationas of September 1941 is given as Appendix 5.

The Hitler directive of 13 June, 1938, has the following text:

"l. The Armed Forces High Command ("OKW") is responsible for thepreparation of national defense in all fields in accord with mydirectives.

"2. The preparations extend essentially to the following fields:

unity of command of the armed forces in time of war;

coordination of the propaganda and economic warfare with theover-all aims of armed warfare;

defense of the home territory in an emergency (executive power);

organization of the fighting nation;

organization of espionage, intelligence, and counter-espionageservices;

problems of armed forces policy, of military law'and in -ternational law;

organization and distribution in time of war of all com-munication to the other armed forces and other agencies involved;

organization of war economy which includes:

the direction of war economy,

armament industry,

raw materials,

contracts and price control,

securing of supplies needed by the armed forces.

"3. I shall issue directives for the preparation of war from timeto time to:

the Commander in Chief, Army;

the Commander in Chief, Navy;

The Minister for Air and Commander in Chief, Air;

the Chief of the Armed Forces High Command.

"The Armed Forces High Command is responsible for the written for-mulation of these strategic directives; it will conduct the conferencesdealing with such details which concern several arms.

"4. To the Armed Forces High Command are to be submitted all

documents which are needed for the carrying out of the duty givenunder (2) , and for personal information. This regulation does notlimit in any way the right of the Commanders in Chief to represent tome in direct conference any matter concerning their individual branch.

"5. I reserve for myself the right to nominate in accord with the

needs of the political and military situation, in the event of a

threatening war, a Commander in Chief, Armed Forces, as my responsible

adviser and my representative for the over-all command.

"6. I also reserve the right to order exercises for the prep-

arati6on of the national defense in all fields, such as mobilizationexercises, studies, armed .forces maneuvers, communication exercises,

etc. The command of such exercise'sg i from case to case

54293

neither did it c1

to one of the Commanders in Chief." In the preparation and executionof such exercises, the Armed Forces High Command will serve as Staffto this Commander in Chief.

signed: Adolf Hitler.

counter signed: Jodl,Colonel, General Staff."

VII. Joint Command in World War II- - - - - - - - - - - -

The Fuehrer Directive of 13 June 1938 (VI) established the broadbasis for Germany's joint command in World War II. The variousopinions as to the function of such joint command, outlined in thememoranda of the Commanders in Chief (IV,V), continued neverthelessto exercise their influence. Up to July 1944, joint command was amatter of compromise between these different tendencies.

These compromises were in most cases adapted to the particularsituation and location, and took many different forms which cannotbe described in this report. In general, five developments appearto have been outstanding, as seen from the files of the German-Naval Staff:

(a) The Armed Forces High Command (OKW) controlled to a

large extent all matters pertaining to Intelligence, Communications,Sabotage, and Procurement and Distribution of men and material.

(b) Military operations involving more than one4wereusually planned by the "Wehrmachtsfuehrungstab" (Operational Staff)of the OKW. Based on this study the Fuehrer issued an operationaldirective to the Commanders in Chief, Under this directive theCommanders in Chief usually exercised full command authority, beingresponsible directly to the Fuehrer.

(c) For the execution of numerous large or protractedoperations, one Joint Commander in Chief was appointed by the Fuehrer

and invested with command authority for all arms within the 'scope

of his area and/or operation.

(d) When in the fall of 1941 the German Army was not able

to gain a decisive victory on the Eastern Fronts Hitler relieved

the Commander in Chief, Army General von Brauchitsch, At the same

time, he took a large step to accepting the Brauchitsch plan (IV)

by a decision which stated: "The Fuehrer and Supreme Commander took

over on 19 December 1941 the post of Commander in Chief, Army,personally". For the contihuation of the eastern campaign, over-all

command was exercised by Hitler and his Field Headquarters Staff

which was, in fact, a part of the Operational Staff, Armed Fprces

High Command,

(e) Military administration of all occupied territory was

as a rule vested in the OKW, represented by a Commanding General.

In the following are given several documents which illustrate the

joint organization in four specific cases.

(A), Authority and Responsibility on an International Level

On 22 December 1939, the Armed Forces High Command sent out a secret

communication based on a Fuehrer directive that military staff

conferences with Italy were to be resumed. This communication out-

lined the fields of responsibility of the Commanders in Chief during

these conferences as follows:

"a. Armed Forces High Command ("OKW"):

1, Organization of Joint Command;

.2, Participation of Italy in all intelligence andrcounteicintncl |ielige n

51 1293

3. Participation of Italy in the German news black-out against foreign countries;

4. Co-ordination of propaganda warfare;

5. Co-operation in the field of war economy;

6. Co-operation in the field of communications.

"b. The Commanders in Chief of the three arms:

1. Organization;

2. Armament, production, munitions; possibilitiesfor mutual support;

3. Effectiveness of weapons; weapons development;

4. Exchange of information;

"c. The Commander in Chief, Army:

1. Permanent fortifications;

2. Railway and Transportation Problems;

"d, Commander in Chief, Navy:

1. Repair capacity of Yards and Docks;

2. Equipment of bases at home and in colonies,

"e. Commander in Chief, Air;

1. Exchange of target studies;

2. Co-operation in air defense;

3. Meteorological services;

4. Joint use of ground installations and facilities.

"B. Joint Command in the Central and Western Mediterranean.

In 1943, with the African campaign under way, Hitler as SupremeCommander named General Kesselring as "Oberbefehlshaber Sued" -Commander in Chief, South, The directive outlining the duty andauthority of the Commander in Chief, South, issued on 23 June 1943over Hitler's signature reads in part as follows;

"I. The Commander in Chief, South, being by rank the senior Germanofficer in Italy, is the representative of the German Armed Forcesat Headquarters, Italian Armed Forces ll questions pertaining tothe conduct of the war in the central and western Mediterranean.

"II. The Commander in Chief, South is responsible for the executionof my directives and orders.

"III. He is responsible for the conduct of war of the German troopsof the three arms within the area of his command, insofar as thesetroops- are not operating under Italian command. In that case he hasto assure that the German troops are operating in accord with Germanprinciples of command and strategy.

"IV. He is responsible for the close co-operation of the three armswith each other and with the Italian forces, and he assures exchangeand co-ordination of communications for reconnaissance and operations.

"V, He is responsible for the concentration of all German personneland material into "Alarm Units" and for the organization of suchunits and for their readiness for action. He initiates theorganization of joint task forces which are to form a reserve for all

i. B< u B« **--. ^*~- 'i 2l +293

German armed forces. uis par of the directive is assumed to havebeen motivated by the possibility of a separate Italian armistice).

"VI, He is in charge of supply for all German military personnel inthe central and western Mediterranean. For this purpose hecommunicates directly with the three Commanders in Chief.

"VII. He governs the use of all shipping tonnage in the central andwestern Mediterranean and the use of all air transport space in hisarea.

"VIII. He is responsible for the unified direction of allcommunications, intelligence and espionage, propaganda and specialactivities for all three arms, as well as of legal and medical matters.

"IX. In all matters mentioned as well as in principal problems oforganization he reports to the Armed Forces High Command andmaintains close contact with the three Commanders in Chief. TheCommanders in Chief are to participate in all directives of aprincipal nature to troops within the area,

"X. Without limiting the administrative ("truppendienstliche")authority of the three arms, the Commander in Chief, South, exercises

full authority over:

1. All Army, SS, and Air Force Units assigned to ground duty,including units operating under Italian tactical command;

2. The German Naval Command, Italy, including units operatingunder the Italian Naval Command. Overall directives for naval war-

fare in the Mediterranean are issued by the Naval Staff, Commander

in Chief, Navy,

"XI. The staff of the Commander in Chief, South, is a joint Armed

Forces Staff".

C. Military Administration of Occupied Territories by OKW

As a rule, a general representing the OKW was named as militarycommander for any occupied territory as soon as large-scale fightingceased. For Norway, the Commander of Army Group XXI was named as

joint military commander by Adolf Hitler in a directive dated 24 April

1940. Based on this directive, 0KW issued an order over Keitel's

signature, which read in its essential parts as follows:

"1. The Commander of Arniy Group XXI is to deal with matters

of mutual importance to the three arms. He represents the German

Armed Forces in their relation to the Norwegian State and people.

2. The Commander of Army Group XXI is responsible for military

security in the interior and in the event of an enemy invasion.

Prosecution of the war against England from Norway by sea and air is

the responsibility of the respective Commanders in Chief and of their

subordinate commands in Norway.

"3. In the event of danger, especially in defense of an enemy

attack, the Commander of Group XXI is authorized to transmit military

requests to the (local) commanders of the three arms. These are

obliged to follow such requests as far as their own military operations

and technical possibilities permit. If they decline acceptance of

such orders, they are fully responsible for their action.

"4, All of Norway remains military operational zone. Executive

power in the operational zone is not vested in the Commander of

Group XXI. Requests from the commanders of the three arms regarding

civilian matters are submitted directly to the (civilian) Reich

Commissar for Norway. The Commander of Group XXI is to be informed

of such requests.

"5. The Commander of Group XXI, in accord with directives from

the Chief, OKW or the responsible OKW offices direc e in a unified

manner the following activities:

S5493

a. The suppl mi its stationed in Noway, insofaras the arms do carry out their own supply,

b. The military land transportation;

c. The military land communications;

d. Armament and defense. industry;

e. Principal military matters related to administration,

supply and billeting;

f. The confiscation of military installations andequipment insofar as they do not clearly belong to the

activity or base of one of the arms;

g. Problems related to prisoners of war;

h. Military security;

i. Intelligence, and Counter-Intelligence;

k. Military border traffic;

1. Moral leadership;

m. Problems of press and propaganda as far as they have

territoral character, and the spiritual guidance;

n, War Cemeteries."

"D. Joint Command in a Divisional Level.

As it appears from the files of the German Naval Staff, only in a

few instances. were detailed orders issued with regard to joint

command on a Uivision level. One of those instances is represented

by an order of the 2nd Panzer Army Group Command ("Panzerarmeeober-

kommando 2"). This order by Dr. Rendulio, General of the Infantry,

to all units within his area and dated 28.10.43 sets up regulations

for the command and deployment of army coastal artillery units in

defense of the Dalmatian Coast, It reads in part:

"1, Requirements of naval warfare have priority for all coastal

artillery The most important task of all-coastal artillery is to

destroy the enemy before he reaches the shore. Accordingly, the main

field of action for the coastal artillery is offshore. qt

s aTartier i s afffsu Yet, the coastal artillery may also

be called upon to-take part in an engagement on land, This situation

calls for a clear definition of command.

"Since the main field for coastal artillery is offshore, tactical

command rests with the Naval Commander ("Seekommandant", i.e. naval

officer charged with coastal defenses). This situation must not lead

tb the assumption that the other ground forces have no part in the

defense against an enemy approaching from the sea. Everybody concerned

must clearly realize the prime importance of annihilating the enemy

before he reaches shore. In this common effort, the Navy has command

of all artillery.

"2, The Naval Commander ("Seekommanddant") is the tactical

commander of all coastal artillery within his sector. He is responsible

for:

a. Suggestions to the Commanding General concerning

organization and employment of army coastal artillery in accordance

with his orders;

b. Conduct of local reconnaissance, through staffs to be

formed for this purpose; they are to act under a Naval Officer. Since

these staffs are to coordinate the army coastal artillery plans with

the over-all plan for coastal defense, they must be formed by divisional

staff officers. Besides the Naval Officer in command there will be

assigned to each staff one officer of the divisional artillery staff,

one officer each for the pioneers, th Mi the communications

troops, as well as o |e - r3 illery if this branch

S 8- 54293

INC ASI FDis represented in the sector;

c. Submittal 'of the results of reconnaissance to hissuperior naval officer for final approval, after the report hasbeen approved by the Commanding General.

"3. The Naval Commander ("Seekommandant") is responsible forand acts under the authority of:

a. For Artillery action offshore under his superiornaval commander:

b. For artillery action ashore under the army divisionalcommander.

"For (a) as well as for (b) the Naval Commander has full commandauthority. For operations under (b) he receives his directivesregarding coastal artillery from the army divisional commander.

"Accordingly, there will be no change of command for the coastalartillery- during a battle for the beach. Each battery remains underone and the same command for the entire duration of the engagement,

"4. According to Fuehrer Directive 40, Section IV, 1 b, theNavy is responsible for the training of all coastal artillery, in-cluding army coastal artillery. To arrive at a unified procedure inthis manner, the following is ordered:

a, The Navy ("Seekommandant") issues the principal ordersand directives with regard to targets offshore,

b. The Navy supervises training of coastal artillery foraction offshore. The Naval Commanders responsible for this trainingare entitled at all times to review the training schedules,, to informthemselves on the efficiency of the training by sending deputies, orto make personal training inspections,

c. For the training of all coastal artillery for actionashore, Army and Divisional Commanders are authorized to issueafter agreement with the Naval Commander primary orders anddirectives. Training of all coastal artillery for action at theshore line and on the beaches is supervised by the Army".

54295-19-

APPEN]IX i ARMEDh FORCES OFFICE " OUTLINED IN A COhMVLNICATION BY GENERAL KEITEL ON I AUGUST 1937

jCOMffV ANER IN CHIEF, ARMED FORCES

HEFOF STAFF OF TH E .ARMED FORCES

CE T AL__ ARMEDM FORCES .ARMIED FORCES__

IPmgsoi-, EN __- OPERATIONAL DEPR V3NT GENERAL DEPAR ITIT .

~NATIO I ThEF fFOREIGN ESPIONAGE _ IPROAGANDA.LINJLANI)I SUJPPLY11ITTELLIGER CEI AND COUNTER __

jSECRETARY, REICH !ESPIONAGE LBUDGETi LAWIIDEFENSE COMM4ITTEE~

17-k( ARECONOMY__L~DEPRME__

CONTRACTS RAJAND M~AhR I.ALSiPRICES

AP~PENDIX II :?"ORGNIZATION OF COMUB\LANID IN TIME OF WlaR " OUTLINED BY GENEAL KEITEL ON 19 MARCH 1938 IN ASWER TO GENERAL BPAUCHITSCH I OADI

TIM FUEBEER -TB E FUEBPR

COORDINATION WITH

MILITARY OBJECTIVES

ECONOIC 1WARFAREAA .

THE_______ _THE THE_______

-IUR llvE COI1vIARPJER, PARMED FORCES, AND-- rARMED FORCES HIGHCOI1I4ANUD ("OK")f

LAND I ARFARE'AIR- VARIFARE NA1VAL OWRFARE

(C-in-C ARMY) I(C-in-C AIR) (C-inwC NAVY)

COORDINATION WITHMILITARY 'OBJECTIVES

fPROPLNPAMkW!RFkRE

ORGA-tNIZA TION OF THEFIGHTING 11iTI-ON

SRE I CH DEFE

APPENDIX .I

- - - - - - - - - - --- - - - - - - - - -

L AMWIENTS

APPENDIX III " KRIEGSSPITZENGLIEDERJNG It PROPOSED BY GENTERAL VON BRAUCHITSCH IN HIS MEVIORANPUMA OF 8 MARRCH' 1938

IHCOIMM1WEIM IN CHIEF OF THE ARMED FORCES)

JPJICWAR SECRETARY

RICH j WAR GENERAL fREICH ~

IDEFENSE IECONOMY IWAR fSECURITYOFFICE OFICE FEICE OFC

[ _ -SUP~REWAR COUNCIL

G0-in-C C -in- C C -in- CAIRARMiY (*) f NAVY

FI AIR jT ~ARMY 17NAVYHIG COJD1AN IHIGH COMMAviND HIGH COlRiAND

K2dHt OF THE R EICH GENERAL STAFF()-

ARMED FORCES ! INTELLIGENiCE T ZARM!ED FORCESOPERATIONS -! ICO1+VUI CATIONS 4

(*)} 'TE POSTS OF C-in-C ARMY AND CHIEF OF THE REICH G \TERAL STAFF TO BEHELD BY THiE SAME OFFICER.

APPENDIX IV :" KRIEGSSPITZENGLIEDERUNG n PROPOSED BY aDMIRAL RkEDER IN HIS M ORANDI MOF i MARgH 19~3

£ARMED FORCES FICHANCELLORY and AD

(TOP LE EU

LCHIEF OF STAFF AND REICH WAT

STAJF ARMED ~ASECTION IFORCES{ ECONOMY

COOPERATION WTITH AM. V

-.----- THE ThEBRER =-

)JUTANTS ----- ~--*- --.- REICH CHANCELLORY OF THE FUHE

~~~~~UR ,E OEvl TF EL GOVERNENT OFFICESSIPEECIhIMSTF --. ----

jLAM ~ -nC Ci- C-in-C MINISTER FOR .PR. OPAGANDAOTEA~vY AR NAVY FOREIGN AFFAIRS MIAN R MINhTS'

SECRETARY(* ____ __

DEFENSE INTELLIGENCE JCIilITTEEJ YAi

jARMY AIR FRCI ~(c*) THE CHIEF OF STAFAND REICH WAR SECRETARY TOf I GNRL TF SUPREME COIV~IVLAID STAFF MEETINGS IN ADVISORY CAPACIP

'_.STAFF BE THE LIAISON OFFICER BETWEEN SUPRB COIAND STAOTHER MINISTERS.

REICHrERS__

ATTEND ALLPY, AND TO'.FF AND ALL

AND AIR FORCE

, a.._..._.._ _. .. _. _ t._ .. __ .

_ ... _ ,

i

APP2)I~ V ORGA NIZA.TION OF THlE GERMA N ARM FORCES HIGH COIV IIND ("Qit ") i S ,OF ABOUT 1 SEPTEMBR 1941,

CONE NDER IN CHIEF, 4MY

OPERA:TIONA L ST. 2F (" wFSt")("Wehrrachtsfuehrungsstab" )

_(Ar'my),I(Nayt(Air )

*NATIONAL DEFENiSE("i)I (Lanesvrteidigung")

COMVMUNICATIONS ANDSIGNALS ("rstwNv")("Nachrichtenver-L bindung")r

APMED FORCES PROPAGANDA _,( Wty pR? )("Wehrxachtspropaganda")

TI TASPORTATION JmI(ttvirm"u) ('.Chef des-ITransportwes ens derWehrmacht")

THE SUPREMEE C Ol\MNDER-

_____ FORCES HIGHCOM~L1 ND ("0KWJ") COII DR IN CHIEF 3 NA VY {Ldoi iARER IN C:HIEF ,l1AIR

CE TRL DIVISION -'I INTELLIGENCE DIVISION " BUDGET DIVISION MERCANTILE AND 'AR ECONOMY ANDrWZ 'r )I( ".Ai. Auslan6.lAAbwehr") ("W H" )_ ECONOMIC WARFA RE 1JARMAMENTS DIVISION{Ztrlabteilung ) (" Ausi! Abw")("ehrhaushalt " S .(Sd St 1m~?K ) ("iRuoAmt")

("tSonderstab fuerj ("WehrwirtschaftHandeskrieg and a nd Ruestungsamt."}

____ wirtschaftlicheLSEEETN~h~i CES__IN"bw.) "--)CENTRAL SECTION (Z-.--.------s--ahme"

' ___ ;iYI kY 1RI _ FRIGN RELATIONS SECTIONI ("Ausl"') ("Ausland" )

REGIONAL R 2ESENTATIONj2K021 ~2' "yo~L

ISABOTAGE SECTION

[REGIONA L REP RESENTATIQN1"O~ ('-0") ( "\TO"r

( IfAbw'III')-

/1

JCOUNTER INTELLIGENCESECTIONfAwII -f

REGIONAL REPRES!NTATION'

ARLFAMENTS ( "Rue ").I ("R1uestunswrscjplaftl_'

WAR 'ECONOMY(W"UL ("Wehrwrtschaft"

RAW MA~TERIALS ("Ra")

CONTRACTS ("P'eispr")("Vertrags- und Pr'eis-

,~ruefungsstelle"J~

NOTES: 1. Subdivision into Army, Navy, and Air branches, as shown for the Operational anidthe, Intelligence Division, was common formost 0KW offices.

2. Since the 0KW underwent many reorganizations, in using this chart the date should be observed.3. Based on documents from the files of the German Naval Staff. Minor offices have been omitted.

The Senior Army, Navy,or"Air Attaches withthe German diplomaticrepresentations inneutral states

- -.--