1 A Bad Time for Timing An Analysis of the US Navy Officer Promotion Process LT Austin Hulbert, USN “Naval Aviation must become better stewards of its resources because it can no longer afford to deliver readiness at any cost, as in the past. Our challenge instead is to efficiently deliver the right amount of readiness at the right place at the right time so that Naval Aviation combat forces are able to meet the required mission and resources are available to recapitalize the Fleet. We need to make smart decisions on scarce warfighting resources.” Naval Aviation Enterprise 1 The U.S. Navy has an outdated promotion system that must be fundamentally changed to meet the needs of the service as it transitions to a leaner, more agile 21 st century force. Our current system was codified during the Cold War, but its origins date back to the years following the end of WWII. This system was designed around a large force structure designed to fight symmetric wars against our Cold War adversaries. The last decade has seen a fundamental change in the mission and ethos of the Department of Defense (DoD). Unfortunately, the personnel management system has not changed to accommodate this new force. In his 2014 white paper on the looming officer retention problem, CDR Guy Snodgrass pinpoints the fundamental focus of today’s promotion system when he says, “Our manning system tends to focus heavily on the quantitative needs of the service at the expense of retaining the right officers – the ones with qualitative skills like sustained performance in Fleet operations, advanced education, and preferred skill sets.” 2 Current Situation The U.S. Navy’s promotion system requires fundamental change to ensure the health and strength of future leadership. Current challenges include: • Fixed promotion timelines independent of career paths • Promotion zones based on overall time in service • Inconsistent career progression/experience within communities This paper will present why the current system fails to meet the needs of the modern Naval Officer. The following changes should be implemented to incentivize retention of our best, brightest, and most talented: • Decouple timeinservice from promotion • Career progression will be based on consistent, measured performance • Align rank with responsibility • Allow for more flexibility in an officer’s career Such changes will incentivize officers to expand on their personal and professional development, and will result in longer overall time in service at a lower cost than the current system. Recent years have shown an increasing trend in officers, both pre and postcommand, deciding to leave the Navy. 3 This trend is disturbing for many reasons, as it is indicative of a declining pool of talented and experienced officers available to rise through the ranks and lead the service well into the future. Recent problems such as increasing deployment lengths and sequestration cuts have made the situation worse, with many officers feeling like pawns in an 1 United States Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Enterprise, Integrated Resource Management Team: http://nae.ahf.nmci.navy.mil/irmt.asp 2 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014. 3 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014.
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A Bad Time for Timing An Analysis of the US Navy Officer Promotion Process LT Austin Hulbert, USN
“Naval Aviation must become better stewards of its resources because it can no longer afford to deliver readiness at any cost, as in the past. Our challenge instead is to efficiently deliver the right amount of readiness at the right place at the right time so that Naval Aviation combat forces are able to meet the required mission and resources are available to recapitalize the Fleet. We need to make smart decisions on scarce warfighting resources.” -‐Naval Aviation Enterprise1
The U.S. Navy has an outdated promotion system that must be fundamentally changed to meet the needs of the service as it transitions to a leaner, more agile 21st century force. Our current system was codified during the Cold War, but its origins date back to the years following the end of WWII. This system was designed around a large force structure designed to fight symmetric wars against our Cold War adversaries. The last decade has seen a fundamental change in the mission and ethos of the Department of Defense (DoD). Unfortunately, the personnel management system has not changed to accommodate this new force. In his 2014 white paper on the looming officer retention problem, CDR Guy Snodgrass pinpoints the fundamental focus of today’s promotion system when he says, “Our manning system tends to focus heavily on the quantitative needs of the service at the expense of retaining the right officers – the ones with qualitative skills like sustained performance in Fleet operations, advanced education, and preferred skill sets.”2
Current Situation
The U.S. Navy’s promotion system requires fundamental change to ensure the health and strength of future leadership. Current challenges include:
• Fixed promotion timelines independent of career paths • Promotion zones based on overall time in service • Inconsistent career progression/experience within communities
This paper will present why the current system fails to meet the needs of the modern Naval Officer. The following changes should be implemented to incentivize retention of our best, brightest, and most talented:
• Decouple time-‐in-‐service from promotion • Career progression will be based on consistent, measured performance • Align rank with responsibility • Allow for more flexibility in an officer’s career
Such changes will incentivize officers to expand on their personal and professional development, and will result in longer overall time in service at a lower cost than the current system.
Recent years have shown an increasing trend in officers, both pre-‐ and post-‐command, deciding to leave the Navy.3 This trend is disturbing for many reasons, as it is indicative of a declining pool of talented and experienced officers available to rise through the ranks and lead the service well into the future. Recent problems such as increasing deployment lengths and sequestration cuts have made the situation worse, with many officers feeling like pawns in an
1 United States Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Enterprise, Integrated Resource Management Team: http://nae.ahf.nmci.navy.mil/irmt.asp 2 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014. 3 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014.
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endless Washington political feud. Making matters crueler, the very business of personnel management often openly refers to officers as “inventory,” a dehumanizing reference that further exacerbates the disillusionment. This retention challenge is likely to become more difficult as officers are faced with reduced resources to care for their families and increasing time away from home. Recognizing these complications, the Navy must act swiftly to make drastic changes in its approach to tackling this problem. This paper will address the challenges in career progression and retention that the current officer promotion system creates. It will propose solutions that will fundamentally change the way officer advancements are made and billets are assigned. These solutions will create a personnel management environment that will enable forward-‐thinking and motivated officers to pursue unique education and other career-‐broadening opportunities whilst achieving career milestones to allow him or her to continue a progressing career. CDR Snodgrass made the prescient warning that, “Senior leaders within the U.S. Navy, with the cooperation of the Department of Defense and Congress, should take swift action through the use of targeted incentives and policy changes to help ensure the best, brightest, and most talented Naval Officers are retained for continued naval service . . . .”4 Thus, the focus must shift towards establishing which experiences and service wickets each community values, and promote based on said breadth of knowledge. The time to act is now. The Beginning of Timing
“The Naval Aviation Enterprise was the trailblazer for enterprise development within the Navy. The very beginning of our Enterprise stemmed from an acknowledgement that ‘business as usual’ was not creating a more efficient or effective warfighting force.” –Naval Aviation Enterprise5
Following the end of WWII, the War Department was faced with the challenge of downsizing the Army and Navy, and fundamentally restructuring how it was to do business. One of the challenges that faced the service chiefs was the promotion and management of the officer corps. Of particular consternation to Congress was the inconsistency of promotion systems, not just between the Army and the Navy, but within the services themselves. Congress directed the newly renamed National Military Establishment, the precursor to the DoD, to develop a promotion and personnel management system that would apply to all branches of the military. Two chief pieces of legislation were to result from these directives, the Officer Personnel Act (OPA) of 1947, and the Officer Grade Limitation Act (OGLA) of 1954. Among other issues, the OPA addressed the problem of immobility within the Army by adopting the Navy’s “up-‐or-‐out” promotion system (in place since 1916) by requiring officers to go to promotion boards after a designated time-‐in-‐service. This act served to restructure the services in their promotion of officers to ensure, in the words of General Eisenhower, a “vigorous body underneath.”6 Recognizing the need to trim the number of senior officers to make room for ascending juniors in the new system, Congress passed the OGLA, which expanded on the OPA by setting grade limits on officer ranks of O-‐4 and above. These two acts served to align the services’ promotion systems with the goal of encouraging a healthy competition for promotion.
4 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014. Page 2. 5 United States Department of the Navy, Naval Aviation Enterprise: http://www.public.navy.mil/airfor/nae/Pages/History.aspx 6 RAND Corporation, The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: a retrospective assessment, Bernard Rostker . . . [et al.]. Santa Monica, CA, 1993. Page 92.
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By the 1960’s the DoD ordered a study to determine the effectiveness of the OPA in managing officer promotions. This study, which was known as the “Bolte Report,” recommended, “a uniform (modified) up-‐or-‐out promotion system should be established.”7 Though subsequent legislation stalled, the language in this report formed the basis for what was to become the Defense Officer Personnel Management Act (DOPMA). In 1980, the DOPMA passed, and formed the core structure within which all military officers would be managed for the foreseeable future. Though the DOPMA was structured to ensure fairness and healthy competition for promotion, it was developed in a drastically different time to meet the needs of a vastly different force. The 1990s saw a rapid reduction in force size and composition. Though the chief threat to the United States continued to be symmetric, the myriad low-‐intensity conflicts of the decade were indicators that times were changing, and the attacks of September 11th, 2001 are a visible reminder of that. Following these attacks, the realization came to the DoD that changes to the mission, force composition, and philosophy were needed to address these rapidly-‐evolving threats. Pursuant to this goal, the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) highlighted the need to recruit and retain an officer corps composed of individuals who were innovative, highly educated, and mission-‐oriented.8 Five years after this realization, the 2006 QDR focused particular attention to officer promotion: “The Department’s career advancement philosophy should foster innovation by encouraging career patterns that develop the unique skills needed to meet new missions such as irregular warfare.”9 Fortunately for the DoD, the military is replete with officers who have these qualities; however, officers like these were those most likely to “depart from the norm,” and seek new and interesting jobs and opportunities within the military. Regrettably, the current lock-‐step promotion system does not encourage or enable many of these officers to stay. This problem will become further compounded when we look at the behavior and value structure of the generations now filling the ranks of the junior officer positions. As outlined in his paper, Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy Snodgrass cites a joint study by PricewaterhouseCoopers, the University of Southern California, and the London Business School that discusses some of the chief differences between the “Baby Boomer” and “Millenial” generations. He notes, “Millenials are more willing to vote with their feet if they feel their needs aren’t being met, forcing the service to adapt or subsequently fall victim to a lack of talent as disenfranchised service members leave.”10 As these Millenials populate the ranks of the junior and mid-‐grade officer corps, and become the percentage workforce of the enlisted ranks, a change is needed to adapt the promotion system to best adequately meet the needs of the individual, and merry their needs with those of the Navy.
7 RAND Corporation, The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: a retrospective assessment, Bernard Rostker . . . [et al.]. Santa Monica, CA, 1993. Page 97. 8 United States Department of Defense, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: DoD, September 30, 2001. Page 50. 9 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: DoD, February 6, 2006, p. 80. 10 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014.
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An Untimely System
“In our assessment we found that DOPMA was a better static description of the desired officer structure than a dynamic management tool.” –RAND Corporation, 199311
Personnel management is one of the most problematic challenges faced by the DoD. Our current system was designed to operate across the services and provides fixed promotion timing to guarantee steady ascension of officers through the ranks. It operates rather simply by delineating both minimum time-‐in-‐grade (TIG) requirements and promotion windows (zones). Both systems run on a clock that starts the day the officer is commissioned, and stops or pauses with very few exceptions. A brief analysis of these two timing requirements will highlight the issues that make them unsuitable to a modern, adaptable promotion system. The first of these two requirements is that of time-‐in-‐grade. TIG requirements ensure the various ranks are consistently populated, with an equal number of personnel entering on a fixed timeline as there are leaving. The provisions for TIG are listed below12:
Rank TIG Requirement O-‐1 18 months O-‐2 2 years
O-‐3 through O-‐5 3 years O-‐6 through O-‐7 1 year
Though TIG requirements place obligations of service on an officer’s progression, they do not delineate a specific time or “zone” for promotion, and thus more closely resemble an experience metric. As the officer progresses in his or her career, overall timing considerations do not begin to manifest themselves as an issue/burden until the officer is up for promotion to O-‐4, when the concept of “zones” now becomes a factor. Reflecting the “up-‐or-‐out” philosophy that governed the eventual creation of the DOPMA, there came a time for the services to start reducing the force through promotion selectivity. The DoD decided to create a simple set of timing criteria that promotion boards would use to determine an officer’s eligibility for promotion13:
Promotion to: Timing* Opportunity O-‐4 10 years ± 1 year 80% O-‐5 16 years ± 1 year 70% O-‐6 22 years ± 1 year 50%
* Years of commissioned military service plus all entry grade credit.
The focus of officer promotion in this system is wholly based on total years of military service, regardless of how that service is spent. Thus, naval officers progressing in rank together could share vastly different experiences, complicating the required performance comparison between them in selection for promotion. This static promotion system chafes on our most talented officers
11 RAND Corporation, The Defense Officer Personnel Management Act of 1980: a retrospective assessment, Bernard Rostker . . . [et al.]. Santa Monica, CA, 1993. Page V. 12 10 USC § 619 13 Department of Defense Instruction 1320.13, “Commissioned Officer Promotion Reports (COPRs) and Procedures,” June 21, 1996. Enclosure 2, Table 1 (page 8).
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who expect rewards consummate with their capabilities and performance. On a macro level, the differences in career experiences and leadership opportunities are even more diverse between the varied warfighting communities. This focus on overall career timing over quality of experience and competency represents the largest single burden affecting officer promotion and retention. Refocusing the Promotion System
“Each of the Military Departments will map the array of competencies and performance criteria that constitute its forces and also evaluate and improve personnel development processes to achieve those standards. Advancements, awards and compensation may then be linked to an individual’s performance rather than to longevity or time-‐in-‐grade. This will better align incentives to outputs and reward excellence.” 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review14
As mentioned above, the key to establishing a new promotion system is to de-‐couple advancements and compensation from time-‐in-‐service, and marry them with performance-‐based assessments. Once this is accomplished, the focus will shift towards achieving required career progression milestones regardless of time in service. Restructuring the promotion process does not require the establishment of a new baseline for advancement; rather, it requires each community to decide which milestones an officer must achieve before being considered for promotion. Each of the major communities has unique timing challenges and career milestones that it values. It is well known that the aviation and submarine communities require a significant time-‐to-‐train, upwards of two and a half years in some cases, before an officer is ready for deployment. Other communities, such as surface warfare, have career paths that value a breadth of experience with exposure to multiple units and do not have to deal with prolonged training times. Recognizing this, the current promotion system, which places all officers, regardless of community, on the same path, is misguided. Thus, the focus must shift towards establishing which experiences and service wickets each community values, and promote based on said breadth of knowledge. For this article, the strike/fighter community will be the career path to be modeled, as it is the most familiar to the author. Student Naval Aviators, upon arrival in Pensacola, are at the beginning of a long road of instruction and evaluation. Regardless of the specific pipeline that is chosen, the time-‐to-‐train places the Naval Aviator and Naval Flight Officer significantly behind his year group (YG) peers, such as SWOs, with regards to the timing and number of deployments. In the case of the strike/fighter pilot or NFO, training times average 39 and 33 months respectively, and that is only after the student starts his or her training. In some cases, the time between commissioning and Aviation Preflight Indoctrination (API, the first phase of flight school) can be upwards of seven months. When coupling rank with time, the current system places officers at promotion marks with vastly different experiences. Promotion boards (statutory boards) are faced with the challenge of comparing apples to oranges, as various officers have had assorted tours, with some having more fleet service, and thus more observed performance evaluations, than others. We are now faced with the problem of determining whom to promote when we compare officers who have different skill sets, fewer breakouts, and different experiences. The solution is to create a system where officers are compared against each other for promotion based on similar experiences resulting from similar service requirements and their associated opportunities for peer breakouts. In order to align 14 United States Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: DoD, February 6, 2006, p. 80.
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performance, so that apples may be compared with apples, we must ensure officers arrive at promotion boards having completed the same style of tours for the requisite time needed to allow the board members to make judicious selections based on complete performance evaluations. Pursuant to this goal, we must first establish the qualities and experiences within naval aviation that we value. Currently, junior officers (JOs), upon completion of fleet replacement squadron (FRS) training, report to the fleet for a 36-‐month tour in a deployable squadron. The importance of this JO sea tour cannot be understated, as it is perhaps the most formative time in an aviator’s career. During this tour, the JO is exposed to leadership challenges and flight experiences that will both shape and highlight the type of officer he or she is to become. More challenges, both on the ground, and in the air, propel the JO to leadership responsibilities of increasing importance. At the same time, the JO is being mentored by both his chiefs and his department heads to assume roles and responsibilities in the squadron that allow him to grow as an officer. All the while, the commanding officer and executive officer are evaluating JO performance and are making judgment calls on who the standout performers are. This same process, performance and leadership growth and evaluation, occurs across the fleet in each of the various communities. Following this sea tour, junior officers are sent to a 33-‐month shore tour, where again, leadership and performance are evaluated. For many junior officers, this tour most often includes duties involving flight instruction, though exceptions are not rare. Regardless of the type of assignment of duties involved, this shore tour places even more responsibility on the shoulders of the JO. For most aviators, this shore tour is spent as some manner of flight instructor. In these roles, the responsibilities are significant, as he or she is entrusted with the skill development and mentoring of young student naval aviators. At the same time, squadron leadership places duties similar to those performed during the sea tour, but of increasing scope and responsibility, on the JO. The transition from being part of the ready room to a peer leader is occurring, and these experiences are highlighting those qualities that are sought after in a prospective department head. The JO sea and shore tours represent the two most important milestones for consideration for selection to O-‐4 in the strike/fighter community. Unfortunately, the mismatch between career milestones and timing in the current system places many officers up for promotion without the full experience and necessary performance evaluations of a JO shore tour. As a result, many officers are screened for promotion at the statutory board without requisite peer breakouts. Board members are thus hindered by incomplete performance and leadership assessments, and must make their selections as best they can. To illustrate this point, one can look at the case of a strike/fighter junior officer who attended a two-‐year post-‐graduate masters program immediately following commissioning. Upon the completion of graduate school, this officer will be promoted to O-‐2 and will start flight training. After nearly 3 years of flight school, this officer will arrive in the fleet as an O-‐3 with one year TIG. Following his three-‐year sea tour, he or she will arrive at a 33-‐month shore tour with 4 years TIG. This leaves the officer with one to two years at most in his shore tour to break out and earn a highwater fitness report (FITREP). Understandably, many of these officers fail to remain competitive, and are detailed appropriately, their chances at promotion having been reduced the day they accepted graduate education orders. This process of rank advancement before selecting job assignment is the most problematic challenge towards encouraging highly qualified personnel to remain in service. This system forces the statutory boards to select individuals for promotion referencing a peer breakout largely affected by timing, rather than leadership and proven performance. Admin boards, in contrast, are
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charged with the selection of individuals for job assignments such as department head and command. These boards are conducted separately and are composed of different memberships, with two different objectives. Though the memberships in both cases are looking to select the "best and most fully qualified," the board's interpretation is obviously influenced by which board the member is sitting on and the relative competition among eligible officers, which could result in different selections. Thus, the possibility exists for an individual to be screened for command, but not for O-‐5. Though rare, this is a problem that occurs when trying to get two different groups of board members to pick the exact same individuals for promotion and milestone jobs. The existence of this problem undermines an officer's faith in the selection system-‐-‐as in which board, the admin or the statutory board, picked the right group and which one picked the wrong group. The challenge in promoting our most capable and talented officers is how to make the statutory board and the admin board pick the same people. The fix must be to align rank with responsibility and make the assessment and selection together, based on performance evaluations of similar duration for every candidate. The solution rests in combining the admin and statutory boards by community, and to allow each of these communities to decide the member composition and selection criteria of the “tanks” where advancement decisions are made. Such a combination empowers the selection boards, both for restricted and unrestricted line, to promote and reward their top performers and enable those with proven track records to continue their rise to the top. Though this solution seems simple enough, its implementation is far from it, as the admin and statutory boards are separated by law. Accordingly, changes will require the support of senior Navy leadership and the willingness to go before Congress to amend or repeal the outdated laws. Having established the need for a unitary board to select officers for promotion and assignment, the question becomes what qualities and service milestones are valuable to each of the communities to facilitate selection of our best and brightest. This process will require a tremendous amount of discussion within and between the various communities, but such a dialogue will prompt an educated debate on the merits of various tours, and can help shape the way in which we groom our officers for promotion. Furthermore, these needs can be periodically reviewed and changed, to continually shape the requirements as the service adapts to a changing security landscape. The following chart combines the TIG requirements of the existing DOPMA laws with the proposed requirements for competencies in the strike/fighter community. Though these particular requirements are specific to the naval aviator, each of the unrestricted line, restricted line, and staff communities can determine it’s own unique eligibility requirements to best meet it’s particular needs.
Promotion to: Eligibility Requirement Minimum Duration
DOPMA Minimum TIG
Targeted Minimum TIG
LTJG Completion of Flight School (Wings) As Necessary 18 months O-‐1 18 months O-‐1
LT 1. Completion of FRS 2. JO Sea tour service
As Necessary 12 months 24 months O-‐2 24 months O-‐2
CDR (CO/XO) Department Head tour 30 months 36 months O-‐4 48 months O-‐4
Note the minimum TIG is stipulated by the DOPMA, and is not a requirement for advancement. The goal will be to align the various communities such that officers should promote with similar time in observed fleet service. Whatever length of time-‐in-‐grade the service targets should be common
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across the assorted communities. For example, a Surface Warfare Officer competency and service chart could read somewhat similar to the one below.
Promotion to: Eligibility Requirement Minimum Duration
DOPMA Minimum TIG
Targeted Minimum TIG
LTJG Completion of first JO sea tour 18 months 18 months O-‐1 18 months O-‐1
LT Completion of second JO sea tour 24 months 24 months O-‐2 24 months O-‐2
CDR (CO/XO) Second DH tour 30 months 36 months O-‐4 48 months O-‐4
The exact requirements to determine promotion eligibility is a topic for an entirely different discussion altogether; however, we can see that regardless of the specifics, once we determine the criteria for selection, we can now discard overall career timing to shift the focus towards competency. What results is a career timeline that is based on the individual, with wickets that are unique to the community, on a milestone timeline that is common to the naval service. The adaptation of this model will effectively negate the need for year group numbers, as timelines have shifted away from groups and towards individuals. This invites the question of how detailing and selection will take place in a system where each officer has his or her own timeline. The answer to this question lies in the discussion of career wickets mentioned earlier. Since career progression in the new system will be based on achieving career milestones, the detailing process simply groups people together based on predicted completion of the specified career landmarks. Records are now easier to compare, as individuals have completed the same wickets. This system makes career breaks easier, as it no longer matters when an officer departs the standard career progression, because milestone completion, regardless of when completed, is all that matters. Furthermore, adverse effects resulting from time-‐to-‐train variances are also negated, as the time spent in training has no bearing on the service record examined for advancement. As officers fulfill their tours, their completion dates will determine when they are eligible for promotion consideration. Recognizing the inability for the Bureau of Personnel (BUPERS) to handle hundreds of unique timelines, individuals will be grouped together for ease of advancement/selection boards. The current system does this, but on a yearly basis, a procedure hardly befitting a system that focuses on individual timelines. The proposed solution is to assign individuals to Fiscal Year (FY) Quarter groups. Quarterly grouping, though flexible for the individual, presents challenges to the organization when it comes to making decisions on promotion and the subsequent assignment of follow-‐on orders. Quarterly selection boards will suffer from a smaller pool of individuals and will be a frequent burden for BUPERS to manage. The solution to this question is best left to another discussion, but it goes without saying that yearly boards are, by nature, not complimentary to this proposed system. This paper has gone into great discussion on the merits of creating a system that enables our most qualified officers to continue their professional development and service to the Navy. However, a move towards this system begs the question of how to prevent officers from crowding the field-‐grade ranks and thus bloat the service. This very issue was the genesis of the OPA discussed earlier, and must be addressed if changes are to occur. The current system mandates officers who fail to screen by the designated time in service be discharged. If we are to change the system to create promotion windows based on the completion of specified career milestones, then
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we must also choose to separate officers based on their inability to screen following the completion of said milestones. For officers who choose to delay screening for graduate school or other career breaks, controls must be implemented limiting the number and/or duration of intermissions to ensure these officers are given the desired opportunities whilst not lingering and stifling the upward mobility of officers progressing behind them. The specifics for such controls is up for further debate and research, but possibilities include delaying promotion boards no longer than “x” number of years/months to ensure careers continue to move forward and not stall. Such a system is an absolute must to prevent mediocre officers who desire to take advantage of a stagnant system to remain in place and “ride out their 20.” Again, further debate and research must be done to answer important questions such as number of chances at promotion, maximum time-‐in-‐grade, duration of off-‐track assignments, and overall officer quotas. Though the answers to these questions will most likely face significant legislative hurdles, the difficulty of their implementation should not detract from the importance and necessity of their realization. Fundamental transformations are needed for the Navy to promote and retain its best and brightest officers. The aforementioned changes serve to re-‐focus the officer promotion and assignment system towards the accurate assessment of individuals who have measured, proven track records. This article has argued that these changes will bring about a more robust and capable officer corps that will keep the service strong well into the 21st century, but it would be remiss if it did not include a discussion of the financial implications of such a landmark change to the promotion system. Time is Money
“To ensure U.S. Armed Forces remain ready and capable requires that we make much-‐needed reforms across the defense enterprise . . . In addition, military and civilian leaders across the Department agree that we must reform military compensation in a responsible way that protects the ability to modernize the force over the long-‐term.” –Chuck Hagel, Secretary of Defense15
Alterations in how the Navy goes about promoting its officers will naturally have a significant financial impact on the overall cost of the officer corps. The following section will discuss the implications that career path changes will have on pay and other compensation. Additionally, it will discuss options to incentivize billets and subspecialties that will enhance the individual officer and thereby the strength of the service. This discussion on cost savings will focus on two key components: the cost of the individual, and the return on investment. When discussing the cost of the individual, principle elements include the costs of the pay, benefits, and training the individual receives. The topic of return on investment is much more difficult to quantify in terms of dollars spent versus value added. Thus, a discussion of return on investment will focus chiefly on dollars invested versus years returned. Not only does this simplify the argument, but when one considers the broader topic of officer advancement and retention, the focus must be on cumulative years of service. The military is a niche tradecraft in that we cannot hire outside talent—we must promote from within. Accordingly, the initial investments made to train the warfighter in his chosen profession are directly returned as this apprentice hones his skill and becomes a master. Hence, it is in the best interests of the service to gain longevity of service, as this maximizes the return. Similar to the previous discussion, this article will use the strike/fighter pilot as a model for illustrating the possible cost savings that
15 Secretary’s Letter, United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: DoD, March 4th, 2014.
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this system will produce. First, we will look at the simple costs of the individual in the current promotion system versus the proposed system, and will then move on to discuss the return on investment that comes from adopting this new promotion framework. The baseline comparison of promotion systems will be made against an aviator who is on a “normal” career progression free of unnecessary delays or postgraduate education. Since our current system couples rank with time in service, a strike/fighter aviator will promote to O-‐2 before the completion of advanced flight training. Under the proposed system, promotion is tied to milestones, and in the case of aviation, winging would be the wicket to promote to O-‐2. Looking at this “normal” progression, one would see that time spent in the O-‐1 grade would increase by three months. Though not significant, this small cost savings, multiplied across the community of student naval aviators, represents significant pay savings. When one considers delays in time-‐to-‐train or postgraduate education, the savings are significant, as illustrated in the sample timeline below:
When one considers the myriad variables such as time-‐to-‐start, time-‐to-‐train, training delays, and any number of other factors, the time spent in lower pay grades will tend to increase. Though individuals, given the correct aviation pipeline, could spend less than two years as an O-‐1, the majority of individuals will remain junior for longer, resulting in cost reductions that can lower aggregate personnel costs. In the 41 years of the all-‐volunteer force, the DoD has seen substantial increases in service member compensation and benefits. The current fiscal environment, however, threatens to erode these benefits. Recently, the service chiefs have been asking for reductions in pay growth to offset these rising personnel costs. When the discussion turns towards pay, talk of reductions is an important factor officers will consider when making the decision to stay in or get out. Restructuring the promotion system will not only save money, but presents the service with an opportunity to incentivize individuals to work harder for greater pay. For example, the officer presented with several months to begin flight school might be frustrated by the fact he will remain at a lower pay grade for longer. The Navy can incentivize this officer to expand his knowledge, skills, and abilities by paying more for subspecialties earned through individual professional development. Opportunities to earn important qualifications and experience can be used to fill the training gaps and make up for perceived lost pay. For example, surface warfare officers can see a pay increase when one’s surface warfare pin is earned, and parallel incentives can be mirrored across the communities. Expanding this, officers who pursue postgraduate degrees prior to starting their fleet service can be offered added pay resulting from subspecialties earned from their education. These incentives show the officer that the furtherance of education and acquisition of valuable skills and qualifications will pay more, as they are skills valued by the Navy. The discussion now turns towards how the Navy can best achieve a return on these investments by switching to a competency-‐based promotion system.
It was mentioned earlier that any discussion of a return on investment must focus on the years invested in an officer’s training versus the years returned in service. Again, we will compare sample timelines for officers under the current system and those in the new system. For this particular comparison, we will take the model of the officer who pursued postgraduate education immediately following commissioning.
Note how in the current system, an officer who attends a two year postgraduate education, in order to remain on timeline with his peers, must give up a dissociated sea tour. Herein we see the negative effects that timing delays and issues have when they cause additional sea tours to be lost. This loss takes away opportunities for an aviator to gain more insight and exposure to staff service, while also gaining valuable flight leadership and tactical development opportunities. In this particular case, the Navy is not seeing a proportional return on the investment it made not only in advanced education, but flight training in general because the officer is unable to offer a “payback” tour, where he or she is typically able to pass on the skills and wisdom accrued in recent service on to the next generation of leaders. An officer who attends postgraduate studies is expected to return the education investment in subsequent service, but instead loses not only two years of sea time, but is at a disadvantage for promotion when compared to officers who have had multiple opportunities to break out amongst their peers. In transitioning to a competency-‐based system with consistent advancement milestones, the same officer can fulfill a career similar to his peers, and will not lose out on valuable sea time and leadership development opportunities. This new system guarantees a consistent return on investment when it requires milestone completion for advancement, and yields an officer who finishes his milestones at 14-‐plus years of active duty, and is thus more likely to continue his or her service to the Navy. The Navy must focus on the long-‐term strength of the service when determining what is the best course of action to take when modernizing the officer promotion system. The proposed transformations yield significant financial benefits to the organization, and targets incentives to reward and retain the best and brightest. When one considers these advantages, the case towards fundamentally restructuring the officer promotion process is a win-‐win for both the naval service and the individual officer.
“We must act swiftly. We must stop reacting belatedly to trailing indicators and act proactively based on leading indicators and readily identifiable factors derived from two years worth of fleet input and officer interviews. We are competing with global demand to retain our best, brightest, and most talented officers – and we cannot afford to simply let them walk away.” –CDR Guy Snodgrass16
Fundamentally changing an organization’s personnel management system is a daunting task that, at first glance, seems almost insurmountable. However, the complexity and scope of this endeavor must not dissuade the leadership from making the much-‐needed changes to create a system that fosters the advancement and promotion of our most talented and capable officers. The first step in this process will be to identify the experience, knowledge, and critical skills that the Navy targets in its leaders. Once these attributes are identified, the service must determine the assignments and career milestones that will best develop these attributes while allowing accurate and complete performance evaluations. This framework provides the core structure for the new system, around which the various details can be planned to create a personnel management system best tailored to the needs of the communities and the naval service. In the author’s opinion, the most important details that must be discussed in the implementation of this system will be the composition, structure, and timing of the selection boards, and the restructuring of non-‐competitive tours. Earlier in this article, it was discussed how combining the statutory and admin boards would create a selection process that could be tailored to meet the individual needs of the various communities. Though this seems a simple task, it is quite the opposite. Furthermore, the timing and frequency of selection boards will require necessary adjustments to an officer’s career progression. The possibility exists that the non-‐competitive tours, such as the dissociated sea tour and joint tour, could have their duration extended or reduced as appropriate to best respond to promotion boards that would, hopefully, be more frequent than yearly. Both of these questions are indicative of the many questions that would arise should a system such as this come to fruition. It is crucial that an informed and spirited debate take place regarding these challenges so that the system best responds to the needs of the individual and the naval service. Unfortunately, fundamental changes such as these will not occur overnight. These modifications must, and should, be well thought-‐out and carefully implemented to ensure fair and responsible advancements occur, and the best and brightest are targeted for retention. In a forthcoming article entitled “Sustained Superior Timing”, LT William Kelly will address the Career Intermission Program and how it can bridge the gap between the current promotion system and the one proposed herein. Such immediate fixes are needed to ensure combat-‐proven naval leaders who desire to serve can continue their careers unhindered by timing constraints. Fixes such as these are necessary in the interim, but fundamental changes are absolutely essential if the Navy is to guarantee the future strength of the service.
16 Keep a Weather Eye on the Horizon: A Navy Officer Retention Study, CDR Guy M. Snodgrass, U.S. Navy, 2014.
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Time is Running Out
“Maintaining our commitment to sustaining and strengthening the health of the All-‐Volunteer Force in times of decreasing defense budgets requires us to make prudent, significant, and enduring reforms wherever possible.” –2014 Quadrennial Defense Review17
The 21st century global security environment is becoming increasingly complex. Threats continue to evolve, requiring a force capable of meeting them on every battlefield. The DoD must match these threats with a modern force that is highly adaptable and is commanded at all levels by the very best leaders and strategic thinkers. The identification and selection of these officers is challenging enough, and is further encumbered by the outdated promotion system in place today. Significant changes to the current laws are required to the officer advancement system to enable the DoD to properly lead and shape its forces in the 21st century battlefield. Eight years after the 2006 QDR called for a capabilities-‐based promotion system, the Navy has yet to make significant progress to that end. Though immediate changes are needed, a fundamental transformation must be undertaken. Senior Navy leadership must recognize this need to adapt is officer corps and champion the required legislative action to ensure our promotion system moves forward and remains agile. The changes proposed herein will create an officer selection system that rewards competencies and ensures forward thinking, educated, and inspiring naval leaders are retained for future service. This system not only will encourage our best and brightest to stay in, but will result in net personnel cost savings, while incentivizing officers to pursue career enhancing skills and education that will serve to strengthen the naval service. Keeping ahead of the rapidly-‐evolving security environment requires prescient, experienced, and motivated leaders who will challenge the status quo to ensure the American military remains a robust and capable force. Times are changing, and its time we change with them.
17 United States Department of Defense, 2014 Quadrennial Defense Review Report, Washington, D.C.: DoD, 2014.
