SAFEGUARDS CASE STUDIES OF THE 1990’s

R. HooperMonterey, June 2012

IRAQ

A BRIEF HISTORY OF SAFEGUARDS IMPLEMENTATION IN IRAQ PRIOR TO THE GULF WAR

Iraq was an original signatory of the NPT (July 1968) and became a party prior to NPT entry-into-force

Their Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement entered-into-force February 1972

Israeli 1981 destruction of the 40 MW Tamuz I research reactor being constructed by the French at the Tuwaitha Nuclear Research Center

Iraqi response – the Tuwaitha “berm” and other measures against low altitude attacks

Ikonos satellite image of Tuwaitha

HISTORY CONTINUED

In the years prior to the Gulf War, safeguards were implemented in four installations designated to be facilities at Tuwaitha

IRT 5000 research reactor 0 power Tamus II research reactor an away from reactor fresh fuel store a pilot fuel fabrication facility

inspector access was limited to “strategic points” at each of those four locations as specified in facility attachments

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IT

TUWAITHABuildings declared by Iraqto IAEA before 1991 aredisplayed in red

FuelFabricationLaboratory

IQC

Tammuz 2Reactor

IQB

IRT 5000Reactor

IQA

THE GULF WAR AND THE UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS

The Gulf War ended in March 1991 with Iraqi acceptance of UNSCR 687 – cease fire and disarmament of Iraq

UNSCR called for the “destruction, removal and rendering harmless” of Iraqi WMD and associated infrastructure

IAEA was given a qualified mandate re nuclear disarmament. The remainder – missiles, chemical and biological – was the responsibility of the newly created UNSCOM

UNSCR 687 INSPECTIONS CONTINUED

First IAEA UNSCR 687 on-site inspection occurred mid-May 1991

Mapping the Iraqi clandestine program

“chase the disc”, IAEA 2 “the parking lot”, IAEA 6 the Haider Chicken Farm documents

Destruction, removal, rendering harmless

The nuclea

r- related sites in

Iraq

SOUTH AFRICA

--A CASE OF NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT-

SOUTH AFRICA’S NUCLEAR WEAPONS PROGRAM

The program existed for at least 20 years (1969-1989)

The white South Africa government was motivated by a deep fear of a black uprising and of communism

South Africa possessed sufficient indigenous technical capabilities and materials

The key was the capability to enrich uranium; the facility was located at a nuclear research installation at Pelindaba near Pretoria

The South Africa AEC produced sufficient highly enriched uranium for 7 gun-type nuclear weapons

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE NPT

South Africa began discussions pursuant to signing the NPT in 1987

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, amid heavy international pressure and an imminent change of government, South Africa signed the NPT on 10 July 1991

South Africa’s comprehensive safeguards agreement with the Agency entered-into-force on 16 September 1991

SOUTH AFRICA AND THE IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS

At the 1991 General Conference, a group of African States pushed through a C resolution requesting the Board to instruct the DG to verify the completeness of South Africa’s initial report

-This was a first-

The DG’s “completeness team” began its work in South Africa a couple of months later

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.)

The focus, of course, was the uranium enrichment activities the pilot plant (Y plant), and the semi-commercial plant (Z plant)

a unique enrichment process and the availability of extensive operating records covering the Y Plant operating history

in March 1993, South Africa formally acknowledged the former existence of a nuclear weapons program and the completeness exercise took on a disarmament dimension

IMPLEMENTATION OF SAFEGUARDS (CONT.)

in 1994, the Agency concluded that the HEU declared and presented – largely material recovered from dismantled weapons – was consistent with what reasonably could have been produced, and

that there was no indication that all nuclear weapon components, designs and related infrastructure had not been destroyed or otherwise rendered harmless

DPRK

DPRK’s NUCLEAR PROGRAMME AND IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (1)

The programme dates to a 1959 nuclear cooperation agreement with the USSR

The USSR supplied an IRT 5000 Research Reactor and an isotope production laboratory that became operational in 1965

Safeguards were first implemented at the RR under an INFCIRC/66 type of agreement

DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (2)

Across the 1980’s, DPRK constructed and operated

a 5 MWe natural uranium fueled, graphite moderated, gas cooled reactor

conversion/fuel fabrication facility reprocessing facility

DPRK acceded to the NPT in 1985, but did not meet its Article III obligation to conclude a CSA until 1992

DPRK AND IMPLEMENTATION OF IN’TL SAFEGUARDS (3)

Entry-into-force of DPRK’s CSA occurred 10 April 1992, the submission of their initial report followed quickly

(4 May 1992)

Ad hoc inspections to verify the correctness and assess the completeness of the initial report began immediately

The DPRK pledged a high level of cooperation with “anytime, any place access”

THE AD HOC INSPECTIONS

There were 6 ad hoc inspections during the remainder of 1992, inconsistencies between inspection data and DPRK declarations regarding the operational histories of the 5 MWe reactor and the reprocessing facility soon developed

In broad terms, the DPRK declared that the core of the 5 MWe reactor was the original core and that there had been one “hot” reprocessing campaign involving a mixture of damaged, lightly irradiated fuel and fresh fuel

PRINCIPAL INCONSISTENCIES

The waste declared and presented as having resulted from the single reprocessing campaign was not compatible with inputs and the Pu product

Environmental samples taken in the Pu finishing area contained

Pu isotopically different from the declared Pu product

The ingrowth of Am in Pu particle indicated three points in time when Pu separations were done, not one

SATELLITE IMAGERY

leading to a request for a special inspection, which has never happened

DPRK AND STRENGTHENED SAFEGUARDS

Provided added impetus to efforts to strengthen safeguards

Provided additional evidence of the power of environmental sampling

Tacit acceptance by the Board that the Agency would accept and make use of third party information