A Casualty of Political Transformation?:

The Politics of Japanese Energy Efficiency

Phillip Y. Lipscy

Department of Political Science &Shorenstein Asia-Pacific Research

Center,Stanford University

Politics of Energy Efficiency: The General Puzzles

• Cross-National Variation in Energy Efficiency Policies and Outcomes–What Explains Cross-national Variation

in Outcomes?–Why are Different Policies Adopted?–What Political Factors Affect the

Effectiveness of Policies?

Why Japan?

• Strong Energy Efficiency Record• Important component of foreign

policy and foreign aid • Not Clear Why Japan has Done So

Well• Role of Politics?

Cultural Explanations?• Energy Policy Experts Often Claim: “Japan

is Different”• Unique Culture of Frugality?

The Political Context of Japanese Efficiency Policies

• Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy• Interest Group Politics• Efficiency Clientelism

Bureaucratic Initiative & Independence

• Stable Government Policy– Encourages private sector investment in

efficiency– vs. US: Carter Reagan; Clinton Bush

• Public-Private Communication• Depoliticized Policymaking– Top Runner Program– Explicitly designed to prevent perversion

of policy through lobbying

0.00%

0.01%

0.02%

0.03%

0.04%

0.05%

0.06%

0.07%

0.08%

0.09%

Budgets of National Energy Efficiency Agencies and Ministries, Share of GDP

0

200

400

600

800

1000

1200

1400

Number of Employees in NationalEnergy Efficiency Agencies / Ministries

Interest Group Politics• Interest Group Politics– Absence of Strong Anti-Efficiency

Interest Groups– Early establishment of industry

leadership in efficient products– Virtuous Cycle: • Specialization in efficient products Political

support for efficiency Policy to support efficiency

– e.g. Automobile Sector & Fuel Economy Standards• Toyota; Honda strong lobby for stringent

standards

Efficiency Clientelism• Efficiency Clientelism: policies that served dual

purpose:– Provision of Pork to LDP (Old Ruling Party) Constituencies– Energy Efficiency through Diffuse Costs Imposed on

General Public • Efficiency Clientelism matched up well with

Japan’s post-World War II political arrangements– MMD-SNTV Electoral System; Rural Overrepresentation– LDP One-Party Dominance– Bureaucratic Initiative

• Contributed to Japan’s abnormal transport profile of high costs, low total distance traveled, high rail-share, and low automobile-share

0

5,000

10,000

15,000

20,000

25,000

Total Distance Traveled (All Modes), Annual Passenger KM per Capita

0

5000

10000

15000

20000

25000

Passenger KM per Capita by Travel Mode

Car

Bus

Rail, Tram, Metro

Air

Water

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

Rail and Bus Share of Total Distance Traveled

Japan

Denmark

Italy

Sweden

Germany

France

Finland

Norway

Great Britain

US

Example: Kei-Cars (軽自動車 )

• Subsidization of light-weight automobiles through tax incentives and relaxed requirements

• Began as part of motorization policy in 1950s

• In 1970s, coopted to serve dual purpose:– Energy Efficiency fuel efficient vehicles

for rural areas with limited public transportation

– Subsidization of rural residents, small business

Subsidies for Kei-Cars

Kei-Cars Regular Automobiles

Automobile Acquisition Tax (Time of Purchase)

3% 5%

Automobile Weight Tax(Every 3 Years)

13,200 (~$160) 56,700 (~$690)(Compact Car)

Automobile Tax (Yearly)

7,200 (~$90) 29,500 (~$360)

Highway Discount(Per Use; Rural Areas Only)

20% Discount n/a

Registration of Parking Space

Not Necessary(Rural Areas Only)

Required

Kei-Car Ownership by PrefecturePrefecture Kei-Cars as

% of TotalPopulation Density (people/km2)

Kochi 50.0% 108

Nagasaki 49.6% 349

Okinawa 49.0% 609

Shimane 48.8% 107

Tottori 48.3% 169

… … …

Osaka 28.0% 4,657

Aichi 27.2% 1,436

Chiba 26.4% 1,199

Saitama 26.0% 1,888

Hokkaido 25.9% 70

Kanagawa 20.0% 3,728

Tokyo 16.2% 5,937

Rural Transportation in US vs. Japan

Other Examples

• Highway Tolls• Gasoline Tax• Shinkansen Bullet Train Network• Electricity Prices

The End of Efficiency Clientelism

• Political Changes Since the 1990s Undermine Efficiency Clientelism– Electoral Reform – Delegitimization of Bureaucracy– End of LDP Dominance

• Peculiar Position of DPJ (New Ruling Party)– Public Endorsement of Significant CO2

Reductions • Hatoyama 25% Reduction Target from 1990 Levels

– Policy Commitments that Run Counter to CO2 Reduction

Conclusion• Political Sources of Japan’s Efficiency

Policies – Bureaucratic Initiative & Autonomy – Interest Group Politics– Efficiency Clientelism

• New Approach? – Distribution of revenues to efficiency-

enhancing activities & R&D rather than pork

– Challenge: difficult to implement pro-efficiency policies with diffuse costs without public backlash

–Where will political support come from?