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THEASIAPACIFICJOURNALOFPUBLICADMINISTRATIONVOL.31,NO.2(DECEMBER2009):171-195
Benchmarking for Excellence: A Comparative Analysis of
Seven Asian Anti-Corruption Agencies
Jon S T Quah
Anti-corruption agencies (ACAs) have been established in many Asian countries to tackle the problem of corruption. However, with the exceptions of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore and the Independent Commission Against Corruption in Hong Kong, many Asian ACAs have been ineffective. What criteria should be used to evaluate their effectiveness? After analyzing the functions of the ACAs in India, Hong Kong, Macao, Philippines, Singapore, South Korea and Thailand, this article recommends that their performance should be benchmarked according to 22 indicators. It concludes that benchmarking provides an ACA with an objective method for evaluating its performance by comparing it with the performance of more effective ACAs. Benchmarking also enables an ACA to improve its performance by introducing reforms to remove the weaknesses exposed by comparison with more effective ACAs in other countries.
Introduction
Corruption isperceivedasaseriousprobleminmanyAsiancountriestoday according to Transparency ’s International 2008CorruptionPerceptionsIndex(CPI).Themostcommonresponseinthesecountriesistheestablishmentofanti-corruptionagencies(ACAs)tocombatcorruption.However,according toPope (2000:104),ACAshavebeen “moreoftenfailures thansuccesses.”Whatcriteriashouldbeusedtoevaluate theireffectiveness?ThisarticleaddressesthisquestionbysuggestingseveralcriteriaforbenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAs.
Thearticle isdivided into five sections.The first sectiondefinesbenchmarkingandidentifies itsrationale.ThesecondsectiondiscussestheadvantagesofestablishingACAs.The thirdsection focuseson thedifferent typesofACAsanddescribes the functionsof theseACAs:theCorruptPractices InvestigationBureau (CPIB) inSingapore; theIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(ICAC)intheHongKongSAR;theCommissionAgainstCorruption(CCAC)intheMacaoSAR;theCentralBureauof Investigation (CBI) in India; theKorea IndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption(KICAC) inSouthKorea; theNationalCounterCorruptionCommission(NCCC)inThailand;andtheTanodbayan orOmbudsman in thePhilippines.ThesesevenACAsareselected for
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comparativeanalysistoillustratetheirdiversefunctionsandalsobecauseoftheiravailablepublishedperformancedata.Thefourthsectioncomparestheirperformanceaccordingtoseveralindicators.Theconcludingsectionrecommends thatAsianACAs shouldbenchmark theirperformanceaccordingto22indicators,asbenchmarkingenablestheirpoliticalleadersandpolicy-makers toassess theireffectivenessandmakethenecessarychangesforimprovingtheirperformance.
Benchmarking: Meaning and Rationale
TheoriginsofbenchmarkingcanbetracedtoJapanesebusinessfirmswhichvisitedothercountries inthe1950stobenchmarkthebestorganisationsfromwhichtotransfertechnologyandbusinesspracticestothemselves.These Japanesecompaniesdescribedwhat theydidas “industry tours” insteadofbenchmarking.Theprocessofthetoursinvolvedthesefoursteps:researchingpublisheddatatoidentifythebestorganisations;contactingtheorganizationstoscheduleavisit;visitingtheorganizationsandcarefullyselectingpertinentdata;andreturninghomeandadopting(withrelevantadaptations)thelessonslearnttogainacompetitiveadvantage(Harrington&Harrington1996:29).
Theapplicationofbenchmarkingtomeasurebusinessperformanceintermsofcost/salesandinvestmentratiosduringthe1950sencouragedcompanies in theUnitedStates to identify their own strengths andweaknessesbycomparingthemwiththoseoftheircounterpartswithintheindustry.Thegrowthofcomputertechnologyinthe1960sand1970sfurtherspurredtheapplicationofbenchmarking(Kozak2004:9).Xerox’s success inreinventing itself throughbenchmarkingresulted in therecognitionofbenchmarkingasan important toolofcontinuous improvement forAmericancompaniesinthe1980s.Benchmarkingisnowemployedintheautomotive,education,health,medicine, telecommunications, transportand tourism industriesand is recognised internationallyasaqualityimprovementtool(Kozak2004:9-10).
Inhiscontentanalysisof11widely-useddefinitions,Kozak (2004:7) found that “all thesedefinitionshave a common theme,namely:the continuousmeasurement and improvementof anorganization’s performanceagainstthebestintheindustrytoobtaininformationaboutnewworkingmethodsorpracticesinotherorganizations.”ThemostusefuldefinitionforthisarticleisSpendolini’s(1992:9)definitionofbenchmarkingas “acontinuous,systematicprocessforevaluatingtheproducts,services,andworkprocessesoforganizationsthatarerecognizedasrepresentingbestpractices for thepurposeoforganizational improvement.”Here,benchmarkingreferstotheprocessofevaluatingtheeffectivenessofAsianACAswiththeobjectiveofimprovingtheirperformance.
Whatistherationaleforbenchmarking?Internalbenchmarkingrefersto“two-waycommunicationandsharingopinionsbetweendepartments
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withinthesameorganizationorbetweenorganizationsoperatingaspartofachain indifferentcountries” (Kozak2004:10). Incontrast,externalbenchmarkinginvolves“acomparisonofworkwithexternalorganizationsinordertodiscovernewideas,methods,productsandservices.”Externalbenchmarkingenablesanorganisation to improve itsperformancebymeasuringhow itperforms, comparing itwith its competitors, anddetermininghowthelatterhaveachievedtheirperformancelevels.Thus,externalbenchmarkingprovidesanorganisationwith“opportunitiesforlearningfromthebestpracticesandexperiencesofotherswhoareattheleadingedge”(Kozak2004:11).
This article focuses on external benchmarking to compare theperformanceofsevenAsianACAsonthebasisofseveralindicators.Rose(2005:35)contends thatbenchmarkingprovidespolicy-makerswithatoolforevaluatinganationalprogrammeandenablesthemtolearnaboutsuccessfulprogrammesinothercountries.Thus:
The intentionof benchmarking is constructive: to evaluate aprogramme’sperformanceby ameasure independent of theopinionsofpolicymakers . . .Evaluatingaprogrammeagainstabenchmark standardwill showwhether, or towhat extent,satisfaction is justified. Insofaras the resultsarepositive, theprocessendorsesthepredispositiontoignorewhatisdoneabroad.Butinsofarasbenchmarkingshowsthataprogrammeproducingdomesticsatisfactionisnotsosuccessfulasothersevaluatedbythesamestandard,benchmarkingcanstimulatepolicymakerstoadoptimprovementsbylearningfromcomparablecountriesthatdodobetter.
In short, the advantage of benchmarkingAsianACAs is that itidentifiesthoseineffectiveACAsandencouragesthemtoperformbetterbyemulatingthebestpracticesoftheirmoreeffectivecounterparts.
Rationale and Advantages of ACAs
ACAsarespecialisedagenciesestablishedbygovernmentsforthespecificpurposeofminimizingcorruptionintheircountries.Meagher(2005:70)definesACAsas“separate,permanentagencieswhoseprimaryfunctionistoprovidecentralizedleadershipin[such]coreareasofanti-corruptionactivity...[as]policyanalysisandtechnicalassistanceinprevention,publicoutreachand information,monitoring, investigation,andprosecution”.Nichollsetal(2006:476)observethatanACAhasfouradvantages:reducedadministrativecosts;enhancedpublicprofile;concentrationofexpertise;andreduceduncertaintyoverthe jurisdictionbyavoidingduplicationofpowersandwork.TheUnitedNationsOfficeonDrugsandCrime’sAnti-CorruptionToolkit(2004:89-90)hasidentifiednineadvantagesofanACA:
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ahighdegreeofspecialisationandexpertise;ahighdegreeofautonomyto insulate it fromcorruptionandotherundueinfluences;separatenessfromtheagenciesanddepartmentsthat itwillbe investigating;a“freshstart” whennew,andthusfreefromcorruptionandotherproblemsthatmayaffectexistinginstitutions;considerablepubliccredibility;establishedsecurityprotection;political,legalandpublicaccountability;clarityintheassessmentofitsprogress,successesandfailures;andswiftactionagainstcorruptionastask-specificresourcesareusedandofficialsarenotsubjectedtothecompetingprioritiesofgenerallawenforcement,auditandsimilaragencies.
Themost importantadvantageofcreatinganACAis that it sendsapowerfulsignal to thecitizens in thecountry that thegovernment iscommitted to fighting corruption (UNODC2004: 90).However, thisinitialadvantage iseroded if thegovernmentdoesnotdemonstrate itscommitmentbyproviding theACAwith sufficient legalpowersandadequatehumanandfinancialresources.Also, thegovernmentshouldprovide theACAwithoperationalautonomyso that itcan investigateanyone,regardlessofstatusorposition.AlloftheoperationaladvantageslistedabovewillcountfornaughtifthegovernmentdoesnotsupporttheACAbyallowing it tooperate independentlyandbyproviding itwithadequateresourcesforperformingitsfunctionseffectively.
Types and Functions of Asian ACAs
Types of ACAs
Table1showsthat16ACAswereestablishedinAsiabetween1952and2006,fromtheCPIB’sformationinSingaporeinOctober1952tothecreationoftheIndependentAuthorityAgainstCorruption(IAAC)inMongoliainDecember2006.
Thereare several typesofACAsdependingonwhether theyareconcernedwithcombatingcorruptionsolely,orwiththeperformanceofmanyfunctionsincludinganti-corruption;onwhethertheir jurisdictionislimitedtothepublicsectoronly,ortoboththepublicandprivatesectors;andonthenatureoftheiranti-corruptionfunctions.Table2summarisesthefeaturesofthesevenACAswhichareanalysedbelow.
Functions of CPIB
DuringSingapore’scolonialperiod, theBritishauthoritiesreliedontheAnti-CorruptionBranch(ACB)oftheCriminalInvestigationDepartment(CID)intheSingaporePoliceForcetocurbcorruption.Thiswasaseriousmistakeforthreereasons.First,theACBwasasmallunitofonly17menwithadifficulttasktoperform:theeradicationofcorruptioninthecivilservice.Second,astheCID’stopprioritywastodealwithseriouscrimes
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Table 1Anti-Corruption Agencies in Asian Countries
Country Anti-corruption agency Date established
Singapore CorruptPracticesInvestigationBureau
October1952
India CentralBureauofInvestigation
April1963
Malaysia Anti-CorruptionAgency October1967
HongKongSAR,China IndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption
February1974
BruneiDarusalam Anti-CorruptionBureau February1982
Philippines Tanodbayan*(Ombudsman) May1988
Nepal CommissionfortheInvestigationofAbuseofAuthority
1990
SriLanka CommissiontoInvestigateAllegationsofBriberyorCorruption
November1994
Pakistan NationalAccountabilityBureau November1999
Thailand NationalCounterCorruptionCommission** November1999
MacaoSAR,China CommissionAgainstCorruption December1999
SouthKorea KoreaIndependentCommissionAgainstCorruption***
January 2002
Indonesia CorruptionEradicationCommission December2003
Bangladesh Anti-CorruptionCommission May2004
Bhutan OfficeoftheAnti-CorruptionCommission January2006
Mongolia IndependentAuthorityAgainstCorruption December2006
*TheTanodbayanwasoriginallyestablishedbyPresidentFerdinandMarcos in July1979.As itwasineffective,itwasreorganisedwhenPresidentCorazonAquinoissuedExecutiveOrderNo242on24July1987.TheOfficeoftheOmbudsmanbecameoperationalon12May1988.**TheNCCCwasrenamedtheNationalAnti-CorruptionCommission(NACC)on15July2008.***TheKICACwasmergedwiththeOmbudsmanandtheAdministrativeAppealsCommissiontoformtheAnti-CorruptionandCivilRightsCommission(ACRC)on29February2008.
likehomicide,thetaskoffightingcorruptionreceivedlowerpriorityastheACBhadtocompetewithotherbranchesforlimitedresources.Third,theACBwasineffectivebecauseoftherampantpolicecorruptionincolonialSingapore(Quah2007:14-15). InOctober1951,aconsignmentof1,800poundsofopiumworthS$400,000(US$133,330)wasstolenbyagangof
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Table 2Types of Anti-Corruption Agencies in Seven Countries
Anti-corruption agency
Functions Jurisdiction Location
CPIB,Singapore Investigation,preventionandeducation
Publicandprivatesectors
PrimeMinister’sOffice
ICAC,HongKongSAR,China
Investigation,preventionandeducation
Publicandprivatesectors
ChiefExecutive’sOffice
NCCC(NACCfrom15July2008)Thailand
Inspectionofassetsofpublicofficials,investigation,preventionandeducation
Publicsectoronly
Senate
CBI,India Anti-corruption,economiccrimesandspecialcrimes(organisedcrimeandterrorism)
Publicsectoronly
CentralVigilanceCommission
CCAC,MacaoSAR,China
Anti-corruptionandombudsman
Publicsectoronly
ChiefExecutive’sOffice
OmbudsmanPhilippines
Anti-corruption,ombudsman,prosecution,discipline,andpublicassistance
Publicsectoronly
HouseofRepresentatives
KICAC(ACRCfrom29February2008),SouthKorea
Anti-corruption,ombudsmanandadministrativeappeals
Publicsectoronly
OfficeofthePresident
robbers,whichincludedthreepolicedetectives.AspecialteamappointedbytheBritishcolonialgovernmenttoinvestigatetherobberyfoundthatcorruptionwaswidespreadespeciallyamongthosepolicemeninvolvedinprotectionrackets(Quah2007:16).
TheopiumhijackingscandalmadetheBritishauthoritiesrealisetheimportanceofcreatinganindependentACAthatwasseparatefromthepolice.Accordingly, theACBwasreplacedwith theCPIB,whichwasformedasthefirstAsianACAinOctober1952,toperformthesefunctions:receivingandinvestigatingcomplaintsconcerningcorruptioninthepublicandprivatesectors; investigatingmalpracticesandmisconductbypublicofficers;andexaminingthepracticesandproceduresinthepublicservice
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tominimizeopportunitiesforcorruptpractices(CPIB1990:2).Aspartofitspreventivefunction,theCPIBisalsoresponsibleforscreeningcandidatesselectedforpositionsinthecivilserviceandstatutoryboardstoensurethatonlythosecandidateswithoutanytaintofcorruptionormisconductareactuallyappointed(RepublicofSingapore1994:638).
Functions of ICAC
ThesamestorycanbetoldinHongKong,whichwasunderBritishrulefrom1841to30June1997.FollowingSingapore’sexperience,theACBoftheCIDintheRoyalHongKongPoliceForce(RHKPF)wasalsoresponsibleforcurbingcorruptionfrom1948to1971,whentheACBwasupgradedtotheAnti-CorruptionOffice(ACO),whichwasalsoineffectiveintacklingtheextensivepolicecorruption.Theescapeofacorruptionsuspect(ChiefSuperintendentPeterFGodberon8 June1973) to theUnitedKingdomangeredthepublicandunderminedtheACO’scredibility.Consequently,theGovernor,SirMurrayMacLehose,wascompelledbypubliccriticismtoaccept theBlair-KerrCommission’srecommendation toestablishanindependentACA,separatefromtheRHKPF,tofightcorruption(Quah2003:137-140).
UnliketheCPIB’s investigativemodel, theICACisdescribedas the“universalmodel”becauseof its three-prongedstrategyof focusingoninvestigation,communityrelationsandprevention(Heilbrunn2006:136).TheICACwasformedon15February1974to “rootoutcorruptionandtorestoreconfidence in theGovernment” (Wong1981:45).TheICAC’s raison d’etre is toperform“atrinityofpurposecomprisinginvestigation,preventionandeducation.”The ICAC’s “three-prongedapproach” is critical fordeveloping “anewpublic consciousness” and is reflectedin itsorganisationalstructureof the threeDepartmentsofOperations,CorruptionPrevention,andCommunityRelations(ICAC1989:28-29).
Functions of NCCC/NACC
Section19of theOrganicActonCounterCorruptionBE2542 (1999)identifies thepowersanddutiesofThailand’sNCCC(ONCCC2006a:10-11).TheNCCC’sfirstfunctionistoinspectandverifythedeclarationoftheassetsandliabilitiessubmittedbypoliticiansandcivilservants.OfficialswhofailtodeclaretheirassetsormakefalsedeclarationsarereportedtotheConstitutionalCourtbytheNCCC.Thosefoundguiltyareremovedfromtheirpositionsandbarredfromholdingpoliticalofficeforfiveyears.
TheNCCC’s second role involvesmaking recommendations onpreventingcorruption to theCabinetandothergovernmentagencies;enhancingtheintegrityoftheofficialsandpublicbyorganisingcontests,meetingsandseminarson fightingcorruptionamong thepeopleandcivilservants;andfosteringcooperationamongthepublicbyconducting
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seminarsoncounteringcorruptioninBangkokandtheotherprovinces.TheNCCC’s third function is to suppress corruptionby taking
disciplinary action against corrupt politicians and bureaucrats. Itinvestigatescorruptioncomplaintsagainstpoliticiansandcivilservants,andtheSenatehasthepowertoimpeachthemforhaving“unusualwealth,” orforcommittingcorruption,malfeasance,orabuseofpower.Section58empowerstheSenatetoinitiatetheremovalfromofficeofpoliticalleadersandseniorbureaucratsforsuchoffences.Section59specifiesthattheSenatecanalsoinitiatetheimpeachmentofcorruptpoliticiansandbureaucratsif itreceivesarequest that issupportedbyone-quarterof theHouseofRepresentatives,or if thecomplaint issignedby50,000membersof thepublic(ONCCC2006a:23).
Functions of the CBI
InApril1963,thegovernmentofIndiacreatedtheCBIbyincorporatingtheDelhiSpecialPoliceEstablishmentasoneofitssixdivisions,namelythe InvestigationandAnti-CorruptionDivision. InFebruary1964,anEconomicOffencesWingwasaddedtotheCBI(CBI2008:2).Tomeettheincrease in thenumberofsecuritiesscamcasesandeconomicoffenceswiththeliberalisationofIndia’seconomy,theCBIwasreorganisedin1994andthreeinvestigationdivisionswereformed.First,theAnti-CorruptionDivisionwasestablished todealwith casesof corruptionand fraudcommittedbypublic servantsofall centralgovernmentdepartments,publicsectorundertakingsandfinancialinstitutions.Second,theEconomicCrimesDivisionwasformedtohandlebankandfinancialfraud;import,exportandforeignexchangeviolations;large-scalesmugglingofnarcotics,antiquesandculturalproperty;andsmugglingofothercontrabanditems.ThethirddivisionistheSpecialCrimesDivision,whichdealswithcasesofterrorism,bombblasts,sensationalhomicides,kidnappingforransom,andcrimescommittedbythemafiaorunderworld(CBI2008:3-4).
Functions of CCAC
Toenable theCCAC to combat corruptionmoreeffectively,Macao’s LegislativeAssemblyenactedtheOrganisationalLawoftheCCAC(LawNo10/2000)on14August2000togivetheCCACpowersofdetention,search,seizureanduseofweapons;andits investigatorsarealsogiventhestatusofcriminal investigationpoliceofficers(CCAC2007:12).TheCCACperformsfourfunctions:preventingactsofcorruptionandfraud;investigatingcrimesofcorruptionandfraudcommittedbycivilservants;investigatingallegationsofcorruptionandfraudinelectoralregistrationandtheelectionofmembersofgovernment institutions inMacao;andprotectinghumanrights,freedomandlegitimateinterestsofindividuals,aswell as ensuring fairness, lawfulness andefficiencyof thepublic
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administration(CCAC2001:12).Unlike thepreviousACAs, theCCAC is concernednotonlywith
investigatingandpreventingcorruptionamongcivil servants. It alsoperformsthefunctionofanOmbudsmantoprotecttherights,freedomandinterestsofindividualsinMacao.
Functions of the Ombudsman
InthePhilippines, theOfficeof theOmbudsmanwasoriginallyformedinJuly1979whenPresidentFerdinandMarcosissuedPresidentialDecreeNo1630. In fightingcorruption, theOmbudsman’srolewas to fileandprosecute civil andadministrative cases involvinggraft andcorruptpracticesandotheroffencescommittedbycivilservants.However, theOmbudsmanwasineffectiveduringtheremainingsevenyearsofMarcos’ rule,ascorruption“reacheditsall timehigh”and“permeatedalmostallaspectsofbureaucratic lifeandinstitutions”,resultingin“thesystematicplunderofthecountry”(Varela1995:174).
WhenPresidentCorazonAquinoassumedoffice inFebruary1986,“therewashighexpectation that the endof the cultureofgraft andcorruptionwasnear” (Varela 1995: 174).Among theanti-corruptionmeasures introduced, theTanodbayan was reorganised in 1988duringAquino’s termofoffice.The “rejuvenated”Ombudsman is theconstitutionallymandated leadACA in thePhilippinesandperformsthe following functions: investigationof anomaliesand inefficiency;prosecutionofgraftcasesintheSandiganbayan(SpecialAnti-GraftCourt);disciplinarycontroloverallelectedandappointedofficialsexcept formembersoftheCongressandJudiciaryandimpeachableofficials;requiringpublicofficialsandemployeestogiveassistancetothepublic;andgraftpreventionbyanalysinganti-corruptionmeasuresandincreasingpublicawarenessandcooperation(OfficeoftheOmbudsmanofficialwebsite).
Functions of KICAC/ACRC
InSouthKorea,PresidentKimDaeJung’scomprehensiveanti-corruptionstrategymetwithstiffresistanceintheNationalAssembly.Consequently,ittookmorethantwoyearsbeforetheAnti-CorruptionActwaspassedon24July2001.Sixmonthslater,theKICACwasformedon25January2002asthedejureACAinSouthKorea(Quah2003:169).InitsAnnual Report 2005, theKICAC(2006:4,7) identifiedits functionsas: formulatingandcoordinatinganti-corruptionpoliciesbyorganisingregularly the Inter-AgencyMeetingonCorruption;evaluatingthelevelsofintegrityandanti-corruptionpracticesofpublicsectororganisations;monitoringcorruptionandprotectingandrewardingwhistle-blowers;promotingcooperationtofightcorruptionbyencouragingcivilsocietyinvolvementandpublic-privatepartnershipagainstcorruption,andengagingintheglobalfight
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againstcorruption; improvingthe legalandinstitutional frameworkstoremovelawsandpracticeswhichencouragecorruption;andinculcatingethicalvaluesinsocietybypromotingpublicawarenessofcorruptionrisksandbyenforcingthecodeofconductforpublicsectoremployees.
UnliketheothersixACAs,theKICACcannotinvestigatecorruptioncasesbyitself; ithastorelyontheBoardofAuditandInvestigationandotheragenciestodoso.On29February2008,theKICACwasmergedwiththeOmbudsmanandtheAdministrativeAppealsCommissiontoformtheAnti-CorruptionandCivilRightsCommission(ACRC),whichperformsthesefunctions:handlingandaddressingpubliccomplaintsandimprovingrelatedunreasonablesystems;buildingacleansocietybypreventinganddeterringcorruptioninthepublicsector;andprotectingpeople’srightsfromillegalandunfairadministrativepracticesthroughtheadministrativeappealssystem(ACRCwebsite).
Comparative Analysis
AcomparisonofthefunctionsofthesevenACAsshows,first, thatonlySingapore’sCPIBandHongKong’sICACareconcernedwithcombatingcorruptioninboththepublicandprivatesectors.Incontrast,theotherfiveACAsdevotetheiranti-corruptioneffortsonlytothepublicsector.
Second, theCPIBandICACare the twoACAswhich focuson theinvestigationof corruptionoffences, thepreventionof corruptionbyreducing theopportunities for corruption, and the educationof thepopulationonthenegativeeffectsofcorruption.However,as theCPIBhasarelatively limitednumberofstaff (eg,only89 in2007), itdevotesmoreattentiontoinvestigationthantheotherfunctionsofpreventionandeducation(RepublicofSingapore2008:374).Incontrast,theICAC,whichhad1,200staff in2007,emphasisesallof thefunctionsof investigation,preventionandeducation(ICAC2008:30).
Third, theother fiveACAsperformother functions inaddition tocombatingcorruption.Thailand’sNCCC,forexample, isalsoconcernedwiththeinspectionandverificationoftheassetsandliabilitiesofpoliticiansandseniorbureaucrats,alongwithitsanti-corruptionfunctions.Similarly,theCBIinIndiaisresponsiblenotonlyforcombatingcorruption,butalsoforeconomiccrimesandspecialcrimesliketerrorismandorganisedcrime.
Macao’sCCACand thePhilippines’OmbudsmannotonlycombatcorruptionbutalsoperformthefunctionsofanOmbudsman.However,thePhilippines’Ombudsmanperformsmore functions as it is alsoresponsiblefortheinvestigation,preventionandprosecutionofcorruptioncases,disciplinarycontrolofcivilservants,andtheprovisionofpublicassistance.SouthKorea’sKICACwasconcernedonlywiththepreventiveandeducativeaspectsofcombatingcorruptionduringits firstsixyearsas itdidnothaveinvestigativepowers.After theKICAC’smergerwiththeOmbudsmanand theAdministrativeAppealsCommissionon29
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February2008toformtheACRC,theACRCisnowresponsibleforanti-corruption(withoutinvestigation),ombudsmanfunctions,andconsideringadministrativeappeals.Thus,theKICACandACRChavebeenuniqueasACAs,astheyhavenotbeenresponsibleforinvestigatingcorruptioncaseseventhoughtheirfunctionistocombatcorruption.
Benchmarking the Seven ACAs’ Performance
Asthefirststep inbenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAs, it isnecessarytoidentifythemosteffectiveACAs.Rose(2005:35,37)describesthisfirststepastheagreementonastandardforcomparingprogrammeoutcomes.Thesecondstep is tocompareprogrammeswith thechosenstandardsoastocreatealeaguetableindicatingtheperformanceofalloftheACAsaccordingtotheselectedindicators.
National Indicators
Threeindicatorsareusedhere:TransparencyInternational’s2008CPIscore;theWorldBank’s2008controlofcorruption indicator;andthePoliticalandEconomicRiskConsultancy’s (PERC)2008surveyoncorruption.Theseindicatorsreflecttheeffectivenessofthecountries’anti-corruptionstrategieswhichareimplementedbytheirrespectiveACAs.
Table3ranksthesevenAsiancountriesaccordingtotheirscoresonthe2005CPIandPERCandtheirpercentilerankontheWorldBank’scontrolofcorruptionindicator.AsshowninTable4,therankingofthesevenAsiancountriesdoesnotchangeverymuchiftheyarerankedaccordingtothe2008CPI,PERCscores,andthecontrolofcorruptionpercentilerank.TheonlychangesarethehigherrankingofSouthKoreaandIndiaoverMacaoandThailand,respectively,in2008.
Aspoliticalwillisthemostimportantfactorforensuringtheeffectiveimplementationofacomprehensiveanti-corruptionstrategyinacountry(Quah2003:181),howcan itbeascertained?Politicalwill refers to thecommitmentofpolitical leaders tominimizecorruption. Itexistswhenthesethreeconditionsaremet:comprehensiveanti-corruptionlegislationexists; the independentACAisprovidedwithsufficientpersonnelandresources;andtheanti-corruption lawsare impartiallyenforcedbyanindependentACA(Quah2007:37-38).
Agency Indicators: Per Capita Expenditure and Staff-Population Ratio
ToassesswhetherthesevenACAsareprovidedwithadequatepersonnelandbudgetbytheirgovernmentstoperformtheirfunctions,dataontheirpersonnelnumbersandbudgets foraselectedyear (2005)areused tocalculatethesetwoindicators:
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Table 3CPI, CC and PERC Indicators for Seven Asian Countries, 2005
Economy CPI score* Control of corruption* PERC score* Rank
Singapore 9.4 98.1 0.65 1
HongKong 8.3 92.7 3.50 2
Macao 6.6** 68.9 4.78** 3
SouthKorea 5.0 70.4 6.50 4
Thailand 3.8 54.4 7.20 5
India 2.9 46.1 8.63 6
Philippines 2.5 34.0 8.80 7
*CPIscorerangesfrom0(mostcorrupt)to10(leastcorrupt);PERCscorerangesfrom0(leastcorrupt)to10(mostcorrupt);andcontrolofcorruptionusesapercentilerank.**2006figuresareusedasMacaowasnotincludedinthe2005CPIandPERCsurvey.Sources:WorldBank(2009),TransparencyInternational(2005),andPERC(2008).
Table 4CPI, CC and PERC Indicators for Seven Asian Countries, 2008
Economy CPI score Control of corruption
PERC score Rank
Singapore 9.2 99.5 1.13 1
HongKong 8.1 94.2 1.80 2
SouthKorea 5.6 69.6 5.65 3
Macao 5.4 58.0 3.30 4
India 3.4 44.4 7.25 5
Thailand 3.5 43.0 8.00 6
Philippines 2.3 26.1 9.00 7
Sources:TransparencyInternational(2008),WorldBank(2009),andPERC(2008).
Percapitaexpenditure–thatis,theACA’sbudgetfor2005inUS$(toensurecomparability),dividedbythetotalpopulationinthecountryforthesameyear.Staff-populationratio–that is, theratioof thepopulationinthecountryin2005tothenumberofACApersonnelin2005.
Table5shows thatwhileHongKong’s ICACis thebest fundedofthesevenACAswithabudgetofUS$85million, it isrankedsecondas
1.
2.
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Table 5Per Capita Expenditure of the Seven ACAs in 2005
ACA Budget Population Per capita expenditure
Rank
CCAC US$10.6m 488,100 US$21.72 1
ICAC US$85m 7,000,000 US$12.14 2
CPIB US$7.7m 4,300,000 US$1.79 3
KICAC US$17.8m 47,800,000 US$0.37 4
NCCC US$22.8m 64,200,000 US$0.36 5
CBI US$30.3m 1,081,200,000 US$0.28 6
Ombudsman US$12m 81,400,000 US$0.15 7
Sources:BudgetdataareobtainedfromCBI(2006),CCAC(2006),ICAC(2006),KICAC(2006),OfficeoftheOmbudsman(2006),ONCCC(2006b),andRepublicofSingapore(2007).The2005populationfiguresaretakenfromEconomist(2007).
itspercapitaexpenditureofUS$12.14 isbelowthatofMacao’sCCAC,whichhasapercapitaexpenditureofUS$21.72.Singapore’sCPIBhasthesecondsmallestbudgetofUS$7.7million,but itspercapitaexpenditureofUS$1.79isrankedthirdasSingapore’spopulationof4.3millionisthesecondsmallestamongthesevencountries. Incontrast, thepercapitaexpendituresoftheotherfourACAsarelessfavourablebecauseoftheirlargerpopulations,withIndiahavingtheworld’ssecondlargestpopulation(1.0812billion).ThisexplainswhytheCBIisrankedsixthintermsofpercapitaexpenditureeventhoughitsbudgetofUS$30.3million ishigherthanthebudgetsoftheNCCC,KICAC,andtheOmbudsman.TheKICAC’
spercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.37isfourth,asSouthKoreahasasmallerpopulation thanThailandand thePhilippines.TheNCCC is rankedfifthwithapercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.36eventhoughitsbudget islargerthantheKICAC’sbudget,asThailandhasmorepeoplethanSouthKorea.TheOmbudsman’s lowestpercapitaexpenditureofUS$0.15 isnotsurprising inviewof itsbudgetofUS$12millionandthecountry’s populationof81.4million.
WhilethepercapitaexpendituresoftheACAsindicatetheirleveloffunding,theirstaff-populationratiosindicatewhethertheyareadequatelystaffedornot.Table6showsthateventhoughtheCBIhasthemoststaffwith4,711personnel, it is rankedsixthwithastaff-populationratioof1:229,505.On theotherhand, theCPIBhas the smallest staffwith82personnel,butitsstaff-populationratioof1:53,086isrankedthird,behindtheCCAC,whichhasthebeststaff-populationof1:4,358,andtheICAC,whichisrankedsecondwithastaff-populationratioof1:5,863.TheNCCC’
sstaff-populationratioof1:69,481isrankedfourth,andtheOmbudsman
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Table 6Staff-Population Ratios of the Seven ACAs in 2005
ACA Personnel Population Staff-population ratio
Rank
CCAC 112 488,100 1:4,358 1
ICAC 1,194 7,000,000 1:5,863 2
CPIB 82 4,300,000 1:53,086 3
NCCC 924 64,200,000 1:69,481 4
Ombudsman 957 81,400,000 1:85,057 5
CBI 4,711 1,081,200,000 1:229,505 6
KICAC 205 47,800,000 1:233,171 7
Sources:asinTable5.
isrankedfifthwithastaff-populationratioof1:85,057.TheKICAC’sleastfavourablestaff-populationratioof1:233,171 indicates that it isunder-staffedwith205personnelgiventhecountry’spopulationof47.8million.
Agency Indicators: Independence and Credibility
InhisanalysisofthestrategyofrelyingonanACA,Johnston(2002:255)hasidentifiedfourprerequisitesforitssuccess:independence,permanence,coherence,andcredibility.However,forthisdiscussion,onlythecriteriaof independenceandcredibilityareconsidered.The firstprerequisiteof independence is important topreventanACAfrombeingusedasapoliticalweaponagainsttheopponentsofthegovernment,as“corruptioninvestigationsdobecomeweapons inpartisanconflictsand tacticsofreprisal.”Indeed,“wherecorruptioninvestigationsarepoliticized,powerfulofficialscan‘protecttheirown’andconcealevidence”(Johnston2002:256).An independentACAcan followtheevidenceofcorruptionwhereverit leadsandresistpressurestoconduct investigationsandprosecutionsofpolitical targets.Furthermore, itpublicisesall itsactivitiesfreelyandconductstheminatransparentmannertoassurecitizensthat“theevidencetheygivewillbetakenseriously,andthattheycanfilereportswithoutfearofreprisals”(Johnston2002:257).IndependenceensuresthatanACAwillhaveadequatefundingandaccesstoinformation.
Second,howdoesanACAenhanceitscredibility?Johnston(2002:261)contendsthat:
… if thepublic believes that all complaintswill be carefullyconsidered,andpursuedas faras theevidencetakes them; thatinvestigatoryandmonitoringfunctionsaresustainedandbroadlyemployed;thatpreventionactivitiesareavailabletoall;thatchoices
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andprioritiesareguidedbyavisionof theoverallgood,ratherthanbyexpediencyorpartisangain;andthattheagencyitself isincorruptible(nosmallchallengeinitsownright),acredibleimageofindependencecanbebuiltupovertime.
Tosustain itscredibility,anACAhas toconductpubliceducationcampaignsregularly.Credibilityisperhapsthemost importantcriterionasanACA’sreportsandeffortswill“becomesuspectorseenasfutile”ifitlosesitscredibility(Johnston2002:261).
BasedonJohnston’scriteriaofindependenceandcredibility,howcananACA’sindependenceandcredibilitybeevaluated?AnACA’sdegreeofindependencecanbeassessedaccordingtotheseindicators:
Location:WhereistheACAlocatedinthegovernment?
Appointment of director:Whoappointshim/herandtowhommusthe/shereport?
Independence from police: AstheACAsinformerBritishcoloniesoriginatedfromthepolice,istheACAstillpartofthepoliceorisitanindependentagency?
Investigation of political leaders and senior civil servants:HastheACAinvestigatedpolitical leadersandseniorcivilservants if theyareaccusedofcorruption?
Taking action against “big fish”:HastheACAtakenactionagainstcorruptprominent individuals?Howmany “bigfish”havebeenprosecutedandconvicted?
Weapon against opposition: Has theACA been used by thegovernmentasaweaponagainstitspoliticalopponents?
HowdoesanACAensure itscredibilityamong thecitizens in thecountry?TherearefourmainindicatorsofanACA’scredibility:
Consideration of all complaints:Does thepublicperceive thatallcomplaints,nomatterhowsmall,willbeconsideredbytheACA?WhatistheproportionofcomplaintsinvestigatedbytheACA?
Public perceptions of the ACA’s professionalism: Does thepublicperceivetheACAtobeimpartialinitsinvestigationsandnotabuseitspowers?Does thepublicbelieve that theACAwillkeepthecorruptionreportsconfidential?
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
1.
2.
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Enforcement of the anti-corruption laws:DoestheACAenforcetheanti-corruption laws impartially?Does theACAfocusonpettycorruptionandignoregrandcorruption?Aretherichandpowerfulprotected from investigation andprosecution for corruptionoffences?
Public image of the ACA:Howis theACAviewedbythepublic?Isitseenasanincorruptibleagencyorasanagencyriddledwithcorruption?HowarecomplaintsagainstACAofficersdealtwith?
To illustrate theuseof the first indicatorofanACA’s credibility,available data on the actual proportion of corruption complaintsinvestigatedbytheICAC,CPIBandCCACareprovidedinTables7,8and9,respectively.Table7showsthattheproportionof“pursuablereports” in theICAC’sOperationsDepartmentincreasedfrom78.3percentin2001toapeakof91.5percentin2004.TheICACreceived23,927corruptionreportsduring2001-2006,and19,844reports(82.9percent)werepursuable.
UnliketheICAC,theCPIBhasreceivedfewerreportsofcorruption,asTable8shows that4,563reportswerereceivedby theCPIBduring1998-2002.Theproportionof reports investigatedby theCPIBvariedfrom47.6percent in2002to68.9percent in1999.Onaverage,however,nearly60percentofthereportsreceivedbytheCPIBfrom1998-2002wereinvestigated.
Like theCPIB, theCCAChasalsoreceived fewerreports than theICAC.Table9showsthattheCCACreceived5,942casesduring2000-2007.However,only949cases(19percent)werecommencedorinvestigatedbytheCCACduringthatperiod.Theproportionofcommencedcasesvariedfrom9.7percentin2004to25percentin2007.
Toassess thepublicperceptionsofanACA’sprofessionalismandpublic image,surveysmustbeconductedofacountry’spopulation toobtain informationon theseaspects.Therelevant findingsof surveysconductedinHongKongandSingaporearehighlightedinTables10and11,respectively.Table10demonstrates the tremendouspublicsupportfor the ICACandtheirpositiveassessmentof itsprofessionalism.TheICAC’sannual surveys from2003-2006 showed thatnearlyallof therespondentssaid that the ICACdeservedtobesupported.Ninety-fivepercentofthemindicatedthattheirconfidencewouldincreaseorremainthe same in thenextyear.Theirhigh levelof trust in the ICACwasmanifestedinthefactthatanaverageof72.6percentoftherespondentswould reveal their identitywhen reporting corruption to the ICAC.Nearly 68percentof thembelieved that the ICAC’s anti-corruptionworkwaseffective.Finally, about three-quartersof the respondentsin all of the four surveysviewed the ICACas an impartial agency.
Table 11 shows, first, that 13 percent of the respondents ratedcorruptioncontrol inSingaporeasexcellent;42percentasverygood;39
3.
4.
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Table 7Proportion of Pursuable Reports by ICAC, 2001-2006
Year Total corruption reports
Pursuable reports
Proportion of pursuable reports
2001 4,476 3,504 78.3%
2002 4,371 3,255 74.5%
2003 4,310 3,930 91.2%
2004 3,746 3,426 91.5%
2005 3,685 3,022 82.0%
2006 3,339 2,707 81.1%
Total 23,927 19,844 82.9%
Sources:ICAC(2004,2007).
Table 8Proportion of Reports Investigated by CPIB, 1998-2002
Year Reports received Reports investigated
Proportion of reports investigated
1998 852 575 67.5%
1999 1,128 777 68.9%
2000 991 515 52.0%
2001 812 497 61.2%
2002 780 371 47.6%
Total 4,563 2,735 59.9%
Source:CPIB(2003:5.36).
percentasgood;andonly7percentas fair.Second,71percentof themagreedorstronglyagreedthattheCPIBhaddonewellinsolvingcorruptionoffences;61percentofthemtrustedtheCPIBtokeepSingaporecorruptionfree;and56percentofthemagreedorstronglyagreedthattheCPIBwasworld-classincurbingcorruption.Third,whentherespondentswereaskedwhethertheCPIBwasimpartialorfairinitsinvestigations,Table11showsthat69.9percentsaidthatitwasimpartialorfair,5.6percentsaidthatitwaspartialorunfair,and24.5percentdidnotknoworhaveanopinion.Similarly,whentherespondentswereaskedwhethertheCPIBhadabuseditsinvestigationpowers,Table11showsthat65percentofthemsaidthat
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Table 9Commenced Cases by CCAC, 2000-2007
Year Commenced cases Not-commenced cases
Proportion of commenced cases
2000 135 783 14.7%
2001 134 1,062 11.2%
2002 131 917 12.5%
2003 90 333 21.3%
2004 76 708 9.7%
2005 142 438 24.5%
2006 116 377 23.5%
2007 125 375 25.0%
Total 949 4,993 19.0%
Source:CCAC(2001-2008).
Table 10Public Perceptions of Hong Kong’s ICAC, 2003-2006
Survey Item 2003 2004 2005 2006 Average
%indicatingthattheICACdeservestobesupported 99.3% 99.1% 98.9% 98.9% 99.1%
% indicating that their confidence inICACwould increaseor remain samenextyear
94% 93.9% 96.0% 97.1% 95.3%
%believingthatICACwouldkeepcorruptionreportsconfidential 88.9% 89.3% 88.6% 92.6% 89.9%
%indicatingthattheywouldrevealtheiridentitywhen reporting corruption toICAC
75.9% 71.8% 70.7% 72.0% 72.6%
%believingthatICAC’santi-corruptionworkiseffective 67.3% 67.5% 67.9% 68.5% 67.8%
%believingthattheICACisanimpartiallawenforcementbody 73.4% 70.9% 72.6% 80.3% 74.3%
Source:CompiledfromICAC(2004-2007).
ithadnot,7.2percentsaidthat ithaddoneso,and27.8percenthadnoopinionordidnotknow.Finally,66percentoftherespondentsbelievedthattheCPIBwouldkeepthecorruptionreportsitreceivedconfidential,andonly10percentsaidthatitwouldnotdoso.
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Table 11Public Perceptions of CPIB’s Performance in 2002
Survey item Survey findings
HowwouldyouratecorruptioncontrolinSingapore?
1. Excellent=13%;verygood=42%;good=39%;fair=7%;poor=0
CPIBhasdonewellinsolvingcorruptionoffences
2. Stronglyagree=20%;agree=51%;notsure=28%;disagree=2%;stronglydisagree=0
CPIBcanbe trusted tokeepSingaporecorruption-free
3. Stronglyagree=24%;agree=37%;notsure=32%;disagree=6%;stronglydisagree=1%
CPIBisworld-classinfightingcorruption4. Stronglyagree=17%;agree=39%;notsure=36%;disagree=7%;stronglydisagree=1%
DoyouthinkCPIBisimpartial/fairinitsinvestigations?
5. Yes=69.9%;no=5.6%;don’tknow/noopinion=24.5%
Do you think CPIB has abused i tsinvestigationpowers?
6. No=65%;yes=7.2%;don’tknow/noopinion=27.8%
DoyouthinkCPIBwillkeepcorruptionreportsitreceivesconfidential?
7. Yes=66%;no=10%don’tknow/noopinion=24%
Source:CPIB(2003:5.40&14.97)
Performance Indicators for ACAs
Meagher(2005:80-81)suggeststhreetypesofperformanceindicatorsforACAs:output indicatorsbasedon theirworkload;outcome indicatorstomeasure their effectiveness in attaininggoals; andefficiencyandproductivityindicatorssuchascost-effectiveness, input-outputratio,andunitcosts.However,only theperformance indicatorsof theCPIBandICACareavailableandshowninTables12,13and14asillustrations.Table12identifiesanddefinestheCPIB’sperformanceindicatorsanddatafrom1997to2002.
Table13showsthatthenumberofcases investigatedbytheICAC’s OperationsDepartmentincreasedfrom1,522in1987to4,989in2002.TheOperationsDepartment’sstaffalsogrewfrom744to966duringthesameperiod.While theOperationsDepartment’sproductivityratio increasedfrom2.05in1987to5.16in2002, itdeclinedfrom4.71in1994to4.39in1999,andincreasedagainto5.09in2000.
Finally, Table 14 shows that 2,751personswereprosecuted forcorruptionand1,068civilservantsweredisciplinedduring2001-2006.TheICAC’saverageconvictionrateduringthisperiodwas83percent.
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Table 12CPIB’s Performance Indicators and Data, 1997-2002
Performance indicator Definition Performance data
Cycletime1. Time taken to complete aninvestigation
Exceededtargetbyanaverageof31%from1999-2002
Completionrate2. Percentageofcasescompletedin a year
Exceededtargetofcompleting90%casesfrom1999-2002
Prosecutionrate3. Percentageofcaseresultinginprosecution
Increased from47% to 60%from2000-2002
Convictionrate4. Percentageofcasesconvictedincourt
Increased from97% to 99%from2000-2002
Attendancetovisitors
5. Target is toattendto80%ofitsvisitorswithinfiveminutes
Exceededtargetby1%to6%from1997-2000
Numberofpersonschargedanddisciplined
6. Numberofpersonschargedandnumberofpublicofficersdisciplined
680 personswere chargedand293publicofficersweredisciplinedfrom2000-2002
Source:CPIB(2003:3.24,3.25,5.36,14.96).
Table 13ICAC Operations Department’s Productivity Ratio, 1987-2002
YearNumber of staff
(a)Number of cases investigated (b)
Productivity ratio (b/a)
1987 744 1,522 2.05
1988 739 1,699 2.30
1989 736 1,895 2.57
1990 791 2,065 2.61
1991 794 2,430 3.06
1992 758 2,502 3.30
1993 773 3,086 3.99
1994 814 3,836 4.71
1995 827 3,710 4.49
1996 885 3,257 3.68
1997 929 3,307 3.56
1998 925 3,774 4.08
1999 943 4,139 4.39
2000 932 4,748 5.09
2001 943 4,954 5.25
2002 966 4,989 5.16
Source:ICAC(2003:104).
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Table 14Number of Persons Prosecuted for Corruption, ICAC’s Conviction Rate, and
Number of Civil Servants Disciplined, 2001-2006
Year Number of persons prosecuted
Conviction rate Civil servants disciplined
2001 535 79% 188
2002 604 83% 165
2003 421 85% 234
2004 494 84% 161
2005 356 81% 170
2006 341 88% 150
Total 2,751 83% 1,068
Sources:CompiledfromICAC(2004-2007).
Benchmarking for Excellence: An Agenda for Action
TheprevioussectionhassuggestedthattheperformanceofAsianACAsshouldbebenchmarkedaccordingto22indicators,whicharelistedinTable15.These22 indicatorsarenotexhaustiveasnotallof theperformanceindicatorsemployedbyotherAsianACAsareincluded.
Benchmarkingprovides theAsianACAswithanobjectivemethodforevaluatingtheirperformancebycomparingtheirperformancewiththeperformanceofmoreeffectiveACAs; identifyingtheirstrengthsandweaknesses;andlearningfromtheexperiencesofmoreeffectiveACAsbyeliminatingtheirweaknessesandreinforcingtheirstrengths.ItgivestheseACAsandtheirgovernmentsthenecessarydataformakingimprovementsif theyaredissatisfiedwith theeffectivenessof theiranti-corruptionstrategies.
AnotheradvantageofbenchmarkingtheACAs’performance is thatgovernmentswhichareconsideringthecreationofanACAwillfindthebenchmarkingdataon theexistingAsianACAsuseful in identifyingtheir strengths to emulate and theirweaknesses to avoid. In theiroverviewreportonPacificIslandcountries,LarmourandBarcham(2004:33-34) found that the12countriesconsidereddidnothaveanyACA.Indiscussingtheutilityof introducinganACAinthesecountries, theyrecommendedcautionas theexistingauditor-generalofficesandotherwatchdogagenciesareunder-staffedand ineffective.Furthermore,as“seniorappointmentsinthesecountriesareoftenmadetorewardpoliticalsupport,thepositionofanti-corruptioncommissionermayendupbeingjustsucharesource” (Larmour&Barcham2004:22).Inviewoftheirlowstatecapacity,moreresourcesmustbeallocatedby theirgovernments
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Table 15Indicators for Benchmarking the Performance of Asian ACAs
National Indicators(3)
1.TransparencyInternational’sCPIscoreforaselectedyear.2.WorldBank’scontrolofcorruptionpercentilerankforthesameyear.3.PERC’scorruptionscoreforthesameyear.
Agency Indicators(19)
4.ACA’spercapitaexpenditure5.ACA’sstaff-populationratio6.ACA’sindependence
a.Locationb.Appointmentofdirectorc.Independencefrompoliced.Investigationofgrandcorruptione.Frying“bigfish”
f.Weaponagainstopposition7.ACA’scredibility
a.Considerationofallcomplaintsb.PublicperceptionsofACA’sprofessionalismc.Enforcementofanti-corruptionlawsd.PublicimageofACA
8.ACA’sperformanceindicatorsa.Cycletimeb.Completionratec.Productivityratiod.Prosecutionratee.Convictionratef.Attendancetovisitorsg.Numberofpersonschargedanddisciplined
if theywish toestablishACAs;otherwise suchACAswouldhave tocompetewithotherexistingagenciesforthelimitedresourcesavailable.
BenchmarkingtheperformanceofAsianACAsenablesPacificIslandstatesandothercountriestolearnfromtheexperiencesofboththeeffectiveandthe ineffectiveAsianACAstomaketherightdecision indecidingwhetherornottoestablishACAs.IftheydecidetointroduceACAs,theirgovernmentsmustdemonstrate theirpoliticalwillbyproviding theseagencieswiththenecessarylegislation,personnelandfinancialresources,aswellastheautonomyforthemtoperformtheirfunctionsimpartiallyandwithoutpoliticalinterference.
Inviewof theseadvantagesofbenchmarking, therecommendationhere is thatAsianACAs should initiate the benchmarkingof theirperformancebyadoptingadefiniteagendaforaction,includingcollectingdataonthe22performanceindicators;comparingtheirperformancewiththeperformanceofotherACAs;andmakingimprovementstorectifythose
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weaknessesexposedbycomparisonwiththemoreeffectiveACAs.Benchmarkingenables theAsianACAs to strive forexcellenceby
providingthemwithatoolformeasuringtheirperformanceagainstthebestACAs to improve theirownperformanceby initiatingreforms torectifythoseweaknessesexposedbythecomparisonwithbestpracticeselsewhere.BenchmarkinganACA’sperformancealsoenables interestedstakeholderstoassessthegovernment’spoliticalwilltocurbcorruptioninthecountry.
Thevastdisparity inpolicy contexts and thevaryingdegreesofpoliticalwillinfightingcorruptioninAsiancountriesrequiretheirpolicy-makerstoheedJohnston’s(1999:225)soundadvicethatACAsare“unlikelytoberightforeverycountry.”However, ifagovernmenthasestablishedanACAtospearheaditsanti-corruptionstrategy,itcanenhancetheACA’s prospectsforsuccessbyprovidingitwithadequatestaffandbudget,bynotinterferinginitsdailyoperations,and,mostimportantly,byresistingthetemptationtousetheACAasapoliticalweaponagainstitsopponents.Inshort,anACAisadouble-edgedswordandcanbeusedbyagovernmentforgoodorforevil. Inthehandsofacleangovernment, theACAisanassetandapowerfulweaponagainstcorruptpoliticians,bureaucratsandbusinessmen.Conversely,acorruptgovernmentcanmakeamockeryofitsanti-corruptionstrategybyusingtheACAtovictimizeitspoliticalfoes.
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Jon S T Quah is an anti-corruption consultant in Singapore: http://www.jonstquah.com . This article is a revised version of a paper presented at the Third Anti-Corruption Expertise Workshop on “Excellence in Management of Anti-Corruption Agencies” organized by the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau in Singapore, 14-16 October 2008.