A Dangerous Trade: An Analysis of Potential Motivations and Implications of Chinese Arms Transfers...

7/30/2019 A Dangerous Trade: An Analysis of Potential Motivations and Implications of Chinese Arms Transfers with the Middl

1/37

ADangerousTrade:

AnAnalysisofPotentialMotivationsand

ImplicationsofChineseArmsTransferswiththeMiddleEast

JennaSackler

GOVT-451

20NOVEMBER2012


2/37

1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction.2

Chinese Arms Sales....4

Possible Motivations.....14

Possible Implications....25

Conclusion.30

Works Cited...33

IMAGES

Fig. 1: Top Global Arms Suppliers, 2010-11...5

Fig. 2: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan7

Fig. 3: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran9

Fig. 4: Top Arms Suppliers to Middle East, 2004-8......12

Fig. 5: 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East14

Fig. 5: China's Crude Oil Imports by Source, 2009...17

Fig. 6: Map of China with Xinjiang Highlighted........21

Fig. 7: China's Increasing Participation in International Organizations.26


3/37

2

INTRODUCTION

Weapons proliferation is a delicate issue, but it has become a key manifestation of

the growing global competition between the United States and the Peoples Republic of

China (PRC).

All states partake in physical arms transfers, and especially with the advent of the

Internet and other electronic technology, information transfer is impossible to completely

prevent. Shaping trends in international weapons transfers to U.S. will is a priority of the

United States, and the most disconcerting problems arise when powerful states vital to

U.S. interests engage in arms transfers with adversaries of the United States. First on the

list of states with whom the United States has a complex relationship encompassing both

partnership and opposition is, of course, the PRC.

Since the foundation of the PRC in 1949, Beijing has, as has almost every

powerful state, used arms sales as a means to project political or military influence and

contain its foes. A significant problem in studying Chinese arms transfers, however, is

Beijings noted history of underreporting information in many categories, of which arms

transfers is one. While Chinese arms have found their way all over the globe, many of

the most important deals, especially over the past decade or two, have been with the

Middle East. Particularly notable arms deals between the PRC and the Middle East have

been those with both Iran and Iraq during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq War and countless

arrangements with other regional players transferring information or materiel for nuclear

and chemical weapons.1 These and other weapons transfers are a physical manifestation

of the Sino-Middle Eastern relationship, one that is fraught with complexities.

China and the Middle East first interacted in the 1930s as Nationalist-controlledChina, in the throes of warsexternal against Japan, and internal between the

1Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, (report prepared for members of

Congress by the Congressional Research Service; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2012), p. 10.


4/37

3

Nationalists and the Communistsrealized that in order to update its military and

industry enough to be victorious in either war, it needed greater energy supplies.2 Oil

deals began with the Middle East, primarily Saudi Arabia and Iran. That underlying

theme, energy security, has driven the Sino-Middle East relationship, as it has the US-

Middle East relationship and, in the modern world, it pervades much of international

relations.

Other cultural factors deepen the ties between China and many Middle Eastern

governments. Two of the most important ones are: Anti-American feeling, or a need

(whether real or imagined) to counter perceived United States hegemony in the region;

and admiration by some despotic Middle East governments of the PRCs astronomical

growth under a totalitarian regime.3 Communism never took hold in the Middle East, but

many dictatorships in that region implement similar tactics of repression and censorship

as does the CCP. Thus, those governments look to China as a shining example of the

possibility for ascension to global superpower-status under authoritarianism.

Another important factor in the relationship between China and the Middle East is

Israel. In many arenas, Israel can be considered a proxy for the United States, on top of

posing its own set of sociocultural, religious, and political challenges. This instance is no

differentthe United States encouraged Israel to interact with the PRC on arms in the

1960s in order to capitalize on the Sino-Soviet split, though the relationship did not heat

up until the 1980s.4 Mainly aircraft and missile technology, some of which had a US

background, was transferred. However, after the 1989 Tiananmen Massacre, the United

States wanted to distance itself from China, so became wary when Israel continued its

military and diplomatic relationship with the PRC, with Beijing recognizing Israel as a

state in 1992 despite alternate directions from Saudi Arabia.5 Israels primary motivation

behind engaging diplomatically with China lies in attempting to stem Chinese sales of

weapons or technology to Israels adversaries in the Middle East, especially Syria and

Iran, whose arms relationship with China will be a primary focus of this paper.

2 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and the Middle East,

(Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008), p. 5.3 Ibid, p. 3.4 Ibid, p. 71.5 Ibid, p. 38.


5/37

4

CHINESE ARMS SALES

For the past half-century, and even more so recently, China has been one of the

top suppliersand receiversof international arms. As of 2011, China was ranked the

fifth largest exporter and fourth largest importer of arms.6

The majority of arms imported

by Beijing are advanced conventional weapons, largely originating in Russia.

Throughout the mid-2000s, China spent over two billion dollars annually on arms from

Russia alone, though that number has fallen in the past few years.7

These weapons are

brought in to supplement Chinas vast military overhaul, with the purpose of modernizing

to what China believes to be the standard set by other, primarily Western, powers today.

Facets of this modernization include shrinking the physical size of the Peoples

Liberation Army (PLA), expanding and updating Chinas cyber capabilities, and ensuring

that their arsenal is as up-to-date and powerful as possible.8

6 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China. Arms Control Association, (updatedAugust 2012), .7Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 10.8 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach, (London:

Praeger Security International, 2008).Not mentioned on any specific page, but demonstrated throughoutbook.


6/37

5

Figure 1: Top Global Arms Suppliers, 2010-11 (figures expressed in 1990 $US millions)9

Chief in Chinas arsenal is its small, but effective, nuclear cache, purportedly for

deterrence only. Beijing has claimed in the past that China will never strike first under

any circumstances, but recent tensions with the United States over Taiwan have led to an

edit of that statement which leads US analysts to believe that should the United States

intervene in a Chinese conquest of Taiwan, Beijing would respond with a nuclear strike.10

On a similar note, China has had, and continues to have, a bustling trade in the exchange

of nuclear information and materiel, which is not only economically advantageous, but

also supports nuclear proliferation to states China chooses with whom it (and perhaps

Russia) has a relationship, but other nuclear powers do not.

The primary recipients of Chinese arms sales, whether conventional or nuclear,

are Pakistan, Iran, various other Middle Eastern states to a lesser degree (especially pre-

revolutionary Libya, Syria, and Saudi Arabia), and North Korea.11 This paper will focus

9 Arms Transfers Database, TIV of arms exports from the top 10 largest exporters, 2010-2011, (Table,

Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 10 November 2012).10 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 78.11 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.


7/37

6

on those states within the Middle East, including Pakistan due to its importance vis--vis

Chinas continuous struggle to contain India. In the period between 2007 and 2011, the

same period that saw China fall to fourth place in arms imports, Beijings arms exports

increased 95%, landing them at a close sixth behind the United Kingdom.12 In 2011,

Chinese arms exports totaled $2.2 billion US, down slightly from its 2005-07 high, but

enough to push China into the number five spot.13 Although most Chinese arms deals are

negotiated by external companies, the relationship between the state and companies

especially the largest ones, such as China North Industries Corporation (Norinco), the

majority of which are state-ownedresults in most arms sales having governmental

approval.14 Perhaps the largest portion of that amount, at least in recent years, has come

from Pakistan.

Chinas history of selling weapons to Pakistan stretches back decades, to the

beginning of the Sino-Indian border conflicts.15 Beijing viewed Pakistan as a strategic

asset in order to contain India and distract it from Chinese movements in Tibet. With

Chinas help, Islamabad started its nuclear program in force in 1974, in response to

Indias nuclear tests.16 Since then, China has been key in selling Pakistan the material,

information, and training necessary to maintain and update its nuclear arsenal. For

example in 2010, Beijing signed a deal to export two more reactors to Pakistan, adding to

the Chasma-2 reactor that had been sold in 2004 with the expectation of being ready for

use by 2011.17 The United States and other Western powers claim that this deal

transgresses against Chinas promises as a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Groups

(NSG), which it has been since 2004. In response, China cites the increasingly unstable

12 Rise in international arms transfers is driven by Asian demand, says SIPRI, Stockholm International

Peace Research Institute (19 March 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).13

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 10.14 China North Industries Group (NORINCO (G)), (description; GlobalSecurity.org, 7 November 2011)

(accessed 7 November 2012).15China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012), p. 399.16 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan. Arms Control Association, (updatedAugust 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/pakistanprofile>.17 Mark Hibbs, Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness, (Nuclear Energy Brief;

Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April 2010).

(accessed 5 November 2012).


8/37

7

situation in South Asia, pointing especially to growing United States presence in and

around India.18

Figure 2: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan19

Conventional weapons deals between the PRC and Pakistan have also contributed

to a large portion of Chinese arms exports. Most recently, these deals have focused on

surface-to-surface missile technology, J-17 fighter aircraft (2007), Airborne Warning and

Control Systems aircraft (2008), and a contract for future J-10 aircraft (2009).20 However

for perspective, recent agreements between the United States and Pakistan have resulted

in multi-billion dollar sales to Pakistan of F-16 fighter aircraft and other updates.21

18 Ibid.19 Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden:

SIPRI, generated 24 November 2012).20Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 15.21 Ibid.


9/37

8

Beijing is certainly not the only power from whom Pakistan imports weapons, but it is the

only nuclear power to supplement conventional trades with nuclear ones, helping

Islamabad combine the two and truly enhance its military capabilities. Recently, Pakistan

requested Chinese help in building a naval base at Gwadar, a strategically important

location due to its proximity to the Straits of Hormuz and thus the Persian Gulf.22

Increased Chinese presence near the Persian Gulf presents the United States with a

serious problem, especially as U.S. military priorities shift away from the Middle East

and Indian Ocean to the Pacific, leaving the 5th Fleet stationed off Bahrain with little

help.

Another of Chinas primary clients is Iran. Arms contracts with Iran began during

the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-88; China supplied both sides during that conflictand was

one of few states to do sobut has not had any significant deals with Iraq since the early

1990s.23 Iran, however, has been a constant recipient of Chinese assistance, whether

arms or not. On both the conventional and nuclear side of the weapons business, Iran has

benefitted from Chinese exports, or at least Chinese technology. While its most

advanced ballistic missiles, primarily the Shahab-3 and Sejjil-2, are based on North

Korean technology, North Koreas arsenal is in turn built to Chinese standards.24 China

has also assisted Iran is procuring or developing cruise missiles with a range of up to

3,000 kilometers, or about 1,864 milesmore than enough to reach Tel Aviv from

Tehran.25

On the nuclear side, China has had a large impact on the Iranian program. China

and Iran signed two nuclear cooperation pacts, in 1985 and 1990, and both China and

Russia heavily aided the Iranian nuclear program throughout the 1990s, including a 1991

deal in which China sold Iran uranium compounds that was not declared to the

22 Farhan Bokhari and Katherine Hille, Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,Financial Times (22

May 2011) (accessed 7 November 2012).23Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 1024 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran. Arms Control Association, (updated

August 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/iranprofile>.25 Ibid.


10/37

9

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA).26 The relationship deepened in 1992 when

then-President Rafsanjani visited Beijingafter that, China became a primary supplier of

arms and nuclear information.27 Iran also benefitted from the knowledge of rogue

Pakistani nuclear scientist A. Q. Khan, linking China indirectly to Iran.28 Since the turn

of the twenty-first century, Chinas involvement in Irans nuclear program has been

subtler. No overt deals have transpired, but Chinese geologists have assisted in finding

sites for Iranian mines or factories, and Chinese scientistseven from official

government institutionshave provided valuable information.29

Figure 3: 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran30

In the mid-2000s, when the Western world began to seriously worry about the

Iranian nuclear program, China effectively blocked the United Nations Security Council

(UNSC) from reaching a resolution of the issue, and when the crisis reemerged in 2011,

26 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, (report; Iran Watch, March

2012) (accessed 8 November 2012).27 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,Middle East Journal,vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): p. 14.28 Ibid, p. 15.29 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit.30 Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI,

generated 24 November 2012).


11/37

10

China and Russia refused to increase UNSC economic sanctions on Iran.31 Due to its

continued economic relationship with Iran, China is considered a leader in talks to

curtail Irans nuclear proliferation; whether or not China (and Russia) can be trusted to

seriously help the effort to prevent Iran from acquiring fully-functional nuclear weapons

is a question that the United States and its allies continuously consider.32

Libya has been a more indirect recipient of Chinese arms. In September, 2011,

while Libya was in the midst of its revolution to overthrow the dictatorship of Muammar

Gaddafi, reports surfaced indicating that representatives from the Gaddafi regime had

signed a weapons deal with China. Beijing has since claimed that the government had no

knowledge of that trade, preferring a spectator role in the Libyan conflict.33 The

international community has accepted Chinas version of events, but Libyan-Chinese

relations are still under stress because Beijing refused to support the rebels during the

war, and only slowly accepted the National Transitional Council as a legitimate

government.34 Libya is important to China, and China to Libya, because China imports

about 10% annually of Libyas oil exports (11% in 2010), and many Chinese firms, both

state-owned and private, have billion-dollar interests in Libya.35 While there is no

documented link between Tripolis former nuclear program and China other than a failed

deal in 1970 between Chinese Premier Zhou Enlai and Muammar Gaddafi, IAEA

scientists suspect Chinese involvement in the Libyan program.36

Syria also has a proliferation relationship with China. During the 1980s, Syria

attempted to buy ballistic missiles from China; experts are still unsure whether or not that

31 Ibid.32 John Irish, China says Iran nuclear talks at "crucial stage"Reuters (27 September 2012)

(accessed 5 November 2012).33 James Hardy and Christopher F. Foss, China Denies Selling Arms to Ghaddafi Regime,Janes

Defence Weekly (6 September 2011)

(accessed 30 September 2012).34 Steven Sotloff, Chinas Libya Problem, The Diplomat(14 March 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).35 Ibid.36 Jon Grevatt, China to tighten arms export controls in wake of Libyan controversy,Janes DefenceIndustry 2011 (7 September 2011)

(accessed 30 September 2012).


12/37

11

sale was actually completed.37 In the period between 2003 and 2010, Syria imported

approximately $300 million worth of conventional weapons from China, though that

pales in comparison to the $1.2 billion from Russia. China has assisted Syrias nuclear

program, donating a reactor and information, which Syria claims is unrelated to

weaponry, though the IAEA does not agree.38 Syria has also received North Korean

nuclear technology, again creating an indirect link between China and the Syrian nuclear

program. Most recently, China and Russia have continued to support Bashar al-Assads

regime and prevented international intervention by utilizing their veto power and

influence in the UNSC. As the Western community has quietly provided weapons to the

rebels so, many Western experts assume, have Russia and China been maintaining the

governments weapons supply and trade health.39

37 Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria. Arms ControlAssociation, (updated July 2012), < http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/syriaprofile>.38 Ibid.39 Matthew Bell, Arms sales at root of Russian/Chinese 'ruse' to veto UN resolution against Syria, says

Washington,Janes Defence Weekly (6 October 2011)

.


13/37

12

Figure 4: Top Arms Supplier to Middle East, 2004-840

The weapons trade relationship between Saudi Arabia and China has been

comprised less of trade of actual weapons, and more of access, information, and

privileged influence. Concerning the actual acquisition of weapons, Saudi Arabia has

received much more from the United States and its Western allies, with import totals

between 2008 and 2011 exceeding $10 billion.41 China, conversely, has not sold Saudi

Arabia weapons since the 1980s. However, China is increasingly becoming a vital client

for Middle Eastern oil, and Saudi Arabia is not only one of the biggest oil producers, but

also acts as a leader of OPEC states. Beijing and Riyadh signed a strategic oil contract in

1999, tightening relations and ensuring their connection.42 Saudi Arabia is also suspected

to have played a financing role for Chinese assistance of the Iranian nuclear program.43

In exchange, experts fear that Saudi Arabia would be given access to Iranian weapons

should the need arise. The Sino-Saudi relationship is much more strategic than involved

40 Sam Perlo-Freeman, Arms Transfers to the Middle East, (Backgrounder paper; Stockholm, Sweden:SIPRI, July 2009), p. 4.41Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 14.42 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 8.43 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East.Middle East Quarterly, vol. 12, no. 2,

(Spring 2005).


14/37

13

in actual weapons transfers, but it could prove a serious issue for US interests in the

region.

Finally, Chinas record of participation in international institutions combating

dangerous proliferation, especially nuclear, is spotty at best. As one of five recognized

nuclear powers, China ratified the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992.44

China also ratified the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material

(CPPNM) in 1989, and the CPPNM 2005 amendment in 2009, which ensures that party

states will enforce the prevention, detection and punishment of offenses relating to

nuclear material.45 The 2005 amendment allows for greater cooperation between states

to the same goal. Further, China is a party to the Biological Weapons Convention,

Chemical Weapons Convention, and Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons. As

of 2010, China had ratified the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of

Nuclear Terrorism.46

As previously mentioned, China is a member of the Nuclear Supplier Group. It is

also a member of the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism, the IAEA

Additional Protocol, and has fulfilled the requirements of the UNSC Resolutions 1540

and 1673, which preclude the proliferation of nuclear materiel to allegedly problematic

states.47

Chinas record on nuclear proliferation has improved in recent years, a symbolof Beijings effort to, in some ways, pacify Western powers. However, China is not party

to either the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) or the Hague Code of Conduct

against Ballistic Missile Proliferation.48 In 2004, China applied for membership to the

MTCR, but its bid has not yet been approved by a sufficient number of member states.

Chinas record, both historic and recent, has shown an unwillingness to curb missile

proliferation; Beijing claims to not proliferate missiles capable of carrying a nuclear

payload, but intelligence reports from many states and watchdogs have proved

44 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.45 IAEA, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, (international convention; Vienna:

IAEA, 1979), (accessed 5 November 2012).46 Rohan Perera, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, April 2005

(report on international convention; New York, NY: United Nations, 2008)

.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.


15/37

14

otherwiseespecially concerning surface-to-surface missiles, China has been spreading

technology with abandon.49

Figure 5: 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East50

POSSIBLE MOTIVATIONS

The question raised by Chinas close arms relationship with the Middle East is

why would China want to arm the Middle East? How can China benefit from an armed

Middle East? The answers to those questions are manifold, but they can generally be

divided into two broad categories: economic and strategic. Economic benefits China

could reap from an armed Middle East range from simple and not too vital, to extremely

necessary for Chinas continued ascension to power. The most basic benefit is simply a

transaction that gives China money, another source of revenue for the PLA and state in

general. A more important one, among the most important possible motivations across

either camp, is lucrative oil deals, which could have a huge effect on Chinas ability to

compete.

492011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and Disarmament Agreements

and Commitments, (annual report prepared by the Department of State; Washington, DC: US GPO, August

2011).50 Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East, (Table, Stockholm,

Sweden: SIPRI, generated 30 November 2012).


16/37

15

Strategic benefits, on the other hand, tend to be more sensitive. The first involves

a historic adversary. Since the inception of the PRC, India and China have clashed over

their extensive border, particularly over Tibet. India is bordered on its Western side by

Pakistan, which could explain Chinas extreme interest in that state. Another interest of

Chinas is to curry favor with Middle Eastern, especially Islamist, governments as that

region becomes more and more vital. If China can pacify and appease Islamist

governments, then perhaps Beijing can feel less fear over the potential radicalization of

Muslims in Xinjiang and, to a much lesser extent, Ningxia, already problematic regions.

This idea of gaining the friendship of Middle Eastern and particularly Islamist

governments has another extremely appealing benefit to China: it would combat

perceived United States hegemony in the region. Diverting some of the influence that the

United States has, or could have, in the Middle East would not only increase Chinas

influence in the region, but would also be another battlefield in the growing global

maneuver for power between the United States and China.

The simplest and most easily explained, and perhaps least beneficial when

weighed on balance, motivation behind Chinas arms sales to the Middle East is the

driving force behind, of course, all economic interaction everywhere in the world. That

is, of course, to gain money. In 2011, as previously noted, Chinese revenue from armsexports was over $2.2 billion.51 Though that number puts China comfortably within the

top six arms suppliers in the world, especially to developing or Third World states, it is

paltry when compared to the revenue from other Chinese export industries.

According to Chinas Ministry of Commerce, China finished 2011 with a trade

surplus of $155.1 billion; compared to that massive number, just over $2 billion is tiny.52

It is also only a fraction of revenues derived from United States arms exports, or $12.2

billion in 2011 alone. The U.S. accounted for approximately 30% of all global arms

51Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., p. 8.52 China Resource Center, (fact sheet; Washington, DC: Office of the United States Trade

Representative, 2012). (accessed 5 November 2012).


17/37

16

exports.53 Thus arms export revenue is not a decisive motivation for Beijing to pursue

arms deals. It is certainly a bonus, and one that adds to Chinas overall economic

improvement, especially by opening roads for trade with some states it might not

otherwise have, but it is certainly not a factor that greatly impacts Beijings export

financial profile.

A more significant economic impetus for Chinas selling copious amounts of

arms to the Middle East involves oil. As China further cements its status as an industrial

and economic powerhouse, a reputation largely based on manufacturing, it will continue

to rely on oil, or even increase its dependence on foreign oil. The CCPs 10th Five-Year

Plan, which covered 2001-2005, was the first to mention energy security explicitly,

identified guaranteeing and protecting access to oil as a priority.54 The vast majority of

oil produced today originates in the Middle East, so it follows that China would be

interested in the region. Beijing imported 55% of its oil in total, and 51% of that was

brought in from the Middle East.55 The two largest exporters of oil to China are Iran,

which provides around 12% of Chinas oil, and Saudi Arabia, which in recent years has

reached as much as 20%.56 As one report in The Atlantic notes, this means China is

becoming the new United States in regards to oil diplomacy with the Middle East.57

That means, first and foremost, protecting the region from which the oil originates.

53 Big Guns: The Worlds Biggest Arms Exporters (Daily chart; The Economist online, 20 May 2012)

(accessed 5

November 2012).54 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 1.55 Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, The Atlantic (19 July

2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).56 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 42.57Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, op cit.


18/37

17

Figure 6: China's Crude Oil Imports by Source, 200958

Much of the United States interest in the Middle East throughout the second half

of the twentieth century stemmed from its oil needs. Now, as the United States draws

closer to regaining energy independence, Washington appears to have started to feel more

freedom to take stronger oppositional stances in the Middle East, for instance siding

wholeheartedly with the citizens of a state attempting to overthrow a dictator, rather than

needing to appease that dictator to secure oil imports.59 That would tend to deepen

Chinese fears of the United States either constraining or opposing behaviors China

would support. United States action in the Middle East could cause and, in fact,

already has caused problems in Chinas acquisition of oil. Chinas primary goal in allpolicy, foreign and domestic, is to maintain its economic growth, to which oil is

58 Ibid.59 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 4


19/37

18

indispensable. To combat those fears, China has begun to manipulate weapons sales in

order to secure access to oil.60

Primarily, this means favorable arms sales to states with which China has a strong

oil relationship. Iran demonstrates perhaps the greatest example of this. China imports

over 12% of the oil that Iran produces per year, making China Irans largest oil trading

partner. In 2010, China became Tehrans largest economic partner in any arena.61

In

2004, a Chinese state-owned company (SINOPEC) and Iran signed a strategic

cooperation agreement stating that in exchange for importing 10 million tons of Iranian

liquid natural gas annually, China would take the lead in developing the oil field at

Yadavaran, Irans largest undeveloped oil field at the time of signing.62 It went into

effect in 2007. China is also helping Iran create pipelines from the Caspian Sea through

Kazakhstan to China, which would ease Chinas access (especially since Chinas naval

capability to protect shipping lanes is not as effective as its land capability).63

Iran has also received countless shipments of conventional weapons from China,

stretching back to the Iran-Iraq War of 1980-1988coincidentally, right after China

began its policies of economic opening and reform under Deng Xiaoping.64 Iran has also

received tremendous help from Norinco, a massive Chinese state-owned industry

proficient in every type of industrial manufacturingespecially weaponry. Norinco builtLine 4 of the Tehran subway in the 1990s and, through a proxy company it owns, shipped

Iran large quantities of steel piping necessary for chemical and explosive weapons.65

The first of the strategic geopolitical motivations for arming the Middle East

refers mainly to Chinas involvement in the Pakistani military. That, of course, is

containing India. China and India share a border through the contested Tibetan region,

60 Ibid, p. 2.61 Najmah Bozorgmerh and Geoff Dyer, China Overtakes EU as Irans Top Trade Partner,Financial

Times (8 February 2010) (accessed 9 November 2012).62 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 39.63 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p 8.64 Ibid, p. 4.65 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit.


20/37

19

which has been the site of many conflicts between the two states.66 Tibet, which contains

the Himalayan mountain range, identifies ethnically and religiously closer to India. Its

Buddhist government, headed by the Dalai Llama, finally fled to India to escape PLA

suppression following a 1951 revolt.67 Throughout the 1950s, there were many

skirmishes along the McMahon Line, the border between China and Tibet drawn in 1914

by British forces.68 By 1959, clashes had escalated and, with both sides claiming the

other fired first, appeared to be poised to devolve into war. PLA troops were constantly

stationed at the border, and the CMC ordered regiments from the border with Tibet and

nearby Xinjiang to prepare for a frontier counteroffensive.69

In the fall of 1962, the conflict between China and India escalated into a war.

Chinese reports cite 2,400 PLA casualties and 8,700 Indian casualties.70 During the lead-

up to, and actually in the midst of, the war, India sought assistance from many foreign

powers, including both the United States and the Soviet Union (during the Sino-Soviet

split), leaving China very isolated.71 Most sources cite the war as a Chinese victory, and

it certainly reflected the increased technological and operational capabilities of the PLA.

But it did not fully end the conflict, especially because the Tibetans created a hostile

environment in which Beijing had to enforce its policies. Since then, Tibet has been a

flashpoint not only between China and India, but also between China and the rest of the

world. In 2005, perhaps at least partially as an attempt to further normalize Sino-Indian

relations, China welcomed India, Iran, and Pakistan into the Shanghai Cooperation

Organization, whose mission is combating regional terrorism and extremism.72

To attempt to contain India and distract its forces from Tibet, China has grown a

close weapons relationship with Indias neighbor and rival to the west, Pakistan. As

discussed above, Islamabad is one of the primary recipients of Chinese weaponry and

technology. In 1974, in response to Indian nuclear testing, China assisted Pakistan in

66China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, op cit., p. 399.67 Ibid.68 Ibid.69 Ibid.70 Ibid, p. 400.71 Ibid.72 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 16.


21/37

20

starting its own nuclear program, and has helped maintain it ever since, giving updates in

both information and technology as needed. China sold Pakistan two updated reactors in

2010 to be in use by 2011.73 Pakistan has also bought huge quantities of conventional

weapons from China, and presumably will continue to do so. Bolstering the Pakistani

military provides China with an ally on the other side of India, either to distract India

during times of peace or to create a second front in the case of a war. Though the Sino-

Pakistani relationship is clearly the foremost example in regards to containing India,

Chinese (or indirectly Chinese) interaction in Afghanistan and even nearby Iran would

serve to give India trouble to its west as it, too, strives for continental power in Asia.

Another strategic geopolitical motivation is much broader and affords China a

larger range of benefits. The majority of the governments in the Middle East are

controlled by Islamist factions or monarchs, which means they are governed by the laws

of Islam, and several have the desire to export political Islam as far around the world as

possible, through mainly peaceful means, but violent if necessary.74 Paradoxically, the

PRC is an atheist nation and has had a poor relationship with various religious

institutions; perhaps the most repressed religious group under PRC rule is Muslims. Of

the thirty-three high level administrative regions in China, two are majority Muslim:

Ningxia and Xinjiang.75 Citizens of Ningxia assimilated into the PRC at the very

beginning, and thus have been allowed basic religious freedom so long as they abide by

PRC law.76 Xinjiang, however, has been a different story.

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region is located in western China and covers

about 1/6 of its total land area. Its population is over twenty million, and over eight

million of that are of Uighur ethnicity, a Turkic group that is predominately Muslim.77

Since 1955, after two suppressed independence attempts, it has been a registered

autonomous region, which means that in theory, it has more legislative rights than do

73 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan, op cit.74 The Harsh Reality of Chinas Uighur Muslim Divide,Al-Jazeera (12 October 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).75 Ibid.76 Ibid.77 Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and Chinas Xinjiang Region, (Backgrounder Report; New York, NY:

Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2012).


22/37

21

regular provincesalthough the reality of that is often challenged.78 Though the

plurality of the population is Uighur Muslim, the PRC has steadily been encouraging Han

(the PRC majority ethnic group) workers to emigrate to Xinjiang. The Han population

has risen from 6.7% to 40%, according to a Council on Foreign Relations report. 79

Although Beijing claims to not discriminate against Uighurs, all reports on the region

find differently; until a 2011 policy change, 800 out of 840 public service jobs were

reserved for Hans.80 In the 1990s, even the Chinese minister of religious affairs, Zhou

Guohai, expressed Beijings deep fears of the Quran and what it teaches to

followers.81

Figure 7: Map of China with Xinjiang Highlighted82

Beijing greatly fears, and regularly attempts to suppress, any activity viewed byBeijing as extremist, known as any public moves to politicize Islam.83 PRC

78 Ibid.79 Ibid.80 Ibid.81 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p. 15.82 Uyghur, (Map; Verbix, 7 July 2009, ) (accessed 10

November 2012).


23/37

22

government forces insist that many Uighurs during the 1980s and 90s traveled to

Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asian states and learned extremist views, some even

joining the Taliban or Taliban-opposition force the Northern Alliance.84 The most

militant of the Uighur rebel groups was known as EMIT and was very active in the

1990s. They and others have relationships with the Pakistani Taliban, as Pakistani

officials have openly admitted along with their promise to help contain terrorism in

Xinjiang.85

Tensions between Beijing and Uighur forces always run high, but in 2009 they

came to a head in Urumqi, the capital of Xinjiang, leaving nearly 200 people dead.

Amnesty International reports that even as late as 2011, dissenters who spoke out against

Beijings treatment of the rebels were being jailed or even executed.86 Beijing also

restricts Uighur Muslims ability to build mosques or other Muslim-interest institutions,

subverting their ability to practice their religion and culture.

If the PRC nurtures its relationship with outspoken Islamist governments, perhaps

it can prevent those same governments from attempting to help Uighur Muslims in their

pursuit of an independent state. This particularly applies to Chinas close relationships

with Iran and Saudi Arabia, two states certainly bent on spreading political Islam as much

as possible. In 1997, the Grand Mufti of Saudi Arabia wrote an opinion articleemphasizing the moral obligation to our Muslim brothers, referring to those

systematically oppressed in Xinjiang.87

China has recently done more to appease Muslim governments, especially

powerful ones such as Saudi Arabia and Iran. The primary way to do that is through

economic cooperation. While oil accounts for perhaps the largest portion of the

economic cooperation (including a 2004 strategic contract between Saudi Arabia and

China), weapons sales are certainly a powerful factor as well.88 If China can build up

83 Ibid.84 Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and Chinas Xinjiang Region, op cit.85 Ibid.86 Ibid.87 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p. 16.88 Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East, op cit., p. 6.


24/37

23

these Middle Eastern and Muslim governments security forces, they will not only be

indebted to China financially, but should also feel affinity towards that state which

provided them with their power. Thus these governments, especially Saudi Arabia, Iran,

and Pakistan, will have a greater chance of viewing the PRC favorably and be less likely

to support the separatist Uighur Muslim elements.

A fifth potential motivation for Chinas arming the Middle East, under the

category of strategic or geopolitical motivations, is perhaps the most important

arguably the overarching motivation for all of Chinas military modernization and actions

outside of the East and Southeast Asian region. That goal is to contain what is perceived

to be American hegemony.89 Despite ever-increasing economic cooperation between

China and the United States, the two states are ideologically opposed, and that opposition

is reflected in many arenas, but none more so than foreign policy. The PRC is a

communist statethe most powerful communist state in the world since the fall of the

Soviet Union, and as such is the leading voice in spreading communismthat claims to

focus on domestic issues, only intervening in another states problems if a Chinese

interest is at risk.90 The United States, on the other hand, has built a reputation over the

twentieth century as a global police force, protecting not only U.S. interests but also

spreading democracy and fighting on behalf of peoples seeking freedom. Those two

goals often led to contradictions in U.S. policy, seen especially in the Middle East in the

twentieth century, as the United States covertly supported numerous coups and

revolutions to install rulers indebted to U.S. will.

Unless either the United States or the CCP drastically changes its perspective on

international relations, Beijing and the Washington will never be as close as their trade

relationshipwhich in 2011 reached $539 billionmight suggest.91 The Middle East, as

has already been discussed, is a particular point of tension between the two; continued

safe access to oil is of utmost importance to both states, and both import a vast quantity

of oil from the region. Further, the Middle East is a strategically and historically

important area as a link between the East and the West, so control of it (or in modern

89 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 215.90 Ibid, p. 120.91 China Resource Center, op cit.


25/37

24

terms, greatest influence over it) affords a huge advantage.92 Finally, just as first Japan,

then China and other East Asian states were the most rapidly developing states of the

twentieth century, it appears that in the twenty-first century, Middle Eastern states will

develop fastest. As the primary superpower in the current global balance, the United

States interest in the Middle East is obvious. China is interested in the Middle East for

two layers of reasons: one is the same interests that the United States, and all other

powers, have in the Middle East. The other is to block the United States from achieving

its goals in the region.

There are many specific examples of Chinas blocking the United States and its

allies in the Middle East through the medium of arms sales. Despite direct warnings from

the United States and its allies against doing so, China has assisted in the nuclear program

of many states deemed dangerous by the international community, primarily Iran and

Pakistan.93 Particularly regarding Iran, in 2006, when the United Nations endeavored to

bring tougher sanctions on Iran and create some sort of comprehensive admonition to

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmedinejad to shut down the nuclear program, China

utilized its UNSC veto to block it.94 That action gave Iran several more years to develop

its program before it once again took center stage in autumn of 2011.

China, along with Russia, has also continued to back Bashar al-Assads despoticregime in Syria, a major recipient of Chinese missiles and related technology.95

Although international mobilization to support Syrian rebels may have been lacking even

with Chinese and Russian support, it cannot be ignored that their opposition is a major

hindrance. Beyond those examples, the PRC certainly has a lengthy history of

encouraging regimes that the United States might view differently. Sudan is a friend of

Chinas, despite Western disapproval of al-Bashirs government. China also encourages

parties with ties to terrorism or at least violent anti-Western or anti-democratic

sentiments, particularly in powerful or problematic states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran.96

92 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 10.93 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.94 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit.95 Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria, op cit.96 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit., p.17.


26/37

25

This type of strategic blocking of U.S. interests further improves the relationship

between China and various Middle Eastern governments who may be anti-Western,

desiring freedom and power on their own terms rather than through some U.S. program.

It is also a forum to test out US reaction to Chinese intervention. Knowing how the

United States reacts is very important to the PRC.97 In East Asia, particularly those states

of Southeast Asia that border China and islands in the South China Sea, China appears to

have aims to increase its territory and reintegrate those areas that historically belonged to

various dynasties or empires. Of course, the most important of those lands is Taiwan.

However, Taiwan has signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with the United States, so

deterring U.S. intervention in a PRC-Taiwan military conflict would be difficult, even if

vital. Although the United States official diplomatic ties with China are with the PRC

mainland rather than Taiwan, a PRC invasion of Taiwan would still spark U.S.

intervention.98 Thus, it is critical for Beijing to understand what lines are not crossable

and what manner of retaliation can be expected.

POSSIBLE IMPLICATIONS

The two most significant implications of Chinese arms sales, and increased

Chinese influence in general, in the Middle East are: an inability of the international

community, especially the United Nations, to intervene effectively in any situation in theregion; and a further complication between China and the United States. The former

implication proves especially dangerous as transnational security issues, such as climate

change, cyber security, terrorism, and energy security, become ever more important. The

latter reflects Chinas clearly stated goal to become a superpower, to shift the

international system from unipolar centered around the United Statesas it has been

since the fall of the Soviet Blocto bipolar (with the PRC as the second pole) or, even

better, multipolar with numerous superpowers, perhaps one per region.99 China

obviously sees itself as the pole for the Asia Pacific region, but the United States has

powerful influence and vital interests in the region, complicating Chinas plans.

97Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012, (report prepared for

Congress by the Office of the Secretary for Defense; Washington, DC: US GPO, May 2012), p. 18.98 Ibid, p. 17.99 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 28.


27/37

26

In the current globalizing world, international cooperation is becoming more

important than ever. Not international cooperation in the style of treaties and alliances

that were popular in past centuries, but the type of joint work that began after World War

I and grew in force after World War II, particularly the United Nations. Institutions,

though flimsy and not often successful at enforcing their resolutions, have also increased

in reputation on the international stage.

Figure 8: China's Increasing Participation in International Organizations100

Although China belongs to many international institutionseven having one of

five coveted permanent seats in the United Nations Security Counciland is party to

numerous important treaties, the manner in which the CCP conducts its foreign policy is

not always conducive to the growing interconnection among states.101

Particularly,

Beijings emphasis on militarization and constant desire to annex what it considers

historically Chinese territory (Taiwan and surrounding islands, and to some extent

continental Southeast Asia) harkens to an earlier century in which each state jealously

100 Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, Chinas New Engagement in the International

System: In the ring, but punching below its weight, (report; Washington, DC: Center for American

Progress, November 2009), p. 11.101 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.


28/37

27

protected its own interest even to the detriment of the international community.102

Perhaps this is because during the first iteration of that feeling, China was on the opposite

enda territory to be divided. Now, as arguably one of the most powerful, certainly one

of the most important, states in the world, China desires an arena to flex its muscle.

The most important issues that affect not one state or region but the whole globe

are terrorism, cyber security, nuclear proliferation, climate change, and energy security.

China is a pivotal player in curbing all of those problems, although its record on climate

change is questionable at best, because for the past several decades China has favored

economic advancement over sustainability. Concerning terrorism, climate change,

nuclear proliferation, and energy security, the Middle East is among the central regions,

impossible to discount from the conversationBeijing knows that. China, as does any

powerful state, uses its influence to achieve its goals when dealing with less powerful

states. However, concerning many of the abovementioned issues, China has different

goals than does the international community in general (as led by the United States).

When discussing terrorism, Chinas official line supports the U.S. -led war on

terrorism. But, CCP spokespeople often repeat, China only supports U.S. action in

concert with a fully UN-approved plan that avoids civilian casualties.103 Any brief

look at the war on terror or modern war tactics in general displays that civilian casualtiesare an inevitable, tragic consequence of war. Thus China can simultaneously claim to

support U.S. action while still condemning it.

Another unavoidable problem that U.S. policymakers will find in the Middle East

as a result of Chinas rising influence concerns nuclear proliferation. Most of the

international community desires a nuclear weapons-free Middle East. Chinas

proliferation record, especially with nuclear information or technology, or nuclear-

capable missiles, demonstrates that China does not necessarily agree.104 This was proven

absolutely in the mid-2000s, when Beijing effectively blocked the United Nations from

passing a workable resolution to halt the Iranian nuclear program or placing effective

102 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 40.103 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit.104 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.


29/37

28

sanctions on Iran.105 In a more indirect manner, Chinese encouragement of nuclear or

chemical weapons programs around the Middle Eastparticularly Iran, Pakistan, and to

a lesser degree Syriahinders international efforts to limit nuclear proliferation to

unstable states.106

As the 2011-2012 year of endless upheaval and revolution throughout the Middle

East showed, the region is not stable. Warring factions and parties utilize every tactic

available to gain power; possession of nuclear weapons, either by despotic governments

or desperate revolutionaries, would have inflamed the situation much further. However,

at the moment, Beijing cares more for increasing Chinas influence in a region as vital as

the Middle East than it does for Middle East stability, so long as its main oil providers

(Iran and Saudi Arabia) remain relatively stable.107

The basis for Chinas incongruent action concerning terrorism and nuclear

proliferation, in fact the basis for much of Chinese foreign policy, as noted previously, is

to balance United States influence, both in the Middle East and globally. The United

States has, over the past century, taken up the mantle of global police force; U.S.

foreign policy has involved pressing U.S. will on other states, primarily in the form of

spreading democratic ideals. Throughout the mid-twentieth century, the United States

main adversary in this fight for global influence was the Soviet Union. Since its collapse,which was coincident with Chinas economic rise, the PRC has actively sought to

become the alternate global power to the United States.

Chinas primary arena for combating U.S. influence has been through nuclear

proliferation. The United States view is complicated: it tends to advocate no

development of weapons by states that are not already nuclear capable, but not total

destruction of current nuclear caches, and spread of nuclear energy technology. China

takes a different approach: officially, Beijing fights for lowering the global number of

nuclear weapons to zero, but China repeatedly proliferates technology and materiel.108

105 Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, op cit.106 Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East, op cit.107 Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle, op cit., p. 3.108 Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China, op cit.


30/37

29

Clearly Beijing wants to counter the U.S. position, no matter how many contradictions

that creates.

Another impetus for Chinas balancing of U.S. influence in the Middle East is to

redirect some of the tension between Beijing and Washington to an arena further from

Chinas sovereign territory. China and the United States have continually clashed over

land in Asia, with the United States fighting on behalf of those smaller states against

China. For example, China has, numerous times, invaded territory around its border

regions and nearby islands, such as Vietnam, Tibet (as already discussed), andthrough

the proxy of North KoreaSouth Korea.109 However, the most important of these is, of

course, Taiwan.

Taiwan, home of the democratic Republic of China, claims independence, but the

PRC contends it is Chinese territory. Many scholars, including Richard D. Fisher,

believe that China will, within the next century, launch a full-scale invasion of Taiwan to

reclaim it.110 Based on the Mutual Defense Treaty between Taiwan and the United

States, that would spark a conflict between the United States and China. The United

States recent implementation of multiple Ballistic Missile Defense systems in rings

throughout Asia (areas protecting Japan, South Korea, India, and potentially Taiwan)

increase Beijings fears that the United States is attempting to isolate China similar to itstreatment of the Soviet Union during the Cold War.111 Further, China feels that such

physical protection of Taiwan would allow Taiwan to more emphatically fight for

independence.

Despite Chinas rapid and extensive military modernization, the United States

remains significantly more powerful. Thus, Beijing would be determined to divert U.S.

attention, particularly attention to tensions with China, to regions further from Chinas

territory. A prime candidate for that diversion is the Middle East. The Middle East would

be a convenient space for a proxy confrontation between China and the United States,

because it is important enough that both sides care deeply about it, but far enough from

109China at War, ed. Xiaobing Li, op cit., various sections.110 Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization, op cit., p. 124.111 Richard Weitz, China Steps Up Rhetoric Against US Missile Defense, The Jamestown Foundation:

China Brief, vol. 12, no. 20 (October 2012), p. 12.


31/37

30

each sides own territory that each would react militarily there. However, any true

military confrontation between China and the United States is unlikely. Not only for the

reason of military disparity, but also because both China and the potential battleground

the Middle Eastunderstand the importance of United States cooperation to increasing

economic power, regardless of current problems.

The most likely reasoning behind Chinas constant balancing of the United States,

particularly in a region as vital as the Middle East, is merely to demonstrate Chinas

growing power. Chinese foreign policy implies that Beijing has no designs in becoming

embroiled in a confrontation with the militarily superior United States in the near future,

but believes that one of the hallmarks of a superpower is to demonstrate its power and

exert influence on weaker states. After an immensely successful economic rise to power,

over the past decade China has realized that it must further modernize in other ways

particularly militarily and has adjusted its foreign policy to reflect that change.

Naturally, especially considering Chinas huge energy consumption needs, the first place

Beijing would look to exert influence would be the Middle East. As in the Asia Pacific

region, pursuing hegemony there would necessitate a run-in with the United States; China

is simply attempting to play the role of superpower in the hopes of eventually reaching

that status.

CONCLUSION

Chinese arms sales to the Middle East, whether conventional or nuclear, present a

threatthough not a huge oneto the United States. As China continues to grow in

physical power and influence, especially as it continues to modernize the PLA, it will

naturally turn its eye to perhaps the most vital, and certainly most unstable, region in the

world today. The Middle East matters to China as the historic link between the East and

West, and today as an oil source and canvas for Beijings political and military influence.

Though China has increased its arms sales (the majority of which are to the Middle East),

it is still a small enough player on the global arms field that the United States need not

worry overmuch. In fact, the United States is selling significantly more weapons to many

of the same states; the only truly problematic state with which China has a flourishing


32/37

31

arms transfer relationship is Iran, which China has helped develop a nuclear program as

well as other infrastructure and economic needs.112

Despite legitimate fears throughout the international community that China is not

dedicated to global limitations on arms deals, the PRC has been making large strides

toward becoming more involved diplomatically and economically. This particularly

applies to the Middle East, on whose oil and strategic location China so relies. On

November first, the Chinese Foreign Ministry released its version of a plan to end the

conflict in Syria.113

Much like Kofi Annans plan earlier this year, it allows a significant

amount of the Assad regime to remain in power, though it calls for a transitional authority

and immediate humanitarian aid to those affected by the conflict.114

Importantly, it bars any international military action. Chinaand Russiahas

blocked any attempts by the international community to intervene in the Syrian conflict;

though they claim to desire an end to the violence, they still support the legitimacy of

Assads government.115 Neither wants to lose another fellow nondemocratic regime to

Western ideals. Nonetheless, though Beijings approach to the Syria problem is vastly

different from that of the United States, the fact that both powers are fighting more loudly

for an end to the conflict could present a starting point for closer relations. The United

States should also take care to note that Chinese ideals of exceptionalism are largelybased on U.S. examplesdespite ideological differences, China desires the same

superpower status achieved by the United States.116 Therefore perhaps one of the most

effective ways to shape Chinese actions to U.S. will, or at least to engage Beijing to

attempt the same, in the arena of foreign policy is not to shirk its duty (whether real or

perceived) to the international community, as it arguably has in Syria, but rather to be

involved.

112Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, op cit., various pages.113 Neil Mc Farquhar, China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the Civil War in Syria,New

York Times (1 November 2012) (accessed 10 November 2012).114 Ibid.115 Ibid.116 Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, Chinas New Engagement in the International

System, op cit., p. 52.


33/37

32

Chinas selling arms to the Middle East, much like the majority of Chinas other

military or political posturing against the United States, is merely to demonstrate its

growing power and begin to build a foundation of influence. U.S. policymakers should

not fear an imminent conflict with the PRC, nor that PRC sales to the Middle East will

block the United States from gaining access to oil and trade with the region.

Nonetheless, the U.S. should not become complacent: competition is heating up in the

region and a 21st Century renewal of the great game could be afoot.


34/37

33

WORKS CITED

PERIODICALS

Dan Blumenthal, Providing Arms: China and the Middle East.Middle East Quarterly,vol. 12, no. 2, (Spring 2005): pp. 11-19.

Richard Weitz, China Steps Up Rhetoric Against US Missile Defense, The JamestownFoundation: China Brief, vol. 12, no. 20 (October 2012): pp. 11-14.

Steve A. Yetiv and Chunglong Lu, China, Global Energy, and the Middle East,MiddleEast Journal, vol. 61, no. 2 (Spring 2007): pp. 199-218.

Ziad Haider, Sino-Pakistan Relations and Xinjiangs Uighurs,Asian Survey, vol. 45,no. 4 (July-August 2005): pp. 522-545.

NEWS ARTICLES

Damien Ma, Dependence on Middle Eastern Oil: Now its Chinas Problem, Too, TheAtlantic (19 July 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).

Farhan Bokhari and Katherine Hille, Pakistan Turns to China for Naval Base,Financial Times (22 May 2011) (accessed 7 November 2012).

James Hardy and Christopher F. Foss, China Denies Selling Arms to Ghaddafi Regime,Janes Defence Weekly (6 September 2011) (accessed 30 September 2012).

Jon Grevatt, China to tighten arms export controls in wake of Libyan controversy,Janes Defence Industry 2011 (7 September 2011) (accessed 30 September 2012).

John Irish, China says Iran nuclear talks at "crucial stage"Reuters (27 September 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).

Matthew Bell, Arms sales at root of Russian/Chinese 'ruse' to veto UN resolution against

Syria, says Washington,Janes Defence Weekly (6 October 2011) (accessed 30 September 2012).

Najmah Bozorgmerh and Geoff Dyer, China Overtakes EU as Irans Top TradePartner,Financial Times (8 February 2010) (accessed 9 November 2012).


35/37

34

Neil Mc Farquhar, China Presents a Four-Point Proposal for Resolving the Civil War inSyria,New York Times (1 November 2012) (accessed 10November 2012).

Rise in international arms transfers is driven by Asian demand, says SIPRI, StockholmInternational Peace Research Institute (19 March 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).

Steven Sotloff, Chinas Libya Problem, The Diplomat(14 March 2012) (accessed 5November 2012).

The Harsh Reality of Chinas Uighur Muslim Divide,Al-Jazeera (12 October 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).

BOOKS

Jon B. Alterman and John W. Garver, The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, andthe Middle East, (Washington, DC: CSIS Press, 2008).

Richard D. Fisher, Chinas Military Modernization: Building for Regional and GlobalReach, (London: Praeger Security International, 2008).

Xiaobing Li, China at War, (Santa Barbara, CA: ABC-CLIO, 2012).

GOVT PUBS

Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 2004-2011, (report prepared for

members of Congress by the Congressional Research Service; Washington, DC: USGPO, August 2012).

Military and Security Developments Involving the Peoples Republic of China 2012,(report prepared for Congress by the Office of the Secretary for Defense; Washington,DC: US GPO, May 2012).

2011 Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control, Nonproliferation, and

Disarmament Agreements and Commitments, (annual report prepared by the Departmentof State; Washington, DC: US GPO, August 2011).

FACT SHEETS

China Resource Center, (fact sheet; Washington, DC: Office of the United States TradeRepresentative, 2012). (accessed 5November 2012).

Kelsey Davenport and Lauren Weiss, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Syria.Arms Control Association, (updated July 2012), (accessed 9 November 2012).


36/37

35

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: China. Arms ControlAssociation, (updated August 2012), (accessed 9 November 2012).

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Iran. Arms ControlAssociation, (updated August 2012), (accessed 9 November 2012).

Wyatt Hoffman, Arms Control and Proliferation Profile: Pakistan. Arms ControlAssociation, (updated August 2012), (accessed 9 November 2012).

REPORTS

China North Industries Group (NORINCO (G)), (description; GlobalSecurity.org, 7November 2011) (accessed 7 November 2012).

Mark Hibbs, Pakistan Deal Signals China's Growing Nuclear Assertiveness, (NuclearEnergy Brief; Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 27 April2010). (accessed 5 November 2012).

Nina Hachigian, Winny Chen, and Christopher Beddor, Chinas New Engagement in theInternational System: In the ring, but punching below its weight, (report; Washington,DC: Center for American Progress, November 2009).

Preeti Bhattacharji, Uighurs and Chinas Xinjiang Region, (Backgrounder report; NewYork, NY: Council on Foreign Relations, 29 May 2012).

Sam Perlo-Freeman, Arms Transfers to the Middle East, (Backgrounder paper;Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, July 2009).

Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control, Irans Nuclear Program, (report; IranWatch, March 2012) (accessed 8 November 2012).

IMAGES

Arms Transfers Database, TIV of arms exports from the top 10 largest exporters, 2010-2011, (Table, Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 10 November 2012).

Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Pakistan, (Table,Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 24 November 2012).

Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11 Trade Register, PRC and Iran, (Table, Stockholm,Sweden: SIPRI, generated 24 November 2012).

Arms Transfers Database, 2001-11, Chinese Arms Sales to the Middle East, (Table,Stockholm, Sweden: SIPRI, generated 30 November 2012).


37/37

Big Guns: The Worlds Biggest Arms Exporters (Daily chart; The Economist online,20 May 2012) (accessed 5 November 2012).

Kyra Stoddart, Shocking Facts About Whos Arming Human Rights Abusers[INFOGRAPHIC], (Infographic; New York, NY: Amnesty International Human RightsNow Blog, 12 April 2012). (accessed 5 November 2012).

Uyghur, (Map; Verbix, 7 July 2009, )(accessed 10 November 2012).

INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

IAEA, Convention on Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, (internationalconvention; Vienna: IAEA, 1979), (accessed 5 November 2012).

Rohan Perera, International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear

Terrorism, April 2005 (report on international convention; New York, NY: UnitedNations, 2008) (accessed 5November 2012).

Date post:	14-Apr-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	potomacfoundation
View:	217 times
Download:	0 times

A Dangerous Trade: An Analysis of Potential Motivations and Implications of Chinese Arms Transfers...

Documents