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A FIPS 140-2 evaluation could authorize CC-like tests · A FIPS 140-2 evaluation could authorize...

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  • Author: Jean-Pierre KRIMM

    CESTI-LETI

    [email protected]

    Speaker: Axel BONESS

    A FIPS 140-2 evaluation could

    authorize CC-like tests

    ICCC 2005 - TOKYO

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 2

    2005 CESTI-LETI Presentation

    A French ITSEF

    A part of the LETI (CEA) in Grenoble

    Accredited for electronic components and

    their embedded software

    Performs CC and ITSEC evaluation

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 3

    2005 Context

    The World of the Smart Card evaluation:Common Criteria

    time spent on specific vulnerability assessment

    FIPS 140-2mainly conformance tests

    The Common Criteria and FIPS 140-2 are different

    abstractness

    focus of tests (conformance vs evaluation)

    Is this difference due to a particular interpretation ?

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 4

    2005 Presentation Outline

    CC evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 validationgeneral presentation

    physical security testing

    philosophy of tests

    Vulnerability assessment in a FIPS 140-2 evaluation: Problems / Solutions

    In Practice: a Feasibility Study

    The Standard ISO/19790

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 5

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 6

    2005 Actors

    CC Evaluation

    Certification Bodies (Certification)

    ITSEF (Testing Lab)

    Sponsor and Developer

    FIPS 140-2 Validation

    NIST/CSE (Validate tested cryptographic modules)

    CAVP and CMVP (FIPS Approved Algo and

    Certification)

    CMT Lab (Testing Lab)

    Vendor

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 7

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 8

    2005 Laboratories

    ITSEF (CC)

    Accredited in each National Scheme by CB

    In the French Scheme

    COFRAC Accreditation

    DCSSI Licensing (either Soft or Hard + ES)

    CMT Lab (FIPS 140-2)

    Cryptographic Module Testing Laboratories

    Accredited by National Voluntary Laboratory

    Accreditation Program (NVLAP)

    US, Canada and UK

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 9

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 10

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 11

    2005 Product under Evaluation

    Target Of Evaluation (CC)

    An IT product or system and its associated

    guidance documentation that is the subject of an

    evaluation

    Set of hardware, and/or software, and/or firmware

    Cryptographic Module (FIPS 140-2)

    Set of hardware, and/or software, and/or firmware

    Implements a cryptographic algorithm

    Contained within a defined boundary

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 12

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 13

    2005 Applicability

    IT Product Certified (CC)

    French Banking Application

    All Software and Hardware which need Security Assurance

    Cryptographic Modules Certified (FIPS 140-2)

    U.S. Federal organizations must use validated

    cryptographic modules

    Government of Canada departments are recommended by

    CSE to use validated cryptographic modules

    Everyone who needs guaranty on standard implementation

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 14

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Security PolicySecurity TargetDescription

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 15

    2005 Product Description

    Security Target (CC)Assets and Assumptions

    Threats on the Assets

    Security Objectives which counter Threats

    Security Functional Requirements

    Cryptographic Module Security PolicySecurity rules

    Roles, Services and Crypto Keys and CSPs

    Security Policies (I&A, Access Control, )

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 16

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    4 Security Levels7 EALsSecurity Levels

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Security PolicySecurity TargetDescription

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 17

    2005 CC Security Levels

    EAL 7

    EAL 6

    EAL 5

    EAL 4

    EAL 3

    EAL 2

    EAL 1

    CC

    Hierarchically Ordered EAL

    each EAL represents more

    assurance than all lower EALs

    Based on pre-defined assurance

    scale

    Can be customized

    (augmentation)

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 18

    2005 FIPS 140-2 Security Levels

    Level 1 is the lowest, Level 4 most stringent

    Requirements are primarily cumulative by level

    Overall rating is lowest rating in all sections

    No customisation allowed

    Not Validated

    Leve

    l 1

    Leve

    l 2

    Leve

    l 3

    Leve

    l 4

    Security Spectrum

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 19

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    4 Security Levels7 EALsSecurity Levels

    FIPS 140-2CC

    DTRCEMMethodology

    Security PolicySecurity TargetDescription

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 20

    2005 Methodology

    CEM (CC)

    CC requirements are refined to Work-Units

    Up to EAL 5

    Derived Test Requirements (FIPS 140-2)

    FIPS 140-2 requirements are refined to Vendor

    and Tester Requirements

    For all Security Levels

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 21

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    4 Security Levels7 EALsSecurity Levels

    FIPS 140-2CC

    ValidationEvaluationPhilosophy

    DTRCEMMethodology

    Security PolicySecurity TargetDescription

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 22

    2005 Philosophy

    Evaluation (CC)

    Specific Security Assurance Requirements for

    Vulnerability Analysis

    Penetration Testing through AVA_VLA

    Functional vulnerability through ATE_IND

    A quotation table exists (cf. JIL for Smart Card)

    Validation (FIPS 140-2)

    Conformance testing of Cryptographic Module

    It is not an evaluation (NO VLA, )

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 23

    2005 CC Evaluation vs FIPS 140-2 Validation

    US and Canadian OrganizationAllApplicability

    CMT Lab (NVLAP)ITSEF (CB in each scheme)Laboratories

    CMVP, CAVP

    CMT Lab

    CB

    ITSEF

    Actors

    4 Security Levels7 EALsSecurity Levels

    FIPS 140-2CC

    Security AreasSARTester Tasks

    ValidationEvaluationPhilosophy

    DTRCEMMethodology

    Security PolicySecurity TargetDescription

    Cryptographic ModuleTarget Of EvaluationProduct

    Crypto algo validation (CAVP)NonePrerequisite

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 24

    2005 Security Assurance Requirements (CC)

    Choose a level of component in following Class

    Security Target Evaluation (ASE)

    Configuration Management (ACM)

    Delivery and Operation (ADO)

    Development (ADV)

    Guidance Documents (AGD)

    Life Cycle Support (ALC)

    Tests (ATE)

    Vulnerability Assessment (AVA)

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 25

    2005 FIPS 140-2 Security Areas

    Cryptographic Module Specification

    Cryptographic Module Ports and Interfaces

    Roles, Services, and Authentication

    Finite State Model

    Physical Security

    Operational Environment

    Cryptographic Key Management

    EMI/EMC requirements

    Self Tests

    Design Assurance

    Mitigation of Other Attacks

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 26

    2005 Possible interpretations

    a DTR statement is incomplete"Attempt to access (by circumventing the documented protection mechanisms) [...]"

    in tester requirements TE03.22.02 and TE07.01.02

    2 interpretationsUsing Only: External Interfaces of the Module (Functional Means)

    Or going further: Performing Environmental and Physical Testing

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 27

    2005 Environmental and Physical testing

    Environmental Testing could beclassical perturbation of commands

    timing attack during a calculation

    SPA, EMA, DPA, DFA attacks

    more to come

    Physical Testing could beprobing

    reverse engineering

    and so on

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 28

    2005 Problems and Proposals

    Identified Problems

    How to quote the attacks ?

    How to know if the attack leads to a fail verdict ?

    Which quotation for each security level ?

    Proposals

    Use the CC Smart Card Quotation Table

    Map VLA.1 to level 3, VLA.2 to level 4

    Allow augmentations to other levels (VLA.3)

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 29

    2005 A Quotation Table Exists (JIL)Factors Identification Exploitation

    Elapsed time

    < one hour 0 0

    < one day 1 3

    < one week 2 4

    < one month 3 6

    > one month 5 8

    Not practical * *

    Expertise

    Layman 0 0

    Proficient 2 2

    Expert 5 4

    Knowledge of the TOE

    Public 0 0

    Restricted 2 2

    Sensitive 4 3

    Critical 6 5

    Access to TOE

    < 10 samples 0 0

    < 100 samples 2 4

    > 100 samples 3 6

    Not practical * *

    Equipment

    None 0 0

    Standard 1 2

    Specialized 3 4

    Bespoke 5 6

    Range of

    values

    Resistance to

    attacker with attack

    potential of:

    SOF

    rating

    0-15 No rating No rating

    16-24 Low Basic

    25-30 Moderate Medium

    31 and above High High

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 30

    2005 A Feasibility Study

    Outside FIPS applicability contextEMI/EMC does not apply

    "FIPS Approved" has been re-defined

    Performed by the CESTI-LETIQ4 2004 - Q1 2005

    Sponsored by the DCSSI

    The Cryptographic Module = an already certified Java Card FIPS 140-2 level 3

    Two PhasesFIPS 140-2 evaluation (adapted security areas)

    Capitalisation reports (general, methodology and process)

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 31

    2005 ISO/19790

    DCSSI is involved in ISO/19790 standard

    The Context of the Feasibility Study Applies

    Methodology Report of the Feasibility Study has been used as input

    DCSSI proposition is to include some vulnerability assessment analysis and testing

  • CESTI-LETI - ICCC 2005 - TOKYO 32

    2005 Conclusion

    CC evaluation and FIPS 140-2 validation are

    different but:

    We can introduce vulnerability assessment

    analysis on Cryptographic Modules

    We can use the same Quotation Table

    This can lead to a common scheme for the

    penetration testing allowing some comparisons

  • Thank you for your attention

    Any questions ?

    Speaker: Axel Boness

    [email protected]

    Author: Jean-Pierre Krimm

    [email protected]

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