A Fissile Material Approach to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation
Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 2014 Revision 2
Zia Mian, Frank von Hippel, Alexander Glaser
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
About the IPFM
To provide the technical basis for policy initiatives to reduce
global stocks of military and civilian fissile materials
MISSION
• Established in 2006, IPFM has 28 members from 18 states
• Publications: annual Global Fissile Material Reports, research reports, and country studies
• www.fissilematerials.org and www.fissilematerials.org/blog
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Global Fissile Material Reports
2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty
2009: A Path to Nuclear Disarmament
2010: Balancing the Books: [Weapon State] Production and Stocks
2011: Nuclear Weapon and Fissile Material Stockpiles and Production
2013: Increasing Transparency
NEXT: Unmaking the Bomb: A Fissile Material Approach
with country perspectives and draft FM(C)T
with country perspectives
of Nuclear Warhead and Fissile Material Stocks as a Step toward Disarmament
A Fissile Material to Nuclear Disarmament and Nonproliferation, MIT Press, 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons
HEU in weapons usually more than 90% enriched in U-235 (0.7% in nature)
The Hiroshima bomb used 60 kg of 80%-enriched HEU
Plutonium (mostly Pu-239) separated from irradiated uranium
The Nagasaki bomb used 6 kg of Plutonium
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
A modern thermonuclear warhead contains on average 3–4 kg of plutonium and 25 kg highly enriched uranium
Adapted from Final Report of the Select Committee on U.S. National Security and Military/Commercial Concerns
with the Peoples Republic of China (“Cox Report”), U.S. House of Representatives, 3 January 1999
Fissile Materials and Nuclear Weapons
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Fissile Material Production for Weapons
Country HEU production Plutonium production for weapons
China stopped 1987
(unofficial) stopped 1991
(unofficial)
France stopped 1996 stopped 1992
Russia stopped 1987–1988 stopped 1994
United Kingdom stopped 1962
(but imports from United States) stopped 1995
United States stopped 1992 stopped 1988
Israel, India, Pakistan, and North Korea are still producing
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Highly Enriched Uranium, mid 2013
Stockpile available for weapons
Naval (fresh)
Civilian material
Excess (mostly for blend-down)
Naval (irradiated fuel)
Eliminated
Metric tons
Global stockpile is about 1350 tons, almost 99% is in weapon states
(25 MT of HEU are equivalent to 1,000–2,000 nuclear weapons)
*Estimate
11.7 MT26 MT*16 MT* 2.4 MT* 0.3 MT* 15 MT3.0 MT*
1.4 MT 8.1 MT4.6 MT
616 MT*
517 MT
260 MT
152 MT
100 MT
141 MT
63 MT
20 MT* 10 MT* 20 MT*
20 MT
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Separated Plutonium, mid 2013
Military stockpile
Additional strategic stockpile
Civilian stockpile, stored in country (Dec. 2012)
Civilian stockpile, stored outside country (Dec. 2012)
Excess military material
Metric tons
Global stockpile is about 500 tons, more than half is civilian and this stock is growing
(5 MT of plutonium are equivalent to 1,000–1,500 nuclear weapons)
*Estimate
1.8 MT* 0.54 MT* 0.03 MT 88 MT*0.15 MT*0.84 MT* 38 MT6 MT* 3.2 MT
49.3 MT90.3 MT
49.5 MT
34.0 MT
35.0 MT
9.3 MT 11.0 MT
0.01 MT3.8 MT 2.0 MT
0.2 MT* 4.7 MT*
57.5 MT
0.9 MT
6 MT*
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Disposed
4.4 MT
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Global Fissile Material Report 2008: Scope and Verification of a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, IPFM, Princeton, NJ, September 2008
The Challenges of an FM(C)T
Many similarities to IAEA safeguards in NPT non-weapon states but some new issues
Verification challenges are small compared to the political challenges of negotiating a treaty
2000 NPT Review Conference on the FMCT
FMCT Verification
A non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively
verifiable treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear
weapons … taking into consideration both nuclear disarmament and
nuclear non-proliferation objectives.”
“
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Global Fissile Material Cleanout
Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 2014 Revision 1
Frank von Hippel
Outline
Highly-enriched uranium �� Eliminating HEU to make disarmament more irreversible. �� Ending civilian use of HEU �� Ending naval use of HEU
Separated plutonium �� Ending plutonium separation and use �� Disposal of existing stocks
One ton of excess Russian weapon-grade uranium produced enough LEU to support a 1000-Megawatt (1-GWe) light-water nuclear power reactor for 1.5 years.
500 tons of Russian HEU – enough for 20,000 nuclear weapons were blended down 1993-2013.
Blending Down Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) to low enriched uranium (LEU) for power-reactor fuel
as part of nuclear disarmament
Global HEU Stocks, by Category
0
200.00
400.00
600.00
800.00
1000.00
Military Naval fresh Naval spent Civilian Excess Eliminated
RussiaUnited StatesOther NWSNNWS
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2,000 bomb equivalents
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The special concern about
HEU and terrorists.
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[LEGACY OF ATOMS FOR PEACE] Cleaning out HEU-fueled research reactors
(Focus of Nuclear Security Summits) Only 21 non-weapon states with more than 1 kg of HEU today
9/11
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Critical & Subcritical Assemblies
Pulsed Reactors
Steady Power Res. Reactors
Naval Reactors
(+ icebreaker & training)
Total
<0.25 MWt
0.25-250 MWt
Russia 23 15 2 13 84 137 China 1 2 0 0 3 Europe 3 3 3 5 13 (UK) 27 USA 6 2 1 6 103 118 Others 5 2 9 4 2 (India) 22 Total 38 22 17 28 202 307
� 50 reactors
Focus of current policy
New naval reactors could be designed to
use LEU fuel
Lifetime cores. Could be retired or replaced with computer simulations.�
HEU-fueled reactors: Remaining challenges not yet addressed: pulsed and critical assemblies and naval reactors�(http://;22*,&-"3&1*",2�/1(/facilities/1&2&"1$)!".%!*2/3/0&!01/%4$3*/.!1&"$3/12�)3-,) �
Pulsed reactors are simply massive pieces (>100 kg) of
HEU metal alloy. This material could easily be
used to make an “improvised nuclear device” Jon Long, “Assessment of Pulse Reactor Fuel for Packaging and
Accountability”, Institute of Nuclear Materials Management Annual Meeting, Phoenix, Arizona, 10-14 July 2005.
Critical assembly mockup of large breeder reactor core Tens of thousands of disks containing: 0.7 tons HEU(90%), 2.8 tons HEU(36%) and 0.5 tons plutonium
(Institute of Physics and Power Engineering, Obninsk, Russia) The good news: 90% HEU is being eliminated (also in Japan).
HEU fuel for naval propulsion
Country Nuclear ships and submarines Naval fuel enrichment U.S. 11 aircraft carriers, 72 submarines 90+% U.K. 10 submarines Same as U.S. Russia 4 cruisers, 29 submarines (+7 icebreakers) 21-90+% India 1 submarine Average of 45%? China 14 submarines < 20%? France 1 aircraft carrier, 10 submarines < 10% going down to 5% Brazil submarines under development <20% Total 12 aircraft carriers, 136 submarines �
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Signs of hope In January, U.S. nuclear Navy acknowledged possibility that it could
switch to LEU without unacceptable loss of life or performance.
Russia has developed high-power density LEU cermet fuel for its new icebreaker and floating nuclear power plant
Global Plutonium Stocks, by Category ���� �������
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Civilian plutonium
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Why all that separated civilian plutonium? �1975: Predicted imminent global need for plutonium breeders
Uranium was expected to run out; plutonium needed to start breeder reactors. Today, uranium accounts for only a few percent of cost of nuclear power and is
projected to be plentiful for at least 100 years. �
Projected nuclear �capacity (1975, IAEA)�
Projected band for nuclear capacity (2013, IAEA), Far East (~China)~ 40%)�
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Estimated Low-cost Uranium �(40-year supply for LWRs)�
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Spent LEU fuel storage�
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Plutonium & uranium�
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Separated �Plutonium �
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�� �����"#".%/.&%�20&.3�'4&,�1&01/$&22*.(���� France continues and recycles plutonium in MOX (mixed oxide 41".*4-�0,43/.*4-��,*()3�6"3&1�1&"$3/1�'4&,���.$1&"2&2�$/23�/'�.4$,&"1�0/6&1�".%�%/&2�./3�1&%4$&�20&.3�'4&,�1&0/2*3/18�2*9&��
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Countries that reprocess (% of capacity)
(GWe, [109 Watts])
Countries that have quit or plan to quit reprocessing and plan to store (GWe)
Countries that store (GWe)
France (85%) 63.1 (but EDF opposes)
Armenia (in Russia) 0.4 Argentina 0.9 Belgium (in France) 5.9 Brazil 1.9
India (�50%) 4.4 Bulgaria (in Russia) 1.9 Canada 12.6 Czech Rep. (in Russia) 3.7 Iran 0.9
Pilot plants Finland (in Russia) 2.7 Mexico 1.3 China (pilot plant) 11.7 Germany(in France/UK)13.1 Pakistan 0.7 Russia (pilot plant) 23.6 Hungary (in Russia) 1.9 Romania 1.3 Slovak Rep. (in Russia) 1.8 Slovenia 0.7
Future very uncertain Spain (in France, UK) 7.6 South Africa 1.8 Japan (100%) 44.2 Sweden (in France/UK) 9.3 South Korea 18.7 Netherlands(100%France) 0.5 Switzerland (France/UK) 3.3 Taiwan, China 5.0 Ukraine (5% in Russia) 13.1 UK 9.9 U.S. (since 1972) 101.1 Total 160.6 Total 62.5 Total 146.6
Most countries manage older spent fuel with safe low-cost onsite dry cask storage. (Japan has some dry cask storage at Fukushima-Daiichi.)
At Fukushima Daiichi Tokai
U.S. Connecticut Yankee (old picture)
Lingen NPP, Germany
after the tsunami
15
Plutonium Disposal – alternatives to MOX? UK, US and Japan together have about 200 tons to dispose of – enough
for more than 25,000 Nagasaki bombs
MOX (mixed uranium-plutonium oxide)fuel programs not working: �� UK MOX plant abandoned after an expenditure of ~ $2 billion �� U.S. has spent ~$4 billion on MOX plant construction and has decided
project is “unaffordable” �� Japan was only able to get permission to irradiate French-made MOX
containing 2.5 tons of plutonium in 10 years before Fukushima. �� Immobilization and direct disposal in a repository may be less a less
costly alternative.
Hot isostatic pressing of powder to immobilize plutonium in a low-leachable ceramic.
–UK National Nuclear Laboratory ~20
cm�
Will We Ever Be Able to Account for Global Fissile Material Stocks?
Rio de Janeiro, 21 March 2014 Revision 1
Alexander Glaser
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
How Much Fissile Material is There?
Baseline declarations of fissile material stocks
Establishing confidence in the completeness of declarations (Verification)
A Two-Step Process
Most weapon states have not yet made public their fissile material holdings
(United States and Britain are the exceptions)
Independent stockpile estimates carry significant uncertainties
(up to 20%, ton quantities in the case of Russia)
Baseline Declarations
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Supporting Declarations Put Data in Context
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM:STRIKING A BALANCE
DEPAR
TMENT OF ENERGY
UNITED
STATES OFAM
ERICA
OFFICIAL USE ONLYContains information which may be exempt from publicrelease under the Freedom of Information Act (5 U.S.C.552), exemption number 2. Approval by the Department ofEnergy prior to public release is required.
Reviewed by: _________________ Date: ______________
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - DRAFT
OFFICIAL USE ONLY - DRAFT
A HISTORICAL REPORT ON THE UNITED STATES
HIGHLY ENRICHED URANIUM PRODUCTION,ACQUISITION, AND UTILIZATION ACTIVITIES
FROM 1945 THROUGH SEPTEMBER 30, 1996
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
NATIONAL NUCLEAR SECURITY ADMINISTRATION
OFFICE OF THE DEPUTY ADMINISTRATOR
FOR DEFENSE PROGRAMS
REVISION 1
DECEMBER 2005
14
1996 and 2001 U.S. Declarations on Plutonium and HEU
and can help lay the basis for verification of fissile material production and stocks
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Plutonium: The First 50 Years: United States Plutonium Production, Acquisition and Utilization from 1944 Through 1994 U.S. Department of Energy, DOE/DP-0137, 1996, www.ipfmlibrary.org/doe96.pdf
Detailed Fissile Material Production Declarations
Example
Annual U.S. weapons plutonium
production by site (and grade)
Same information available for HEU
Weapon states should prepare to declare the histories of their HEU
and plutonium production, use, and disposition
Will We Ever Be Able to Verify the Completeness of Such Declarations?
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Many Aspects of Declarations Can Be Reviewed
for Consistency Even Without Verification
17
Simulated data for 1981 (annual mean); Ole Ross, Simulation of Atmospheric Krypton-85 Transport to Assess the Detectability of Clandestine Nuclear Reprocessing, PhD Thesis, Hamburg University, Germany, 2010
Historic atmospheric krypton-85 levels have been recorded and can be used to estimate large-scale plutonium production in some nuclear weapon states
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Public Historic Documents Can Often Help
Reconstruct Production Histories
18
Le retraitement des combustibles irradiés: La situation de la Hague et Marcoule, Analyses et positions de la CFDT
Rayonnement, Syndicat National du Personnel de l'Energie Atomique, No. 92, Février 1981
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Much better would be formal data exchanges of historic production records
Developing and Demonstrating Effective Verification of Fissile Material Production Histories
Will Require Cooperative Projects
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Nuclear Archaeology for Plutonium(U.S. Hanford B Reactor, 1944–1968)
Graphite
Sampling Position
212014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Nuclear Archaeology for Historic Production of Highly Enriched Uranium Has Yet to be Demonstrated
Storage area for cylinders of depleted uranium in 2001
at K-25 Site, Oak Ridge, TN
Equipment in storage from the gaseous diffusion plant
in Pierrelatte, June 2009, www.francetnp2010.fr
Nuclear archaeology for uranium enrichment is potentially more challenging
because it is less obvious which signatures in equipment and waste materials would
be most effective for verifying cumulative production of HEU
S. Philippe and A. Glaser, "Nuclear Archaeology for Gaseous Diffusion Enrichment Plants," Science & Global Security, 22, 1 (2014)
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
“The Clock is Ticking”Shutdown production reactors and enrichment plants are being decommissioned
Shutdown of the last Russian plutonium production
reactor ADE-2 in Zheleznogorsk, 2010
Source: U.S. Department of Energy
Demolition of the K-25 uranium enrichment plant began
in December 2008 and has been completed in 2012
Source: Bechtel Jacobs
In many cases, facilities have been temporarily preserved;
but in other cases, environmental concerns (or site stewardship decisions)
have led to the demolition of former production sites
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Offer Test Beds for Nuclear ArchaeologyTo begin countries could offer single sites or facilities as test beds and invite
partners with similar production facilities to engage in “site-to-site exercises” tojointly demonstrate verification approaches and measurement techniques
Left: Windscale Piles, www.sellafieldsites.com Right: G2/G3, Marcoule, www.francetnp.fr
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Even in Many Non-nuclear Weapon States, Candidate Facilities Would be Available to Demonstrate
Methods Required for Nuclear Archaeology
NRX, Canada Ågesta Reactor (105 MWt), near Stockholm, Sweden
2014 IPFM Meeting, Rio de Janeiro, March 2014
Summary
• Over 2000 tons of fissile material are in the global stockpile The civilian stockpile of plutonium is growing
• Need a verifiable FMCT
• Major reductions of Cold War stockpiles of HEU have been accomplished No progress on plutonium disposal
!• Consensus to phase out civilian uses of HEU but none yet on HEU naval reactors
• Need to end civilian reprocessing of spent fuel
!• Accounting for global stocks of fissile materials requires more transparency
Baseline declarations and collaborative efforts needed to demonstrate completeness