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A Genealogy of UN Intervention in Somalia

Lessons for the Next Generation

Mary Johnson 3222514/20/2012

Word Count: 5755 including footnotes, excluding cover page and bibliography

Mary JohnsonInternational Law on the Use of Force‘A Genealogy of UN Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Next Generation’

A Genealogy of UN Intervention in Somalia: Lessons for the Next Generation

I. Introduction

Somalia poses a unique and complex problem for members of the international community who wish to see stability restored in the Horn of Africa. History tells a sad and seemingly hopeless narrative of human suffering, failed intervention, terrorism, piracy, and political unrest, a cacophony though which it can be difficult to hear the voices of optimism. Just when it appears there is an opening for progress, some evidence of the continuing instability rears its ugly head. As recently as early April 2012, a bomb blast attributed to Al-Shabaab disrupted an address by the prime minister, killing four and injuring 11 people who were in attendance at the National Theater in Mogadishu.1 This incident was especially upsetting from an international viewpoint, not only for the loss of lives, but also because it occurred in the wake of the UN Security Council’s authorization of an increase in African Union troops mandated to ‘use all necessary means to reduce the threat from al-Shabaab’.2 The resolution authorizing the AU troops was adopted shortly before the London conference on Somalia, which was hoped to ‘mark a tipping point in Somalia's fortunes.’3 Sadly, as evidenced by this most recent attack, it seems this tipping point has not yet been reached.

Given the plague of violence and conflict which has led to Somalia becoming ‘a byword for the suffering of a failed state,’4 this latest bombing must be viewed as part of a continuum of unrest stretching back to the end of the Siad Barre regime in 1991. Even before Barre’s regime fell, Somalia has faced difficulties thriving as an independent state, perhaps due to the legacy of colonialism, the entrenchment of the clan system, the ecological vulnerability of its territory, or a combination thereof. The spring of 2011 saw the worst drought and famine in 60 years ravage the country, which combined with the on-going political unrest and took a devastating human toll.5 According to the BBC, up to one million people died as a result of ‘fighting between local warlords and an inability to deal with famine and disease’.6 Statistical indications of the dire conditions in Somalia are tragically grim: less than 40% literacy, a child mortality rate of one in ten before the age of five, and a life expectancy of 50 are but a few examples of the awful facts of life for Somali people.7 Pinpointing the causes of this suffering is far from straightforward, and the complexity of 1 Mohamed Ibrahim and J David Goodman, ‘Deadly Blast Shatters Calm in Somali Capital’ (New York Times, 4 April 2012).2 Julian Borger and Mark Tran, ‘UN votes to increase Somalia peacekeeping force’ (The Guardian, 22 February 2012).3 Ibid.4 The New York Times, ‘Somalia’ <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html> accessed 10 April 2012.5 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Somalia’ (20 January 2012) <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm> accessed 9 March 2012.6 BBC News, ‘Somalia profile’ (10 February 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503> accessed 9 March 2012.7 Richard N Haass in Bronwyn Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach (Council on Foreign Relations, March 2010) vii.

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Somali history and culture has inhibited international aid efforts to reverse Somalia’s fortunes for many years.

In the early 1990s, the situation in Somalia was deemed to constitute a threat to international peace and security by the UN Security Council, kicking off a series of international interventions lasting until March 1995. These actions started by providing humanitarian aid delivery protection but later morphed into something else, becoming operations authorized to use force to fulfil both humanitarian and reconciliatory aims. For a variety of reasons including loss of impartiality, Somalia being a failed state, vague mandates, lack of perceived legitimacy, and poor preparation, the UN had to admit defeat, an unprecedented act which has left an indelible legacy of failure.

The 1993 Battle of Mogadishu (immortalised in the book/film Black Hawk Down) was a flash point in the international narrative in Somalia, marking the bloodiest battle involving American troops since Vietnam, with casualties estimated in the thousands.8 Even though the troops involved in that incident were not under UN command and control, it has been suggested that this incident shined a light on the ineptitude of UN peacekeeping missions and was directly responsible for their subsequent curtailment.9 The absence of timely UN action during the Rwandan genocide is a particularly grave example of this alleged reluctance to authorise peacekeeping missions even in the face of gross humanitarian crises.10

What was it about the situation in Somalia that so vexed the UN, and what lessons does this hold for the present? In an effort to deconstruct a highly complex situation, this paper seeks explore the relationship between the failed UN actions in Somalia in the 1990s and the perceived reluctance on the part of the international community to put ‘boots on the ground’ today. In so doing, the legal and normative arguments of experts on the region will be consulted and synthesized, alongside detailed examination of the UN Security Council mandates that gave rise to the missions of the 1990s. Though it is beyond the scope of this paper to suggest a comprehensive intervention strategy, by cataloguing the mistakes of the past, it is hoped that a clearer path to suitable UN action in the future will come to light.

II. Brief Political History of Somalia from Independence to Intervention

8 PBS Frontline, ‘Ambush in Mogadishu: Synopsis’ (original broadcast date 29 September 1998) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/synopsis.html> accessed 19 April 2012.9 Bjorn Sorenson, ‘Peace Unkempt: How Ambiguities in Public International Law and International Humanitarian Law Contributed to the Failed U.N. Intervention in Somalia’ (8 July 2010) 3 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636377> accessed 23 March 2012.10 David Shinn, ‘Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011) 65.

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Any analysis of the situation in Somalia would be remiss not to reflect on the importance of the clan system. Although most Somalis belong to the same tribe, their clan identities define their culture, and most Somalis are fiercely loyal to clan at the exclusion of nation or ethnicity.11 During colonial rule, arbitrary boundaries divided some clans while forcing rival nomadic clans to share disputed land, resulting in ‘universal Somali indignation and condemnation’ against the international community, which arguably persists to this day.12

Somalia gained independence from Italy and Great Britain in 1960.13 The UN was involved in the establishment of an independent Somalia from the very beginning, when the General Assembly in 1949 passed a resolution outlining the 10-year international trusteeship that would precede independence.14 Following independence, the division between the former British protectorate and the former Italian colony persisted until General Siad Barre mounted a successful and bloodless coup in 1969.15

Barre’s rule over Somalia was characterised by his policy of ‘scientific socialism’, an attempt to sever traditional ties with the clan-based identities.16 Under the motto ‘socialism unites, tribalism divides’, Barre tried to urge Somalis to ‘use the wealth and prosperity hidden in their land and avoid begging other nations’.17 This ideology underscores a persistent tension between the cultivation of an independent Somali identity and the acceptance of a role for the international community. Barre’s terrorizing of the population led to a civil war, but when he finally fled Somalia in 1991 the clans that had fought in unity to oust him re-divided in his absence, and the state was on the verge of collapse.18 It was around this time that the UN authorized intervention, the details of which will be discussed below. Before cataloguing the Security Council resolutions authorizing the various interventions, the basis on which the use of force was justified must first be analysed.

III. Justification for the Use of Force by the UN Security Council

Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations authorises the Security Council to ‘determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall…decide what measures shall be taken…to maintain international peace and 11 Jama Ali Jama, ‘Restoration of Democratic Governance in Somalia’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011) 17.12 Ibid. It should be noted that this paper will not engage in any analysis of the semi-autonomous regions of Puntland and Somaliland.13 US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Somalia’ (20 January 2012) <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm> accessed 9 March 2012.14 Ibid.15 Christiane E Philipp, ‘Somalia: A Very Special Case’ (2005) 9 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 517, 521.16 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Somalia: History’ (20 March 2012) http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/somalia?profile=history accessed 20 April 2012. 17 Philipp at 522.18 Ibid 523.

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security.’19 Bearing this in mind, in an effort to place their actions squarely within the bounds of Chapter VII, the Council in Resolution 794 stated outright that ‘the magnitude of human tragedy caused by the conflict in Somalia, further exacerbated by the obstacles being created to the distribution of humanitarian assistance, constitutes a threat to international peace and security.’20 This became the basis for authorization of the first United Nations Operations in Somalia (UNOSOM I) and was reiterated as the justification for the use of force that undergirded the subsequent UN action in Somalia. Prior to UNOSOM, the only time the UN had described an intra-state conflict as constituting a threat to international peace and security was following independence in the Congo in 1960.21 Somalia would thus set the new standard, but it would not necessarily be a standard of excellence.

Although at first blush the nature of the situation in Somalia does not appear to infringe upon international peace and security, it was not confined to the territorial borders of Somalia. The human suffering took many forms, and when it is catalogued it is easy to see why the Security Council deemed it fit to intervene. The worst drought of the century affected up to 3 million people, compounding the clan infighting which had caused the displacement of as many as 1.7 million people.22 Humanitarian aid was looted, electricity and running water were scarce, and aid workers were robbed and extorted.23 Compounding these difficulties, there was no central state structure for aid organizations to work with. Despite the fact that 300,000 people died as a result of the famine, international attention was not focused on Somalia, being drawn instead by the Iraq-Kuwait conflict, the breakdown of the Soviet Union, and the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. Thus, when the Security Council finally authorized intervention in April 1992, the situation was already wildly out of control. In this sense, the UN was destined to remain behind the ball in Somalia.

IV. UN Security Council Resolutions and Their Resultant Missions: Examining the Mandates of UNOSOM I, UNITAF, and UNOSOM II

A. UNOSOM I and UNITAF

Responding to a request by Somalia to examine the situation in the country, in January 1992 the Security Council issued Resolution 733, imposing an arms embargo.24 Following the signing of a ceasefire agreement in Mogadishu on 3 March 1992, Resolution

19 Charter of the United Nations, (adopted 25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16 Article 39.20 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794.21 Philipp 527.22 Philipp 523. 23 Ibid. 24 UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/Res/733.

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746 urged the various factions to honour the ceasefire.25 When these actions proved insufficient, Resolution 751 authorised the UNOSOM I mission.26

UNOSOM I was envisioned as a ceasefire observation mission consisting of fifty personnel.27 UNOSOM I was the first UN force established with the primary purpose of protecting delivery of humanitarian aid.28 It undertook its mission while Somalia was still in the midst of conflict, and therefore national reconciliation was also an important part of the UNOSOM I mandate.29 Despite these objectives, several months after their initial authorization the UNOSOM mission was overwhelmed by the constantly deteriorating situation. Thus, in July the Security Council issued Resolution 767, in which it stated its concern ‘about the availability of arms and ammunition in the hands of civilians and the proliferation of armed banditry throughout Somalia.’30 Resolution 767 contains a lightly veiled threat to use force, stating in paragraph 4 that in the absence of cooperation, ‘the Security Council does not exclude other measures to deliver humanitarian assistance to Somalia’.31 One month later, Resolution 775 authorized an increase in UNOSOM troops to 4,219, though only 900 of these ever deployed.32

Despite the efforts of UNOSOM and the other humanitarian agencies working on the ground, relief efforts remained hampered by the end of 1992 as looting continued unabated. It was observed that ‘[i]n essence humanitarian supplies became the basis of an otherwise non-existent Somali economy’, and the Security Council decided it needed to take more drastic action to curtail the widespread looting and violence. The Security Council declared itself ‘mindful of [the] deteriorating, complex and extraordinary nature [of the situation], requiring an immediate and exceptional response,’ and unanimously passed Resolution 794.33 The Security Council stated that ‘it has become necessary to review the basic premises and principles of the United Nations effort in Somalia, and that UNOSOM's existing course would not in present circumstances be an adequate response to the tragedy in Somalia’.34 Resolution 794 then authorized ‘all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for relief operations in Somalia’, accepting the offer of the United States to supply troops to the mission that would be known as UNITAF, or Operation Restore Hope.35

25 UNSC Res 746 (17 March 1992) UN Doc S/Res/746.26 UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/Res/751.27 Ibid. 28 Christine Gray, International Law on the Use of Force 522.29 Philip 528. 30 UNSC Res 767 (24 July 1992) UN Doc S/Res/767.31 Ibid. 32 UNSC Res 775 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/Res/775; Philip 529.33 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794.34 Ibid.35 Ibid.

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Although the mandates authorized the mission to use ‘all necessary means’, Security Council code for the use of force, the strategy for the mission as articulated by President George H W Bush was ‘feed and leave’.36 Perhaps because of this limited strategy, UNITAF was generally regarded as a success,37 as during its short tenure it managed to improve overall security in the sectors under its control.38 Thus, in what it perceived to be a positively shifting environment, the Security Council began to lay plans for the deployment of UNOSOM II.

B. UNOSOM II

Resolution 814 envisioned a ‘prompt, smooth and phased transition’ from UNITAF to UNOSOM II.39 Invoking Chapter VII explicitly, the resolution authorized an expansion in UNOSOM forces and set out their mandate as including disarmament, enforcement of the arms embargo, repatriation of refugees and displaced persons, and ‘consolidation, expansion and maintenance of a secure environment throughout Somalia’.40 This broad mandate represented an unprecedented UN action and would be the subject of much confusion amongst the troops actually deployed as part of the mission, a hindrance which will be discussed in more detail below.

The day after Resolution 814 was passed, leaders of 14 different Somali political movements agreed to maintain the ceasefire and to cooperate with the disarmament process.41

A transitional government was agreed. When UNOSOM II was deployed, there was optimism about assisting in the nation-building activities of the local Somali communities, supporting them in the exercise of their right to self-determination.42 Following on from the successes of UNITAF, it seemed that the situation was on the verge of turning around.

Tragically, in early June 1993 an incident took place which made clear that efforts at national reconciliation would not proceed as envisioned. Twenty-five Pakistani peacekeepers with UNOSOM II were killed, their bodies mutilated and put on display by the United Somali Congress forces led by General Aideed.43 In swift response, the Security Council passed Resolution 837, which condemned the killings and encouraged the ‘rapid and accelerated deployment of all UNOSOM II contingents to meet the full requirements of 28,000 men’.44 36 Tom Farer, ‘Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterlky 1, 7.37 UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Somalia: History’ (20 March 2012) http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/somalia?profile=history accessed 20 April 2012. 38 Philipp 536.39 UNSC Res 814 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/Res/814.40 Ibid. 41 Philipp 539.42 Philipp 540.43 Bjorn Sorenson, ‘Peace Unkempt: How Ambiguities in Public International Law and International Humanitarian Law Contributed to the Failed U.N. Intervention in Somalia’ (8 July 2010) 3 <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636377> accessed 23 March 2012.44 UNSC Res 837 (6 June 1993) UN Doc S/Res/837.

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However, in the haste to respond, Resolution 837 also arguably negated UNOSOM’s impartiality. By confirming the Secretary General’s authorization to take action ‘against those responsible for publicly inciting such attacks…including to secure the investigation of their actions and their arrest and detention for prosecution, trial and punishment’,45 Resolution 837 effectively mandated the arrest of General Aideed.46 Thus, it has been argued that UNOSOM II ‘interpreted its mandate as not merely authorising but requiring it to disarm the factions,’ which involved greater use of force and in turn led to the abandonment of any claim to impartiality.47 This mission shift resulted in the UN becoming ‘a belligerent in the chaos of an armed conflict within a failed state.’48

It is easy in hindsight to focus exclusively on the failures of the UN intervention efforts in Somalia, but it is important to recognize the successes as well. Resolution 865 commended UNOSOM II for achieving ‘eradication of starvation, establishment of a large number of district councils, opening of schools and resumption by the Somali people in most areas of the country of their normal lives’, no small feat in the civil war-torn country.49 In light of these successes, Resolution 878 extended the mandate of UNOSOM II through November 1993.50 Resolution 885 established a Commission of Inquiry into the attacks on UNOSOM II personnel and suspended the arrest efforts that had begun under Resolution 837.51 Resolution 886 extended the mandate of UNOSOM II through May 1994 and included a ‘fundamental review’ of the mandate by February 1994. These resolutions seem to indicate that the Security Council was learning its lessons as it went along, progressively amending the mandates of the Somalia missions in response to the situation on the ground.

In February 1994, Resolution 897 authorised the scale-down of the UNOSOM II mission to 22,000 troops,52 and Resolution 923 renewed the mandate through September 1994.53 The mandate was extended one month more by Resolutions 946 and 953,54 before finally being terminated by Resolution 954.55 That resolution admits defeat by recognizing that

the lack of progress in the Somali peace process and in national reconciliation, in particular the lack of sufficient cooperation from the Somali parties over security issues, has fundamentally undermined the United Nations objectives in Somalia and,

45 Ibid.46 Sorenson 3.47 Ibid.48 Ibid.49 UNSC Res 865 (22 September 1993) UN Doc S/Res/865.50 UNSC Res 878 (29 October 1993) UN Doc S/Res/878.51 UNSC Res 885 (16 November 1993) UN Doc S/Res/885.52 UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/Res/897.53 UNSC Res 923 (31 may 1994) UN Doc S/Res/923.54 UNSC Res 946 (30 September 1994) UN Doc S/Res/946; UNSC Res 953 (31 October 1994) UN Doc S/Res/953.55 UNSC Res 954 (4 November 1994) UN Doc S/Res/954.

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in these circumstances, continuation of UNOSOM II beyond March 1995 cannot be justified.56

This was the first time that the UN left a country before its goals had been achieved,57 and yet it had nonetheless made great strides toward improving the situation for Somalis. In particular, the mission was able to stem the tide of starvation and improve access to health for large sections of the population, saving ‘countless thousands of lives and [starting] to curb the rampant violence.’58 While complete political reconciliation may not have been achieved, it is difficult to pin this responsibility on the international community in the absence of full cooperation of the various parties. That further human tragedy was avoided is a credit to the UN efforts and bears remembering today, when the continuing instability in Somalia begs the question of what role the early termination of UNOSOM II may have played in perpetuating the conflict. One can only wonder whether, had the mission continued despite the insufficient cooperation, the situation might not have been ameliorated eventually.

V. Classifying the UN Missions in Somalia and the Importance of Impartiality

In order to comprehensively appraise the UNITAF and UNOSOM missions, it is important to think about their intended parameters. Whether they were envisioned as peacekeeping missions, peace enforcement missions, or humanitarian interventions may have had implications for the interpretation of their mandates.

While various definitions of peacekeeping exist, there is general agreement that traditional peacekeeping requires consent of the parties, impartiality, and the non-use of force except in self-defence.59 By contrast, peace enforcement actions do not strictly require the consent of the parties, nor is there a clear limitation on the use of force, though impartiality is still required. Humanitarian intervention is defined without any reference to peace, consisting of an ‘intervention by a third party in the affairs of another without that country’s consent in order to prevent serious human rights violations being inflicted on the local population.’60

While these definitions provide useful guidelines, the individual mandates and circumstances of each mission often blur the lines between the different types of operations.61

For example, both UNITAF and UNOSOM II have been characterized as peace enforcement

56 Ibid. 57 Gray 224.58 Philipp 549. 59 Farer, supra note 36; M Goulding, ‘The Evolution of Peacekeeping’ 69(3) International Affairs 464 (1993); Report of the Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992) UN Doc A/47/277;The Peacekeepers Handbook (International Peace Academy, 1984) 22.

60 Ray Murphy, UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: operational and legal issues in practice (Cambridge University Press 2007) 10.61 Ibid 16.

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actions,62 while others characterise the former as a peacekeeping force and the latter as an enforcement force.63 UNOSOM II has also been characterised as some combination of peacekeeping, peace-making, peace enforcement and nation-building.64 The relevant facts are often changing, such that a mission can begin life with a traditional peacekeeping mandate but quickly shift into fulfilling the responsibilities of a humanitarian intervention.65

Despite this ever-shifting ground, impartiality proved to be the key inquiry in characterising the UN missions in Somalia. Once Resolution 837 authorised the arrest of ‘those responsible for publicly inciting’ attacks on peacekeepers, the mission was no longer impartial, but targeted members of certain clans. Others have argued that even before Resolution 837, ‘in the hostile climate pervading Somalia, even the provision of humanitarian food aid was not a neutral act’.66 The significance of impartiality will be examined further below as part of an inventory of shortcomings of the UN missions in Somalia.

VI. Reasons the Missions were Unsuccessful in Fulfilling Their Mandates to Restore Peace in Somalia

Theories abound about what was the prevailing reason the UN missions in Somalia failed, but even in the absence of definitive answers, a comprehensive picture of errors is useful to shed light on how humanitarian intervention in Somalia in the future might be better conceived. This section will list the prevalent conclusions.

A. Lack of Impartiality

Impartiality has significance beyond the classification of a mission as peacekeeping or humanitarian intervention. The perception of the Somali people made impartiality critical because ‘the only way peacekeepers can work is by being trusted by both sides, being clear and transparent in their dealings and keeping lines of communication open.’67 Impartiality of the various UN actors was compromised by their multifaceted involvement, from humanitarian assistance to military actions, rendering the UN ‘rightly perceived as being involved in the conflict rather than as a neutral actor.’68 Impartiality is crucial to peace-related missions because ‘the identification of one of the factions as an enemy, and the use of force in pursuit of limited military goals designed to neutralise it, will ultimately escalate rather 62 Ibid 10.63 Philipp 535.64 Murphy 48.65 Ibid 10. 66 Sorenson 13.67 Trevor Findlay, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 2003).

68 Valeria Saggiomo, ‘Let’s Think the Impossible! Alternative Scenarios Against Human Insecurity in Somalia’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011) 248.

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than decrease the level of conflict.’69 Currently, the African Union Mission in Somalia is ‘widely viewed as a combatant in the conflict rather than as a neutral peacekeeping force’,70 impairing its efficacy.

B. Somalia as Failed State and Ambiguities in the Law of Humanitarian Intervention

A failed state is a country which is ‘unable to exercise authority over [its] territory and provide the most basic services to [its] people.’71 The Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States lists the principles of statehood as a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to enter into relations with other states.72 At the time of the first UNOSOM intervention, Somalia arguably met none of these conditions, meaning that Somali belligerents did not enjoy the same benefits of sovereignty as would a state during an armed conflict, such as the ability to take prisoners of war.73

Although the International Committee for the Red Cross insists that the principles of customary international humanitarian law apply even to failed states, the characterization of the conflict as non-international (at least prior to Resolution 837) meant that the peacekeepers were, at a maximum, only obligated to abide by Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions.74 When Resolution 837 effectively eliminated the impartiality of the UN troops, causing them to become belligerents in an international armed conflict, the status of Somalia as a failed state made application of humanitarian norms incredibly difficult. This was further compounded by the impossibility of implementing the principle of distinction in a country where ‘the entire population of Somalia was heavily armed.’75

This conundrum raises significant concerns about state sovereignty and the utility of humanitarian intervention when it is applied ‘only against weak states’.76 The fact that conflict in failed states is difficult to classify suggests the need for comprehensive norms governing the application of international humanitarian law in this unique situation. Although today Somalia arguably meets the requirements of statehood, future UN action would be wise to address this issue explicitly before deploying missions of any type.

C. Vague Mandates

69 Murphy 152.70 Bronwyn Bruton, Somalia: A New Approach (Council on Foreign Relations Special Report No. 52, March 2010) 21.71 Ibid vii.72 Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 20.73 Sorenson 8.74 Ibid.75 Sorenson 3.76 Ian Brownlie, International Law and the Use of Force by States (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1991) 340-341.

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Although the phrase ‘all necessary means’ is generally accepted as indicating the authorization for the use of force, the general vagueness of the rest of Resolution 794 is striking considering that this was the first time the Security Council authorized humanitarian relief operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter.77 Not only were the mandates vague and sometimes contradictory, but changes occurred without sufficient dialogue between Security Council Member States, states contributing troops, and Somalis themselves.78 The rules of engagement were also ‘inherently ambiguous and incomplete’, and accordingly changed ‘substantially’ during the period of operations.79 The consequences of this vagueness are difficult to measure, but an example of the confusion illustrates its importance.

Whether or not disarmament was included in the UNITAF mandate was ‘the subject of major dispute between the Secretary-General and the Americans.’ 80 The text of Resolution 794 refers to the Secretary General’s recommendation that action be taken ‘in order to establish a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations’,81 but it was unclear whether this referred to disarmament or not. ‘The US commander argued that disarmament was not part of the mission and Somali warlords were told that they could keep their weapons if they moved them outside Mogadishu’, while the Secretary General wanted UNITAF to actively disarm the fighters.82 It is thought that this was ‘a tragic mistake, as the disarmament…would have sent an early and absolutely clear message that the United States and the United Nations were serious about restoring order in the country and were moving in the same direction.’83 By contrast, while a ‘more detailed resolution with clearer aims and objectives would have been preferable’,84 it cannot be said with any certainty that the situation would have progressed any better given the peculiar nature of the Somali situation and the abundance of other factors contributing to the difficulty.

D. Lack of Legitimacy

The US government conducted a post-mortem to determine the reasons for the failure of UNOSOM II, concluding that a lack of legitimacy was the central downfall.85 This is supported by the ‘local tendency to conflate the relief effort with unpopular international counterterror operations.’86 Further, it has been argued that peacekeeping troops in Somalia lost their deterrent effect due to the awkward command structure of the missions, the

77 Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press, 2008) 222.78 Ibid.79 Ibid 163.80 Philipp 535-536.81 UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794.82 Philipp 535-536.83 Ibid. 84 Ibid.85 Gingery, Lee S, ‘Principles of Military Operations Other Than War as Applied to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II’ (1997) Naval War College http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA325087 accessed 18 April 2012.

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confusion of the rules of engagement among the various troops, and the ability of General Aideed to dominate the media coverage so as to shape public opinion against the UN troops.87

As a result, Somalis failed to perceive a genuine threat of force, which is seen as a necessary component to successful peace enforcement missions.88

E. Poor Preparation and Lack of Contextual Understanding

Pursuant to what became known as the ‘Somalia Affair’, the Canadian government launched an inquiry into the activities of the Canadian Airborne Regiment, embedded ith UNOSOM II. The report revealed atrocious behaviour on the part of some peacekeepers, including the beating to death of a Somali teenager, while Belgian peacekeepers were tried for torture for attempting to roast Somali children on a spit.89

The Canadian report reads as an attempt to place blame squarely on an abstract ‘Somalia debacle’ rather than on individual soldiers, claiming that ‘rudderless [soldiers] fell invariably into the mire’.90 There was a ‘total lack of peacekeeping experience among UNOSOM II ranks’ who were ‘[p]oorly prepared, confused about the rules, and knowing little about Somali culture,’ meaning that ‘it was not surprising that the stresses of the mission proved too much for the troops.’91 Failing to account for the intricacies of ‘status, class, race, and language that were central to the patterning of violence in post-1991 Somalia’92 was seen as a massive hindrance for the troops to be able to fulfil their mandates.

VII. Conclusion: Repercussions of the Failure of the Somalia Missions in the 1990s and Avoiding the Mistakes of the Past

The effects of the failures of UNITAF and UNOSOM on Somalia are clear and direct. The evidence is overwhelmingly in favour of viewing these missions as categorical failures which turned Somalia into ‘the graveyard of the new world order.’93 UNOSOM II in particular has been singled out as having a ‘profound effect on the willingness of states to support subsequent UN multinational peacekeeping’ because of its ‘ambitious and controversial’ nature.94 86 Bruton 18.87 Sorenson 14.88 Barbara Crossette, ‘The World Expected Peace: It Found a New Brutality’ New York Times (24 January 1999).89 Fleitz, Frederick H, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests (Greenwood Publishing Group 2002) 121.

90 Commission Report, cited in Sherene Razack, Dark threats and white knights: the Somalia affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism (University of Toronto Press 2004).91 Razack 142.92 Catherine Besteman, ‘Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia’ 11(1) Cultural Anthropology 121 (1996).93 Ken Menkaus, ‘Somalia at a Crossroads of American Foreign Policy’ (Foreign Policy in Focus, 28 January 2002) <http://www.fpif.org/articles/somalia_at_crossroads_of_american_foreign_policy> accessed 18 April 2012.94 Murphy 24.

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However, these assessments fail to take account of the benefits the Somali people derived from the UNITAF and UNOSOM missions, focusing instead only on the failures from a western point of view. The Black Hawk Down incident, in which the Somali casualties vastly outnumbered the American casualties, is burned in the UN memory as a tragedy because of the loss of peacekeepers and the bungling of what was meant to be a 30 minute capture mission, and not because of the 1,000 Somali deaths. Critical assessments of the UNITAF and UNOSOM missions regularly fail to account for the fact that ‘the civilian population in Somalia derived significant benefits from the United Nations involvement, including the end of starvation’,95 no small feat in a drought-ravaged and civil war-torn country. The myopic focus on UN failure is misplaced and ‘continue[s] to hobble the United Nations capacity to respond swiftly and decisively to crises.’96

The Secretary General has stated that the UN and the international community have failed the peoples of Africa by ‘not adequately addressing the causes of conflict; by not doing enough to ensure peace; and by our repeated inability to create the conditions for sustainable development’.97 The Secretary General believes that the ‘great reluctance to assume the political and financial exposure associated with deploying peacekeeping operations’ goes well beyond the lessons of the ‘serious setback’ in Somalia,98 and that ‘[t]he credibility of the United Nations in Africa to a great extent depends upon the international community’s willingness to act and to explore new means of advancing the objectives of peace and security on the continent.’99

The international community cannot continue to cower in fear, haunted by the memories of the difficulties in Somalia in the 1990s. The ‘virtual abandonment of Somalia by the international community’ is deplorable.100 While it cannot be assumed that humanitarian intervention, if carried out today, would be any more successful than those fated missions of the 1990s,101 this cannot be an excuse for inaction. The long history of UN involvement in Somalia suggests that the international community still has a crucial role to play in bringing an end to the political instability and improving the quality of life for Somali people. Despite the imperfections of the UN missions of the 1990s, humanitarian intervention can have and has in fact had a positive impact. The Somalia missions of the 1990s no longer provide a legitimate excuse for inaction on behalf of the international community.

95 Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’ (1998) UN Doc S/1998/318 para 31.96 Ibid. 97 Ibid para 5.98 Ibid para 29.99 Ibid para 30.100 David Shinn, ‘Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011) 65.101 Ibid 66.

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BIBLIOGRAPHY

UN Documents and other international instruments

Charter of the United Nations, (adopted 25 June 1945, entered into force 24 October 1945) 1 UNTS 16.

Report of the Secretary-General, ‘An Agenda for Peace’ (1992) UN Doc A/47/277.

Report of the Secretary-General, ‘The causes of conflict and the promotion of durable peace and sustainable development in Africa’ (1998) UN Doc S/1998/318

Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States (adopted 26 December 1933, entered into force 26 December 1934) 165 LNTS 20.

UNSC Res 733 (23 January 1992) UN Doc S/Res/733.

UNSC Res 746 (17 March 1992) UN Doc S/Res/746.

UNSC Res 751 (24 April 1992) UN Doc S/Res/751.

UNSC Res 767 (24 July 1992) UN Doc S/Res/767.

UNSC Res 775 (28 August 1992) UN Doc S/Res/775.

UNSC Res 794 (3 December 1992) UN Doc S/Res/794.

UNSC Res 814 (26 March 1993) UN Doc S/Res/814.

UNSC Res 837 (6 June 1993) UN Doc S/Res/837.

UNSC Res 865 (22 September 1993) UN Doc S/Res/865.

UNSC Res 878 (29 October 1993) UN Doc S/Res/878.

UNSC Res 885 (16 November 1993) UN Doc S/Res/885.

UNSC Res 897 (4 February 1994) UN Doc S/Res/897.

UNSC Res 923 (31 May 1994) UN Doc S/Res/923.

UNSC Res 946 (30 September 1994) UN Doc S/Res/946.

UNSC Res 953 (31 October 1994) UN Doc S/Res/953.

UNSC Res 954 (4 November 1994) UN Doc S/Res/954.

Books and Articles in Books

Brownlie, Ian, International Law and the Use of Force by States (3rd edn, Clarendon Press 1991).

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Bruton, Bronwyn, Somalia: A New Approach (Council on Foreign Relations 2010).

Christine Gray, International Law and the Use of Force (Oxford University Press 2008).

Findlay, Trevor, The Use of Force in UN Peace Operations (Oxford University Press 2003).

Fleitz, Frederick H, Peacekeeping Fiascoes of the 1990s: Causes, Solutions and US Interests (Greenwood Publishing Group 2002).

Jama, Jama Ali, ‘Restoration of Democratic Governance in Somalia’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011).

Murphy, Ray, UN peacekeeping in Lebanon, Somalia and Kosovo: operational and legal issues in practice (Cambridge University Press 2007).

Razack, Sherene, Dark threats and white knights: the Somalia affair, peacekeeping, and the new imperialism (University of Toronto Press 2004).

Saggiomo, Valeria, ‘Let’s Think the Impossible! Alternative Scenarios Against Human Insecurity in Somalia’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011).

Shinn, David, ‘Somalia and the International Community: Facing Reality’ in Ulf Johansson Dahre (ed) The Role of Democratic Governance versus Sectarian Politics in Somalia (Lund University 2011).

The Peacekeepers Handbook (International Peace Academy, 1984).

Journal Articles

Besteman, Catherine, ‘Representing Violence and “Othering” Somalia’ (1996) 11(1) Cultural Anthropology 121.

Farer, Tom, ‘Intervention in Unnatural Humanitarian Emergencies: Lessons of the First Phase’ (1996) 18 Human Rights Quarterly 1.

Goulding, M, ‘The Evolution of Peacekeeping’ (1993) 69(3) International Affairs 464.

Philipp, Christiane E, ‘Somalia: A Very Special Case’ (2005) 9 Max Planck Yearbook of United Nations Law 517.

Sorenson, Bjorn, ‘Peace Unkempt: How Ambiguities in Public International Law and International Humanitarian Law Contributed to the Failed U.N. Intervention in Somalia’ (2010) Social Science Research Network http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1636377 accessed 23 March 2012.

News and Online Sources

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BBC News, ‘Somalia profile’ (London, 10 February 2012) http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14094503 accessed 9 March 2012.

Borger, Julian and Tran, Mark, ‘UN votes to increase Somalia peacekeeping force’ The Guardian (London, 22 February 2012).

Crossette, Barbara, ‘The World Expected Peace: It Found a New Brutality’ The New York Times (New York, 24 January 1999).

Gingery, Lee S, ‘Principles of Military Operations Other Than War as Applied to the United Nations Operations in Somalia II’ (1997) Naval War College http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA325087 accessed 18 April 2012.

Ibrahim, Mohamed and Goodman, J David, ‘Deadly Blast Shatters Calm in Somali Capital’ The New York Times (New York, 4 April 2012).

Menkaus, Ken, ‘Somalia at a Crossroads of American Foreign Policy’ (Foreign Policy in Focus, 28 January 2002) http://www.fpif.org/articles/somalia_at_crossroads_of_american_foreign_policy accessed 18 April 2012.

New York Times, ‘Somalia’ http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/international/countriesandterritories/somalia/index.html accessed 10 April 2012.

PBS Frontline, ‘Ambush in Mogadishu: Synopsis’ (original broadcast date 29 September 1998) http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/ambush/etc/synopsis.html accessed 19 April 2012.

UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa: Somalia: History’ (20 March 2012) http://www.fco.gov.uk/en/travel-and-living-abroad/travel-advice-by-country/country-profile/sub-saharan-africa/somalia?profile=history accessed 20 April 2012.

US Department of State, ‘Background Note: Somalia’ (20 January 2012) http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/2863.htm accessed 9 March 2012.

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