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A Guide to Regulation
and Supervision oMicrofnance
Consensus Guidelines
October 2012
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CGAP is an independent policy and research center dedicated to advancing nancial access or theworlds poor. It is supported by over 30 development agencies and private oundations who sharea common mission to improve the lives o poor people. Housed at the World Bank, CGAP pro-vides market intelligence, promotes standards, develops innovative solutions, and oers advisoryservices to governments, micronance providers, donors, and investors.
2012, CGAP/World Bank. All rights reserved.
CGAP
1818 H St., N.W., MSN P3-300
Washington, DC 20433
+1 202 473 9594
www.cgap.org
www.micronancegateway.org
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iii
Table o Contents
Preace vii
Introduction 1
Part I. Preliminary Issues 4
1a. Terminology: What Is Micronance? What Is Financial Inclusion? 4
1b. Financial Inclusion as a Regulatory Objective; Regulation as Promotion 8
Special windows or micronance 9
Create a new ramework or amend an existing one? 10
Regulatory arbitrage 11
1c. Regulatory Denitions o Micronance and Microcredit 11
Box 1. Crating a regulatory denition o microcredit 12
1d. Prudential and Nonprudential Regulation: Objectives and Application 14
Box 2. A systemic rationale or applying prudential regulation to
microlending-only institutions? 16
1e. Regulate Institutions or Activities? 18
Part II. Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Micronance 19
2a. New Regulatory Windows or Depository Micronance:
Timing and the State o the Industry 19
2b. Rationing Prudential Regulation and Minimum Capital 21
2c. Adjusted Prudential Standards or Micronance 22
Permitted activities 23
Capital adequacy 23
Capital adequacy or nancial cooperatives and their networks 25Unsecured lending limits and loan-loss provisions 26
Governance 28
Liquidity and oreign exchange risk 28
Loan documentation 30
Restrictions on co-signers as borrowers 30
Branching requirements 31
Reporting 31
Reserves against deposits 32
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iv Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
Insider lending 32
To whom should special prudential standards apply? 33
Box 3. Basel core principles and depository micronance 33
2d. Transormation o NGO MFIs into Licensed Intermediaries 34
Ownership suitability and diversication requirements 35
Board and management qualication requirements 36
Loan portolio as part o minimum capital 36
2e. Deposit Insurance 37
Part III. Prudential Supervision Issues in Deposit-Taking Micronance 39
3a. Supervisory Tools, Enorcement Mechanisms, and Limitations Regarding MFIs 40
Microcredit portolio supervision 40
Stop-lending orders 40Capital calls 41
Asset sales or mergers 41
3b. Costs o Supervision 41
3c.Where Should the Micronance Supervisory Function Be Located? 42
Within the existing supervisory authority? 42
Delegated (or auxiliary) supervision 43
Sel-regulation and supervision 44
Supervision o nancial cooperatives 45
The case o small member-based intermediaries 47
Part IV. Nonprudential Regulatory Issues 49
4a. Permission to Lend 49
4b. Reporting and Institutional Transparency 51
4c. Consumer Protection 52
Box 4. Level playing elds, equal treatment 53
Adequacy and transparency o inormation 53
Discrimination 54Abusive lending and collection practices 55
Over-indebtedness 55
Interest rate caps 56
Data privacy and security 58
Recourse 59
An appropriate regulator 59
4d. Credit Reporting Systems 60
Box 5. The benets and challenges o credit reporting in micronance 61
4e. Limitations on Ownership, Management, and Capital Structure 63
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Table o Contents v
4. NGO Transormations into For-Prot Companies 64
4g. Secured Transactions 65
4h. Financial Crime 66
AML/CFT 66
Fraud, pyramid investment schemes, and related nancial crimes 68
Identity raud 69
4i. Tax Treatment o Micronance 70
Taxation o nancial transactions and activities 70
Taxation o prots 71
Part V. Regulating the Use o Branchless Banking to Serve the Poor 72
Box 6. Bank-based and nonbank-based models 73
5a. Agents and Other Third-Party Arrangements 745b. AML/CFT in Branchless Banking 76
5c. Nonbank Issuers o E-Money and Other Stored-Value Instruments 76
5d. Consumer Protection in Branchless Banking 77
5e. Payment Systems: Regulation and Access 78
5. Interagency Coordination 79
Part VI. Regulating Micronance Providers in Microinsurance 80
6a. What Is Microinsurance? 80
Dening microinsurance 80
Roles in delivering microinsurance 82
Types o microinsurance products 82
6b. MFIs and Microlending Banks in Microinsurance 82
MFIs as insurance underwriters 83
MFIs as insurance intermediaries 84
Microlending banks in microinsurance 85
The special case o credit lie insurance 85
6c. Regulation o Microinsurance Sales 87Sales agents 88
Commissions 89
Group sales 89
Disclosure, claims, consumer understanding 91
Bundling 92
Part VII. Summary o Key Observations, Principles, and Recommendations 94
7a. General Issues 94
Regulatory denitions 94
Regulatory windows or depository MFIs 95
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vi Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
7b. Prudential Regulation 95
Rationing prudential regulation and minimum capital 95
Adjusting prudential standards or micronance 95
To whom should special prudential standards apply? 96
Transormation o NGO MFIs into licensed intermediaries 97
Deposit insurance 97
7c. Prudential Supervision 97
7d. Nonprudential Regulation 98
Permission to lend 98
Reporting 98
Consumer protection 98
Credit reporting systems 99
Limitations on ownership, management, and capital structure 99NGO transormations into or-prot companies 99
Secured transactions 100
Financial crime 100
Tax treatment o micronance 100
7e. Branchless Banking 100
7. Microinsurance 101
Appendix A. Authorship and Acknowldgments 103
Appendix B. Glossary 105
Appendix C. Microlending Institutions and Their Funding Sources 109
Appendix D. Bibliography 110
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1
Introduction
In the past decade, nancial authorities in most developing and transitional economies have
put more emphasis on bringing ormal nancial services to the large numbers o the worlds
poor who currently lack adequate access.2 For many, the question has been whether and
how to regulate micronancea term that evokes a particular set o services, providers,
and customers. But the question is now being posed in broader terms: what kind o regula-
tion and supervision will help to achieve ull fnancial inclusion through the extension o -
nancial services to the billions o poor and low-income people who are presently excluded?Even more broadly, how should we regulate and supervise the nancial system as a whole
in a way that balances eective access, nancial stability, and nancial integrity?3
This eort requires policy makers to weigh the potential benets o regulatory action
against potential limitations on access due to the costs o compliance and enorcement.
Regulation and supervision need to be proportionate: costs should not be excessive
when measured against the risks being addressed (although both are dicult to measure,
and there will very likely be dierences o opinion among regulators, providers, and
consumers).4
However, this balancing eort is particularly important to nancial access,where cost reduction is crucial or expanded outreach.
Scope. This Guide addresses regulatory and supervisory issues that are specically
relevant to ormal nancial services or poor people. While there is a need to think o
micronance in the context o the wider nancial architecture, this Guide ocuses on the
specics o micronance regulation and supervision and addresses issues and principles
applicable to nancial sector regulation and supervision more generally only when neces-
sary to understand the specics o regulating and supervising micronance.
It ocuses on private actors, both or-prot and nonprot. A wide variety o state-ownedor state-controlled institutions also serve poor people, but this Guide does not address the
specic issues such institutions pose: they are too diverse to allow discussion o the issues that
would apply to each type. For the same reason, this Guide does not devote separate attention
2 To avoid repetition o the term poor and low-income, we oten reer to clients as simply poor. Readersshould understand that the term reers to a broader group that includes not only poor people but also low-income clients above the poverty line.3 As described in a 2011 white paper prepared by CGAP on behal o the G-20s Global Partnership orFinancial Inclusion (GPFI), eective access involves convenient and responsible service delivery, at a cost
aordable to the customer and sustainable or the provider (p.1).4 See Porteous (2006).
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2 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
to savings banks, even though they are major providers o nancial services or poor people in
many countries.5 Nevertheless, most o the general principles in this Guide would apply to state
institutions as well as private ones and to both state-owned and privately owned savings banks.
Audiences and ormat. Financial regulators and supervisors are the primary intendedaudience or this Guide. But this Guide may also interest a wider audience, including not
only other authorities whose decisions aect nancial services, but also service providers
and other local stakeholders who participate in the regulatory and supervisory decision-
making process and live with the results, as well as sta o international agencies that
support governments on nancial inclusion policy.
Some readers will use this Guide as a general introduction to the ull range o topics
covered; others will consult it as a reerence on specic issues. Most sections begin with
key points (in shaded boxes), ollowed by discussion and analysis.On some issues covered here, experience justies clear conclusions that will be valid
everywhere with ew exceptions. On other points, the experience is not clear, or the an-
swer depends on local actors, so that no straightorward general prescription is possible.
On these latter points, the Guide suggests rameworks or thinking about the issue and
identies actors that need special consideration.
Country-specifc actors. Although the key points and analyses in this Guide are based
on country experiences, we have intentionally avoided discussion o country-specic
examples. Instead, the ocus is on extracting rom global experiences those general prin-ciples and recommendations that may be relevant across a range o country contexts.6
When considering the issues presented in this Guide, country contextincluding regu-
latory ramework; retail providers level o development; capacity and constraints o
supervisors; and other political, economic, historical, and cultural actorsis critical.
It is unwise to use another countrys regulatory regime as a template without thoroughly
examining country-specic actors that might call or dierent treatment.
In what sense is this Guide a consensus document? We developed the material in this Guide
in consultation with a wide range o regulators, supervisors, and other experts. (Key contribu-tors are listed in Appendix A.)7 Although experts working on these topics do not agree on all
points, there are wide areas o consensus. Based on our consultations, CGAP believes that the
5 For a discussion o regulation and supervision rom the perspective o savings banks engaged in micro-nance, see WSBI (2008).6 See, e.g., Trigo Loubire, Devaney, and Rhyne (2004), p. 3: Arguing against criticizing one country ashaving a decient ramework or another as having an exemplary one and arguing or the premise that eachramework refects the realm o possibilities that were present as micronance entered the nancial picture,the paper advises designers o new micronance regulation, and the international advisors who proposemicronance rameworks [to] take these realities into account.7 Acknowledgment o these contributions does not imply that the individuals or their organizations haveendorsed all the contents o the Guide.
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Introduction 3
main messages o this Guide refect the views o most specialists with wide knowledge o past
experience and current developments in regulation and supervision or nancial inclusion.
Other resources. Because this Guide ocuses on regulatory and supervisory issues that
are specic to poor peoples nancial services, it does not address many broader principles onancial sector regulation and supervision. For these broader issues, readers should consult
the core principles and other publications o the relevant standard-setting bodies (SSBs), par-
ticularly the Basel Committee or Banking Supervision (BCBS), the Committee on Payment
and Settlement Systems, the International Association o Insurance Supervisors (IAIS), the
International Association o Deposit Insurers (IADI), and the Financial Action Task Force
(FATF).8 As noted in the 2011 white paper CGAP published on behal o the G-20 Global
Partnership or Financial Inclusion (GPFI), these ve SSBs are paying increased attention to
micronance and nancial inclusion.9
The contents o this Guide are generally consistent withthe broad principles o the SSBs as well as their specic guidance relevant to nancial inclusion.
Recommendations on regulating and supervising to oster nancial inclusion have
also been published by various think tanks, civil society organizations, and industry
groups.10 These sources are reerenced in Appendix D.
Organization. The Guide is structured as ollows:
Part I discusses preliminary issues, such as denitions o micronance and micro-
credit, nancial inclusion as a regulatory objective, and the dierence between pru-
dential and nonprudential regulation. Part II discusses prudential regulation o deposit-taking institutions engaged in
micronance.
Part III looks at the challenges surrounding supervision o depository institutions
engaged in micronance.
Part IV discusses nonprudential regulation o both depository and nondepository
institutions engaged in micronance.
Part V addresses regulation obranchless banking.
Part VI discusses regulation omicroinsurance, especially when it is sold or adminis-tered by micronance providers.
Part VII summarizes the key observations, principles, and recommendations.
8 The relevant principles and publications o these bodies are listed in Appendix D.9 See, e.g., BCBS (2010); G-20 Principles or Innovative Financial Inclusion (http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/to-principles.html), and Multi-Year Action Plan on Development(http://www.g20.utoronto.ca/2010/g20seoul-development.html). See also FATF (2012a); FATF (2011); IAIS and CGAP Working Group onMicroinsurance (2007); and IAIS, Microinsurance Network, and Access to Insurance Initiative (2010).10 See, e.g., the Center or Global Developments Policy Principles or Expanding Financial Access (http://www.cgdev.org/content/publications/detail/1422882/); the Smart Campaigns Client Protection Principles
(http://www.smartcampaign.org/about-the-campaign/smart-micronance-and-the-client-protection-principles);and WSBI (2008).
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4
Part I. Preliminary Issues
This Part opens with a discussion o some basic terms used in this Guide. (Appendix B,
Glossary, covers a much longer list o terms.) We turn then to enabling regulationthat
is, regulation whose explicit purpose is to promote the development o providers and
products that serve the nancially excluded poor. Next we discuss regulatory denitions
o micronance and microcredit, which may be dierent rom the denitions o those
terms as used in general discussion. Then we note the crucial distinction between pruden-
tial and nonprudential regulation o micronance. This discussion o preliminary issuesconcludes by examining the question o whether to regulate by institution, by activity, or
by some combination o the two.
1a. Terminology: What Is Microfnance? What Is Financial Inclusion?
In most countries the modern micronance movement started with a ocus on micro-
credit, and only later embraced the importance or poor people o savings, money trans-
ers, and insurance services.11 Microcredit still looms large in the sel-image o mostproviders who identiy themselves as micronance institutions (MFIs). However, the
vision o ull nancial inclusion is evolving, and recent years have seen a vocabulary
shit away rom micronance and toward nancial access, nancial inclusion,
and similarly broad terms. Nevertheless, this Guide uses the terms micronance and
microcredit, mainly because many countries already use this terminology in their regu-
lations, and such use appears likely to continue.
In this Guide, micronance reers to the provision o ormal nancial services to
poor and low-income (and, or credit, in particular, nonsalaried) people, as well as otherssystematically excluded rom the nancial system.12 As noted, micronance embraces
not only a range o credit products (or business purposes, or consumption smooth-
ing, to und social obligations, or emergencies, etc.), but also savings, money transers,
and insurance.
11 Financial cooperatives have a dierent history in much o the world, and have been taking savings romlow-income clients since long beore the modern micronance movement.
12 Formal indicates services provided by an institution that is legally registered with a government authority.
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Preliminary Issues 5
What does nancial inclusion mean, and how does it dier rom micronance?
In this Guide, nancial inclusion reers to the state in which all working age adults
have eective access to credit, savings, payments and insurance rom ormal service pro-
viders.13
In many developing countries and transitional economies, this includes largenumbers o households that are not considered poor or even low income by local stan-
dards, as well as most small- and medium-size enterprises (SMEs) (at least with respect
to access to credit).14
Both micronance and nancial inclusion reer to ormal nancial services
those delivered by providers that are registered with or licensed by a government. Though
inormal providers are not discussed in this Guide, it is important to recognize that most
poor people use a wide variety o inormal providers, even when they also have access to
ormal services.As used in this Guide, the terms microcredit and microloan have our important
dimensions:15
1. A microloan is typically much smaller than a conventional bank loan, although there
is no universally agreed maximum.
2. The loan typically has either no collateral or unconventional collateral (which re-
quently is not sucient to cover the lenders loss in the case o a payment deault).
3. The borrower is typically sel-employed or inormally employed (i.e., not salaried by
a ormal employer).4. The lender typically uses the common microlending methodology described below.
For various reasons, this broad working denition o microcredit would not be suit-
able or a regulatory denition. See 1c. Regulatory Denitions o Micronance and
Microcredit.
Although most microcredit clients are microentrepreneurs in the sense that
they have their own income-producing activities, they use their loans not only or
business purposes but also or nonbusiness purposes, such as consumption smoothingor nancing social, medical, and educational expenses. Notwithstanding this, micro-
credit is distinct rom typical consumer credit (e.g., credit cards or deerred payment
or purchases), which usually involves scored lending to salaried people. Consumer
13 GPFI white paper (2011, p. 1). See ootnote 3 regarding the meaning o eective access (a term also usedin the white paper), which incorporates concepts o responsible delivery and aordability.14 Many regulatory issues in SME nance (such as borrower insolvency rules) are o limited relevance inmicronance and are thereore generally not explored in this Guide.15 The terms microcredit and microloan are used synonymously in this Guide, even though the terms
credit and loan have distinct legal denitions in some regulatory systems.
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6 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
credit raises distinct regulatory and supervisory issues that are not discussed in this
Guide.
In this Guide, the term common microlending methodology reers to lending
approaches that have been applied over the past our decades and that involve most, butnot necessarily all, o the ollowing:
The lenders personal contact with the borrower
Group lending, or individual lending based on an analysis o the borrowers (and/or
borrowers household) cash fow as opposed to scoring
Low initial loan sizes, with gradually larger amounts available in subsequent loans16
An understanding that borrowers who repay their loans aithully will have prompt
access to ollow-on loans
A compulsory savings requirement that must be satised by the borrower beorereceiving the loan to demonstrate the borrowers willingness and ability to make pay-
ments and/or to provide a partial cash collateral or the loan
This common microlending methodology is perhaps the most important distinguish-
ing eature o microcredit rom a regulatory and supervisory perspective and is critical to
many discussions in this Guide.
What is an MFI? In this Guide, the term reers to a ormal institution whoseprimary
business is providing nancial services to the poor.17
The range o institutional typesdelivering one or more micronance services includes a wide variety o nongovernmental
organizations (NGOs); commercial nance companies (sometimes reerred to as non-
bank nance companies); nancial cooperatives o various types; savings banks; rural
banks; state-owned agricultural, development, and postal banks; commercial banks; and
a large array o state-backed loan unds. Many institutions oer nancial services to the
poor alongside products targeting more afuent clients, and not necessarily as a primary
business activity. This distinction can be important: oten the risks that regulation and
supervision are intended to address will be dierent in the context o a diversied nan-cial service provider.
This Guide ocuses on the ollowing institutional types: NGO MFIs, commercial mi-
crolending companies, commercial banks, micronance banks, and nancial cooperatives.
16 This practice is not as universal as it once was. Also, it should be noted that even where this is a commonpractice, loan sizes do not continue to grow indenitely. The lender (or regulation) may impose an upper loanlimit or all borrowers or or an individual borrower, and borrowers oten reach a voluntary plateau in thesize o loan they want.17 Many organizations engaged in micronancein particular, domestic and international NGOsgive equal
or greater priority to nonnancial services, such as business training, agricultural training and inputs, healthservices, and education.
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Preliminary Issues 7
In some cases, both NGOs and nancial cooperatives are discussed separately rom other
types o MFIs owing to their distinctive attributes.
Financial cooperatives take many orms, including credit unions, savings and
credit cooperatives, cajas, caisses, cooperative banks, and others. In many countriesthey serve large numbers o poor people. However, this Guide does not address in
depth the specic prudential issues raised by nancial cooperatives. Although they
are all member-based and have in common the one member one vote rule, there
are wide variations in their structure (including governance) and attributes across
countries and regions. This variation is due in part to the three distinct traditions
underlying most models (German, French/Canadian, and Anglo-American) as well as
dierences in nancial cooperatives operations and in the size and composition o
their membership. Given their importance to nancial inclusion as well as widespreadconcerns about the quality o their oversight, regulators, policy makers, and SSBs may
all have a role to play in improving prudential regulation and supervision o coopera-
tive intermediaries.
As noted, this Guide does not discuss the regulatory issues specic to state-owned
institutions or savings banks, but many o the issues discussed here apply equally to
them as well. In many developing and transitional countries, state-owned nancial
institutions and savings banks (which may be state-owned) provide a substantial por-
tion o poor peoples nancial services. In some countries, these are the only ormalnancial institutions serving the poor. The goal o a level playing eld would argue
or subjecting state-owned banksin particular, state-owned commercial banksto the
same prudential and nonprudential requirements as privately owned banks engaged in
the same activities. However, there is wide disparity in regulatory treatment o state-
owned banks in both developed and developing countries. This may be largely due to
the assumption that the government will back all liabilities o its institutions. While
the discussion, given its complexity, is beyond the scope o this document, it should be
a goal o governments to ensure that state institutions complement rather than replaceprivate sector actors.
Savings banks are oten regulated dierently rom commercial banks. Although this
Guide does not include a discussion o the issues o particular relevance to the regulation
and supervision o savings banks, the regulation and supervision o micronance activi-
ties discussed herein generally apply to savings banks as well.18
18 The World Savings Bank Institute (WSBI 2008) has articulated general principles with respect to the regula-
tion o micronance as well as recommendations or specic regulatory measures, although these measuresare not aimed toward the regulatory regime or savings banks in particular.
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8 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
1b. Financial Inclusion as a Regulatory Objective; Regulation as Promotion
Key Points
To crat and enorce appropriate regulation with a nancial inclusion objective,
regulators need to understand the distinctive characteristics o micronance, in-
cluding clients and their needs, products and services, and institutions providing
those products and services.
Problems oten arise due to inadequate coordination among nancial regulators
and other government agencies whose responsibilities may aect institutions de-
livering micronance.
Regulation creates costs or both the regulated institutions and the supervisor.These costs should be proportionate to the risks involved.
To the extent possible, regulation should aim to be institution-neutral (support-
ing an activity-based regulatory approach), both to create a level playing eld
that osters competition and to reduce risk o regulatory arbitrage.
In creating new windows or micronance, regulators need to be alert to the possibility
o regulatory arbitrage. Some countries create special micronance windows with one
sort o activity in mind, and then are surprised to nd that the window is also being
used or other activities that the regulators might not have been so keen to promote.
The prevailing view o regulation and supervision o nancial institutions centers on
protecting the nancial system as a whole, and nancial institutions ability to repay their
depositors in a cost-eective manner.19 Adding a urther objective o promoting nancial
inclusion introduces three new vectors o responsibility and risk: new service provid-
ers, new customers (who may be unamiliar with ormal nancial institutions), and new
products and delivery methods, such as branchless channels. To crat appropriate regula-
tion and to supervise eectively, regulators need to understand the particular character-
istics and risks o micronance, including the clients and their needs, the products and
services, and the institutions providing them.
The micronance regulators challenge is how to balance nancial access, nancial
stability, nancial integrity, and consumer protection. This complex and constantly
19 This is accomplished through (i) dening ownership requirements and permitted activities, (ii) requiringinstitutions to have appropriate risk management policies and to meet certain perormance norms, (iii) build-ing systems to keep the supervisor inormed about the institutions operations, and (iv) equipping the supervi-
sor with appropriate tools, including sta and power to intervene. Increasingly, regulators are ocusing onnancial providers relationships with each other (e.g., competition, cooperation) and with their customers(e.g., bank secrecy, consumer protection), as well as on preventing criminal use o nancial markets, such asmoney laundering or nancing o terrorism.
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Preliminary Issues 9
changing balance requires on-going costbenet analysis.20 It oten involves not just the
nancial regulator but also other government agencies, such as the consumer protection
agency, the competition agency, the social welare agency, and law enorcement authori-
ties. Unless there is robust communication and coordination among these bodies, sub-stantial problems are likely to result.
Regulation now being enacted or micronance seeks not only to protect the nan-
cial system and depositors, but also to promote poor peoples access to ormal nance.
To begin with, regulation can be promotional simply by enabling or acilitating basic
microlending. In some countries, reorm is required to establish clear legal authority
or nonbank entities to engage in lending (see 4a. Permission to Lend). This is impor-
tant because commercial actors oten have been willing to enter micronance only ater
experimentation by NGOs or other noncommercial lenders.Regulation can also be promotional by adjusting norms so that existing institutions can
reach new customers or expand the range o services oered (e.g., by removing interest rate
caps that make small loans unprotable, or by adjusting prudential norms to address specic
issues with deposit-taking MFIs). And regulatory change can make investment in micro-
nance more appealing (e.g., through avorable tax treatment). Finally, regulation can enable
the ormation o new kinds o MFIs. Regardless o its objective, regulation should aim where
possible to be institution-neutral (see 1e. Regulate by Institution or Activities?), both to cre-
ate a level playing eld that osters competition and to reduce risk o regulatory arbitrage.21
Special windows or microfnance
Oten, a new special windowthat is, a distinct regulatory categoryis created or micro-
nance. In some countries, new regulation has created a series o special windows, with the
possibility o graduating rom one to the next. The approaches include enabling the ollowing:
Nonbank microlending institutions
Nonbank deposit-taking institutions (both to oer poor people a savings alternativeand to access deposit unding or lending operations)
Some combination o these two, which is sometimes reerred to as a tiered approach.
20 Calculating costs and benets is not easy. Costs include those o the regulated institutions and those o theregulator, neither o which may be easy to estimate ex ante. Some benets (e.g., consumer protection) arehard to quantiy. Stakeholders value risks and benets dierently, and the risks o nonregulation may not beully apparent beore a crisis.21 Competition is touched on only briefy in this Guide. However, the central aim o competition policy (maxi-
mization o consumer welare) is likely to be dierent in countries with a high percentage o poor people.In such countries, the distributional aspects o maximizing consumer welare (i.e., how wealth is distributedamong the society, including to poor people) can be very important when crating and enorcing competitionpolicy. See Adam and Alder (2011).
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10 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
In deciding whether to open a special window, the rst step should be to determine
what, i anything, in the existing legal ramework is holding back the market. (That said,
however, the decision to open a new window is sometimes driven more by political than
by technical considerations.)Experiences around the world show that a new window that removes a barrier to
nonbank microlending (e.g., ending an explicit or implicit prohibition o lending by non-
prots) is likely to increase the number o customers served airly quickly (although they
are not always the customers envisioned by proponents o the regulatory change). By
contrast, where the regulatory objective o a new window is to enable deposit-taking,
results have been mixed. Sometimes the binding constraint has been scarcity o
motivated entrepreneurs and investors,22 or a lack o managers who can competently
handle the risks involved when lending rom deposits. In such cases, opening a specialwindow by itsel may not do much to increase services, at least until investor interest and
management skill are better developed. (See 2a. New Regulatory Windows or Deposi-
tory Micronance: Timing and State o the Industry.)
Create a new ramework or amend an existing one?
I a new special window is to be created, should this be done by amending existing
nancial sector laws and/or regulations, or by creating new ones? Whichever approach istaken, the new institutional type(s) should be incorporated into the basket o rules that
apply to similar institutions oering similar services (e.g., nancial consumer protection
and treatment in bankruptcy).
Incorporation in the existing ramework makes regulatory harmonization more
likely, and inconsistent or unequal treatment less likely. This applies both to the ini-
tial regulatory reorm as well as to uture amendments.23 However, local actors will
determine the advisability o this integrated approach versus creating a separate new
ramework. Policy makers may be reluctant to open up the banking law or amend-ment because they dont want to trigger a review o other issues that have nothing to
do with micronance.24
22 This problem can be exacerbated by regulation that is inappropriate or overly burdensome to new models.23 When changes are implemented via regulations (as opposed to laws), uture adjustments are typically mucheasier to implement, given the ewer procedural obstacles to adopting, amending, or repealing regulations ascompared with legislative acts.24 The decision has at times been infuenced by a donors technical assistance package that includes a new
drat micronance law (oten based on another countrys law). This approach is seldom, i ever, appropri-ately tailored to the local context.
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Preliminary Issues 11
Regulatory arbitrage
I a new window involves lighter or more avorable regulation, existing institutions
and new market entrants may contort to qualiy as MFIs. Such speculation amongregulatory alternatives, or regulatory arbitrage, can leave some institutions under-
regulated. Also, entrants may use a new micronance window or businesses that are
quite dierent rom what policy makers had in mind when creating it. For instance,
consumer lenders (who generally target salaried borrowers) have used a licensing orm
intended or micronance (where lending usually ocuses on borrowers without ormal
employment) to benet rom a higher usury rate applicable to microlending. Com-
mercial banks that cannot meet increases in the minimum capital requirement or other
prudential requirements or banks have, in some instances, been relicensed under amicronance window, without having the motivation or knowledge necessary to serve
low-income customers eectively. In at least one case, many o the newly licensed MFIs
that had previously been underperorming banks ailed, tainting the entire concept o
micronance in the country.
1c. Regulatory Defnitions o Microfnance and Microcredit
Key Point
Regulatory denitions o micronance and microcredit should be tightly
ramed to meet specic regulatory objectives and should not simply be drawn rom
general literature on micronance.
Earlier, we gave broad denitions o micronance and microcredit as those termsare used throughout this Guide. However, these denitions usually will not be suitable
or use in a given countrys regulation (see 1a. Terminology: What Is Micronance?
What is Financial Inclusion?). An appropriate regulatory denition must be based on
a clear articulation o the country- and situation-specic objective(s) the regulation is
meant to serve. For instance, i the purpose is adjusting prudential norms or depository
MFIs, it might be appropriate to dene microcredit in terms o a specic maximum
loan amount. However, the same denition might not be appropriate or determining
whether an NGO MFI serves a sucient public benet to deserve a prot tax exemption.See Box 1.
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12 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
Box 1. Crating a regulatory defnition o microcredit
There is no standard regulatory denition o microcredit that would be suitable or
global use. However, some general practical cautions emerge rom the experience o
countries that have crated their own denitions or a variety o regulatory objectives:
1. Use o unds. Identiying the primary purpose o particular loans (e.g., microen-
terprise, housing, education, other) may help MFIs and their clients manage risk.
However, the regulatory denition should not require that the loan be used to
und a microenterprise. First, this would interere with the other valid reasons or
which poor people borrow. Second, money is ungible, and numerous analyses o
the actual use o microcredit show that a signicant portion o the money is indeed
not invested in a microenterprise, even i this is the declared purpose o the loan
and even i such a purpose is required by regulation. Most microloan customers
are in act microentrepreneursin the sense they are pursuing sel-led, small-scale
earning activitiesbut this does not mean that they always use their loan proceeds
or microenterprise purposes. Financial services, including microloans, can be cru-
cially important or poor households not only to nance income-producing activity
but also to allow payment o regular consumption expenses despite irregular and
unreliable income streams. In addition, microloans and other micronance services
enable amilies to accumulate sums o cash that are large enough to deal with emer-
gencies, sporadic opportunities, or major social obligations.
2. Maximum amount. Regulators who set a maximum microloan amount intro-
duce two problems or the sector. Microlenders (i) will not be able to accommo-
date successul clients who eventually want loans that exceed the limit and ( ii)
will have less opportunity to balance the more costly small loans with less costly
larger loans. On the other hand, a high maximum amount dilutes the low-income
targeting and increases the risk o regulatory arbitrage. A two-pronged approach
may help to strike the right balance: (i) a maximum average outstanding loan
balance or the entire microcredit portolio and (ii) a higher maximum initial
amount or any microloan (aggregating multiple loans to a single borrower or
purposes o this calculation).a The limit on average loan size preserves overall
targeting, while the higher limit on individual loan size allows some fexibility.
3. Defning the customer. Dening the target customer in regulation is oten tempting,
but can pose practical challenges. For example, a denition that reers to poor
customers could exclude low-income unbanked persons who are both needy and
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Preliminary Issues 13
potentially protable borrowersat least i there is any expectation that the limit
on client income will actually be enorced. In practice, demonstrating or enorcing
compliance with such a limit could also be very dicult and expensive.
Microcredit is sometimes dened in terms o lending to microentrepreneurs
(people who earn their income rom work outside the ormal sector). Even i the
policy maker intends a tight ocus on this clientele, it may be more practical at
times to introduce a degree o fexibility, or instance, by including the house-
holds o microentrepreneurs or by requiring that microentrepreneurs constitute
the majority o borrowers.
In some cases, the target clientele o microcredit has been dened quite narrowly,
but in practice supervisors have allowed lenders considerable fexibility in choosing
clients. The letter o the law can be invoked to deal with lenders who claim to be
doing microcredit but are actually serving an entirely dierent type o customer.
4. Requirements with respect to collateral. To dierentiate microcredit rom con-
ventional retail bank loans, the regulator might want to require that microloans
be uncollateralized. Any such regulatory requirement should build in fexibility.
For instance, microborrowers who own no collateral and start o with small, un-
secured loans occasionally succeed in growing their enterprises and raising their
income to the point that they acquire substantial assets that could be pledged as
normal collateral. Moreover, some MFIs accept collateral to enhance repayment
incentives, even when the value o the collateral would not be enough to make
the lender whole in the event o deault.
5. Defning microcredit in law or in regulations. I economic circumstances
change or the original denition proves problematic in practice, a denition o
microcredit that has been enshrined in law requires the ull legislative process
to change. Denitions in regulations typically can be adjusted more easily. In
some countries, legal protocol requires a certain level o specicity in the law, but
still leaves room to permit important details to be determined in regulations.
a Note that two dierent measuring rods are involved here: over time the average outstanding loan bal-ance o a microcredit portolio tends to be a little more than hal o the average initial disbursed amounto the loans in the portolio. Thus, i the average outstanding balance (loan portolio divided by numbero active loans) is capped at 200 and the initial disbursed amount o any individual loan is capped at2000, this would mean that the maximum or any single loan would be roughly ve times the allowableaverage o loans across the portolio. See Rosenberg (1999).
Box 1. Continued
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14 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
A regulatory denition o microcredit may be challenging, but dening micro-
savings is a much simpler matter, mainly because such a denition is rarely needed.
Restricting the income level or other characteristics o depositors usually would be coun-
terproductive. Typically, the purpose o an institution awarded a depository micronancelicense is to serve the needs o poor and low-income customers. Even on that assumption,
deposits captured rom more afuent customers serve that purpose as long as they are
used to und loans to the lower income customers. In act, a common unding pattern in
deposit-taking MFIs is that most o their depositors have very small account balances,
but most o their deposit undingcomes rom a minorityoten a small minorityo
accounts with larger balances.
However, deposit size limits still may be relevant, depending on the regulatory ob-
jective. For example, increasing numbers o countries have capped savings balances andtransaction sizes or certain accounts when dening categories o lower risk that will
justiy relaxed anti-money laundering and combating the nancing o terrorism (AML/
CFT) requirements.
1d. Prudential and Nonprudential Regulation: Objectives and Application
Key Point
Absent extraordinary circumstances, nondepository MFIs should not be subjected to
prudential regulation and supervision.25
When a deposit-taking institution becomes insolvent or lacks adequate liquidity, it
cant repay its depositors, andi it is a large institutionits ailure could undermine
public condence enough so that the nancial system suers a run on deposits or other
system-wide damage. Prudential regulation involves the government in overseeing the
nancial soundness o these institutions and taking action when problems arise.In contrast, nonprudential regulationwhich is also reerred to as conduct o
business regulationdoes not involve monitoring or assessing the nancial health o
the regulated institution.26 Nonprudential regulation o micronance tends to ocus on
25 Some traditions o nancial sector regulationnotably those with historical ties to Franceapply pruden-tial regulation to all types o lending institutions, regardless o their potential to jeopardize systemic stability.26 The use o the term conduct o business regulation may be more common. However, this term encom-
passes a narrower range o regulation relating to the conduct o the provider regarding consumers and otherproviders and would not typically include topics such as taxes and ownership limitations.
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Preliminary Issues 15
three main objectives: (i) protecting consumers o nancial services, (ii) enabling a range
o institutions that provide a mix o appropriate products and services, and ( iii) provid-
ing governments with inormation to carry out economic, nancial, and criminal law
enorcement policy. Some nonprudential regulation is subject to general enorcement, in-cluding civil and criminal prosecution and private rights o action. Other nonprudential
regulation may be enorced by specic regulatory bodies.27
Sometimes a rule serves both prudential and nonprudential objectives. Eective con-
sumer protection-related regulation o lending, or example, can lead to better asset qual-
ity, which in turn contributes to an intermediarys overall nancial healtheven though
this is not the primary regulatory objective.
There is wide recognition that compliance with, and enorcement o, prudential regu-
lation is usually more complex, dicult, and expensive than nonprudential regulation,or both the regulator and the regulated institution. This can be particularly problematic
in some developing countries where regulators and supervisors are already stretched to
capacity with their mainstream banking and insurance sectors.
Thus, an important general principle is to avoid using burdensome prudential regu-
lation or nonprudential purposes. For instance, i the concern is only to keep persons
with bad records rom owning or controlling nondepository MFIs, the bank regulator
does not have to take on the task o monitoring and protecting the nancial soundness
o such institutions. It would be sucient to require disclosure o the individuals owningor controlling them, and to submit proposed individuals to a t and proper screening.
Why do governments impose prudential regulation on banks and other nancial
intermediaries, but not on nonnancial businesses? Banks, much more than other busi-
nesses, und their operations with other peoples money, mainly deposits rom the pub-
lic. This creates incentives or managers to take inappropriate risks. More importantly, it
exposes banks to deposit runs. Loss o condence by depositors in one bank can spread
quickly to depositors in other banks, threatening to destabilize the entire banking and
nancial system, with serious consequences or all other sectors o the economy. There iswide agreement that the cost o prudential regulation is justied when the stability o the
nancial system or the saety o depositors is at risk.
Lending-only MFIs obviously pose no risk to their depositors (they have none) and
are not subject to depositor runs. However, as noted, they should be subject to appropri-
ate nonprudential regulation.
27 For example, permission to lend and reporting requirements may be enorced by the regulator o the
particular type o institution; nancial consumer protection may be regulated by the nancial regulator or aconsumer protection body; AML/CFT will typically be regulated by a countrys nancial intelligence unit.
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16 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
Box 2. A systemic rationale or applying prudential regulation to microlending-only
institutions?
Are microlenders that are unded by sources o capital other than public depos-
its engaged in nancial intermediation that needs to be prudentially regulated?
(See Appendix C or a discussion o nondepository MFIs sources o unding and
their potential regulatory ramications.) In general, our answer is a rm no.
Lending-only MFIs cant create depositor runs, but some observers have pointed
out that they can occasionally create contagious borrower runs. During the global
nancial crisis o 20082009, more than one country experienced such a contagion e-
ect in its microcredit market. I an MFI is ailing, then it is common or borrowers to
stop repaying their microloans, because a key repayment motivation is the borrowers
expectation o a new loan when the old one is repaid. I a major MFI ails, borrow-
ers at other institutions may have doubts about their own lenders solidity and the
reliability o its implicit promise to give uture loans. I this happens, other MFIs can
be contaminated by the original MFIs repayment problems. In at least one country,
the government (via a state-owned institution) unded the acquisition o one o the
countrys largest MFIs by another MFI to prevent such a contagion eect and to avoid
losses by the commercial banks that had large loans outstanding with the MFIs.a
Does the possibility o borrower runs justiy prudential regulation o lending-
only MFIs? Four actors warrant examination: systemic risk, cost o prudential regu-
lation and supervision, who should bear the risk o loss, and capacity to supervise
eectively:
1. Systemic consequences. The ailure o one or more microlending institutions
would typically not imperil a countrys whole banking and nancial system. Even
when microlenders serve huge numbers o customers, their assets will seldom
account or a large percentage o the countrys nancial assets.b A rare exception
might be ound in cases where wholesale loans to MFIs are a major part o the
assets o a countrys banks, although the more direct and appropriate route is
to improve supervision o the banks lending practices (as opposed to imposing
prudential regulation on lending-only MFIs).
2. Cost. Prudential supervision is costly or both the supervisor and or the
supervised. And the experience has been that it costs substantially more to
supervise MFI assets than an equivalent volume o normal bank assets. Absent
subsidy, sustainable institutions pass such costs on to their clients. In the case o
depository institutions, the costs o prudential regulation and supervision are
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Preliminary Issues 17
likely to be less than the costs o bailing out the nancial system. In contrast, the
ailure o microlending institutions will typically not require a systemic bailout.
3. Risk o loss. The ailure o a microlending institution results in the loss o inves-
tors and donors unds. Investors and donors can mitigate this risk by supervis-
ing the investee institutions. Where no deposits are involved, there is no loss o
the publics money. Clients o the ailed institution may lose access to services,
temporarily or permanently. The same is true o many nonnancial businesses;
however, this risk is not viewed as a reason to impose prudential regulation on
those businesses.
4. Capacity to supervise. Retail depositors are generally not in a position to evaluate
the management and condition o the banks that hold their unds. In contrast,
owners, lenders, and donors can and should supervise the microlending institu-
tions they invest in.
In the great majority o circumstances, these actors do not add up to a good
case or prudential regulation o nondepository microlenders.c (At the same time,
nonprudential regulationespecially consumer protection regulationis completely
appropriate or such institutions.)
a See Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille (2010).b In rare cases, MFI assets loom large in a countrys nancial system, but in those cases the MFIs aretypically already prudentially supervised because they take deposits.c Some regulators, particularly in countries with links to the French regulatory tradition, disagree withthis position.
As part o their lending methodology, some MFIs require compulsory savings romtheir borrowers beore loan disbursement and/or during the lie o the loan. This require-
ment tests the clients ability and willingness to make regular payments and provides
cash collateral that protects a portion o the loan. Should MFIs that take compulsory
savings, but not voluntary savings, be treated as deposit-takers and subjected to pruden-
tial regulation? There are diering views on this question.
Usually, clients o MFIs that take compulsory savings are net borrowers: the compul-
sory savings amount is typically a (small) raction o the customers loan size so the clients
owe the MFI more money than the MFI owes them. I the MFI ails, these customers canprotect themselves by the simple expedient o not paying their loans.
Box 2 Continued
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18 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
On the other hand, there are times when the customer has little or no loan balance
outstanding, usually at the end o the term o an amortizing loan or between loans.
At those times, the compulsory savings can exceed the loan balance, and the customer
is in a net at-risk position. This airly small degree o risk has to be weighed against thecosts o prudential supervision.
Several countries have taken a middle path on this issue by requiring prudential
licensing or any MFI that intermediates clients compulsory savings (i.e., lends them to
other borrowers), but not or MFIs that keep the savings in an account with a licensed
bank or invested in low-risk securities. Regulators should consider protecting customers
prior claim on the unds in the event the MFI ails, or instance, by requiring the compul-
sory deposits to be held in a trust und or escrow account.28
1e. Regulate Institutions or Activities?
To advance nancial inclusion while promoting a level playing eld, similar activities
should be subject as much as possible to similar regulation, regardless o the institution
being regulated. The ability to regulate activities similarly will depend on both the specic
regulatory issue being addressed as well as how the dierent institutions are regulated
(i.e., under one or many laws) and supervised (i.e., by one or many regulators). There are
various approaches. Under a unctional approach, supervision is determined by activ-
ity. A unied or integrated approach combines prudential and nonprudential regula-
tion and supervision under one roo. The twin peaks approach uses separate structures
or prudential and nonprudential issues. In many countries that use a unied or twin-
peaks approach, nondepository institutions all outside o the supervisory regime.
Some prudential rules should depend on institutional type: or instance, dierent
kinds o institutions may call or dierent rules about permitted activities or capital
adequacy. In contrast, most nonprudentialstandards applicable to micronance services
would generally be appropriate regardless o institutional type providing them. In par-
ticular, there is a strong argument that nancial consumer protection and AML/CFT are
better achieved through a single set o rules applicable to all providers o a given service.
Sometimes, regulation by activity (instead o by institutional type) makes good sense
as a matter o principle, but is not easible as a matter o political economy. For example,
it may not be easy to get regulation adopted that puts upstart market entrants on a level
playing eld with established market incumbents.
28 The regulator will want the right to veriy that the unds are treated in this way. Such verication could beviewed as prudential supervision, but this does not mean that other prudential requirements should be introduced.
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19
Part II. Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Microfnance
As micronance moves beyond microcredit, prudential regulation o depository micro-
nance comes into play.29 The primary reasons or prudential regulation o depository
institutions are (1) to protect the countrys nancial system by preventing the ailure o
one institution rom leading to the ailure o others, and (2) to protect small depositors
who are not well-positioned to monitor the institutions nancial soundness themselves.30
I prudential regulation does not ocus closely enough on these two objectives, scarce
supervisory resources can be wasted, institutions can be saddled with unnecessary com-pliance burdens, and development o the nancial sector can be constrained.
2a. New Regulatory Windows or Depository Microfnance: Timing and the State o
the Industry
As previously discussed, many countries have created new regulatory windows or depo-
sitory micronance, while many others are considering such a step. Where new windows
are under consideration, policy makers should begin by determining whether and how
the existing nancial sector regulation hinders institutions rom providing savings services
or the poor or rom raising other deposit unding to expand their microcredit services.31
I existing regulation does not present a barrier, or i the real binding constraint lies else-
where, then a new window will not necessarily improve access. And even i the existing
regulation does inhibit the development o depository institutions serving poor people, it
may be preerable to amend (or provide exemptions to) the existing regulation instead o
embarking on the complex task o creating a new window.
The likelihood that a new window or depository micronance will substantially
expand nancial services or the poor depends on whether there will be a critical mass
o qualiying institutions, which in turn will depend on the type o window opened and
the regulations governing it. Thus, it is important or regulators to determine (i) which
29 See, e.g., BCBS (2010).30 Insurance companies and securities rms are also subject to prudential regulation. The regulation o micro-insurance when delivered by MFIs and other micronance providers is addressed in Part VI; the regulation osecurities rms is beyond the scope o this Guide.31 The analysis should include identiying obstacles to new delivery channels (such as agent or electronic
banking) and new types o providers (such as nonbank e-money issuers).
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20 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
actorsexisting NGOs, domestic entrepreneurs, or oreign investorsare likely to
respond to a new window and (ii) whether those actors are likely to have the manage-
ment skill to run sae depository micronance.
In addition, the regulator needs to consider what entity would supervise the newinstitutions, and whether there will be any problems with supervisory capacity.
I the expectation is that over the medium term the new depository window will be
used mainly by existing NGO microlenders that transorm into depository institu-
tions, then regulators should rst assess the practical capacity o the leading institutions
to undertake such a transormation. In particular, have these microlenders demonstrated
the ability to run a loan business that is stable and protable enough so that it can be
saely unded with public deposits? In this context, the actual nancial perormance and
prospects o existing MFIs is a crucial element that oten gets too little attention in dis-cussions o regulatory reorm. In making such an assessment, regulatory sta who are
inexperienced with the special dynamics o microcredit will need expert assistance.
On the other hand, policy makers may see the new window as a means o attract-
ing investment in start-up depository MFIs, more than as a path or transorming NGO
MFIs. Here again, they need to think practically about who the likely takers will be.
I they are hoping or greeneld (i.e., start-up) operations based on oreign investment
and technical expertise, are there any identiable actors on the scene who are likely to
be interested? I local startups are expected, there are several actors worth considering: Has the protability o micronance, or at least microcredit, been demonstrated in the
country yet? Otherwise it may be hard to interest entrepreneurs and investors.
Does the country have experienced microcredit managers who can teach new sta
how to make and collect microloans?
How entrepreneurial is the countrys private sector? The regulatory window that
would draw dozens (or hundreds) o entrants in one country might draw relatively
little interest in another country with a less entrepreneurial culture.
Several countries have built technically sound new regulatory windows or micro-
nance but have seen little response. Conversely, most o the successul new depository
windows are in countries that already had a strong microcredit industry beore the win-
dow was put in place. It would overstate the point to claim that a new window will never
spark the emergence o new service providers when little had been going on previously.
In a ew countries, a new prudential licensing window or small rural banks (not neces-
sarily doing micronance) resulted in many new institutions providing service to areas
previously without access. However, supervision proved much more dicult than antici-pated. In each case, many o the new banks ailed, and the bank regulator had to devote
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Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Microfnance 21
signicant resources to cleaning up the situation. Nevertheless, many o the new banks
did not ail, and these continue to provide ongoing rural services.
2b. Rationing Prudential Regulation and Minimum Capital
Key Points
Minimum capital should, in principle at least, be set high enough to ensure that
the institution can cover the inrastructure, management inormation system
(MIS), and start-up losses to reach a viable scale. Minimum capital should also
provide incentives or adequate perormance and continued operation.
In creating a new window or depository micronance, it is important to assess
supervisory capacity and set the minimum capital requirement high enough to
avoid overburdening the supervisor.
Where possible, it is usually preerable to set minimum capital through regulation
rather than legislation, but the regulator needs to be clear in its communications
with the market to avoid a perception that the regulator is unpredictable. Pri-
mary among other advantages, setting the requirement through regulation makes
it easier or supervisors who are new to micronance to start with a manageable
number o new licensees, reserving the option o reducing minimum capital and
licensing more institutions as experience is gained.
Supervisors have limited resources, so there is a trade-o between the number o
new institutions licensed and the likely eectiveness o the supervision they receive.
And when measured as a percentage o assets supervised, the cost o eective prudential
supervision is higher or microcredit portolios than or normal bank loans (even though
there may eventually be some economies o scale).32 Finally, overstretched supervisory
capacity can result in reputational issues or the supervisor as well as potential losses
to depositors. Thus there are strong arguments or rationing the number o licenses,
especially at an early stage. The most common tool or this rationing is the minimum
capital requirementthat is, the minimum absolute amount that owners must invest as
equity in an institution seeking a license to accept deposits.33 The lower the minimum
capital, the greater the likely number o entities that will have to be supervised.
32 One way to cover such additional costs is to charge the supervised institutions a supervision ee although
this can aect access.33 Qualitative licensing requirements also serve to limit new entrants.
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22 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
The minimum capital requirement should be high enough to und appropriate inra-
structure and systems and to cover start-up losses.34 (In some countries, there are dierent
capital requirements depending on geographic scope, with the lowest requirement or a local
[e.g., district-based] institution, ollowed by regional, provincial, and national.) Micronanceadvocates who see regulation primarily as promotion usually want very low minimum capital
requirements, making it easier to obtain new licenses. Supervisors who will have to oversee the
nancial soundness o new deposit-taking institutions know there are limits on the number o
institutions they can supervise eectively and thereore usually avor higher minimum capital
requirements. In addition and more importantly, supervisors are justiably cautious about
lowering minimum capital norms solely to enable more potential entrants to satisy them.
In principle, allowing more licenses tends to oster competition and access to services.
But this doesnt necessarily mean that the right policy is to enable the ormation o manysmall deposit takers. In most micronance markets, the vast majority o the clientele is
being reached by ve to 10 large MFIs.35 In some o these markets, licensing o many very
small market entrants may not produce enough new outreach to justiy the additional
supervisory burden. Obviously, the appropriate number o micronance providers will
vary depending on the size and diversity o a countrys market.
When policy makers are opening an MFI depository window or the rst time, there
is considerable uncertainty about how much burden it will put on supervisory resources,
and how long it will take supervisory sta to learn the distinct dynamics o micronance.Given this uncertainty, some regulators make a reasonable decision to err on the side o
conservatism (higher minimum capital) at rst, permitting the requirements to be ad-
justed later when the supervisors have more experience with the demand or licenses and
the practicalities o supervising micronance. Such fexibility is easier i minimum capital
is specied in regulations rather than in the law.
2c. Adjusted Prudential Standards or Microfnance
Some prudential norms developed or conventional banking dont t well with the
risks and requirements o micronance, which involves dierent products and services.
Whether micronance is being developed through specialized stand-alone depository
34 In practice, the minimum required capital is oten based noton calculations o operational costs but instead ona reduction in the capital required or a conventional bank license or on the requirements set in other countries.35 For example, according to MIX Market data (www.themix.org), the top ve MFIs in India accounted or 58 per-cent o the clients served by the 85 MFIs reporting data in 2009. This holds up in other markets across dierentregions, e.g., Bolivia (65 percent), Bosnia and Herzegovina (66 percent), and Ghana (53 percent). In some countrieswith hundreds o MFIs, the overall amount o services provided would drop only a little i the smallest 50 percent or
even 75 percent o them closed down. In India the smaller 50 percent o MFIs reporting to MIX in 2009 accountedor only 3.6 percent o total borrowers. This is similar to 2009 data in Bolivia (9.1 percent) and Ghana (15 percent).
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Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Microfnance 23
MFIs, through nancial cooperatives, or as special product lines within retail banks, the
regulatory requirements discussed next will need review and possible revision.36
The issues discussed below include the most common requirements, but other rules
may need adjustment in some countries. Many o the adjustments relate to distinctiveeatures o microlending, refecting the act that micronance diers rom conventional
banking more on the credit side than on the deposit side.
Permitted activities
Key Point
Regulationincluding any proposed new regulation that provides or depository
micronanceshould clearly dene the types o permissible activities that a pruden-
tially regulated institution may engage in.
Regulation may permit certain institutions to engage only in lending and deposit-
taking (or initially only lending, with deposit-taking being permitted later subject to super-
visory approval). Other institutions may be allowed to provide money transer or oreign
exchange services. Limitations on permitted activities will signicantly aect prudential
requirements, including in particular capital and liquidity rules. Regulation may also limitan institutions scope o activities by dening and restricting the concept o microcredit.
Managers o newly licensed MFIs may not have much experience with managing the
ull range o banking activities and risks (e.g., retail savings delivery and asset and liability
management). Permission to engage in sophisticated activities usually should be based on
management capacity and institutional experience. For example, depository micronance
providers may be well-equipped to serve as microinsurance agents, but are unlikely to be well-
positioned to underwrite insurance risk. (As noted in 6b. MFIs and Microlending Banks in
Microinsurance, such activities are oten governed by a separate regulatory ramework.)
Capital adequacy
Key Point
There are strong arguments (and recent experiences) that support the imposition o
higher capital adequacy standards or specialized depository MFIs than or banks.
36 See BCBS (2010).
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24 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
Regulators require banks to hold capital that is adequate when measured against the size
and riskiness o the banks assets and its o-balance-sheet exposure. The capital adequacy ratio
(CAR)the ratio o equity to risk-weighted assetsis a primary ocus o bank supervision.
A higher CAR means less risk to depositors and the nancial system. But a higherCAR also means less unding rom deposits, which lowers prots and makes the inter-
mediary less attractive or investors. New MFIs in general take longer than commercial
banks to leverage their equity and build their loan portolios, so a high CAR may not
hamper their operations much in their initial years. Over the longer term, however, a
higher CAR can reduce poor peoples access to loans and other nancial services. The
regulator needs to balance saety and access when setting capital adequacy norms.
There have been years o debate about whether specialized MFIs should have a
tighter capital adequacy requirement (i.e., a higher ratio) than diversied commercialbanks. Five reasons have been advanced or imposing a higher CAR on MFIs:
Particular eatures o a microloan portolio. Well-managed MFIs typically have main-
tained excellent repayment perormance, with delinquency oten much lower than in
conventional retail banks. However, the repayment perormance o a microloan porto-
lio can deteriorate much more quickly than a conventional retail bank portolio. First,
microloans are usually unsecured (or secured by assets that are insucient to cover the
loan plus collection costs). Second, the borrowers main incentive to repay a microloan
is usually the expectation o access to uture loans.37
When a borrower sees that othersare not paying back their loans, his own incentive to continue paying declines because
the outbreak o delinquency makes it less likely that the MFI will be able to reward the
borrowers aithulness with a ollow-on loan. And i a borrower has no collateral at
risk, he may eel oolish repaying his loan when others are not. Thus, outbreaks o delin-
quency in an MFI can be contagious. (This risk is lower in the case o a commercial bank
with a diversied portolio o which microloans are a part.) The conventional wisdom
has been that as a general rule, i a microlenders annualized loan loss rate rises above
5 percent, or over 10 percent o its portolio is late by more than 30 days, managementmust correct the situation quickly or the situation is likely to spin out o control.38
High administrative costs. MFIs administrative costs are high relative to the size o
the individual loans. As a consequence, to stay afoat, MFIs need to charge interest
rates that are higher than that o the typical commercial bank loan.39 When loans are
37 This is true not only or individual microloans but also or group-based microloans.38 This general rule is widespread in the industry, but it is based on anecdotal experience, not statistical analysis.39 This is because the costs o making loans dont vary in direct proportion to the amount lent; a portolio
containing a large number o small loans will be more costly than a portolio o the same ace value butcontaining a smaller number o larger loans. However, many MFIs could increase eciency, thus reducingadministrative and operational costs.
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Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Microfnance 25
not being repaid, the MFI is not receiving the cash it needs to cover the costs associ-
ated with those loans. Because an MFIs costs are usually much higher than a com-
mercial banks costs per unit lent, a given level o delinquency will decapitalize an MFI
much more quickly than it would decapitalize a typical bank. Portolio diversifcation issues. MFI loan portolios are not concentrated in a ew
large loans. But they are oten conned to one or two loan products with substantial
covariant risks. In addition, some MFIs operate in a narrow geographic area.
Maturity o management and systems. In some countries, MFIs do not have a very
long track record and tend to have less experienced management and sta than banks.
This is an especially important issue in the case o a transorming NGO MFI: the pre-
transormation sta has little experience with the particular challenges o asset and
liability management o a deposit-taking institution. Limitations o supervisory tools. In many countries, the supervisory agency has little
experience with judging and controlling micronance risk. Additionally, a ew impor-
tant supervisory tools work less well or specialized MFIs (see Supervisory Tools and
Their Limitations).
In response, those who argue that capital adequacy requirements should be no higher
or MFIs than or conventional banks have pointed to long years o stability and solid
loan collection in licensed MFIs. They also stress the importance o a level playing eldbetween MFIs and banks.
However, recent experience has suggested that the long-term risks in microlending
may be higher than they appeared to be at earlier stages. In particular, more micro-
credit markets are reaching saturation as competitors hungry or market share expand
very quickly. Recent outbreaks o serious over-indebtedness and collection problems
in some maturing markets strengthen the argument or a higher capital adequacy re-
quirement or those institutions with assets comprised mainly o uncollateralized mi-
crocredit.
Capital adequacy or fnancial cooperatives and their networks
Financial cooperatives present a particular issue when dening capital or CAR purposes.
All members o a cooperative have to invest a minimum amount o share capital in
the institution. But unlike an equity investment in a bank, a members share capital may
usually be withdrawn when the member leaves the cooperative. From the vantage o
institutional saety, such capital is not very satisactory: it can easily be withdrawn at pre-cisely the point where it would be most neededwhen the cooperative gets into trouble.
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26 Microfnance Consensus Guidelines
Capital built up rom retained earningssometimes called institutional capitalis not
subject to this problem.
One approach to the issue is to limit members rights to withdraw share capital i the
cooperatives capital adequacy alls to a given level. Another approach is to give coop-eratives a ew years to build up a required level o institutional capital, ater which time
capital adequacy is based solely on retained earnings.
A ederation o cooperatives may be integrated enough so that the member cooperatives
can be treated as a single conglomerate or supervisory purposes (e.g., the ederation man-
ages the assets and liabilities o the network, has considerable control over the actions o the
member cooperatives, or creates a mechanism to reimburse depositors i a network member
ails). In such circumstances, a consolidated CAR or the whole ederation (without applying
a ratio to each member) might arguably be sucient. However, a consolidated ratio risksinequitable distribution o capital (e.g., where one cooperative has riskier and possibly higher
earning assets than its capital would support). There is at least one country that takes a mid-
dle path by imposing a consolidated CAR on the network and a lighter ratio on each member.
Unsecured lending limits and loan-loss provisions
Key Points
A microloan portolio should not be limited to a specied percentage o the
lenders equity nor burdened with a high general provision requirement simply
because the loans are not conventionally collateralized.
Absent special circumstances, perorming microloans should have the same provi-
sion requirement as other loan categories that are not particularly risky. However,
the provisioning schedule or delinquent microloans that are uncollateralized
should be more aggressive than the provisioning schedule or secured bank loans.
Regulations oten limit unsecured lending by a bank to a specied percentage o the
institutions equity. This kind o rule is inappropriate or unsecured microcredit port-
olios that use the common microlending methodology (see 1a. Terminology: What Is
Micronance? What Is Financial Inclusion?). Such portolios have generally per-
ormed well without traditional collateral. Limiting microlending to some raction o
an institutions capital (as is common or banks unsecured conventional loans) would
make microlending by specialized MFIs impossible. It would also make microcredit lessappealing or diversied banks. This does not imply that microloan portolios never
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Prudential Regulation o Deposit-Taking Microfnance 27
deteriorate, but that well-implemented microlending methodologies can generally miti-
gate credit risk eectively.
Bank regulations oten require high (sometimes 100 percent) loan-loss provisions or all
unsecured loans (except loans to other licensed intermediaries) at the time they are made,even beore they become delinquent. This is obviously impractical or microcredit. Even i the
MFI later recovers the provision expense when the loan is collected, the accumulated charge
or current loans would produce a massive under-representation o the MFIs real net worth.
To manage these two problems, a ew regulators have treated guarantees, particularly
group guarantees, as collateral or purposes o applying such regulations to microcredit.
This can be a convenient and pragmatic solution to the problem, cosmetically at least.
However, group guarantees are less eective than is oten supposed. Many MFIs do group-
based lending but do not ask or guarantees. Many others ask or guarantees but do notenorce them.40 Still others do not use groups at all. The most powerul source o security
in microcredit tends not to be the MFIs use o group guarantees, but rather the strength o
its lending, tracking, and collection procedures, as well as the credibility o the institutions
promise that clients who repay will have access to the services they want in the uture.41
The more straightorward solution, at least where it is supported by the historical
collection experience among microlenders in the market, is to waive the equity limi-
tation and/or the prohibitively high general provisioning requirement or unsecured
loans in qualiying microcredit portolios (i.e., those using the common microlendingmethodologysee 1a. Terminology: What Is Micronance? What Is Financial Inclu-
sion?). General provision requirements usually should be the same or uncollateralized
microloansprovided that they are originated through adequate processes that take into
account the markets characteristics and risksas or normal secured bank loans.
However, once a microloan alls delinquent, doubt is cast on the borrowers willingness
and ability to pay. The implicit contract between borrower and MFIthat aithul repay-
ment will lead to uture servicesmay be breaking down. This is especially true or shorter
loan terms with more requent repayments. Ater 60 days o delinquency, a three-monthunsecured microloan with weekly scheduled payments presents a higher likelihood o loss
than does a two-year loan secured by real estate and payable monthly. Since microlending
is typically not backed by adequate collateral, the provisioning schedule or delinquent
microloans should be more aggressive than the schedule or delinquent secured bank loans.
40 There is evidence that in some cases the impact o group lending versus individual lending on repaymentrates is negligible. Gine and Karlan (2010), in a long-term eld experiment in the Philippines, ound thatswitching rom group to individual lending did not impact repayment rates. Similarly, results o laboratory-based testing o this hypothesis ound that, absent dierent peer monitoring systems, perormance is mostly
similar across group and individual lending schemes (Cason, Gangadharan, and Maitra 2008).41 See Chen, Rasmussen, and Reille (2010).
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Governance
Key Point
Boards o deposit-taking MFIs should be independent o management and should
include members with experience in nance and banking, as well as members who
understand the clients well.
As stated in the Basel Core Principles, sound corporate governance underpins
eective risk management and public condence in individual banks and the banking sys-
tem.42 This emphasis is underscored by the proposed addition o a new core principle on
corporate governance. (See 2d. Transormation o NGO MFIs into Licensed Interme-
diaries or a discussion o governance and ownership issues when an NGO transorms
into a commercial, shareholder-owned entity.)
Management should receive oversight rom an independent board. This is especially
important in micronance, where NGOs have been historically dominant: NGOs have
no owners, which somet