This is a repository copy of Weight of Shell Must Tell : A Lanchestrian reappraisal of the Battle of Jutland.
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MacKay, Niall James orcid.org/0000-0003-3279-4717, Price, Christopher and Wood, Andrew James orcid.org/0000-0002-6119-852X (2016) Weight of Shell Must Tell : A Lanchestrian reappraisal of the Battle of Jutland. History. pp. 536-563. ISSN 1468-229X
https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-229X.12241
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1
WeightofShellMustTell:ALanchestrianreappraisaloftheBattleofJutland
NiallMacKay
DepartmentofMathematics,UniversityofYork,YorkYO105DD,UK
ChristopherPrice
HistoryandAmericanStudies,YorkStJohnUniversity,YorkYO317EX
A.JamieWood
DepartmentsofMathematicsandBiology,UniversityofYork,YorkYO105DD
ABSTRACT:Were-analysethe1916BattleofJutland(German:Skagerrak),themajornaval
engagementoftheFirstWorldWar,inthelightoftheunderstandingofdreadnoughtfleettactics
developedoverthedecadeleadinguptoit.Inparticular,weconsidertheinteractionofthecalculus
ofLanchester’sSquareLawwithfleetgeometryandthecommanders’decisionsthatdeterminedit,
andwiththeshipbuildingdecisionsassociatedwiththeLanchestriantrade-offbetweenqualityand
quantity.Were-examinethebehaviourofthecommandersinthelightofthistacticalanalysis,and
concludethattheoutcomeofJutland,inspiteofapparentBritishtacticalandtechnologicalfailings,
wastheculminationofadecadeofconsistentandprofessionallyinsightfuldecision-makingbythe
RoyalNavy,whichbuiltandcorrectlywieldeditsdecisiveweapon,theGrandFleet,toachievethe
requiredstrategicvictory.
2
The1916BattleofJutlandremainsasubjectofundiminishedcontroversyasitscentenary
approaches.1Muchofthisdebaterevolvesaroundthequestionofvictoryanddefeat,andthe
performanceoftheBritishcommanders,AdmiralJellicoeandViceAdmiralBeatty.Thelogical
tensioncreatedbyararecombinationofstrategicvictoryandapparenttacticaldefeatnaturally
defiesconsensus.OntheonehandJellicoe,famouslytheonlymanoneithersidewhocouldlosethe
warinanafternoon,wasequallyawarethathecouldnotwinitinthesametimespanandreceives
praiseforacalculatedperformancethatmaintainedBritain’snavalsupremacydespiteanegative
anddispiritingexchangeofhumanandmateriallosses.Conversely,Jellicoe’sapparentlyun-British
playingofthepercentagesiscontrastedwithhissubordinateBeatty’sembraceoftheNelsonian
traditionofdashanddaring,which,criticsargue,couldhavedeliveredacrushingandunequivocal
victorytoBritainatapivotalpointinthewar.Theemotionaledgetothisdebateisfuelledfurtherby
theadditionofadeclinistnarrative,whichplacesBritain’sdramaticlossesofcapitalshipsinthe
1TheearlycontroversybeganwithJ.E.T.Harper’sNavalStaffAppreciation(latermoderatedintoK.G.B.and
A.Dewar,NarrativeoftheBattleofJutland(London,1924)),which,followinginterventionsbyBeatty,was
highlycriticalofJellicoe(seealsoJ.E.T.Harper,ThetruthaboutJutland(London,1927)andJ.E.T.Harperand
L.Gibson,TheRiddleofJutland(LondonandNewYork,1934)).Thewrittenbattleragedthereafter,
exemplifiedbythepro-BeattyC.Bellairs,TheBattleofJutland:thesowingandthereaping(London,1920)and
thepro-JellicoeAdm.SirReginaldBacon,TheJutlandScandal(London,1924.ThedefinitivehistoryisA.J.
Marder,FromtheDreadnoughttoScapaFlow:TheRoyalNavyintheFisherera,1904-1919,5vols(Oxford,
1961-1970).ForaccessiblemodernsummariesseeP.HartandN.Steel,Jutland1916─DeathintheGrey
Wastes(London,2003)andEricGrove,‘ThememoryoftheBattleofJutlandinBritain’,inM.Epkenhans,J.
Hillmann,F.Nägler,Skagerrakschlacht:Vorgeschichte─Ereignis─Verarbeitung(Munich,2009),translatedas
Jutland:WorldWarI’sgreatestnavalbattle(Lexington,2015),whichalsogivescurrentGermanperspectives.
RegardingourtitlewenotethatJellicoewrotetoChurchillon14/7/1914that‘TheGermanswouldarguethat
theirgunsareofsufficientpowertocarrytheirprojectilesthroughourcomparativelyweakarmour[and]ithas
notbeennecessarytohaveheaviergunshitherto.IdonotagreewiththembecauseIattachsomuch
importancetoweightofburstingshell’.A.TemplePattersoned.,TheJellicoePapers:selectionsfromthe
privateandofficialcorrespondenceofAdmiraloftheFleetEarlJellicoeofScapa(NavyRecordsSoc.,vols108
and111,1966and1968),vol.I,item31.Fisherwastypicallymoreexclamatory:‘Afterall,theimmense
superiorityofour13.5“gunsMUSTtell’(FishertoJellicoe,21/1/1915,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item103).
3
contextofaperceivedongoingandacceleratingindustrialandinstitutionalfailure,particularly
relativetoGermany.2
Recentworkhastendedtoemphasizeeithertechnicalissuesorcommandandcontrolwithinthe
widercontextoftheRoyalNavy’sorganizationalculture.3However,fromonecrucialperspective
Jutlandhasyettobeaddressed.Fiftyyearsoftechnicaldevelopmentofcapitalshipshadbeen
accompaniedbyscanthardevidenceconcerninghowbesttousethem:yetfleettacticshadtobe
developed,andthereisalargebodyofwritingonthetopicfromthetwentyyearsprecedingJutland,
almostentirelyneglectedintherecentresurgenceofpre-FirstWorldWarnavalhistory.4Itscentral
2See,forexample,C.Barnett,TheSwordbearers:SupremeCommandintheFirstWorldWar(London,1963).
Thesecondofthefourcasestudiesinthebookis‘Sailorwithaflawedcutlass:AdmiralSirJohnJellicoe’.The
thesisiscritiquedinE.Grove,‘HowflawedreallywasBritain’scutlass?AcritiqueoftheBarnettthesis’,inA.
ClesseandC.Coker,TheVitalityofBritain(Luxembourg,1993).ForarecentperspectiveseeShawnT.Grimes,
StrategyandWarPlanningintheBritishNavy,1887-1918(London,2012).
3AsubstantialbodyofworkbySumidaexploresvariousaspectsoftheuseofthisrapidly-changingtechnology,
rangingfromtheproblemoffirecontrol(J.T.Sumida,‘BritishCapitalShipDesignandFireControlinthe
DreadnoughtEra:SirJohnFisher,ArthurHungerfordPollen,andtheBattleCruiser’,JournalofModernHistory,
51(1979),pp.205-230)tothatoftheoptimalrangeatwhichtofight(J.T.Sumida,‘AMatterofTiming:The
RoyalNavyandtheTacticsofDefensiveBattle,1912-1916’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,67(2003),pp.85-136),
althoughhisconclusionsaredisputed(M.Seligmann,‘AGermanpreferenceforamedium-rangebattle?British
assumptionsaboutGermannavalgunnery,1914-1915’,WarinHistory,19(2012),pp.33-48;J.Brooks,
‘PreparingforArmageddon:GunneryPracticesandExercisesintheGrandFleetPriortoJutland’,Journalof
StrategicStudies36(2015)pp.1006-1023;StephenMcLaughlin,‘BattlelinesandFastWings:BattlefleetTactics
intheRoyalNavy,1900-1914’,JournalofStrategicStudies38(2015),pp.985-1005.).Thetechnicalaspectsof
gunnerycontrolaredealtwithbyJohnBrooks,DreadnoughtGunneryandtheBattleofJutland:TheQuestion
ofFireControl(Abingdon,2005),causticallyreviewedinJ.T.Sumida,‘Gunnery,Procurement,andStrategyin
theDreadnoughtera’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,69(2005),pp.1179-1187;responsebyJ.Brooks,Journalof
MilitaryHistory,70(2006),pp.195-200).Lanchestrianthinkingisneverdiscussedexplicitlyinthisliterature,
butSumidanotesthedynamicnatureofBritishtacticalthinking,andtheRoyalNavy’s`Intelligent
considerationof…fleetfireandmovement–thatis,thenavalhistoricalequivalentof“inherentmilitary
probability”’.TheRoyalNavy’sorganizationalcultureanditseffectoncommandandcontrolareexploredina
landmarkworkbyAndrewGordon,TheRulesoftheGame:JutlandandBritishNavalCommand(Annapolis,
1997).However,Gordondoesnotdiscussfleettactics.Thepointthattheyshouldnotbeneglectedaftera
periodofrapidtechnologicalchangeismadeinM.Allen,‘TheDeploymentofUntriedTechnology:British
NavalTacticsintheIroncladEra’,WarinHistory,15(2008),pp.269-293.
4Themostcomprehensivebibliographyandmostthoroughdiscussionofthefleettacticsofthisoranyother
eraisWayneP.Hughes,FleetTactics(Annapolis,1986).Invariousotherarticles,whichweshallrefertolater,
Hughesexplorestherelationsamongtechnology,tacticsandtheoperationallevelofnavalwarfare.Fora
4
themeisofthequantificationandmathematizationoftheroleofthe‘biggun’.Intheearly
twentiethcentury,theoristsinmanycountrieswereexploringmeansofpredictingvictoryordefeat
inbattlethroughtheuseofgeometryandcalculus.ThemostfamousexampleistheBritishengineer
andscientistF.W.Lanchester’s‘squarelaw’,whichprovidedarevolutionaryunderstandingofthe
effectsofmodernweaponry,andpredictedthatanoutgunnedforcewaslikelytosufferan
acceleratingrateoflossrelativetoitsopponentuntilitwascompletelydestroyed.5Evenmilitary
analysts,however,areoftenunawarethattheessentialconclusionsoftheSquareLawwere
independentlyarrivedatintheUSA(twice),RussiaandFrance,thoughapparentlynotinGermany.6
Thisbodyofworkwarnedagainstacceptingbattleifevenslightlyoutnumbered,andstressedthe
desirabilityofaninitialunopposedperiodoffire,howeverbrief,andofdividinganenemyforceand
destroyingitindetail.
TheeffectofsuchthinkingonthecontestbetweenBritishandGermanbattlefleetswasprofound.
JellicoeinformedLanchesterthat‘yourN-squarelawhasbecomefamousintheGrandFleet’,7andat
thestrategiclevelthehighGermanconceptofthenavalwaragainstBritain,theriskfleet
[Risikoflotte],evolvedintoaclassicLanchestrianplanofdetachinganddestroyingaportionofthe
summaryofrecentworkbyhistoriansseeM.S.Seligmann,‘Therenaissanceofpre-FirstWorldWarnaval
history’,JournalofStrategicStudies,36(2013),pp.454-479.
5F.W.Lanchester,AircraftinWarfare:theDawnoftheFourthArm(London,1916),basedonarticlesin
Engineering,98(1914),pp.422-423andpp.452-453.
6J.V.Chase,‘AMathematicalInvestigationoftheEffectofSuperiorityofForceinCombatsUpontheSea’,
unpublishedsecretpaper,1902(reprintedinAppendixCofFiske,FightingMachine,below);BradleyA.Fiske,
‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,USNIPrizeEssay,ProceedingsoftheUnitedStatesNavalInstitute[PUSNI]31(1905),
pp.1-80;BradleyA.Fiske,TheNavyasaFightingMachine(NewYork,1916;reissuedintheClassicsofSea
Powerseries,NavalInstitutePress,Annapolis,1988;LtA.Baudry(FrenchNavy),TheNavalBattle:studiesof
tacticalfactors(London,1914);M.Osipov,‘Theinfluenceofthenumericalstrengthofengagedforcesontheir
casualties’(1915),translatedbyR.HelmboldandA.S.Rahm,NavalResearchLogistics,42(1995),pp.435-490.
7LetterfromJellicoetoLanchester,15thJune1916,heldasB3/18,Lanchesterarchive,UniversityofCoventry.
5
largerGrandFleetandthenengagingtheremainderonequalornumericallyfavourableterms
[Kraftausgleich].8
FromtheLanchestrianperspective,apparentcertaintiesrelatingtoJutlandbecomeproblematical.
TheGermanconcentrationonarmourprotectionattheexpenseofgun-power,forexample,wasnot
necessarilymorerationalthantheBritishaimofproducingalargernumberofhullswithgreater
numbersofhighercalibregunswhilecuttingexpensivecornerswithlighterandlessintricately
arrangedarmour.NordoesthiscontrastinpreparationinevitablypaintapictureofBritishtechnical
andindustrialdecline,insteadsuggestingamorenuancedquantitativeunderstandingofthe
mechanicsoffleetactionthanthatofthepotentialenemy.Similarly,wecannowprovideaclearer
picturethanbeforeoftheintellectualmilieuinwhichthetacticalviewsofthecommanderswere
formed,andoftheroleofchanceandofthedilemmasfacingthem,inthecontextofwhatWayne
Hugheshascalledthe‘strategy-tacticsdialectic’.9DidthecatastrophicexplosionsonBritish
battlecruisersindicatethatagreaterdisasterhadbeenavoidedfortuitously,orweretheytheresult
ofaparticularandunlikelycombinationofcircumstancesfavouringtheGermans?WhentheBritish
commander,AdmiralJellicoe,turnedawayfromtheGermanfleet,wasthisbecausehelackeddrive
anddaring,orwashesimplyunwillingtofightthemeleebattlehisenemyneededandcravedas
theironlypathtoameaningfulvictory?
8ThepointofdepartureforGermantacticswasthat‘victoryispossibleonlyiftheenemymakesmistakes’
(ViceAdmW.Wegener,TheNavalStrategyoftheWorldWar(Berlin,1929;trans.H.H.Herwig,Annapolis,
1989)).ForasurveyofGermanpre-wartacticalthinkingseeFrankNägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlansin
theKaiser’sNavypriortoWorldWarI’,inEpkenhans,Skagerrakschlacht/Jutland..Forcontemporaryviewssee
AdmR.Scheer,Germany’sHighSeaFleetintheWorldWar(London,1920);OttoGroos,DerKrieginder
Nordsee(Berlin,1922,theofficialhistory);FritzOttoBusch,DieschlachtamSkagerrak(Berlin,1933);Walter
Gladisch,Skagerrak:DieSchlachtam31.Mai1916(Berlin,1936);GeorgvonHase,DerSiegderdeutschen
Hochseeflotteam31.Mai1916.DieSkagerrak-SchlachtnachdenamtlichendeutschenundenglischenQuellen
dargestellt(Leipzig,1934).
9WayneP.Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’,NavalWarCollegeReview39(1986),pp.
2-17.ThatmodernnavieshavelessonstolearnfromsuchhistoryisemphasizedbyLtCdrB.Armstrong,`Now
HearThis–“IfWeAretoRemainaWorldPower"',PUSNI,139/5/1(2013),p.323.SeealsoJamesR.Holmes
andToshiYoshihara,‘Historyrhymes:theGermanprecedentforChineseseapower’,Orbis54(2010)14-34.
6
I
ItisatruismthatalmostallofthetechnicaldevelopmentsinlandwarfarebeforetheFirstWorld
War,forexamplebarbedwire,railwaysandfixedmachineguns,favoureddefence.Innavalwarfare,
therehadbeenacomparableperiodof40yearsorsoafterthedevelopmentoftheironcladduring
whichdefencewassuperiorandcapitalships’abilitytodamageeachotherwithgunnerywasmostly
limited.10Further,veryfewmajornavalengagementstookplaceduringthisperiod,limiting
empiricalevidencefromwhichtolearn.TheironcladerafamouslyopensatHamptonRoadsinthe
Americancivilwar,withMonitorandVirginia(theconvertedMerrimack)bouncingshotsoffeach
other.Consequently,theancienttacticoframmingwasrediscovered,andsankshipsatthe
Austrian-ItalianbattleofLissa.11Butdevelopmentofgunnerycontinuedinparalleltoarmour:for
example,therifledmuzzle-loadersofthe1870scould,inprinciple,penetratethecompoundarmour
oftheday.12TheRussian-JapanesebattleofTsushima(1905)wasfoughtusingbatteriesofmixed
calibre,andofferedlimitedlessons.13However,somecrucialelementswerenowapparent.The
significanceoftheadventanddevelopmentofthetorpedo,anditspotentialdeadlinesstocapital
10Fortheparalleldevelopmentsinguns,armourandpropulsionfromtheearlyironcladstotheFirstWorld
WarseeK.Lautenschlager,‘Technologyandtheevolutionofnavalwarfare’,InternationalSecurity,8(1983),
pp.3-51.
11ForthisstageofnavaltacticsseeforexampleG.H.U.Noel,TheGun,Ram,andTorpedo:Manoeuvresand
TacticsofaNavalBattleinthePresentDay(London,1874)andW.Bainbridge-Hoff,Examples,conclusions,and
maximsofModernNavalTactics(Washington,DC,1884).RammingwasstillconsideredanoptioninLtA.P.
Niblack,USN,‘TheTacticsofShipsintheLineofBattle’,USNIPrizeEssay,PUSNI,22(1896),pp.1-28.
Interestingly,AdmDovetonSturdee,bestknownforhissuccessattheFalklandIslands,claimedinhis1893
NavalPrizeEssaytohavebeenthefirstwriter,in1886,tohavedecisivelyrejectedtheram(CdrD.Sturdee,
‘TheTacticsBestAdaptedforDevelopingthePowerofExistingShipsandWeapons(Gun,Ram,andTorpedo)
WhichShouldRegulateFleets,GroupsandSingleVesselsinAction',1893,RoyalUnitedServicesInstitution
NavalPrizeEssay,inSDEE1/8,ChurchillArchiveCentre,Cambridge).
12Lautenschläger,Technology.
13Fiske,forexample,attributestheJapanesevictorymainlytosuperiortrainingandgunnery.BradleyA.Fiske,
‘WhyTogoWon’,PUSNI31(Dec.1905)807-809.
7
ships,wereconfirmedatTsushima.Beltandturretarmour,“cemented”(carbonized,andthus
hardened)ontheoutsidewhileremainingflexibleontheinside,waspenetrableonlybyhigh-
velocityarmour-piercingheavyshells.Finally,thesteamturbineofferedarevolutionaryand
superiornewformofpropulsion.
ThelaunchingofHMSDreadnoughtin1906thusrepresentedtheculminationofanerain
strategicandtacticalthinkingjustasitintroducedanewoneinwarshipdesign.Concentrationon
clustersofpowerful,quick-firingmaingunsinbattleshipssettledtheissuebetweenproponentsof
thissolutionandadvocatesofmixedmediumandlarge-calibrearmament,andthusbetweenshort
andlongrangeengagements,thoughthisacrimoniousdebatewouldreachapeakofintensitywith
thearrivalofthenewvessels.Therewasnolongeranyprospectofcapitalshipsdemolishingeach
otherwithnumeroussecondaryguns14orofclosingtowithinrammingdistanceofmodern
opponents,andtheneedforcloselycontrolledtacticalevolutionstobringaboutsuchasituation
wasalsogone.Buttherewasnowarangeoffreshproblems.Whatwasthenewlyoptimalcapital
ship,withwhatdisplacementandcombinationofarmour,propulsionandarmament?Andwhat
werethecorrecttacticsforsuchafleetinthisneweraofgunneryaccurateatincreasinglylong
ranges?
Atitssimplest,theSquareLawstatesthat,inattritionalcombatwithlong-rangeaimedweapons
againstwhichthereisnoeffectivedefence,theoutcomedependsonwhichsidepossessesthe
greater`fightingstrength’,definedtobetheweapons’individualeffectivenessmultipliedbythe
squareoftheirnumbers.15The20
thcenturyconventionwasthatthisprocessmustbedescribed
14Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,considerscarefullythescalingrelationbetweenmedium(6”)andlarge(12”)
calibreguns,concludingthatashiparmedwithmorenumerous6”gunsfireseighttimestheweightofshell,
butthat`ifthegunsaretoosmalltodestroy[theenemy’s]turretsandwater-line,thisenergyiswhollywasted’
(Fiske’semphasis).Thisisthecrucialpointonwhichthenewunderstandingsupersedesthatof,inparticular,
the1905battleofTsushima.
15TheSquareLaw,normallyexclusivelyattributedtoLanchester,isalsoclearlystatedinBaudry,TheNaval
Battle.
8
usingcalculus;LanchesterinBritain,OsipovinRussiaandChaseintheUSAdidthisindependently.16
ItsimplicationsfornavalwarfarearemostfullyexploredintheUSNIPrizeEssayof1905byFiske.17
Inkeepingwith20thcenturyusage,however,wewillcallthisbodyofthought‘Lanchestrian’.
Fiske’sessaycontainednocalculus,butrathermodelledbig-gunnavalcombatasaseriesof
discretesalvos,withtheimplicationsbeingdrawnfromasetoftables–nowadayswemightwellcall
them‘spreadsheets’–asopposedtoequations.Hisconclusionswerestark:thesidewiththegreater
numberofbiggunsbroughttobearwouldrealiseadisproportionateandacceleratingadvantage,
eventuallyannihilatingitsopponentwithafinalremainingforcemuchgreaterthantheinitial
imbalance.18Further,thesidewhichcouldbeginfiringfirstwouldenjoyafurtheradvantage,again
outofallproportiontonaïveexpectations,asworkedoutbyBaudryinanexampleinwhichhegives
onefleetamerefourminutes’initialunopposedfire.19
Complementingthiscalculus-basedinsightwasanother,basedongeometry.Incontrasttothe
Nelsonianera,thebiggunwaseffectiveatlongrangerelativetodistancestravelledbyshipson
16Lanchester,AircraftinWarfare;Osipov,‘Influence’;Chase,‘MathematicalInvestigation’.Thecruxofthe
squarelawisapointmadeinBaudry,TheNavalBattle.Iftwoshipsfightone,thennotonlydoestheloneship
receivedoubletherateoffire,butitsownfireisdivided.Thustheproportionalratesofattritionareinthe
ratio1:4,not1:2.Thefullimplicationofthisinstantaneoustruthonlyemergeswhenonesumsitseffectsover
thefullbattle.
17Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’.
18“Bigguns”heremeansthoseof11”calibreorgreater.Fiskenotesthatwhilesmallergunsmaybeableto
produce(throughnumberandrateoffire)agreateroverallweightoffire,thisisunproductiveiftheyare
unabletopenetratearmourordestroyturrets.AtJutland,theprobabilitythatabig-gunhitwoulddestroya
turretwassimilarforthetwoopposingforces,despitedifferencesincalibre.
19Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’.Thepointaboutinitialadvantage(Fiske,‘FightingMachine’,p291;Baudry,
TheNavalBattle,p116)waswellunderstoodbyJellicoe:forexample,intheGrandFleetBattleOrdersinforce
ontheeveofJutland,hestates‘Iattachthegreatestimportancetomakingfulluseofthefireofourheavier
gunsintheearlystagesatlongrange…[this]maygiveustheinitialadvantageingunfirewhichitisso
importanttoobtain’(JellicoePapers,vol.I,item226).SeealsoTheodoreC.Taylor,‘TacticalConcentrationand
Surprise─inTheory’,NavalWarCollegeReview38(1985),pp.41-51;andHughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheir
influenceonstrategy’.
9
battletimescales,sothatconcentratingweaponsnolongerrequiredmassingofships.20Instead
‘appliedgeometry’wasneeded,thefleetcommander’sgoalbeingtoarriveatageometrical
configurationinwhichallofhisbiggunscouldbeconcentratedonhisenemywhiledenyingenemy
attemptstodothereverse.ItisintheRoyalNavythatwefindthecaseputmoststrongly,with
ReginaldPlunkett-Drax,writingafterJutlandwhileonBeatty’sstaff,assertingthat:`Itis“Applied
Geometry"thatmustensureforusthecrushingeffecttobeobtainedbybringingallourforcesinto
actionatthesamemoment.Geometry...Geometry...Geometry...Theleaderofalargefleetshould
diligentlycultivateinhimselfa“geometricsense”’.21Wecanseehowthisdictationofcalculusby
geometryplayedoutatJutlandinFigure1,whichplots(onalogarithmicscale,overtime)theratio
ofBritishtoGermanbiggunsinaction.FortheBritish,Lanchestrianadvantageisachievedwhenthis
ratioismaximized(andviceversafortheGermans).
Thusthetacticalimperativewastousefleetgeometrytodictatecalculus,givingacogentreason,
beyondthefleetcommander’snaturaldesiretokeephisforceundercontrol,forasinglebattleline
ratherthandivisionaltactics.22Theconclusionisthatfleetor‘operational’tactics,asopposedto
20Indeed,‘themorewidelyseparatedthepointsfromwhichthefireoriginates,themoreeffectivetacticallyis
theconcentration,becausethemoredifficultitistocounter’(Capt.E.W.Harding,RMA,‘StudiesintheTheory
ofNavalTacticsIII’,NavalReview,4(1913),pp.208-222);‘inamodernfleetowingtothegreatdistanceat
whichthegunscandeveloptheirmaximumhittingcapacity…theprincipleofCONCENTRATIONcanbe
effectedbytheconvergenceoffirefromwidelydispersedpositions(R.Plunkett-Ernle-Erle-Drax,‘Noteson
GrandFleetBattleTactics’,16/12/1916(writtenforDavidBeatty),inDRAX1/18,ChurchillArchivecentre,
Cambridge).
21Drax,‘NotesonGrandFleetBattleTactics’,DRAX1/18;seealso‘GrandFleetBattletactics’,1/1/17,in
BTY/7/2,CairdLibrary,Greenwich).Inthelightofthis,hispublicassertionafterJutlandthat`whatwerequired
was…lessgeometryandmoreginger’isblatanthypocrisy(R.Plunkett-…-Drax,‘JutlandorTrafalgar?’,Naval
Review13(1925)238-243).Manypre-warauthorstreatnavaltacticsasageometricalproblem,forexample
Baudry,TheNavalBattle,andR.Bernotti,TheFundamentalsofNavalTactics(Annapolis,1912).Evenwhere
planegeometryisnotexplicitlytheparadigm,itslanguagepervadestacticalwritings(forexampleCapt.E.J.
W.Slade,‘BattleshipsandBattleshipTactics’,RoyalNavalWarCollegereportno.3,11/1906,inHTN/116/B,
CairdLibrary,Greenwich).
22ForthedevelopmentofthecontrastingtacticsseeMcLaughlin,Battlelines.Draxconsidersdivisionaltactics
inanessayforBeattyof9thAugust1917,heldinBTY/7/2,CairdLibrary,Greenwich.Hisgoverningprincipleis
concentration:henotesthatthebattle-lineprincipleof‘”fireatyouroppositenumber”[will]neglectpriceless
10
smaller-scaleshipordivisiontactics,becameakeydeterminantofsuccess.23Thesidewiththe
numericaladvantageinweaponswasguaranteedasuccessfuloutcomeifitcouldcreatethe
conditionsdescribedabove.Sothesedevelopmentsimpliedmoreorderlyfleetactionsthanhad
hithertobeenenvisaged.Difficultiesinsurprisinganopponentincreasedthelikelihoodthatwell-
matchedfleetswouldmeetbroadsidetobroadsidewiththeirentirestrengthincapitalships
deployedinlineofbattle.Insuchasituation,withgoodvisibilityandsufficienttimeforthe
engagementtobeconcluded,analmosttextbookemploymentofLanchester’sequationscouldbe
playedoutinwhichtheadvantagesofconcentrationcouldberealised.‘Symmetrical’conditionsof
thistype,inwhichneithersideenjoyedanadvantagebeyondsuperiorityinmateriel,wouldcertainly
endinthedestructionoftheweakerforce,atalesserabsolutecosttothelarger.Thethoughtfuland
well-readcommanderofthesuperiorforcewouldbeawareofthesubtlevariationsinachievement
oftheseconditions.Insuchcircumstancesafleetwhichknewitselftobeoutgunnedwouldrefuse
battle,anditsopponentwouldenjoytheeffectivefruitsofvictorywithouthavingtofight.Thepoint
isperhapsbestmadebyWayneHughes,who,quotingClausewitzon‘engagementsthatdidnottake
placebuthadmerelybeenoffered',notesthatthereisnodefenceinnavalwar,andthattheinferior
opportunitiesforconcentratedfireatanearertarget’.Butofcoursesuchconcentrationcanalsobeeffected
byabattleline.Anintermediatepossibilityistofightenechelon,asadvocatedinLtA.P.Niblack,‘Thetactics
ofshipsinthelineofbattle’,PUSNI,22(1896),pp.1-28:‘theadvantagewillalwaysbe[to]echelon,ifcorrectly
manoeuvredagainstafleetformedinline,[for]itis[then]difficulttodoubleuponanyofthem.YetBacon,a
staunchJellicoesupporter,wasabletowritethat`in1900attheWarCourseatGreenwichIusedtoworkthe
tacticalboard…againstallcomers,andnevercouldanyopponentsobtainatacticaladvantagebyassuming
anyotherformationthanlineahead'.AdmSirReginaldBacon,ANavalScrap-Book,1877-1906(London,1925).
Jellicoesimplysaysthat‘todividethefleetistocourtdisaster’.JellicoePapers,vol.1,item206.
23Thereisnoexplicitlyoperationalleveloftacticalthoughtinpre-FirstWorldWarwritingonnavalmatters.
OnehasthecalculusofFiske,Chase,BaudryandLanchester,andtheclearlygeometricalreasoningneededto
exploitit,but,aswesawabove,noclearconsensusaboutfleettacticshademerged.Foramodern
perspective,seeWayneP.Hughes,‘NavalOperations:acloselookattheoperationallevelofwaratsea’,Naval
WarCollegeReview,65(2012),pp.23-47.
11
forcealwaysloses(anddoessodisproportionatelybadly):‘[since]Scheerknewhisfleetwas
decisivelyinferior,therewasneverafighttothefinish'.24
Lanchester’sequationsenjoyedgreatpopularityamongmilitaryanalystsinthe20thcentury,when
theywereoftenusedtomodellandbattlesandcampaigns,albeitwithonlypartialsuccess.25But
landwarfarewasknowntobegreatlysubjecttothefogofwar,andthecommanderofinferior
forcescouldoftenhopetoengineerapartialvictorythroughwell-chosentacticsexploitingvariable
factorssuchasconcealmentofforces,superiorcommunicationsordifficultterrain.TheJutland-era
navalbattle,however,apparentlycarriedthemathematicalinevitabilityoftheSquareLaw.26This
waswellcapturedinthemilitarytheoristJ.F.C.Fuller’sassessmentofthenavaldefeatatCoronel:
`Cradock’s[ships]wenttothebottom,notthroughanactofGod,butthroughanactof
mathematicalcertainty’.27Theonlyhopeforanoutmatchedbattlefleetwastoengineerasituation
inwhichitcouldengageitswholeforceagainstadetachedandinferiorportionoftheenemy’s
24Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’.FortheGermanperspective,seeWegener,Naval
StrategyoftheWorldWar.Onthestronger,BritishsideSumidanotesadivisionofviewsbetweenwhathe
calls“agnosticopportunists”and“clandestinepre-empters”(includingJellicoe),withthelattertakingclearly
thepositionthatbattlemustonlybesoughtunderthecorrect,favourableconditions(J.T.Sumida,
‘Expectation,Adaptation,andResignation:BritishBattleFleetTacticalPlanning,August1914-April1916’,
NavalWarCollegeReview,60(2007),pp.101-122).
25ForabriefintroductionseeN.J.MacKay,‘Lanchestercombatmodels’,MathematicsToday,42(2006),pp.
170-173.Foranintroductiontomathematicalmodellinginthebroadsenseofilluminatingcoredynamics(as
opposedtodetailed,calibratedmodellingforpreciseprediction)seeJ.M.Epstein,‘Whymodel?’,Journalof
ArtificialSocietiesandSimulation11(2008)12.
26Atleastinfairweatherandintheabsenceofrealfog.Weknowoftwopublishedattemptstoapply
Fiske/LanchestermodelstoJutland.JosephCzarnecki,‘N-squaredlaw:Anexaminationofoneofthe
mathematicaltheoriesbehindtheDreadnoughtbattleship’,www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-076.htm,
accessed29June2012,usesFisketablesforfivecasesofsmallbattlesbetweenDreadnoughts,andconcludes
that‘Britainsawtheopportunitytostackthedeckandtookit.’ColinLyle,‘ANelsonianJutland?’,Journalofthe
RoyalUnitedServicesInstitute[JRUSI],140(1995),pp.56-60,invokesLanchester(butwithoutcrunchingthe
numbers)tosupporthisclaimthatamoreNelsoniancommanderwould‘eschewthetoo-unwieldysingleline’
andtherebyhaveexploitedthesquarelawtoachieveacrushingvictory–andisrebukedbyMaj.J.D.Harris,
lettertoJRUSI140(1995),p68,fornotconsideringJellicoe’sknowledgeofhistechnologicaldeficiencies.
Indeed,itcouldbeseenasoneoftheimplicationsofthepresentpaperthatitwastheGermanswhoneededa
NelsonforstrategicvictoryatJutland,nottheBritish.
27J.F.C.Fuller,TheFoundationsoftheScienceofWar(London,1926),ch.13,section8.
12
superiorfleet,butoneofsufficientsizetoguaranteeanoverallnumericalsuperiorityafterthisfirst
andlesservictory.ForGermanybeforethelaunchingofDreadnought,thisseemedaforlornhope
givenBritain’svastnumericalsuperiorityincapitalships.In1899theGermanAdmiraltystaffnoted
anadverseratioincapitalshipsof22:8or2.75:1.Inearly1904theratioforthewinterof1904-5
wasexpectedtobe61:26or2.35:1.28
Insuchconditionsofbattlefleetinferioritytheriskfleetconceptcouldonlyfunctionincertain
circumstances.FormanyyearsitwasassumedthattheBritishwouldattacktheGermancoast,and
attritionoftheRoyalNavybycoastaldefenceswashopedfor.Thisscenarioenvisagedcoastal
artillery,minesandtorpedoesinflictingdeeplossesontheRoyalNavywhiletheGermanbattlefleet
washeldinreserveforacoupdegrâceonceKraftausgleichhadbeenachieved.TheultimateBritish
decisionforadistantblockaderestingonthefleetbasedatScapaFlowintheOrkneysnullifiedsuch
thinking.Jellicoewasalsoacutelyconsciousofthedangerofhisshipssufferingunderwaterdamage
closetotheGermancoastorforthatmatterinafleetaction,29thoughperhapsnotquitetosuchan
extentthathis‘sleepnessnightswerevisitedbyafearfularrayofunderwaterweapons’.30The
GermanswouldthusbeforcedtodeploytheirfleetwellintotheNorthSeatoalterthestrategic
situationrelativetotheRoyalNavy.
ItwasalsoassumedthatthesacrificeoftheGermanfleetwouldweakentheBritishunacceptably
inthecontextofasubsequentstrugglewithathirdpower,aprospectwhichmightdeterBritish
navalattackandmakeLondonpoliticallymoreamenableinpeacetime.ThepossibilityofBritain
beingdeterredbypotentiallossesagainstGermanyinthefaceofotherhostilepowersalsofaded,
however,astheBritishengagedinablizzardofeffectivediplomaticactivitytowootraditionalrivals,
aidedunconsciouslybytheKaiserreichitself.TheaggressiveGermanposturethatproducedthe
28Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.34.
29See,forexample,Jellicoe’smemorandumof12/4/16totheFirstSeaLord.JellicoePapers,vol.1,item213.
30Gordon,TheRulesoftheGame,pp.466-7.
13
navalchallengetoBritainwasreplicatedinotherareasanddrewherpotentialenemiescloser
together.TheTripleEntenteneutralised,atleastforthepresent,potentialnavalrivalrybetween
Britain,RussiaandFrance,andthisfactorcoupledwiththeAnglo-JapaneseallianceandBritish
appeasementofUSinterestsinthewesternhemisphereenabledarapidandneartotal
concentrationofBritishcapitalshipsintheNorthSea.ThisdisastrousoutcomeforGermany
worsenedtheLanchestrianarithmeticfortheHighSeasFleetandremoved,fortheforeseeable
future,anotherpillaroftheriskfleet’sintellectualfoundations.
II
ThelogicofLanchestrianmodellinghadprofoundimplicationsfornationalpolicybeforeWorldWar
One.ItswiftlybecameapparentthatDreadnoughtpresentedalevelplayingfieldbyrendering
Britain’spreviousoverwhelmingnumericaladvantageincapitalshipsnullandvoid,butitislesswell
rememberedthatdecisionsonfuturebuildingprogrammessuddenlycarriedanincreasedand
enormousweightofresponsibility.Germany’sriskfleetideawasinstantlymorecredible,thoughthe
pointwasmorequicklygraspedinBritainthaninGermany.Thebuildingofdreadnoughts‘was
imitatedbytheGermans’ascriticsofthetypeinBritainfeared,althoughinGermaneyesit‘stilldid
notovercomethesuperiorityoftheRoyalNavy,onlynarrowingitsomewhat’.31
Insquare-lawtermsanarrownumericalinferioritywasnomorecauseforoptimismthanalarge
oneinaclashoffullfleetsandtheKaiser’snavywasunlikelytomatchmassiveBritishbuilding
capacityintheshortterm,especiallygiventhecallonresourcescommandedbythearmy.
31Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.44.
14
Nevertheless,thepossibilityofdividinganddefeatingtheRoyalNavyintheLanchestrianmanner
byconstructingasufficientlylargeforceofdreadnoughtsandsettingtrapsforadetachedpartofthe
GrandFleetremained,andtheBritishhadanabsoluteneedtocreateandmaintainamarginof
superioritysufficienttoprecludeanyprospectofaclashoffullbattlefleetsandwhichcouldsurvive
attritionthroughmines,submarineattackoraccident.TheGermansbegantoperceivethe
possibilityofadistantBritishblockadeintheNorthSeathroughtheiranalysisofRoyalNavy
manoeuvres,particularlythoseof1912,andrealisedthatsuchadeploymentwouldleavetheBritish
EastCoastuncovered.ItwouldalsobeverydifficultforBritishlightforcestotrackGermansorties;
destroyersweretoofewinnumbertoscreentheNorthSeaatdistancefromtheGermancoastand
submarineslackedthecommunicationrangetoreportmovement.Aggressiveactiontowardthe
BritishcoastmightwellresultinafleetactiononGermany’stermsastheGrandFleetmovedsouth
tomeetsuchaGermanattack.Thislineofthinking‘paintedafuturefortheGermannavalwarthat
wasinnorespectsbleak’.32
TheGermansretreatedfromsuchaggressivepossibilitiesaftertheirmanoeuvresof1913-14,
however.Amongreasonsforthiswere‘fearoftheunknown’33andthefactthat‘Germanexperience
offleetoperationsatanydistancefromtheGermancoastwaslimited’.34Ultimately,theHighSeas
Fleet‘existedverymuchwithinacoastaldefencemindset’:35thepatternofGermanactionpursued
atJutlandandonotheroccasionsbeforeandafterhadbeenset.Nevertheless,possibilitieshadbeen
revealedthatmoreforwardleadershipcouldexploit.
32Nägler,‘OperationalandStrategicPlans’,p.50.
33JamesGoldrick,BeforeJutland:TheNavalWarinNorthernEuropeanWaters,August1914-February1915
(Annapolis,2015)p.73.
34Goldrick,BeforeJutland,p.71.
35Goldrick,BeforeJutland.
15
ItwasalsotruethattheSquareLawwasscalable,sotherewasatheoreticalpossibilityofan
outnumberedfleetbreakinguptheenemylineandcreatingalocalsuperioritywithinthebattleat
thelevelofsquadronsanddivisions.ThishadaNelsonianring,anddivisionaltacticswerethus
dangerouslyappealingtosomeinthenumericallydominantRoyalNavy.IntheDreadnoughtage,
however,suchasituationwouldrepresentGermany’sbesthopeofsuccessinfleetaction.36
Jellicoe’sinsistenceondeployingtheGrandFleetinbattleasasingleforceunderhispersonal
commandsothat‘Inallcasestherulingprincipleisthatthefleetasawholekeepstogether’37
seemedtoprecludethedangerofhisfleetbeingsubdividedintopotentiallyoutnumbered
components,butafter1906theBritishinvestmentinthenewideaofthebattlecruiserwouldchange
thissituationandmakeadangerousdivisionalclashmorelikely.
Thefirstbattlecruiser,HMSInvincible,resembledDreadnoughtbutwasmuchfaster,speedbeing
gainedattheexpenseofarmouredprotectionandthuswithnocompromiseingunpower.Sucha
vesselcouldoverwhelmanysmalleropponentandeasilyescapeanordinarydreadnought.The
battlecruiserconceptwasappealingtoaNavywithglobalpolicingresponsibilities,buttheships
wouldalsobeexpectedtoperformreconnaissanceforthefleet.Inthelightofthis,andingrave
tensionwiththeirdesignpurposeashuntersofoceanraiders,theybecameexpectedtojointheline
ofbattleaftertheirreconnaissancemissionwascompletedinafleetaction.Regardlessofthe
capabilitiesoftheshipsthiscreateddangerfortheRoyalNavyinanumberofways.First,theidea
receivedheavyinvestment:by1916,tenbattlecruiserswereinservice.Theywerebasedseparately
36ThebeliefthattheBritishwouldhavebenefitedfromamoremanoeuvre-based,Nelsonianapproachechoed
throughtheinter-waryears.CdrRussellGrenfell,TheArtoftheAdmiral(London,1937),basedonhislectures
attheRoyalNavalStaffCollege,Greenwich;CaptainRichard,FrenchNavy,‘JutlandandthePrinciplesofWar’,
trans.fromRevueMaritimeinJRUSI,67no.465(1922),pp.128-139.Nooneseemstohaveunderstoodthe
randomizingeffectofthemeleeontheLanchestriancertaintyofthebattleline,whichwequantifylater.
37Gordon,TheRulesoftheGame,p.397.
16
fromthebattleshipsoftheGrandFleetandofficiallyandmisleadinglydescribedastheBattleCruiser
Fleet[BCF].AstheGermanswereaware,thismeantthatnearlyathirdoftheRoyalNavy’scapital
shipgunpowerwasseatedinvesselswhichmustsailseparatelyfromtheirbaseatRosythto
rendezvouswiththeGrandFleetbeforeacontinuouslineofbattlecouldbeformed,andwhich
wouldactuallyseekouttheGermanfleetseparatelybeforesuchaunioncouldbeestablished.The
CommanderoftheBCF,RearAdmiralSirDavidBeatty,wasalsoknowntobeanaggressivefigure,
keentoassertindependentleadershipandwho‘wantedtograspthebigpictureandseehisrolein
thelargercontext’.38FromtheGermanperspectivehewas,inthecontextoftheirplans,theideal
opponent.
Thedecisiontocompromiseinarmourratherthanfirepowerorspeedalsohadobviousdangers,
thoughtherewerecountervailingadvantages.Aspartoftheline,Britishbattlecruiserscould
contributeeffectivelytoafleetengagementwiththeirheavyarmamentwhiletheriskcreatedby
theirlighterarmourwouldbemitigatedbytheGermanneedtodividetheirfireagainstthemore
numerousBritishfleet.Intheirreconnaissancerole,however,numericalsuperiorityfortheBCFwas
notguaranteed,andherethethinarmourofthevesselswasespeciallydangerous.Beatty’srolewas
toforcehiswaythroughanenemyscreenofsimilarvesselsandfindtheenemybattlefleet.The
perceivedneedtogetinclosewouldnullifytheadvantageofhisheaviergunsrelativetomorelightly
armedbutmoreheavilyarmouredGermanbattlecruisersandexposehislighterarmour.Therewas
alsoanincreasedprospectofmeleesituationsdevelopinginwhichtheBritishbattlecruisersmight
suddenlyfaceagraveLanchestriandisadavantage.
ButthisdoesnotnecessarilyimplythatBritishtechnologyorattitudetotechnologywasatfault.
Indeed,InvinciblerepresentedadvancedthinkingthattheGermansattemptedtocopybeforethe
truenatureoftheBritishvesselwasrevealed.Germanknowledgeofherconfigurationwas
38AndrewLambert,Admirals:TheNavalCommanderswhoMadeBritainGreat(London,2008),p.363.
17
necessarilylimited.Tirpitzthereforepursuedadesigninlinewithhisownprioritiesforavesselof
limitedcostthatcouldnotbeequatedwithabattleshipsoasnottothreatenhiscampaigntogain
fundsforthenewdreadnoughtsintheReichstag39.ThusthelaterBlücherwasconceptuallyprimitive
andnomatchfortheBritishvessel.ThefirsttrueGermanbattlecruiser,VonderTann,wassuperior
toInvincibleinallrespectsexceptarmament,butitofferednodesigninnovationandreflected
thinkingtheBritishhadundertakenwhentheDreadnoughtconceptwasnew.WhenVonderTann
waslaunchedinMarch1910,nearlythreeyearsafterInvincible,threeBritishbattlecruiserswere
alreadyinserviceandthemuchlargerandmoreheavilyarmedLionwouldbelaiddownin
Novemberofthatyearandlaunchedtenmonthslater.
TheBritishdilemmawasineffectthebasiceconomicproblemofpossessinglimitedresourcesto
satisfyunlimitedwants,whichwasconstantlyintensionwithFisher’sdesirethatBritainleadthe
navalarmsraceonallmeasures.Dreadnoughtbattleshipswerethesinglemostexpensiveand
technologicallyadvanceditemsthatastatecouldpurchase,andoncedecisionshadbeenmade
mistakescouldnotberedeemed.Havingdecidedonall-big-gunships,adecisionhadthentobe
madeaboutthetrade-offbetweennumberandquality,aquestiontowhichLanchestrianthinking
hadaclearanswer,withfightingstrengthgivenbyqualityofunitsmultipliedbythesquareoftheir
numbers.TheAdmiraltywaswellawareofthegraveissuesithadtoconsiderandin1906,whilethe
implicationsofthenewDreadnoughtdesignwerebeingexplored,40acommitteewasformedunder
thechairmanshipofCaptainC.L.Ottley,theDirectorofNavalIntelligence,comprisingtechnical
expertsincludingJellicoe.41Itwasinvitedtoconsider,amongothermatters,theintroductionofa
39ThecontentionthataBritishdisinformationcampaigndisguisingInvincible’sradicaldesignwasbelieved,
hasbeendisputed.NormanFriedman,FightingtheGreatWaratSea:StrategyTacticsandTechnology
(Barnsley,2014)pp.198-199.
40SuchanalysiswasalreadyunderwayevenbeforeDreadnought’sseatrialshadbegun(‘HMShips
DreadnoughtandInvincible’,24thMay1906,AL252/4/8,ALHRB).
41Thisisusuallyknownasthe‘FusionCommittee’,althoughthebattlecruiser/battleshipfusionwasoneof
threemattersthecommitteewasformedtoconsider.ItcomprisedC.R.Ottley(DirectorofNavalIntelligence,
18
‘fusion’classofcapitalshipcombiningthepowerandprotectionofthedreadnoughtbattleshipand
thespeedofthebattlecruiser(stillreferredtoasan‘armouredcruiser’bythecommittee).This
wouldineffectbeafastbattleshipwithheavyarmour,powerfularmamentandgreatspeed.Sucha
vesselwoulddominatefutureengagementsbetweendreadnoughts,butitspreciseconfiguration,
beyondsuperiorityoverallexistingdesigns,wasstillamatterofconjecture.Theonecertaintywas
thatitwouldbeveryexpensiverelativetoexistingdreadnoughts.Thecommitteebelievedthatif
Britain’snewvesselsweretobe‘ofthe“Fusion”class,forthesameexpenditurewecanbuildonly
threeasagainstfour“Dreadnoughts”…andthereforein1909weshallhaveonlyabarenumerical
superiorityoverGermanyinnewArmouredVessels.’42
Thiswasunacceptable,especiallyasGermany’sresponse‘shouldbeandprobablywouldbe’to
buildsimilarvesselsemphasizinggreatergunpowerattheexpenseof‘speedorcoalendurance’.
TheBritishfleetwouldthusfaceasituationinwhich‘ourshipsaredecidedlyinferiortotheirsin
gunfire’.IntermsoftheSquareLawthismeantdoom,andthecommitteewasclearthat‘speed,
thoughdesirable,cannotbeassessedatsohighavalueasasuperiornumberofguns’.The
committeeagreedthatthefusionconcepthadmerit,asadivisionofsuchvessels‘wouldbeofgreat
value,owingtotheirgreatspeedallowingthemtobeusedasafast“FlankingDivision”’forthe
battlefleet’.Itwasargued,however,that‘thisfunctionisnon-existentuntilwehaveasufficient
superiorityinmodernArmouredVesselsoverothercountries’.Interestingly,thissuperioritywas
interpreted,incloseconformitywithLanchester,strictlyintermsofbig-gunfirepowerratherthan
numberofships.Thecommitteeconcluded‘thatitshouldbeourfirstaimtoaddgun-firetoour
inthechair),J.R.Jellicoe(DirectorofNavalOrdnance),R.H.S.Bacon,C.Madden,S.Nicholson,H.Jones,H.
Orpen,T.E.CreaseandGrahamGreene.InNavalNecessitiesIV,heldbyALHRB,Portsmouth.
42TheFusionCommittee’sreportisheldas‘II-FusionDesignofArmouredDesign’(sic),inreportofNavy
EstimatesCommittee,1906-7,AL253/28,AdmiraltyLibraryNavalHistoricalBranch,Portsmouth[ALHRB].
19
Fleetbeforemovinginthedirectionofgreatlyincreasedspeed,andthattheproposed“Fusion”
shipsare,forthemoment,premature’.43
Amomentousdecisionwasthustakennottoconstructsuchvesselsuntilasufficientquantityof
lesscapablecapitalshipshadbeencreatedtomakethefusionvessels’appearancedecisive.This
resolutionwasacceptedbytheAdmiralty,thoughitrancountertotheexpectationsofFisherwhen
asFirstSeaLordwhenheestablishedtheFusionCommittee.44Indeed,thedecisionwasaclear
checktoFisher’sprogrammeofconstant,‘plunging’innovation,andconstitutedanexemplarycase
ofprofessionalpolicyformulationanddecision-makingbyalearningorganisation.45Thedecisionto
postponethe‘fusion’shipswasprescientinbothtechnicalandstrategicterms.In1906,thepaceof
developmentwassuchthattheCommittee’sideaofafusionship,involvingwingturretsandthe
new13.5”gun,wouldresemblethefirstsuper-dreadnoughtsoftheOrionclass,andthoughcapable
thesevesselswouldhavebeendatedby1914.Waitingforthemwouldhaveservedlittletechnical
purposeandresultedinamoreexpensiveandthussmallerfleetwhenwarbrokeout.Itcouldeven
43FusionCommitteereport.
44AtthemeetingoftheSeaLordswhichinstigatedtheFusionCommittee,itwasstatedthat‘Itwasdesiredto
bringaboutafusionofthetwodesigns’(i.e.battleshipsandbattlecruisers)‘bynextyear;itseemedpossible
forthistobedone,anditwouldbeagreatassistanceifthecommitteewouldlookintothismatter.’InNaval
NecessitiesIV.
45InthiswedisagreewithAngusK.Ross,FourlessonsthattheUSNavymustlearnfromthe'Dreadnought'
revolution,NavalCollegeWarReview63no.4(2010),pp.119-143,whicharguesthatFisherwantedan
innovativerevolutionandtheFusionCommitteethwartedthis.Rossconsidersthisoutcometobefailure,and
thelesson(forthe21stcenturyUSNavy)theimportanceofbeinga'learningorganization'.Weinsteadclaim
thattheFusionCommittee'spositionwasaconscious,technocraticdecisionwhichguaranteedBritishnaval
supremacythroughbig-gunfirepower.TheRoyalNavy’squalitiesasalearningorganizationaredemonstrated
throughoutthearchivematerialoftheperiod.Forexample,in‘TheBuildingProgrammeoftheBritishNavy:
ThelessonsoftheRusso-Japanesewarintheirapplicationtotheprogrammeofarmoured-shipbuildingof
Britain,Germany,andFrance’(AL252/3/8,15thFebruary1906,ALHRB)wefindabalancedandthorough
analysisofFrench,ItalianandUScommentaryonTsushima(thewriterisclearlyanattentivereaderofPUSNI).
Similarly‘AdmiraltyPolicy:Repliestocriticism’(AL252/5/8,15thOctober1906,ALHRB)isathoroughand
balanced140-pageresponsetocriticismoftheDreadnoughtconcept.
20
havecreatedfortheGermansawindowofopportunityduringthefirstfewmonthsofthewar
duringwhichtheymighthaveachievedparityorevenasmalladvantageinbig-gunfire.46
Thedesignoftheactualfusionships,theQueenElizabethClass,wasnotfinaliseduntil1912.Their
newconfiguration,witheightnew15’’gunsofunprecedentedpowerinfourturrets,ratherthanten
13.5’’weaponsinfive,providedgreaterfirepowerandasavinginweightwhichwastranslatedinto
bothheavierarmourandnearlytwicethepropulsivepowerofthepreviousclassofsuper-
dreadnoughts.Theyalsopromisedtomakeredundanttheconceptofconstructingseparate
battleshipsandbattlecruisers,asthenewvesselswereexpectedtoperformbothrolescapably.Even
atthisstage,however,technicalcapabilityfellslightlyshortofthetruefastbattleship,andthe
battlecruisersurvived.ThetopspeedoftheQueenElizabethclassfellbetweenthemaximaof
typicalbattleshipsandbattlecruisers,andtheapparentsuccessofbattlecruisersintheearlyclashes
attheFalklandIslandsandHeligolandBightcoupledwiththereturnofFisherasFirstSeaLord
shortlyaftertheoutbreakofwarledtothecommissioningoftwonewvesselsofthetype,Renown
andRepulse.IndeedRepulsereplacedabattleshipofthesamenameoftheRoyalSovereignclass
alreadyintheearlystagesofconstruction,thecontractforwhichwascancelled.47TheRoyal
Sovereignclassvesselsthemselves,thoughsucceedingtheQueenElizabeths,alsorevertedtothe
lowerspeedofexistingbattleships.
Despitewartimereversiontothebattlecruiserconcept,thenewQueenElizabethsasfusionships
wereagenuineadvanceontheoriginalDreadnoughtdesignand,likeDreadnought,outclassedall
46AfascinatingepisodeinthedevelopmentoftheseideasistheSimsvsMahancontroversyintheUSA,which
pitchedtheUSInspectorofTargetPracticeagainstthegreatnavalhistorianMahaninthepagesofPUSNI.Sims
madetellingargumentsinfavourofall-big-gunships,buttheinterestforourpurposesisintheUS-UK
interchangeofideas.Sims’paperforRoosevelt,‘BigBattleshipsofHighSpeed’,wassentinconfidenceto
Fisheron3rdNovember2007(beforeRoosevelt’sJanuary1907speechtocongressonthetopic),andformsthe
basisoftheargumentoftheDirectorofNavalIntelligenceC.L.Ottley’s‘TheStrategicAspectsofOurBuilding
Programme,1907’(AL253/68,ALHRB),senttotheKing’sprivatesecretary.Simsrestatedhisargumentin‘The
TacticalQualitiesoftheDreadnoughtTypeofBattleship’,Brassey’sNavalAnnual1907,pp.391-409.
47I.Johnston,ClydebankBattlecruisers(Barnsley,2011),p.92.
21
previousvesselsafloatwhentheyenteredservice.Theten15”shipsofthisandthesimilarly-
configuredbutslowerandmoreheavilyarmouredRoyalSovereignclassdidnotjointhefleetuntil
aftertheoutbreakofwar.Theirarrival,however,addedmassivelytothegunpoweroftheexisting
GrandFleet,transformedwhatforJellicoewasaworryinglynarrowmarginofsuperiorityintoa
decisiveadvantage,andremovedanyprospectofaGermanchallengetothefullGrandFleet.Only
twocomparablevesselsoftheGermanBayernclasswerecompleted.
Inadoptingaquantitativeapproachtotheirsituation,theBritishhadimplicitlytakenaviewona
mathematicalissue,ofwhatistheunitofoffensiveanddefensiveforceconcentration.Asimplistic
viewwouldassertthatthiswasthecapitalship,butinLanchestrianwardestructioniswroughtin
proportiontothenumberofeffectiveweapons,biggunsinthecontextof1916.48TheBritishhad
thusdeterminedtoplacegunsonthewaterasquicklyaspossible.Bythetimethelastshipofthe
fourNassauclassvesselswascommissionedinMay1910,theRoyalNavyhadcommissionedseven
dreadnoughtbattleshipsandthreebattlecruisers.Thevalueofthisapproachbecamestillmore
apparentwhenthecharacteristicsoftheNassauclassbecameknown.Despitetheirheavyarmour
andhighbuildqualitytheGermanvesselswere,aswithBlücher,backwardinimportantrespects.
TheNassaushadobsoletereciprocatingenginesratherthantheturbinesofallBritishdreadnoughts.
ThevesselscarriedanimposingtwelvegunscomparedtothestandardBritishten,buthadfour
wingturrets,twooneachsideofthevessel,whichcouldnotfireacrossdeck.Thusonlyeightguns
couldbefiredinbroadsideandathirdoftheships’firepowerwaswasted.Thegunswereof11”
calibre,whentheBritishwerealreadymovingto13.5”allalongthecentreline.
48Thebeliefthattheshipistheunitcanleadtoviewssuchas‘seabattlesbasedon[bigguns]wereboundto
beindecisivebecauseheavygunshardlyeversankships’(R.GarciayRobertson,‘Failureoftheheavygunat
sea,1898-1922’,TechnologyandCulture,28(1987),pp.539-557).Incontrastwearguenotonlythatsuch
battlescanbewon,bydestroyingturrets,butthatLanchestriancertaintyofoutcomecanleadtostrategic
victoryafterinconclusivefighting.
22
Ashipwithitsmainarmamentunabletobearinbroadside,orcompletelywreckedinbattle,
contributesnothingintheLanchesterequationsexcepttotheextenttowhichitdeflectsfireaway
fromstill-activeships.Theunit,rather,isthesetofweaponswhichstandsandfallstogether.Fiske
reachedtheunambiguous,definitiveconclusionthattheappropriateunitwasthebig-gunturret,
andthisviewremainspersuasive.49GermanturretsenjoyednospecialadvantageoverBritishin
termsofprotectionandwerenolesslikelytobedisabledordestroyedinaction.50Theyalso
containedgunsoflessercalibrethantheirBritishopponents,thoughthisdeficiencywouldtellonly
atlongranges,giventhegreateraccuracyofthesmallerGermangunsandthelimitedeffectiveness
ofBritishshellsbefore1916.Fromthisperspective,thatofabattleofgunturrets,theBritish
advantageingunpowerfullyjustifiedpre-warpolicyiftheirweaponswereemployedtofulleffect.
However,iftheexplosionsontheBritishbattlecruisersrepresentedagenericfaultinRoyalNavy
dreadnoughtdesign,sothatthedestructionofaturretentailedthedestructionoftheship,thenthe
wholeshipwouldhavetobeconsideredtherelevantunitofmass,withradicaleffectsonthe
LanchestrianbalanceinGermany’sfavour.51
AcomplicatingfactorinaddressingthisissueisagaintheseparatecommandoftheGrandFleet
underJellicoeandtheBCFunderBeatty.Thelatter’saggressivestyleofcommandhasbeen
identifiedbysomeashavinganeffectonthevulnerabilityofhisvessels,bothinthemanneroftheir
deploymentandintheirgunnerytrainingandtheprocedurestheyemployedinaction.Jellicoe,by
contrast,hasbeencharacterisedbyhiscriticsasacautioustechnocrat,lackingthefightingspirit
49‘each[big-gun]turretwithitsgunsshouldberegardedasaunit.Thereseemstobenoescapewhatever
fromtheconclusionthatweshouldrecognizethecombinationasourunitofoffensiveanddefensivepower...'
(Fiske’sitalics),Fiske,‘AmericanNavalPolicy’,p.28.
50J.Campbell,Jutland:ananalysisofthefighting(London,1986).
51ForarecenttreatmentseeN.A.Lambert,‘‘OurBloodyShips'or‘OurBloodySystem'?Jutlandandthelossof
thebattlecruisers,1916’,JournalofMilitaryHistory,62(1998),pp.29-55.
23
necessaryinafleetcommander.TheAdmiralty’sassiduouspre-warplanningtoprovideafleet
suitableforwarwasthusatthemercyofthoseemployedtouseit.52
III
HavingbuiltafleetcalculatedtoguaranteestrategicvictoryunderLanchestrianconditions,itthen
becameessentialtoasuccessfuloutcomethatthisfleetbecommandedsoastobringsuch
conditionsabout.ThecontrastbetweenJellicoe,commanderin1916oftheGrandFleet,andBeatty,
commanderoftheBCF,wasinmanywaysrepresentativeoftheirintellectualenvironment.The
impactofnewtechnologyandnewthinkingcreatedafastmovingdebateinwhichaconsiderable
degreeoferuditionwasrequiredtokeepup.53Jellicoewasjustsuchatechnocrat,andmadeithis
businesstokeepabreastofdevelopmentsandexploretheirimplications.Beattyrepresentedthe
oppositeendofthespectrum.Self-consciouslyNelsonian,heinterpretedthistraditionintermsof
aggressive,thrustingleadershipandanoverridingrequirementtoclosewiththeenemyandimpose
hiswill.Beattydidnotconsiderhisstyleofleadershiptobeunintelligentorignorant,andhis
reflectiveprofessionalismhasbeennoted.54Hewas,however,overtlyanti-intellectualandwasnot
aloneinsobeing.HMSDreadnoughtattractedthehostilityofthisfaction,whichdidnotacceptthe
52Awide-rangingrecentsourceisJamesA.Yates,TheJutlandControversy:Acasestudyinintra-servicepolitics,
withparticularreferencetothepresentationoftheBattlecruiserFleet'straining,conductandcommand,PhD
thesis,UniversityofHull,1998.
53IntheRoyalNavy,acentralfigureintheDreadnought-erainvestigationofship(asopposedtofleet)tacticsis
AdmiralSirWilliamMay,commanderoftheHomeFleet1909-11and(whileC-in-CatPlymouth)umpireofits
exercisesin1912-13.PapersinMAY/10,CairdLibrary,Greenwich,showdetailedunderstandingofhowbig
gunsandincreasingrangesemphasizetheimportanceofplotting,spottingandratechange.Thiscanbe
contrastedwiththewritingsofold-schoolerssuchasAdmSirCyprianBridge,TheArtofNavalWarfare:
introductoryobservations(London,1907),orAdmSirR.N.Custance(writinganonymouslyas‘Barfleur'),Naval
Policy:apleaforthestudyofwar(London,1907),whostressestheneedforconcentration,butfailsto
understandthatthelongrangeofbiggunschangesthewaythisisbestachieved.
54Lambert,Admirals,p.346.
24
suddenstrategicandtacticalshiftsitnecessitated.Jellicoethusrepresentedanewanduntested
rationality,andinhiscommandrolefacedtheadditionalburdenthathishardthinkingaboutthe
fleetactionofthefuturewouldbecontestedandinsomepowerfulquartersdisregarded.
Jellicoe’swritingsbeforeJutlandmakeclearhiscarefulconsiderationofthetacticsnecessaryto
bringaboutLanchestrianvictory.Hiscommitmenttoanundividedfleethasalreadybeennoted.
Despitehiswell-knownapprehensionsconcerningthedangerposedbytorpedoes,heintendedto
openfireatmediumtolongrangesandcontinuedoingsoforseveralminutesevenafterheknew
thattorpedoeshadbeenlaunchedagainsthim,takingadvantageoftheirslowrunningtocreatethe
crucialfewminutesofunopposedfirebeforeevasiveactionbecamenecessary.55Healso
appreciatedthatlongrangesandhighspeedsmadefullcontrolofhisfleetessential,bothto
engineerLanchestrianconditionsofforceconcentration,andtoextricatethefleetintactfroman
55Sumida,in‘AMatterofTiming’and‘Expectation’,believesthatJellicoesoughtamedium-rangebattle,while
Seligmann,‘AGermanpreference?’,contendsthatJellicoewaswellawareoftheGermanexcellenceatlong-
rangeshootingandsoughttomatchit.Ofcourseimprovementingunnerywasrapid,andJellicoewouldhave
wellunderstoodthatneithersidecouldexpecttohaveperfectknowledgeoftheother’sstateofdevelopment.
Hisviewsthereforehadtobefluid.Heclearlyunderstoodtheimportanceofopeningfireatthelongest
possiblerangesasearlyas1906:‘Thefunctionofartilleryisnotonlytodestroytheenemy...butalsoto
preventthedevelopmentofhispowerbydoingsoatrangesatwhichheisunabletomakeaneffectivereply
[Jellicoe'semphasis].…Itiscurioustonotethatalthoughthisfacthasbeenlongrecognisedinshorefighting...
ithasneveruntilrecentlybeensufficientlyrecognizedinnavalwarfare....Therecentdevelopmentofthe
prospectofhittingfrequentlyatlongrangesistheall-importantfact...'(Jellicoe,‘ConsiderationsoftheDesign
ofaBattleship’,AL252/4/8,ALHRB).DuringthewarwemaynotethesubtleshiftbetweenAugust1914,when
hewrotethat‘deploymentatlongrangemaygiveustheinitialadvantageingunfireitissoimportantto
obtain,buttherecanbenodoubtthatwemustgraduallyclosetherangetoobtaindecisiveresults’
(AddendumtoGrandFleetBattleInstructions,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item38),andMay1916,whichhas‘I
attachthegreatestimportancetomakingfulluseofthefireofourheaviergunsintheearlystagesatlong
range…therangeshouldbebetween15,000and10,000yards,thelatterbeingreachedastheenemy’sfireis
overcome;intheearlystagesofanactionIdonotdesiretoclosetherangemuchinside14,000yards’(Grand
FleetBattleOrders,JellicoePapers,vol.1,item225).Hisgoverningprinciple–naturallyenough,andperfectly
thatofFiske,BaudryandLanchester–wasthat‘oursystemmustbethatwhich…willenablethehighestrate
ofaccuratefire’(Jellicoe,18/1/15,`Remarksontheuseofdirectorfiringfromthemainarmament',heldin
ADM137/1995,NationalArchives,Kew,andcitedinSumida,‘Expectation’).
25
engagementwithoutdangerofdefeatindetail.56Asnotedearlier,concentrationoffirenow
requirednotmassingofshipsbutratherfleetdispositionswhichguaranteedconcentrationof
gunfire,averydifferentpropositionwhichmadeaNelsonianemphasisonthegrantingofgreat
latitudetosubordinates,nowknownas‘missioncommand’,peculiarlyinappropriate.
Indeed,theincreasedcertaintyofgeometricfirepowerconcentrationovermeleetacticscanbe
quantified.Wenotedearlierthatsymmetricrandomfragmentationoftheopposingfleetsinan
otherwise-deterministicLanchestrianbattlehastheeffectofrandomizingtheoutcome.For
example,splittingeachfleetintotwo(uniformlydistributed)randomfragments,whileitdoesnot
changetheaverageoutcome,hastheeffectofinjectingrandomnessequivalenttoastandard
deviation(i.e.typicalvariation)intheratioofthefleets’numbersof16%,andtherebyatypical
variationinsquare-lawfightingstrengthsof36%.Putsimply,allowingsuchdivisioncreatesahigh
degreeofrandomness,whichcaneasilyoverturnthecertaintyofaLanchestrianadvantage.Attheir
simplest,thetacticalimperativesfacingJellicoeandScheerare,assooften,bestcapturedby
Hughes:‘Amajorpartofskillandexpertiseisrecognizingandavoidingsituationsdominatedby
uncertaintywhensuperior,andcreatingopportunitiesforuncertaintyfortheenemywhen
inferior.’57ForJellicoe,ameleewouldhaverandomisedhisperfectLanchestrianbattle.ForScheer,
ameleeagainstpartoftheGrandFleetmighthavebeenideal.
Jellicoethereforefacedatensionbetweensomedegreeofcertaintyaboutthecorrecttacticsfor
employinghisbigguns,alongsidegreatuncertaintyaboutboththeireffectivenessandthepossible
56SeeGoldrick,BeforeJutland.Historianswhohaveservedasnavalofficerstendtoplacegreateremphasison
acommander’sremaininginfullcontrolofhisfleetthandocivilianhistorians(WayneHughes,private
communication).
57WayneP.Hughes,‘UncertaintyinCombat’,MilitaryOperationsResearch,1(1994),pp.45-57.Drax’sessay
inBTY/7/2,notedabove,remainsequivocalondivisionaltactics.HeunderstandsFiske’sprinciplethat
‘concentrationrequiresisolation’(Fiske,FightingMachine,p263)butfailstoreachaclearviewonwhether
suchconcentrationrequiresdeparturefromline-aheadtactics.Hewantsdivisionstobeabletoexploit
transientopportunitiesavailabletothem,butknowsthatdividingafleetcanleadtodefeatindetail,astark
conclusionofFiskeandLanchester.
26
importanceofthemineandtorpedo.58Theactualoutcomeofthebattlewouldnotnecessarilybe
themostprobableoutcome,andJellicoe’sheavyburdenofresponsibilityandreflective
temperamentdictatedacautiousappraisalofanactionlonganticipated.Blessedwithatelling
marginofsuperiorityingunpower,andahighprobabilityofvictoryinsymmetricalcircumstances,
Jellicoehadadutytobewaryofanyfactorthatmightmovethebalanceofprobabilityinfavourof
hisoppositenumber:andinthedeploymentofevermorepowerfulmodernweaponryinthe
crampedconfinesoftheNorthSea,suchdangersweremany.Inthislight,Jellicoe’sfamousturn
awayfromScheeraftercrossingthe‘T’makesgreatersense.ThestandardviewofJellicoe’scriticsis
thatheshouldhaveturnedtowardstheHighSeasFleet,perhapslosingafewbattleshipswounded
bytorpedoes,butacceptingsuchlossesinpursuitofvictory.Butthesewoundedshipscouldeasily
havecrippledtheGrandFleet’sperfectlineandtherebydeniedhimtheconditionsessentialforthat
victory.
IV
Despiteanumberofnavalactionsin1914,thetacticsofthedreadnoughtclashwerefirstputthe
testatDoggerBankinJanuary1915,whenBritishandGermanbattlecruisersmet.Thisskirmishisof
significantinterest,asitisonmanylevelsasmall-scaleprecursortotheopening‘RuntotheSouth’
oftheJutlandBattle.ItrevealstousboththetacticschosenbyBeattyandHipperandtherelative
meritsoftheships.
58UncertaindiscussionoftorpedotacticspervadestheliteraturebeforeJutland.Forexample,withinone
journal,theProceedingsoftheUSNavalInstitute,onehas:V.Cunibertitrans.T.WithersJr,‘Alltorpedoes!’,
PUSNI,40(1914),pp.27-31,advocatingafleetofsmallsemi-submersibletorpedoboats;LtR.A.Dawes,‘Battle
Tactics’,PUSNI,41(1915),pp.1873-1895,offeringaturnaway(butnottowards)asafleettacticwhenunder
torpedoattack;andH.H.Frost,‘Theproblemoffiringatafleetunderwaywithlong-rangetorpedoes’,PUSNI,
39(1913),pp.681-698.PerhapsthefinalwordshouldgotoLtChesterW.Nimitz,‘Militaryvalueandtacticsof
modernsubmarines’,PUSNI,38(1912),pp.1193-1211:‘Thesteadydevelopmentofthetorpedo[andthe]
submarine…willresultinamostdangerousoffensiveweapon,…whichwillhavealargepartindecidingfleet
actions.’
27
DoggerBankisusuallyconsideredtobeanopportunityfordecisiveBritishvictory,59lostonlyby
anuntimelysignalfromRalphSeymourinthedisabledLion.Thecontemporaryaccountsare
strikinglytriumphal,butthelaterexperienceofJutlandsuggeststhisattitudetobemisplaced.Had
thethreeengagedships–Tiger,PrincessRoyalandNewZealand–continuedagainstthethree
remainingGermanships,asuccessfulresultwasunlikelyforanumberofreasons.60
ThestandardofgunneryintheBCFwasknowntobewellbelowthatoftheGrandFleet.There
werenofacilitiesforgunnerytrainingatRosythandthesecouldonlybeprovidedwhenBCF
divisionsweresentinrotationtotheGrandFleetbaseatScapaFlow.NorwasBeattyinclinedto
emphasizeaccurategunnery.Hisviewwasthatrateoffirewasmoreimportant,andthussafety
featuresthatmighthavereducedthisweredisregarded,creatingthedanger,laterrevealedat
Jutland,ofaturretpenetrationtransmittingexplosivefiretotheships’magazineswithcatastrophic
results.61TheGermans,bycontrast,areconsideredtohavelearnedmuchfromthebattleinthis
respect,duetothefortuitousescapeofSeydlitzfromaflashexplosionnotunlikeLion’snear-miss16
monthslater.ItisalsonowacceptedthatBritishpowderwasmuchmorecombustiblethanGerman,
placingapremiumonstringentmeasurestolimitthetransmissionofflashexplosions.
EvenhadBritishammunitionhandlingproceduresbeenimpeccable,theolderBritish
battlecruiserswererenderedasobsolescentasthehaplessBlücherintheirscoutingrolebythe
appearanceofthenewGermanbattlecruiserswithheavierarmourandsimilararmament.Ofthe
59Hughes,FleetTactics,p75;CaptJ.Cresswell,RoyalNavalStaffCollegelecture(1932),ChurchillArchives
CentreCRES3/2
60AquantitativestudybytheauthorsusingmodernBayesianmethodsisNiallMacKay,ChristopherPriceand
A.JamieWood,‘WeighingtheFogofWar:IllustratingthepowerofBayesianmethodsforhistoricalanalysis
throughtheBattleoftheDoggerBank’,toappearinHistoricalMethods.
61TheexchangebetweenJellicoeandBeattyofNovember1915makesclearthedifferenceintheirviews:
Jellicoewrites‘Ifeartherapidityideawascarriedtoexcess’,Beattyreplies‘Ifeelverystrongly[that]we
shouldendeavourtoquickenupourfiring’,andJellicoeexplainsthat‘Iamallforrapiodityoffire,butmyonly
fearisthatshipsmaybreakintorapidfiretoosoon’.JellicoePapers,vol.1,items172-174.
28
threeshipspursuingtheGermanbattlecruisers,thearmourofNewZealandcouldnothave
withstoodtheconcentratedfireofGerman11”and12”gunsatmediumrange.Finallyall
shortcomingswerecompoundedbypoorfiredistribution,whichleftMoltkeunmolestedwhenTiger
mistakenlyconcentratedonSeydlitz.ThiswasadeadlymistakeasthegunneryofevenGerman
battlecruisersdeterioratedsharplywhenunderfire,incontrasttotheirexcellentperformancewhen
notengaged.ThiserrorwasrepeatedatJutland,whenDerfflingerwasnottakenunderfireand
doubledupwithSeydlitzonQueenMary.
Tactically,itisclearfromthisbattlethatBeattyhadfailedtocomprehendkeyideasfrompre-war
tactics:thesimultaneousengagementofthefleet,positioningofflagship,anduseofspeedand
greatergunrangetosecureunmolestedfiring,FiskeandBaudry’sfiveminutes.Thefirst,especially,
wouldcomebacktohaunttheBCFintheearlystagesoftheJutlandencounter.
TheoutcomeofDoggerBankmightseemtopresageacatastrophefortheRoyalNavy.The
chancesoftheGermanHighseasFleetencounteringtheoverconfidentBCFinisolationandexposing
itsweaknesseswerehighandtheGermansexecutedjustsuchaplanwhentheyputtoseaonMay
311916.Previousattemptstoachievethisresulthadbeenfrustratedbycircumstanceandthe
timidityofAdmiralsPohlandIngenohl,whowerereluctanttorisktheHighSeasFleetexceptin
overwhelminglyfavourableconditions,andhadreasontofearthewrathoftheKaiseriftheydid.
ThenewandaggressivecommanderoftheHighSeasFleet,Scheer,succeededinhisprimaryaimof
drawingtheBCFoutofRosyth,buttheinitialdispositionssuggestedaGermanratherthanaBritish
disaster.
JellicoewasawareoftheGermanplanthroughinterceptionofcrackedGermancommunications,
andputtoseatorendezvouswiththeBCFandsurpriseScheerwiththeconcentratedGrandFleet.A
chancefactoralsounhingedtheGermanplan,asthe3rdBattlecruiserSquadron[3BCS]hadbeen
detachedtoScapaFlowforgunnerypracticeandtemporarilyreplacedatRosythbythe5thBattle
29
Squadron,[5BS]consistingoffourofthefivenewQueenElizabethclassbattleships,easilythemost
powerfulwarshipsatseaontheday.ApartfromgenericfaultsinBritishshells,theypossessednone
oftheshortcomingsofthebattlecruiserstowhichtheywereattached,particularlyintermsof
accurategunnery.
TheGermanplanwastomeetBeattywiththeHighSeasFleet’sbattlecruisersunderHipperand
drawthemontotheapproachingHighSeasFleetfordestruction.TheunsuspectingHipper,
however,withfivebattlecruisersseemeddestinedtomeettenBritishcapitalships.Insuch
circumstancestheSquareLawpromisedaninevitableresult.Theencounterwouldbesymmetrical,
inLanchestrianterms,butofcoursethisdidnotmeananevencontest.Britishshipsarmedwith15”
and13.5”gunscouldengageHipper’s11”shipsbeyondeffectiverangeoftheirownmain
armamentsandhewouldhavenoprospectofconcentratinghis12”fireontheweakerBritish
vesselsbeforehisfightingpowerwaseliminated.NorwouldhehavetimetoretreatontotheHSF
beforebeingdestroyed,ashisshipswereslowerthantheenemybattlecruisers,andalmostmatched
by5BS
However,thedifferentphasesofthebattleproducedaspectsoftheextremesdesiredbyboth
sides.TheweaknessesinBeatty’ssignallingdisplayedatDoggerBankwererepeatedand,inhis
eagernesstogetatHipper,heleft5BSbehind.Hispoordeploymentof5BSfartohisrearcreateda
thirdsubdivisionoftheGrandFleet.ThismadepossibleHipper’ssurvivalandpresentedhimwithan
opportunity.ThoughHipperwasunabletoavoidbattle,andevenwithout5BStheSquareLaw
suggestedanegativeoutcomeforhisfivebattecruisersagainstBeatty’ssix,circumstancesfavoured
him.Beatty’sshipsclosedtowithintheeffectiverangeofGermangunsbeforeopeningfire,and
thoughthisresultedfrompoorvisibilityratherthancalculation,theeffectwastoplacehislong-
armedbutthin-skinnedforceofbattlecruisersinunnecessarydanger.Poorfiredistributionleft
DerfflingerunmolestedandenabledHippertoachievemomentsofeffectivenumericalsuperiorityin
theraggedrunningfightwhichdevelopedwhenthebattlecruisersmet.Thesecircumstances
30
suggestedtheeliminationofBeatty’sforce,inthefirstplacebecausetheSquareLawwouldnot
functiontohisadvantage,andthenaftertheimmediatelossofIndefatigable(Fig.1,pointA)because
itwouldstarttoworkagainsthim.However,unlikeHipper,thespeedofhisvesselsgavehimthe
optionofdisengagement.
ThedynamicsofthisprocessareclearfromFigure1,withBeattyfailingtoachieveconcentration,
andtherebyafavourablegunfireratio,duringthefirsttwentyminutes.When5BSclosedtherange
sufficientlytoengage(Fig.1,B),theBCFfinallyachievedconcentrationandHipperwasplacedin
apparentlymortalperil.Beattywasabletoopentherangebetweenhisbattlecruisersandthoseof
theenemy,reducingtheeffectivenessoftheirsmallermainarmament,while5BSengagedHipper’s
forceeffectivelyatsuchrangethattheyhadnomeansofreply.However,5BSatthisstagecould
onlyengagetherearofHipper’slineand,unpleasantthoughthiswasforMoltkeandVonderTann,
Hipper’snewestandmostpowerfulvesselsLützowandDerfflinger,with12”gunsalongthe
centreline,werestillinactionwithBeatty.
ThelossofQueenMarytoanexplosionoccurredatthispointofthebattle(Fig.1,C).The
importanceofDerfflinger'sescapefromBritishfireattheoutsetofthebattlehasbeendismissedon
thegroundsoftheGermanship'spoorinitialshooting,62butshehadstillnotbeenhitwhencredited
withthefatalsalvoagainstQueenMary,firinginconjunctionwithSeydlitz,andhadnotsufferedthe
sharplydegradingeffectsofbattledamageonherfirecontrol.Evenwithouttheexplosion,the
SquareLawsuggestedacatastrophicresultfortheBritishbattlecruiserinthisunequalexchange.
With5BSinaction,however,theundergunningoftheGerman11”shipspromisedtobethedecisive
weaknessoneithersideifthisactionweretocontinue.VonderTannparticularlybegantosuffer
immediateandseveredamage.Infact,thearrivalofScheerandtherestoftheHighSeasFleet
(Fig.1,D)broughtthe‘RuntotheSouth’phaseofthebattletoacloseandturnedthetablesagain.
62Campbell,Jutland,p.39.
31
Beattywasnowdecisivelyoutnumberedandhisonlyoptionwastoreversecourseandseekunion
withtheGrandFleet.Thiswasalsohisdutyashehadineffectsucceededinhisscoutingroleand
locatedtheenemyfleet.Thephaseofthebattleknownasthe‘RuntotheNorth’thusbegan,
thoughnotquiteyetfortheQueenElizabethsof5BS,whichstillonasouthwardcoursepassed
Beatty’sshipsheadingnorth,waitinganxiouslyfortheordertoexecuteadelayedsignaltoturn
(Fig.1,E).Whenthisarrivedeachshipof5BSturnedinsequenceandfacedtheconcentratedfire
alonewhileturning,creatingasituationwhichtheseuniquelyvaluablevesselsshouldneverhave
facedandinwhichtheGermansmightagainhaveachievedtheirdesiredrisk-fleetresult.Onceagain
Beatty’sfailuretounderstandtheLanchestriandynamicisstarklyvisibleinFigure1,wherebetween
pointsDandFweobserveareversalofthegunfireratiointheGermans’favour,theonlyperiodof
thebattleduringwhichthiswasachieved.Catastrophewasavoided,however,and5BSwasableto
stayaheadofthepursuingenemy,absorbanumberofhitsanddamageenemyvesselswith
effectivegunnery,beforeactionwasbrokenoff(Fig.1,F).
Inbothphasesofthescoutingduel,theGermansenjoyedavisibilityadvantage,withtheBritish
shipsoutlinedagainstthesettingsunwhiletheirownwereconcealedinthemurktotheEast.
However,intheRuntotheNorth,theduelbetweenHipperandBeattycontinuedandinstark
contrasttotheRuntotheSouthBeattyhadthebetterofit.Beattywasnowmuchmorecarefulto
usehissuperiorspeed,increasinglyapparentastheGermans’inferiorbrowncoaltookitstoll,to
dictatetherangeofengagementforhisbattlecruisers,whileValiantandBarhamof5BSscored
repeatedlyagainstHipper’sships.Thoughtheresultsofthiscontinuingengagementwere
undramatic,theysuggestthelikelyoutcomehadBeattydeployedwiselyintheruntothesouthwith
hisfullforce.Beatty,however,nowachievedsuccessbydeliveringtheunsuspectingHighSeasFleet
ontoJellicoe’sguns,againreversingtheadvantage.
Whenthebattlefleetsmet(Fig.1,G),Jellicoehavingsuccessfullydeployedinbattlelinetoport,an
idealLanchestrianpositionalsituationwascreatedinwhichtheHighSeasFleetwouldnormallybe
32
destroyed(Fig.1,H,at1830).AgainpoorvisibilityfavouredtheGermansenoughtosavethem,for
althoughtheorientationofthefleetsrelativetothesettingsunwasreversedinfavouroftheBritish,
generalvisibilitybythistimewaspatchyandinplacesreducedalmosttozero,negatingJellicoe’s
numericaladvantageandmomentarilyreversingitwhenInvincible,rangingwith3BCSaheadof
Jellicoewassuddenlyexposedbyachangeinthelight.Thismisfortuneled,aswithQueenMary,to
adverseSquareLawconcentrationinwhichshewasexposed(afewminutesafterFig.1,G)tothefire
oftwoGermanships,LützowfiringthesalvoresultinginInvincible’sfatalexplosion(atpointHin
Fig.1).Nevertheless,theaccuracyoftheshootingof3BCSwasclearlyimprovedbytheirtrainingat
ScapaFlow,andInvincibleiscreditedwithinflictingfataldamageonLützowbeforeherdemise.Thus
theoldestbattlecruiserandthenewestpresentatthebattleeffectivelysankeachother.
ConfrontedwiththeconcentratedGrandFleet,Scheerhadnooptionbutflight.Hesuccessfully
executedthebattleturnawaypractisedforsuchanoccasion(Fig.1,I),aidedbypoorvisibilitywhich
preventedatleasthalfoftheGrandFleet’sbattleshipsfromengaging,63andvanishedintothemurk
beforeturningandblunderingintoJellicoeagain(Fig.1,J,at1900).Theturnawaythenhadtobe
repeated,butwas‘ashambles’comparedtothefirstattempt:onthissecondoccasion,visibilitywas
betterfortheBritish,manymoreofJellicoe’sshipsfoundtargets,andthemanoeuvrewaspoorly
executedunderheavyfire(Fig.1,K,notsharplydefined).Atthispoint,theSquareLaw‘was
beginningtotiptheHighSeasFleetdownasteepeningslopetooblivion’,64butthedisarrayof
Scheer’sshipswasultimatelymaskedbythelayingofsmoke,awell-executeddestroyerattackon
theGrandFleetforcingaturnaway,andasacrificialchargebyhisbattlecruisers.Inthis‘death
charge’ontheBritishfleet,furtherpoorvisibilitysavedHipper’sshipsfromextendedpunishment
andenabledthemtoescape,butinarareclashofthenewestvesselsDerfflingerwas‘shattered’,
primarilybythenew15”battleshipRevenge,losingtwoofherfourturretsinamatterof
63Campbell,Jutland,p.155.
64Gordon,RulesoftheGame,p.461.
33
moments.65Inbetterconditions,neitherofScheer’saboutturnswouldhavesavedhimifconducted
infullviewoftheconcentratedGrandFleet.Nevertheless,thepointofdecisionhadbeenreached
andJellicoehad,instrategicterms,won.66Nobrightprospectotherthanescaperemainedto
Scheer,andhelatercreptpastJellicoeinthedark.
V
TheBritishcapitalshipslostatJutlandwereallbattlecruisers.Twoofthethreelostwereamong
Britain’soldestvesselsofthistype,lesswellprotectedandarmedthanlaterships:therealshock
wasthelossofthenewQueenMary,whichcanneverthelessbematchedagainsttheequally
valuableLützowdespitemuchheavierlossoflifeontheBritishship.Thereislittleevidencetopoint
tosystemicweaknessinBritishshipdesignanddoctrineinthecontextofdreadnoughtencounters.
ShortcomingsrelatemoretothehabitsoftheBCFandBeatty’sidiosyncraticleadership,allofwhich
hadbeenondisplayatDoggerBank.
Apartfromthis,sourcesagreethatBritishcorditewasmuchmorelikelytoexplodethanGerman,
andthatifbothfleetshadbeenequippedwiththeBritishpropellantatleastoneGermancapital
shipwouldhavemetthesamefate.However,catastrophicexplosionrequiredafireorcordite
detonationreachingamainmagazine,andtheevidenceofthebattlewasthatsuchafatewasbyno
meansoverwhelminglyprobableinBritishships.AlltheBritishlossesinvolvedashellpenetratinga
gunturret,causingacorditefirewhichtransmitteditselftoamainmagazineandtriggereda
65Gordon,RulesoftheGame,p.459.
66Jellicoehadatleasttwicepreviouslystatedhisattentionnottobedrawnintoafleetengagementdeepin
theGermanBightlateintheday.LetterfromJellicoetoCaptFredericDreyer,9thJuly1915,ChurchillArchives
Centre,DRYR3/1;memorandumfromJellicoetoAdmSirHenryJackson,12thApril1916,JellicoePapers,vol.1
item213.
34
catastrophicexplosion.OnlyafractionofGermanhitscouldbeexpectedtohitaturret,anda
smallerfractiontopenetrate.Lionwashit13timesbythe12”shellsofLützowinadditiontothe
near-fatalturrethit,andTigerwashit13timeswithoutseeminglikelytosink.Amongturrethits,not
allwouldcausecatastrophe,whichwaspreventablebyalertfirecontrolandfloodingofmagazines
asonLion.QueenMaryexplodedsometimeafterbeinghit,implying,forwhateverreason,
unsuccessfulfirefightinganddamagecontrol.
Iftheprobabilityofacatastrophichitfromasingleshellwasverylow,Germanchancesof
inflictingsuchablowwouldobviouslybeincreasedifmoregunscouldbebroughttobearonthe
target.Whenoutnumbered,GermangunswerelesslikelytoscoreaturrethitthanBritish,butthe
differentphasesofthefightingatJutlandprovidedoccasionswhenthiswasnotso.QueenMaryand
IndefatigablewerelostwhentheformerwasfiredonexclusivelybymorethanoneGermanshipfor
aperiodoftimeandthelatterwhenshebecamedetachedfromtheline.Similarly,Invincible,though
inthevanoftheGrandFleet,wastwomilesaheadofitwhenfatallyhitfacingoddsof2-1inchance
conditionsofsuddenlyimprovedvisibilityfortheGermans.
Itisusuallyassumedthatthebattlecruisers’adoptedroleasafastwingoftheGrandFleetwasa
mistakewhichplacedtheminmortaldanger.However,iftheyhadmettheGermansaspartofthe
GrandFleetinlineofbattletheirchancesofsurvivalwouldhavebeengreaterthanwhenskirmishing
withGermanbattlecruisers.AheavilyoutnumberedGermanfleetcouldnothaveexpectedto
concentratetheweightoffireonanyonebattlecruiserthattheyactuallyachievedatJutland,andat
theoutsetofactionanumberofBritishshipswouldhavereceivednofireatall,mostlikelythose
whichoverlappedtheGermanlineateitherend,wherethebattlecruisersexpectedtobestationed.
AfurtherfactorworkingagainsttheGermanswasthattheirprospectsofachievingcatastrophic
hits,althoughslim,weregreatestattheoutsetofbattle.Jellicoewasconsistentinhisviewthatthe
firstfiveminutesoffirewerelikelytobedecisive,nodoubtinfluencedbyhisreadingofpre-war
35
material.67ThoughGermanshipscouldremainafloataftersustainingenormousdamagetheirutility
inafleetencounterwouldceasewhenthelastoftheirmainarmamentwassilenced.Thiswould
occuratanincreasingrateasthebattleprogressedwithaconcomitantreductionintheircapacityto
inflictequivalentdamageontheBritish.TherateandeffectivenessofthefireofGerman
battlecruisersalsodegradedrapidlyasthevesselsreceivedhits,whetherornottheypenetratedthe
armour:thekineticenergyimpartedbytheimpactofthelargeBritishshellswasconsiderable,
producingashockeffectonthecrewanddegradingtheeffectivenessofsensitivefirecontrol
equipment.68Inthiscontext,thefailureoftheBCFtoengagethenewanddangerousDerfflinger
earlyinthebattlewasagraveerror.GenerallyinaccurateshootingbytheBCFalsohandedHipper
theearlyinitiative,stressingagainthevalueofthe‘firstfiveminutes’.
ThusnoneoftheapparentweaknessesofBritishshipsrelativetoGermanwaslikelytoaffect
decisivelyabroadside-to-broadsideencounterofthebattlefleets.Thestrengthsresultingfrom
earlierdecisions,chieflyintermsofnumericalsuperiorityinships,gunsandguncalibre,weremuch
moreimportant.InLanchestrianterms,Germansuccesswouldhavetobeachievedthroughtheir
longed-forKraftausgleich.Theyputtoseaon31stMay1916withpreciselythisintention,andduring
thatdayandthefollowingnighttheLanchestrianbalanceshiftedfluidlybetweentheopposingsides,
morethanoncechangingradicallywithinsecondsaseachsoughttoachieveaClausewitzianpointof
decision[Schwerpunkt].
67Fiske,AmericanNavalPolicy;Baudry,TheNavalBattle.
68ThecapacityofburstingBritishshelltodegradeGermanfightingcapacityiswelldocumentedinYates,The
JutlandControversy.
36
VI
FromaLanchestrianperspectivebothsidesflirtedwithdisasteratvariousstagesoftheBattleof
Jutland.However,theGermansachievedathreetooneadvantageindreadnoughtssunk,andmore
importantlyescapedextermination.ThisresultseemedtodefyLanchestrianprobabilityasitwas
understoodatthetime.EachofScheer’smassiveblunderswasanunforcederrorwhichwouldhave
costhimhisfleethadnotrandomfactorsinvolvingweatherandcircumstantialBritishdeployments
developedexactlyastheydidontheday.
Whenthefleetssetsail,theforewarnedBritishinadvanceofScheer,themostprobableoutcome
wasthedestructionofHipper’sbattlecruisersbythereinforcedBCF,possiblyforthelossofoneor
twoBritishbattlecruisers,butwiththefirepowerof5BSensuringBritishpredominance.Afterthis,
ScheerwouldnecessarilyhavereturnedtoportwithallhopeofafuturechallengetotheGrand
Fleetabandoned.Beatty’sweaknesses,andthosehetoleratedinhissubordinates,threwawaythis
favourablesituationandforatimeofferedtheGermansexactlythelimitedyetportentousvictory
theysought.However,Beatty’sunstabledynamicproducedastilllessprobableevent:aclashofthe
fleetsinwhichScheercouldnotprevail.Takenasawhole,however,thebattleproducedatthe
strategiclevelexactlytheoutcomethatLanchester’slogicwouldpredict.ThefullLanchestrian
battle,withitscertaindefeat,mustalwaysbedeclinedbythenumerically-inferiorforce.69
The25Britishdreadnoughtbattleshipsoflessthan15"mainarmamentwerenoteverythingthat
couldbedesiredbut,inmounting127turretsoftwingunsofatleast12”calibre,theynevertheless
providedafleet-in-beinglargeenough,byanarrowmargin,todeteranyGermanthoughtof
engaginginafullfleetactionwithoutpreviousattemptsatpartialattrition.Thiswasinitselfa
decisivestrategicresult,butmustbeconsideredabluffifBritishshipsweremarkedlyinferiorto
theirGermanequivalents.Evidencesuggeststhatthiswasnotthecase.Britishbuildqualityperunit
69Hughes,‘Navaltacticsandtheirinfluenceonstrategy’,asnotedabove.
37
whichwasdeliberatelylessthanoptimal,especiallyinspeedandarmour,wasoffsetbyincremental
improvement,superiornumbersandgunpower:theculminatingvesselsintheBritishproduction
process,theQueenElizabeths,wereoutstandingvesselsbyanystandard.
JudgementsofthetechnicalqualitiesofopposingshipsshouldalsorecognisethattheBritishand
Germanfleetswereengagedinaprocessoftechnologicalleapfrogduringaperiodofextraordinarily
swiftdevelopment,andonoccasionssuchasJutlandvesselsproducedintheearlypartoftheperiod
couldfindthemselvesoutclassedwhenencounteringnewervessels.AtJutlandtheBritishfieldedsix
battleshipsintheultimatedreadnoughtconfigurationofforeandaftturretsalongthecentreline,to
twoGermanbattlecruisersofthesametype,oneofwhichwaslost.Asmightbeexpected,Lützow
andDerfflingerweredeadlyopponentstootherbattlecruisersandolderdreadnoughtbattleships,
butwhenDerfflingerencounteredRevenge,thebattleshipoverpoweredthebattlecruiserinamatch
ofgenerationally-compatiblevesselsinwhichDerfflinger’slimitedmainarmamentwasnot
effectivelyoffsetbyenhancedarmour.Insum,theGermanswereoutnumberedandatleast
matchedintechnologicaltermsbytheGrandFleet,andthisbeingthecasetacticsbecameof
paramountimportance.
ThustheadversebalanceofBritishlossesindicatednotoverallweaknessbutratherthatJutland
wasthegreatLanchestrianbattlethatneverquitehappened,asScheerwastwiceabletodeclineits
culminationwhenheknewhimselftobemomentsfromdestruction.Nevertheless,atthe
operationalandtacticallevelsthebattlestillrespectedaLanchestriandynamic,astheshiftingfight
betweensquadronsandshipsproducedmomentsofbattlewhenconcentrationwasrealizedandthe
resultingadvantagesaccrued,broadlyfavouringtheGermans.ThecostlyBritishvictoryatJutlandis,
therefore,bestunderstoodinLanchestriantermsasaraceforconcentrationwhichJellicoe
ultimatelywon.AlthoughthiswasnotconvertedintoGermanshipssunk,andcriticsonbothsides
werequicktocontrastJutlandwithTrafalgar,theeffectontheenemy’swilltofightwasmuchthe
sameandJellicoe’sactionsandhisunderstandingofhissituationmustbeconsideredsound.
38
Jutlandshouldthereforebeseenasavictoryshapedfrom1905to1916byadevelopingbut
integratedvisionoffleetpolicyandtacticswhichenabledFisher’sprogrammeofperpetual
technologicaladvancetobecarriedthroughtostrategicsuccess.Essentialtothiswasnumerical
superiority,dictatedbythecruxofLanchester’sargument,thequantificationofthetrade-off
betweennumbersandquality.70TheRoyalNavy,forallitsflaws,wasalearningorganization,in
whichreformingdrivewasbalancedbytechnocraticexpertsmakingfinely-balanceddecisionsina
rationalmannerthroughaperiodofintensetechnologicalandtacticalchange.Itgotthebig
decisionsright,buildingandcorrectlywieldingitsdecisiveweapon,theGrandFleet,toachievethe
requiredstrategicvictory.
Acknowledgments.WeshouldliketothankMatthewSeligmannforastimulatingseminar(andfor
pointingouttheexchangebetweenBrooksandSumida),andJamesGoldrickandBrianMcCuefor
helpfuldiscussions.NJMshouldliketothanktheUSNavalPostgraduateSchool,Monterey,forits
hospitalityandfinancialsupportwhilethisworkwasbegun.Inparticular,hewouldliketothank
WayneHughesforextensivediscussionsoffleettacticsandtheirhistory,andGlenKoueforhelp
withreferences.WeshouldalsoliketothankthestaffoftheChurchillArchiveCentre,Cambridge;
theCairdLibrary,NationalMaritimeMuseum,Greenwich;andespeciallytheAdmiraltyLibraryNaval
HistoricalBranchandNationalMuseumoftheRoyalNavy,Portsmouth,fortheirhelp.
70IronicallyLanchester’santicipatorBradleyFiskemissedthispointwhenhewrotein1920that‘theGerman
navywasthebetter,andwasvanquishedmerelybecauseitwasthesmaller’.B.A.Fiske,reviewofJellicoe,
‘TheGrandFleet’,AmericanHistoricalReview25(1920)280-282.
39