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A Lemke-Type Algorithm for Market Equilibrium under Separable,
Piecewise-Linear Concave Utilities
Ruta Mehta
Indian Institute of Technology – Bombay
Joint work with Jugal Garg, Milind Sohoni and Vijay V. Vazirani
Exchange MarketSeveral agents
Several agents with endowment of goods
Several agents with endowments of goods and different concave utility functions
Given prices, an agent sells his endowment and buys an optimal bundle from the earned money.
1p 2p3p
Parity between demand and supplyequilibrium prices
1p 2p 3p
Do equilibrium prices exist?
1p 2p 3p
Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 1954
Celebrated theorem in Mathematical Economics
Established existence of market equilibrium under very general conditions using a deep theorem from topology - Kakutani fixed point theorem.
Arrow-Debreu Theorem, 1954
Celebrated theorem in Mathematical Economics
Established existence of market equilibrium under very general conditions using a theorem from topology - Kakutani fixed point theorem.
Highly non-constructive!
Computation
The Linear Case
DPSV (2002) – Flow based algorithm for the Fisher market.
Jain (2004) – Using Ellipsoid method.
Ye (2004) – Interior point method.
Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave (SPLC)
Utility function of an agent is separable for goods.
Amount of good j
Utility
Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave (SPLC)
Utility function of an agent
is separable
Rationality – Devanur and Kannan (2008); Vazirani and Yannakakis (2010).
Amount of good j
Utility
Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave (SPLC)
Utility function of an agent
is separable
Rationality – Devanur and Kannan (2008); Vazirani and Yannakakis (2010).
Devanur and Kannan (2008) – Polynomial time algorithm when number of agents or goods are constant.
Amount of good j
Utility
SPLC – Hardness Results
Chen et al. (2009) – It is PPAD-hard.
Chen and Teng (2009) – Even for the Fisher market it is PPAD-hard.
Vazirani and Yannakakis (2010) It is PPAD-hard for the Fisher market. It is in PPAD for both.
Vazirani and Yannakakis
“The definition of the class PPAD was designed to capture problems that allow for path following algorithms, in the style of the algorithms of Lemke-Howson. It will be interesting to obtain natural, direct path following algorithm for this task (hence leading to a more direct proof of membership in PPAD), which may be useful for computing equilibria in practice.”
Initial Attempts DPSV like flow based algorithm.
Lemke-Howson A classical algorithm for 2-Nash. Proves containment of 2-Nash in PPAD.
Lemke-Howson type algorithm for linear markets by Garg, Mehta and Sohoni (2011).
Extend GMS algorithm.
Linear Case: Eaves (1975) LCP formulation to capture market equilibria. Apply Lemke’s algorithm to find one.
He states: “Also under study are extensions of the overall method to include piecewise linear concave utilities, production, etc., if successful, this avenue could prove important in real economic modeling.”
In 1976 Journal version He demonstrates a Leontief market with only
irrational equilibria, and concludes impossibility of extension.
Our Results Extend Eave’s LCP formulation to SPLC markets. Design a Lemke-type algorithm.
Runs very fast in practice. Direct proof of membership of SPLC markets in PPAD. The number of equilibria is odd (similar to 2-Nash,
Shapley’74). Provide combinatorial interpretation.
Strongly polynomial bound when number of goods or agents is constant.
In case of linear utilities, prices and surplus are monotonic Combinatorial algorithm. Equilibria form a convex polyhedral cone.
Linear Complementarity Problem For LP: Complementary slackness conditions
capture optimality. 2-Nash: Equilibria are characterized through
complementarity conditions.
Given n x n matrix M and n x 1 vector q, find y s.t.
My ≤ q; y ≥ 0
My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0 yTv = 0yT(q – My) =
0
nR
Properties of LCP
yTv = 0 => yivi = 0, for all i.
At a solution, yi=0 or vi=0, for all i.
Trivial if q ≥ 0: Set y = 0, and v = q.
P: My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0
yTv = 0
Properties of LCP
yTv = 0 => yivi = 0, for all i.
At a solution, yi=0 or vi=0, for all i.
There may not exist a solution.
yTv = 0
P: My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0
Properties of LCP
yTv = 0 => yivi = 0, for all i.
At a solution, yi=0 or vi=0, for all i.
If there exists a solution, then there is a vertex of P which is a solution.
yTv = 0
P: My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0
Properties of LCP
Solution set might be disconnected.
There is a possibility of a simplex-like algorithm given a feasible vertex of P.
yTv = 0
P: My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0
Lemke’s Algorithm Add a dimension:
P’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0yTv=0
T = Points in P’ with yTv=0.
Required: A point of T with z=0
Assumption: P’ is non-degenerate.
The set TP’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0
Assumption: P’ is non-degenerate.
n inequalities should be tight at every point.
P’ is n+1-dimensional => T consists of edges and vertices.
The set TP’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0
Assumption: P’ is non-degenerate.
Ray: An unbounded edge of T. If y=0 then primary ray, all others are secondary
rays. At a vertex of T
Either z=0 Or ! i s.t. yi=0 and vi=0. Relaxing each gives two
adjacent edges of S.
The set TP’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0
Assumption: P’ is non-degenerate.
Paths and cycles on 1-skeleton of P’.
z=0
z=0
z=0
Lemke’s AlgorithmP’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0
Assumption: P’ is non-degenerate.
Invariant: Remain in T.
Start from the primary ray.
Starting VertexP’: My + v – z = q; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0 Primary Ray:
y=0, z and v change accordingly.
Vertex (v*, y*, z*): y* = 0; i* = argmini qi; z* = |qi*|; vi* = qi + z*;
z=z*
y =
0z=∞
v > 0
vi*=0
The Algorithm Start by tracing the primary ray up to (v*, y*,
z*).
z=z*vi*=0
v > 0, y =
0z=∞
The Algorithm Start by tracing the primary ray up to (v*, y*,
z*). Then relax yi* = 0,
vi*=0yi*=0
v i*>0
v i*=0
y i*>
0
The Algorithm
In general If vi ≥ 0 becomes tight, then relax yi = 0,
And if yi ≥ 0 becomes tight then relax vi = 0.
z=0
vi=0yi=0
vi =0
yi >0
v i>0y i=
0
vi*=0yi*=0
v i*>0
v i*=0
y i*>
0
The Algorithm Start by tracing the primary ray up to (v*, y*,
z*). If vi ≥ 0 becomes tight, then relax yi=0
And if yi ≥ 0 becomes tight then relax vi=0.
vi=0yi=0
vi =0
yi >0
v i>0y i=
0
vi*=0yi*=0
v i*>0
v i*=0
y i*>
0
Properties and Correctness No cycling.
Termination: Either at a vertex with z=0 (the solution), or on an
unbounded edge (a secondary ray).
No need of potential function for termination guarantee.
Exchange Markets A: Set of agents, G: Set of goods
m= |A|, n=|G|.
Agents i with wij endowment of good j utility function :
i nf R R
Separable Piecewise-Linear Concave (SPLC) Utilities
Utility function f i is: Separable – is for jth good, and f i(x) = Piecewise-Linear Concave
Segment k with Slope , and range = b –
a.
: ij
f R R ( )if xj j j
ijku i
jkl
ijf
xj
ijku
a b
Optimal Bundle for Agent i Utility per unit of money: Bang-per-buck
Given prices Sort the segments (j, k) in decreasing order of bpb Partition them by equality – q1,…,qd. Start buying from the first till exhaust all the
money
Suppose the last partition he buys, is qk
q1,…,qk-1 are forced, qk is flexible, qk+1,…,qd are undesired.
ijki
jkj
ubpb
p
p
( )ij jjw p
Forced vs. Flexible/Undesired Let be inverse of the bpb of flexible
partition. If (j, k) is forced then:
Let be the supplementary price s.t.
Complementarity Condition:
i
1, and
ijki i i
jk jk jk ji j
ubpb q l p
p
0ijk 1
ijk
ii j jk
u
p
0 and 0
( ) 0
i i i i i ijk jk jk j jk jk j jk
i i ijk jk jk j
q l p q l p
q l p
Undesired vs. Flexible/Forced If (j, k) is undesired then:
Complementarity Condition:
1, and 0. Therefore 0.
ijki i i
jk jk jki j
ubpb q
p
1 10, and 0
i ijk jki i
jk jki ij jk i j jk i
u uq q
p p
1
0
( ) 0
ijki
jk ij jk i
i i ijk jk i j jk
uq
p
q u p
LCP Formulation
, ,
, ,
0
0, 0, ( ) 0
0, 0, ( ) 0
, 0, 0
0, 0, 0
i ijk j j j jk j
i k i k
i i i i i ijk i j jk jk
i ijk ij j i i
jk jk i j jki i i i i ijk jk j jk jk jk jk
jk ij jj k j j k
j
j
ijk u p q
j q p p p q p
i q w p z q w
q u p
ijk q l p q
z
p
p
l
LCP and Market Equilibria Captures all the market equilibria.
To capture only market equilibria, We need to be zero whenever is zero:
Homogeneous LCP (q=0) Feasible set is a polyhedral cone. Origin is the dummy solution, and the only vertex.
( , , ), 0ijk ji j k p
ijk
jp
Recall: Starting VertexP’: My + v – z = q = 0; v, y, z ≥ 0
yTv=0 Primary Ray:
y=0, z and v changes accordingly.
Vertex (v*, y*, z*): y* = 0; i* = argmini qi; z* = |qi*| = 0; vi* = qi + z* = 0;
The origin
z=z*
y =
0z=∞
v > 0
vi*=0
Non-Homogeneous LCP If u is a solution then so is αu, α ≥ 0. Impose p ≥ 1.
p1
p2
0 p1
p1=1
p2=1
p2
0
Non-Homogeneous LCP
Starting vertex: and the rest are zero. End point of the primary ray.
arg max iji j
z w
,
,
1, , 0, 0
,
1,
, 0, 0
, 0, 0
, , 0, 0
ijk
i i i i i i ijk i j jk jk jk jk jk jk
i i i i i i i ijk jk j jk jk jk jk jk j
j j j j j ji k
ijk ij j i ij i i i i
j k j
j
k
jik
j q p t p
ijk u p r q r q r
ijk q l
t p t
i q w p z
p
s w s s
ijk
a l a a
1, 0i ij jk jkp b b
Non-Homogeneous LCP
Let y and v = [s, t, r, a] then in short
My + - zd = q; y, v, z ≥ 0; b ≥ 0
yTv = 0
,
,
1, , 0, 0
,
1,
, 0, 0
, 0, 0
, , 0, 0
ijk
i i i i i i ijk i j jk jk jk jk jk jk
i i i i i i i ijk jk j jk jk jk jk jk j
j j j j j ji k
ijk ij j i ij i i i i
j k j
j
k
jik
j q p t p
ijk u p r q r q r
ijk q l
t p t
i q w p z
p
s w s s
ijk
a l a a
1, 0i ij jk jkp b b
[ , , , ]p q v
b
Lemke-Type Algorithm
P’: My + - zd = q; y, v, z ≥ 0; b ≥ 0
yTv = 0
A solution with z=0 maps to an equilibrium.
does not participate in complementarity
condition.
If a becomes tight, then the algorithm
gets stuck.
v
b
0ijkb
0ijkb
Detour – Strong Connectivity
Strong Connectivity (Maxfield’97) G = Graph with agents as nodes. Edges
G is Strongly Connected.
ijf
Strong Connectivity Weakest known condition for the existence of
market equilibrium (Maxfield’97).
Assumed by Vazirani and Yanakkakis for the PPAD proof.
It also implies that the market is not reducible. Reduction is an evidence that equilibrium does not
exist.
Secondary ray => Reduction => Evidence of no market equilibrium.
Back to The Algorithm
Lemke-Type Algorithm
P’: My + - zd = q; y, v, z ≥ 0; b ≥ 0
yTv = 0
does not participate in complementarity
condition.
If a becomes tight, then the algorithm
gets stuck.
This is expected otherwise NP = Co-NP
Since checking existence is NP-hard in general
(VY).
v
b
0ijkb
0ijkb
Lemke-type Algorithm
P’: My + - zd = q; y, v, z ≥ 0; b ≥ 0
yTv = 0Assumption: Market satisfies Strong
Connectivity
and accordingly
v
b
0ijk jp 0 i
jk jp
1i ijk j jkp b i i
jk j jkp b
CorrectnessAssumption: Market satisfies Strong Connectivity
If ∆ is sufficiently large (polynomial sized), then never becomes tight.
Secondary rays are non-existent Since a secondary ray => equilibrium does not
exist.
Algorithm terminates with a market equilibrium.
0ijkb
Consequences Obtained a path following algorithm.
Runs very fast in practice.
Proves the membership of SPLC case in PPAD using Todd’s result on orientating complementary pivot
path
Start the algorithm from an equilibrium by leaving z=0, it reaches another equilibrium Since secondary rays are non-existent. Pairs up equilibria => The number of equilibria is
odd.
Combinatorial Interpretation Prices are initialized to 1. Goods with price more than 1 are fully sold.
Only agents with maximum surplus are in the market z captures the maximum surplus.
Allocation configuration does not repeat. Strongly polynomial bound when number of
agents or goods are constant.
The Linear Case Eaves (1975) – “That the algorithm can be
interpreted as a `global market adjustment mechanism' might be interesting to explore.”
The maximum surplus monotonically decreases, and prices monotonically increase. Market mechanism interpretation
Unique equilibrium if the input is non-degenerate.
In general, equilibria form a polyhedral cone.
Experimental Results Inputs are drawn uniformly at random.
from [0, 1], from [0, 1/#seg], and from [0, 1]
|A|x|G|x#Seg
#Instances
Min Iters Avg Iters Max Iters
10 x 5 x 2 1000 55 69.5 91
10 x 5 x 5 1000 130 154.3 197
10 x 10 x 5 100 254 321.9 401
10 x 10 x 10
50 473 515.8 569
15 x 15 x 10
40 775 890.5 986
15 x 15 x 15
5 1203 1261.3 1382
20 x 20 x 5 10 719 764 853
20 x 20 x 10
5 1093 1143.8 1233
ijku i
jkl ijw
What Next? SPLC case:
Analyze how the obtained equilibrium different. Combinatorial algorithm. Explore structural properties like index, degree,
stability similar to 2-Nash. Extension to markets with production.
Rational convex program for the linear case.
Thank You
Properties of LCP
yTv = 0 => yivi = 0, for all i.
At a solution, yi=0 or vi=0, for all i => n inequalities tight.
P is non-degenerate => every solution is a vertex of P. Since P is an n–dimensional polyhedron.
yTv = 0
P: My + v = q; v, y ≥ 0