A Liberal Theory of the Good?

Canadian Journal of Philosophy

A Liberal Theory of the Good?Author(s): Patrick NealSource: Canadian Journal of Philosophy, Vol. 17, No. 3 (Sep., 1987), pp. 567-581Published by: Canadian Journal of PhilosophyStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/40231550 .

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CANADIAN JOURNAL OF PHILOSOPHY 567 Volume 17, Number 3, September 1987, pp. 567-582

A Liberal Theory of the Good? PATRICK NEAL Hamilton College Clinton, NY 13323 U.S.A.

One argument often made in support of liberal political morality is that liberalism, both as a theory and as a practice, is neutral in regard to the question of the good life.1 In this essay, I shall criticize and reject this argument. Now this conclusion is anything but novel; one would have almost as much difficulty finding a critic, of whatever perspec- tive, granting that liberalism is indeed neutral with regard to the good as one would have finding a liberal denying it.2 It is this phenomenon that I find especially interesting, and which serves to set the context of my discussion. If, as I aim to show, it is a relatively straightforward path of argument which leads to the conclusion that liberalism is not neutral with regard to the question of the good life, then why do so many liberals remain convinced that it is? Why, when liberals and their critics debate the issue of neutrality, do they so often seem to talk beyond one another? It seems to me that instances of these debates ought to come off better than they do, and so I shall attempt here to describe how they might.

Since I maintain that liberalism is not neutral with regard to the good, I suppose that my argument must aim at being put such that a liberal can agree that it has been fairly presented, and yet continue to adhere to liberalism. Now this continued adherence could not, of course, be based upon liberalism's (supposed) neutrality regarding the good. My account must be wide enough to undermine the neutrality thesis without being so wide as to undermine liberalism itself in the process. The decision to proceed in this manner embodies something more than

1 See, for example, Ronald Dworkin, 'Liberalism/ in S. Hampshire, ed., Public and Private Morality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1978) 113-42.

2 One liberal who does not endorse neutrality is William Galston, 'Defending Liberalism/ American Political Science Review 76 (1982) 621-9.



568 Patrick Neal

merely strategic considerations, for I remain unsure whether liberalism is the most defensible form of political life. However, the argument presented here suggests that if it is, it is not because it is neutral in regard to the question of the good, and if it is not, it is not simply because it fails in being neutral with regard to the good. In criticizing those liberals who maintain the thesis of neutrality, I mean to imply that liberalism stands in need of a better defense than that which it receives from them.

Let us begin with liberal theory.3 First, we need to address the ob- jection that liberal theory is not monolithic. One could argue that while deontological, or rights-based, versions of liberalism attempt to maintain the neutrality thesis by arguing that the right is prior to the good, teleological versions of liberalism, that is, utilitarianism, openly pro- claim a conception of the good in defining the right as that which maximizes the good. Perhaps then, we should simply look in front of us, i.e., at utilitarianism, to find a liberal theory of the good.

Now, in a sense this is true; utilitarianism does contain a theory of the good, and it is, for all intents and purposes, the liberal theory of the good. I maintain, however, that this theory is also characteristic of deontological versions of liberalism, be they contractarian or liber- tarian. In maintaining this, I mean to question the unfortunate tendency prevalent in Anglo-American political theory, which is to suppose that rights-based and utilitarian theories of justice are the fundamental alter- natives open to reasonable consideration as viable accounts of justice. Other accounts of justice, which are said to differ fundamentally from both deontological and teleological versions of liberalism in that they posit and advocate the pursuit of some substantive conception of the good, are lumped together under the heading, 'perfectionism/ It is worth noting here that 'perfectionism' is a concept used by 'non- perfectionists' (i.e. liberals) to describe non-liberal theories of justice; it is doubtful that those categorized as 'perfectionists' would be com- fortable with the characterization (not to say evaluation) which accom- panies this apparently innocent labelling. Aristotle and Nietzsche, two 'perfectionists' mentioned by Rawls, would surely be surprised to find themselves in the same bed, and would likely wonder whether they had not ended up there simply because they were not liberals.4

3 The practice of liberal states with regard to neutrality raises some issues which will not be discussed in this essay, which focuses upon liberal theory; I have treated the issue of neutrality in regard to some of these practical issues in 'Liberalism and Neutrality/ Polity 17 (1985) 664-84.

4 On perfectionism, see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Cambridge, MA: Harvard

University Press 1971), 325-32.



A Liberal Theory of the Good? 569

The utilitarian theory of the good is not a perfectionist one, or at least is not in the prevailing contemporary form of utilitarianism, which I shall call, following Dworkin, 'preference' utilitarianism. Preference utilitarianism has come to replace what Dworkin labels 'psychological'5 utilitarianism, of which Bentham may be taken as the prime exemplar. Psychological utilitarianism aimed at maximizing satisfactions which were conceptualized as (at least in principle) empirically verifiable, quantifiable and capable of comparative measurement; in short, amenable to representation within a felicific calculus. This version of utilitarianism foundered on the shoals of the impossibility of inter- personal comparisons of utilities. Preference utilitiarianism is, in its way, more modest; it takes the aim of social policy to be that of maximizing the satisfaction of individual preferences, leaving aside the attempt to quantify levels of individual satisfaction in terms of happiness or pleasure. The good which preference utilitarianism, or hereafter simply utilitarianism, sets out to maximize in some sense (whether it be total or average or some variant thereof) is the satisfaction of individual preferences. 'Preferences,' on this theory, is a concept capable of universal content; all desires, ends, interests or goals which an individual may have can be consumed under the formal category of 'preferences.' So, according to utilitarianism, can all conceptions of the good which an individual may have. So the utilitarian theory of the good is of a special kind; it is not a substantive, or perfectionist, conception of the good, in that it does not refer to some conception of human excellence which all individuals are morally obligated to pursue or enhance. Nor need it refer to the satisfaction of existent desire. Rather, individuals are to define for themselves what is good, and no such conception of the good is intrinsically privileged over any other; from the point of view of the state, a preference for the life devoted to pushpin is to be treated as equal to the preference for a life devoted to poetry. Now this sounds a great deal like a doctrine of neutrality regarding the good, and indeed it is. What, then, do deontological liberals have against utilitarianism? Partly, and superficially, the complaint is that the status of individual rights is insecure within utilitarianism, in that the maximization of preference satisfaction might conflict with claims of individual liberty. This, of course, begs the question at hand, since the priority of liberty is what utilitarianism denies. The more fundamental complaint is that utilitarianism does not take seriously the separateness of persons, that it treats preferences rather

5 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press 1977), 231-9



570 Patrick Neal

than the persons having preferences as of decisive moral importance. Utilitarianism is said not to take seriously the dignity and autonomy attendant to moral personality, to be unable to account fully for the fact that the satisfaction of preferences has value only insofar as these are realized in the course of self-directed human activity. On a utilitarian theory of justice, it does not matter, except indirectly and contingently, how the sum of satisfactions is distributed among individuals.6

Now our question is how deontological versions of liberalism differ from utilitarianism in regard to the question of the good. In one sense, they clearly differ. Deontological liberalism limits the pursuit of the good, understood as the collective satisfaction of preferences, by prior principles of right, which are understood to yield basic individual rights or liberties which constrain the maximization of the satisfaction of preferences. Rights are trumps (Dworkin) or boundaries (Nozick) set- ting strict limits to what the state can legitimately do with regard to individuals. However, in regard to the question of the good understood as the question of what constitutes the good life for individuals, these versions of liberalism are similar, in maintaining that the state must be neutral in regard to this question. No conception of the good life held by an individual is politically privileged; all are to be treated equally. The two versions differ in regard to what it means to treat individuals equally, but cohere in treating the question of the good life as a matter of free individual choice. The only legitimate limit upon an individual's liberty to define and pursue his or her conception of the good is that he or she allow others the same liberty. The state is to provide a neutral framework for these pursuits by enforcing those measures necessary to their being carried out peacefully and orderly. There are, of course, differences between liberals as to what properly constitutes 'enforcement' here, ranging from defenses of the minimal state preventing force and fraud and securing contracts to defenses of the welfare state providing the material means necessary to the successful practical pursuit of individual ends. All agree, however, that the state is not to enforce or pursue any substantive conception of what constitutes the good life; individuals must be free to do this themselves.7

6 These criticisms are developed at length in Rawls, A Theory of Justice and Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (New York: Basic Books 1974).

7 I would argue that liberals need not (though some do) hold the (untenable) view that the substance of individual preferences is unaffected by the social or historical context within which the individuals holding them happen to live. What is distinc- tive about liberalism is the ontological thesis that individuals are the primary bearers




Yet if this is so, how can we speak of a liberal conception of the good? Apparently, liberalism prevents no one from pursuing his or her conception of the good; it simply prevents anyone from imposing his or her conception of the good upon anyone else, or from harming anyone else in the process of pursuing his or her conception of the good. Liberalism seems to be uniquely privileged in relation to other political theories, which, insofar as they do presume some substantive conception of the good as an ideal to be pursued, not only threaten the freedom of individuals as a matter of practice, but also take on the theoretical burden of somehow justifying and explaining just why what is therein conceptualized as the good life is in fact that. The appeal of liberalism thus has both a practical and theoretical aspect. Practical- ly, liberalism asks us to ask ourselves if we really want our lives struc- tured by an elite; would it not be better to be masters of our own destinies? Theoretically, liberalism beckons us hold on to our powers of critical reason, and avoid the temptation of succumbing to the doctrines of absolutism and their expositors who claim privileged insight into the meaning of the good. Where, after all, is the proof?

Now the first thing which ought to make us, and I mean liberals, too, skeptical about this characterization of the state of affairs in political theory is that it comes close to maintaining that liberalism is the only reasonable political morality there is. It is seen not as one among many political doctrines potentially open to reasonable assent, but as a uniquely privileged one which makes no controversial or substantive assumptions about the good life of man (admittedly a highly controversial question) where other political theories do. If this were true, it might well be unreasonable not to be a liberal. Liberals ought reflect upon whether anyone devoted to the exercise of critical reason, as they understand themselves to be, would want to commit themselves to such a position. Can we really be so sure that all those Thomists, Marx- ists, Straussians and neo-variants thereof are just misguided (at best, subversive at worst)? In any case, the characterization is not accurate. The liberal theory of the good may be defensible, but it does need defending, because prima facie it is no more plausible than any other.

How then does the liberal fail to be neutral regarding the question of the good? In a very special way - for although liberalism is neutral with regard to conceptions of the good, it has a very distinct conceptualiza-

of preferences; I take it that one may, without contradiction, maintain this thesis and yet grant that the particular substance of these preferences is intimately af- fected by the prevailing social and historical context. The difference between the two types of 'individualism' at issue here is artfully elaborated in Michael Sandel, Liberalism and the Limits of Justice (New York: Cambridge University Press 1982).



572 Patrick Neal

tion of what it means to have a conception of the good. At the second- order level of individual conceptions of the good, we may say that liberalism advocates and embodies the principle of neutrality. But there is nothing neutral about the first-order conceptualization of conceptions of the good which obtains in liberal theory. Liberalism, if it does not have a theory of the good, certainly has a meta-theory of the good.

On liberal theory, you can, at the second-order level, define for yourself and pursue any conception of the good which does not violate the liberty of others to do so as well. However, there are at least three things which are non-neutral about this conceptualization of conceptions of the good. They are (a) the way it conceptualizes the relation between a 'conception of the good' and those who possess or bear it, (b) the way it conceptualizes the meaning of 'a conception of the good/ and (c) the way it does linguistic, and hence theoretical, violence to alternative, non-liberal conceptualizations of 'conceptions of the good' when they are translated into the lanuage of liberal meta-theory.

Within liberal meta-theory, it is individuals who have, or possess, or bear conceptions of the good. These are conceptions of what ends they desire to pursue in the course of their lives. Now these ends can be shared with other individuals, but only in a particular sense. They can be shared contingently and aggregatively but not essentially and collectively. Let us explain these distinctions.

On the liberal meta-theory of the good, each individual is responsi- ble for defining his or her conception of the good. Now it may happen that the ends of life defining my good turn out to be the same as those defining yours. We may then be said to share a conception of the good. This sharing is, however, contingent upon our having chosen, as separate selves, ends which happen to cohere. Moreover, it may be that I define my ends with reference to yours, that is, that I understand my good to consist in the furtherance of those ends which you define as your good. This point is important; liberal meta-theory requires that individuals define for themselves their own good, their own ends. However, your conception of the good need not be selfish, or self-interested in the narow sense of egoistically desiring to maximize the successful pursuit of your desires or preferences at the expense of others'. Your conception of the good, your ends, may amount to attempting to maximize the successful pursuit of my ends. Liberal meta- theory, then, need not necessarily lead to egoism in the narrow sense.

You can, then, on liberal meta-theory, be a liberal altruist, desiring that my, or others', substantive ends be successfully pursued. However, what you cannot do is cease to have a conception of the good which is understood as being primarily possessed and defined by you as an individual, as a separate self. If you desire above all else to see me achieve the successful pursuit of my ends, then that is what you




have chosen to define as your good. The point is that this is your conception of the good, and only yours. It is not mine, and it is not ours, except in the special sense outlined above. We share certain ends because you as an individual happen to have contingently chosen to define your good with reference to my conception of the good. On liberal meta-theory, we cannot essentially share a conception of the good.

What does this mean, exactly? It means that you and I cannot speak, or understand ourselves, in the following way: we cannot say that we as separate selves have no conception of the good because we cannot understand ourselves (our selfs) except insofar as we are allowed to define and speak of them with reference to the conception of the good we (claim) to share. If we speak this way, we are claiming to share a conception of the good essentially, and not just contingently. We are saying that in the absence of the substantive relation between us (which we take to define our good), we are not selves, and cannot coherently understand ourselves as such. We are saying that we cannot, as separate selves, say what our good is, because we have no sense of self in the absence of the good we share, that good being the intrin- sic value of the relation between us. Liberal meta-theory prevents us from speaking this way because it requires that individuals be the primary bearers of conceptions of the good, whatever their substance may be. We are violating this requirement by reversing the order of ontological priority, claiming as we do that essentially shared conceptions of the good yield and define selves, and that in their absence there can be no separate selves to serve as the bearers of conceptions of the good.

Liberal meta-theory does not, however, simply silence those who wish to speak the language of essentially shared conceptions of the good. If this were the case, the non-neutraility of liberal meta-theory would be far easier to pinpoint and describe than it is. Liberalism con- tinues to allow us to speak, but asks that we translate our self- understanding, which as I have outlined it violates the grammatical rules of liberal meta-theory, into the language of that meta-theory.

Now there is no question that this can be done. All non-liberal meta- theories of the good can be translated into the language of liberal meta- theory so as to conform to the rules of expression therein. The question is whether such translations can be carried out without violence being done to the languages thereby assimilated. If this could be done, then the claim of neutrality upon the part of liberalism would be but- tressed. But it seems to me that it clearly cannot be done.

Consider our previous example. You and I wish to maintain that we share a conception of the good essentially, that is, in a way which is essential and prior to our understanding of ourselves as selves. Liberal



574 Patrick Neal

meta-theory is perfectly willing to accommodate the conception of the good we act upon; neutrality requires it (so far as it does not harm others, which we assume here it does not). All that is demanded of us is that we alter our self-understanding so that we conceptualize ourselves as partners who, as individuals, have chosen (freely, let us say) each of us to pursue a conception of the good which involves some degree, perhaps a very large one, of consideration, perhaps even sym- pathy and benevolance, for the aims and ends of the other. We can even go so far as to understand ourselves as liberal altruists toward each other, in that I define my good to consist of you achieving your ends, and you define yours reciprocally. What, aside from the curious prospect that as altruists on this model we may wind up frustrating ourselves in attempting to maximize the successful pursuit of each other's ends, is so bad about this? What has been lost in the translation?

From the point of view of liberal meta-theory, nothing. We are simply being asked to understand ourselves, each of us, as free and equal moral beings, each with conceptions of the good we wish to pursue. But from our point of view, we have lost something more, for our claim is quite simply that we cannot understand ourselves, we cannot make sense of ourselves as selfs, in this way. From our point of view, we cannot express who we are in the language of liberal meta-theory. To put the point another way: liberal meta-theory sees two selves and therefore sees necessarily two conceptions of the good (even if they are identical in substance, they still constitute two conceptions of the good); we see two selves because there is one conception of the good essentially shared by the two selves who understand themselves in terms of this shared relation.

Let us consider the case of Ralph. Ralph says that his conceptualization of conceptions of the good, his meta-theory of the good, differs fundamentally from the liberal one. Ralph maintains, let us say, that his conception of the good is the collective pursuit of those virtues understood as excellences within the Athenian polis. The liberal says this is fine; Ralph may pursue those virtues, whatever they are, and in company with others who choose to do so, just so long as he leaves other individuals free to pursue their ends. But Ralph objects; he claims that what is noteworthy about these virtues is not merely their substance, but the meta-theory of the good they presuppose. He claims that these virtues cannot be pursued within the neutral framework of the liberal state, and he therefore claims that that framework is not in fact neutral. They can be pursued, the good as he understands it can be pursued, only insofar as this pursuit is collectively undertaken upon the basis of essentially shared ends which are understood by the participants to be definitive of themselves as selves. Ralph claims that it is a necessary condition of his pursuing virtue that everyone else




pursue a conception of the good which serves to identify these virtues as such.

The liberal objects; Ralph, it is said, simply wants to impose his conception of the good upon everyone else. If Ralph has a preference for a certain set of virtues, he is free to pursue them as best he can; but Ralph is supposing himself superior to others in wanting to impose these virtues, his conception of the good, on everyone else. But Ralph will object that this is not what he is saying, or at least trying to say. Ralph claims that it is not a conception of his good, of his preferences, which he is trying to express, but rather a meta-theory of the good, one which holds that the good for any individual cannot properly be understood as the personally possessed set of ends he or she desires to pursue, but must instead be understood as a set of essentially shared collective ends. Ralph claims that he cannot pursue the good as he understands it within a liberal framework because his conceptualization of conceptions of the good denies the very thing which liberalism presupposes - that conceptions of the good are born primarily by separate selves.

Ralph will be at pains to try to get the liberal to see the following crucial point; that he is not, in advocating such a meta-theory of the good, pressing his personal interests, his individual ends as a separate self. He is pressing not a conception of the good, but a conceptualization of conceptions of the good, which, he submits is not applicable simply to him but to everyone. Ralph is arguing not for the satisfaction of his ends, but for a meta-theory of the good. Yet it is just this distinction which is denied him from within the language of the liberal meta-theory of the good, for therein no such distinction can be made. The liberal will be prone to translate Ralph's first-order, meta-theory of the good into an expression of a second-order conception of the good and situate it within the universe of individually defined and possessed ends. Again, there is no question that this can be done; but what happens is that an alternative meta-theory of the good is not allowed to express itself as such. Now, we may judge this a good thing, or we may not; but judgment is required here, because the translation of Ralph's meta-theory of the good into the liberal language of neutrality is not itself neutral. It is, if anything, neutralizing.

It may be objected here that 'essentially shared conceptions of the good' which define selves need not necessarily be good in an evaluative sense.8 1, let us say, may not be able to understand myself except in

8 See, in this regard, D.J.C. Carmichael, 'Agent-Individualism: A Critique of the

Logic of Liberal Political Understanding' (Dissertation, University of Toronto 1978).



576 Patrick Neal

terms of the essentially shared relation of love which characterizes my marriage; but you, and perhaps even I at some future point in time, may not be able to understand yourself (myself) and express who you are (I am) except in terms of an essentially shared relation of hatred with your (my) spouse. The relation may turn out to be an essentially shared evil rather than an essentially shared good. However, it is questionable whether the liberal can marshall the linguistic resources necessary to consistently level this complaint. He rules out essentially shared conceptions of the good not because they are good or evil, but because they are essentially shared. I have thus far followed liberalism in defining 'the good' formally, without content, as that which is prefer- red. I have simply claimed that to understand 'the good' even in this formal sense as individually defined and possessed by separate selves is to rule out a conceptualization of the good as essentially shared and definitive of selves.

But this in itself is a bit curious. It is bound to strike common sense as odd that the liberal conceptualization of the good makes no distinction between good and bad conceptions of the good. The good which I define and pursue as a separate self may encompass any and all ends; except those the pursuit of which entails overriding the liberty of others. This refusal to discriminate amongst ends in terms of their substantive meaning is, of course, necessary if there is to be neutrality at the second-order level of individually possessed and defined conceptions of the good. But the non-liberal will complain that this is to assimilate the language of good to the language of preferences. 'Good,' within liberal meta-theory, is severed from its relations with the family of concepts within which it is embedded in ordinary discourse, such as the antonyms 'evil' and 'bad,' and the synonyms 'proper,' and 'righteous.' And it is no accident that the terms synonymous with 'good' in ordinary language are normatively positive, the terms antonymous normatively negative. These conceptual relations reflect and consitutive- ly express our practices of normative assessment and judgment, wherein the concept of 'good' finds its home in practical life. 'Preferences,' on the other hand, is, as one should expect given its role in liberal meta-theory, a concept without any straightforward attach- ment to these normative practices. We may hold that it is a good thing, prima facie, that preferences be satisfied rather than frustrated, but 'preferences' has no relation with synonyms or antonymns which are clearly normative. Indeed, it is not clear that 'preferences' has any antonyms at all. While it is not manifestly absurd to say that 'John's ends are bad,' or that 'John's ends are evil,' it would seem absurd to say that 'John has no preferences,' and it is nearly impossible to cite a word which is the antonym of 'preferences' and which has a normatively negative meaning such that one could replace 'bad' and 'evil' in the




locutions above with it. The only thing I can come up with is something like 'John has anti-preferences/ but I don't know what this could mean.

I do not wish to argue here that these considerations somehow demonstrate the absurdity of liberal theory. The point is that when the concept of 'good' is translated into the language of liberal meta- theory so that 'conceptions of the good' become equivalent to preferr- ing some ends and desiring to see them achieved, a dimension of the meaning of this concept as it occurs in practical language is purged. The dimension is that of the normative assessment and judgment of ends qua ends. In the language of liberal meta-theory, no one can have a conception of the bad; they can have only a conception of the good. Other individuals may be of the opinion that one's conception of the good is normatively good or bad, but this is simply an expression of their preferences regarding the preferences of others, and is not to receive public expression through the state practically, or through the terms of liberal meta-theory.

Now this purging may, all things considered, turn out to be a good thing. But that is just the point. It is a purging, or, if you wish, a translation which is less than neutral (or pure) in that it changes the meaning of the concepts involved, and this translating activity stands in need of explicit defense. To put the point another way: the translation of the good as normative concept into the good as neutral concept equivalent to 'preferences' is not itself neutral, but is rather normative in that the meaning of the concept is changed thereby.

This problem of translation can be seen as well with regard to other conceptualizations of concepts which non-liberals fail to share with liberals. Consider, for example, the apparently innocent conceptualization of 'teleological' theories of justice as those which define the right as that which maximizes the good. But then accounts which differ fundamentally in terms of their conceptualizations of 'the good' are rendered similar to one another for purposes of analysis. Once 'teleology' is translated into a neutral, formal term, it is detached from the other linguistic and theoretical contexts from within which it takes on particular meanings. In being formalized, the concept is not, however, left without a context; it is rather placed in a particular context, that of the formal grammar of liberal meta-theory. So, for example, Aristotle comes to be understood as advocating the maximation of a substantive conception of the good which he happened to hold and desired to see pursued; Aristotle, like everyone else, had some preferences. Yet it is highly questionable whether Aristotle's understanding of the good can be so conceptualized without losing its essential character. The good, as I understand Aristotle to have understood it, must be seen within the context of a teleological conception of nature, goodness being the imminent unfolding of the purposes therein, vir-



578 Patrick Neal

tue being the active recognition and affirmation of these through the recognition of oneself as a participant part of that nature. This caricature may do less than justice to Aristotle, and even insofar as it is accurate there is much within that is contentious; yet it would seem to me that to translate this meta-theory of the good into the language of personally defined and possessed ends is to eviscerate it. Aristotle becomes a teleologist without what he would understand to be a teleology; a utilitarian who happens to have advocated the maximization of a substantive conception of the second-order good, in contrast to those utilitarians who advocate the maximization of preference satisfaction generally. Compared to them, Aristotle cannot help but appear as narrow-minded, as one whose preference is simply to see others prefer his preferences.

Let me now try to sum up the point I have been trying, in various ways, to express. Liberalism understands itself to be a political theory which permits no substantive conception of what constitutes the good life for individuals to take public, political priority over any other; it is hence neutral with regard to the question of the good. I have argued that this liberal theory of neutrality regarding the good presupposes a meta-theory of the good which is not neutral. That meta-theory holds that conceptions of the good are properly understood as the individually defined and possessed ends which separate selves pursue. Whether they are shared and pursued collectively, or dissimilar and pursued antagonistically, is a contingent question of fact depending upon what substantive ends happen to have been chosen. This meta-theory is non- neutral because it necessarily rules out any alternative meta-theory which denies that a 'conception of the good' can be properly understood as the ends which separate selves define and pursue. One such alternative is that I ascribed to Ralph, who maintains that 'conceptions of the good' are properly understood as essentially, and not just contingently, shared relations which are primarily definitive of, and not primarily defined by, individual selves. Ralph does not say conceptions of the good are chosen; he says they are recognized.

The reason this point is so easy to miss, and by implication the reason debates between liberals and their critics in regard to neutrality often go awry, is that it is so easy, not to say tempting, to translate alternative first-order meta-theories of the good into the language of liberal meta-theory as second-order conceptions of the good, and transform them thereby into what they are not - the substantive ends thought worthy of pursuit by a particular individual.

Now it is possible for translations to be carried out in the other direc- tion, as, say, when it is claimed that the liberal meta-theory of the good is in fact a rationalization of an impoverished form of life, say that of consumerist capitalism. Nothing I have said thus far provides grounds




for this, or any other, normatively negative assessment of the liberal meta-theory of the good. Of course, nothing said thus far necessarily lends support to liberal meta-theory either.

The choice, if choice is the proper word here, between alternative meta-theories of the good is in (at least) one key respect different from the individual choice of a conception of the good within liberal meta- theory. The choice of a conception of the good, of personal ends, within the language of liberal meta-theory leaves every other individual at liberty to do the same. It is understood as a private choice, one without public, political consequence for the choices of others. But the decision to speak the language of that meta-theory is not without public consequence; for if the good is a matter for private individual choice, then it is not a matter for public political determination. There is no neutral ground here, no 'meta-meta-' theory to which further appeal in the name of neutrality can be made. If we are to speak of the good, then we have to speak; only the skeptic has the false luxury of remain- ing silent. Alternative meta-theories provide different languages for speaking of the good; but to speak any one of them is not to speak the others, and this is as true of the language of liberal meta-theory as it is of any other. The politics of neutrality is conducted within a language which is, like its competitors, non-neutral; those who do not speak it as a matter of course in liberal societies are provided, sometimes against their wishes, with a translator. In the last analysis, that translator is the state.

I want now to conclude by raising the issue of how a liberal might abandon the thesis of neutrality and yet remain a liberal by defending the language of liberal meta-theory. This is, I believe, what Hobbes does in Leviathan. Hobbes has as good a claim as anyone to be the father of the liberal meta-theory of the good. In Chapter 15, he writes:

For Moral Philosophy is nothing else but the Science of what is Good, and Evill, in the conversation, and Society of mankind. Good, and Evill, are names that signifie our Appetites, and Aversions; which in different tempers, customes, and doctrines of men, are different: And divers men, differ not onely in their judgment, on the senses of what is pleasant, and unpleasant to the tast, smell, hearing, touch, and sight; but also of what is conformable, or disagreeable to Reason, in the ac- tions of common life. Nay, the same man, in divers times, differs from himself e; and one time praiseth, that is, calleth Good, what another time he dispraiseth, and calleth Evill: From whence arise Disputes, Controversies, and at last War. And therefore so long as man is in the condition of mere Nature, (which is a condition of War,) as private Appetite is the measure of Good, and Evill: and conse-

quently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good, and therefore also the way, or means of Peace ....9

9 Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan, C. B. Macpherson, ed., (Harmonds worth: Penguin Books 1968), Pt. I, ch. 15, 216



580 Patrick Neal

Good and Evill, then, are names used by individuals to describe their appetites and aversions, or, if we strip away the psychology here, their preferences. Now although Hobbes says, in this passage, that 'conse- quently all men agree on this, that Peace is good/ and that therefore they accept his moral philosophy as true and speak its language ow- ing to this happy contingent sharing of at least one big end, he knows perfectly well that this is not so, that there is nothing this obviously neutral about the neutral language of the good he proposes to have everyone speak. That is why Leviathan requires a sword. And Hob- bes also knows that, in spite of his efforts toward rationally explaining to everyone why it is in their interest to speak this language, not everyone will. That is why the sword is a sharp one - the force of words being too weak not only to hold men to the performance of their covenants, but too weak to force men to make them in the first place. The coercion endemic to political practice based upon the liberal meta- theory of the good is open and explicit in Hobbes, not obscured within the language of neutrality. So, for example, Hobbes does not translate Aristotle into the language of liberal meta-theory and allow him to speak as a 'perfectionist'; he declares him an enemy of the state and banishes him. In the same Chapter 15 where he says that 'conse- quently all men agree on this, that Peace is Good,' he spends most of his time trying to rationally persuade those who manifestly do not agree with this (the fool, the rebel and the saint)10 of the folly of their ways.

Those arguments are unconvincing, or at least will convince only those who are not fools, rebels and saints to begin with. But Hobbes is aware of this. The real argument against fools, rebels and saints, or against anyone who resists the language of liberal meta-theory, is the Leviathan considered as a rhetorical whole, which I understand to be the attempt to jolt resisters into a transformation of their self- understanding through the vicarious experience of their own death, an experience with which Hobbes attempts to provide them. However powerful that attempt, the vicarious experience of death is not the real thing. So the ultimate argument against fools, saints and their fellow travellers is no argument at all - it is the sword. Those who fail to heed the lessons of Leviathan, and refuse either to speak the language of liberal meta-theory or avail themselves of a translator, will learn the lessons the hard way - from Leviathan, who imposes silence.

10 Hobbes speaks explicitly of the Foole in Chapter 14. 'Rebel7 and 'Saint/ however, are my terms; were Hobbes to give a personified label to his arguments, he would

surely choose different terms, i.e. what I have labelled the argument of the saint, he would label the ravings of a (dangerous) fanatic.




Hobbes's case in support of the language of liberal meta-theory, whatever one's judgment may be, has its merits. It is an argument, in that it is conscious of the need to defend the language of the good it propounds. It is conscious that the language is a particular one. And it makes no bones about the coercion necessary to ensure that the language be rendered practically effective in the 'Conversation and Society of Mankind.' It is, to my mind, the most powerful argument in defense of liberalism yet expounded; the Bill 101 of the liberal way of life, designed to ensure its survival.

Liberals need not agree with that judgment; but if not, they ought to offer an argument in its stead, one which purports to explain why it is not only good to speak the liberal language of the good, but to require others to do so as well. At the least, they ought not suppose that the language of neutrality regarding the good is itself neutral - and that not simply because they are thereby less than neutral toward their critics, but because they do less than justice to the liberalism they would defend.

Received October, 1985 Revised April 1986



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A Liberal Theory of the Good?

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