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A Non-Monetary Protocol for P2P Content Distribution in Wireless Broadcast
Networks with Network Coding
I-Hong Hou, Yao Liu, and Alex Sprintson
Dept. of ECE, TAMU
Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally instead of getting all packets from the base station
A BA,B
A,B
Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally instead of getting all packets from the base station
A BA,B
A,BA B
Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally instead of getting all packets from the base station
A BA,B
A,BA B
A B
Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally instead of getting all packets from the base station
A BA
B
A B
Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally instead of getting all packets from the base station
A BA
B
A
B
Benefits of Wireless P2P
• Exchange data locally requires less power• Reduce power consumption• Reduce interference• Increase spatial reuse and hence total
system capacity
• Reduce the amount of data from BS• Reduce cost
Incentives in P2P
• People benefit from “receiving” data, not “transmitting” data
• A policy is needed to make people contribute• Tic-for-tac exchange between 2 peers
A BNeed: B Need: A
Incentives in P2P
• People benefit from “receiving” data, not “transmitting” data
• A policy is needed to make people contribute• Tic-for-tac exchange between 2 peers
A BNeed: B Need: A
A
B
Free Rider Problem
• The broadcast wireless channels make it a little bit more tricky…
A
A
B
BNeed: BNeed: A
…….
…….
Free Rider Problem
A
A
B
BA B
• The broadcast wireless channels make it a little bit more tricky…
• The broadcast wireless channels make it a little bit more tricky…
Free Rider Problem
A
A
B
BA
A
B
B Free Riders!
Contributions
• Propose a non-monetary protocol for wireless P2P networks
• Address the free rider by incentivizing nodes to contribute
• Derive closed-form Nash Equilibrium• Propose a distributed mechanism that
converges to the Nash Equilibrium• Incorporate network coding
A Model for Incentives
For every packet I download, I want:• Make as few transmissions as possible• Minimize the inter-packet delay, or,
equivalently, maximize download rate
A Model for Incentives
My cost function:
gn{avg. transmissions per download}
+wn{avg. inter-download delay}
gn: price for transmission
wn: price for waiting
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
TimeTime
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
backoff
backoff
TimeTime
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
Time up
backoff
TimeTime
Have: A Need: B
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
backoff
backoff
TimeTime
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
backoff
Time up
TimeTime
B
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
TimeTime
A
B
B
Protocol Illustration
A
A
B
B
TimeTime
B
B
A
A
Protocol for Bilateral File Exchange
• Two files, A and B, in the system• The protocol consists of rounds• In the beginning of a round, nodes need B
secretly picks a backoff time• The node n with the smallest backoff time
transmits a control packet after backoff• Nodes that need A secretly picks a backoff
time• The node m with the smallest backoff time
exchanges with n
Why the Protocol Works?
For every packet I download, I want:• Make as few transmissions as possible• Minimize the inter-packet delay, or,
equivalently, maximize download rate
If I pick a large backoff time• More likely that I don’t transmit
• Longer delay
Performance Analysis
• Only two files in the system• Strategy of node n that needs A: Choose
backoff time as an exponential variable with mean
• Theorem: This strategy is a Nash Equilibrium• Average amount of time on backoff:
Performance Analysis
• Only two files in the system• Strategy of node n that needs A: Choose
backoff time as an exponential variable with mean
Need to know the parameters of all other nodes!
A Distributed Mechanism
• I don’t know other nodes’ strategies• I can estimate them by monitoring
system history• Update my strategy accordingly
Theorem• The mechanism converges to a Nash
Equilibrium• Node’s cost decreases with each update
Simulation Setup
• 10 nodes need A, and 10 nodes need B• gn=1, wn uniformly distributed between [1,2]
• Each node decides its initial policy by assuming that there are 100 nodes that need the same file as it does, and all nodes have the same value of wn as itself
• Each node uses the mechanism to update its strategy
Simulation Results
Performance Analysis
• Only two files in the system• Strategy of node n that needs A: Choose
backoff time as an exponential variable with mean
• Theorem: This strategy is a Nash Equilibrium• Average amount of time on backoff:
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C
backoff backoff
backoff backoff
backoffbackoff
B C
B C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C
Time up backoff
backoff backoff
backoffbackoff
B C
B C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B C
Have: A, B Need: C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
Cbackoff backoff
backoffbackoff
B C
B C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
Cbackoff backoff
backoffTime up
B C
B C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B CC
C C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B C
A B+
C C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B C
A B+B = A-
B
B
C C
Incorporating Network Coding for Multiple Files
AA BB
A
A
C
C B C
B C
A B+ B = A-
B
B
C C
A
A
Performance Analysis for Network Coding
• Theorem: When there are multiple files with network coding employed, and every node chooses its backoff time as an exponential random variable, the Nash Equilibrium can be computed by solving a series of linear equations
Conclusions
• We propose a non-monetary protocol to address the free rider problem in wireless P2P networks
• The core idea is to apply random backoff• Derive closed-form Nash Equilibrium• Propose a distributed mechanism for
convergence• Extend the protocol to incorporate network
coding