A Overview of Software - Springer978-1-84628-717-6/1.pdf · A Overview of Software A.1 Introduction...

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Overview of Software

A.1 Introduction

Quite extensive software tools have become available over the last 10 – 15 years. A brief overview over some of the main tools which are oriented towards offshore/oil and gas applications are presented in this appendix. These tools have been categorised into the following:

QRA software QRA software tools for scenario and probability analysis QRA software tools for consequence analysis Risk management software Qualitative risk assessment software Reporting and analysis of incidents and accidents.

Brief summaries are presented as an overview, followed by brief sections presen-ting some of the main characteristics of these products. These summaries have been prepared by the software vendors. Only those products are detailed where a response was received from the vendors. The descriptions are structured as follows:

Name and purpose of software Scope of software License conditions, pricing etc

It should be stressed that there is a large amount of general software tools for CFD from many different suppliers. These have not been included in the presentations that follow throughout this appendix. Some of these may have quite valid applications during estimation of loads from fire or explosion, or for gas dispersion or oil slick movements. Because there are so many software tools available in this

524 Appendix A: Overview of Software

category, it becomes impossible to give an overview of all relevant tools. None of these are therefore included.

Software tools that are only directed at onshore usage are not included in the reviews, neither are tools for production/transport regularity analysis.

All software tools that are mentioned in the following are commercially available from the vendor as listed.

Table A.1. Overview of software for quantitative risk analysis

Software Purpose Contact ASAP® 3D geometrical description and analysis of a

fixed set of event trees Lilleaker Consulting, Oslo, Norway

COSAC® Risk assessment tool for early project phases of a field development for concept evaluation and screening

Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller,Norway

CRA Tool® Risk assessment tool to rapidly risk rank various offshore development concepts

Atkins, Glasgow, UK

NEPTUNE® Comprehensive Offshore Quantitative Risk Assessment software

DNV Software, London, UK

PLATO® 3D geometrical platform model, analysing explicitly development and timing of esca-lating hazards, fire, explosion and structural collapse

EnvironmentalResourcesManagement, London, UK

RiskSpect-rum®

Fault tree and event tree software Relcon, Stockholm, Sweden

RISK® Comprehensive offshore quantitative risk assessment tool

ERS Technology, UK

SAFETI® Comprehensive QRA tool for Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Impact


A.2 Electronic Contacts

The following is a listing of electronic contacts to the software providers:

ERS Technology, UK www.erstechnology.com Lilleaker Consulting, Norway www.lilleaker.com Century Dynamics, Horseham, UK www.autoreagas.com DNV Software, london, UK www.dnv.com Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway www.safetec.no Atkins, Glasgow, UK www.atkinsglobal.com/oilandgas EQE, London, UK www.eqe.co.uk Fire Safety Design, Sweden www.fsd.se Four Elements, London, UK www.erm.com Prediction Technologies Inc www.prediction–technologies.com Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway www.scandpower.no Atkins, Bristol, UK www.atkinsglobal.com

Appendix A: Overview of Software 525

Table A.2. Overview of QRA software for scenario and probability risk analysis

Software Purpose Contact BlowFAM® Evaluation of blowout risk during specific

well operations Scandpower, Kjeller, Norway

COAST® Shipping traffic database, using GIS for user interface and graphical pres. of information on shipping routes and vessel characteristics

Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway

COLLIDE® Analysis of collision risk between vessels and platforms


DATABASEMANAGER®

For storage, handling, and display of reliability analysis data

ERS Technology, UK

EGRESS® Mustering and evacuation simulation for evacuation/rescue modelling

ERS Technology, UK

LEAK® Calculation of the frequency of leaks at an installation


RDAT–Plus® Bayesian data analysis Prediction Techno-logies, MD, USA

CARA–FaultTree®

Fault tree analysis and construction Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway

Table A.3. Overview of QRA software for consequence analysis

Software Purpose Contact AutoReaGas® CFD–based explosion simulation Century Dynamics,

Horseham, UK FIREX® Empirical prediction of main fire

characteristics and responses Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller,Norway

FLACS® Explosion simulation Gexcon, Bergen, N KAMELEONFireEx–KFX®

Fire and gas dispersion simulation ComputIT, Trondheim, Norway

MONA® Advanced tool for simulation of single–comp. multiphase systems


OLGA® Transient multiphase flow simulator for systems comprising flow lines, risers and process equipment.


PHAST® Windows–based toolkit for determi-nation of consequences of accidental releases of hazardous material


Gexcon, Bergen, Norway www.gexcon.com ComputIT, Trondheim, Norway www.computit.no Relcon, Stockholm, Sweden www.relcon.se Scandpower Petroleum Technology, Norway www.scandpowerpt.com


Table A.4. Overview of software for qualitative risk analysis

Software Purpose Contact PHA–Pro® Hazard recording and reporting tool,

including four Process Hazard Analysis techniques; HAZOP, What If/Checklist, FMEA and Preliminary Hazard Analysis


PHAROS® Integration of job hazard analysis process with the Permit to Work System

EQE, London, UK

Kyrass® Safety management through a hazards register


Sabaton® FMEA and FMECA analysis Safetec Nordic, Trondheim, Norway

Table A.5. Overview of software for accident/incident analysis

Software Purpose Contact ProSafe® Registration of information from unplanned

occurrences, including analysis and reporting capabilities for trends and patterns to be defined

EQE, London, UK

Synergi® Registration analysis and reporting of information from incidents, accidents and unplanned occurrences

Pride, Stavanger, Norway

A.3 Quantitative Risk Analysis Software

A.3.1 ASAP®

The following is a brief description of this software, the function, vendor, pricing and main features.

Function 3D geometrical description and analysis of a fixed set ofevent trees

Vendor Lillesoft a.s., Baerum, Norway Pricing License fee using ASAP on the Lillesoft Terminal Server:

NOK 160,000 (12 months) NOK 90 000 (6 months)NOK 50,000 (3 months)NOK 20,000 (1 month) Prices valid through 2006.

ASAP® is a computer analysis package that calculates the risk related to hydrocar-bon leaks, fires and explosions on oil and gas installations. Complex interactions in horizontal and vertical directions are taken care of by adjusting the models to three–dimensional geometry. Scenarios such as gas and liquid jets followed by gas dispersion and fire development can be seen in 3D graphic, giving a good interpre-tation of the accident.


Table A.6. Overview of risk management software

Software Purpose Contact Hazard Log DatabaseManagement®

Registration and management of hazards Atkins, Bristol, UK

PRISM® Audit tool for Safety Management Assessment of Safety Management performance

ERS Technology, UK

Riskplot II® Risk summation and presentation tool, including outputs of risk contours, F–N data, risk transects and a listing of dominant events

Four Elements, London, UK

ORBITOffshore®

Computer system designed to support the analysis work related to Risk Based Inspection, RBI, for offshore topside systems


BowTieXP® Management of major risks to people, the environment, assets and reputation by means of Abow–tie@ graphical interface diagram

Governors BV, Netherlands

THESIS Management of major risks to people, the environment, assets and reputation by means of “bow–tie” graphical interface diagram

ABS Consulting, Warrington, UK

ASAP® consists of a design package, physical and statistical models along with design interface models. The latter constitutes the connection between the physical models and the design. In the design package the user designs the geometry of the installation and the process flow diagram for equipment containing hydrocarbons. All the models are intelligent in the sense that they automatically adjust to the geometry and logic the user defines. This implies that design changes and concept development are catered for in a fast and consistent manner by the program.

ASAP® is currently being re–designed to cope with transient analysis of gas dispersion, detection, ignition and equipment escalation according to NORSOK Z–013 and Statoil/Norsk Hydro internal Guideline for protection of pressurised systems exposed to fire.

A.3.2 COSAC®


Function Risk assessment tool for early project phases of a field deve-lopment for concept evaluation and screening

Vendor Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway Pricing NOK 120,000 per license.


COSAC® is a computerised tool for efficient risk assessment in the early project phases of a field development.

COSAC® analysis and results are tailor-made for concept evaluation and screening. Its aim is to increase the safety of new offshore developments by utilising 20 years of experience gained from risk analyses. Some of the main features of COSAC® include reducing uncertainty, improving the quality and efficiency of early phase safety evaluations. COSAC® provides a safety score for every risk factor associated with an offshore field development concept. A low score indicates safety concerns and/or lack of documentation of important safety issues. Therefore, a low safety score in COSAC® puts these issues in focus. In addition the user is provided with information on how to resolve the problems identified by COSAC®.

A.3.3 CRA Tool®


Function Fast track risk tool that can be used in the assessment ofvarious offshore oil & gas concepts

Vendor Atkins, Glasgow, UK Pricing Contact vendor for information.

The Concept Risk Assessment (CRA) Tool® focuses on the key parameters that drive the risk levels in new offshore oil and gas developments. The model was developed in conjunction with BP and Shell, driven by a requirement to rapidly rank large numbers of concepts in terms of their risks to the asset, personnel and the environment.

The tool has been used to assist in the selection of the best concept for around thirty new oil, gas and condensate developments in the North Sea and worldwide. The novelty is that the risk assessment is based on a number of pre–processed risk building blocks for each item of hazardous equipment. These are then moderated by gearing factors to take account of specific aspects of the design.

A.3.4 NEPTUNE®


Function Offshore risk analysis Vendor DNV Software, London, UK Pricing Available upon request

Neptune® is the successor to OHRAT, and was released in 1999. Neptune® is a comprehensive software tool for designing, calculating and providing full tracea-bility of a quantitative risk assessment. The system architecture has been designed to give maximum flexibility with respect to system configurations (client/server,


distributed solutions, data communication, and web solutions). Neptune® contains models for calculation of discharge, dispersion, pool formation and evaporation, flammable and toxic effects and impact. Also contained with Neptune® are models designed for the specific needs of offshore installations, such as smoke generation, endangerment of muster areas, collision with ships, and many more. In addition, special attention has been given to allow users to incorporate new models. Neptune® offers flexible modelling of hazards and risks through a wide range of analytic capabilities including consequence modelling, event tree modelling, leak frequency calculations, sensitivity and what–if analysis. Neptune® is based on a very simple concept; data flows from one model to another model along specified paths. Data is input only once, and if a change is made anywhere within the study this will be carried along the specified paths and affect the rest of the study. Neptune® operates under MS–Windows® and has tools like Excel® (incl. Visual Basic®) fully integrated.

A.3.5 PLATO


Function 3D geometrical platform model including representation ofsafety related engineering components and design features,analysing explicitly development and timing of escalating hazards, fire, explosion and structural collapse

Vendor Environmental Resources Management (ERM), London, UK Pricing GBP 36,000 (leasing schemes also available)

Optional annual maintenance: GBP 3,000 per year (telephone support and free minor software revisions).

PLATO uses a 3D model of the platform in which all safety related engineering components and design features are explicitly represented. The development and timing of escalating hazards such as fire, explosion and structural collapse are simulated with automatic generation of scenarios where safety related components affect the outcome. Results can be processed not only for the overall level of socie-tal and individual risk but also to determine the primary escalation mechanisms and key safety critical equipment. The primary benefits over event tree methods are modelling realism, auditability, explicit representation of geometry/time and ease of update for evaluation of design options or platform modifications.

A.3.6 RiskSpectrum®


Function Fault tree and event tree software Vendor Relcon AB, Stockholm, Sweden Pricing Contact RELCON for pricing.


RiskSpectrum® PSA Professional offers an intuitive user interface for modelling everything from the basic fault tree with AND and OR–gates to advanced fault tree and event tree integration of sequences in linked event trees with boundary condi-tions and CCF events.

The integrated analysis tool (RSAT) is specially designed for solving large PSA models and offers MCS (minimal cut set), sensitivity, importance and time dependent analysis. RiskSpectrum® PSA Professional also includes an MCS editor and an advanced post-processing function. The software has the following analysis functions:

Powerful analysis functions based on a fast cut set algorithm, which generates and stores minimal cut sets (MCS). For any existing MCS–table, RiskSpectrum® calculate uncertainty, impor-tance, sensitivity, and time dependent reliability measures. Analyses can be carried out on several levels: Any fault tree gate, any indi-vidual event tree sequence, any consequence (every event tree sequence can be assigned one or more consequences, e.g. a plant damage state). An analysis case can specify a ‘boundary condition set’ which includes a list of logical settings to apply to the model. The boundary condition set can include settings of true/false state for house events, basic events and gates. This is very useful both for running analysis of the same base model, but with different variations, or for sensitivity analysis. Analysis groups can be used for defining complex sets of up to thousands of analysis runs carried out in an automated sequence. This is particularly valuable when re–calculating the entire PSA. Success top events in event trees are handled both qualitatively and quanti-tatively.

RiskSpectrum® Professional is specially designed to fulfil the demands for complete Probabilistic Safety Assessment (PSA) software tool for nuclear power installations.

Linking between event trees and fault trees, and linking of “chains” of event trees House events and exchange events for complex variations of a base model, which makes it easy to manage different plant configurations, specialisa-tion of models for different initiating events and/or different accident sequences. These features are particularly valuable in carrying out external event analyses. CCF groups for automated CCF quantification based on several different CCF models.

Fully graphical event and fault tree editors and inherent Windows functions such as cut, copy, paste and drag–and–drop makes RiskSpectrum® Professional easy to learn and use.

RiskSpectrum® Professional uses an ‘open’ database format utilising the Microsoft Access format. Each of the database tables is essentially ‘unlimited’ in


terms of number of records, except the obvious limit in available space on the storage media (hard disk).

A.3.7 RISK®


Function Comprehensive offshore quantitative risk assessment tool Vendor ERS Technology, UK Pricing Not available.

RISK® is a linked spreadsheet QRA model developed on EXCEL®. It enables users to clearly identify the key stages of the risk assessment process and follow individual major hazard events from their initiation, through accident development, to the contribution they make to accident scenarios, TR Impairment, individual risk and PLL. Key features of RISK® are:

Developed using industry standard spreadsheet software package (EXCEL®).Is user friendly and can be interrogated by engineers without the need for formal training. Is easy to tailor to meet specific project requirements. Is transparent and focuses on key scenarios at an appropriate level of detail.

A.3.8 SAFETI®


Function Comprehensive QRA software tool for flammable, explosive and toxic impact

Vendor DNV Software, London, UK Pricing Available on request.

SAFETI® (Software for the Assessment of Flammable, Explosive and Toxic Im-pact) is the most comprehensive and widely used onshore QRA package available. It is a Windows® based system that provides a user friendly, industry standard method for quantifying major chemical risks. It enables analysis of the likelihood and severity of major hazards and makes use of the PHAST® models to predict the consequence of major releases. By combining these with their frequencies and taking account of population location and density, along with ignition source location for flammable and explosive effects, a number of presentations of 'risk' are possible. These include risk contours, F/N curves, risk transects and risk ranking at specific points.


A.4 QRA Tools for Scenario and Probability Analysis

A.4.1 BlowFAM®


Function Evaluation of blowout risk during specific well operationsthrough assessment of approximately 300 elements, whichinfluence the probability of a blowout

Vendor Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway Pricing License condition: Price NOK 120,000. Requires

membership of ‘Sintef Offshore Blowout Batabase’. Membership of BlowFAM steering committee: NOK 250,000 (includes three user licences). Use of BlowFAM® in projects on royalty basis: NOK 40,000.

BlowFAM® is a PC–tool for evaluation of blowout risk during specific well opera-tions. BlowFAM® has been developed in close co–operation with drilling/well intervention professionals in the participating companies. In addition, drilling specialists from several contractor companies have contributed.

The BlowFAM® model has identified approximately 300 elements, that influence the probability of a blowout. Many of these are applicable for the whole well life while others are only relevant for a specific well phase, e.g. drilling of the well. These elements are rated in regard to their importance to the risk. Main risk contributors for a specific development can be identified and cost–efficient risk reducing measures may be implemented.

The BlowFAM® model is also a valuable tool for communicating risk elements to the drilling professionals involved in the well operations.

A.4.2 COAST®


Function Shipping traffic database holding details on regular shippingtraffic on the Norwegian and UK Continental Shelves as well as other areas of the world. Includes graphical presentation ofinformation on shipping routes and vessel characteristics using GIS

Vendor Safetec Nordic, Norway Pricing Not available.

COAST® is a shipping traffic database that operates on a GIS platform, and holds detailed information on the regular shipping traffic on the Norwegian and UK continental shelves, as well as other areas of the world. The data in COAST® is presented as shipping routes, where each route contains information such as the


annual number of vessels on the route, distribution of vessel types and sizes, route width (std. dev.), etc. COAST® facilitates searches around user–defined positions to identify the traffic pattern, traffic density and vessel characteristics inside the search area, as well as distance and bearing from the search position. The GIS program automatically plots the identified routes on electronic charts.

COAST® was developed by Safetec during 1995/96 in a project funded by UKOOA, HSE and DETR and successfully achieved its main objective which was to provide a comprehensive, up–to–date and easy to use database on shipping movements which could be used to assess risks between shipping and offshore installations in UK waters. In 2002 COAST Norway® was developed, funded by the OLF, providing a much more comprehensive and detailed coverage of Norwegian waters, in addition to the North Sea.

The main data sources for COAST® are Lloyd’s port log data, AIS data, radar data and a large number of traffic surveys. Additional surveys and data collections are undertaken each year to maintain the accuracy of the system. A new platform for COAST® is being developed, to meet the requirements of new and much more comprehensive data sources that have become available.

A.4.3 COLLIDE®


Function Analysis of collision risk between vessels and platforms Vendor Safetec Nordic, Norway Pricing Not available.

COLLIDE® is a collision risk tool developed by Safetec under the sponsorship of offshore operators in the UK, Norwegian, Danish, German and Dutch sectors to assist in the assessment of ship collision risk. The tool has the primary function of calculating the frequency and consequence of ship impacts against any offshore structure.

The system provides models for assessing the risks associated with passing (merchant, tankers, fishing, standby, supply) and visiting traffic (alongside installa-tions, standby, supply) and gives consideration to both drifting and powered colli-sion scenarios. The main data source for COLLIDE® is detailed shipping traffic data. This data may come from COAST®, or from other available sources. Other inputs include installation details, environmental data (wind, wave, etc.), vessel characteristics, etc.

The COLLIDE® model has regularly been updated to take into account the effects of technological developments and additional information sources beco-ming available.

A.4.4 Database Manager®



Function For storage, handling, and display of reliability analysis data Vendor ERS Technology, UK Pricing Not available.

Database Manager® is a tailored database capable of hosting reliability and safety data. Data can be input or supplied by ERS Technology from its own databases. Database Manager® then enables the data to be configured, searched and analysed, and presented in various reporting formats.

Data Manager® facilitates file and data transfer to and from other databases. It accepts virtually unlimited data input, constrained only by hardware availability. It handles a wide variety of database taxonomies, including all major reliability database taxonomies.

A.4.5 Egress®


Function Mustering and evacuation simulation for evacuation/rescuemodelling

Vendor ERS Technology, UK Pricing Not available.

The EGRESS® code allows the movement of large numbers of personnel, such as when mustering on an installation, to be simulated. The platform layout is modelled as a matrix of interconnecting cells. The code covers both the physical movement and behavioural decision-making of personnel. The output is graphical and the movement watched as a real–time graphical representation. It was developed as part of a joint industry project in the UK between ERS Technology, Shell, Texaco, Exxon, and the Health and Safety Executive.

The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other industries to provide assessments of the movement of people during incidents.

A.4.6 LEAK®


Function Calculation of the frequency of leaks at an installation Vendor DNV Software, London, UK Pricing Available on request.

LEAK® is a software tool which calculates the frequency of leaks at an installation, typically an oil platform. Each installation is broken down into a number of areas which are themselves split into a number of segments each containing a list of equipment groups. Each equipment group is built up of base elements such as valves, flanges, pipes, etc. LEAK® will calculate the leak frequency for the instal-


lation, area, segment or equipment group based on built-in historical leak frequency data. The total frequency for each user defined category is reported together with each contributor. The model used expresses the frequency of a leak being larger than a certain size as a continuous function of the equivalent hole size diameter. The historical data used in the calculations is read from a database, enabling the most up–to–date data to be included.

A.4.7 R–DAT Plus®


Function Bayesian data analysis Vendor Prediction Technologies, Hyattsville, MD, USA Pricing Not available.

R–DAT Plus® is a full–featured Bayesian data analysis package for risk analysts. It is designed for users who need to perform system specific analyses, but who also have a need to develop generic prior distributions based on industry data.

R–DAT Plus® provides the user with a powerful, yet simple and flexible envi-ronment for storing and organising many types of reliability data and related infor-mation. A hierarchical structure enables the user to develop functional or structural or any other type of breakdown, at any level of detail. The elements of this hier-archy act as folders containing the reliability data and the results of Bayesian analyses performed on the data sets.

With R–DAT® the user may specify the prior distribution in many different ways depending on the type and level of information available. These include a wide variety of parametric distributions (e.g., lognormal, beta and loguniform) using any of a number of input options such as lower and upper bounds, mean and variance, or the distribution parameters. Furthermore, R–DAT® enables the user to develop generic distributions based on industry data (counts of failures in other plants) as well as expert estimates. The resulting distributions will represent the plant–to–plant variability of failure rate of a given class of components or initiating events, and can be used in a plant specific analysis in order perform the Two–Stage Bayesian procedure.

A.4.8 CARA–Fault Tree®


Function Fault tree analysis and construction Vendor Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com) Pricing The price for a single user license is NOK 12,000 (app-

roximately USD 1,450/EUR 1,750).


CARA–FaultTree® is our tool for fault tree analysis and construction. A fault tree is a logical diagram that displays the interrelationships between a potential critical event (accident) in a system and the reasons for this event. By constructing a fault tree you analyse how a system can fail, and the analysis also gives you insight into how the components contributes to the system reliability. With its intuitive graphical user interface, the program lets you create fault trees in a flash. A total of six system performance measures and six measures of component importance are available, along with enhanced report utilities.

A.5 QRA Tools for Consequence Analysis

A.5.1 AutoReaGas®


Function Integrated CFD software tool for analysing combustion inflammable gas mixtures and subsequent blast effects.

Vendor Century Dynamics, Horseham, UK Pricing Not available.

AutoReaGas® is a powerful interactive, integrated CFD software tool for analysing combustion in flammable gas mixtures and subsequent blast effects. Industrial applications of the software include risk and safety assessment of offshore plat-forms and onshore petrochemical and process plants, power plants, mining instal-lations and transportation systems.

AutoReaGas® can perform numerical simulation of gas cloud explosions inclu-ding flame propagation, turbulence and the effects of objects in the flow field. The code can also simulate the propagation of resulting blast waves and their interac-tion with structures.

The software is jointly developed by Century Dynamics and TNO and successfully integrates many features of the well known REAGAS®, BLAST® and AUTODYN® codes to provide a unique capability in one commercially available and supported code. The code has been, and continues to be, extensively validated against experimental data.

AutoReaGas® is available as a paid-up licence or as an annual licence and a trial and training is also available.

A.5.2 Firex®


Function Prediction of main fire characteristics and responses of firescenarios based on empirical correlations


Vendor Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway Pricing PC–software NOK 45,000.

The program system FIREX® is capable of predicting the main fire characteristics and responses of six fire scenarios:

Pool fire in the open Pool fire in enclosure Fire on sea surface Jet fire Diffusive flare fire Fireball/BLEVE.

FIREX® is based on well known prediction methods, which have been compared and verified against experimental data. FIREX® predicts:

Incident heat radiation onto targets not engulfed by the flames, as a function of the distance from the fire. Heat flux to targets engulfed by the flames as a function of time from the onset of the fire. Temperature response of steel structures as a function of time and degree and type of insulation. Smoke production and visibility in smoke as a function of time from the moment of ignition. Pool fire hazard ranges. Fireball hazard ranges. For pool fires in enclosures; ceiling temperature, development of hot gas.

A.5.3 FLACS®


Function 3D CFD software tool for analysing gas and air flows inindustrial environments as well as in the atmosphere. Majorapplication areas include ventilation, dispersion and gasexplosions and subsequent blast effects

Vendor Gexcon, Bergen, Norway Pricing Price matrix with various options upon request to

[email protected].

The development of FLACS® has been carried out continuously since 1980 with the co–operation, support, direction and funding of ten international oil and gas companies as well as legislative bodies of three countries. Application specific


validation, wide applicability and efficiency when using FLACS® has been given high priority in the development work.

The software has been used for explosion consequence assessment and risk analysis for more than 300 offshore installations and onshore industrial areas world wide (by Gexcon) and is also used by numerous consultants worldwide (40–50 user groups of FLACS® worldwide, 2006). In addition it is increasingly being used for general industrial CFD analyses, particularly where flows in and around complex geometries is an issue. In recent years it has also been validated for atmo-spheric dispersion use.

Particular characteristics of FLACS® and its application include:

Explosion simulations Any ignition point location Hydrocarbon gases (e.g. any mixture of methane, ethane, propane, butane, ethylene, propylene, acetylene) and hydrogen Variable gas cloud size Variable gas concentration Vent panels: weight, opening mode, opening pressure Yielding walls: failure mode Effect of water spray: nozzle type, flow rate, location Any type of louvered walls, angle of blades, effective openings Prediction of blast wave strength outside the explosion area Effect of inert gases; CO2, N2, and varying O2 concentration .

Dispersion simulations Modelling of gas release Leak source location, size, and direction Forced and natural ventilation conditions Concentration profiles at gas detector locations Jet release/diffusive release Realistic scenario design: Ignition at any time or location during dispersion Exhaust release and dispersion.

Ventilation simulations Modelling of external wind field Modelling of forced/HVAC ventilation Louvre drag factors Air change rates at varying external wind conditions Effect of netting and other blockages Flow velocities in the module and through the louvre Wind chill index calculations Helideck safety assessment.


A.5.4 KAMELEON FireEx–KFX®


Function CFD–based tool for prediction of gas dispersion and firecharacteristics and response in complex geometries, as wellas fire mitigation and extinguishment analysis and design

Vendor ComputIT, Trondheim, Norway Pricing Short and long term leasing contracts, licenses ranging from

academic to commercial licenses.

Kameleon FireEx – KFX® is an advanced simulator dedicated to gas dispersion and fire simulation with the following main characteristics:

Three-dimensional transient finite volume CFD code. Includes CAD import capabilities (PDS, PDMS, Flacs macro, others). Interfaced with the finite element structure response codes Fahts/Usfos . Includes detailed lagragian models for fire mitigation by water systems (sprinkler, deluge, curtains, mist etc.).Includes efficient and user friendly pre- and post processor capabilities. Developed by ComputIT/NTNU/Sintef with the partners Statoil, Total, ENI–group, Hydro, ConocoPhillips, Gaz de France, Ruhrgas and Sandia National Laboratories (USA). Used for a large number of industrial analyses world wide for more than 20 years.

Industrial analyses performed by KFX can typically be:

Simulation of all kind of fires; pool fires, jet fires, spray fires, flares, fire in enclosures, in complex congested areas, or in open space. This includes detailed calculation of temperatures, radiation, smoke, visibility, concentra-tions of species, toxic gases, noise etc.Fire impact on structures and process equipment Optimization of passive fire protection Fire temperature, radiation and smoke impact on humans Evaluation of escape routes Simulation and evaluation of fire mitigation by water systems; sprinklers, deluge, mist, curtains Flare simulations; radiation, noise (not standard KFX version), detailed tip simulations Dispersion of gas Calculation of explosive cloud sizes Gas and fire detection systems Combustion in furnaces, engines, furnace design etc.Reduction of emissions; CO, NOx, others


HVAC (ventilation simulations) Turbulent flow analysis with respect to helicopter operations, buildings, environments etcFluid flow and combustion in general 3D visualization, animations, contour plot in real CAD geometry.

A.5.5 Mona®


Function Advanced and general tool for simulation of single–component multiphase systems

Vendor Scandpower Risk Management, Kjeller, Norway Pricing To be discussed.

MONA® is an advanced, general tool for simulation of single–component multi-phase systems. MONA can handle general network of pipelines and vessels and thermal non–equilibrium conditions. MONA®'s ability to simulate water hammer and cavitation is validated against loops in Sweden and Germany.

A.5.6 Olga®


Function Transient multiphase flow simulator for systems comprisingflow lines, risers and process equipment

Vendor Scandpower Petroleum Technology, Kjeller, Norway Pricing Available as lease for a limited period or as a permanent

licence.

OLGA® is a simulator for transient multi–phase flow phenomena. OLGA® can model general networks of flowlines, risers as well as process equipment.

OLGA® is more accurate in predicting pressure gradients, liquid hold–up, flow regimes and flow rates than competitive models and correlations. OLGA'®s ability to predict release behaviour from condensate pipeline (reflecting bottom topo-graphy), is of significant importance in risk analysis of offshore installations.

OLGA® is verified and validated against more than 10,000 experiments at the two-phase-flow test loop operated by SINTEF in Trondheim.

A.5.7 PHAST®



Function Windows–based toolkit for determination of consequences ofaccidental releases of hazardous material


PHAST (Process Hazard Analysis Software Tools) is a Windows–based toolkit, which determines the consequences of accidental releases of hazardous material. It examines the progress of a potential incident from initial release, through forma-tion of a cloud, with or without a pool, to its dispersion. The program uses DNV's unique Unified Dispersion Model (UDM) to apply the appropriate entrainment and dispersion models as the conditions change and to integrate the relevant individual models such that the transition from one behaviour pattern to another is smooth, continuous and automatic. It is applicable to all stages of design and operation across a range of process and chemical industry sectors and may be used to identify situations which present potential hazards to life, property or the environment.

A.6 Qualitative Risk Assessment Software

A.6.1 PHA–Pro®


Function Hazard recording and reporting tool, including four process hazard analysis techniques; HAZOP, What If/Checklist, FMEA and Preliminary Hazard Analysis


PHA–Pro® is a Windows based hazard recording and reporting tool which includes four process hazard analysis techniques in a single integrated product. The avail-able techniques are HAZOP, What If/Checklist, FMEA and Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Fully user customisable risk matrices, up to 10 by 10, are available for severity and likelihood ranking of consequence, safeguards and recommendations. Comprehensive recommendation management facilities are available to manage the multitude of recommendations arising from a typical HAZOP study. Other features include wizards to simplify complex tasks, file templates, timed backup and auto recovery, spell checker and all standard windows functionality such as cut, copy and paste, find and replace and drag and drop editing.

A.6.2 PHAROS®



Function Integration of job hazard analysis process with the Permit toWork system

Vendor EQE, London, UK Pricing From GBP 5,000 per annum to GBP 50,000 per annum

depending on the number of installations

Pharos® is a powerful system that integrates the job hazard analysis process with the Permit to Work system controlling the planning and execution of hazardous activities. It incorporates many years of EQE's experience in the design and implementation of Permit to Work systems and application of workplace hazard management processes.

The elements within the system include, hazard assessment and job hazard analysis, work tracking and coordination, (including interfaces with maintenance systems), and isolation/lockout control. The system enhances safety with reduced operational costs by the combination of risk assessment methodology and computer technology.

A.6.3 Kyrass®

The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing and main features.

Function: Safety management Vender: Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com) Pricing: The price for a single user license is NOK 20,995.

Kyrass® is a software tool designed to help businesses performing safety manage-ment in a practical manner. It is used to establish a register of hazard sources and to manage this register. Kyrass® is used to identify and prioritise risk reducing measures and facilitates the documentation of reviews, revisions and evaluations. The Kyrass® safety management tool is currently a Norwegian tool (i.e. the user interface is in Norwegian).

A.6.4 Sabaton®

The following is a short description of this software, its function, vender, pricing and main features.

Function: FMEA and FMECA analysis Vender: Sydvest Software (www.sydvest.com)

Sabaton FMEA® NOK 9,500 (appr 1,160 EUR / 1,500 USD)

Pricing:

Sabaton FMEA Pro®

NOK 19,500 (appr 2,390 EUR / 3,090 USD).

Sabaton® is an analysis tool supporting FMEA (Failure Mode and Effects Analy-sis) and FMECA (Failure Mode, Effects and Criticality Analysis). FMEA and


FMECA are typically used in product and system development to reveal possible failures and failure modes, and the effects of these failures. The analysis results typically in proposals for design improvement aimed at eliminating system failure or mitigating the effects of component failures. With Sabaton® you simply start a new analysis by selecting analysis form template, or you make your own fully user–defined form. Sabaton® supports you in conducting FMEA and FMECA ana-lyses according to international standards such as ISO 9000, SAE J1739, SAE ARP5580, IEC 60812, BS 5760–5 or MIL–STD 1629.

A.7 Reporting and Analysis of Incidents and Accidents

A.7.1 ProSafe®


Function Registration of information from unplanned occurrences, including analysis and reporting capabilities for trends andpatterns to be defined

Vendor EQE, London, UK Pricing From GBP 5,000 to GBP 150,000 depending on the number

of installations

ProSafe® is a Safety & Loss Prevention system developed for the Oil & Gas industry. It captures information from any unplanned occurrence that causes, or has the potential to cause, harm to people, the environment, assets or a company=sreputation. The information is then analysed and reports, (graphs, charts, text), produced. Its data mining capabilities enables trends and patterns to be defined that help focus the deployment of resources to prevent future loss.

Prosafe®=s embedded data dictionary enables companies to change the system to incorporate their own terminology and language. It is also scaleable enabling its use across many geographical locations or as a single departmental system.

A.8 Risk Management Software

A.8.1 Hazard Log Database Management® Tool


Function Registration and management of hazards Vendor Atkins, Bristol, UK Pricing STG 7,500, plus tailoring for system / customer requirements

(typically STG 3,000), for a one–off purchase.


The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management® Tool has been developed based upon the Safety Hazard/Risk Management requirements of UK MoD Defence Standard 00–56. It is currently in use on a number of UK MoD defence projects ranging from whole ship projects to shore–based facilities, as well as a tri–national (UK/France/Italy) naval defence communications project.

Furthermore, the Hazard Log Database® has also been tailored for use on the Lewisham Extension to the Docklands Light Railway, and is proposed for a number of other civilian and defence projects in the UK, Europe and Asia.

The Atkins Hazard Log Database Management® Tool is based in Microsoft Access 2®, and can be run on PC or Network facilities.

The clear advantage of the tool is that it provides a systematic and traceable means of managing system safety in accordance with a recognised standard process. It facilitates an effective approach to the management of safety risk reduction measures adopted and actions placed to provide the appropriate levels of confidence in the final safety justification.

Atkins are able to tailor the Database® to the specific needs of the system application under assessment, and the needs of the managing authority.

Each copy of the tool requires an individual licence. Where multiple use is required on a number of system element contracts for

instance, then pricing can be structured differently, and Atkins are open to discus-sion in these matters.

A.8.2 Prism®


Function Audit tool for Safety Management Assessment of SafetyManagement performance

Vendor ERS Technology, UK Pricing Not available.

PRISM® is an audit tool that is designed to penetrate each level of an organisation using a structured and systematic methodology. The audit involves both interviews and inspections to build up a picture of both the documented management systems and their implementation.

The code has been used both offshore and onshore for the oil and gas and other industries to provide assessments of the state of development of a company's Safety Management System.

A.8.3 Riskplot II®


Function Risk summation and presentation tool, including outputs ofrisk contours, F–N data, risk transects and a listing of domi-nant events


Vendor Four Elements, London, UK Pricing GBP 7,900 for a single user licence.

RISKPLOT® is a risk summation and presentation tool. A regulatory version is currently being developed for UK HSE. Outputs include risk contours, F–N data, risk transects and a listing of dominant events. The risk for each scenario is calculated, accounting for:

wind direction, speed and stability the number of people affected in specified time periods whether populations are indoors/outdoors, fixed (e.g. within dwellings) or mobile (e.g. motorists) topographic effects (e.g. the presence of hills or cliffs) whether event locations are at a fixed point, multiple points or distributed along a line source (e.g. pipeline).

A.8.4 ORBIT Offshore®


Function Offshore risk based inspection tool Vendor DNV Software, Høvik, Norway Pricing Available upon request.

ORBIT Offshore® is a software tool that uses DNV's Risk Based Inspection (RBI) technique to help users optimise their inspection management programme. DNV's RBI technique, as described in DNV RP–G 101 “Recommended Practice for Risk–Based Inspection of Topsides Static Mechanical Equipment”, is used to calculate the risk due to corrosion, erosion and cracking for pressure equipment in a marine environment.

ORBIT Offshore® is designed to help users sustain high productivity and reliability of their offshore platforms by minimising lost production and downtime through effective inspection and maintenance. It assists in the management of safety and equipment integrity to user specified levels.

It helps you to achieve these objectives systematically and efficiently. It allows you to quantify the risk for process and utility systems and equipment on topsides and FPSOs. Risk can be defined in terms of potential loss of life, cost, or both. A cost–effective inspection programme can then be devised based on the greatest risk reduction per cost of inspection

A.8.5 BowTieXP® IADC Edition and Black BowTieXP®


Function Management of major risks to people, the environment,assets and reputation by means of ‘bow–tie’ graphical inter-face diagram


Vendor Governors BV, Netherlands Pricing Please visit www.bowtiexp.com for up–to–date pricing infor-

mation.

BowTieXP® is a system which assists companies in the analysis and management of their major risks to people, the environment, assets and reputation. The reports from BowTieXP® can form part of a formal Health, Safety & Environmental Case, can be used for communication to personnel responsible for safety critical activities, and for day–to–day management of the facility. BowTieXP® is available in a special IADC edition that has been optimised to meet the needs and requirements of the offshore industry. BowTieXP® supports the new IADC HSE Case Guidelines and makes the production of HSE Cases easier and more productive. Special IADC HSE Case guideline templates

The BowTieXP® suite of products goes several steps further than other bow–tie tools and allows risk analysis to be ‘tested’ against incident data (Black BowTieXP® add–on). Modelling of simultaneous operations and many other advanced risk analysis features are also available in the BowTieXP® suite of products (Standard, Advanced, Server, RKM Edition, Black BowTieXP®). Also, BowTieXP® and Black BowTieXP® integrate with recognised incident investiga-tion systems like TOP–SET® (which has a proven track record over 20 years), including the new TOP–SET® BlackBox tool for more productive incident investigations.

BowTieXP® provides a structured approach for completing the risk manage-ment process and ensures that controls identified are linked to a company’s busi-ness and to individuals’ responsibilities.

The bow–tie graphical interface diagram provides an extremely useful representation of the risk management process that is readily understood at all levels in a company and also allows for simple data entry.

A.8.6 THESIS


Function Management of major risks to people, the environment,assets and reputation by means of ‘bow–tie’ graphical inter-face diagram

Vendor ABS Consulting, Warrington, UK Pricing GBP 500–2,000 per licence depending upon numbers of

licences and modules required.

THESIS (The Health, Environment, Safety Information System) is a software tool that can effectively demonstrate how a facility’s safety management system can be implemented. It assists companies/operators in the analysis and management of the hazards and risks to which their business is exposed, and graphically displays and illustrates the relationship between hazards, controls, risk reduction measures and a business’s HES activities.


THESIS is an application, originally developed by Shell and now jointly with ABS. It has been developed based on the bow–tie concept to visually display how hazards are controlled and how the risk associated with them is reduced to As Low As Reasonably Practicable (ALARP). It documents the provenance of information and the reference sources from which the information is obtained, i.e. it is an ideal audit tool.

The ‘bow–tie’ graphical interface diagram provides an extremely useful repre-sentation of the risk management process that is readily understood at all levels in a company and also allows for simple data entry.

Glossary

The following definitions are coordinated with ISO terminology (ISO/IEC Guide 73:2002) where relevant.

Acceptance criteria (for risk)

Criteria that are used to express a risk level that is considered acceptable for the activity in question, limited to the high level expressions of risk.

Accidental event Event, or chain of events, that may cause loss of life, health, or damage to environment or assets.

Accidental effect The result of an accidental event, expressed as heat flux, impact force or energy, acceleration, etc. which is the basis for the safety evaluation.

Acute release The abrupt or sudden release in the form of a discharge, emission or exposure, usually due to incidents or accidents.

ALARP (As Low as ReasonablyPracticable)

ALARP expresses that the risk level is reduced - through a documented and systematic process - so far that no further measure may be identified, except those that have costs that are grossly disproportionate to the benefits.

Barrier element A component of a barrier system that by itself is not sufficient to perform a barrier function.

Barrier function A function planned to prevent, control, or mitigate undesired events or accidents.

Barrier (or risk) influencing factor

Conditions that influence on the performance of barrier systems.

Barrier system Technical, human and/or organisational measures designed and implemented to perform one or more barrier functions.

BLEVE Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion, is defined as rupture of a hydrocarbon containing vessel due to being heated by fire loads.

Causal analysis The process of determining potential combinations of circumstances leading to a top event.

550 Glossary

Consequence Outcome of and event. Consequence evaluation

Assessment of physical effects due to accidents, such as fire and explosion loads.

Contingency planning

Planning provision of facilities, training and drilling for the handling of emergency conditions, including the actual institution of emergency actions.

Control (of hazards) Limiting the extent and/or duration of a hazardous event to prevent escalation.

Cost/benefit evaluation

Quantitative assessment and comparison of costs and benefits. In the present context often related to safety measures or environmental protection measures where the benefits are reduced safety or environmental hazard.

Chronic release The continuous or ongoing release in the form of a discharge, emission or exposure.

Defined situations of hazard and accident

A selection of possible events that the emergency preparedness in the activity should be able to handle, based on the activity=s design accidental events, as well as hazardous and accidental situations associated with a temporary increase of risk, and less extensive accidental events.

Design Accidental Event

Accidental events that serve as the basis for layout, dimensioning and use of installations and the activity at large, in order to meet the defined risk acceptance criteria.

Design Accidental Load

The most severe accidental load that the function or system shall be able to withstand during a required period of time, in order to meet the defined risk acceptance criteria.

Dimensioning Accidental Event

See Design Accidental Event

Dimensioning accidental load

See Design Accidental Event

Effectiveness analysis of safety and emergency preparedness measures

Analysis which shall document the fulfilment of functional requirements to safety and emergency preparedness.

Emergency preparedness

Technical, operational and organisational measures that are planned to be implemented under the management of the emergency organisation in case hazardous or accidental situations occur, in order to protect human and environmental resources and assets.

Emergency preparedness analysis

Analysis which includes establishment of defined situations of hazard and accident, including dimensioning accidental events, establishment of functional requirements to emergency preparedness, and identification of emergency preparedness measures.

Glossary 551

Emergency preparedness organisation

The organisation which is planned, established, trained and exercised in order to handle occurrences of hazardous or accidental situations.

Environmental resource

Includes a stock or a habitat, defined as:

Stock A group of individuals of a stock pre-sent in a defined geographical area in a defined period of time.

Alternatively The sum of individuals within a species which are reproductively isolated with-in a defined geographical area.

Habitat A limited area where several species are present and interact. Example: a beach.

Environment safety Safety relating to protection of the environment from accidental spills which may cause damage.

Escalation An increase in the consequences of a hazardous event or a sequence of events.

Escalation factor Conditions that lead to increased risk due to loss of control, mitigation or recovery capabilities.

Escape Actions by personnel on board surface installations (as well as those by divers) taken to avoid the area of accident origin and accident consequences to reach an area where they may remain in shelter.

Escape way Routes of specially designated gangways from the platform, leading from hazardous areas to muster areas, lifeboat stations, or shelter area.

Establishment of emergency preparedness

Systematic process which involves planning and imple-mentation of suitable emergency preparedness measures on the basis of risk and emergency preparedness analysis.

Evacuation Abandonment of the installation from sheltered areas by the dedicated evacuation means. Emergency evacuation is normally the main consideration, as precautionary evacua-tion is less demanding on the evacuation resources.

Event Tree Analysis Inductive analysis in order to determine alternative potential scenarios arising from a particular hazardous event. It may be used quantitatively to determine the probability or frequency of different consequences arising from the hazardous event.

Fault Tree Analysis Deductive quantitative analysis technique in order to identify the causes of failures and accidents and quantify the probability of these.

Functional requirements to safety and emergency preparedness

Verifiable requirements to the effectiveness of safety and emergency preparedness measures which shall ensure that safety objectives, risk acceptance criteria, authority minimum requirements, and established norms are satisfied during design and operation.

552 Glossary

Internal control All administrative measures which are implemented to ensure that the work is in accordance with all requirements and specifications.

Main safety function Safety functions that need to be intact in order to ensure that personnel that are not directly and immediately exposed, may reach a place of safety in an organised manner, either on the installation or through controlled evacuation.

Major accidents Accidents where multiple (often 5 or more) fatalities may be caused, often resulting from a hydrocarbon leak or from a serious structural damage.

Material damage safety

Safety of the installation, its structure, and equipment relating to accidental consequences in terms of production delay and reconstruction of equipment and structures.

Mitigation Limitation of any negative consequence of a particular event.

MOB-boat Man over board boat Muster Station A place where personnel may gather in a Safe Haven prior

to evacuation or abandonment from emergency situations. Muster area Area on the platform where the personnel may be

sheltered from accidental conditions until they embark into the lifeboats.

Occupational accidents

Accidents relating to hazards that are associated with the workplace (falls, slips, crushing etc.), thus other hazards than hydrocarbon gas or oil under pressure. These accidents are normally related to a single individual.

Personnel safety Safety for all personnel involved in the operation of a field.

Probability Extent to which an event is likely to occur. Reliability analysis Analysis of causes and conditions of failure, inspection,

maintenance and repair, and the quantitative assessment of up-times and down-times.

Residual Accidental Event.

Accidental event which the installation is not designed against, therefore it will be part of the risk level for the installation.

Residual risk Risk remaining after risk treatment. Risk Combination of the probability of an event and its

consequence. Risk acceptance Decision to accept a risk. Risk analysis Systematic use of information to identify sources and to

describe the risk. Risk assessment Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation. Risk avoidance Decision not to become involved in, or action to withdraw

from, a risk situation.

Glossary 553

Risk control Actions implementing risk management decisions. Risk evaluation Process of comparing the estimated risk against given risk

criteria to determine the significance of the risk. Risk identification Process to find, list and characterise elements of risk. Risk management Coordinated activities to direct and control an organisation

with regard to risk. Risk management system

Set of elements of an organisation's management system concerned with managing risk.

Risk perception Way in which a stakeholder views a risk, based on a set of values or concerns.

Risk reduction Actions taken to lessen the probability, negative consequences, or both, associated with a risk.

Risk transfer Sharing with another party the burden of loss or benefit of gain, for a risk.

Risk treatment Process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk.

Safety goals Concrete targets against which the operations of installa-tions at the field are measured with respect to safety. These targets shall contribute to avoidance of accidents or resistance against accidental consequences.

Safety objective Objective for the safety of personnel, environment and assets towards which the activity shall be aimed.

Serious accidents See major accidents. Shelter Area An area on the platform where the crew will remain safe

for a specific period of time in an emergency situation. Stakeholder Any individual, group or organization that can affect, be

affected by, or perceive itself to be affected by, a risk. Working accidents Accidents relating to other hazards than hydrocarbon gas

or oil under pressure (falls, crushing etc.) normally related to a single individual.

Worst case consequence

The worst possible HSE consequences resulting from a hazardous event. For this to occur, all critical defences in place must have failed.

Abbreviations

AIR Average Individual Risk AIS Automatic Identification System ALARP As Low As Reasonably Practicable ARCS Admiralty Raster Chart Services ARPA Automated Radar Plotting Aid bara bar absolute barg bar gauge (overpressure) BBD Barrier Block Diagram bbls barrels BD Blowdown BFETS Blast and Fire Engineering for Topside Systems BLEVE Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion BOP Blowout Preventer BORA Barrier and Operational Risk Analysis CAD Computer Aided Design CBA Cost Benefit Analysis CCA Cause-Consequence Analysis CFD Computational Fluid Dynamics CPA Closest Point of Approach CPP Controllable Pitch Propellar CSE Concept Safety Evaluation DAE Design Accidental Events DAL Design Accidental Loads DFU Defined situations of hazard and accident DHSV DownHole Safety Valve DP Dynamic Positioning dwt Dead Weight (tonnes) E&P Exploration and Production E&P Forum Previous name of organisation now called OGP EER Escape, Evacuation and Rescue EESLR Risk due to explosion escalation by small leaks EFSLR Risk due to fire escalation by small leaks

556 Abbreviations

EIA Environmental Impact Assessment EIF Environmental Impact Factor EQDC Emergency Quick DisConnector ESD Emergency Shut Down ETA Event Tree Analysis Ex Explosion [protected] FAR Fatal Accident Rate FCC Frigg Central Comlex FEM Finite Element Method Fi-Fi Fire Fighting FLACS Flame Accelerator Software FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis FPS Floating Production System FPSO Floating Production, Storage and Off-loading unit FPU Floating Production Unit FRC Fast Rescue Craft FSU Floating Storage Unit FTA Fault Tree Analysis GBS Gravity Base Structure GIR Group Individual Risk GIS Geographical Information System GoM Gulf of Mexico GPS Global Positioning System GR Group Risk GRP Glass fibre Reinforced Plastic GRT Gross Register Tons HAZID Hazard Identification HAZOP Hazard And Operability Study HC Hydrocarbon HCL Hybrid Causal Logic HCLIP Hydrocarbon Leak and Inventory Project HES Health, Environment and Safety HIPPS High Integrity Pressure Protection System HOF Human and Organisational Factors HR Human Reliability HSE Health and Safety Executive IEC International Electro-technical Commission IMO International Maritime Organization IR Individual Risk IRPA Individual Risk per Annum ISO International Organisation for Standardisation JIP Joint Industry Project LCC Life Cycle Cost LEL Lower Explosion Level LFL Lower Flammability Level LNG Liquefied Natural Gas MIRA Environmental risk analysis (‘Miljørettet risikoanalyse’)

Abbreviations 557

MMI Man-Machine Interface MNOK million Norwegian kroner MOB Man Overboard MODU Mobile Offshore Drilling Unit MP Main (propulsion) Power MSF Module Support Frame MTO Man, Technology and Organisation NORSOK Norwegian offshore standardisation organisation (‘Norsk Sokkels

Konkurranseposisjon’) nm Nautical Mile NMD Norwegian Maritime Directorate NOPSA National Offshore Petroleum Safety Authority [Australia] NPD Norwegian Petroleum Directorate NPV Net Present Value NTNU Norwegian University of Science and Technology NTS Norwegian Technology Standards Institution OLF The Norwegian Oil Industry Association (‘Oljeindustriens Lands-

forening’) OR Overall Risk OTS Operational Condition Safety (‘Operasjonell Tilstand Sikkerhet’) P&ID Piping and Instrumentation Drawing PETRAD Program for Petroleum Management and Administration PFEER Prevention of Fire and Explosion and Emergency Response PFP Passive Fire Protection PGS Petroleum Geo-Services ASA PHA Preliminary Hazard Analysis PLATO Software for dynamic event tree analysis PLL Potential Loss of Life PLS Progressive Limit State POB Personnel On Board PRS Position Reference System PSA Petroleum Safety Authority [Norway] PSA Probabilistic Safety Assessment PSD Process Shut Down QA Quality Assurance QC Quality Control QM Quality Management QP [Frigg] Quarters Platform QRA Quantified Risk Assessment R&D Research and Development RABL Risk Assessment of Buoyancy Loss RAC Risk Acceptance Criteria RACON Radar signal amplification RAE Residual Accidental Events RAMS Reliability, Availability, Maintainability, Safety RNNS Risk Level [project] (‘Risiko Nivå Norsk Sokkel’) ROV Remote Operated Vehicle

558 Abbreviations

RRM Risk Reducing Measure SAFOP Safety and Operability Study SAR Search and Rescue SBV Standby Vessel SCR Safety Case Regulations SIL Safety Integrity Level SJA Safe Job Analysis SLR Risk due to small leaks SOLAS Safety of Life at Sea SSIV SubSea Isolation Valve ST Shuttle Tanker SUPER-TEMPCALC

Software for 2D temperature analysis TASEF-2 Software for 2D temperature analysis TCP2 [Frigg] Treatment Platform 2 TH Thruster TLP Tension Leg Platform TP1 [Frigg] Treatment Platform 1 TR Temporary Refuge TRA Total Risk Analysis TST Technical Safety Condition (‘Teknisk SikkerhetsTilstand’) TTS Technical Condition Safety (‘Teknisk Tilstand Sikkerhet’) UEL Upper Explosive Limit UFL Upper Flammability Limit UPS Underwater Production System USFOS Software for non-linear and dynamic analysis of structures VEC Valued Ecological Component VHF Very High Frequency VOC Volatile Organic Compounds VTS Vessel Traffic System WOAD Worldwide Offshore Accident Database (ref. DNV)

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Index

abandonment;236; 254; 479; 552 accident;2; 7–9; 15–18; 20–24; 28–30;

43; 45; 46; 49; 52–55; 57–59; 61; 62; 64; 66; 67; 71; 77–86; 88; 91–107; 111–113; 123–125; 131; 136; 139; 143–145; 158; 167; 175–180; 186; 189–198; 206; 214–217; 220; 221; 233–236; 239; 243; 250–252; 257; 261–263; 269; 271–275; 278; 311; 314; 332; 334; 335; 344; 345; 351; 354; 355; 399; 407; 412; 426; 432; 435; 437; 447; 454; 459; 468; 477; 478; 482; 500; 502–;512

accumulated frequency;25; 39 AIR;10; 19; 21–23; 29; 35–37; 63; 66;

68; 69; 246; 500 air diving;273 ALARP;5; 6; 10; 11; 51; 63; 65; 72; 76;

126; 305; 405; 466; 479; 497; 500; 502; 521

Alexander L. Kielland;52; 55; 61; 78; 93; 100; 258; 263; 407

asset risk;25; 27; 39; 138 assumption;44; 56; 70; 185; 190; 222;

239; 240; 244; 288; 294; 359; 364; 370; 378; 381

attendant vessel;51; 55–57; 60; 356; 360; 445; 446

availability;27; 40; 48; 66; 90; 129; 134–137; 140; 145; 151; 167; 171; 186; 193; 214–216; 237; 257; 262; 269–271; 326; 458–460; 466; 489; 495; 511; 515

bad weather conditions;101; 103 BFETS;3; 282; 298; 309; 325; 333; 337;

347; 452

blowdown;18; 126; 183; 215218; 297; 462; 475; 488; 498–500

blowout;39; 40; 48; 54; 74; 79; 80–87; 113; 125; 130–132; 138; 141; 175; 189–191; 230; 236; 258; 263; 265; 279; 311; 339; 432; 441; 467; 468

BORA;49; 122; 136; 154; 170–173; 183; 335; 407; 495; 496

Brent A;78; 89; 90; 117; 214; 277; 278 buoyancy compartment;111; 133; 442 cargo tanks;115; 480; 483 cause analysis;120–123 check lists;161 chi-square distribution;148 collision;27; 41; 46; 108; 113; 123; 133;

139; 142; 170; 241; 251; 279; 302; 353–368; 371–388; 391–397; 400; 403; 405; 417–432; 448; 461; 473

columns;84; 100; 102; 289; 323; 380; 388; 442; 454

combustion reaction;280; 281; 283 comparative studies;129; 497 Concept Safety Evaluation;1; 157 condensate;209; 212; 472 conditional probability;18; 174; 179;

185; 212; 216; 241; 330; 349; 370; 396; 466

consequence analysis;120; 157; 195; 230; 280; 457; 473

consequence category;39 control centre;261 control room;93; 102; 215; 259; 261;

454; 510 Cost Benefit Analysis;500 cost of reinforcement;343 critical temperature;221

574 Index

CSE;1cumulative function;35 DAE;300; 555 DAL;555damage;4; 8; 16; 2427; 38–40; 70–75;

79; 84; 87; 89; 90; 94; 96; 105; 112; 115; 120; 126; 133; 138; 143; 191; 207; 214; 216–219; 220–225; 228–231; 251; 262; 277; 306; 314; 334; 345; 350–356; 359; 378; 380; 385; 386; 396; 408; 411; 414; 426; 432; 435–441; 454; 456; 464; 473; 498; 499; 500; 502; 503; 504; 505; 512

data sources;140; 150; 151; 364; 412 decision to evacuate;236 decommissioning;11; 274; 275 Deep Sea Driller;78; 98; 99; 117 depressurisation;131; 132; 206; 486 design basis;2; 123; 301; 332; 468; 471;

486; 487 DFU;493dimensioning fire;299; 300; 301; 455 dimensions of risk;16; 76; 137 DP-system;49; 361 dropped load;436; 439; 442; 457 dropped objects;133; 134; 136; 192; 279;

435; 443; 474 ecological component;232 EER;236; 238; 241; 263 Ekofisk A;78; 94; 95; 117; 258; 265 Ekofisk B;78; 79; 80; 117; 229; 258 Emergency Preparedness Analysis;13;

62; 67 Enchova;78; 83; 117 environmental risk;4; 8; 27; 64; 67; 73–

75; 138; 228; 230 EQDC;556escalation;9; 18; 24; 47; 78; 80–97; 99;

101; 102; 104–108; 111; 114; 117; 123; 125; 135–139; 158; 176–178; 181; 183; 186; 190; 194–196; 214; 217–219; 236; 241; 248; 250; 278; 279; 304; 312–314; 330; 345; 349–351; 407; 457; 459; 468; 469; 499; 500; 513

escape;17; 18; 21; 29; 37; 65; 66; 91; 92; 100; 132; 145; 176; 179; 191; 224; 227; 235; 241; 243; 245; 248–256; 259–261; 271; 291–293; 437; 468; 481; 483; 484

ETA;122

evacuation;9; 18–21; 29; 65; 66; 79–88; 91–101; 103–106; 145; 157; 175–179; 190; 224; 225; 227; 228; 235–238; 249; 251–263; 384; 468; 481; 483

evaluation of risk;1; 16 event tree analysis;125; 134; 175; 262;

310; 342 exceedance diagram;40; 312; 330 exploration drilling;84; 183; 311; 412;

435explosion;3; 11; 12; 47; 65; 77; 84–96;

109–111; 120; 125; 132; 134; 136; 139; 141; 170; 177; 186–190; 204; 211–226; 235; 243–252; 265; 277; 280; 298; 308–339; 342–351; 400; 402; 432; 452; 455; 459–;467; 472; 473; 478; 484–487; 491; 497–500; 512–515; 518; 520

exposed hours;19; 20 external ignition model;209 Exxon Valdez;78; 115; 229 falling object;4; 54; 120; 143; 437–443;

448; 453 FAR;19–23; 29–32; 36; 45; 54–63; 66;

68; 237–240; 246; 272–275; 408; 446; 478; 480–484; 488

fatality analysis;235; 251; 255; 262 fire;3; 9–12; 18; 47; 48; 65; 77; 80; 83–

96; 110; 116; 120; 125; 126; 130–136; 139; 141; 145; 150; 157; 163; 170; 175–195; 206–225; 234; 235; 244–254; 262; 265; 277–317; 332; 336; 345–349; 384; 385; 395; 397; 400–404; 439; 440; 453–478; 483–491; 496–502; 507; 509–515; 520

fixed installation;28; 33–35; 53; 54; 143; 284; 368; 418; 420; 454; 467

FLACS®;157; 329; 330; 347; 348 flare;53; 54; 95; 208–216; 336; 498 floating production;2; 13; 111; 136; 202;

289; 380; 399–403; 442; 453; 454; 467; 468; 495

flotel;33–35; 59; 61; 100; 113; 258; 264; 355; 407; 409; 412

flow rate;131; 132; 137; 192; 200; 204; 205; 215; 324; 432; 467; 468; 472

FMEA;3; 122; 153; 167 f-N curve;17; 35; 36; 69; 480; 481 FPPY;17 FPSO;33; 49; 96; 107–112; 142; 193;

257; 332; 354; 400; 402; 418–430; 449; 454; 477; 480–483

Index 575

FRC;84; 91; 106; 107; 265; 267; 268; 444

frequency assessment;360; 401 FTA;122; 167 functionality;103; 171; 214; 215; 511 gas cloud;85; 94; 97; 120; 148; 190–193;

204; 205; 211; 213; 214; 237; 248; 315–329; 341–348; 449; 450

generator;195; 196 generic data;140; 146; 147; 149; 375 global failure;379; 380; 381 Glomar Java Sea;78; 103; 117 group risk;17; 21; 36; 63 hazard identification;121; 156; 159; 161–

163; 404; 413 HAZID;121; 161; 274; 404; 408 HAZOP;3; 122; 153; 157; 163–167; 274;

517; 518 helicopter evacuation;227; 237; 258 HES management;ix; 9; 10; 13; 88; 93;

127; 134; 153; 154; 399; 488; 494; 510; 520

HOF;125; 136; 215; 422 HSE;2; 10; 11; 58; 63; 65; 66; 142–145;

202; 206–212; 225; 333; 356; 381; 401; 412; 418; 445; 495; 508; 511

hull;33; 106; 143; 157; 226; 260; 332; 384; 385; 399; 407; 417; 433

ignition;18; 47; 78–97; 117; 120; 126; 130; 131; 141–145; 157; 176; 179; 185; 190–196; 204–214; 236; 243–251; 255; 258; 278–290; 297–300; 310; 315–329; 334–337; 340; 346; 460; 462; 466; 473; 474; 485; 489; 490; 513

ignition source;89; 94; 144; 157; 190; 196; 206–214; 286; 316–329; 336; 341; 460; 473; 474; 513

ignition temperature;204; 206; 281 immediate ignition;213; 286; 317 impact angle;438; 441 impairment;10; 16; 17; 23; 24; 37; 63–

68; 128; 137; 186; 217; 224–226; 252; 261; 340; 459; 460

impairment frequency;24; 37; 66; 186 initial screening;162 initiating events;119; 121; 122; 123; 129;

167; 172; 180; 182; 407 installation specific data;142–148; 150;

158instantaneous release;285; 286 insulated steel;295; 296

Ixtoc;78; 80 jacket structure;143; 353; 354; 379; 388;

395Jotun;78; 96; 97; 117 leak;18; 43; 44; 50; 78; 83; 84; 87; 89–

97; 125; 131; 132; 142; 145; 146–150; 157; 158; 172; 173; 177; 180–196; 200–215; 225; 236; 241–248; 258; 263; 277–284; 298; 310; 318; 324–329; 334; 335; 339–347; 407; 449; 460–474; 485–490; 496; 508; 515; 518; 520

LEL;317local failure;395; 407 major accident;ix; 7; 8; 16; 17; 20; 23;

29; 30; 38; 52–55; 61; 64; 77–79; 95; 99; 111; 234; 235; 477; 482; 510; 511

major hazard;55; 61; 62; 66; 95; 152; 180; 233; 235; 274; 290; 477; 493; 510; 511

manhours;21; 33; 43–45; 55–57; 62; 201; 275; 446; 478; 482

marginal angle;394 material damage risk;4; 16; 39; 75; 306;

307; 464; 465; 499; 512 matrix presentation;39 minor damage;40; 353 MIRA;70; 228; 229; 231; 232 Mobile Drilling Units;258; 454 modelling of fire escalation;217 modification phase;33 MODU;87; 319 module support beam;442; 443 NMD;10; 400; 409 non-essential personnel;111; 113; 236;

261Norne;78; 107; 257; 425; 426 Norpipe;354; 355; 386 NORSOK;13; 43; 62–67; 119; 151–157;

250; 299; 301; 303; 380; 455; 456; 471; 517

NPD;2; 3; 62; 79; 83; 98; 103; 105; 142; 299; 301; 455; 514

NPD regulations;301 NPV;351; 503; 505; 506 occupational accident;17; 20; 21; 29; 30;

52–55; 61–66; 145; 239; 274; 444; 481; 482

Ocean Oddesey;78; 86 Ocean Ranger;78; 101; 102; 117; 263;

265; 269; 399; 402; 454 Ocean Vanguard;78; 112; 410; 433

576 Index

OREDA®;145Oseberg B;354; 355 overall risk level;62; 273; 512 oxygen;223; 281; 291–293; 315 P-34;78; 112; 402 P-36;78; 109; 117; 402 passive fire protection;18; 139; 157; 184;

217–220; 285–289; 295; 298; 305; 314; 456; 457; 471; 500–507; 514

personnel risk;17; 26; 58; 66; 128; 465; 512

Petrobras;111; 112 PFEER;10; 11; 508–513 PFP;298–307PHA;3; 122; 162; 164; 557 pick up;87; 266; 268 Piper Alpha;2; 3; 10; 54; 67; 89–93; 142;

145; 186–193; 214; 225; 241; 248; 249; 265; 277; 291; 314; 345

platform design;407 platform specific modelling;208; 219 PLATO®;175; 195; 196 PLL;10; 17; 21; 23; 29–35; 63; 68; 70;

241; 242; 350; 463; 480; 483; 502; 503; 506; 508

POB;21–23; 35; 69; 227; 252; 263 Preliminary Hazard Analysis;3; 122;

162; 164 probability study;128; 136 process accidents;40; 350 process area;47; 48; 150; 211; 217; 218;

284; 315; 335; 339; 341–349; 440; 483; 484; 485; 489

process leak;126; 206; 211; 310; 467; 480; 483

production delay risk;16 PSA;1; 3; 5; 6; 8; 48; 55; 60; 63; 64; 96;

112–114; 142–145; 158; 171; 200; 202; 205; 227; 233; 303; 340; 365; 399; 403–411; 429; 436; 445; 455; 457; 477; 515

public domain source;143 pump room;87; 102; 212; 400; 402 QRA;1–4; 10; 11; 17; 27; 35; 42; 43;

119–129; 138–140; 153–161; 166; 172; 175; 176; 180; 189; 194–196; 211; 212; 218; 233; 238; 244; 246; 250; 303–312; 330; 344–350; 399–403; 408; 412; 448; 452; 463; 474–478; 493; 494; 495; 499; 508; 509; 512; 513; 514; 516; 518

quantification of risk;274; 490

RABL;400; 404–406; 432; 433 real risk;16 recovery time;229; 230 regulatory requirements;10; 64; 399;

408; 452; 490 Reint;355; 364 reliability;10; 14; 48; 89; 94; 122; 134;

145; 167; 169; 171; 179; 194; 214; 215; 216; 237; 335; 362; 373; 384; 386; 399; 448; 471; 474; 498; 511

reliability analysis;122; 179; 216; 362; 400

rescue;9; 11; 12; 18; 21; 80; 85–91; 99–101; 106; 129; 137; 145; 157; 226–228; 236; 252; 257; 262–271; 445–448; 481; 483; 484

rescue fatalities;18; 262; 483; 484 rescue study;263 residual production phase;33 Reynolds number;438 riser fire;132; 257 risk; 1–45; 49–76; 86; 88; 90; 97; 99;

111; 119–130; 134–147; 151–159; 161; 164; 165; 170–177; 191–196; 206; 214; 217; 219–221; 228; 230; 233–246; 249; 251; 253; 255–257; 261; 264; 271–275; 297–299; 306; 307; 334; 335; 347; 350–366; 372; 375; 381–388; 391–394; 399–409; 412–419; 423; 426; 435; 436; 448–468; 473–503; 505; 507–521; 546

Risk Acceptance Criteria;51; 62; 65; 70; 76; 478

risk acceptance criteria for temporary phases;76

risk analysis; 1; 3; 4; 7; 10; 14; 16; 43; 63; 86; 88; 90; 125–129; 134; 137; 138; 142; 146; 151; 153; 154; 194; 228; 249; 256; 358; 399; 400; 407–409; 448; 451; 455–462; 466; 479; 493; 494; 508; 518; 520

risk aversion;16; 21; 22; 35; 36 risk estimation;26 risk level;10; 11; 21; 31; 43; 50; 51; 55–

63; 66–69; 71; 72; 74; 99; 126; 144; 146; 152; 155; 235; 237; 238; 257; 264; 272; 273; 307; 350; 351; 363; 372; 382; 384; 403; 404; 408; 412; 455; 480; 481; 487; 488; 494; 495; 497; 498; 502; 508–514; 517–520

RiskSpectrum;135; 137; 179; 194 RRM;502; 503; 505; 506

Index 577

Safety Case Regulations;2; 10; 24; 65; 495

Safety Integrity Level;474 SAR;98–102; 256–259; 264–270; 447 SBV;265scenario based analysis;246 Sea King;257; 260 Seacrest;78; 105 sensitivity analysis;506 serious damage;40 shape coefficient;438 shuttle tanker;27; 41; 48–51; 62; 107;

108; 142; 354; 355; 360; 361; 389–394; 417–421; 425–430; 454; 473

shuttling;28; 34; 35; 58; 260; 272; 273; 365; 368; 369; 518

significant damage;40; 143; 307; 500; 503; 504

significant effect;50; 71; 132; 190; 351; 498

SJA;3; 155 slick thickness;286; 289 smoke;65; 87–93; 126; 132; 150; 191;

207; 217; 224; 225; 226; 250–261; 280; 284; 290–293; 338; 460; 509

soot production;225; 292; 294 spill risk;71; 137 statistical simulation;236; 262; 270 Statpipe;96steel jacket platform;238; 355; 356; 380 storage and offloading;400 stranding;371structural failure;31; 76; 78; 104; 217;

224; 236; 245; 261; 279; 378; 395; 397; 440; 448; 462; 483

subsea equipment;133; 440; 441 subsea gas leak;449 sudden rupture;191 supply vessel;41; 79; 80; 98; 104; 143;

353–358; 360; 387; 389; 393

support structure;24; 193; 226; 241; 278; 289; 298; 300; 303; 332; 394; 399; 436; 495

survivability;134; 135; 192; 214; 216; 314; 399; 511

synthesis;123; 271 system description;129 system level;162 tanker accident;71 technological risk;16 thruster;402; 421; 422 thruster capacity;421 towline;40; 106 TRA;1; 152; 153; 155; 157; 558 trusses;298; 303; 354; 388 turret;418; 420; 422; 454; 483 UEL;192; 317 UK Health and Safety Executive;142;

239; 333 underwater production system;441 uninsulated steel;222 USFOS®;134; 301–305; 307 VEC;39; 232 ventilation;205; 208; 291–293; 299; 303;

319; 322; 326; 327; 329; 335; 336; 345; 346; 348; 473; 497; 498; 500

vessel;20; 27; 28; 51; 53; 56; 79; 80; 84–87; 94–98; 101–107; 111–115; 133; 142; 143; 150; 165; 190; 193; 200; 221; 222; 236; 263–269; 284; 299; 320; 353–367; 369–389; 392–397; 402; 411; 414; 416; 417; 422; 432; 435; 442–447; 470; 471; 473; 487

wellhead area;80; 212; 252; 339–344 wellhead platform;37; 39; 41; 79; 94;

339; 342; 454; 520 West Gamma;53; 78; 105; 117; 258;

263; 401; 402; 407; 444 West Vanguard;78; 84; 85; 112; 113;

117; 258; 265; 319 wireline operations;183 WOAD®;39; 141–144; 311; 353; 439 workover;79; 130; 183; 437

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