JUNE 2017

A Process in Search of Peace:Lessons from the Inter-MalianAgreement

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS AND MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR

ABOUT THE AUTHORS

ARTHUR BOUTELLIS is Director of the International Peace

Institute’s Brian Urquhart Center for Peace Operations.

Email: boutellis@ipinst.org

MARIE-JOËLLE ZAHAR is a visiting Senior Fellow at IPI.

She is Director of the Research Network on Peace

Operations and Professor of Political Science at the

Université de Montréal.

Email: marie-joelle.zahar@umontreal.ca

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The authors would like to thank all those who shared their

insights in interviews conducted in New York and in Mali

during two field visits carried out in February and May

2017. They would also like to thank all the representatives

of the government of Mali, armed groups, and civil society,

as well as members of the international mediation team

and experts who took the time to speak with them for this

report.

The authors are particularly grateful to those colleagues

who provided advice and feedback on various earlier drafts

of this report, including Yvan Guichaoua, Jean-Hervé

Jezequel, Delphine Mechoulan, Eva Meyer, Colombe de

Nicolay, and Anne Savey.

IPI owes a debt of gratitude to its many donors for their

generous support. In particular, IPI would like to thank the

Federal Republic of Germany for making this publication

possible.

Cover Photo: Installation of interim

authorities in Kidal, Mali, February 28,

2017. MINUSMA/Ag Cheick Nasser.

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this

paper represent those of the authors

and not necessarily those of the

International Peace Institute. IPI

welcomes consideration of a wide

range of perspectives in the pursuit of

a well-informed debate on critical

policies and issues in international

affairs.

IPI Publications

Adam Lupel, Vice President

Albert Trithart, Associate Editor

Madeline Brennan, Assistant ProductionEditor

Suggested Citation:

Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar,

“A Process in Search of Peace: Lessons

from the Inter-Malian Agreement,” New

York: International Peace Institute,

June 2017.

© by International Peace Institute, 2017

All Rights Reserved

www.ipinst.org

CONTENTS

Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iii

Executive Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

The Shadow of Past Peace Agreements(1960s–2012). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

PAST WAVES OF REBELLION

THE LEGACY OF PAST AGREEMENTS

The Fourth Wave of Rebellion (2012–2014). . . . . . . . 9

THE 2012 CRISIS

THE OUAGADOUGOU PRELIMINARY AGREEMENT

THE TURNING POINT: CLASHES IN KIDAL

The Algiers Negotiations (2014–2015). . . . . . . . . . . . 12

FIVE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS

THE PARALLEL SECURITY TRACK ANDEVOLVING MILITARY BALANCE OF POWER

AN AGREEMENT SIGNED IN TWO STAGES ANDUNDER DURESS

Implementation of the Bamako Agreement. . . . . . . 21

THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN IMPLEMENTATION

ARMED GROUPS AND IMPLEMENTATION:CONFRONTATION, FRAGMENTATION, ANDRECOMPOSITION

LOCAL MEDIATION, OR THE “CLANIZATION”OF PEACE

NEGOTIATING “UNSPOKEN FACTORS”:TERRORISTS AND TRAFFICKERS

THE MISSING PIECES: PEACE DIVIDENDS ANDSOCIETAL BUY-IN

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:MAINTAINING UNITY OF ACTION AND PURPOSE

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

LESSONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

THE WAY FORWARD: 2017 AND BEYOND

Abbreviations

AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali

AQIM al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb

AU African Union

CJA Congress for Justice in Azawad

CMFPR Coordination of Patriotic Movements and Forces of the Resistance

CPA Coalition of the People for Azawad

CSA Follow-Up Committee

CSE Monitoring and Evaluation Committee

CTMS Joint Technical Commission for Security

CTS Technical Security Commission

DDR Disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration

ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States

EU European Union

FLM Macina Liberation Front

GATIA Self-Defense Group of Imghad Tuaregs and Allies

HCUA High Council for the Unity of Azawad

MAA Arab Movement of Azawad

MINUSMA UN Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali

MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad

MPSA Popular Movement for the Salvation of Azawad

MSA Movement for the Salvation of Azawad

iii

1

Executive Summary

The Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation inMali, resulting from the Algiers Process (hereafterthe “Bamako Agreement”), signed in two stages inMay 15 and June 20, 2015, was supposed to usher ina new era of peace and stability in Mali. However,not only has there been little progress inimplementing the agreement, but the securitysituation remains volatile. This state of affairs is allthe more troubling given the internationalcommunity’s mobilization in support of the Malianstate. Why, in spite of this international mobiliza-tion, are some warning that the peace agreement isin danger of collapse?

Any analysis of the situation in Mali must start byacknowledging that the most recent crisis was thecountry’s fourth rebellion, and the third to endwith a negotiated agreement between the govern-ment of Mali and armed groups in the north. Thelegacy of these past negotiations has created a sensethat agreements do not get implemented. This hasfed mistrust on both sides and radicalized thearmed movements. Although past negotiationshave established the role of Algeria as the mediatorof choice, this legacy cast a shadow over the 2014–2015 Algeria-led mediation process, whose compli-cations gave rise to a number of the obstacles facingimplementation of the Bamako Agreement.

The end of the Bamako Agreement’s two-yearinterim period on June 20, 2017, provides anopportunity to assess progress on its implementa-tion. Best described as a “framework agreement,”the Bamako Agreement sketches the broad outlinesof a solution while leaving much to be clarifiedduring implementation. As a result, implementa-tion has required intensive mediation as the partiesinterpret the agreement and translate it into newstructures, mechanisms, and institutions. Six keyissues have created challenges during this process.These challenges offer a number of lessons for UNengagement in peace processes.1. The government’s role in implementation: The

mediators identified the Malian state as theprimary actor responsible for implementation.While the government has recently showngreater will to move ahead, particularly in theareas of security and political institutions,implementation in other areas has lagged.Moreover, the way the government has

implemented the agreement has createdtensions with armed groups and contributed tothe dysfunction of the follow-up mechanisms.

2. The fragmentation and recomposition ofarmed groups: Continuous realignmentsamong armed groups have had three directconsequences for implementation. First, theinternational mediation team has struggled toaddress the challenge of new armed groupsvying for inclusion in the Follow-UpCommittee. Second, clashes among armedgroups have allowed the government to blamethe stalled implementation on insecurity. Andthird, fragmentation of groups has caused themto focus more on community-based orindividual perks than on peace dividends.

3. The “clanization” of the peace process: Splits inarmed groups along clan-based lines havereflected the increasing “clanization” of theconflict. Despite temporary agreementsbrokered at the local level, power strugglesbetween and within clans have continued,feeding into the cycle of insecurity andcontributing to stalling the implementationprocess. Most notably, these power strugglesplayed out in the appointment of new interimauthorities in the northern regions.

4. “Unspoken factors” including terrorism andtrafficking: While the negotiations did notaddress terrorism and organized crime, thesehave become pressing challenges during theimplementation period. With attention focusedon northern Mali, terrorist groups have spread tothe center of the country, and Mali has becomethe most dangerous theater for UN peacekeepers.The slow progress of implementation has alsomade it difficult to differentiate between“compliant,” “terrorist,” and “criminal” groups,and the lines between them remain blurred.

5. The lack of peace dividends and societal buy-in: Implementation has been slowest in the areaof development, largely due to the limitedpresence of the state and persistent insecurity innorthern Mali. This has weakened societal buy-in to the peace process among northerners. Atthe same time, perceived concessions made toarmed groups and northerners have weakenedsocietal buy-in in the south. Nonetheless,Malians remain generally supportive ofimplementation.

2 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

6. Maintaining unity of action and purpose in theinternational community: The internationalmediation team, which was enlarged after thesigning of the agreement, actively supportedimplementation through guarantees and follow-up mechanisms. While the diversity of actorsinvolved sometimes helped hammer outagreements, it also has made it difficult for theinternational community to maintain unity ofvision and a constant level of engagement.

While implementation of the BamakoAgreement is far behind schedule, there are nowsome small achievements to build on. Importantly,the government of Mali has accepted that June 20th

cannot be the end of the interim period, and thegovernment and the signatory armed groupsseemed to have entered into a new positivedynamic until clashes between the Platform andCoordination and affiliated clans resumed in theKidal region in June 2017. Many remain concernedthat the parties are more interested in the processthan in peace itself, and there is a risk that theinternational mediation team may disengage fromfollowing up on implementation. Despite theseconcerns, implementation of the peace agreementremains the only option to avert a return toviolence.

Introduction

Signed in two stages in Bamako on May 15 and June20, 2015, the Agreement for Peace andReconciliation in Mali, resulting from the AlgiersProcess (hereafter the “Bamako Agreement”) wassupposed to usher in a new era of peace and stabilityin Mali. However, not only has there been littleprogress in implementing some of the keyprovisions of the agreement, but the securitysituation remains volatile. Insecurity has beenspreading from northern to central Mali. Islamistgroups are resurging; a new armed group, theMacina Liberation Front, has emerged in centralMali and entered into an alliance with other MalianIslamist groups—al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb(AQIM), Ansar Dine, and al-Mourabitoun—inMarch 2017. The country has become the most

dangerous theater for UN peacekeepers, who areregularly targeted and have suffered significantcasualties, including since the Bamako Agreementwas signed.1

This situation is all the more troubling given theinternational community’s mobilization in supportof the Malian state. Ever since the coup d’état inMarch 2012, when Malian soldiers, displeased withtheir government’s management of the rebellion innorthern Mali, mutinied and overthrew thegovernment of President Amadou Toumani Touré,regional and international states and organizationshave come to Mali’s aid. Following the coup d’étatand the resumption of widespread fighting innorthern Mali, the African Union (AU) and Francedeployed troops to prevent the collapse of theMalian state. The United Nations, AU, EconomicCommunity of West African States (ECOWAS),European Union (EU), and Switzerlandcontributed to the negotiation of the OuagadougouPreliminary Agreement, signed on June 18, 2013.In April, the Security Council authorized the UNMultidimensional Integrated Stabilization Missionin Mali (MINUSMA), which deployed on July 1,2013.

While these efforts paved the way for the reestab-lishment of legitimate state authorities with theelection of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta inAugust 2013, they failed to resolve the crisisbetween Malian authorities in Bamako and armedgroups in northern Mali. To address this ongoingcrisis, the Algerian government spearheaded amultilateral mediation process between the govern-ment and these groups in Algiers, which resulted inthe Bamako Agreement.

Why, in spite of this broad internationalmobilization, is the state of implementation suchthat the International Crisis Group has called uponthe UN Security Council to “reorient[MINUSMA], whose mandate it will renew in June,to help prevent the agreement’s collapse”?2 Thisreport traces the difficulties of implementing thepeace agreement by placing current events in Maliin the broader historical context of past peaceprocesses in the country. It also examines these

1 From its establishment in June 2014 to April 30, 2017, MINUSMA suffered 117 fatalities. This high fatality count in just three years makes MINUSMA the UN’smost dangerous mission. Data from UN, available at www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/fatalities/documents/stats_3apr.pdf .

2 International Crisis Group, “Open Letter to the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping in Mali,” April 24, 2017, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/open-letter-un-security-council-peacekeeping-mali .

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 3

3 Stephanie Pezard and Michael Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali: Past Agreements, Local Conflicts, and the Prospects for a Durable Settlement (SantaMonica: Rand Corporation, 2015), p. 5, available at www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR800/RR892/RAND_RR892.pdf .

4 Jean-Pierre Olivier de Sardan, “The ‘Tuareg Question’ in Mali Today,” Cahiers du Mapinduzi 3, no. 1 (2013), p. 33.5 Two of the main leaders of the 1990 rebellion, Iyad Ag Ghali and Mohamed Ag Najem, had fought for Libya’s Islamic Legion in Lebanon and Chad.

difficulties in light of the 2014–2015 Algeria-ledmediation process, as a number of the obstacles toimplementation are directly related to complica-tions that arose during these negotiations. Thereport draws lessons from both the negotiationsthemselves and the two years of implementation. Itanalyses the impact of the mediation process on theimplementation of the Bamako Agreement and thesustainability of its outcomes.

The report emphasizes a number of issues that,while discussed with specific reference to theMalian case, have broader import and hold lessonsfor future mediation processes. These include: thelegacy of past processes on trust between theparties; the government’s primary role inimplementing the agreement; the fragmentationand recomposition of competing armed groups;local mediation efforts and the “clanization” ofpeace; the challenges posed by “unspoken” issues ofterrorism and organized crime; the missing peacedividends for the people of Mali and lack of societalbuy-in; and main taining unity of action andpurpose in the international community. Thereport concludes with some lessons for the UnitedNations and analyses the way forward for theimplementation of key provisions of the agreementahead of the July 2018 presidential elections.

The Shadow of Past PeaceAgreements (1960s–2012)

No analysis of the current situation in Mali cangloss over the fact that the 2012 armed uprising wasthe fourth rebellion to end with a negotiationprocess and result in an agreement between thegovernment of Mali and armed groups in thenorth. Since the country gained independence in1960, there have been four waves of rebellion in thenorth: 1963–1964, 1990–1996, 2006–2009, and2012–2013. The 1963–1964 rebellion was militarilydefeated by a strong Malian army supported by theSoviet Union, the shadow of which has taintedrelations between the north and the south eversince. All the others were followed by negotiationsthat resulted in a peace agreement. Thus, as noted

in a recent report, “Mali’s previous peace accordsrepresent a useful place to begin assessing theproblems that stand in the way of the emergence ofa durable peace today.”3

PAST WAVES OF REBELLION

The First Wave: Repression and Exile(1963–1964)

The first rebellion began in 1963, only three yearsafter Mali gained independence. The armed groupsdemanded political recognition of the specificitiesof northern Mali and a special status for the region.Instead, the first post-colonial regime of PresidentModibo Keïta chose repression. The northernregions were subjected to martial law and militaryadministration. According to one anthropologist,the brutality of the repression by the mainlysouthern Malian army “left painful traces in thecollective memory, in particular in the region ofKidal, and fuelled deep resentment within manyfamilies in this zone who were affected by themassacres” (see Figure 1 for a map of Mali,including the northern regions).4

In 1968 President Keïta was overthrown. Underthe single-party regime of the Democratic Union ofthe Malian People (Union pour la démocratie et lepeuple malien) led by General Moussa Traoré, therebellion seemed to abate. In the mid-1970s andmid-1980s droughts pushed thousands ofnortherners to leave Mali. They sought refuge inAlgeria and Niger, where they connected with bothcountries’ own Tuareg rebel movements, and inLibya, where Muammar Qaddafi integrated theminto the Islamic Legion, a Libyan-sponsoredmercenary force.The Second Wave: The TamanrassetAccord and the National Pact(1990–1996)

The 1990–1991 rebellion was led and fought byTuareg and Arab exiles.5 Their demands echoedthose of the first wave—better living conditionsand recognition of a northern political identity—but they also asked that Tuaregs be allowed tointegrate into the Malian army. Referring to therebels as “highway thugs,” General Traoré once

4 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Figure 1. Political map of Mali, 2014–2017

again chose repression over negotiations. Theresulting abuses have been blamed for aggravatingthe grievances of the north.6 The regime choseAlgeria to mediate the crisis.

Signed on January 6, 1991, the TamanrassetAccord that resulted from these negotiationsgranted the north special status, allowingnortherners to manage their economic, social, andcultural affairs at the regional and local levelsthrough elected assemblies. It allocated around 47percent of the next development program to thenorthern regions and provided for their demilita-rization.7 Kept secret because its terms were fearedto be unacceptable to the south, it ultimatelybecame moot when a popular revolution supportedby the army and led by Lieutenant-ColonelAmadou Toumani Touré overthrew GeneralTraoré on March 26, 1991.

The revolution did not improve the situation innorthern Mali, as the rebellion split into fourfactions over diverging aspirations.8 The newMalian government enlisted the support of Algeria,with help from Mauritania and France, to negotiatewith the rebels. Under Algerian pressure, theTuareg and Arab rebel groups entered into analliance (the Coordination of United Movementsand Fronts of Azawad) in order to negotiate. OnApril 11, 1992, they signed a National Pact (Pactenational) intended to reset the relationshipbetween southern and northern Mali.9 The pactprovided some of the same concessions as theTamanrasset Accord: special status for the north,the withdrawal of the Malian armed forces fromthe north, integration of rebels into the Malianarmy, an ambitious development program, anddeepened decentralization extending to the entirecountry.10 In exchange, the rebels agreed to give up

their calls for the independence of Azawad.The Malian authorities proved unable to

mobilize sufficient support for the agreement in thesouth or to rally all the northern clans around it.Almost 2,500 former combatants were integratedinto the army and administration, and 9,500 wereprovided financial subsidies—numbers “perceivedas too small in the north and too large…in thesouth.”11 Divisions in the north and the slow pace ofpolitical and economic reform triggered newtensions.The Third Wave: The Algiers Accord andIts Aftermath (2006–2009)

When violence resumed in northern Mali in 2006,it resulted once again from the now familiarexplosive mix of northern grievances and inappro-priate southern responses. Since 1996, northernMali had continued to lag behind the south interms of development,12 while southernerscontinued to distrust northerners, who they feltwere being rewarded for taking up weapons. TheMalian government, for its part, failed toimplement the promises made in 1992, which,according to two experts “deepened nationaldivisions and the rift between the northern andsouthern territories.”13 Things worsened in 2002with the election of President Amadou ToumaniTouré.

In May 2006, as the Malian military withdrewfrom the north, fighters united under the banner ofthe Alliance for Democracy and Change under theleadership of Iyad Ag Ghali, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga,and Hassan Ag Fagaga took control of the cities ofKidal and Ménaka. Once again, Algeria offered tolead a mediation process. The resulting AlgiersAccord, signed on July 4, 2006, granted northern

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 5

6 Grégory Chauzal and Thibault van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict: Moving beyond the 2012 Crisis,” Netherlands Institute of International RelationsClingendael, March 2015, p. 31, available at www.clingendael.nl/sites/default/files/The_roots_of_Malis_conflict.pdf .

7 Accord sur la cessation des hostilités, Tamanrasset, Algeria, January 6, 1991. Full text (in French) available atwww.unesco.org/culture/fr/indigenous/Dvd/pj/TOUAREG/TouaregC4_2.pdf .

8 These four factions were: the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad, the main group active during the rebellion (composed of the dominant Ifoghasclans and led by Iyad Ag Ghali); the Revolutionary Liberation Army of Azawad (composed mainly of Tuaregs from the Taghat Melett, Idnan, and Imghad clans);the Popular Liberation Front of Azawad (composed of the Chaman-Amas clan); and the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad (composed of Mali’s Arab minority).Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 32.

9 Pacte national conclu entre le gouvernement de la République du Mali et les mouvements et Fronts Unifiés de l’Azawad consacrant le statut particulier du nord auMali, Bamako, Mali, April 11, 1992. Full text (in French) available at http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-pacte-reconciliation-national92 .

10 The number of communes (administrative units) increased from 19 to 703, the first communal elections were held in 1998, and a third administrative region wascreated in northern Mali around Kidal. Some economic and security powers were devolved from the national government to newly created local and regionalassemblies.

11 Pezard and Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, p. xiii.12 For a good overview of inequalities between northern and southern Mali, see Macartan Humphreys and Habaye Ag Mohamed, “Senegal and Mali,” January 2003,

available at www.columbia.edu/~mh2245/papers1/sen_mali.pdf .13 Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 32.

Mali further political autonomy and more develop-ment funds.14 Like its predecessors, few of itsprovisions were ever implemented.

The Algiers Accord was rejected by severalMalian political parties, including the Rally forMali party (Rassemblement pour le Mali) headed byIbrahim Boubacar Keïta, which considered theagreement a weak and inappropriate politicalsolution to a security problem.15 Tuareg leadersfrom non-Ifoghas clans also refused to endorse theagreement, which they considered only beneficialto the Ifoghas community from which Iyad AgGhali hailed. Indeed, the Ifoghas of Kidal wereoverrepresented in the institutions created tomonitor implementation of the agreement. Otherclans, such as the Idnan and Taghat Mellet, weregradually excluded from the process.16

Criticism of President Touré’s management ofthe rebellion also reflected suspicions that Iyad AgGhali’s movement may have colluded with AQIM.Rumors of alleged high-level governmentalcomplicity with traffickers and armed groups grew.Touré also fed divisions among northerncommunities by setting up two militias—oneTuareg and one Arab—to fight the North MaliTuareg Alliance for Change, Ibrahim Ag Bahanga’snew movement set up in opposition to Ag Ghali’sleadership.17 All of these factors quickly cametogether to render the Algiers Accord obsolete.

Departing from his earlier approach of demilita-rization of northern Mali, in 2010 President Touréattempted to address growing insecurity in thenorth by implementing a Special Program forPeace, Security, and Development in NorthernMali (Programme spécial pour la paix, la sécurité etle développement du Nord Mali). With a totalbudget of €48.6 million, the program was initiallyperceived as a historic commitment to northernpopulations based on the 1992 National Pact and2006 Algiers Accord.18 However, it ended up

establishing “securitized development andgovernance hubs” (pôles sécurisés de développementet de gouvernance) with little or no local consulta-tion. With its budget going disproportionately tosecurity—in particular to the building of armycamps—instead of development, many contestedthe program.19 Some analysts cite this as one of thereasons the National Movement for the Liberationof Azawad (MNLA) took up arms in January 2012.THE LEGACY OF PAST AGREEMENTS

While the first wave of rebellion following Mali’sindependence was defeated militarily, the secondand third were followed by negotiations thatresulted in a peace agreement. The legacy of theseagreements has affected each subsequent round ofnegotiations. In particular, it has created a sensethat agreements do not get implemented, whichhas fed mistrust on both sides and radicalized thearmed movements, contributing to increasinglyuncompromising demands. It has also establishedAlgeria as the mediator of choice in Mali’s crises.Mistrustful Parties

Perhaps the most striking feature of pastagreements is their redundancy.20 Each agreementhas committed the Malian authorities to recognizethe special status of the north, implement greaterdecentralization, reconsider Bamako’s heavy-handed security approach, lessen the role andpresence of the Malian armed forces in northernMali, promote economic development, andintegrate the rebels into the Malian security forcesand civilian administration.

Bad faith and poor implementation are oftenmentioned as two of the main reasons for thefailure of previous peace agreements. An Arableader in Mali described the problem as follows:“Peace didn’t hold in the past because it’s like in amarriage. There will be problems, but, so long asthey work at it, they’ll be fine. The problem is that,

6 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

14 Accord d’Alger pour la restauration de la paix, de la sécurité et du développement dans la région de Kidal, Algiers, Algeria, July 4, 2006. Full text (in French)available at http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accordalger2006 .

15 See Rally for Mali, “Déclaration du bureau politique national du RPM,” July 12, 2006, available at http://ibk2007.over-blog.net/article-10089823.html .16 International Crisis Group, “Mali: Avoiding Escalation,” July 18, 2012, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-avoiding-escalation . 17 Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 11.18 “Mali: ATT lance sa stratégie anti-Aqmi de développement du nord,” Jeune Afrique, August 10, 2011, available at www.jeuneafrique.com/179914/politique/mali-

att-lance-sa-strat-gie-anti-aqmi-de-d-veloppement-du-nord/ . See also interview with the coordinator of the program, Mohamed Ag Erlaf, “Nord du Mali:Concilier développement et sécurité,” Marchés Africains, 2011, available at http://marchesafricains.fr/articles/13561/mohamed-ag-erlaf-directeur-general-de-l%E2%80%99anict-et-coordinateur-du-pspsdn-(interview) .

19 Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 50.20 Pezard and Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, pp. 7, 23–43.

with Mali, one of the partners had no interest inmaking things work.”21 This is a common percep-tion that can be traced back to what has beendescribed as “Bamako’s fundamental failure toestablish legitimacy among many northerners.”22

Since independence, Malian national identity hasbeen built around the Bambara and other Mandeethnicities. In discussions with the authors, severalMalian officials referred to their missions to thenorth as “Malian missions” as opposed to “govern-ment missions,” underlining the representation ofnorthern Mali and its communities as “other.” Atthe same time, the populations of northern Malihave developed stronger commercial, cultural, andlinguistic ties with Algeria and North Africa ingeneral than with Bamako. Marginalized groupsand communities in northern Mali have thusinterpreted the securitized implementation ofpeace agreements as a mere extension of militaryadministration and its excesses. Reflecting on the2006 and 2015 agreements, a senior Malian civilservant of northern origin argued that, in bothinstances, little, if anything, was done to rebuildtrust and close the growing gap between north andsouth. The civil servant added, “Whenever in thecourse of discussions [in government circles] onetries to bring back some balance, you are told thatyou are partial rather than nationalist.”23

Northerners are not the only mistrustful party inMali. The history of successive rebellions has alsohad a profound impact on public opinion in thesouth. Southerners make up approximately 80percent of Mali’s population and, like northerners(though to a lesser degree), lack access to basicservices. Many are resentful of what they havecome to understand as a “premium for rebellion”—the benefits that (at least on paper) accrue to thenorth with every new peace agreement.

Indeed, it has been noted that “the peaceagreements and economic incentives given to somecombatants in order to disarm them have indirectlyencouraged, in a depressed economic environment,

a rebel economy and the emergence of localentrepreneurs of violence.”24 This war economy hasfed the historical association that southerners makebetween Tuaregs and insecurity “because of theirlong and mythicised experience of ‘rezzou,’ orraiding, against sedentary people.”25

Southerners are also deeply suspicious of theexclusionary nature of the processes that haveproduced past peace agreements. There has histor-ically been little public information about the peaceprocesses and even less about the content of thepeace agreements. According to one Malian civilservant, rumors abounded in southern Mali in2015, as they had in 2006, that the population wasnot being told the true extent of the concessionswrested by the armed groups at the negotiatingtable.26 The popular saying “les vrais accords sontrestés à Alger” (“the real accords were left behind inAlgiers”) reflects the extent of southern distrust.From Local Groups and Grievances toTransnational Radicalized Movements

Another legacy of the successive waves of rebellionand subsequent peace agreements is the transfor-mation of the armed groups and the radicalizationof their demands. The first wave of northernrebellions was a local affair; the rebels demandedthat the authorities in Bamako recognize thespecificities of northern Mali. According to oneMali expert, it was also a reaction by the leadingTuareg clans of the Kel Adagh confederationagainst Bamako’s policies, which sought toundermine the existing social order that gave thempreeminence.27

Not only was this first rebellion a limited Tuaregaffair, but it was also a rebellion of noble clans thatmany clans did not join. Even the Tuareg spiritualleader, the amenokal, did not favor taking up arms,although his brother was one of the leaders of therebellion. However, the Malian armed forces’repression targeted Arabs and Tuaregs indiscrimi-nately, whether they had taken up weapons or not.This contributed to the mobilization of larger

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21 Ibid., p. 23.22 Ibid., p. xv.23 Interview with Malian civil servant, Bamako, May 9, 2017.24 Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 19.25 Ibid.26 Interview with Malian civil servant, Bamako, May 9, 2017.27 Jean Sebastian Lecocq, “That Desert Is Our Country: Tuareg Rebellions and Competing Nationalisms in Contemporary Mali (1946–1996)” (PhD dissertation,

Universiteit von Amsterdam, 2002), p. 97, cited in Pezard and Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, p. 9.

8 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

28 Pezard and Shurkin, Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, p. 12.29 Pierre Boilley, Les Touaregs Kel Adagh: Dépendances et révoltes—du Soudan français au Mali contemporain (Paris: Karthala, 1999), cited in Pezard and Shurkin,

Achieving Peace in Northern Mali, p. 12.30 By 1994, the Imghad clan was clashing violently with the MPA, the successor of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Azawad. Today, the Imghad are

hostile to the MNLA and tend to be found in the ranks of GATIA. See de Sardan, “The ‘Tuareg Question’ in Mali Today,” p. 39.31 Ag Fagaga is a member of the noble Ifergoumessen clan in the Kel Adagh confederation, while Ag Gamou belongs to the lower-caste Imghad clan. This also

illustrates clan struggles and the discomfort of upper-caste clans with the upward social mobility of members of lower-caste clans.32 Lecocq, “That Desert Is Our Country,” pp. 391–92, 400.33 It acquired these financial means by kidnapping Westerners for ransom and trafficking drugs. See Chauzal and van Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict,” p. 34.34 Morten Bøås and Liv Elin Torheim, “The Trouble in Mali: Corruption, Collusion, Resistance,” Third World Quarterly 34, no. 7 (2013), cited in Chauzal and van

Damme, “The Roots of Mali’s Conflict.”35 Yahia Zoubir, “Algeria and the Sahelian Imbroglio: Preventing War and Fighting Terrorism,” Al Jazeera Center for Studies, November 25, 2012, p. 3, available at

http://studies.aljazeera.net/mritems/Documents/2012/11/25/2012112595728720580Algeria%20and%20the%20Sahelian%20Imbroglio.pdf .

swaths of the population against Bamako.After the first rebellion, a combination of factors,

including government repression, harsh droughtconditions, and a lack of economic opportunities,drove many people to leave northern Mali. Someheaded south and ended up in camps for internallydisplaced persons, others sought refuge inneighboring Algeria, Niger, or Mauritania, andothers enrolled in Qaddafi’s Islamic Legion. Thisexperience radicalized many northerners, givingthem what has been described as “a new identity asMalian Tuareg that, for some, was accompanied bya desire to transcend northern Mali’s traditionalhierarchies.”28

This was the background of Iyad Ag Ghali, theleader of Mali’s second rebellion in 1990. While AgGhali hailed from a noble clan in the Kel Adaghconfederation, the rebellion did not initially have aclan- or caste-centered agenda. Rather, Ag Ghali’sPopular Movement for the Liberation of Azawadformulated demands that reflected the grievancesand concerns of the entire community.29 Therebellion also mobilized Tuaregs beyond the clansof the Kel Adagh confederation and the nobility ingeneral.30 Arab communities also joined the fight,forming the Arab Islamic Front of Azawad.

The 2006 rebellion has been described as havingbeen triggered by a personal rivalry: the dissatisfac-tion of Colonel Hassan Ag Fagaga at the appoint-ment of his rival, El Hadj Ag Gamou, ascommander of the Gao garrison.31 Dejected, AgFagaga deserted and started the Alliance forDemocracy and Change.32 When Ag Fagaga andIbrahim Ag Bahanga rejected the 2006 AlgiersAccord, they formed an alliance with Niger-basedTuareg groups under the banner of the Niger-MaliTuareg Alliance for Change (Alliance TouarègueNiger-Mali pour le Changement). President Touréactively enlisted the support of rival Arab and

Tuareg militias to defeat this alliance, a divide-and-rule tactic that fragmented the armed groups.

Furthermore, by 2007, there were rumors that AgGhali, the nominal leader of the Alliance forDemocracy and Change, had ties to AQIM. In 2003the Algeria-based Salafist Group for Preaching andCombat (Groupe salafiste pour la prédication et lecombat, later AQIM) had taken advantage of thesecurity vacuum to enter northern Mali. Itsextensive financial means allowed it to buy thesupport of local criminal networks and thegoodwill of northern communities.33 The organiza-tion distributed money, handed out medicine,treated the sick, and bought SIM cards for youngpeople.34 It thus attracted recruits, who were drawnto the organization by a mix of security andeconomic considerations. The Movement forOneness and Jihad in West Africa (Mouvementpour l’unicité et le jihad en Afrique de l’Ouest, orMUJAO), an offshoot of AQIM created in 2011,followed a similar pattern.The Road to Peace Goes through Algiers

Last but not least, Mali’s history of consecutivepeace agreements established the role of Algeria asthe mediator of choice. Algeria’s interest andinvolvement in security in the Sahel is prompted bya number of factors.

The Tuareg issue is also an Algerian issue, ascolonial map-makers divided the Tuareg popula-tion among several different countries. Algeriarecognized the rights of its own Tuareg populationin the 1960s. However, it grew worried as Libya’sQaddafi instrumentalized Tuaregs in his quest forregional leadership; as one North Africa expertdescribes, Qaddafi encouraged “the emergence of aTuareg [independence] movement and even theestablishment of an independent Tuareg state as away of exerting leverage over rival actors in theregion, especially Algeria.”35 Algeria’s concern for

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 9

its own national unity and territorial integritymeant that it could not approve of Tuareg claimsfor autonomy or irredentism.

Ever since independence, Algeria has alsoopposed foreign, particularly Western, interven-tion in its internal affairs and regional sphere ofinfluence. According to one analyst, since the endof the Algerian civil war in the late 1990s, Algeriahas “sought to marshal a coordinated regionalresponse to cross-border terrorism, smuggling, andother armed group activity in the Sahel’s vast andunder-policed border regions.”36 To this effect, ithas enlisted “core” neighboring countries—Mali,Mauritania, Niger, and even Nigeria—as part of aconcerted regional strategy to contain AQIM. Asnoted by one expert, Algeria has also “elicited theadherence of Sahel countries to a vision thatfocuses on the settlement of regional securityproblems without the involvement of foreignpowers, except in sectorial cooperation.”37 Forexample, Algeria was instrumental in the establish-ment of regional security organizations, includingthe Common Operational Joint Chiefs of StaffCommittee (CEMOC) and the Fusion and LiaisonUnit (UFL), which have shaped the regional fightagainst terrorism.

Algeria’s leadership role is recognized by regionalactors.38 It is also acknowledged by external powerssuch as the EU and US. Algerian military intelli-gence may, in the words of the US embassy, be a“prickly, paranoid group to work with,”39 but itsrole in the fight against AQIM is essential. With thelargest defense budget on the continent ($10.2billion in 2016),40 strong military capabilities, andrecognized counterterrorism expertise, Algeriaplays an essential role in the US counterterrorismstructure in the Sahel. Algeria’s importance in thesecurity realm is further enhanced by bilateraldefense partnerships with European countries such

as the UK and Germany, as well as by its role in theAU, where an Algerian has historically headed thePeace and Security Department of the AUCommission.

The Fourth Wave ofRebellion (2012–2014)

THE 2012 CRISIS

The 2012 crisis in Mali started with a Tuaregrebellion, the fourth since Mali’s independence in1960 (see Figure 2 for a timeline of the crisis). InJanuary 2012, bolstered by the return of soldierswith heavy weaponry from Qaddafi’s IslamicLegion, the National Movement for the Liberationof Azawad (Mouvement national de liberation del’Azawad, or MNLA) occupied a large part ofnorthern Mali and, on April 6th, declared theindependence of this territory, which it calls“Azawad.”41 On January 17, 2012, the MNLA andAnsar Dine joined forces to attack a Malian armygarrison in the town of Aguelhok in the Kidalregion. The reported execution of about 100Malian soldiers when the army garrison surren-dered on January 24th after running out of ammuni-tion was a profound shock to many Malians.42

The Malian armed forces’ poor performance infighting the rebellion triggered a coup d’état inMarch 2012. Over the course of two days,frustrated army officers overthrew the governmentof President Touré, thus bringing about thecollapse of the Malian state. Although Mali hadoften been described as a beacon of democracy, thestate had long been weakened by corruption and byTouré’s policy of “demilitarization,” his allianceswith the local elites of northern Mali, and hisreliance on ethnic militias in pursuit of narrowpolitical agendas.43

The occupation of northern Mali by the Tuareg

36 Alexis Arieff, “Algeria and the Crisis in Mali,” Institut français des relations internationales, July 2012, available atwww.ifri.org/fr/publications/editoriaux/actuelles-de-lifri/algeria-and-crisis-mali .

37 Ibid., p. 3.38 This paragraph is based on Anouar Boukhars, “The Paranoid Neighbor: Algeria and the Conflict in Mali,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October

2012, available at http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/10/22/paranoid-neighbor-algeria-and-conflict-in-mali-pub-49756 .30 “US Embassy Cables: Terrorists Damage Bouteflika’s Credibility,” The Guardian, December 6, 2010, available at

www.theguardian.com/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/142554 .40 Data from Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, available at www.sipri.org/databases/milex .41 The MNLA is a primarily ethnic Tuareg secular separatist group, which originated in October 2011 from the fusion between the pacific National Movement of

Azawad (Mouvement national de l’Azawad) and the armed Tuareg Movement of Northern Mali (Mouvement Touareg du Nord Mali).42 “Guerre au Mali: Retour sur le drame d’Aguelhok,” Jeune Afrique, October 21, 2013, available at

www.jeuneafrique.com/167687/politique/guerre-au-mali-retour-sur-le-drame-d-aguelhok .43 “When Touré won the 2002 election, Transparency International ranked Mali 77th of 182 countries in its corruption perceptions index; it had fallen to 118th by

10 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

MNLA was short-lived. Al-Qaida in the IslamicMaghreb (AQIM)44 and its offshoot, the Movementfor Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO),45which were militarily and financially superior,quickly drove out MNLA forces, taking control ofTimbuktu and Gao, respectively. Another IslamistTuareg group, Ansar Dine, took control of Kidal.46Following the occupation of northern Mali by theseIslamist forces, President Blaise Compaoré ofBurkina Faso, who ECOWAS had appointed as itsmediator in the Malian crisis in March 2012,initiated negotiations between the interim Maliangovernment and both Ansar Dine and the nowweakened MNLA. Algeria similarly attempted tohave Ansar Dine dissociate itself from AQIM andMUJAO.47 These negotiation attempts came to anabrupt end when the Islamist groups startedmoving south toward Sévaré and possibly Bamako.

While UN Security Council Resolution 2085 ofDecember 20, 2012, had authorized an African-ledInternational Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA),the rapid movement of Islamist groups southtoward Bamako prompted the interim Maliangovernment to call for French military assistance.On January 11, 2013, France launched OperationServal, which deployed before AFISMA. TheFrench military intervention inflicted heavy losseson the Islamists within the first few days of combat.Facing little resistance as armed groups largelyvanished into northern Mali’s rugged Adrar desIfoghas and southern Libya, Operation Serval

quickly regained control of the northern towns ofGao, Timbuktu, and Kidal with support fromChadian troops deployed as part of AFISMA.48 Theweakened MNLA came out in support of theFrench intervention in the hope that this wouldhelp it regain control of northern Mali.49

With the end of major combat operations, Francesupported the idea of deploying a UN mission toMali. The UN Multidimensional IntegratedStabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) wasauthorized by Security Council Resolution 2100 ofApril 15, 2013, for deployment on July 1st.MINUSMA was mandated to support politicalprocesses in Mali and carry out a number ofsecurity-related tasks. However, achieving thismandate also required the reestablishment of theconstitutional order disrupted by the March 2012coup d’état. This would be the main objective of theOuagadougou peace talks.THE OUAGADOUGOU PRELIMINARYAGREEMENT

On June 18, 2013, following a two-week mediationprocess, the interim Malian government and twoTuareg armed groups—the MNLA and the HighCouncil for the Unity of Azawad (Haut conseil pourl’unité de l’Azawad, or HCUA)50—signed aPreliminary Agreement on the PresidentialElection and Inclusive Peace Talks in Mali inOuagadougou, Burkina Faso (see Figure 3 for anoverview of the agreement’s follow-upmechanisms).51 Article 24 allowed groups that did

2011. A World Bank study indicates that more than two-thirds of Malian businesses have paid bribes to win bids for government contracts.” Roland Marchal,“The Coup in Mali: The Result of a Long-Term Crisis or Spillover from the Libyan Civil War?,” Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, March 2012, p. 2,available at http://noref.no/Regions/Africa/Mali/Publications/The-coup-in-Mali-the-result-of-a-long-term-crisis-or-spillover-from-the-Libyan-civil-war/(language)/eng-US .

44 AQIM was created in January 2007 when elements of the Algerian Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat and its predecessor the Armed Islamic Group, whichfought against the secular Algerian government, pledged allegiance to al-Qaida. It is organized into several zones and katibas (military units), with four katibas inthe Sahel. It aims to create an Islamic state across North Africa and has used trafficking, kidnapping for ransom, and taxation to fund its terrorist activities.

45 MUJAO is a jihadist militant group that broke off from AQIM in October 2011, reportedly due to disagreement over the distribution of kidnapping revenue andthe dominant position of Algerian nationals in the leadership. Unlike AQIM, the majority of MUJAO’s members are Malians active in the Gao region (TilemsiArabs, Peulh, and Songhai). Some Mauritanians and Sahrawi have also been reported to be part of MUJAO. In August 2013 MUJAO merged with MokhtarBelmokhtar’s al-Muwaqi’un bil-Dima group to create al-Murabitoun, which claimed responsibility for the attacks on the French uranium mine in Arlit and armybarracks in Agadez, Niger.

46 Ansar Dine is a militant Salafi Tuareg group that played a crucial role in the jihadist takeover of northern Mali. Iyad Ag Ghali, a former rebel leader of the Tuaregrebellions in the 1990s, created the group after he was denied the leadership of the MNLA in the 2012 rebellion. Its alliance with AQIM supplied Ansar Dine withboth weaponry and combatants.

47 “Au Mali, le groupe Ansar ed-Dine se divise face aux pilonnages,” Libération, January 24, 2013, available at www.liberation.fr/planete/2013/01/24/au-mali-le-groupe-ansar-dine-se-divise-face-aux-pilonnages_876377 .

48 International Crisis Group, “Security, Dialogue and Meaningful Reform,” April 11, 2013, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-security-dialogue-and-meaningful-reform .

49 Ségolène Allemandou, “Le MNLA, un nouvel allié pour l’armée française?,” France24, January 23, 2013, available at www.france24.com/fr/20130123-mnla-armee-francaise-mali-negociations-bamako-rebelles-touaregs-islamistes-ansar-dine .

50 HCUA was created in May 2013 out of a splinter group of Ansar Dine, the Islamic Movement of Azawad (Mouvement islamique de l’Azawad), itself created inJanuary 2013. It is primarily composed of Tuareg Ifoghas (a noble clan), is based in the Kidal region, and has a strongly Islamist agenda.

51 Accord préliminaire à l’élection présidentielle et aux pourparlers inclusifs de paix au Mali, Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, June 18, 2013. Full text (in French)available at http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-accord-preliminaire-elections2013 .

not take part in the negotiations to adhere to theagreement, creating a precedent that would haveunforeseen consequences later on. Two groups—the Arab Movement of Azawad (Mouvement arabede l’Azawad, or MAA)52 and the self-defense militiathe Coordination of Patriotic Movements andForces of the Resistance (Coordination desmouvements et forces patriotiques de résistance, orCMFPR)53—took advantage of this provision (seeFigure 4 for an overview of the main armedgroups).54

Led by the host country Burkina Faso, whosepresident was the ECOWAS mediator in theMalian crisis, the Ouagadougou talks weresupported by the United Nations and the AfricanUnion. Unlike previous peace agreements in Mali,the Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement wasfocused on short-term objectives. It sought toachieve a cease-fire that would pave the way forpresidential elections. The agreement provided forthe return of public services to the north, includingthe government’s return to the last rebel-heldstronghold of Kidal. Moreover, Article 21stipulated that, within sixty days of assumingpower, the newly elected government of Maliwould enter into inclusive peace talks with thesignatories and adherents to the agreement, as wellas with communities from northern Mali, to reacha comprehensive and lasting solution to thetensions between the north and Bamako.

The Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement putin place a cease-fire that made it possible for Malito hold presidential and parliamentary electionsacross its entire territory in July and August 2013,including in the Kidal region, where the nationalradio and state-appointed governor symbolicallyreturned in November after a failed attempt in July.Constitutional order was effectively restored withthe election of Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta as presidentwith a solid majority. However, the agreement didnot address difficult issues related to the future ofcombatants and the administrative status of

northern regions.55

Upon the signature of the agreement, the UNSecurity Council had mandated MINUSMA tosupport Mali’s transitional authorities in stabilizingthe country and implementing the transitionalroad map. The agreement’s follow-upmechanisms—the Monitoring and EvaluationCommittee (Comité de suivi et d’évaluation, orCSE) and the Joint Technical Commission forSecurity (Commission technique mixte de sécurité,or CTMS), presided over by MINUSMA’s head ofmission and force commander, respectively—failedto overcome the deep mistrust between the parties.They could not achieve progress on keyconfidence-building measures such as the release ofdetainees and stopped meeting by October 2013due to the lack of political will on both sides.

MINUSMA found itself in a difficult lead role inthe follow-up to the Ouagadougou PreliminaryAgreement, with a mandate to support “theimplementation of the transitional road map,including the national political dialogue” while atthe same time supporting “the reestablishment ofState authority throughout the country.”56 Thenewly elected president and government weremore interested in the UN supporting theredeployment of the Malian defense and securityforces, the return of the state administration tonorthern Mali, and the disarmament of armedmovements than in peace talks. Furthermore,President Keïta and his government were keen onreaffirming the restoration of constitutional orderby exercising Malian sovereignty in the implemen-tation of the agreement. As a result, the govern-ment launched a number of initiatives, such as anational forum on decentralization (États générauxde la décentralisation) and a forum of northerncommunities (Forum des communautés du nord),with little if any consultation or collaboration withthe other signatories or with the internationalguarantors of the agreement.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 11

52 The MAA started out in April 2012 in Timbuktu from residual elements of a militia (backed by former president Touré and led by Arab Colonel Ould Meydou)that had formed in the first months of the rebellion and was made up of both Arabs and sedentary communities. It aims to protect Arab commercial interests—both legal and illegal—and communities. MAA helped AQIM enter Timbuktu out of preference over the Tuareg MNLA but later distanced itself from thejihadists. In 2013 the MAA split into two branches, the MAA-Ahmed Ould Sidi Mohamed and the MAA-Ould Sidatti, which allied with the MNLA and HCUA.

53 The mainly Songhai self-defense militia CMFPR emerged due to the absence of state authority during the rebellions in the 1990s in northern Mali as a groupcalled Ganda Koy. It was recently reactivated alongside other smaller self-defense groups of sedentary populations in the Gao and Timbuktu regions.

54 Neither the MAA nor the CMFPR had taken part in the MNLA-led rebellion, and both were considered to be closer to the government.55 International Crisis Group, “Mali: Reform or Relapse,” January 10, 2014, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-reform-or-relapse .56 UN Security Council Resolution 2100 (April 25, 2013), UN Doc. S/RES/2100.

12 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Building on the momentum created by a visit ofthe Security Council from February 1 to 3, 2014,MINUSMA attempted to re-launch the politicaldialogue by facilitating workshops in February andMarch. During this visit, all Malian stakeholdersreaffirmed to the council their willingness to takepart in an inclusive dialogue to reach a comprehen-sive settlement of the crisis. Nonetheless, theattempt met with little success. Even though theonly tangible outcome of the workshops wasagreement on a modus operandi for cantonment,the armed movements continued to resist thecantonment of their troops in the absence ofpolitical negotiations. For its part, the governmentcontinued to oppose moving forward on security-focused confidence-building measures such asjoint patrols and direct political negotiations withrebel groups.THE TURNING POINT: CLASHES INKIDAL

With a lack of progress on the political front,tensions continued to rise, culminating in clashesbetween the Malian defense and security forces andarmed groups during a visit by Malian PrimeMinister Moussa Mara to Kidal on May 17, 2014.Each side blamed the other for initiating thefighting, which led to the killing of six civil servantsat the governor’s office; the government called it a“declaration of war, which it has to respond to.”57

Four days later, having sent heavy weaponry andtroop reinforcements to the region, Malian forceslaunched an assault on Kidal. However, theyretreated after a few hours of fighting against theMNLA, HCUA, and affiliated armed groups,suffering thirty-three fatalities. Malian troopssought refuge at MINUSMA camps in Kidal andother cities in northern Mali.58

This was a turning point in the peace process.Despite the brokering of a cease-fire on May 23rd,the assault on Kidal radically changed thesituation—and the balance of power—on theground. The armed movements MNLA and HCUAand their ally MAA-Coordination59 were now incontrol of a large part of northern Mali from whichthe Malian defense and security forces and theadministration had fled. The armed movements

started setting up a parallel administration in theseregions, including local security committees. Thisled to much questioning within MINUSMA onhow to work in these areas and engage with armedmovements turned de facto authorities withoutlegitimizing them.

Extremist groups also started to reorganizethemselves and increasingly to target UNpeacekeepers. MINUSMA was now the main forceoperating in northern Mali after the departure ofMalian forces (the few Malian troops whoremained in Ménaka and Tessalit after May 2014effectively became cantoned in their camps) andthe downsizing and reorganizing of French forcesas part of a Sahel-wide counterterrorism strategy(with Operation Serval being replaced byOperation Barkhane).

The Algiers Negotiations(2014–2015)

This is the context in which Algeria, which hadplayed a key role in mediating Malian crises sincethe 1990s, took over the peace process (see Figure 2for a timeline of the negotiations). In January 2014,Algiers started “exploratory discussions” with thearmed movements of northern Mali in an attemptto bring them together in a coherent platformahead of negotiations with the government of Mali.These efforts intensified after the reelection ofAlgeria’s President Abdelaziz Bouteflika in Apriland the clashes in Kidal in May. The efforts onlypartially succeeded.

Following the clashes in Kidal, the armedmovements entered the first phase of negotiationsas two separate groups: the Coordination ofAzawad Movements (hereafter “the Coordi -nation”), an alliance between the MNLA, HCUA,and MAA-Coordination that had existed sinceNovember 2013; and the Platform, which cameinto being on June 14th, bringing together theMAA-Platform, CMFPR, and the Coalition of thePeople for Azawad (Coalition du peuple pourl’Azawad, or CPA, which split from the MNLA onMarch 18th). The Coordination was initially themore militarily relevant force as it was composed of

57 Office of the Prime Minister of Mali, “Communiqué du Gouvernement relatif à la situation à̀ Kidal,” May 17, 2014.58 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2014/403, June 9, 2014, paras. 4 and 5.59 The MAA-Coordination is a splinter group from the MAA that allied with the MNLA and HCUA and is led by Sidi Brahim Ould Sidatt.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 13

60 Despite the symbolic presence of a Songhoi (and ex-Ganda Koy), Mohammed Djiré Maiga, as vice president of the MNLA. 61 International Crisis Group, “Mali: Last Chance in Algiers,” November 18, 2014, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-last-chance-algiers .62 The government and Coordination brought no more than three women each, and the Platform had an all-male delegation.63 The HCUA’s November 20, 2013, political platform called for the establishment of an Islamic state with the implementation of Sharia law.64 Some forty-five Malian military and police captured by the Coordination after the May 2014 clashes in Kidal were released in exchange for some forty-one

Tuaregs who had been imprisoned by Malian defense and security forces during various operations. Although MINUSMA had been trying to facilitate a prisonerrelease for some months already, this prisoner exchange was ultimately orchestrated by Algeria.

the armed groups of northern Mali that took uparms against the government in 2012. While itclaimed to represent all populations of northernMali, it primarily included Tuaregs and Arabs, withfew sedentary groups represented.60 The Platform,composed of groups that never took up armsagainst the government, claimed to represent someof the Tuareg and Arab populations notrepresented by the Coordination, as well as thesedentary populations of central and northernMali. At first the Platform did not have much of amilitary presence on the ground or a clear politicalagenda in the negotiations and was perceived ascloser to the government.

In a declaration issued from Algiers, the govern-ment of Mali, the Coordination, and the Platformall officially recognized the Algerian government’sstatus as chief mediator, effectively sideliningECOWAS’s previous mediation effort and, to someextent, MINUSMA. The new process alsoeffectively dropped one of the main stipulations ofthe Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement, withthe cantonment of armed groups no longer aprecondition for dialogue.61 But the real novelty ofthis process compared to past peace processes inMali was that it involved numerous mediators withdiverse interests and with different links to thevarious parties: the lead mediator, Foreign MinisterRamtane Lamamra of Algeria (who had served asthe AU commissioner for peace and security from2008 to 2013), invited a number of other “co-mediators,” including the UN, AU, ECOWAS, EU,Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, BurkinaFaso, Chad, Mauritania, Niger, and Nigeria. Apartfrom those international actors already involved inthe implementation of the OuagadougouPreliminary Agreement, these included neigh -boring countries with a stake in the outcome of thenegotiations, most of which hosted their ownTuareg populations. This “college of mediators”first met in Algiers in July 2014 ahead of theopening of the first phase of the peace negotiations.The delegations of the government of Mali, theCoordination, and the Platform were composed of

about thirty persons each.62

FIVE PHASES OF NEGOTIATIONS

Phase I: A Road Map for Negotiationsamid Clashes on the Ground

The first phase of the inter-Malian peace negotia-tions lasted two weeks and concluded on July 24,2014, with the signing of a road map (feuille deroute), which provided a framework and guidingprinciples for the negotiations. The signingceremony was a harbinger of things to come: theCoordination and Platform each signed the roadmap separately with the government of Mali, as theCoordination refused to recognize the movementsin the Platform as real belligerents in the conflictand suggested that they should be part of thegovernment delegation instead.

The road map enshrined the red lines set by thegovernment of Mali, including territorial integrity,national sovereignty, unity, and secularism. Thiswas despite resistance from the Coordination,which strongly contested the inclusion of theconstitution of Mali as a fundamental referencedocument for the negotiations and wanted allissues to be open for negotiation. The HCUA inparticular attempted to remove the reference tosecularism (laïcité).63 The MNLA’s rejection of“unity” as a principle also suggested that itsposition on independence, federalism, orautonomy remained essential to the group’sdemands. While the Coordination was envisaging along negotiation process, Algeria suggested that thenegotiations should be completed within 100 days.

Although this first phase had opened with anannouncement on the release of prisoners on July14th as a confidence-building measure,64 it was alsomarked by serious armed clashes on the ground,particularly in the Tabankort region. These clashesshed light on some of the underlying conflictdynamics, including economic dynamics (controlof strategic geographical locations on traffickingroutes), intercommunity dynamics (between Araband Tuareg communities), and intra-communitydynamics (between different castes within the Arab

14 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

and Tuareg communities). Notably, these intra-community dynamics eventually led TuaregImghad clans (considered vassals under thetraditional Tuareg hierarchy) to form the Self-Defense Group of Imghad Tuaregs and Allies(Groupe d’autodéfense Touareg Imghad et alliés, orGATIA). The clashes also underlined the porositybetween armed movements, criminal groups, andterrorist groups. While the government describedthe clashes as between armed groups, theCoordination blamed them on Platform-affiliatedgroups acting as proxy militias for the government.

Following extensive informal negotiations onsecurity facilitated by MINUSMA with the AU andAlgeria (held in the evenings on the sidelines of thetalks), a declaration on a cessation of hostilities wassigned on May 23, 2014.65 This declaration calledfor the establishment of a joint commission led byMINUSMA and comprising key representatives ofthe parties to the conflict. However, the UN’sinability to set up an effective cease-fire monitoringmechanism at the time—owing in part to theabsence of military observers within MINUSMA—limited the impact of this declaration.Phase II: Civil Society “Hearings” and the“Federalism” Hurdle

Initial attempts by some members of the interna-tional mediation team to broaden the process andmake it more inclusive had been met with resist-ance by the parties.66 Nevertheless, at the request ofthe government, the lead mediator decided topreface the second phase of negotiations with aweek of civil society “hearings.” The civil societyrepresentatives participating in these hearings weredesignated by the parties (the government,Coordination, and Platform each chose eighteen)and were flown in by MINUSMA. The delegationsincluded representatives of refugees and thediaspora, traditional leaders, women, youth, andreligious leaders. However, some armed groupsincluded local political and military leaders in theirdelegations, while the government brought in somelocal elected officials. The hearings were organizedaround four thematic groups mirroring the organi-zation of the actual negotiations: (1) political-

institutional issues; (2) defense and security issues;(3) economic development, social, and culturalissues; and (4) reconciliation, justice, and humani-tarian issues.

The three civil society delegations initiallyadopted similar positions as those of the partiesthat designated them. However, their diagnosis ofthe problem and their positions progressivelyconverged as they looked to the state to addresstheir security problems and provide them with thebasic services they all lacked. The government wasunhappy with this development, having hoped thehearings would weaken the armed movements.

A disagreement over the sequencing of the talksdelayed the beginning of the actual negotiations;the Coordination insisted that the talks start withpolitical-institutional issues, while the governmentand the international mediation team wanted workon all four pillars to move in tandem. Moreover,the Coordination refused the presence of thePlatform as a separate party to the conflict since thelatter was not involved in the armed struggleagainst the government. In order to resolve theissue, the international mediation team establishedan informal high-level framework composed of thelead mediator (Lamamra), a senior AU representa-tive (former President Pierre Buyoya of Burundi),and a senior UN representative (the head ofMINUSMA, Bert Koenders). This “triumvirate”proved effective in clearing this and subsequentblockages in the process. It was ultimately decidedthat the four thematic groups would work simulta-neously along two parallel tracks (one between thegovernment and the Coordination and anotherbetween the government and the Platform).

It is also worth noting that the parties had verylittle interaction; rather than speaking to or negoti-ating with one another, they mostly made verbaland written proposals to the internationalmediation team, which would either relay them toor use their content in discussions with the otherparties.

In spite of the respectful atmosphere of themeetings, clear divergences quickly emerged over

65 Accord de cessez-le-feu, Bamako, Mali, May 23, 2014. Full text (in French) available at http://peacemaker.un.org/mali-ceasefire2014 .66 The road map adopted at the end of the first phase limited civil society participation to fora that would take place throughout Mali to sensitize different

components of Malian society on a draft accord following this second phase of the talks, as the parties themselves were not in favor of civil society participation inthe actual negotiations.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 15

67 The G5 is an institutional framework for regional cooperation on development and security in the Sahel. It was formed during a summit in Nouakchott,Mauritania, from February 15 to 17, 2014, among five Sahel countries: Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger.

the proposed institutional framework for a newMalian state. The Coordination insisted on afederal structure, including the establishment of“Azawad” as an entity in northern Mali. Thegovernment countered this with a proposal fordecentralization and regionalization. The Platform,while rejecting federalism, strongly supportedextensive devolution of power to the regions. Boththe government and the Platform rejected theCoordination’s delimitation of “Azawad” ascomprising the regions of Gao, Timbuktu, andKidal. Importantly, the region of Mopti was notrepresented in the Algiers negotiations, nor werethe Peulh of central Mali, only a couple of whomwere in the Platform.

The positions of the parties in the other thematicgroups reflected this debate over federalism versusdecentralization/regionalization. The Coordina -tion proposed the creation of autonomous defenseand security forces for a federal state of Azawad(based on the model of the autonomous region ofIraqi Kurdistan), while the government encour-aged the armed movements to join ongoingsecurity sector reform efforts. The Coordination’sinsistence on federalism as a starting point fordiscussions and the government and the Platform’srefusal to consider the idea ultimately hampereddetailed engagement on other content in thethematic groups.

Despite entrenched positions, the second phaseof the negotiations concluded with convergence onthe need to acknowledge and factor in the particu-larities of northern populations and to preserveMali’s territorial integrity and national unity (asalready agreed in the road map) while transferringimportant powers to regional entities, including topotential new regions. The parties also agreed onthe need for an interim period to implementmeasures immediately after signing an agreement.Some progress was also made on the need to workon urgent security measures through an enlargedJoint Technical Commission for Security (seediscussion of the parallel security track below).Phase III: A Document Begins to Emerge

The third phase of the inter-Malian peace negotia-tions officially opened on October 21, 2014, andmarked a sudden shift into higher gear as the lead

mediator wanted to complete the process (possiblyto open an inter-Libyan dialogue). The centerpieceof this phase was a document of principles(Eléments pour un accord de paix et de réconcilia-tion au Mali). The lead mediator (together with theAU) prepared this document as a “compromise”synthesizing reports produced by the rapporteursof the thematic groups at the end of the secondphase. It was reviewed by the mediation team in arestricted drafting committee on October 19th andendorsed by the G5 countries (Burkina Faso, Chad,Mali, Mauritania, and Niger) at a ministerialmeeting organized in Algiers prior to the launch ofthe third phase.67

The document of principles sketched the broadoutlines of a peace agreement. It proposedlaunching a “Marshall Plan” for the development ofnorthern Mali in the form of a special developmentzone and giving “territorial collectivities” a broadrange of powers. The mediation team received eachparty separately, twice to get their first impressionsand subsequently to get their precise observationsand commentary. The third phase was suspendedon October 23rd to enable the parties to consult withtheir constituencies on the draft document and toprepare written reactions to submit to themediators before reconvening to start negotiationson a draft final agreement.Phase IV: A Draft Agreement

The atmosphere was markedly tense at the officiallaunch of the fourth phase of the process onNovember 20th. The Coordination representativeaccused the government of lacking political will,violating the cease-fire, and using militias to inciteintercommunity violence. The Coordination alsoannounced that it had set up its own civilianadministration and defense and security apparatuscovering 80 percent of the “Azawad” territoryunder its control and that it had thus already begunimplementing its proposed federal solution. Themediation team met separately with the parties tohear their reaction to the draft document of princi-ples. The Coordination refused to back down fromits proposal for federalism, which the governmentrejected, while also opposing a constitutionalreview, the creation of the Senate, and theestablishment of a development zone.

16 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

For the first time since the beginning of theprocess, the mediation team managed to initiatedirect dialogue between the parties, albeit still ontwo parallel tracks. While this would prove to be apositive step and a useful exercise in catharsis, theparties did not debate the core issues of the draftdocument, and key divisions between them wereleft unattended to.

Seeking to capitalize on this new dynamic, themediation team put on the table a draft agreement(Projet d’accord pour la paix et la reconciliation auMali), based on the earlier Eléments pour un accordde paix et de réconciliation au Mali, revised bymediation experts and intended to become anintegral part of the future agreement. This proposalcontained operational details, including in threenew thematic annexes (on the interim period,defense and security, and economic development).A fourth annex detailing international guaran-tees—a strong demand of the Coordination—wasalso suggested. As the fourth phase wound downon November 27th, the mediators requested theleadership of the movements and the governmentto return to Algiers in early January 2015 tocontinue discussions with a view to signing anagreement by the end of that month.Phase V: An Abrupt End to Negotiations

The launching of the fifth and final phase of theAlgiers negotiations was delayed by militarybuildups on both sides—especially in the areas ofBer, Tabankort-Anefis, and Ansongo-Ménaka—and by the resumption of clashes in Tabankort-Anefis between elements of the Coordination andPlatform (reinforced by GATIA). The Coordi -nation accused the government of using thePlatform/GATIA as proxies to reoccupy positionsthe Malian army had lost, in violation of the May23rd cease-fire, while the government kept denyingany link to the Platform.

In an attempt to calm the situation, MINUSMAsent a patrol to Tabankort. The move backfired,however, as the patrol got caught in the cross fireand allegedly came under rocket fire from theCoordination, leading a UN Apache helicopter tofire a rocket on Coordination fighters.68 The newlyappointed head of MINUSMA, Mongi Hamdi,then attempted to address the situation by holding

a meeting of the defunct Monitoring andEvaluation Committee established by theOuagadougou Preliminary Agreement in Algiers.In the end, this meeting only reiterated the need torespect the existing agreement on the cessation ofhostilities, including a return to the positions of thecease-fire from May 23, 2014.

The fifth phase was formally launched onFebruary 11th following preliminary consultationswith the parties and on the heels of a visit by MalianPrime Minister Modibo Keïta to Algiers onFebruary 10th. The mediators held bilateralmeetings with the government, Coordination, andPlatform on a revised draft agreement submitted tothe parties on February 25th, which they presentedas an “acceptable compromise” for everyone. Thelead mediator insisted that negotiations on thedocument had come to an end but that initialing itwould pave the way for further discussions duringthe implementation phase. Algeria also argued thatit was urgent to initial an agreement to counterwould-be spoilers in a regional context of terrorismand organized crime. While the parties seemedcaught by surprise, the general view amongmembers of the mediation team was that negotia-tions in Algiers needed to come to an end and thatfurther discussions were not likely to makeheadway in bridging the positions of the parties.

While it eventually agreed to initial the draftagreement, the government delegation produced atwelve-page document listing a number ofremaining preoccupations. In particular, thegovernment continued to oppose a singleeconomic zone for northern Mali, the option forregions to join together of their own volition, andany preconditions for the redeployment of theMalian army, including joint patrols and integra-tion of ex-rebels. Foreign Minister Abdoulaye Diopalso requested the removal of a reference to“Azawad” in the preamble of the document. ThePlatform agreed to initial the document butinsisted on the inclusion of its allies—the PopularMovement for the Salvation of Azawad(Mouvement populaire pour le salut de l’Azawad, orMPSA) and GATIA—as signatories.

As for the Coordination, it refused to initial theagreement, which it considered not to address

68 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2015/219, March 27, 2015, para. 18.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 17

some of its main aspirations, including the recogni-tion of the northern territory it refers to as“Azawad” as a geographical and political entity andsecurity arrangements within this territory. At thesame time, the Coordination expressed doubts as towhether the international community couldprovide the necessary guarantees for implementa-tion of the agreement and asked for additional timeto consult its constituency before initialing it.

The mediators stood firm, refusing to make anyfurther changes to the draft agreement or to allowmore time for consultation ahead of the initialingceremony on March 1st.69 Ultimately, only thegovernment and the Platform initialed theAgreement on Peace and Reconciliation in Mali(Accord pour la paix et la reconciliation au Mali) inAlgiers on March 1, 2015. The government waslater criticized by the political opposition and civilsociety in Bamako for initialing the agreementwithout consulting them.

As for the Coordination, it held consultationswith its constituencies from March 11th to 16th, butthese concluded with a rejection of the agreementin its current state and an expression of willingnessto continue negotiations with the governmenttoward a consensual agreement. Partly out ofconcern of being subjected to “targeted sanctions,against those who resume hostilities and violate theceasefire,”70 the Coordination took great care topublicly reaffirm its commitment to respecting thevarious cease-fires and cessation of hostilitiesagreements. The international mediation team,which had expanded to include new members (seebelow), remained categorically opposed toreopening negotiations and began applyingincreasing pressure on the Coordination.THE PARALLEL SECURITY TRACK ANDEVOLVING MILITARY BALANCE OFPOWER

While negotiations were taking place in Algiers,security developments on the ground in Maliaffected the process and obliged the mediationteam to establish a parallel track to addressemerging confrontations. MINUSMA, the mainsecurity actor in Mali, and the president of the JointTechnical Commission for Security established bythe Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement played

leading roles in this parallel track.Skirmishes and heightened tension on the ground

between government, Platform, and Coordinationforces accompanied each phase of negotiations.Furthermore, over the course of eight months ofnegotiations, armed movements fragmented andalliances shifted as the relative military strength ofthe various groups evolved and their leaderspositioned themselves in advance of the conclusionof a possible agreement (see Figure 4). MINUSMAreinforced its presence on the ground and chairedsecurity meetings on the margins of the actual talksin an attempt to ease tensions, avoid clashes, andprotect the process from the disruptive impact ofsecurity developments.

As mentioned above, during the first phase ofnegotiations in July 2014, tensions mounted in theTabankort-Anefis area in the Gao region betweenthe Platform and the Coordination. To defusetensions, MINUSMA, the AU, and Algeriaorganized parallel security meetings in Algierswhere they managed to bring representatives of theparties to sign a Declaration of Cessation ofHostilities. The declaration established a jointcommission led by MINUSMA to consolidate thecessation of hostilities on the ground.

During the second phase, and in an effort toprevent further deterioration of the securitysituation, MINUSMA’s force commanderorganized a series of bilateral meetings with theparties. To ensure the discussions reflected thechanging reality on the ground, the Joint TechnicalCommission for Security was enlarged to includetwo representatives each from the four armedmovements of the Coordination and the Platformthat were not yet represented (CMFPR2, CPA,GATIA, and MPSA). Representatives of themediation team (Algeria, Chad, Mauritania, andNiger) were also added to better harmonize thesecurity track with the political process. Thesechanges were a major achievement, all the more sobecause the composition of the Joint TechnicalCommission for Security had been a point ofcontention between the parties, which was one ofthe reasons it had stopped meeting after October2013.

The armed movements fragmented and recom -

69 The US and France were invited to the ceremony as “friends of the mediation.” 70 UN Security Council, Statement by the President of the Security Council, UN Doc. S/PRST/2015/5, February 6, 2015.

18 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Figure 2a. Timeline of lead-up to Bamako Agreement

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 19Figure 2b. Timeline of implementation of Bamako Agreement

20 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

posed many times throughout the process. Forinstance, part of the CMFPR allied with theCoordination (as CMFPR2) before eventuallyreturning to the Platform in April 2015, and part ofthe CPA quickly rejoined the MNLA (from whichit had split off in the first place). The mostimportant development, and the one with thegreatest security implications on the ground, wasthe formation of GATIA as a new armed group inAugust 2014. GATIA gave the Platform significantmilitary strength, transforming what had until thenbeen primarily a political force representingpopulations of northern Mali not represented inthe Coordination, particularly from the Gao andTimbuktu regions. GATIA’s military strength grewexponentially after the first clashes in theTabankort region, and it soon displaced the well-funded MAA-Platform to become the Platform’smain military force.

GATIA openly supports the government, andalthough it has formally allied with the Platform,the Coordination considers it a proxy militia underthe direct orders of Malian General El Hadj AgGamou. For its part, the government of Mali hasalways denied any links to the Platform groups,which it describes as “vigilante groups…formed bythe communities concerned in order to protecttheir land.”71 While the international mediationteam decided not to recognize any of these “newgroups” (to avoid encouraging the creation ofmore), Article 67 of the agreement specifies that theCoordination and Platform are understood toinclude all their members at the time of signature.

The participation of two groups of armedmovements in addition to the government, as wellas the military strengthening of the Platformthrough GATIA, may have ultimately madeconfrontation inevitable as the parties sought to“test” the new balance of military power on theground.72 Indeed, GATIA and MAA-Platformattacked the Coordination, which had just publiclyreaffirmed its intention to initial the agreement(see below), in the town of Ménaka on April 27,2015, just a few weeks ahead of the signing

ceremony. This led to a breakdown of the cease-fire, with the Coordination launching retaliatoryattacks against Malian army positions in theTimbuktu and Gao regions. The ensuing fightingaround Ménaka resulted in many casualties onboth sides, reportedly including members ofprominent Tuareg families. Ultimately, this did notderail the peace process, but it may have putadditional pressure on the Coordination, whichwas losing ground, to sign the agreement.AN AGREEMENT SIGNED IN TWOSTAGES AND UNDER DURESS

Following consultations with the Coordination inAlgiers from April 15 to 18, 2015, the Algeria-ledmediation team issued a communiqué inviting allparties to the inter-Malian dialogue to sign thepeace agreement at a ceremony in Bamako on May15, 2015. Meanwhile, addressing the SecurityCouncil on April 9th, Mali’s foreign minister madeclear his government’s position that “negotiationsare over” and the Malian government was movingforward with implementation. He called on theinternational community to “isolate…and imposesanctions” on “radical and extremist individuals”who would not sign the agreement.73

It was only under strong international pressurethat the Coordination eventually initialed theagreement in Algiers on May 14, 2015, on thecondition that direct discussions be held with thegovernment of Mali to address its demands aheadof the final signing ceremony. Indeed, following thePlatform’s takeover of Ménaka on April 27th, theCoordination had made its adherence to the peaceagreement conditional on the withdrawal of thePlatform from that town.74 It thus refused to jointhe signing ceremony with the government of Maliand the Platform on May 15th.

The May 15th signing ceremony was thereforeheld in Bamako without the Coordination (only theMNLA splinter group CPA showed up). The UNsecretary-general’s statement, delivered at theceremony by Under-Secretary-General forPeacekeeping Hervé Ladsous, called for the

71 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali Abdoulaye Diop, speech to the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7355, January 6, 2015. 72 International Crisis Group, “Mali: An Imposed Peace?,” May 22, 2015, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-imposed-peace .73 Minister of Foreign Affairs of Mali Abdoulaye Diop, speech to the UN Security Council, UN Doc. S/PV.7425, April 9, 2015.74 The Platform forces were led into Ménaka by commander Yoro Ould Daha, the former Islamic police chief of MUJAO in Gao during the 2012 Islamist occupa-

tion of northern Mali. See “Mali: Qui tient la localité de Ménaka?,” Radio France Internationale, May 17, 2015, available at www.rfi.fr/afrique/20150517-mali-tient-localite-menaka-yoro-azawad-casques-bleus-groupes-armes-cma .

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 21

agreement to remain open for the signature ofremaining parties and for dialogue to continue. Italso warned against using the signing ceremony asa pretext for resuming military operations againstnon-signatory groups. This message was not well-received by the Malian president, who, in turn,accused MINUSMA of partiality, revealing whathave been described as “substantial divergenceswith the host country on the process that shouldfollow the signing.”75

On June 5th, following further consultations onthe modalities of implementation, the Coordi -nation announced it would finally sign the peaceagreement. This came as another agreement wasmade between the Coordination and the govern-ment over the withdrawal of Platform forces fromMénaka. On June 19th UN peacekeeperstemporarily took over the security of the town andits population in return for the Coordinationceasing its attacks in northern Mali. On June 19th,the government of Mali also lifted arrest warrantsagainst fifteen key Coordination leaders. Finally,on June 20th MAA-Coordination leader SidiBrahim Ould Sidatt signed the peace agreement inBamako on behalf of the Coordination in thepresence of over 150 Coordination representativesfrom Kidal and the subregion.76

Implementation of theBamako Agreement

The end of the Bamako Agreement’s two-yearinterim period on June 20, 2017, provides anopportunity to assess the progress on its implemen-tation (see Figure 2 for a timeline of the implemen-tation; see Figure 3 for an overview of theagreement’s follow-up mechanisms). The intentionof this report is not to produce an implementation“scorecard” but rather to explore the link betweenthe difficulties encountered during the mediationprocess and the challenges of implementation.

This is all the more important given the nature ofthe Bamako Agreement. During the fourth phase ofnegotiations, the Algeria-led international media -

tion team decided that, no matter how long themediation process, actual consensus between theparties could not be reached. Instead, it presentedthe parties with a “framework agreement.” Whilethe agreement covered the broad outlines of thechanges required to achieve a durable solution inMali, a number of its provisions were framed inaspirational terms and left much to be clarifiedduring implementation.77 In other words, it wasevident that the implementation phase wouldrequire intensive mediation as the partiesinterpreted the aspirational aspects of theagreement and translated them into newstructures, mechanisms, and institutions.

In what follows, we address six key issues thatcreated challenges in the course of this process: (1)the government’s role in implementation; (2)confrontations among armed groups and theirfragmentation and recomposition; (3) the “claniza-tion” of the peace process; (4) “unspoken factors”including terrorism and trafficking; (5) the lack ofpeace dividends; and (6) maintaining unity ofaction and purpose in the international community.THE GOVERNMENT’S ROLE INIMPLEMENTATION

From the moment the Bamako Agreement wassigned, it was abundantly clear that the onus ofimplementation would fall on the Malianstakeholders (Article 2).78 As one key member ofthe international mediation team admitted,however, this has not happened in practice. Forexample, it was the international mediation teamthat organized high-level ministerial meetings ofthe Follow-Up Committee (Comité de suivi del’accord, or CSA) in Algiers on January 18, 2016,and again on February 10, 2017, to attempt to re-launch the implementation process.79 Thiscommittee was the main structure created by theagreement to ensure follow-up and continuedinternational involvement during implementation.

While the signatory armed groups have obliga-tions under the agreement, the internationalmediation team clearly identified the Malian state

75 International Crisis Group, “Mali: An Imposed Peace?”76 Accord pour la paix et la réconciliation au Mali, Bamako, Mali, June 20, 2015. Full text (in French) available at http://peacemaker.un.org/node/2681 .77 Details to be clarified during implementation included key issues such as quotas and criteria for integration of rebels into the Malian defense and security forces.78 Article 2: “The Parties shall implement in their entirety and in good faith, the provisions of the present Agreement, recognising their primary responsibility in this

regard.”79 Interview with key members of the international mediation team, Bamako, February 2, 2017.

22 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Figure 3. Implementation and follow-up m

echanisms in the Ouagadougou Prelim

inary Agreement and Bamako Agreement

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 23

as the primary actor responsible for implementa-tion. To this effect, Article 3 of the agreement calledon Malian state institutions to take all necessarymeasures to adopt the regulatory, legislative, andeven constitutional changes needed for implemen-tation, in close consultation with the signatoryarmed groups and with the support of the Follow-Up Committee.80 Not only was this befitting of theprerogatives and responsibilities of a sovereigngovernment; it also seemed in line with the Malianauthorities’ past insistence on exercisingsovereignty in the implementation of theOuagadougou Preliminary Agreement.

Most observers agree that the implementation ofthe peace agreement has lagged. On February 27,2016, President Keïta and the leaders of thesignatory armed groups already committed toagree on a new timeline for implementing the keyinstitutional and security provisions of the peaceagreement. In his May 2016 report on Mali, the UNsecretary-general interpreted this commitment as“an acknowledgement that the challenges for theimplementation of the agreement are daunting,and that progress made so far has been uneven.”81

According to a foreign diplomat, the first seriousindication of a will to forge ahead with implemen-tation was the government reshuffle of April 11,2017, which promoted former Defense MinisterAbdoulaye Idrissa Maïga to prime minister. This

resulted in the activation of a consultationframework between the government and the armedgroups—although not yet a permanent one.82Some, however, saw the government reshuffle asprimarily motivated by its preparation for thereelection of President Keïta in July 2018 and as amissed opportunity to bring on board ex-rebels ina more inclusive government.83

As the interim period draws to a close, it is clearthat most of the focus has been on the security andinstitutional pillars of the Bamako Agreement, tothe detriment of the justice and developmentpillars. In the two years since the BamakoAgreement was signed, the government of Mali hasinitiated a process of constitutional reform.84 It hasalso installed interim authorities in Kidal, Gao, andTimbuktu, as well as in the newly created regions ofMénaka and Taoudenni, even though they are notyet fully operational.85 According to the secretary-general’s June 2017 report, just 34 percent of stateofficials were present in northern and centralMali—4 percent lower than in March—mainly dueto persistent insecurity.86 The much-awaitedConference of National Entente (Conférenced’entente nationale) was finally held from March 27to April 2, 2017, which resulted in a number ofrecommendations that will inform the Charter forPeace, Unity and National Reconciliation (Chartepour la paix, l’unité et la réconciliation nationale)envisaged by the agreement.87

80 Article 3: “The Malian State institutions shall take the necessary measures to adopt the regulatory, legislative and constitutional measures needed to implement theprovisions of the present Agreement, in close coordination with the Parties and with the support of the Follow-Up Committee foreseen in the presentAgreement.”

81 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/498, May 31, 2016, para. 78.82 Interview with foreign diplomat, Bamako, May 10, 2017.83 Two personalities close to armed groups had been integrated into the July 2016 government but in their individual capacities rather than as representatives of the

groups. Nina Wallet Intalou, one of a handful of women—and probably the most visible one—representing the armed groups (MNLA) in the Algiers negotiations,became minister of handicrafts and tourism but was immediately disavowed by the Coordination. Mohamed el Moctar, who was close to the Platform groups,became minister of national reconciliation at the same time. In April 2017, Alhassane Ag Hamed Moussa, a Songhoi close to the Platform, became minister fordecentralization and local taxation.

84 A draft law on the revision of the constitution was adopted by the Council of Ministers on March 10, 2017. According to the secretary-general’s May 2017 reporton Mali, “In line with the provisions of the peace agreement, the draft law includes the creation of a second chamber of the Parliament, a Senate. However, therewas no mention of the integration of traditional authorities, women and youth into the high council of communities (Haut Conseil des Collectivités), the reformof which was envisaged by the peace agreement to increase inclusivity. The Government has not clarified how the proposed revisions to the constitution willreflect the institutional reforms corresponding to the recommendations of the conférence d’entente nationale, including more attention to the regions.” UNSecurity Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 12. In particular, the proposed revisions do notmake any specific reference to how the Senate would include customary and traditional authorities, youth, and women—something the armed groups would liketo see, as the Senate will effectively replace the High Council for Territorial Collectivities as the legislative authority. Neither does the revision guarantee that theCharter for Peace, Unity and National Reconciliation will be factored into the new constitution.

85 The government announced the extension of the mandate of these interim authorities beyond June 20th to honor their minimum six-month mandate. In Kidal,disagreements continue to block the installation of the new interim authorities.

86 Ibid., para. 5.87 The conference recommendations “include, inter alia, the need to address governance and security issues, especially in the central regions, diversity in the country

and socio-economic issues as well as to fully implement the agreement. The Coordination rejected the conclusion that the term ‘Azawad’ remains a socioculturaland symbolic reality, but carried no political status. A special commission in charge of drafting the charter was set up on 3 May and is expected to submit a draftto President Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta by 20 June.” Another special commission in charge of mapping the “terroirs” of Mali was set up in parallel to address thequestion of “Azawad.” Ibid., para. 2. Another recommendation that was much commented on was the need to engage in dialogue with all Malians, includingjihadists, in the framework of a republican secular state. See “Conférence d’entente nationale au Mali: Dialoguer avec les djihadistes,” Radio France Internationale,April 3, 2017, available at www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170403-mali-conference-entente-nationale-dialoguer-jihadistes .

24 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

There has also been movement on the securityfront with the establishment of the OperationalCoordination Mechanism (Mécanisme de coopéra-tion opérationnel) in Gao, preparations fordisarmament, demobilization, and reintegration(DDR), and the establishment of joint patrols (thefirst such patrol started in Gao on February 23,2017, despite a particularly lethal attack on theOperational Coordination Mechanism on January18th, though the joint patrols have yet to start inTimbuktu and Kidal.

There has been less progress with the Truth,Justice and Reconciliation Commission. Thecommission was established in 2014 with a broadmandate to investigate not only the 2012 coupd’état but also violence in the north stretching backto 1960. However, the secretary-general’sDecember 2016 report on Mali deplored the factthat, in spite of the establishment of some regionaloffices for the commission, the government hadmade little progress on combating impunity.88

This relatively modest progress can be attributedto a number of factors. The lack of progress onsocioeconomic and cultural development (Pillar 3 ofthe agreement) and justice, reconciliation, andhumanitarian affairs (Pillar 4) can partly be attrib-uted to ongoing insecurity in northern Mali. As willbe discussed below, it is also a function of theshadow cast by terrorism and trafficking. The priori-tization of security and political institutions (Pillars1 and 2) also reflects the greater importance given tothese two areas throughout the negotiation process.Moreover, the parties to the agreement tend tounderstand Mali’s problem through either a securitylens (for the government) or a political-institutionallens (for the armed groups). These perspectives, inturn, are directly linked with the deep mistrust thatmars relations between the signatory parties.

As discussed earlier, mistrust is one of thelegacies of a history of failed agreements. To quoteone diplomat, the parties do not believe in theagreement, and the government in particular“believes that the agreement has been imposedupon them. It has neither tried to reach a common

understanding of the text nor attempted to make itits own.”89 This recalls the objection of PresidentKeïta and his Rally for Mali party to the 2006Algiers Accord, which they felt misdiagnosed theproblem of the north and mistakenly proposed apolitical solution to a military problem. As for thearmed groups, they have little faith that thisgovernment is any more willing to implement theBamako Agreement than past governments were toimplement previous agreements. A representativeof an armed group that participated in the negotia-tions thus stressed that it was essential for thegroups to see promises made at the negotiatingtable—particularly on institutional reforms—reflected in the text of the new constitution.90 Thefact that the Bamako Agreement resulted from aheavily mediated process in which the partiesseldom talked face-to-face, relying instead ondiscussions with third-party mediators, onlycompounded the mistrust.

The difficulties of implementation do not resideonly in the substance of the agreement or in theextent to which it has been implemented; they alsoreside in the manner in which implementation hasbeen carried out. Of particular concern are thesequencing of implementation priorities and thedegree of consultation, which was explicitlymandated in Article 3 of the agreement. Govern -ment officials highlighted a number of their priori-ties, chief among which was the deployment of thestate and its armed forces to the north. One officialtalked about the need to “occupy the space” toprevent internal and external enemies from fillingthe void.91

The government’s attempts to forge ahead withsome of its priorities have resulted in tensions. Onenotable crisis was triggered in October 2016 whenPresident Keïta promulgated a law paving the wayfor local elections in line with the electoral calendarthat the government had announced in the middleof 2016. The signatory armed groups contested themove because the peace agreement provides thatthe establishment of interim authorities shouldprecede elections.92 In spite of efforts by the

88 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, para. 71.89 Interview with foreign diplomat, Bamako, May 10, 2017.90 Interview with representative of an armed group, Bamako, May 9, 2017.91 Interview with government official, Bamako, May 12, 2017.92 For its part, the government held that the constitution precluded further deferment of the local elections, which had already been postponed four times since

2009. UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, paras. 7–9.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 25

international mediation team to reach a compro-mise solution, voting was held on November 20th in92 percent of the country’s 703 municipalities.However, voting did not take place in 43 munici-palities in the north and center of the country,including Kidal, due to “security incidents andobstruction by armed individuals, includingmembers of signatory armed groups.”93 Theabsence of the administration in certain localitiesalso makes voting fraud likely. In a statement onNovember 21st, the Coordination rejected the legiti-macy of the election results.

Further, as had been the case during theimplementation of the Ouagadougou PreliminaryAgreement, the armed groups have repeatedlyaccused the government of acting unilaterally andtrying to impose measures as faits accomplis.94 Forexample, when the government appointed theinterim authorities of the regional territorial collec-tivities of northern Mali on October 14, 2016, boththe Coordination and the Platform opposed themove as unilateral. Similarly, in February 2017 thegovernment appointed the new governor of theKidal region—an individual allegedly close toGATIA—the day before the inaugurationceremony of the Kidal interim authorities,triggering objections by the Coordination and thepostponement of the ceremony.95 While themilitary option for returning the state to northernMali has not been on the table since the July 2016clashes in Kidal,96 government officials havesuggested that “international forces should be putto the service of restoring state authority withoutsubstituting for the state.”97

Another problem has been the manner in whichthe government has organized itself to implementthe agreement. In July 2015 the government issueda decree establishing a National Committee for theCoordination of the Implementation of the PeaceAgreement (Comité national de coordination pour

la mise en oeuvre de l’Accord de paix), which waseffectively created in early 2016. Intended tocoordinate across all ministries concerned, thecommittee has been described as “dysfunctional,”weak, and not inclusive. A key member of theinternational mediation team attributed thisdysfunction to the fact that the committee was notempowered by the president and prime ministernor given the necessary means and was “blocked bysome ministers” who did not want to be coordi-nated.98 A senior foreign diplomat also highlightedthat some ministers were delaying implementation,confirming that there was no common governmentstrategy to normalize the political situation.99However, the same diplomat noted that thesituation had improved since the appointment ofMahamadou Diagouraga as high representative ofthe president for the implementation of the peaceagreement on June 15, 2016. It must be recognized,however, that the “governance” of the implementa-tion of the peace agreement remained vague in theagreement itself, to the point that the Coordinationand Platform sometimes considered themselves theco-administrators of the implementation throughthe Follow-Up Committee.100

Whether or not individual ministers havecontributed to the dysfunction of the government’sfollow-up mechanisms, another disruptive trendhas been the frequency of cabinet reshuffles andrestructurings; since the signature of the BamakoAgreement, Mali has had no fewer than six. Ofparticular concern is the splitting of the competen-cies of the former Ministry for TerritorialAdministration and Decentralization betweendifferent new ministries. These reshuffles andrestructurings have complicated the establishmentof reliable channels of communication between theministers and external partners providing technicaland financial support to implementation.According to a Western diplomat, this was“partially to blame for governmental inertia.”101

93 Ibid., para. 8.94 Interview with members of armed groups, Bamako, May 11, 2017.95 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/271, March 30, 2017, para. 8.96 Interview with key member of the international mediation team, Bamako, May 11, 2017.97 Interview with government official, Bamako, May 12, 2017.98 Interview with key member of the international mediation team, Bamako, May 11, 2017.99 Interview with senior international envoy, Bamako, May 10, 2017.100 Interview with international expert via phone, May 15, 2017.101 Interview with Western diplomat, Bamako, May 10, 2017.

26 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

Figure 4. Fragmentation and recomposition of “compliant” armed groups

ARMED GROUPS AND IMPLEMENTATION:CONFRONTATION, FRAGMENTATION,AND RECOMPOSITION

As during the negotiations, the implementation ofthe peace agreement has been marked by ongoingconfrontations among the armed groups and bytheir fragmentation and recomposition (see Figure4 for an overview of the evolution of these groups).This has had three direct consequences onimplementation. First, the emergence of newarmed groups vying for inclusion in the Follow-UpCommittee even though they are not formallysignatories to the agreement has created a challengefor the international mediation team. Second, theintensification of intergroup clashes has allowedthe government of Mali to distance itself from anyresponsibility for the ongoing security challengesand, in turn, to blame insecurity for its limitedability to implement the agreement, particularly itsprovisions on justice and development. Third, thefragmentation of the Coordination—and to a lesserdegree of the Platform—has affected their attitudevis-à-vis implementation; rather than peacedividends, the armed groups are focusing more oncommunity-based perks, such as seats in theNational Assembly, or individual perks, such asallowances for taking part in the Follow-UpCommittee and Technical Security Commission(Commission technique de sécurité, or CTS).

Since the signing of the Bamako Agreement,there have been two rounds of high-intensityclashes between the Coordination and Platform instrategic locations. On August 17, 2015, thePlatform/GATIA attacked and wrested control ofthe locality of Anefis (Kidal region) away from theCoordination.102 While this was the first majorpost-agreement violation of the cease-fire, theclashes were largely a continuation of the war overpositions in northern Mali that had started at theoutset of the Algiers negotiations. In retaliation, the

Coordination established four new positionsaround Goundam (Timbuktu region), also inviolation of the cease-fire.103

In a potentially dangerous escalatory move, onFebruary 2, 2016, a convoy of 250 armed GATIAfighters entered the Coordination stronghold ofKidal, but an intervention by local figures from theCoordination and the Platform and by the head ofMINUSMA, Mahamat Saleh Annadif, succeeded indeescalating the situation.104 However, from July 19to 22, 2016, violent clashes erupted in the town ofKidal between the Coordination and thePlatform/GATIA, leaving more than fourteen deadand eighty-nine injured. This was followed by moredeadly clashes and attacks on civilian populationsin the Kidal region through September.105 Thesubsequent killing of influential Coordinationleader Cheikh Ag Aoussa on October 8th in Kidal,although never explained, may have been related tothese previous clashes.106 According to MINUSMA,GATIA has continued to violate the cease-firethrough June 2017. Attacks and retaliationsresumed in May and June, to date causing thirty tofifty deaths and dozens of injuries in Imghad andIdnan communities in the region of Kidal,including within the Coordination.107

As suggested earlier, the creation of GATIA inAugust 2014 was a game changer. It gave thePlatform, which had had limited military capacity,a strong military presence on the ground. But italso raised suspicions that at least parts of theMalian government were tempted to follow in thefootsteps of former President Touré, who usedproxy militias to rule over northern Mali. Some inthe government and army were wary of subcon-tracting the security of northern Mali to militiasthat were not fully under government control andthat had their own ambitions, both personal(General El Hadj Ag Gamou) and clan-based (theImghad clans). Government officials repeatedly

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 27

102 Platform/GATIA subsequently withdrew from Anefis in September in response to a call for appeasement by President Keïta.103 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016, paras. 19–21. 104 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/281, March 28, 2016. 105 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016, paras. 6, 8. 106 Cheikh Ag Aoussa, a figure in the Tuareg rebellion in the 1990s after returning from Libya, had been the second-in-command to Iyad Ag Ghali of the jihadist

group Ansar Dine in 2012. Following the January 2013 French military intervention in Mali, he repositioned himself within the HCUA, whose military branch hedirected. Souleymane Ag Anara, “Explosion Kills Tuareg Leader outside North Mali U.N. Camp,” Reuters, October 8, 2016, available atwww.reuters.com/article/us-mali-violence-idUSKCN1280ZU .

107 GATIA has violated the cease-fire by looting, together with MSA, the town of Tiderme in the Ménaka region on February 10th, by ambushing Ganda-Izo combat-ants in the Ansongo area of the Gao region on April 22nd, and by clashing with CMFPR2 in the proximity of Arbichi in the Timbuktu region on May 2nd. UNSecurity Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 8 ; Jules Crétois, “Mali: Dans la région deKidal, ‘la tension est énorme,’” Jeune Afrique, June 14, 2017, available at www.jeuneafrique.com/447822/politique/mali-a-kidal-tension-enorme/ .

mentioned insecurity in the north whenaccounting for delays in implementation.108 Theinternational community, however, grew increas-ingly critical of government support for GATIA. InSeptember 2016 the US ambassador to Mali calledon the government to “stop all ties both public andprivate with GATIA,” stating that “Mali needs toassume a greater responsibility for the peace deal’simplementation.”109

In the context of increasing military pressurefrom GATIA and possible “encouragement” by thegovernment, the Coordination began fragmenting,a process that accelerated in September andOctober 2016. This particularly affected theMNLA, which splintered in two,110 as well as theHCUA.111 This splintering has not only destabilizedthe Coordination as a whole; it has also changedthe balance of forces within it: a weakened MNLAreceded to the back, leaving the more religious,largely monoethnic Kel Adagh confederation (ledby the Ifoghas Tuaregs, even though many TaghatMelett, Idnan, and Imghad Tuaregs as well as a fewArabs are present in the Kidal region) and Kidal-based HCUA as the main force within theCoordination. The Idnan clan has also beenlooking for a new leader since former MNLAmilitary commander Mohamad Ag Najim seems tohave distanced himself from his troops.

Observers have raised the possibility that thissplintering was encouraged by the government ofMali, in line with its long-standing strategy toisolate and weaken the MNLA.112 Because of itspolitical stances and multiethnic composition, aswell as the presence among its leaders of “lessknown” figures from Libya who had not partici-pated in previous Malian rebellions, the MNLA isthe most worrisome political challenger to thegovernment.113 Interestingly, it has also been the

group most targeted by terrorist attacks during thenegotiation process and implementation phase, inpart because it openly collaborated with Frenchcounterterrorism forces in Operations Serval andBarkhane.

The splintering has also posed a challenge to theinternational mediation team. The new armedgroups asked to be included in all aspects of theimplementation of the Bamako Agreement, partic-ularly the security aspects—the OperationalCoordination Mechanism, joint patrols, canton-ment, and DDR—but also the interim authorities.So as not to encourage the emergence of newgroups, the principled position of the internationalmediation team has always been that these groupsshould join one of the existing signatorycoalitions—the Coordination or the Platform—inorder to benefit from the peace process.

In the midst of these dynamics of confrontation,fragmentation, and recomposition, there have alsobeen alliances and rapprochements between theCoordination and the Platform, as had been thecase during the Algiers negotiations.114 This reflectsthat, in spite of the often violent struggle betweenthem, the two coalitions of armed groups sharemany grievances and aspirations. These sharedgrievances create the conditions for rapproche-ment, particularly when directed against thegovernment. For example, both the Coordinationand the Platform protested what they perceived asthe unilateral move of the government to sign thedecree on the interim administration on May 18,2016. This led the two coalitions to issue commondeclarations that they were suspending their partic-ipation to the Follow-Up Mechanism, which inturn led to a meeting in Algiers where they forgeda memorandum of understanding (protocoled’entente) to strengthen their coordination on

28 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

108 Interview with government officials, Bamako, May 12, 2017.109 “US Calls on Mali Government to Sever Ties with Northern Militia,” Reuters, September 28, 2016, available at

www.voanews.com/a/us-calls-on-mali-government-sever-ties-militia/3529188.html .110 Former MNLA leader Moussa Ag Acharatoumane established the Movement for the Salvation of Azawad (Mouvement pour le salut de l’Azawad, or MSA) in the

Ménaka region, which soon allied with the Platform/GATIA to gain control of Ménaka town. Rémi Carayol, “Mali: Le MNLA une nouvelle fois amputé,” JeuneAfrique, September 2, 2016, available at www.jeuneafrique.com/354373/politique/mali-mnla-nouvelle-ampute/ .

111 Nasser and Colonel Al Abass created a splinter group, the Congress for Justice in Azawad (Congrès pour la justice dans l’Azawad, or CJA) in Timbuktu.“Coordination de la Rebellion: Que reste-t-il de la CMA?,” MaliActu, January 3, 2017, available athttp://maliactu.net/mali-coordination-de-la-rebellion-que-reste-t-il-de-la-cma/ .

112 Interviews with foreign diplomats, Bamako, May 10–11, 2017.113 These figures included MNLA’s political leader, Bilal Ag Cherif, and military commander, Mohamad Ag Najim.114 The most concrete rapprochement between the Coordination and the Platform during the Algiers negotiations was the signing on September 12, 2014, of a

“Protocole d'entente” between the Coordination (MNLA, HCUA, and MAA, joined by representatives of the CMFPR2 who they brought along to Algiers), theMAA-Platform, and the CPA-Platform, which built on the earlier Ouagadougou Joint Declaration of August 28, 2014. However, the Protocole d’entente left outCMFPR and was immediately followed on September 13th by a retraction by the MAA-Platform.

security, political, and administrative matters.115Another example is the “Anefis process,” the mainrapprochement during the implementation phase,which resulted from direct bilateral talks betweenthe Coordination and the Platform/GATIA as wellas between clans and took place betweenSeptember 27 and October 14, 2015 (see nextsection).116 These rapprochements have neverlasted, in part due to the government’s divide-and-rule tactics and competing individual and groupinterests.LOCAL MEDIATION, OR THE“CLANIZATION” OF PEACE

Although community and ethnic dimensions havebeen central to the cyclical conflicts in northernMali, these have been largely overlooked in theinter-Malian negotiations and the resulting peaceagreement. Rivalries have existed for generationsamong the various communities of northernMali—Tuareg, Arab, Songhoi, Peulh, and otherethnic groups—as well as between clans withineach of these groups.117 Most notably, the ImghadTuaregs and Lemhar and Tilemsi Arabs have beenchallenging the traditional hierarchies within theirethnic groups. These clans have used the peaceprocess as a vehicle in this struggle by creating theirown armed groups (GATIA and MAA-Platform,respectively).

In the past, such struggles would have beenmediated by the traditional leaders of the IfoghasTuareg and Kounta Arab clans (based in Kidal andAnefis, respectively), who played a key role inresolving intercommunity tensions. When boththese leaders died in December 2014, their sonsstepped into these roles. However, because theywere closer to the armed groups within their clans,they were less likely to play such pacifying roles.118Moreover, the struggle for emancipation by theLemhars and Imghads had already started beforethe turn of the century, with the Lemharschallenging the Kountas and the Imghadschallenging the Idnans and Ifoghas during the

1990s rebellion by integrating into central stateinstitutions. El Hadj Ag Gamou, who hadkidnapped the Ifoghas Tuareg traditional leaderAmenokal Intallah Ag Attaher in February 1994,would probably not have accepted a mediation ledby him.

When Algeria paved the way for the negotiationsby accepting two coalitions of armed groups—theCoordination and the Platform—it could be arguedthat it was attempting to overcome community andclan rivalries in order to focus the process onpolitical grievances. Indeed, most armed groups innorthern Mali are dominated by one clan, with thenotable exception of the MNLA, which in its earlydays included the widest range of clans.119 Even theMNLA, however, began to break down into clan-based groups. The splinter group Movement forthe Salvation of Azawad (Mouvement pour le salutde l’Azawad, or MSA), for instance, is Ménaka-based, and there are already reports of its fragmen-tation into two factions representing the Daoussaksand the Chaman-Amas. These splits reflect theincreasing “regionalization” and “clanization” ofthe conflict in northern Mali. These rivalries werenot directly addressed during the negotiations or inthe peace agreement, and reported (informal orsecret) attempts to address them on the margins ofthe negotiations were unsuccessful.

So far, the Anefis process (September 27–October 14, 2015) has been the most successfulattempt at what the International Crisis Group calls“peace from below”—efforts to complement a top-down peace agreement with a bottom-up process.This process sought to address “importantquestions concerning the north’s politico-militaryelite…, including issues of trafficking, powersharing, and intercommunal rivalries.”120 Thecommunity-led process resulted in “a road mapcomprising a series of measures, including thecessation of hostilities, joint initiatives forintercommunal and intracommunal reconciliation,the exchange of prisoners, the establishment of

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 29

115 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016. 116 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, para. 5. 117 Tuareg clan rivalries include those among the Ifoghas, Idnans, and Imghads, as well as the Kel-Antasar, and Chaman-Amas. For the Arabs, they include those

among the Kountas, Berabiche, and Lemhar.118 “Obsèques d’Attaher Ag Intalla,” Maliweb, December 30, 2014, available at www.maliweb.net/nouvelles-breves/obseques-dattaher-ag-intalla-718412.html .119 The MNLA included the Ifoghas, Idnans, Chaman-Amas, Imghads, and Kel Ansar clans from the Touaregs, Daoussaks, Arab Kountas, and some Songhoi and

Peulh.120 International Crisis Group, “Mali: La paix venue d’en bas?,” December 14, 2015, available at www.crisisgroup.org/fr/africa/west-africa/mali/mali-peace-below .

interim local administrations and the freemovement of people and goods.”121

Some observers drew comparisons between theAnefis process and the Bourem Accords of 1995,which were largely credited with stoppingintercommunity violence that followed the signingof the 1992 National Pact. As one expert haspointed out, however, the two processes were quitedifferent. The Bourem meeting was “initiated andrelentlessly pushed forward by civilians and villagechiefs who understood quickly how destructiveviolence was for their communities.” The Anefisprocess, on the other hand, “was led by armedmen, whose representativeness is questionable”and who “may have local agendas but are alsoheavily dependent on external influences,” but onwhom communities seem to be increasinglydependent.122

The international mediation team largely saw theAnefis process as a business deal betweentraffickers (see next section) that could underminerather than complement the Algiers process.Whatever its real purpose, the government of Malimay not have looked favorably upon such dealmaking between Coordination- and Platform-affiliated communities in which it was not involved(other than the presence of a minister for theopening). The UN, however, may have realized thevalue of such local “deals,” as UN Security CouncilResolution 2295 of June 2016 mandatedMINUSMA to “exercise good offices, confidence-building and facilitation at the national and locallevels, in order to support dialogue with and amongall stakeholders towards reconciliation and socialcohesion, to support efforts to reduce intercom-munal tensions.”123

The Anefis road map ensured relative peacebetween the two coalitions of armed groups andtheir respective communities for some months,until tension started building up again after aFebruary 2016 incident during which Imghadelements of GATIA challenged the Ifoghas/

Coordination domination over Kidal (see above).While the head of MINUSMA defused the incidentand the government brokered a parallel agreementbetween the Coordination and the Platform on thejoint management of Kidal on July 17th in Niamey,deadly clashes resumed two days later andcontinued sporadically in August and September.124Imghad-Ifoghas competition for control of Kidaltown (and the Kidal region) invited itself into theeleventh Follow-Up Committee meeting ofSeptember 21–22, 2016, with the Coordinationcontinuing to accuse the government of supportingGATIA and the Platform stressing “the need toaddress the perceived domination of Kidal by theTuareg Ifoghas community.”125

Intercommunity power struggles and the region-alization of conflict also played out in the installa-tion of the interim authorities. When the govern-ment first appointed interim authorities for theGao, Kidal, and Timbuktu regions and named themembers of the transitional councils of the twonew regions of Ménaka and Taoudenni, both theCoordination and the Platform opposed these asunilateral moves and insisted on assuming thepresidency of the interim authorities in Kidal. Thenominations were also protested by civil societyorganizations—especially youth groups in the Gaoand Ménaka regions—and Coordination splintergroups (MSA, CPA, and CMFPR2).126

The process of appointing the new interimauthorities was accompanied by the emergence ofnew clan-based groups. These notably included theTimbuktu-based Congress for Justice in Azawad(Congrès pour la Justice dans l’Azawad), which isalmost exclusively composed of Kel AntasarTuaregs. This group later attempted to stop theinstallation of interim authorities in Timbuktu andTaoudenni in March 2017 by blocking entrances tothe city. The installation of these authorities wasalso opposed by MAA (Arab) factions.127

Ultimately, the interim authorities installed inMali’s five northern regions between February and

121 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, para. 5.122 Yvan Guichaoua, “Un noeud Nord: Démêler la politique de consolidation de la paix locales au Mali,” Peace Direct, August 31, 2016, available at

www.insightonconflict.org/fr/blog/2016/08/northern-knot-untangling-local-peacebuilding-politics-mali/ .123 UN Security Council Resolution 2295 (June 29, 2016), UN Doc. S/RES/2295.124 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016, para. 5.125 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, para. 3. 126 Ibid., para. 4.127 “Autorités intérimaires: Blocage à Tombouctou et Taoudénit,” MaliActu, March 9, 2017, available at

http://maliactu.net/mali-autorites-interimaires-blocage-a-tombouctou-et-taoudenit/ .

30 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

April 2017 reflect a division of power betweenarmed groups, communities, and clans under theumbrella of the Coordination, which took Kidal,Timbuktu, and Taoudenni, and the Platform,which took Gao and Ménaka.128 Regional electionsscheduled for fall 2017 will effectively replace theseinterim authorities. Nonetheless, many fear that,short of a full return of state authority and adminis-tration to the north, the “regionalization”promoted by the peace agreement may usher in asystem of governance under which the central statedelegates the provision of security and basicservices to certain groups.NEGOTIATING “UNSPOKEN FACTORS”:TERRORISTS AND TRAFFICKERS

Terrorism and organized crime have sometimesbeen described as the “unspoken factors” in theMalian peace process. Though always present inthe background of the negotiations, they were notaddressed in the agreement. It was hoped that theagreement would stabilize northern Mali throughpolitical and security arrangements that would helpdraw a sharper line between “compliant” and“terrorist” groups and enroll the former in the fightagainst the latter alongside the Malian armedforces. This was envisaged to take place initially aspart of joint patrols and later by integrating therebels into a reconstituted Malian army andcreating special units to combat terrorism andtransnational organized crime (Article 30).

This, however, did not happen. After the signingof the peace agreement, and as attention largelyfocused on northern Mali, insecurity grew andspread to the center of the country, particularly theMopti region. This resulted from a combination ofwhat the International Crisis Group described as“banditry and a growing number of self-defencemilitias” and a “jihadist uprising” capitalizing onlocal disputes. A number of reports have emerged

that members of the Peulh ethnic group (alsoknown as the Fulani) are being recruited by self-defense militias and “terrorist” groups like theMacina Liberation Front (Force de libération duMacina, or FLM, sometimes called Katiba Macina).Such groups exploit the poverty of the Peulh andtheir longstanding grievances with the Malianarmy, which failed to protect them during the 2012crisis and has been committing abuses againstPeulh populations since returning to the region.129

Since 2015, the Malian army has been the subjectof constant and deadly attacks in central Mali.130The government of Mali was slow to recognize theproblem until March 2017, when it finally launcheda program of support for enhanced security in theMopti and Gao regions and for the management ofborder areas, with support from the EU.131 Thepresident of the National DDR Commission alsorecently announced that three cantonment siteswould be built in central Mali (Ténenkou,Douentza, and Bankass) to welcome combatantsfrom armed groups from central Mali who are notsignatories to the peace agreement.132

The terrorist landscape has also evolved consid-erably since the signing of the peace agreement.After Ansar Dine leader Iyad Ag Ghali denouncedthe peace process in October 2015, a major terroristattack targeted Bamako’s Radisson Blu hotel thefollowing month. The number and scale of attackson both international forces (MINUSMA andOperation Barkhane) and the Malian army havesteadily increased. The attack on the OperationalCoordination Mechanism in Gao on January 18,2017, which killed more than 64 and injured about115 members of the first joint patrol (Malian army,Coordination, and Platform) was a direct attack onthe peace agreement itself. Soon after, in March2017, the main Malian jihadist groups—AQIM,Ansar Dine, al-Mourabitoun, and the Macina

128 “Mali: Les autorités intérimaires installées dans le Nord à partir du 18 février,” Jeune Afrique, February 17, 2017, available atwww.jeuneafrique.com/404627/politique/mali-autorites-interimaires-installees-nord-a-partir-18-fevrier/ .

129 International Crisis Group, “Central Mali: An Uprising in the Making?,” July 6, 2016, available at www.crisisgroup.org/africa/west-africa/mali/central-mali-uprising-making .

130 According to the UN, “Violent extremists and terrorist elements conducted 105 attacks against the Malian defence and security forces, 76 against MINUSMAand 20 against the French forces since June 2016, compared with 84, 66 and 15, respectively, during the previous mandate period. In total, 131 members of theMalian defence and security forces were killed and 176 injured in attacks, compared with 49 killed and 33 injured in the previous mandate period. There hasbeen a 42 per cent increase in attacks against Malian defence and security forces in the Mopti and Ségou regions.” UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 17.

131 The Programme de sécurisation intégrée des régions du centre (PSIRC) supported by the EU Programme d’appui au renforcement de la sécurité dans les régionsde Mopti et de Gao et à la gestion des zones frontalières.

132 “Ténenkou: Démarrage de la construction du centre du cantonnement,” MaliActu, May 5, 2017, available at http://maliactu.net/mali-tenenkou-demarrage-de-la-construction-du-centre-de-cantonnement/ .

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 31

Liberation Front—announced their fusion asJama’a Nusrat ul-Islam wa al-Muslimin’ (Group toSupport Islam and Muslims). This coalition isheaded by Iyad Ag Ghali, a major actor in the 1990sTuareg rebellion, who pledged allegiance to al-Qaida.133

In a context where terrorist groups operating inMali are now primarily led by and composed ofMalians, the Conference of National Entente inspring 2017 made the widely debated recommen-dation that the Malian government should talk tothe jihadists, particularly Iyad Ag Ghali andHamadou Kouffa, a former Peulh preacher andleader of the Macina Liberation Front. But afterinitially expressing openness to the idea, thegovernment changed its position on the matter,reportedly following pressure from France. Whileit remains to be seen whether the jihadiststhemselves would be interested in such negotia-tions, the continued deterioration of the securitysituation in central and northern Mali may promptPresident Keïta to reconsider this option as a lastresort.134

The slow progress in the implementation of thepeace agreement, in particular its defense andsecurity provisions (joint patrols, cantonment,DDR, integration, and security sector reform), hasmade it difficult to differentiate between“compliant,” “terrorist,” and “criminal” armedgroups. All continue to carry weapons and to movearound,135 and the lines between them remainblurred due to the fluidity in their leadership andthe opportunistic calculations of fighters who jointheir ranks.136 All “compliant” armed groupsofficially express their readiness to take part in thecantonment and DDR process. However,continued clashes between the Coordination andthe Platform, the Coordination’s suspicions of thegovernment’s intentions, and the presence of well-armed terrorist and criminal groups make it

unlikely any disarmament process will moveforward anytime soon. Moreover, the DDR processhas not yet yielded benefits such as the short-termsustenance and revenues associated with formalcantonment and long-term integration into theMalian security forces. This has made it difficult forthe leadership of “compliant” armed groups to stoptheir forces from seeking lucrative criminal andtrafficking opportunities. If implementation of theagreement’s security provisions remains slow, theleaders of armed groups increasingly risk beingremoved or losing control of their commandersand troops in the field.

The issue of trafficking is particularly complex,and there has been increasing recognition of theseriousness of the problem. MINUSMA reported inMarch 2017 that “transnational organized crimeand illicit trafficking provide steady income forviolent extremist groups operating in Mali andtargeting MINUSMA and others [and] directlyinterfere with peace efforts and the implementationof the peace agreement.”137 It has also been allegedthat many of the clashes between armed groups innorthern Mali have been triggered by struggles forcontrol of trafficking routes at a time when Malianson all sides of the conflict label “the others” astraffickers.

Yet four years after MINUSMA deployed, theSecurity Council remains unsure how to deal withthe problem beyond encouraging regional cooper-ation on the issue. Neighboring countries thatcould exert leverage on traffickers have not crackeddown on them. Furthermore, the dominant law-enforcement and capacity-building approachesadopted so far have not been effective. There is aneed for more strategic approaches based onengagement with both the host state—which risksbeing penetrated by organized crime—and localcommunities—which need alternative livelihoods.However, such approaches are challenging in the

32 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

133 Jules Crétois, “Fusion de groupes jihadistes au Sahel, sous la bannière d’Al-Qaïda,” Jeune Afrique, March 2, 2017, available atwww.jeuneafrique.com/408773/politique/fusion-de-groupes-jihadistes-sahel-banniere-dal-qaida/ .

134 See Alex Thurston, “Speaking with Jihadists: Mali Weighs Its Options,” IPI Global Observatory, May 25, 2017, available athttps://theglobalobservatory.org/2017/05/jihadism-mali-al-qaeda-france-keita/ .

135 Following clashes between the Coordination and the Platform between July and September 2016, the Technical Security Commission decided on September 30th

that, as of October 17th, unless armed groups notified MINUSMA of movements of heavy weapons beforehand, the UN mission would confiscate the armamentsand that movements of convoys of more than five vehicles would require prior consultation with MINUSMA. This, however, has barely been respected by thearmed groups in practice, and as early as October, movements of more than twenty-five Platform vehicles were observed by MINUSMA. UN Security Council,Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016.

136 See Arthur Boutellis, “Can the UN Stabilize Mali? Towards a UN Stabilization Doctrine,” Stability: International Journal of Security & Development 4, no. 1(2015), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.5334/sta.fz .

137 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/271, March 30, 2017, para. 68.

absence of peace dividends in northern Mali (seebelow). Given the scale of the trafficking problem,it has been suggested that the UN mission shouldbe given a more explicit mandate to analyzeorganized criminal activity and trends138 or that asanctions regime be put in place to help analyzecross-border trafficking.139 Negotiated exits fromcriminal economies could also be explored forsome of the powerful leaders of organized crimenetworks.140

Up to now, responses to both terrorism andorganized crime in Mali have been largely milita-rized. In addition to the existing internationalforces—Operation Barkhane and MINUSMA,whose mandate was made more “robust” in June2016—a regional force of the G5 countries(Burkina Faso, Chad, Mali, Mauritania, andNiger)141 aimed at fighting both terrorism andhuman and drug trafficking has been authorized bythe AU Peace and Security Council and is beingconsidered by the UN Security Council.142 Not onlywill the presence of multiple forces alongside theMalian army pose operational challenges, butinternational and regional forces also risk beingdrawn into the Malian conflict and contributing toprolonging it or reducing the political space whileescalating violence and radicalization in centralMali in particular. In a search for legitimacy, somearmed groups—including the MSA-GATIAalliance in Ménaka—are offering their services tothe French as counterterrorist forces,143 not unlikewhat the MNLA did at the beginning of the Frenchintervention in 2013. A number of experts aretherefore calling for more nuanced approaches

based on human security to address the threat oforganized crime and terrorism.THE MISSING PIECES: PEACEDIVIDENDS AND SOCIETAL BUY-IN

While implementation of the Bamako Agreementhas lagged behind in the institutional and securityrealms, implementation in the development realmhas barely taken off. The African DevelopmentBank, World Bank, Islamic Development Bank,and United Nations jointly conducted an earlymission to evaluate needs in northern Malibetween July and October 2015. On October 22nd,the Organisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment (OECD) hosted an internationalconference for the economic recovery and develop-ment of Mali in Paris. This conference led topledges of more than €600 million, of whichapproximately 25 percent were destined fornorthern Mali.144 By six months later, pledges hadrisen to $3.6 billion for 2015–2017, including $722million for the north, of which $780 million hadbeen disbursed, including $177 million for thenorth.145

In spite of such early encouraging signs, there hasbeen no progress in taking forward the joint assess-ment and in operationalizing regional develop-ment plans. Although the interim period isdrawing to a close, the development strategy for thenorthern regions has not been finalized, and thesustainable development fund envisaged in thepeace agreement has not yet been operational-ized.146

The limited presence of the state and the persist-

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 33

138 See International Peace Institute, Security Council Report, and Stimson Center, “Applying the HIPPO Recommendations to Mali: Toward Strategic, Prioritized,and Sequenced Mandates,” May 2016, available at www.ipinst.org/2016/05/applying-hippo-recommendations-mali .

139 The UN secretary-general suggests that “in order to address the negative impact of such criminality on the peace process, it is advisable to explore ways tocounter illicit activities. In the meantime, the Security Council may wish to consider expanding the mandate of the Group of Experts for the 1267/1989/2253 ISIL(Da’esh) and Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee to increase its focus on new violent extremist and terrorist groups’ activities in the Sahel with connection to Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb.” UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 66.

140 James Cockayne, John de Boer, and Louise Bosetti, “Going Straight: Criminal Spoilers, Gang Truces and Negotiated Transitions to Lawful Order,” UnitedNations University Centre for Policy Research, April 27, 2017, available at https://cpr.unu.edu/going-straight-criminal-spoilers-gang-truces-and-negotiated-transitions-to-lawful-order.html .

141 Jacqueline Dakouo, “G5 Sahel: Une force conjointe d’ici la fin de l’année,” Journal du Mali, May 8, 2017, available at www.journaldumali.com/2017/05/08/g5-sahel-force-conjointe-dici-fin-de-lannee/ .

142 Colum Lynch, “Trump Weighs Vetoing France’s African Anti-Terrorism Plan,” Foreign Policy, June 13, 2017, available athttp://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/13/trump-weighs-vetoing-frances-african-anti-terror-plan/?utm_source=Sailthru&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=Edpix%206-13&utm_term=%2AEditors%20Picks .

143 Jules Crétois, “Nord du Mali: Ag Gamou et Ag Acharatoumane en visite de travail à Paris,” Jeune Afrique, May 24, 2017, available atwww.jeuneafrique.com/441394/politique/nord-mali-ag-gamou-ag-acharatoumane-visite-de-travail-a-paris/ .

144 Article 37 of the peace agreement envisaged a donor conference, but it was to be held two months after the elaboration of a “specific development strategy” thatwould institute a sustainable development fund. The sequencing was therefore not respected, partly due to pressure from France to hold the OECD conference.Interview with development actor, Bamako, May 9, 2015.

145 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/498, May 31, 2016, para. 41.146 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 39.

ence of insecurity in northern Mali have alsohampered progress in the area of development,including the ability of the interim authorities andregional development agencies to deliver peacedividends to the population in the north.MINUSMA has used its trust fund to kick-startjoint projects with local authorities in the regions ofTimbuktu, Gao, Ménaka, and Kidal under theheading of “peace dividends.”147 Nonetheless, asenior foreign diplomat regretted the dearth ofsuch dividends, acknowledging that this was aconsequence not only of insecurity but also of theinsistence of the armed groups to prioritize institu-tional and security matters in the implementationof the agreement.148 The government has alsoalways made the presence of the Malian adminis-tration and its defense and security forces precon-ditions for investing in basic services and develop-ment projects in a locality.149 In addition, the lack ofsecurity remains a major impediment to the returnof refugees.150

According to one international developmentactor, another factor hampering progress ondevelopment is the lack of intergovernmentalcoordination and clear mechanisms for interactingwith external technical and financial partners.Describing the work of the Follow-Up Committee’sdevelopment subcommittee, this actor said, “Thesubcommittee does very little. The meetings havebecome increasingly spaced and brief. When welook at the table of priorities, we realize that verylittle has been achieved.”151

If the lack of peace dividends and persistentinsecurity weaken societal buy-in to the peaceagreement in northern Mali, it is the perceivedconcessions made to the armed groups and tonorthern populations that weaken it in southernMali, where the majority of the population lives.Southern Malians see the agreement’s provisionson development and reintegration as a “premiumfor rebellion”—a popular perception that has also

affected past agreements. A participant in aFebruary 2017 ministerial meeting of the Follow-Up Committee described how this lack of societalbuy-in affects the implementation process: “[Theminister of the economy] refused to say that thesustainable development strategy [under discus-sion] was specific to northern Mali, adding that thiswould not go down well in the south.”152

Reportedly, key government ministers have beenreluctant to move forward with any measures thatwould seem to give preference to regions innorthern Mali, particularly Article 14 of the peaceagreement, which states that the governmentshould transfer 30 percent of its budgetaryresources to territorial collectivities by 2018, withparticular attention to northern regions. It is worthnoting that, with the ministerial reshuffle of April2017, the ministry in charge of reconstruction ofthe north has been eliminated. This has unnervedsome external technical and financial partnerswhile reassuring others who thought the previousministry had become too powerful.

The skepticism of Mali’s northern and southernpopulations toward the peace process and itsimplementation is partly linked to the resistance ofthe parties to socializing their supporters and thecommunities they claimed to represent at the tableto the substance of the Bamako Agreement. Theinternational mediation team had alreadyhighlighted the need for the parties in Algiers tocommunicate with the Malian populationregarding the negotiations. While MINUSMA, theUS Agency for International Development(USAID), the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue,the National Democratic Institute, the GermanCorporation for International Cooperation (GIZ),and various other actors have supported activitiesto publicize the content of the agreement innorthern Mali, there have been comparativelyfewer such activities reported in the south.153

It is telling, however, that the Mali-Mètre, a

34 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

147 Interview with development actor, Bamako, May 9, 2015.148 Interview with senior foreign diplomat, Bamako, May 10, 2017.149 Interview with members of international mediation team, Bamako, February 3, 2017.150 Sebastien Laroze-Barrit, “Mali Refugees Cautious about Return, despite Peace Deal,” UN Refugee Agency, July 7, 2016, available at

www.unhcr.org/news/latest/2016/7/577b5dc84/mali-refugees-cautious-return-despite-peace-deal.html .151 Interview with international development actor, Bamako, May 10, 2017.152 Interview with participant in Follow-Up Committee ministerial meeting of February 10, 2017, Bamako, May 10, 2017.153 MINUSMA supported several restitution workshops with women’s groups, youth groups, political parties, and other societal actors; USAID translated the

document into all of Mali’s main languages; and GIZ produced a booklet summarizing the agreement in twenty questions and answers for use by the Ministry ofReconciliation.

regular and extensive public opinion poll fundedby the Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung foundation, foundin December 2016 that the main sources ofinformation on the agreement were radio (66.5percent), television (59.8 percent), and “grins,” thelocal term for informal gatherings on the doorstepsof houses (29.7 percent). These sources were farahead of MINUSMA, the government, or any ofthe armed groups, none of which were higher than1.7 percent. Interestingly, two out of five Malians(42 percent) consider that implementation has notprogressed, with 15 percent considering that therehas been no progress whatsoever. In spite of theseresults, two-thirds of Malians (65 percent) expresstrust in the agreement’s ability to deliver peace,stability, and security.154 According to one interna-tional development actor, this seemingly contra-dictory result may be explained by the fact that,while citizens in the south may be angry about theconcessions made to the armed groups, mostpeople who lived through 2012 remember theexodus of the sedentary populations of the northand realize the powerlessness of the state. They aretherefore supportive of implementation becausethey see it as the only way to save Mali.155

THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY:MAINTAINING UNITY OF ACTION ANDPURPOSE

The manner in which the Bamako Agreement wasultimately hammered out and the two-stagesigning process signaled the magnitude of thechallenges and the risks of reversal that lay ahead.The scope of these risks made it clear thatimplementation would require active externalsupport. This was acknowledged in the UNsecretary general’s September 2015 report on Mali,which called for the “comprehensive engagementand assistance of the United Nations and theinternational community at large.”156 During thenegotiations, the lack of trust between the partiesand the repeated failure of past peace agreementshad already led armed groups to insist on robustinternational guarantees and follow-upmechanisms, including an independent observer,to compel the government to do its part and assign

blame in case of ill will. These numerous interna-tional guarantees had not appeared in previouspeace agreements in Mali.

As the international mediation team began toorganize itself to support the implementationprocess, the first order of business was to establishthe follow-up mechanisms foreseen by theagreement, namely the Follow-Up Committee andits technical bodies. On June 20, 2015, Algeriaofficially launched the Follow-Up Committee,which began its work by defining its rules ofprocedure and establishing timelines for theimplementation of the provisions of the peaceagreement.

However, the first committee meeting had to beadjourned over disagreements about the participa-tion of splinter armed groups, as the Coordinationrefused to include its former members the CPA andthe CMFPR2, which had participated in the firstsigning ceremony on May 15th alongside thePlatform. The issue of the inclusion of these armedgroups delayed the effective start of thecommittee’s work until January 25, 2016. Underthe auspices of the high representative of the AUfor Mali and the Sahel, former President Buyoya,the Coordination and the Platform reached anagreement to allocate the CPA and the CMFPR2one additional seat each as “invitees” to thecommittee and one seat each in one of the subcom-mittees of their choice under the umbrella of theCoordination.157

For its part, the international mediation teamwas enlarged to include Nigeria, France, and the US(and later the UK) as official members, thus givingthem each a seat on the Follow-Up Committee. OnJuly 21, 2015, the committee agreed that Algeria,which holds the presidency of the committee,would co-chair the four thematic subcommitteesalong with MINUSMA (defense and security), theAU (political institutions), ECOWAS (justice,reconciliation, and humanitarian issues), and theEU (socioeconomic and cultural development).MINUSMA, which had been made responsible forheading the committee’s secretariat alongside theAU Mission for Mali and the Sahel, EU, ECOWAS,

154 Friedrich-Ebert-Stiftung, Mali-Mètre: Enquête d’opinion ‘Que pensent les Maliens?,’” November 25–December 6, 2016, pp. 40–48, available at www.fes-mali.org/images/documents/MM_8.pdf .

155 Interview with international development actor, Bamako, May 10, 2017.156 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/819, September 29, 2016, para. 61.157 Ibid., para. 5.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 35

and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation, beganpreparations to establish a dedicated structure tothis effect.

Beyond the formal international mediation team,a number of nongovernmental mediation organi-zations also contributed to the process. The Centrefor Humanitarian Dialogue and Promediation havebeen particularly active in Mali. Although notinvited to Algiers for the negotiations, they haveorganized negotiation trainings for the govern-ment, Coordination, and Platform (in coordinationwith MINUSMA), as well as related workshopswith various components of Malian society. Ingeneral, members of the international mediationteam have perceived the role of these NGOs asmore constructive during the implementationphase, particularly in helping to resolve differencesbetween the Coordination and the Platform.During the negotiations, they were at timesperceived—rightly or wrongly—as oversteppingtheir roles and acting as advisers to some of theparties, putting them at odds with the efforts of theinternational mediation team.158

The Follow-Up Committee has not escaped thedysfunction of other parts of the implementationprocess. The parties, particularly the armed groups,have continued to misunderstand its role,expecting the committee to actively implement theagreement. To date, the government has notappointed its representatives, who were intended tosit as vice-chairs of the various subcommittees.Whenever the armed groups, particularly theCoordination, want to signal their dissatisfaction atthe pace of implementation or to protest the deteri-oration of the security situation, they withdraw,disrupting the committee’s work. As discussedearlier, it took repeated high-level committeemeetings to overcome these hurdles. Anotherproblem with the Follow-Up Committee is itssecretariat, which never became functional.Instead, MINUSMA’s mediation unit continues totake care of the committee’s administrative tasks.Moreover, according to a number of interviewees,while the committee has held its scheduledmonthly meetings, its international members havedone little to follow up in between.

The Technical Security Commission, the mainsecurity follow-up mechanism mandated by theagreement, has only fared slightly better. OnAugust 5, 2015, the force commander ofMINUSMA convened the final meeting of the JointTechnical Commission for Security created by theOuagadougou Preliminary Agreement. Thiscommission had already been enlarged during theAlgiers negotiations in September 2014, duringwhich the parties had agreed to replace it with theTechnical Security Commission. In this meeting,the parties agreed to launch the process of identi-fying cantonment sites and to establish theOperational Coordination Mechanism to facilitateand coordinate joint patrols. They also decided toset up a joint observation and verification team inKidal.

From September 1st to 2nd, MINUSMA’s deputyforce commander convened the first meeting of theTechnical Security Commission. According to oneparticipant, there is no absenteeism in the commis-sion because the parties feel a mutual need forsecurity-related information. However, the variousparties are not represented at a sufficiently highlevel to make decisions, and blockages are oftensimply referred to the political level in the Follow-Up Committee. For instance, the issue of inclusionemerged in security discussions when, inDecember 2016, the MPSA, CPA, and CMFPR2issued a joint statement denouncing their exclusionfrom the interim political and security arrange-ments. This demand for inclusion by Coordinationsplinter groups delayed the operationalization ofthe Operational Coordination Mechanism andjoint patrols. A compromise was eventuallyreached at the political level, whereby an additional150 members (75 each for the Coordination andthe Platform) were authorized to accommodatemembers of the splinter groups.159

It would be tempting to simply blame theproblems of the follow-up mechanisms on the lackof will of the signatory parties. However, if theagreement has lacked an effective implementationframework, part of the problem resides in theinternational community’s difficulty in main -taining unity of vision and purpose. Since the

36 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

158 Interview with international mediation actors, Bamako, May 11, 2017.159 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2016/1137, December 15, 2016, paras. 6, 14.

negotiations in Algiers, the international mediationteam has been a motley crew with differentinterests, capabilities, and access to and relation-ships with the Malian actors. This diversity wasmade necessary by the complexity of the 2012Malian crisis. According to one Malian govern-ment official, “You needed more parties thanAlgeria to come on board and save the Sahel, butAlgeria had to be there to prevent the creation of anindependent state between it and Mali, eventhough some of the armed groups would havepreferred ECOWAS to remain as the leadmediator.”160 This diversity has sometimes helpedhammer out agreements, as various mediationactors have leveraged their special ties with some ofthe negotiating parties to overcome hurdles alongthe way.

However, the diversity of the mediation team hasalso compounded the problems of implementation.While the triumvirate of Algeria, the AU, and theUN formed an effective troubleshootingmechanism at different points during the Algiersprocess, according to a foreign diplomat, a broadergroup of international mediators—ECOWAS,France, the US, and the EU—were most involved inthe Follow-Up Committee.161 The resultingstructure is “heavy,” as several members cannottake decisions locally and have to consult with theirprincipals in regional capitals or at the headquar-ters of international or regional organization. It isalso complicated by changes in key personalities:the head of MINUSMA, Bert Koenders, departedmidway through the Algiers negotiations; Algeria’sformer ambassador to Mali and lead mediator,Noureddine Ayadi, departed at the end of thenegotiations; and Ramtane Lamamra was replacedas the head of Algeria’s foreign ministry.

While all international members of the Follow-Up Committee share a basic consensus that thepeace agreement is the only way to resolve theconflict in Mali, geopolitical considerations andnational interests regularly return to the fore. Thismay explain, at least in part, the less than forcefulpublic reaction by the international members of thecommittee to the lack of progress in implementa-tion, as well as the few joint mediation

communiqués they have put out. This mutedreaction can also be explained by the committee’srole as a mediator; it cannot name and shame if it isto oversee the implementation of the agreement bythe parties and help iron out difficulties anddisagreements in the interpretation of the text.According to a senior member of the internationalmediation team, this further underlines the needfor the appointment of an independent observer asmandated in the agreement. This is reminiscent ofthe situation in which MINUSMA found itself afterthe Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement when itchaired the follow-up mechanism; the missionfound itself uncomfortably positioned between itsmandate to support the return of state institutionsto the north and its role as president of the follow-up committee, which involved the use of goodoffices to facilitate implementation of theagreement.

However, as has been repeatedly mentioned inalmost every one of the UN secretary-general’sreports on Mali since 2015, the Follow-UpCommittee has limited leverage to press for theimplementation of the agreement in the absence ofpolitical will on the part of the signatories. Somemembers of the mediation team have also beenmore reluctant than others to “push and pull” theparties to achieve advances in implementation inbetween committee meetings, owing to theirrespect for national ownership and acknowledg-ment of the primary responsibility of the parties forimplementation. A senior member of the interna-tional mediation team noted that the committee’sleverage over the parties was further complicatedby Algeria’s insistence on chairing the Follow-UpCommittee and co-chairing all of its subcommit-tees, even though the Algerian ambassadorpresiding over the committee would only fly toBamako for meetings once a month. According tothe mediator, “This role should not fall to aneighboring country because its implication insupporting the implementation of the peaceprocess will undoubtedly be perceived as interven-tionist; the chairmanship of the [Follow-UpCommittee] should have been handed to theUnited Nations.”162

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 37

160 Interview with government official, Bamako, May 9, 2017.161 Interview with foreign diplomat, Bamako, May 9, 2017.162 Interview with senior member of the international mediation team, Bamako, May 10, 2017.

Although it was not in the lead of the negotia-tions in Algiers, MINUSMA occupied a unique rolein the agreement’s implementation. With over10,000 troops and a civilian presence in Bamako,Kidal, Gao, and Timbuktu (in particular), themission’s commanding presence on the groundraises questions about the role it should or couldtake in the implementation process. Further, themission’s mandate makes it not only a member ofthe international mediation team and of theFollow-Up Committee but also an implementingpartner, particularly in the defense and securityrealm. Whether rightly or not, Malian partiesexpect MINUSMA to assist in reestablishingsecurity and fault it for not doing so. Several Maliangovernment officials, for instance, suggested thatthe mission ought to put its resources at thedisposal of the Malian state. One civil servantspecifically raised the need for MINUSMA to allowthe Malian armed forces to use its helicopters torespond to security incidents in the north.163

Such demands led to a change in MINUSMA’smandate in 2016 to increase its capabilities andallow it to adopt a more “proactive and robustposture,” including when protecting civiliansagainst asymmetric threats. This was welcomed byMalian Foreign Minister Diop, who said hiscountry’s expectations “centred on a more robustposture for MINUSMA, strengthening its capabili-ties and greater support for Mali’s ArmedForces.”164 Accordingly, discussions on renewingthe mission’s mandate in June 2017 have focusedon securing central Mali, including throughincreased coordination with the Malian armedforces and the G5 Sahel counterterrorism force.

This focus risks relegating the peace process andimplementation of the peace agreement to thebackground. It is thus worth considering theInternational Crisis Group’s recommendation thatthe Security Council reorient MINUSMA’smission, “particularly by strengthening its politicaland civil affairs components and giving the missiona greater role in local reconciliation.” It is alsolikely that, with the end of the interim period and

the forthcoming presidential elections in July 2018,the government will want to move away from aheavy follow-up structure. In this context, theFollow-Up Committee’s appointment of anindependent observer to objectively evaluate thestate of implementation, as mandated by theagreement (Article 63), could be a useful follow-upto the committee.166

Conclusion

This report has analyzed the implementation of theBamako Agreement in Mali over the past two years,linking the challenges of implementation to thedifficulties experienced during the negotiations inAlgiers. In so doing, it aims to draw as complete apicture of the situation as possible for the UnitedNations and other external actors involved in theprocess to draw lessons and take these into accountwhen planning forward. It highlights a number ofchallenges that emanated from the legacies ofprevious agreements, the general environment inwhich the agreement was negotiated andimplemented, and the choices that the interna-tional mediation team and the parties made at thetable and beyond. While some of these challengeswere more difficult to address than others, it is theirinteraction that has made the Malian peace processso complex and so fraught with dangers. Theseconcluding thoughts attempt to tease out some ofthe lessons from the UN engagement and toprovide a glimpse into what may lie ahead for Malibeyond the end of the interim period in June 2017.LESSONS FOR THE UNITED NATIONS

The UN can draw six broad lessons from theimplementation of the Bamako Agreement in Mali:1. Even when it does not officially lead a

mediation process, the UN may end up leadingimplementation in practice.It matters being the big kid on the block. Thesheer scope of MINUSMA’s presence in Malihas affected perceptions and expectations bothamong Malians and within some circles of theinternational mediation team. While the UN

38 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

163 Interview with senior Malian civil servant, Bamako, May 12, 2017.164 United Nations, “Security Council Adopts Resolution 2295 (2016), Authorizing ‘More Proactive and Robust’ Mandate for United Nations Mission in Mali,” UN

Doc. SC/14246, June 29, 2016.165 International Crisis Group, “Open Letter to the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping in Mali.”166 A working group headed by the AU special representative, former President Buyoya, has been tasked with submitting a shortlist of candidates to the Follow-Up

Committee for consideration.

was not in the lead of the negotiations in Algiers,and while it only co-chairs the security anddefense subcommittee of the Follow-UpCommittee, in practice the UN has found itselfobliged to take the lead on certain aspects ofimplementation.Taking the lead, however, comes with the risk ofbeing faulted for either doing too much or notdoing enough. This became abundantly clearwhen members of the international mediationteam expressed disappointment overMINUSMA’s perceived failure to establish theFollow-Up Committee’s secretariat and for itsdecision to have its own mediation unit performthese duties instead. It was also illustrated by thecriticism various parties to the agreementlevelled against the mission’s performance onthe ground in Mali, particularly on the securityfront. While MINUSMA’s mandate was clearlydrafted to support the cease-fire arrangementsand confidence-building measures put in placeby the parties to the agreement, the mission hasbeen faulted for not doing enough to supportthe redeployment of the Malian army to thenorth and to protect civilians from theimminent threat of physical violence. Demandsfor MINUSMA to take a more robust posturehave been partially met by the terms of themission’s new mandate of June 2016, but theyhave not been met in practice due to its persist-ently limited capabilities and a challengingenvironment where asymmetric security threatsabound.

2. When implementing an agreement it did notmediate, the UN may find itself accountable tomore than one “principal.”In contributing to implementing some aspectsof the Bamako Agreement, MINUSMA is defacto accountable to the Follow-Up Committeewhile also officially accountable to the SecurityCouncil. This may cause tensions if the different“principals” do not see eye to eye or ifMINUSMA has to participate in the implemen-tation of provisions or decisions that do notfully live up to the international legalframeworks to which UN missions are bound.One particularly telling instance is MINUSMA’s

position vis-à-vis the justice, reconciliation, andhumanitarian pillar of the agreement. While theagreement reiterates that war crimes and crimesagainst humanity cannot be subject to limita-tions, the granting of amnesty—a provision thatwould have been untenable from a UNstandpoint—was hotly debated and onlynarrowly averted in Algiers. However, the UNwas not able to ensure the vetting of prisonersreleased by the government as part of theconfidence-building measures. MINUSMA hasnow initiated a system of human rightsprofiling, which will likely put in evidenceproblems with some of the individualsappointed to the Follow-Up Committee, jointpatrols, and interim authorities in relation totheir past deeds during the 2012 Islamistoccupation of northern Mali.

3. UN missions, even when mandated underChapter VII, remain dependent on thegoodwill of the host country, and heads ofmissions remain vulnerable to the threat ofdismissal.The government of Mali and the majority ofMalians still resent having been placed on theSecurity Council’s agenda. This has led thegovernment to put more weight on one part ofMINUSMA’s mandate: to support the return ofstate institutions, including the Malian army, tothe north. After the Ouagadougou PreliminaryAgreement, this created tension between themission and the newly elected president and hisgovernment as MINUSMA also sought to fulfillthe other part of its mandate: to exercise goodoffices in support of the implementation of thetransitional road map.Following the Bamako Agreement, this tensionhas abated because of the diversity of interna-tional mediators involved in the Follow-UpCommittee. However, the end of the interimperiod increases the risk of various internationalactors disengaging from the day-to-day follow-up on implementation, which could again leaveMINUSMA alone in the ring. As a result, themission may again find itself in an uncomfort-able position. It is being called upon to assist thegovernment in managing the deteriorating

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 39

167 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, paras. 41–42.

security situation in central Mali and inredeploying the Malian army to the north(whether or not it is reconstituted as per theagreement). At the same time, MINUSMA mayneed to exercise its good offices to mediatefuture disagreements on the interpretation ofthe agreement and to push what has until nowbeen a reluctant government to implement it(notwithstanding the priorities of the newgovernment).

4. UN assets such as logistics and expertiseprovide opportunities for leverage.While the United Nations was not in the lead inAlgiers and is but one of several internationalactors in the Follow-Up Committee,MINUSMA could count on a number of assetsto increase its leverage in Mali. Particularlyimportant were UN logistics and expertise.Without UN transportation capabilities, neitherthe negotiations nor many of the meetings of theFollow-Up Committee and Joint TechnicalCommission for Security/Technical SecurityCommission would have been possible. Theleaders of armed groups in particular, as well asMalian administrators and elected officials,came to rely on UN aviation capabilities at atime when they could not easily travel and whensome of them did not feel comfortable transitingthrough Bamako.UN expertise also provided MINUSMA withleverage. Staff and mediation experts secondedto the mission were essential to the elaborationof key documents such as the three thematicannexes (on the interim period, defense andsecurity, and economic development), which,however imperfect, have provided essentialdetail for operationalizing the BamakoAgreement. Likewise, the presence in Algiers ofMINUSMA staff with expertise on securitymanagement, chief of all the force commanderand his deputy, proved invaluable at a timewhen security incidents threatened to derail thenegotiations. Since the agreement was signed,MINUSMA support has been essential to theimplementation of the agreement’s defense andsecurity provisions, its mediation unit hasprovided administrative support to the Follow-Up Committee, and its various sections haveassisted the government in organizing activitiesto socialize Malians to various aspects of the

agreement.Whether the mission took full advantage ofthese assets is difficult to ascertain, as it was notthe focus of this report, but they clearlyprovided it with access and with the opportunityto build trust. More generally, these assetshighlight the importance of advance planningand preparedness, one of the key principles ofthe UN Guidance on Effective Mediation. Mostnotably, MINUSMA is the first peacekeepingmission to be endowed with a separatemediation unit, an initially controversial movethat ultimately proved an asset during thenegotiation and implementation phases.

5. Principles matter, and the UN is theappropriate vehicle to push for a principledapproach to mediation.The UN Guidance on Effective Mediation onlydates back to 2012, but already the UN’s pushon matters such as inclusivity has left its mark.While there are no shining success stories ofefforts to promote inclusivity in Mali, constantreminders of the need for inclusivity fromMINUSMA and the secretary-general havebrought the issue into the public consciousness.For instance, in spite of the sustained participa-tion of Malian women and women’s associa-tions in activities related to the implementationof the peace agreement, the formal inclusion ofwomen in the process lags far behind. Sixwomen were appointed as commissioners onthe Truth, Justice and ReconciliationCommission (out of twenty-four total), and sixwomen were named to the special commissionin charge of drafting the Charter for Peace,Unity and National Reconciliation (out of fifty-three total). Not a single woman was nominatedby the armed groups to serve in the interimauthorities (nor in the Follow-Up Committee orsubcommittees), although the governmentdesignated one woman as a member of thetransitional councils (out of thirty-two total)and two women as special advisers (out oftwenty total).In spite of this meager record, President Keïtafelt compelled by unrelenting pressure to sign adecree in December 2015 providing for a 30percent quota for the appointment of women tonational institutions and legislative bodies. In

40 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

our interviews, some Malian civil servants even“joked” that they had learned a new word,“inclusivity.”168 While this may not be the resultsought, the uneasiness it reflects and theunsolicited need to raise the issue indicate atleast some recognition of its importance.

6. The personalities of UN officials matter.Since its inception, MINUSMA has been led bythree different special representatives of thesecretary-general. While each broughtsomething different to the table, they all hadtheir own limitations. Bert Koenders washampered by the legacy of the OuagadougouPreliminary Agreement. Koenders was per -ceived to be closer to the armed groups becauseof his attempt to use good offices to encouragethe parties to move toward the mandatedinclusive talks to find a comprehensive andlasting solution to the crisis. Nonetheless, hisability to develop a good rapport with bothAlgerian Foreign Minister Lamamra and AUSpecial Envoy Buyoya resulted in the establish-ment of the Algiers triumvirate.MINUSMA lost some of its leverage uponKoender’s resignation and his replacement byTunisia’s Mongi Hamdi, perceived to be closerto Algeria. Indeed, this was when Algeriadecided to take the lead on implementation andpreside over not only the Follow-Up Committeebut also over all of its subcommittees, in adeparture from standard practice when there isa Security Council–mandated mission on theground.The current head of MINUSMA, MahamatSaleh Annadif, is a Chadian diplomat withextensive experience in peace processes. Chad isinvolved in the Follow-Up Committee as one ofthe regional countries brought on board byAlgeria and is a military leader in the region,including through its participation inpeacekeeping missions. This, together withAnnadif’s understanding of the armed groups,has resulted in a happy medium wherebyAnnadif has developed good relations with allsignatories to the agreement—both the govern-ment and the armed groups.

However, even Annadif’s skills might be testedin the months ahead, as the mission runs therisk of turning away from implementation ofthe peace agreement. Indeed, the need torespond to security concerns in central Mali, theUN secretary-general’s commitment to providesupport to the planned G5 force, andMINUSMA’s mandated support to theredeployment of the Malian army riskunsettling the delicate balance the mission hasachieved between its stabilization and goodoffices roles. This has contributed to discussionsabout the way forward ahead of the renewal ofMINUSMA’s mandate. While the InternationalCrisis Group has suggested that the missionreorient its focus toward good offices, itsprevious suggestion that the UN decouple theroles of stabilization and good offices byappointing a special envoy in charge ofmediation while leaving MINUSMA to tend tosecurity issues also merits mentioning.

THE WAY FORWARD: 2017 ANDBEYOND

On January 30, 2017, the fifteenth meeting of theFollow-Up Committee in Bamako was boycottedby the Coordination. According to the secretary-general’s March 2017 report on Mali, theCoordination was protesting the “lack of inclusive-ness in the decision making of the implementationprocess and delays in implementing interimmeasures.… Halfway through the meeting therepresentatives of the Platform coalition of armedgroups walked out in solidarity with [theCoordination].”169 At the turn of 2017, and only afew months away from the end of the eighteen- totwenty-four-month interim period, manyquestioned whether the peace agreement was stillworth holding on to or if it was time to startlooking for alternatives.

Led by Algeria, the international mediation teamattempted to revive the process as it had previouslydone at the beginning of 2016. On February 10,2017, Algerian Foreign Minister Lamamraconvened a ministerial-level meeting of the Follow-Up Committee, which gave new momentum to theprocess. Following eighteen months of little

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 41

168 Interview with senior Malian civil servant, Bamako, May 12, 2017.169 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/271, March 30, 2017, para. 3.

progress in the implementation of the agreement,some key milestones were finally reached. The firstGovernment-Coordination-Platform joint patrolwas launched in Gao (composed of 600 memberseach from the Malian army, Coordination, andPlatform and another 150 from CMFPR2, MSA,CJA, etc.). An agreement on the composition ofinterim authorities was reached, and despite someinitial contestation these were installed in Kidal onFebruary 28th (without Platform representatives), inGao and Ménaka on March 2nd, and in Timbuktuand Taoudenni on April 20th. Moreover, theConference of National Entente, which took placefrom March 27th to April 2nd, was more successfulthan anticipated, as the armed groups and opposi-tion political parties that initially announced theywould boycott the event eventually joined in.

While implementation is far behind schedule,170the implementation agenda was ambitious giventhe conditions under which the parties signed theagreement, and there are now some small achieve-ments to build on. The joint patrols will need to beexpanded to Timbuktu and Kidal and equipped sothat they can effectively fulfill their expected role ofsecuring the interim authorities as well as thecantonment and DDR process.171 The interimauthorities will need to be made operational—withcompetent staff and adequate financial means—sothat they can start providing services to northernpopulations ahead of the regional elections that aresupposed to be held in October and November2017. And following on the Conference of NationalEntente, a Charter for Peace, Unity and NationalReconciliation will now need to be produced,which would record some of the key root causes ofthe crisis and renew the commitment of Malians toreconciliation.

Importantly, the government of Mali hasaccepted that June 20th cannot be the end of theinterim period and that the mandate of the interimauthorities will need to be extended to honor the

peace agreement’s requirement that they serve forat least six months. Appointed on April 1, 2017, thenew government of Prime Minister Maïga (amember of the president’s Rally for Mali party) hasmade the implementation of the peace agreementits top priority. This may have less to do with asudden change of heart than with the realizationthat, at a time when the Malian army finds itselfunable to control the deteriorating situation incentral Mali, the government must find ways tomake good on President Keïta’s promise to deliverstability. This is all the more important as the newgovernment, which does not include ex-rebels, isprimarily geared toward preparing for the July2018 presidential elections, in which PresidentKeïta intends to run for a second term.172

From this electoral perspective, the population ofsouthern Mali, which represents 80 percent of theelectorate, will be more important than that ofnorthern Mali. Even so, there are signs that amongsouthern Malians there is a growing realization thatthere is no military solution to the crisis innorthern Mali and that the agreement is still thebest chance to stabilize that part of the country. Butjudging by the push for a constitutionalreferendum slated to take place on July 9th,173 thegovernment may not have completely moved awayfrom its past practice of just “ticking the boxes” andunilaterally implementing the provisions of theagreement it deems most relevant, which risksderailing the process. To this effect, a newimplementation calendar could be helpful, aswould be the establishment of a permanent consul-tation framework (cadre de concertationpermanent) as decided during the February 2017ministerial-level meeting of the Follow-UpCommittee.

Until clashes between the Platform and theCoordination and affiliated clans resumed in theKidal region in June 2017,174 the government,Coordination, and Platform seemed to have

42 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

170 For instance, according to the peace agreement, the joint patrols should have started within sixty days of signature; integration criteria, quotas, and modalitiesshould have been decided within ninety days; and the armed groups should have submitted their lists of combatants and the government integrated them withinsix months.

171 The peace agreement’s Annex 2 on defense and security clearly states that the primary role of the joint patrols in Gao, Timbuktu, and Kidal would be to securethe cantonment and DDR process. Over time, however, the parties have increasingly considered the joint patrols as directly linked to the security of the interimauthorities. The problem is that, until now, only one joint patrol has been established in Gao, and it only operates within the city (whereas cantonment sites willbe outside urban centers).

172 UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on the Situation in Mali, UN Doc. S/2017/478, June 6, 2017, para. 13.173 “Référendum constitutionnel au Mali: Dispersion d’un rassemblement d’opposants,” Radio France Internationale, June 9, 2017, available at

www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170608-referendum-constitutionnel-mali-dispersion-rassemblement-opposants .174 Jules Crétois, “Mali: Dans la région de Kidal, ‘la tension est énorme.’”

entered into a new positive dynamic. This startedwhen, on the eve of the seventeenth session of theFollow-Up Committee on May 2, 2017,175 somegovernment ministers met with representatives ofthe armed groups and decided to create aninformal technical and political committee underthe aegis of the high representative of thepresident.176 This committee is intended to moveforward implementation in the periods betweenthe monthly meetings of the Follow-Up Committeewhen it had typically stalled. Implementation willalso depend on the Coordination and Platformworking out their differences and working togetherin good faith.

But many observers remain concerned that theparties—and some of their appointed representa-tives in the various follow-up mechanisms—aremore interested in the process than in peace itself.They remain concerned that, to date, the partieshave done just enough to stay in the process buthave not committed themselves to it fully, asillustrated by the fact that they have barelyimplemented interim arrangements and have notprogressed on larger institutional reforms. Theyfear that any major incident could be used to onceagain stall a process that has not yet reached thepoint where it is irreversible. In particular, themodalities and timing of the redeployment of theMalian army (whether reconstituted as per theagreement or not) to northern Mali—and particu-larly to Kidal—and of the DDR process could leadto renewed tensions, as they have in the past.177

There is also a possibility that the internationalmediation team and the lead mediator, Algeria,may disengage from following-up on implementa-tion. Already the mediation team has repeatedlythreatened to cut monthly allowances to represen-tatives of the armed groups on the Follow-UpCommittee and Technical Security Commission.

In a departure from standard diplomatic practiceand from the Follow-Up Committee’s usual concil-iatory style, the committee’s president recently senta letter to the president of the Coordination—apparently leaked to the press—accusing the groupof “once again and one time too many” failing tomeet their commitments for not vacating Camp #1in Kidal, where the Operational CoordinationMechanism and joint patrols were supposed to beinstalled.178 The pressure seemed to pay off, asCoordination forces finally vacated the premises onJune 2nd to allow for the rehabilitation of the camp.In the latest meeting of the Follow-Up Committee,the parties agreed to launch the OperationalCoordination Mechanism and joint patrols inKidal by June 20th.179 But the question is whether thechange in government in Algeria at the end of May,which saw the replacement of Foreign MinisterLamamra—the architect of the peace agreement—may affect Algeria’s commitment to the Mali file.180

This has led to discussions regarding the designa-tion of an independent observer by the Follow-UpCommittee to objectively evaluate the state ofimplementation, as per Article 63 of the peaceagreement. While it is difficult to imagine howsuch an observer could assign blame (orrecommend sanctions, as certain Security Councilmembers seem to hope), his or her designationcould prove a useful mechanism to replace theheavy follow-up structures of the Follow-UpCommittee as implementation extends past theinterim period. However, the observer’s role will belimited to just that—observing. As a result,amicable but sustained pressure from countries inthe region—all members of the internationalmediation team but each with leverage overdifferent parties, including the government—willbe essential to ensuring that this peace agreement,unlike past ones, is ultimately implemented.

A PROCESS IN SEARCH OF PEACE 43

175 MINUSMA, “Communiqué de la dix-septième session du Comité de suivi de l’accord,” May 2, 2017, available athttps://minusma.unmissions.org/communiqu%C3%A9-de-la-dix-septieme-session-du-comit%C3%A9-de-suivi-de-l%E2%80%99accord .

176 Representatives of the Coordination and the Platform on the Follow-Up Committee now share offices with the high representative of President Keïta,Mahamadou Diagouraga, in the former building of the Regional Solar Energy Centre (CRES) in Bamako, which also facilitates regular consultations.

177 “Kidal: Le retour de l’administration malienne avant le 20 juin compromis?,” MaliJet, June 14, 2017, available at http://malijet.com/a_la_une_du_mali/188112-kidal_retour_administration_malienne_compromis.html .

178 “Mali: Tensions entre le Comité de suivi de l’accord de paix et la CMA,” Radio France Internationale, May 25, 2017, available at www.rfi.fr/afrique/20170525-mali-tensions-entre-comite-suivi-accord-paix-cma-boutache-sidati .

179 MINUSMA, “Communiqué de la dix-huitième session du Comité de suivi de l’accord,” June 6, 2017, available athttps://minusma.unmissions.org/communique%CC%81-de-la-dix-huitie%CC%80me-session-du-comite%CC%81-de-suivi-de-l%E2%80%99accord .

180 Lamamra was replaced by Abdelkader Messahel, previously co-Minister of Foreign Affairs in charge of the Maghreb, the African Union, and the Arab League,who has also been following the Malian file closely. “Officiel: La formation du nouveau gouvernement annoncée, départ de Lamamra, Bouterfa, Bouchouareb etGrine,” HuffPost Maghreb, May 25, 2017, available at www.huffpostmaghreb.com/2017/05/25/algerie-gouvernement-tebb_n_16802982.html .

In this context, the G5 Sahel counterterrorismforce, authorized on April 13th by the AU Peace andSecurity Council and under consideration by theUN Security Council, should aim to support adifficult political process rather than be a substitutefor it.181 MINUSMA, which remains the onlymember of the international mediation team with a

significant presence in the north, should continueto play a strong political role at both the nationaland local levels.182 In the absence of alternatives, thebest rampart against terrorism and a return toviolence continues to be the implementation of thepeace agreement and the return of a more legiti-mate state presence to northern Mali.

44 Arthur Boutellis and Marie-Joëlle Zahar

181 The EU has already committed €50 million to this counterterrorism force, which could be composed of 10,000 troops. See “La France demande à l’ONUd’autoriser le déploiement d’une force africaine dans le Sahel,” Jeune Afrique, June 7, 2017, available at www.jeuneafrique.com/445468/politique/france-va-demander-a-lonu-dautoriser-deploiement-dune-force-africaine-sahel/ .

182 The International Crisis Group’s recommendation is that “by strengthening MINUSMA’s civilian components, reinforcing its good offices role, tasking it withlocal reconciliation and reviewing its relationship with other security forces in Northern Mali, the Council would better position the UN to support the peaceagreement’s implementation and prevent its collapse.” International Crisis Group, “Open Letter to the UN Security Council on Peacekeeping in Mali.”

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