Robert Folger

A Referent Cognitions Theory of Relative Deprivation

Southern Methodist University

Since its introduction by Stouffer, Suchman, DeVinney, Star, and Williams ( 1949), the concept of relative deprivation (RD) has been the subject of a variety of theoretical accounts. Notable among the classic formulations are those of Davis (1959), Gurr (1970) , and Runciman ( 1966). More recently, the conceptual uud empirical work of Faye Crosby (e.g., Bernstein & Crosby, 1980; Cook, Crosby, & Hennigan, 1977; Crosby, 1976; Crosby & Gonzalez-lntal, 1984) and ol Joanne Martin (e.g . , 1981; Martin & Murray, 1984) has stimulated a revival of interest in the topic (e.g., see deCarufel, 1981; Guimond & Dube-Simard, II)HJ).

( 'oincident with this revival of interest in RD has been a recent tendency for 'ocial cognition researchers to take a greater interest in people's affective reac­tHHIS . As Fiske and Taylor (1984) have put it, " After roughly ten years of ultl'llsive work on social cognition, researchers are coming to the conclusion that tllr rather arid field could use some irrigation by affect" (p. 31 0). Fiske and lu lor illustrate this trend in terms of three theoretical perspectives , each of wl11rh considers the cognitions that influence people's affective reactions to outromes (Abelson, 1983; Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Weiner, 1982). They ul'o note that the research associated with each of these perspectives has been " '' '' il'ted almost exclusively to retrospective reports of past events or to role­pluy111g methodologies involving hypothetical situations. Summarizing this state 11l1111airs , they have commented as follows: "All three sets of ideas endorse the I'' 111'1111 proposition that cognitions can be an important cause of affective re-1'1111\\'\ . 1\nd all three remain to he examined empirically in the context of actual

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l .'olgn , Ill pil'~~ :t , il ,C) that incorporati;S th t: rt:SllliS of S\:Vt:ra l laboratory t:Xjll:ll

llH: Ilt ~ on actualc1llotion (e.g .. Folger, Rosenfie ld, Rheaume . & M<.~rtin. I<JHl : hllgcr . Ros~.:nficld. & Robinson, 19H3), the impetus to which w<.~s Crosby 's ( llJ76) se1ninal statement regarding preconditions of RD. This framework focuses on a re latively c ircumscribed type of affective reaction (viz., resentment) and hence docs not entail a commitment to any particular taxonomy of attribu ­tional categories, in contrast to Weiner's ( 1982) description of the influence th<.~t di ffcrent attributions have on various emotional states (e.g., pride, shame). It builds directly on Kahneman and Tversky's ( 1982) discussion of the way reac­tions to existing outcomes are colored by consideration of ''what might have been"; more indirectly, it also takes into account Abelson's (1983) notion th at perceived causal instrumentalities are relevant to consideration of "what might yet be. "

BACKGROUND TO THE MODEL

The Emotion to be Explained

Stouffer et al. ( 1949) used RD in a post hoc way to account for anomalous survey responses by armed forces personnel during World War ll . These responses indicated dissatisfact ion , and the anomaly was that greater dissatisfaction was expressed by personnel whose objective conditions were well-off than by person­nel whose objective conditions were not so well-off. The explanation offered was that satisfaction varied as a function of subjective rather than objective frames of reference . The standard of comparison was sometimes presumed to be the sol­diers ' nonmilitary status or conditions in civilian life ; in other cases, it was presumed that an invidious social comparison (to others similarly situated, but advantaged relative to the respondent) had been made.

Subsequent use of RD extended the concept to such contexts as civil unrest (e.g., Morrison & Steeves, 1967; Searles & Williams , 1962) and revolution (e.g., Davies , 1962; Gurr, 1970). As the result of this usage, RD has come to be associated with an emotional experience that transcends mere dissatisfaction. Crosby (1976) has described the relevant emotional experience as follows :

The emotion of relative deprivation is one type of anger, defined by Webster' s dictionary as "a strong feeling of displeasure and usually of antagonism. " The emotion of relative deprivation can be called "a sense of grievance" or of resent­ment , the latter of which Webster identifies as "a feeling of indignant displeasure at something regarded as a wrong, insult, or injury. " (p. 88)

Following Crosby's lead , I will use the word resentment as a convenient shorthand expression. More or less synonymous expressions would include mar-

.! /\ ltl II HI N I COC oNIIION ' II II OilY 01 HII /\I lVI- 1)1 PRIVATION 35

uln11/ntg1' and rigiltl'o/1.1' illllig11ulio11. Such phrases should make it clear that I am lllll'IL' ~It·d in the ~ensc ol injustice rather than mere discontent. A similar distinc­IIPII tw~ h~.:~.:n 1nadc by 1\verill (19~2. 19~3) , in his investigation of the phe­nwn ·nologi~.:al diflcrence between true social anger and mere annoyance, and by StL·il. Tuchman. and Deutsch ( 1979), in their investigation of injustice versus l111~trat ion. (On the relationship between the present framework and theories of 111~.:quity, sec Folger, in press-c.)

Countereffects of Hope

/\bel son's ( 1983) discussion of the relationship between outcomes and emotions •ives a prominent role to people 's thoughts about possible future outcomes. People set goals and make plans that are causally instrumental to their obtaining

lksircd outcomes. "lio.~l.J:le _p~E!s..QDne_c;tis:m_~!W~!':IJ the~e L':ILJ..~<tli!!§trumentalities and t_he _9e_,~i_r~d . .stulc.Q~~·

Within the RD literature, however, hope has a problematic status. Consider, lor example, the following quotation from de Tocqueville ( 1856/1955): "Pa­tiently endured so long as it seemed beyond redress, a grievance comes to appear intolerable once the possibility of removing it crosses men's minds" (p. 182) . This passage seems to suggest that hope provides the occasion for the release of suppressed resentment, as if people do not allow themselves the luxury of ex­pressing resentment until it may do some good- or even as if it is impossib le for resentment to be experienced in the first place unless prospects for improvement are perceived . A related empirical phenomenon is Grofman and Muller's (1973) finding that tendencies toward expressing discontent were as likely when peo­ple's economic status was improving as when it was declining; only steady-state outcomes seemed to suppress discontent. Intrigued by this survey result, I con­ducted an experiment (Folger, 1977) to examine the consequences of different types of improvement. Sure enough, certain conditions of improvement did produce some of the angriest complaints from subjects about remaining ineq­uities (see also deCarufel, 1979, and deCarufel & Schopler, 1979, for further specification regarding the exact nature of these conditions).

It was with some surprise, therefore , that I learned from an unpublished manuscript in 1978 about the results of a study later reported by Bernstein and Crosby ( 1980). In that role-playing study, vignettes about a potentially aggrieved target person allowed manipulation of factors relevant to Crosby's (1976) postu­lated preconditions of RD . What surprised me- and Bernstein and Crosby- was the effect produced by manipulating that target person's reported future expecta­tions. Subjects (responding as if they were the target person) expressed less resentment when improvement was expected than when it was not. In retrospect, of course, this result is not so surprising. With clear hindsight it is easy to assert that people are inclined to be happy when things are improving and the outlook for the future is hopeful. Nevertheless, as Bernstein and Crosby ( 1980) com-

36 FOLGER

mented, this finding seems at odds with de Tocqueville's famous aphorism (p. 453).

The Bernstein and Crosby ( 1980) results (see also Hennigan, 1977) showed that hope (expectations of improved future outcomes) can sometimes offset tendencies toward resentment. Having subsequently replicated these results (Folger, Rosenfield , & Rheaume, 1983) , I have come to think of them in terms of a replacement effect mechanism. That is, although current outcomes may be relatively low , expected future outcomes that are higher can serve as a psycho­logical substitute for the current outcomes, mentally replacing them in com­parisons with some standard of evaluation.

I was still puzzling over this effect and its apparent contradiction with the other research cited above, however, when I heard a Katz-Newcomb lecture on "The Psychology of Possible Worlds" delivered by Danny Kahneman later that year. The lecture contained several comments about RD in connection with Kahneman and Tversky's exploration of the simulation heuristic, not all of which appeared in the piece on this topic published later (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982). Some of those comments helped spark my own attempted resolution of the puzzle, as well as the theoretical framework to be described, and it is in the spirit of repaying an intellectual debt that I have offered this account in a more personalized fashion than is common.

The Simulation Heuristic

Many developments in social cognition research and theorizing have been stimu­lated by exploration of the heuristics people use (Fiske & Taylor, 1984) . Pi­oneers in this regard, Kahneman and Tversky (e.g. , 1972, 1973; Tversky & Kahneman , 1971 , 1973, 1974) have identified several cognitive heuristics. Such heuristics serve as guiding principles, convenient mental shortcuts, or simply typical habits of thinking .

Consider someone asked to estimate whether K appears more frequently as the first letter or as the third letter in English words. The typical guess (Tversky & Kahneman , 1973) is that the former are more prevalent , whereas the latter are actually twice as frequent in a typical prose passage . This error illustrates the availability heuristic: in making judgments about an event's probability or fre­quency of occurrence, people will estimate the event as more probable or fre­quent to the extent it is eas ier to recall instances of the event in question. Since people arc used to arranging words in alphabetical order, instances of words with K as the first letter come more eas ily to mind , thereby biasing the est imate.

Initial description of the availability heuristic (Tvcrsky & Kahneman , 1973) in1plil"d it was cqually applicable to the constructing of exam ples and )0 the n·tlll'Vin • ol in~lann·s from 111 ' II lOry. hut thi s position was alllendcd h ·cause " tt •ntll and r·onltllll'tio n al\' <filii · dilklt'lll w:1ys ol h1 in •inr thin •s to 111ind ; they :lit' 11\t'd to .III~Wl' l dill 'lt' lll <(llt' ~titlll\ , and tlivy lollow dillt'lt' lll llil l· ~ " (1\ :illllL'

3. A REFERENT COGNITIONS THEORY OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 37

man & Tversky, 1982, p. 211). In sharpening this distinction, Kahneman and Tversky coined a new phrase for the rules that mental constructions follow- the simulation heuristic. Although Kahneman and Tversky ( 1982) have described several kinds of mental constructions, some of their most notable examples involve counterfactua/ assessments, in which people reconstruct the past. These assessments occur when people mentally "undo" some event that has already taken place.

In one example , two men in the same limousine were traveling to an airport. They were described as having been caught in a traffic jam and arriving 30 minutes after their respective planes had been scheduled to depart. Subjects reading this description were informed that one man learned his flight had left on time , whereas the other man discovered his flight had been delayed and only departed 5 minutes before the limousine arrived at the airport. Of the subjects surveyed, 96% said that the latter passenger would be more upset. Apparently this dramatic phenomenological differentiation of the two men , whose objective t:ircumstances were identical (both missed their planes), occurred because of a subjective variation in the psychological " distance between what happened and what could have happened" vis-a-vis each man (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982, p. - 06) . That is, the mental undoing of the late arrival would be easier for the latter passenger to perform than for the former, since it would only involve imagining any of the numerous ways that 5 minutes ' time could have been saved.

The reactions of subjects to this example suggest that the train of thought people loll ow, in identifying with frustrated airline passengers , makes some reconstruc­tions of the past more cognitively accessible than others. Such thoughts, in other words, have a heuristic-like quality , as if a set of implicit rules were involved. In .rddilion to speculating about the nature of these rules , Kahneman and Tversky I 11JH2) drew attention to '' the implications of these rules for emotions that arise wh ·n reality is compared with a favored alternative, which one had failed to reach h11lcould easily imagine reaching" (p. 202) . The highlighted relationship between rog11i1ion and affect, therefore , is that certain emotions are more likely to occur or will he experienced with greater intensity to the extent it is easy to mentally undo what has transpired , to reconstruct the past , to imagine alternative scenarios, and llil' ll'hy lo dwell upon what might have been . As Kahneman and Tversky put it, IIIVI' .\ li galiOn or people's simulation tendencies " will be helpful in the study of a 1 111 \lt: r or emotions that could be called counterfactual emotions, because of their dr • pc1rd ~o: rK~o: on a comparison of reality with what might or should have been : lrrl \ tl:rtion , regret. and some cases of indignation , grief, and envy are all exam­ph·\" (p . 206). Resentment, then , can be considered a special case of such l1111knci ·~ .

II llliiY he thi s kind or revisionist history to which de Tocqueville's aphorism r 1ppiH·~ A pa~t inju~ti ce ("grievance") is lolcraled, and perhaps is not even 111 11 \'IVnl '"an 111j11stin· , il th • unjustl y trcal~o:d p ·rson cannot imagine having I Will ll\'<lkd ntlil' l Wi\1' ( " it \l'l' llll'd ill' Olld ll'di\'SS") All app~.:;il ror redress 11\ay

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h1· pl' ll' l ' JV\"d a ~ IJI,l:l y to fall on tk:~JI · cars. lor l:Xalllplc , l)l:causl: the standard hy wh1rh the pa~t outconu,; would he ruled unjust is not widely accepted or is not con~idncd applicable by those in author1· 'y. Subsequently, things arc made to appear in a new li ght ("the possibility o removing it crosses men's minds ") . Whatever is responsible for this transformation makes the psychological di stance between existing reality and the "favored alternative" less remote than was previously the case. Given the greater ease with which it is now possible to imagine having been treated otherwise , the injustice becomes intolerable and resentment is expressed.

The Folger ( 1977) experiment on improvement can be reinterpreted in these terms. Two sets of subjects in that experiment (those in the inequity-improve conditions) each privately recorded what they considered to be a fair standard for upcoming pay periods. The pay periods were allegedly to be regulated by a "manager" subject, who would divide a fixed amount each pay period between himself and his assigned " worker" subject. The payments were actually con­trolled by the experimenter, and two initial payments were awarded so as to be quite inequitable in comparison with the privately expressed standard. At that point, some workers (voice condition) were allowed to communicate their private standard to their managers ; the remainder (mute condition) were given no such opportunity.

Subsequent payments received by both sets of workers improved to the same degree , such that the division on the final pay period matched the fair standard. This degree of improvement only partially offset the effects of the previous low levels of payment, however , and the cumulative amounts thus remained inequita­ble. Responses to this inequity diverged: voice-condition workers expressed greater displeasure about unfair treatment than did those in the mute condition . Apparently it was easier for the former to imagine how their manager could have treated them fairly all along. He did seem to have (belatedly) accepted their standard, thus providing a social validation of what constituted fairness. Such consensual validation would make a reconstructed past, simulated to reveal what would have happened if the standard had been applied throughout the pay peri­ods , more salient for voice workers than for mute workers as a frame of reference against which to compare existing reality.

The effects of an improvement experienced under such circumstances, name­ly those that confirm the existence of an injustice but do not totally rectify it , can be contrasted with the effects of an improvement that is merely anticipated . Consider, for example, the results obtained from Bernstein and Crosby's ( 1980) manipulation of future expectations. The circumstances described in their vi­gnettes pertained to someone who wanted to achieve a particular goal at the end of a specified time period (an A as an overall grade at the conclusion of a course; a certain management-level position at the end of 15 years). Subjects reading these vignettes were asked to respond as would the target person at a point prior to that time- a point at which reaching the goal was still in question . Half the

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'ilhJl'l'ls tcad that :tl thi~ pnint th · prospects ol rl'achi11g the goal were still good , when.:as the other hall r ·ad that the prospl:cts were poor. When faced with these !lope versus no-hope cirntntstances. subjects were more likely to identify the lull ·r as embodying grounds for resentment. In considering the effects of simu­lated alternatives to existing reality. therefore , it is important to distinguish IK·tween (a) actually experienced improvements, which can provide the basis for a reconstructed past, and (b) anticipated improvements, which can serve as a salient cognitive replacement for meager current outcomes. As the psychological distance between existing reality and some favored alternative state is reduced, the effects can be quite different depending on whether the focus is on the past or the future.

ELEMENTS OF A REFERENT COGNITIONS MODEL

One's present state is a product of what has happened in the past. When people tcllcct upon present outcomes, therefore, their subjective evaluation of these outcomes will be affected by whatever alternative reconstructions of the past are most cognitively accessible. Because these alternative reconstructions provide a lrame of reference , they will be called referent cognitions. This term is used, then, as a shorthand expression for things that people can easily imagine having taken place, as contrasted with whatever actually took place.

Referent Versus Likelihood Outcomes

Referent cognitions do not only simulate alternatively imaginable past circum­stances, events, and actions of various people; they also simulate what the end result of these happenings might have been. These simulated results are termed n~f"erent outcomes. It is also convenient to label the endpoints of the continuum along which such imagined outcomes can lie. Because referent outcomes are wmpared to actual outcomes, the labels to be used will reflect that comparison. Thus high referent outcomes are those that are hedonically superior to existing outcomes. To say that a person has a high referent outcome, in other words, is to say that he or she can easily imagine having obtained an outcome that is better than the one he or she actually obtained . An experimentally operationalized •xample would be a subject who has failed to reach a goal, but who is aware of other plausible circumstances under which the goal would have been reached .

Such a simulation, which sets up a potential for some resentment, can be distinguished from those reconstructions that simulate a low referent outcome. Low referent outcomes are those that are no better than the level of actual outcomes a person has obtained. Thus a subject could be said to have a low referent outcome if, for example, he or she has failed to reach a goal but can imagine no other plausible circumstances under which the goal would have been

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ad11nnl or II IIH.: mo:-.1 cognilivdy sa lient all·rnaliw cin:unrstano;s that ca n he rru :r •rncd would also have resulled in failure.

Til · l.'ITects of n:krent outcomes di ITer from those of likelihood outcomes; the forru ·r pertain to what might have been achieved. the latter to what might yet be achieved. Future expectations are , of course, also shaped by mental ~ imulations.

In the present terminology, likelihood cognitions are those that project the future only along its most probable course from the present. That is, existing condi­tions, circumstances, and arrangements are taken as a given, and future conse­quences are extrapolated (typically with respect to an end state after some target period).

Labels for endpoints of the likelihood continuum are also specified vis-a-vis their relationship to existing outcomes. Low likelihood outcomes are those that are anticipated as being no better than current outcomes. (N.B.: This is a point of some possible confusion-the "low" does not pertain to outcomes that are unlikely, but to likely future outcomes that represent no amelioration of one's current state; thus it is the likelihood of amelioration to which the term refers. ) Experimental operationalizations of low likelihood could involve a subject who has failed to reach a goal and knows there will be no more opportunities to try to reach it, or a subject who has failed and believes that continued failure is likely. High likelihood refers to anticipated outcomes that are superior to current ones; as an extreme endpoint, it would be operationally represented by a subject who expects to achieve his or her goal. The word outcomes is ordinarily omitted in describing experimental manipulations of likelihood , thereby emphasizing that the conditions differ in the likelihood of amelioration.

Statement of Theoretical Propositions. The language of likelihood and ref­erent cognitions helps to capture the distinction between hope versus distress discussed earlier. In addition, the combined effect of these cognitions has been stipulated in a more general conceptual framework, referent cognitions theory (RCT; see Folger, in press-a,b,c; Mark & Folger, 1984). RCT suggests that the experience of relative deprivation is a joint product of high referent and low likelihood cognitions. RD is experienced, that is, when on the one hand a person can easily imagine how things might have turned out better , whereas on the other hand he or she does not expect any amelioration of current outcomes.

These hypothesized conditions for RD reflect its relative and deprivation components, respectively. A high referent outcome provides the comparative basis for dissatisfaction with one's current outcome; that is, the basis upon which the latter comes to be perceived as relatively inferior. Low likelihood translates this experience into an actual deprivation, one significant enough to be worthy of the name. Specifically, the simulation of low-likelihood prospects for the future means that the deprivation is considered permanent rather than temporary. Rela­tively inferior outcomes (i.e., those experienced under high referent conditions) have little sting, it is hypothesized, when the future is rosy. It is this phenomenon

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ol no ~XfK'I'il'lll'l'd 1{1) l'Vl'll when high rdl'l'l'llt outcollll'S an; simulated, so long us a high likelihood ol amelioration is pen:<.:ived , that has been termed the rt 'fJ/ru ·ellll' Jit t:/fi•ct (hllger, Rosenfield , & Rheaume, I <)83).

1\n Illustrative /~'xperiment. Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, and Martin ( 19~3) manipulated likelihood and referent cognitions in the context of subjects' attempts to win a desirable prize. All subjects worked on both an " incentive" and a " nonincentive " task; they were told that their performance on the former determined whether they would win the prize , whereas performance on the latter did not count. Furthermore, each subject believed that random assignment had been used to establish which of the two had become his or her incentive task and which the nonincentive.

The first round of performance trials took place on the incentive task. Subjects had been told that if their performance during this round was not good enough to earn the prize, they would get another chance during a second round (to be conducted after intervening work on the nonincentive task) . immediately after this first round, all subjects learned that they had failed to earn the prize. Further comments by the experimenter at this point, however, created differing expecta­tions among the subjects as to how good their chances would be during the second incentive round: low-likelihood subjects were led to believe that those chances were quite poor and that they would again fail, whereas high-likelihood subjects were led to believe that due to a change in the performance criterion , their chances of successfully winning the prize during the second incentive round were excellent.

At the start of the intervening trials on the nonincentive task, subjects were reminded that their performance did not count toward earning the prize. Feed­back at the end of these trials , however, informed the subjects what would have happened if they had been assigned differently and their performance had count­ed (as was allegedly the case for some other subjects). Low-referent subjects were led to believe that their performance would not have earned them the prize . 1/igh-referent subjects were led to believe that if they had been assigned differ­ently, they would have won the prize.

Prior to working on the second incentive round , subjects completed a ques­tionnaire containing the dependent measures. This anonymously administered questionnaire allegedly had been written by, and would be returned to, a depart­mental committee interested in the effects of special inc;entives in experiments. Subjects indicated what they expected to receive as the result of having been in the experiment and how they felt about that. Responses to three of the mood­related adjectives (angry, upset, and resentful) were summed to form a com­posite index of discontent.

Results from this measure (see Table 3.1) indicated a main effect of likelihood consistent with the hypothesized replacement effect (see also Folger, Rosenfield, & Rheaume , 1983), such that high-likelihood subjects expressed less discontent

42 FOLGER

TABLE 3. 1 Mean Discontent as a Function of Like! ihood and

Referent Outcomes

Referent Outcomes

Low

High

Likelihood

Low

8.0

13.3

High

4. 7

1.7

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater discontent (com­posite of "angry," "resentful, 11 and "upset"). Reprinted from Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, and ~1artin, 1983.

than did low-likelihood subjects. More importantly, the hypothesized Referent X Likelihood interaction was also obtained. This interaction was produced by a significant referent effect only among the low- I ikelihood subjects, such that those who had been exposed to a high referent outcome expressed greater discon­tent than those exposed to a low referent outcome.

Instrumentalities and Justifications

Means as well as ends are represented in simulations. The focus thus far has been on outcomes, or the end results of simulations. The function of a simulation, however, is to reconstruct or extrapolate these end results as consequences of certain starting conditions and presumed contingencies (the parameters of the simulation run) . The two components of a simulation, then, are its final "out­put" state and the elements mentally represented as having been responsible for producing that state. Following Abelson ( 1983), I will term these latter elements the causal instrumentalities .

Attributions about the causes of outcomes a person has obtained also involve consideration of instrumentalities. When reconstructed outcomes are compared to actual outcomes, a comparison of the respective instrumentalities is relevant. RCT thus states that there are two comparisons important for capturing the essence of a person's experience, not just one: (a) the comparison of actual outcomes to referent outcomes, and (b) the comparison of actual instrumen­talities to referent instrumentalities.

Again in the case of instrumentalities , it is useful to identify the relevant comparative dimension and label its endpoints. In what sense is one set of instrumentalities better than another? Although there may well be a number of possible grounds upon which such a comparison could he based. one of the most significant seems likely to be the degree of conformity to accepted practice and higher-order moral principles . In other words, a satisfying set of instrume ntalit ies is one that is well -justified . The term justifimtion thus describe~ the COlli parativc dintcnsion of grcatcsl inlcrcsl , particularly in lhc conlcxl of RD and il~

propcn ~ it y lo indntT rt·~t'lllllll·nl.

3. A REFERENT COGNITIONS THEORY OF RELATIVE DEPRIVATION 43

There is a certain burden of proof placed upon actual instrumentalities, be­cause they are deemed responsible for current states of affairs. Reflecting this priority, the RCT labels for the endpoints of the justification dimension are given in terms of the evaluative repercussions for actual instrumentalities. That is, a low-justification assessment results when actual instrumentalities are considered less morally acceptable than referent instrumentalities and a high-justification assessment results when actual instrumentalities are considered to have the great­er moral acceptability. Also reflecting this usage, operationalizations (to be illustrated in subsequent descriptions of experiments) have consisted of state­ments made by experimenters that justify to varying degrees the procedures they have used.

Statement of Theoretical Propositions. Justification was not manipulated in the Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, and Martin ( 1983) experiment described above, but speculation that it played a role is consistent with the results from additional measures. One measure asked each subject about the presumed conse­quences of the procedure for a particular group of other subjects, namely those who had been assigned to the tasks differently and whose chances for earning the prize were therefore determined by performance on the task that did not count for the subject himself or herself. High-referent subjects indicated that those chances were good, whereas low-referent subjects indicated they were poor. On another measure, which asked for an overall evaluation of the two tasks, low-referent subjects indicated that the two were approximately equal in difficulty, but high­referent subjects perceived their nonincentive task as being easier. The results from these measures thus suggest that high-referent subjects thought others had been given a break ; low-referent subjects, on the other hand, did not perceive that the differential assignment had produced particular advantages or disadvan­tages for anyone.

If this interpretation is correct, differences in justification were probably <:onfounded with referent outcome levels. Consider the high-referent case. The tasks were perceived as being of unequal difficulty, yet no justification had been given for assigning some subjects to the easier task ; in other words, there was low justification for the existing arrangements. By contrast, low-referent subjects would perceive no special need for statements to justify the random assignment to tasks of equal difficulty, so these arrangements were probably considered high in justification .

These speculations suggest that the combination of high referent outcomes 1111(1 low justification for actual instrumentalities produces maximal resentment. lrHkcd. the addition of justification to the RCT model helps to differentiate 11·~ ·ntment as a conseq uence of RD from mere dissatisfaction. The simulated I'X Istcn<:c of a high referent outcome es tablishes a basis for dissatisfaction. A low l1l..l"iihood of inlpi"OVCIIICnl makes that dissatisfaction lllOrC profound and hence II lOll" 1-.<:clll y ldt . But it is a low tk:grce or justification for existing instrumen-

1111 1()1(.111

i :dilll' \ !hal llan:-.latl·:-. this kind or diss:~ti:-.laction into indignation about :1 wrong . ins1dt . or injury (cl'. Crosby ' s, 1976. n:fen:nn; to the definition of resentment) .

Til· rel:~tionship among the clements of the model can also be slated another way. lli gh rcl"cn.:nt outcomes set up the polelllial for resentment. but any tcndcn­eics toward its expression can be neutralized , or at least blunted, in either of two ways: (a) by high likelihood , such that resentment about temporary setbacks is held in check because more desirable outcomes are about to be obtained anyway; or (b) by high justification, such that the person receiving unsatisfying outcomes has no socially acceptable grounds for complaint because they were derived at the hands of a fair system. A summary statement of RCT predictions is that the experimental condition apt to maximize resentment is the high-referent , low­likelihood, low-justification cell of a factorial design .

An Illustrative Experiment. Folger, Rosenfield , and Robinson ( 1983) tested these predictions , holding likelihood constant at the low level previously estab­lished as necessary for resentment. Female subjects in this experiment partici­pated in pairs, and each thought she was competing against the other for a desirable reward that only one of the pair could win . A scoring rule for determin­ing the winner was announced prior to the competition. After the competition was over, however, a change in the scoring rule was announced.This announce­ment varied in ways that manipulated referent outcomes and justifications orthogonally. Because all subjects were led to believe that they had lost on the basis of the new rule, and because there would be no further competition, the likelihood of amelioration was low (nonexistent) for all subjects.

Referent outcomes were manipulated by informing subjects what the result of the competition would have been if the old scoring rule had remained in effect. High-referent subjects thought they would have won if no change had been made , whereas low-referent subjects thought they would have lost in either case. Cross-cutting this manipulation, varying degrees of justification were provided regarding the basis for the change in scoring procedure. Low-justification sub­jects heard an insufficient explanation; the decision was made to appear arbi­trary, such that there was no good reason why the competition should not have been scored as originally stipulated. High-justification subjects heard a well­grounded explanation for the change, however, such that the original procedure was described as less fair than the newly implemented one.

The results (see Table 3.2) were as predicted. On questionnaire measures of anger and resentment , a referent X Justification interaction was obtained. The scores of low- and high-Referent subjects in the high-justification conditions did not differ significantly from one another, with minimal anger and resentment being expressed in both cases. In the low-justification condition, anger and resentment were likewise minimal for low-referent subjects but were signifi­cantly increased among high-referent subjects . Interestingly, although the same general pattern was true for responses to a measure of simple dissatisfaction,

:J f\ Ill II HI N I CO<I NIIION ' II II OilY 01 f11 If\ IIVL DI:PRIVA liON 45

TI\OLE ).2 Mc.) ll Dl~conLcnl us a Function o f Ju st ifications

and Referent Oul comes

Referent Outcomes

Low

High

Justifications

Low

3.1

9.2

High

4.6

4.1

Note. Higher numbers indicate greater discontent (com­posite of "angry" and "resentful"}. Reprinted from Folger, Rosenfi e ld, and Robinson, 1983.

these results were weaker (i.e . , the Referent X Justification interaction was not significant). This finding emphasizes that resentment should be differentiated from other forms of discontent.

FURTHER IMPLICATIONS OF THE MODEL

Sources of Referent Cognitions

In the incentive-task and competition paradigms described above, subjects aware of high referent outcomes (those they would have received, had circumstances been different) were also aware that other subjects had actually received those outcomes. That is, the type of referent cognition was one involving possibilities for social comparison. Indeed, social comparison is one potential source of referent cognitions. When a person sees someone else who has better outcomes, the process of considering that comparison often makes it easier to imagine how those outcomes might have been obtained. The person making the comparison need only contemplate how the other's instrumentalities might have been his or her own. Particularly when the other is similar (Festinger, 1954), information about that other person's circumstances can make plausible referent instrumen­talities come to mind readily and be subject to active cognitive rehearsal.

The RCT framework, however, does not stipulate that social comparison is necessary for resentment. (Indeed, the sequence may sometimes run in the re­verse order: because a person has first imagined a particular set of referent instrumentalities, he or she may then seek evidence that confirms their simulated consequences, looking for instances of other people who have experienced those instrumentalities .) Rather, resentment can result from referent cognitions that have sources other than, and even completely independent of, social comparison. Given the historically close association between relative deprivation and social comparison (witness the title of this volume), it is important to note that there are empirical grounds for such an assertion.

Support for this proposition can be found in ancillary data reported by Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, and Martin ( 1983). These data were collected to concep-

IIG tOt<.tll

tuall y rl·plil·atc tlrt: l'l'f·ct of re fen.: nt outcornt:s under low-likelihood conditions , in :1 rnannt:r that t:xcluded the possibility of an invidious soc ial comparison to other subjects . !\ modifi cation of the incentive-task paradigm was used . In thi s case , however , the nonincentive task was said to have been once considered by the experimenter (before making final dec isions about the way the experiment would be designed) as the task that would count toward earning the prize. The referent manipulation thus consisted of information about what would have hap­pened if the experimenter had made a different decision. The replication was successful, with high-referent subjects again expressing significantly greater re­sentment than low-referent subjects.

Further ancillary data (Folger, Rosenfield, Rheaume, & Martin , 1983) indi­cate that previously held expectations, even when similarly isolated from any influence of social comparison, represent another source of referent cognitions. A situation was created in which a subject during an experiment learned about an opportunity to finish the session by participating briefly in a second experiment (the second experimenter's subject had allegedly not shown up). The first experi­menter, in describing the opportunity to the subject, indicated agreement with this arrangement and gave details about a special reward the second experimenter had offered in order to enlist the subject's participation. Half of the subjects, however, also learned that there was an eligibility requirement for participating in the second experiment; this requirement was such that the chances of being eligible were only 6% (low initial expectations). The other half of the subjects did not think there was any eligibility requirement and hence felt guaranteed of being able to participate (high initial expectations).

These expectations were subsequently the source of referent outcomes when subjects learned that the first experimenter had revoked the agreement. At that point, low previous-expectations subjects had a low referent outcome- because they had never had much of a chance to receive the reward in the first place (i.e., their most salient simulation of what would have happened, had the promise been kept, indicated a low outcome). The referent outcome was high for high pre­vious-expectations subjects, whose s imulation of the relevant alternative circum­stances (i.e., what would have happened if the agreement had not been re­scinded) indicated a high outcome. Thus subjects with high previous expecta­tions had greater reason than subjects with low previous expectations to be upset about the first experimenter's actions. The results were consistent with this prediction that previously held expectancies would be a source of referent out­comes: the reactions of high-ex pectancy subjects were significantly more nega­tive than those of low-expectancy subjects.

Procedural Justice and Fraternal Relative Deprivation

To the extent that RCT provides a broad conceptual framework, it should address a wide range of issues in the RD and justice literatures . The presentation thus far, however , has been limited in scope. Two major omissions are (a) consideration

:1 A Ill II Ill N I U)<,NIIIONS II II OilY 01 Ill I A I lVI l)II'RIVATION 47

oltJrot ·t·dllmljll.\/i('(' (Thihaut & Walkt:r. llJ75). and (h) consideration ofji·afer­nal RD (Runcintan. llJ66) . RCT applies most directly to egoistic RD. That is , the model 's prt:dictions and the empirical findings pertain explicitly to resent­nt<.:nt about one's own current outcomes, rather than to feelings expressed about the outcomes obtained by one ' s reference or membership group (the fraternal case) . Similarly, the focus on outcome comparisons-actual versus referent­implies a distributive concern rather than a procedural one.

A way to broaden the RCT perspective is to consider the nature of instrumen­talities in greater detail. Instrumentalities encompass the manifold of events and circumstances leading up to outcomes. They are, therefore, not limited to pro­cedures- but the procedural aspects of instrumentalities are apt to loom large in any assessment of justice . A more detailed consideration of instrumentality com­parisons thus has potential implications for procedural justice that have not yet been thoroughly addressed.

Recall that in addition to a low likelihood of amelioration, RCT stipulates two conditions necessary for resentment: (a) awareness of a high referent outcome, and (b) the perception that actual instrumentalities (e.g., implemented pro­cedures) are unjustified . When the first condition is met but the second is not, dissatisfaction should occur without resentment. What happens when the second condition is met but not the first-say, for example, when a procedural im­propriety has been committed without any adverse (i .e ., below referent level) consequences for one's own outcomes? On the one hand, there might be little resentment because those outcomes were unaffected . On the other hand, the procedural impropriety alone might be considered grounds for resentment if the person had some reason to ponder the implications of that impropriety's occur­rence. Stated differently , the task is to identify reasons why a person might express resentment about a procedural injustice in the absence of a current distributive injustice vis-a-vis that person.

Some such reasons can be identified based on previous findings in the justice literature . In particular, results of work by Tyler and his colleagues (e.g. , Tyler, 1984a, 1984b; Tyler & Caine, 1981; Tyler, Rasinski, & Spodick, 1985; see also Folger & Greenberg, 1985; Greenberg & Folger, 1983) suggest that procedural considerations are apt to be of overriding importance when people make global evaluations of some social system (e.g., the courts, a classroom) or its leaders Uudges, teachers). Presumably, global evaluations of systems and their agents­an indication of the respondent's willingness to endorse the status quo- take into account considerations that extend beyond the impact of those systems on the respondent's own current welfare. One reason these evaluations are so heavily influenced by procedural concerns might be, for example, that the procedures endemic to ~ system or commonly practiced by its leaders have long-term im­plications (e.g . , although one's own current outcomes have not yet been adverse­ly affected, the continued use of unjust procedures would jeopardize those out­comes over a longer period of time). A second reason is that any unfairness or impropriety in the procedures associated with systems and their leaders (e.g.,

tlB IOI( ~ IIl

di sc lilllillai<uy codt:s , arbitrary tkcision 111aking practict:s) has pott:ntially ncga tiv · i111plications for ollicrs' outcomes (both now and in tht: future) even if one 's own current outcomes have not yet suffered .

To tht: extent that a person identifies with and /or cares about those other people , therefore, the person should be reluctant to endorse the system and its agents. In other words, even if not egoistically deprived, the person might express resentment out of a sense of fraternal RD. Although procedures that differ in justifiability might thus produce different amounts of resentment (e .g ., an experimental manipulation of procedural justification might produce a main effect on resentment measures), the resentment being expressed would still re­flect a consideration of outcomes and their distribution. In this case, however, the resentment would reflect a concern about others' outcomes rather than one 's own.

Statement of Theoretical Propositions. This expanded treatment of RCT can be summarized in terms of predictions about two types of situations. First consid­er situations in which the focus of attention is on one's own current outcomes . Here RCT predicts that referent outcome levels (a distributive element) and the justifications provided for actual instrumentalities (a procedural element) interact in their impact on resentment. In high-justification conditions, resentment will be minimal regardless of referent outcome levels. In low-justification conditions, resentment will be maximal given the awareness of a high referent outcome, whereas there should be a significantly reduced amount of resentment given the salience of a low referent outcome (cf. Folger, Rosenfield, & Robinson, 1983).

In the second type of situation, attention is focused on implications for the outcomes to be received by other people. Here the RCT prediction regarding resentment is that it will be affected solely by variations in the justifiability of actual instrumentalities. That is, there should be a "procedural justice" main effect, such that greater resentment is expressed under low justification condi­tions than under high justification conditions .

Note that the absence of a Referent X Justification interaction in these latter situations would be due to a substantial amount of resentment expressed in the low-justification/ low-referent condition, relative to the (reduced) amount of re­sentment expressed in the corresponding condition in the former situations . These conditions correspond to one another, however, only in the sense that one's own referent outcomes are low in both cases . Recall that in the second type of situation , these referent outcomes are assumed to be disregarded, because the focus of attention is on the outcomes to be received by other people.

Assuming that someone is motivated to respond out of an interest in others ' welfare, how does the person know what level of outcomes these other people will receive (i.e., when the person knows from direct experience only his or her own outcome)? The answer is that the person can contemplate what would happen to other people if they were also affected by instrumentalities like those

:l 1\ HI II HI N I L ()(,NIII ON ' !Ill OilY 01 HI 1/\ I lVI OLPRIV/\ liON 49

lhl' pl'l son h;~ ~ cx pct icnccd (c .g .. it thcsc othcr p·oplc 's outcomes were con­ltolkd hy lhc san1c authorit y fi gure). Suppose , for example, that Professor Mary lotll':-. is concerned about the welfare of female members in another department. Shl' has had a manuscript reviewed by a journal editor, Professor John Smith, who is currently affiliated with another university but is being considered for the position of chairperson in the department where Jones's female colleagues are located. Jones 's manuscript was rejected. In the rejection letter, Smith's remarks tndicated that he is prejudiced against women, and so Jones imagines what might have happened if a different editor had been in charge. She decides that the lll<.~nuscript has theoretical and methodological problems sufficiently valid for rejection , so her own referent outcome is low . She should not be as resentful, thcrefore , as she would have been if she thought the decision could easily have been different under another editor (the high referent-outcome case) .

In evaluating Smith for the position of chairperson, however, Jones is likely to disregard this personal referent outcome. Instead, she might well consider the potential impact on female members of the department- thinking about what would happen if Smith were hired rather than someone who is not prejudiced against women . A negative evaluation by Jones would represent a response to the low-justification instrumentalities (Smith's prejudice) she had experienced. At the same time, however, this evaluation also reflects a high referent outcome vis­<i-vis the female members of the department searching for a new chairperson. That is, Jones believes that their outcomes would be better if someone else were hired instead.

These arguments suggest that there is a basis for substantial resentment even under low-justification / /ow-referent conditions , provided that the person whose resentment is measured identifies with others and considers their welfare. It must be emphasized that the term "low referent" in this case refers only to the person's own outcomes. When other people's outcomes are of primary concern, however, the effect on resentment will be as if high referent outcomes were involved (viz., the outcomes potentially attainable by other people) . Note the implication that fraternal RD (the basis for the resentment in this case) need not involve a comparison of outcomes obtained by one's own group relative to some other group. Just as egoistic RD need not involve social comparison but can instead be generated by a hypothetical reconstruction of events (see the prior section on sources of referent cognitions) , so also fraternal RD can be created by considering the outcomes one's own group might obtain under some alternatively imaginable circumstances .

An Illustrative Experiment . Folger and Martin (1984) examined these issues using a modification of the paradigm that simulates referent outcomes in terms of previously held expectations . The original version of this paradigm did not include a manipulation of justification. In the experiment to be described, this factor was manipulated along with referent outcomes to provide a conceptual

~!0 I 01 t,f It

II'Jlli l'nt 1011 ol til~: Rt:kr~.:nt X .Just i l1 cat 1011 intl.'ract ion ohtaint:d by h>lg~.:r , Rosen l'icld , and Robinson ( i!)HJ). This intaaction indicates that egoistic RO (resent lllcnt regarding one 's own outcomes) is allected by the combined impact o l' a procedural factor (the degree or justification provided for an experimenter's decision) and a distributive factor (the level of referent outcomes). In contrast, the arguments presented above suggest that if a collective context is made sali­ent, the procedural factor might produce a main effect that is independent of an individual's own relative level of outcomes.

Different instructions were given at the start of the experiment to create the individualistic-versus-collective orientations that would reveal these two separate patterns of effects (i .e., a Referent X Justification effect in the individualistic context, and a justification main effect in the collective context). All of the subjects (students taking Introductory Psychology) had learned that every experi­ment would be concluded with a questionnaire assessing their reactions to it. In addition, half of the subjects (those in the collective conditions) were informed at the outset of the experimental session that the questionnaire responses from thi s particular experiment would help determine whether the experimenter was hired as a research assistant in charge of conducting future studies for the Department of Psychology. The other half (individualistic orientation) were given no such instructions. Every subject learned during the course of the experiment that there would be an opportunity for a bonus reward, but some subjects thought a strin­gent requirement would probably make them ineligible for this opportunity , whereas others thought they were assured of having this opportunity. The experi­menter subsequently eliminated the opportunity, thereby creating a low referent outcome for the former subjects and a high referent outcome for the latter. Some subjects received a note stating that the bonus had been eliminated due to an equipment malfunction (high justification) , whereas others received a note sim­ply stating that the experimenter had decided not to allow the bonus after all (low justification). The concluding questionnaire, completed anonymously by the subjects after these manipulations , asked subjects to indicate their mood. Angry and resentful were among the mood adjectives included; a composite index , formed by summing the responses to these two scales, was the dependent mea­sure of interest.

Recall that the individualistic-orientation subjects thought such measures were being collected to gather data on students' reactions to psychology experi­ments in general. Their responses replicated the Referent x Justification interac­tion that had been found previously (i.e., a significantly greater amount of anger/ resentment being expressed by high-referent , low-justification subjects than by any others) . These subjects have been termed individualistic only be­cause their initial instructions differed from the special instructions given in the collective condition, not because their instructions specifically induced them to focus any more attention on their own individual outcomes than they would

f\HIIIHINI CO(,NIIION!, IIIIOilY OIIlllf\IIVI l)IPHIVA110N 51

11ll111\ 1 ~ 1 · h:1Vl' d1Hl '. lud ·cd . the lonm:r wen: onliu:n y instructions (e .g . , using a 1111111111d UHI\l' lll tonn) siu1ilar to tho~c used in other previous RCT cxperi-

1111 111 ~ I'XJ>L' I iut ·uts dc~igncd to measure reactions to egoistic RD . Ill 1111111 a~t . th · special instructions g iven at the outset of the experiment to

1 11lk1 II Vl' 01 icntat ion subjects placed them in a unique role: since their question-1111111 ' ~~ · ~por1ses would help determine whether the experimenter got the as-1 11111\hip, their responses had implications for the future welfare of other sub­

It 1 I\ (which would be in the hands of this particular experimenter, if the job were 11 ltwardcd). This unique role, in other words, assigned special importance to a

11111\ld ·ration of the procedures the experimenter followed. These procedures Wl ' ll ' unexceptional in the case of the high-justification conditions, which in­volwd cancellation of the bonus opportunity for an understandably good reason (l'qutptnent failure) . The low-justification cancellation of the bonus opportunity, 1111 th · other hand , created an image of the experimenter as someone whose IIJll' rating procedures included arbitrary decisions and plans changed on a whim. hK· ·d with the prospect of placing such a person in charge of the fate of others, uhjccts might reasonably attach greater significance to this procedural im­

pwpriety than to whatever consequences it had had for their own individual well­lwlllg (i .c., their referent outcomes). Results from the collective condition were 1 onsistent with this interpretation. Only a main effect of procedural justification was obtained, such that low-justification subjects expressed greater anger and ll'S ·ntment (regardless of the level of their own referent outcomes) than did high­IllS! i fication subjects. These responses can be said to represent fraternal RD in the sense that the subjects ' own individual level of outcomes had no impact, whereas the implied consequences for others' outcomes did have an impact.

DIRECTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH

i\ lthough the preceding discussion has emphasized specific hypotheses and their ·onfirmation, RCT can also be considered as a very general framework. That is, the core constructs it employs- justifications, the likelihood of amelioration, and referent outcomes-represent three broad categories of influences on RD . Within each category there is room for further elaboration ; indeed , such elabora­tion might well amount to separate "mini" theories for each of the constructs.

For example, refinement of the justifications construct could benefit from consideration of emerging conceptual frameworks for procedural justice (e.g., Brett, 1983; Leventhal, 1980; Sheppard , 1984; Thibaut & Walker, 1978). This factor is also amenable to approaches that emphasize the negotiated character of social accounts (e.g., Schlenker, 1982; Scott & Lyman, 1968; Tedeschi & Reiss, 1981 ), such as the rhetorical strategies used by one person to convince another that the former's actions were legitimate (see Bies, 1984 ). Refinement of

llll· likl'lillood con~llUCt should lal,.e inlo a -counl such possihiliti ·s as curvilinear clfc<:ls when levels in addilion lo lhe lwo exlremes (low and high) arc included (cf. Mark, 1985) . Another possibility is thai the source of future amelioration (e.g., anticipated restitution by an initial harmdoer vs. anticipated improvement based on one's own efforts, despite continuing opposition from the initial harmdoer) will prove to be equally as important as its estimated likelihood .

Finally, additional conceptual elaboration and empirical work should be di­rected toward specifying factors that influence the salience of referent outcomes. This task is easily the most challenging of all; it is analogous in difficulty to conceptualizing determinants of the choice and salience of social comparison. What makes some outcomes so psychologically "close," to use Kahneman and Tversky's (1982) distance metaphor, even when they are only hypothetical and imaginary reconstructions of a past that cannot be changed? Fortunately, Kahn­eman and Tversky have already made a promising start toward answering that question, and future research should build on that foundation.

CONCLUSION

A model of RD based on referent cognitions has been presented. Elsewhere this RCT framework has been contrasted with Crosby's ( 1976) statement regarding the preconditions of RD (Folger, in press-b), with Adams' (1965) model of inequity (Folger, in press-c), and with Thibaut and Kelley's (1959) concept of comparison levels (Folger, in press-a). The priority in this presentation has been to specify the conditions under which RD is associated with the expression of resentment. An additional treatment of RCT has also elaborated this framework in conjunction with a typology of RD responses other than resentment (Mark & Folger, 1984). Additional research on these emotional responses might indeed provide some of the irrigation to social cognition that Fiske and Taylor ( 1984) saw as urgently needed . Furthermore, clarification of RD promises to reinvigo­rate a construct that has long remained dormant in its own development even while it has been the impetus to numerous related theories influential in social psychology.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

The author wishes to thank the following people for their assistance in conducting the research reported in this chapter: Steve Baxter, Betty Breckinridge, Arvinia Chatab, Chris Martin , Karen Rheaume, and Thomas Robinson. Discussions with Russell Crapanzano , Melvin M. Mark , and David Rosenfield were also very beneficial. James M. Olson provided many helpful comments on an earlier version of this manuscript.

.I 1\ IU IIIU N I COCoNIIIUN~, II II 011Y 01 111 1/\ I lVI 1)1 l'lliV/\ II N ~3

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