A Report on the Patrol Special Police and Community Safety in San Francisco

EDWARD STRINGHAM, Ph.D.Research Fellow, The Independent Institute,

Associate Professor, Department of Economics, San Jose State Universityand

Shelby Cullom Davis Visiting Associate Professor of American Business and Economic Enterprise, Trinity College

Independent Institute Working Paper Number 74

December 21, 2009

100 Swan Way, Oakland, CA 94621-1428 • 510-632-1366 • Fax: 510-568-6040 • Email: info@independent.org • http://www.independent.org

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Private Policing in San Francisco

Abstract:ThispaperprovidesananalysisofoneofthelongestestablishedprivatepolicegroupsinAmerica,theSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP).DatingbacktothedaysoftheGoldRush,thePSPareacollectionofindependentcompaniesthatthecitycharterauthorizestopatroldifferentneighborhoodsattherequestofprivateclients.AsurveywasconductedtoinvestigatewhyprivatepartiespaythePSPratherthansimplyrelyingongovernmentpolice.TheresultsindicatethatthePSPplayanimportantroleinprovidingsafetythatcitizenscannotobtainiftheyrelysolelyontheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment’ssafetyservices.However,despitetheseevidentbenefits,thePSPfacesomechallengingpoliticalandregulatoryobstacles.ThisarticlefindsevidencethatmembersoftheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)havebeenusingregulationstorestrictcompetitionandeffectivelytakeoverbusinessusingtheforceoflaw.Thisreportdocumentssomeoftheexpensesthesepracticescosttaxpayersandofferssomesuggestionsforregulatoryreform.Ifit’snotacorefunction,perhapsweshouldnolongerdoit.—KenBukowski,chieffinancialofficer,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment1Mypersonalopinionisthereisaplaceforthem[thePatrolSpecialPolice]inSanFranciscopolicing....They’reanassetthat’sessentiallycost‐freefortheCity.—TheresaSparks,formerpresident,SanFranciscoPoliceCommission2Letusbringbackaveryeffectivetool[thePatrolSpecialPolice]tomakethestreetsofSanFranciscosafer.—EarlSanders,formerpolicechief,SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment3TableofContents

1. Introduction 2

2. SurveyingtheRoleoftheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice 7

3. RegulationstoPromoteSafetyorRestrictCompetition 12

4. EstimatingSomeoftheCostsofRegulationandMonopolization 19

5. ConclusionandRecommendations 24

Appendix.SurveyResponses 27

1RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/S.F.P.D.‐struggling‐to‐make‐budget‐cuts38585652.html.2RetrievedSeptember1,2009fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Extra_force_may_be_on_its_way_out.html.3RetrievedSeptember1,2009fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1997/05/15/MN73142.DTL#ixzz0POif0y9S.

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1. Introduction

SanFrancisco,likemostotherCaliforniacities,isfacinglargebudgetdeficits,andquestionsexist

astowhethercontinuing(andincreasing)policedepartmentbudgetlevelscomparedtopreviousyears

isactuallysustainableinthelongrun.4Budgetcutshaveyettobemade,butsomepeopleworrythat

possiblefuturelayoffsorattritionmayincludeupto325officersintheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment

(SFPD),leadingmanytoaskwhowillkeepSanFranciscosafe.5Althoughmanypeoplebelievethatsafety

issolelythedomainofagovernment‐fundedpoliceforce,thefamousurbantheoristJaneJacobsand

manyothershavepointedoutthatcommunitysafetyisprovidedbynumerousfactors.Jacobs

highlightedthathavingmany“eyesonthestreet”(multiplepeopleobservingtheactivitiesina

community)canhaveamoreimportantimpactonsafetythanattemptingtojustrelyonone

government‐fundedagency.Asafactualmatter,policingcomesfrommanysources,notjustfrom

government‐fundedpolice.FromthewidespreadprivatefootpatrolwatchesinearlymodernEnglandto

theincreasinglycommonself‐helpneighborhoodgroupsinmanycommunitiestoday,various

nongovernmentalorganizationsandprivatepolicegroupshaveplayedandareplayinganincreasingly

importantroleinprovidingsafety.6

Thispaperprovidesananalysisofoneofthelongestestablishedprivatepolicegroupsin

America,theSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP).ThePSPareacollectionofindependent

companiesthatthecitycharterauthorizestopatroldifferentneighborhoodsor“beats”inSanFrancisco

attherequestofprivateclients.ThePSPdatebacktothedaysoftheGoldRushandwereincorporated

4AJanuary2009KCBSheadlinereported,“S.F.P.D.[SanFranciscoPoliceDepartment]ForcedtoTakeaHacksawtoItsBudget,”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.kcbs.com/pages/3751731.php?.AJune2009SanFranciscoExaminerheadlinereported,“Citybudgetcutsposerisktopublicsafety.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/City‐budget‐cuts‐pose‐risk‐to‐public‐safety‐‐47888112.html.5RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/City‐budget‐cuts‐pose‐risk‐to‐public‐safety‐‐47888112.htmlandhttp://blogs.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2009/06/heads_of_fire_police_departmen.php.6Jenkins,Morris.2006.GullahIslandDisputeResolution:AnExampleofAfrocentricRestorativeJustice.JournalofBlackStudies,37(2):299–319.ForaliteraturereviewofthesetrendsseeBenson,Bruce(1998)ToServeandProtect:PrivatizationandCommunityinCriminalJustice.NewYork:NewYorkUniversityPress.

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intheSanFranciscoCityCharterin1856.7TodaythePSPhavehundredsofaccounts,includingsmallto

largebusinesses,merchantandresidentialassociations,churches,streetfairorspecialeventorganizers,

residentialcommunities,andindividualhomeowners.ThePSPprovideawidevarietyofsecurityservices

andactivities,includingpatrollingstreets;standingguardatorpatrollingnearprivatepropertysuchas

businessesandhomes;providingsecuritychecksinsideandoutsideshopsandoffices;speakingwith

residents,businessownersandtheiremployeesandpatrons,andpassersbyonthestreetsandadvising

aboutsafety;discouragingloiteringandvagrancy;interveningintopotentiallydisruptivesituations;

respondingtocomplaintsofshopliftingandnoise;andgenerallymaintainingorderandpeaceonthe

streets.ItistobenotedthatthePSParenotjuststationarypropertyguardsatonelocation;by

municipalcodetheyaretheonlyprivatepatrolpermittedtopatrolthestreetsastheywalkfrom

accounttoaccountaswellasrespondtosafetyemergenciesintheirneighborhood.Inadditionitisto

benotedthatwhetherornotaprivateclientisinvolved,sometimesPSPofficersaffirmativelyassist

anyoneinneed,andtheycanbecalledupontobackupthepublicpoliceandassistwithcrimescene

control.Thustheyprovideapolicepresencetomanymoreindividualsthanjusttheirclients.ManyPSP

officershaveworkedcontinuously,servingaspecificclientorservingintheirneighborhood,foryears,

thusmakingthemaknowncommodityinthecommunity.

TheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolicepresentaninterestingcasetostudybecauseelementsof

theirstructureandnatureofservicerenderthemuniqueintheUnitedStates,includingtheparticular

effectivenessoftheirmodelofdeliveringpolicingservices.ProfessorJamesPastorwritesthatthePSP

have“whatmaybethemostuniqueprivatepolicingarrangementinAmerica.”8However,manypeople

areunawareofhowthePSParefundedandhowmanyandwhomtheyserve.Ineconomicterms,the

7Theprecisedateoftheirformationisuncertainbut“SpecialPolice”arementionedinTheDailyAltaCaliforniaonApril1,1851.IowethispointtoHeatherCassel,whoiswritingahistoryofthePatrolSpecialPolice.8Pastor,James.2009.TerrorismandPublicSafetyPolicing:ImplicationsfortheObamaPresidency.CRCPress,p251.[[AU:Pleaseprovidepublisher’slocation.]]

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PSPprovideaservicethatwouldbeclassifiedasapublicgood.Theirservices,whichprivateclientspay

for,providespilloverbenefitstoanyonewhodesirestokeepSanFranciscosafe.Inthisway,private

clientswhosemaininterestmaybeimprovingtheirpersonalorbusinesssafetyareintentionallyor

inadvertentlyprovidingbenefitstotheirentireblockorneighborhood.Anotherimportantand

interestingfeatureofthePSPisthattheydonotdrainmunicipalbudgets,butarefundedbyprivate

clientswhowanttokeeptheirneighborhoods,placesofbusiness,andpropertiessafe.PSPservicesare

consumerdefinedandconsumerdriven,andofficersprovideservicestothosewhomtheSanFrancisco

PoliceDepartment(SFPD)doesnotalwayshavethetimeorresourcestoserve.ThePSPbecome

profitableandremaininbusinesssolelybyvirtueoftheirsuccessinservingandsatisfyingtheirclientsin

makingthecommunitysafer.

Yetdespitetheseevidentbenefits,thePSPfacesomechallengingpoliticalandregulatory

obstacles.Intheearly1990scertainmembersoftheSanFranciscoPoliceUnionnoticedthatthePSP

hadproductive,andhenceprofitable,contractswithmanybusinessessuchasmajorshoppingcenters,

ornot‐for‐profitgroupssuchaslargehousingprojectmanagementorganizations.Theunionconceived

ofanewmarketingfrontierthatmightbenefitmembershipandprovideanewsourceofincome.

AlthoughthelawpreventsmembersoftheSFPDfromworkingmorethantwentyhoursofvoluntary

overtimeperweek,officersfoundorinventedaworkaroundinwhatisknownasthe10(b)program.9

9SanFranciscoWeeklyreports,“Unlikeovertimeincurredduringthecourseofordinaryduty,whichispaidbytaxpayersaspartofthePoliceDepartment’s$406millionbudget,the10(b)program—bytappingbusinessesandinstitutionswillingtopayfortheextraservices—hitsthePatrolSpecialPolicewhereithurts.TheS.F.P.D.doesn’tadvertisehowmuchtheprogramrakesin.ButdocumentsthedepartmentprovidedtoSFWeeklyinresponsetoapublicrecordsrequestshowthat10(b)garnered$9.5millionduringthe2006–2007fiscalyearalone,upfrom$6.6millionfiveyearsago.

“Forrank‐and‐filecops,whoearntimeandahalfforsuchwork,theprogramcanbelucrative.Uptohalfofthe2,300‐memberpoliceforceparticipatesinthe10(b)programinagivenyear,recordsshow.Rulesrestrictofficersfromworkingmorethan20hoursofvoluntaryovertimewithinsevendays,butsomecopsstillmanagetorackuphugesums.Forexample,inasexdiscriminationlawsuitagainsttheS.F.P.D.,oneofficer,SusanRolovich,whoclaimsthedepartmentunfairlypunishedherinpartbytakingawayher10(b)work,earnedmorethan$185,000—$100,000ofitovertime—inasingleyear,recordsshow.

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SFPDofficersmayexceedovertimelimitsbyacceptingandworkingassignmentsfromthe10(b)

“overtimeprogramwhichallowstheuseofuniformedpoliceofficersassecuritypersonnelatspecial

events,sportsmatches,constructionsites,filmingsites,danceclubs,departmentstores.”10Ifthe

administeringSFPDcouldconvinceexistingPSPclientstohireSFPDofficersinsteadthroughtheir10(b)

overtimeprogram,thentheseSFPDofficerscouldboosttheirsalariesandalsothebaserateuponwhich

theirpensionswouldbecalculated.

HourlyratestheSFPDbilledunderthe10(b)programarenearlydoublethePSP’srates.Today

anoff‐dutySFPDofficerbillsroughly$87perhour,withanupcharge(extrafee)ifamotorcycleorpatrol

carisrequested,andontopofthata22percentadministrativefeeisinvoiced.Thebaseratetherefore

approaches$106perhour,whileaPSPofficer,includinghisorherpatrolcar,canbehiredforroughly

$48perhour.AlthoughhiringanSFPDofficerthrough10(b)istypicallyuneconomicalforthosepaying

thebillswhencomparedtothePSPrate,itprovidestremendousbenefitstotheofficersbeinghired,so

membersoftheSFPDhaveusedvariousmeanstomakesurethattheygethired.Thesetacticshaveled

tovariouslawsuitsallegingthattheSFPDisviolatingantitrustlawsforactingmonopolistically.For

example,thepolicecommissionerhasdelegatedbroadandvirtuallyuncircumscribedauthoritytothe

SFPDtoadministerthePSPprogram,includingscreeningapplicants.Withoutanytimelimitssetbyrule

orregulation,theSFPDhasexercisedthisauthoritytodelayformonthsoryearsonend,orinsome

casesevenlose,applications.TheSFPDhasalsocrosssubsidizedthe10(b)programwithgeneralfunds

sothatSFPDofficerscanofferratesthatappeartobecompetitivewiththosechargedbythePSP.Not

onlymustthehourlyratebecomparedtodeterminecost,butalsotheeffectivenessofthe10(b)officer

workingafteralreadyputtinginanine‐to‐fiveregularpolicingassignment,versusaPSPofficerwho

‘The10(b)programhaskilledus,’saysSamReyes,whohasbeenapatrolspecialbeatownersincethe1960s.HeinsiststhattheS.F.P.D.’santipathytowardthespecialsisowingto‘the10(b)pie.’”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.Seealsohttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/3.10RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3731.

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neverworksovertime,butalwaysservesfreshonregularassignment.Theseandotherallegationswill

bediscussedinmoredetaillater,butonefactthatremainsindisputableisthatsincethenumberand

extentofregulationsgoverningthePSPstartedincreasinginthe1990s,thenumberofPSPofficershas

decreasedfrommorethan200toabout40orsotoday.11

Severalpotentialhypothesesexistaboutwhyincreasednumbersofregulationsarebeing

promulgatedtorestrictthePSPconcerninganincreasedrangeofbehaviorsortopics.Onehypothesisis

thatmembersoftheSFPDareactinginitscapacitytomaximizethepublicgood.Asecondhypothesisis

thatmembersoftheSFPDhavebeenusingregulationstorestrictcompetitionandeffectivelytakeover

businessusingtheforceoflaw.Ifthissecondhypothesisistrue,thenregulationsareactuallyharming

residentsandmakingSanFranciscolesssafe.

Toevaluatethesetwohypotheses,anin‐depthinvestigationwasconductedexaminingevidence

fromvarioussources.Evidencewasgatheredfromgovernmentdocuments,lawjournals,newsmedia,

andpolicecommissionmeetings.TolearnmoreabouttheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice,I

conductedasurveyoftheirclientstogatherdataabouthowtheyareperceived.Theresultsarequite

informative.

EvidenceindicatesthatthePSPplayanimportantroleinprovidingsafetythatcitizenscannot

obtainiftheyhavetorelyonthesafetyservicesoftheSFPD.Thisreportprovidesananalysisofthe

PSP’sroleinprovidingcommunitysafetyinSanFrancisco.Itthenprovidesananalysisofsomeofthe

regulatoryobstaclesthattheyfaceandconcludesbyofferingspecificpolicyrecommendations.

11RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐03‐05/news/san‐francisco‐patrol‐special‐police‐rent‐a‐cops‐with‐guns/.

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2. SurveyingtheRoleoftheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice

TheaveragepersonmaynothavemuchspecificknowledgeabouttheSanFranciscoPatrol

SpecialPolice(PSP),iftheyevenknowabouttheexistenceofthispoliceforceatall.However,anyone

whohasgonetoornearhundredsofindividualbusinessesandmerchantassociations,not‐for‐profit

andhomeowners’organizations,orindividualresidentswhohirethePSPhashadanindirect

relationshipwiththeseofficers.TohelpcollectbaselineclientopinionsaboutthePSP,aprintedsurvey

wasdelivered,primarilybyhand,toatotalof146clients.12Theclientswereaskedtocompletethe

anonymoustwo‐pagesurveyandmailitbackintheincludedstampedaddressedenvelope.The

responseratewasverygood,withsixty‐threesurveys(43percent)completed,givingalargeenough

samplesizetoanalyzeandfromwhichtodrawreasonableconclusions.Thesurveyincludedsome

questionsthataskedrespondentstocheckboxes(suchaswith“Yes”or“No”questions)andother

questionsthataskedrespondentstowritereplies.Thequestionsweredesignedtobenon‐leadingand

toenablecomparisonofthePSP’sperformancewiththatofthepublicpolice.Thecompletesurveyis

includedinAppendixA,andasummaryoftheresultsisprovidedinAppendixB.

AnswerstoquestionsaboutwhyclientspaytohirethePSPratherthansimplyrelyontaxpayer‐

financed“free”publicpolicewereparticularlyinformative,thusallresponsesareincludedinthe

appendix.Manyacademicstheorizethatpublicpoliceprovideallnecessaryservicesandlaw

enforcementthatareneededtoaddressproblemsofcrimeanddisorder.However,answerstothe

surveyclearlyrevealedthatthePSPfillneedsthatarenotmetbytheSFPD.ThePSPofferservicesand

protectionthatclientsstatetheycouldnotobtainotherwise.Completeresponsestosomeoftheopen‐

endedsurveyquestionsareincludedintheappendix.

12Thesurveywasgiveninprintedformandhandedoutinperson(orinsomecasesdroppedinthemail)alongwitha$2bill,whichisacommonwayofinducingahigherresponserate.SeeRizzo,Louis,InhoPark,BradfordHesse,andGordonWillis.“EffectofIncentivesonSurveyResponseandSurveyQuality:ADesignedExperimentWithintheHINTSIRDDSample.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009.fromhttp://www.allacademic.com/meta/p116055_index.html.

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Theresultscanbesummarizedas:

1. ThePSPprovideservicesthatmembersoftheSFPDdonotprovide.2. TheSFPDdoesnotrespondquicklytomanytypesofcallswhereasthePSPdoes.3. Crimeisviewedasaproblem,andthePSPareseenasaproactiveratherthanareactive

solutiontothatproblem.4. MostresponsesindicatethattheSFPDisnotresponsivetotheirneeds.

Inadditiontoopen‐endedquestions,manywere“Yes”or“No”questions,andtheanswerswerealso

quitetelling.Ninety‐sevenpercentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“DoesyourPSP[Patrol

SpecialPolice]officermakeyourneighborhoodamorefriendlyandsafeplace?”(seeFigure1).Eighty‐

ninepercentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“Doyoufeelyouropinionmakesadifference

inwhatyourPSP[PatrolSpecialPolice]officerdoes?”(seeFigure3).Thiscontrastsstarklywiththe

perceptionoftheSFPD,whereonly47percentofrespondentsanswered“Yes”whenasked,“Doyou

feelyouropinionmakesadifferenceinwhattheSFPDdoes?”(seeFigure2).Theseresponsesindicate

thatpeoplefeelthatthePSParemoreresponsivetotheirneedsthanaretheSFPD.

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Figure1.DoesyourPatrolSpecialPoliceofficermakeyourneighborhoodamorefriendlyandsafeplace?

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Figure3.DoyoufeelyouropinionmakesadifferenceinwhatyourPatrolSpecialOfficerdoes?

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Figure4.DoyouthinkthePatrolSpecialPolicewouldbeaseffectiveiftheywerewearinglightblue?

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Otherquestionsaskedaboutvariousregulations,suchas“Doyouthinktheywouldbeas

effectiveiftheywerewearinglightblue?”;77percentofrespondentsanswered“No”(seeFigure4).

Clientsperceivethisregulationaslessconcernedwithsafetyandmoreconcernedwithhandicapping

thePSP.Inansweringthisquestion,manyclientsexpressedorindicatedthatforcingPSPofficerstowear

lightbluewouldmakethemlooklessseriousandhencelesseffective.

Anotherquestionasked,“OneoftherequirementsforyourPSPofficeristhathe/sheturnover

allspecificdetailsofyourcontract,name,andfeesforservicestothepolicecommission.Doesthat

mattertoyou?”Anumberofpeopleexpressedconcernwhileonlytwosawitasagoodthing.For

example,clientsreplied:“Seemslikeaninvasionofprivacythatisn’tnecessaryformysecurityorthe

policecommission’sabilitytodotheirjob”(respondentnumber26),“Iwouldlikeanonymity”(number

34),“PersonalinformationIchoosetorelease”(number40),“MycontractiswiththePSP.The

commissionhasneverapproachedmeforopinionorhelp;Idoubtitevenknowsourproblems”

(number6),“Idonotunderstandthereasonorpurposeforit”(number23),“Becausemyfinancial

recordsarenoone’sbusiness!Iknowofnoreasontheyneedthisinfosinceanofficer’sillegalbehavior

ifanycanbeprosecutedunderexistingcriminallaws”(number19).

Inaddition,thequestionwasasked,“SomepeoplebelievethatthePSPofficersoperateasif

theyareabovethelaw.Doyouhaveanyevidenceofthat?”Forthisquestionthenearuniversalanswer

was“No.”13Onerespondent(number41)wrote,“Youarekidding,right!”Thereisnoevidenceforthe

claimreportedinthemediathattheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolicebehaveunlawfullyorare

“freewheeling.”14Inaddition,inallmyreadingofnewsarticles,Ifoundnofactualevidencebyany

13Everysinglerespondentanswered“No”tothatquestionwiththeoneexceptionofrespondent#31whohappenedtoanswer“Yes”oneverysinglequestiononthesurveyregardlessofwhatthequestionasked,indicatingtherespondentwasnotreadingthequestions.14RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,945720,00.html.

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reporteroranycitationofclientcomplaintsregardingunlawfulbehaviorbythePSP.Infact,allevidence

indicatesthatthePSPareprovidingservicestomakethecommunitysafer.

3. RegulationstoPromoteSafetyorRestrictCompetition

Manyacademicwritersbelievethatgovernmentalregulationsareonlyimplementedtoprotect

thepublic.Nobelprize‐winningeconomistGeorgeStigler,however,pointedoutthatmany

governmentalregulationsareactuallyimplementedtoadvancespecialinterestsattheexpenseofthe

public.Manyoftheseregulationsarepromotedinthenameofthepublicgood,butinrealityareused

torestrictcompetition.FamousexamplesincludethemonopolyprivilegesgiventotheformerAT&T

(theBellSystem)orcablecompaniesinthe1980s(andinmanyplacestoday)whereregulations

effectivelypreventedwould‐becompetitorsfromenteringthetelecommunicationsmarket.AT&Thada

clearvestedinterestininfluencingregulatorstopreventwould‐becompetitorssuchasMCIandSprint

fromenteringthemarketplacesinceAT&Tknewcompetitionwouldleadtolowerpricesforthepublic

andlowerprofitsforthemonopolist.

InSanFrancisco,thePatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)andtheSanFranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)

havecoexistedforthepast160years.Overtime,however,theSFPDhasgraduallyexpandedits

publicizedorintendedroleintoareashistoricallyprovidedbythePSP.TheSFPD’sroleoriginallyfocused

onlawenforcementregardingseriouscrimesagainstpropertyorperson,includingviolenceand

predationbygangsorresultingfromgangwarfare,undercoverinvestigations,criminalarrest,

subsequentinvestigation,andprosecutionassistance.Todaytheyhavemovedintowhatisknownas

“communitypolicing,”amodelofpolicingdevelopedintheearly1970sandonewhosegoalistoadopt

aserviceorientation—providedoriginallyasanintegralpartoftheverynatureofPSPservice.

AccompanyingtheSFPD’sexpandedroleandreachhasbeenanincreasingnumberofregulationson

newareasofbehaviorandrequirementsforthePSP.Onemustinvestigatewhethertheseregulations

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areconsistentwiththehypothesisthat“regulationsarealwaysbenevolent,”orwhethertheyare

consistentwiththehypothesisthatregulationscanbeusedtorestrictcompetition.

CloseinspectionofthecurrentsetofInterimRegulationsofthePatrolSpecialPolice,adoptedin

December2008,indicatesthattheSFPDareinterpretingandadministeringseveralregulationsto

restrictcompetition.LawssuchastheShermanAntitrustActof1890(15U.S.C.§§1–7)andtheClayton

Act(15U.S.C.§§12–27)preventprivatebusinessesfromusingunfairbusinesspracticestomonopolizea

market.15AlthoughtheLocalGovernmentAntitrustAct(15U.S.C.§§34–36)providesthat“local

governmentsandtheirofficialsandemployeesactinginofficialcapacitieshaveantitrustimmunitywith

respecttoactionsbroughtunder15U.S.C.§15fordamages,fees,orcosts,”notallactivitiesare

permitted.16KinsellaandRubinsexplain:

As States became increasingly involved in commercial activities during the late nineteenth century, they began to question the expediency of such an unbending doctrine of absolute immunity. . . . This gave rise to the "commercial activity" exception—so if and to the extent a state engages in “commercial activity,” it will not be entitled to sovereign immunity. The FSIA defines “commercial activity” as “either a regular course of commercial conduct or a particular commercial transaction or act.” U.S. courts have interpreted commercial activity to be any activity in which a private person could engage. The U.S. Supreme Court has held, more specifically, that commercial activity is “the type of actions by which a private party engages in ‘trade and traffic or commerce.’” [See on this Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc (US S. Ct. 1992); SEDCO, Inc. v. Petroleos Mexicanos Mexican National Oil Company, 767 F.2d 1140 (5th Cir. 1985).]17

The California Unfair Competition Law (Business and Professions Code Section 17200 et. seq.) prohibits

unfair competition not only by corporations and firms but also “by other organizations of persons” (which

would include the SFPD if they are classified as an organization or persons).18 InthecaseRusso&Reyes

v.WillisCaseyetal.,15F.3d1089(9thCir.1993),twoPSPofficers(RussoandReyes)allegedthatthe

SanFranciscopolicechief(Casey)hadconspiredtorestrictcompetition.Thecasewentallthewaytothe

U.S.SupremeCourtbutonlyonapretrialMotiontoDismiss;themeritsofthecasewerenever

15RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter2.pdf.16RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/divisionmanual/chapter2.pdf.17Rubins,Noah,andN.StephanKinsella.2005.InternationalInvestment,PoliticalRiskandDisputeResolution:APractitioner’sGuide.DobbsFerry,NewYork:OceanaPublications,pp.141,145.18RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/BPC/1/d7/2/5/s17200andhttp://codes.lp.findlaw.com/cacode/BPC/1/d7/2/5/s17201.

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reached.19The“U.S.SupremeCourt...declinedtohearit:Thesuitwas‘time‐barred,’meaningthatthe

relevanteventsinthesuittookplacetoolongagotomeritjudicialattention.”20

Duringoraboutthetimethiscasewaswendingitswaythroughthefederalcourtsystem,a

sweepingsetofregulationswasintroducedandeventuallypassedin1994.Insignificantpart,these

regulationsremovedmanyofthePSP’slong‐heldpowers,specificallytakingawaytheirpeaceofficer

powersofarrestandreducingthatpowertoacitizen’spowertoarrestonly,andremovingthePSPfrom

civilserviceemploymentstatus.Atthesametime,membersoftheSFPDbeganencouragingbusinesses

tohireoff‐dutypoliceofficers(andalsoprivatepatroloperatorcompaniesallegedlyownedbysome

SFPDfamilymembers).21IthasbeenreportedthatmembersoftheSFPDhavethreatenedbusinesses,

sayingtheirbusinesswillreceivenoprotectioniftheyhirePSPofficersratherthanoff‐dutymembersof

theSFPD.22AsrecentlyasSeptember2009,similarinformationcametolightwhenownersofseveral

entertainmentbusinesseslocatedintheCastrodistrictreportedlyfearedretaliationbycitylicensing

agenciesiftheyfailedtofollowtheleadoftheCommunityBusinessDistrict,wheretheexecutive

leadershiphadbeenpressingforadditionalsecuritytobeprovidedsolelybythe10(b)program.

ThelawcurrentlyprohibitsmembersoftheSFPDfromaccruingmorethan20hoursofovertime

perweek,23butofficerscansubvertthisprohibitionbyparticipatinginthe10(b)program.Thismakes

the10(b)assignmentsmuchsoughtaftersincethemorethatregularSFPDofficerscanworkafterhours

andoffdutyinthe10(b)program,thehighertheirtake‐homepay.Furthermore,SFPDofficers’pensions

arecalculatedbasedonthesalaryoftheirhighestyearofsalary,addingon10(b)spikestothebasefrom

19RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/1998/06/25/MN76911.DTL.20RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/4.21AccordingtoSteveRusso,“Theissueshereare[that]manyoftheseofficerswhoworkintheS.F.P.D.orareaffiliatedwiththeS.F.P.D.ownsecuritycompanies,andtheyinfacthaveassistedincampaigningwithofficersoftheFieldOperationsbureautosolicitthisparticularPoliceCommissionto,onceandforall,removethe[specials’]peace‐officerstatus,thereforerenderingourservicesworthlesstothecitizensoftheCityandCountyofSanFrancisco.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.22RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.23RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.

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whichlifelongpensionsarecalculated.Forthesereasons,anyareainthemarketplacewhereSFPD

officerscansolicitprivateclientsand“compete”withthePSPprovidesanarearipeforgreatcontention.

IfSFPDofficerscannotcompetewiththePSPonalevelplayingfield,thenitbecomesadvantageousfor

themtohandicapcompetitorsviaregulatingthePSPprogram’sadhocadministrativerulesand

practices.Regulationsandtacticsthatappeartoberestrictingcompetitioninclude:

a. TheSFPDhasauthoritytodelayandpreventthePSPfromhiringpersonnel.AlthoughthePSPareprivatebusinesseshiredaccordingtoconsumerdemand,currentregulationsenabletheSFPDtorestrictthesupply.ThePSPandthemediacontinuallybringthisproblemtotheattentionofthepolicecommissionandthepublic;however,noreliefhasbeenforthcoming.Justtobecomeapatrolspecialassistant,oneneedstocompletenumerousforms,andapplicationsareroutinelydelayedformorethanayear.24In2008theSFPDadmittedthatPoliceChiefHeatherFonghadonlyapprovedfiveofthetwenty‐sevenapplicantsinthepastthreeyears.EffectiverestrictionofcompetitionalsoarisesfromtheSFPDprogramadministratorfailingtostayontopofhowmanyapplicationsareinprocess.Inonetellingexchangebetweenthepolicecommissionpresidentandtheprogramadministratoratafall2008policecommissionmeeting,theprogramadministratorcouldonlyestimatethatsixorsevenpendingapplicationswereonhisdesk.Afterseveralmorequestionsfromthepresidentremainedunanswered,thepresidentthenstatedthatsheknewthatseventeensuchapplicationswerepending.Suchtacticsandlackoffollow‐upameliorationfromthepolicecommissionorpolicechiefobviouslydiscouragepotentialapplicantsandpreventthePSPfromstaffingtheiroperations.Inaddition,whensupplyofofficersinthemarketplaceisrestricted,thereislittlehopethatclientdemandcanbemetorthatmarketingeffortswillberewardedbecausethePSPsimplycan’tprovidethenumberofofficerstoservicedemands.ThishasbeenthecaseeveryyearatthefallCastroStreetFestivalaswellasattheCastroStreetHalloweenFestival.ThispracticeofplacinghiringapprovalinthehandsoftheSFPDwithoutanyapparentlimitsistheequivalentofgivingGeneralMotorstheauthoritytodecidewhomToyotagetstohire.

24AccordingtotheSanFranciscoWeekly,“[PatrolSpecialPoliceOfficer]Whitesayshecouldputfivemoretoworkimmediatelyifhehadthem,whichistosayifS.F.P.D.didn’tthrowupbarriers.’Youcan’tgetthemapproved,’grumblesthe65‐year‐oldWhite,tickingoffthenamesof‘quality’peoplehehassponsoredandwhoseapplicationswereeitherrejectedor—moreoften—allowedtolanguishuntilthepersonfinallygaveup.‘They[S.F.P.D.]findsomelittleproblem[intheapplication].Theydelay.Andthentheyfindsomeotherproblemanddelaysomemore.It’sapredictablecycle.’“Noneoftheapplicants,includingsomewhoserésuméshadbeeninthehopperformorethanayear,hadbeenapproved.Innearlyeveryinstance,the‘problems’Shinnidentifiedwerepaperworkdeficienciessuchasincompletebackgroundinformationoramissingpersonalhistorystatement,thekindsofthingscriticssaycouldberesolvedindaysratherthanweeksormonths.Onlyoneapplicant’s‘problemhold’relatedtoinadequatetraining,somethingthatdidn’tescapeWarner’snotice.‘It’sapaperchase,’shesays.‘It’saninstitutionalgamethattheyplaytochokeusoff.’“TheS.F.P.D.concedesthatChiefFonghasapprovedonlyfiveof27patrolspecialassistantcandidatesinthethreeyearssinceTomtookoverday‐to‐dayadministrationoftheprogram.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.policeone.com/patrol‐issues/articles/1701993‐Controversial‐SF‐Patrol‐Special‐Police‐poised‐for‐

comeback/.

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b. ThereareallegationsthattheSFPDcreatesahostileenvironmentformanymembersofthe

PSP.25Forexample,certaindistrictcaptainscallPSPofficersofftheirbeatwhiletheyareonduty,requestingthattheygotodistrictstationsforvariousinspections.StartingafterthepresentsetofinterimregulationswasadoptedinDecember2008,variousdistrictcaptainshavecalledofficersoutofthefieldsothecaptaincouldconducta“uniformcheck”toensurethatthenewlyrequiredbluestripewasinplacedownthesideoftheofficer’spantsandanepauletteacrossthejacketshoulder.Fromallegedlybeingcalled“fakecop”26onaregularbasistohavingtofaceformaldisciplinarychargesissuedagainstthemforapparentlyminorinfractionsonlytangentiallyrelatedorevenunrelatedtopublicsafety,theatmosphereseemshostile.EvidenceofthiscomesfromvarioussourcesincludingformerSFPDPoliceCommissionPresidentTheresaSparks,whostated,“Forthemostpart,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentwouldjustassoonthePatrolSpecialPolicegoaway.”27

c. TheSFPDhastakentoregulatingeverythingforthePSP,includingthecoloroftheiruniforms

andspecificuseofstripingonit.Onereportercallsthecolor“decidedlyun‐coppishlight‐blueoutfits.”28OneformerPSPofficerstated,“You’remakingusbettertargets."Seventy‐sevenpercentofPSPclientswhoweresurveyedbelievedthatthePSPwouldbelesseffectiveiftheywereforcedtowearlightblue.

d. TheregulatoryenvironmentunderwhichthePSPareoperatingisconstantlychanging,yetthe

PSPareoftennotfullyadvisedabouttheexistenceormeaningofvagueorambiguousandadhocinconsistentinterpretationsofregulations.Thisleadstoconfusion,unnecessaryquestionsfromtheSFPDliaisonstaff,andwasteoffoot‐patroltimeforPSPofficers.Thereareallegationsthatadhocorquestionablybaseddisciplinaryactionsareoftenpursuedagainstoneofficeratatimeinanapparentlyselectiveenforcement,whenotherofficersoperateinexactlythesamefashion.

e. AccordingtoanewregulationpassedinDecember2008,theSFPDisdemandingthatthePSP

turnovernotonlythenamesofclientsontheirbeatsbutalsothefinancialdetailsofcontractswithallclientsindicatingthevalueofeachcontract.FormerSanFranciscoPoliceCommissionPresidentTheresaSparksstated,“Weintendtoforcethemtocomply,andiftheydon’twewilluseanyreprimandnecessary,includingrevokingtheiroperatinglicenses.”29Onecouldinterpretthisregulationasbeingimplementedinthenameofsafety.ConverselyonecouldviewthisasanattemptbytheSFPDtoseewhatclientsaremostlucrativesotheycaneasilysinglethemoutaspotentialclientstobesolicitedbyoff‐dutyofficersinthe10(b)program.Someclientswhoweresurveyedexpressedseriousconcernsaboutthisnewregulationpossiblybeingenforced.

25RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/e/a/1997/05/20/NEWS7595.dtl.26Formoreonthissee,“ToServeandCollect.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/.27RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/San_Francisco_Patrol_Specials_on_the_firing_line.html.28RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/andhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Police‐lay‐down‐the‐law‐for‐private‐patrols‐47271962.html.29RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Police‐lay‐down‐the‐law‐for‐private‐patrols‐47271962.html.

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Somespecificallyvoicedobviousprivacyconcerns,giventhatallinformationturnedovertothegovernmentisaccessibletothepublicunderlocalprovisionssuchasSanFrancisco’sSunshineOrdinanceandotherstatelawssuchastheBrownAct.30

f. Usingmoneyfromthecity’sgeneralfundandothertaxresources,theSFPDsubsidizesofficersworkinginthe10(b)program,sotheycanofferratesthatarecompetitivewiththePSP.JamesR.Williamsonwrites,“Crosssubsidizationistheuseofprofitsobtainedinoneproduct,industry,orgeographiclocationtooffsetlossesincurredinanother,andisbutonetypeofpricediscriminationorpredatorypricing.”31Officersworkinginthe10(b)overtimeprogramcurrentlyandtypicallycharge$87perhour(or$93perhourifamotorcycleisinvolvedand$100perhourifapatrolcarisinvolved)andanadditional22percentadministrativeupchargeonthebasehourlyrate.Thisrateiswellabovetheall‐inclusiverate—includingadministrativecosts,liabilitycoverage,tacticalequipmentandpatrolcars—of$48perhourastypicallychargedbyPSPofficers.Inaddition,the10(b)program’sindirectcosttotheclientgoesupifoneconsidersthatthecityrefusestoreimburseanydamagecausedbya10(b)officer’snegligentactionswhileworkingonanoff‐dutyassignment.Thatmeansthecustomer(nottheofficerortheSFPD)isliableforanywrongdoingonthepartoftheSFPD10(b)officer.32YetwhenSFPDofficersmarkettheir10(b)servicescomparedtothoseofthePSP,theSFPDofficershaveclaimed(wronglyso)thatliabilityinsuranceisprovidedwhenindeeditisnot.33Onnotableoccasion,theSFPDmakestheirratesappearcompetitivetoprospectivecustomersbychargingbusinesseslessthan$87,thenpayingtheofficer$87perhourwiththedifferencecomingfromthecity’sgeneralfund(i.e.,moneyfromtaxpayers).Forexample,insteadofchargingtheSanFrancisco49ersfootballteamforfivehoursofsecurityservices($87x5=$435),theywill“donate”twohourstothecustomersandonlybillforthreehoursofservice($87x3=$261).Thentheywillchargetheremainingtwohours($87x2=184)tothegeneralfund(i.e.,taxpayers).

The$261subsidizedpricefora10(b)officernowappearscompetitivewiththe$240fullprice($48x5=$240)chargedbyaPSPofficer,butthe10(b)officerisbasicallyreceivingataxpayer‐financedsubsidyof$38perhoursothe10(b)officer’ssideandafter‐hoursbusinesscanbe“competitive.”

30SeeCaliforniaGovernmentCodeSections54950–63andhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/sunshine_page.asp?id‐34495&mode=text.RetrievedSeptember1,2009.31RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://books.google.com/books?id=eTmjUS7o9y4C&pg=PA38&lpg=PA38&dq=cross+subsidization+antitrust+clayton&source=bl&ots=hpxou5h3NN&sig=qkHyH3XZZJNzQNkzZPqz‐k2eJgY&hl=en&ei=AjGYSrFD5J_xBuvshMYB&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=4#v=onepage&q=cross%20subsidization%20antitrust%20clayton&f=false.32Inarecentcasewherea10(b)officer’shorsekilledaSanFrancisco49ersfan,thelawsuitwillbeagainstthe49ersratherthanthe10(b)officerortheSFPD.TheSanFranciscoExaminerreports,“Theequestrianofficer—a28‐yearPoliceDepartmentveteranwhohad10years’experiencewiththemountedunit—wascontractedoutbythe49ersunderTheCity’s10Badministrativecode.Thatessentiallymeanshewasworkingsecurityfortheteam.Thefootballfranchisewillfacethelawsuitonitsown,clearingTheCityfromanypotentiallylargepayouts,accordingtoMattDorsey,spokesmanfortheCityAttorney’sOffice.”RetrievedOctober28,2009,fromhttp://www.sfexaminer.com/local/Family‐of‐trampled‐49ers‐fan‐seeking‐millions‐63508722.html.33OneSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPoliceofficerstates,“DuringthelastCAD[CastroAfterDarkcoalition]meetingthatIattended,IspecificallyaskedSgt.ChuckLimbertfromtheS.F.P.D.infrontofothermemberspresentiftheCityindemnifiedthe10Bofficerifhe/shekillsgetssued.Hesaidyes!”PersonalcorrespondencewithOfficerJaneWarner(October10,2009).

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Itappearsthatsuchsweetheartdealsarecommontoday,eventhoughtheywerefirstuncoveredandwelldocumentedinareportfromtheSanFranciscoBoardofSupervisors’budgetanalyst.Forexample,duringtheirperiodofstudyin1995–1996,theSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmentprovided8,598hoursforfootballgamesandcollected$174,385eventhoughitcost$315,350.34Thebudgetanalyststates,“ThePoliceDepartmenthaswaivedthepaymentofSpecialLawEnforcementServices(SLES)administrativeoverheadforcertainorganizationswithoutproperauthority.Additionally,paymentsreceivedforSLESadministrativeoverheaddonotaccruetotheGeneralFund,asisrequiredundertheAdministrativeCode.”35

Examplessuchasthesearelikelyjustthetipoftheiceberg.Thereisevidenceindicatingthatsomeofficersareabletospendalloftheirworkattime‐and‐a‐halfpayunder10(b)insteadofattendingtotheirregularjobs,whiletheSFPDhastohireofficersatovertimetofilltheoriginalofficers’hoursandduties.

ThisisnottomentionthefactthatmembersoftheSFPDwhoworkin10(b)assignmentsdonotcompensatethetaxpayersforuseofequipmentwhileworkingthesesidejobs.Forexample,if33percentofapatrolcar’stotalusageisduring10(b)assignments,properaccountingwouldmeanthat33percentofthecostsassociatedwiththatpatrolcarwouldbechargedtothe10(b)(sidework)program.CurrentlytheSFPDcompletelyignoresthesecostsitisimposingonthecityandtaxpayers,oftennotcharginganyoftheadministrativeoverheadfeesatall.SanFrancisco’sbudgetanalystadmonishedtheSFPDbecauseit“inappropriately

34TheSanFranciscoOfficeoftheBudgetAnalystpointedthisoutwhentheywrote,“InFY1995–96,theDepartmentcollected$3,112,906inSLES[SpecializedLawEnforcementServicesProgram]payments(includingthe22.6percentforadministrativeoverhead).However,thePoliceDepartmenthaswaivedthepaymentofSLESadministrativeoverheadforseveralorganizations,suchasmovieproductioncompanies,withoutproperauthority.Additionally,noneoftheSLESadministrativeoverheadpaymentsreceivedbythePoliceDepartmenthavebeendepositedintotheGeneralFund,asisrequiredundertheAdministrativeCode.ThesefundshaveinsteadbeenretainedbythePoliceDepartmentintheSLESfund.ThePoliceDepartmentarguesthatbyretainingtheoverheadpaymentsintheSLESfund,cashflowproblemsareaverted.BasedonthetotalamountofSLESpaymentsreceivedbytheS.F.P.D.inFY1995–96,theamountofoverheadretainedintheSLESfundcouldbeasmuchas$703,517,butisprobablylessbecausethePoliceDepartmentinappropriatelywaivedtheoverheadchargestosomeorganizations.Asdescribedbelow,theControllershouldconductanauditoftheSLESfundtodeterminethetotalamountduetothegeneralfundforoverheadpaymentswhichhavebeenretainedbythePoliceDepartment.“Furthermore,eventhoughSLESfundsareintendedtorecovertheentirecostofprovidingpolicecoverageforaparticularevent,theactualcostofprovidingpolicecoverageisinmanycaseshigherthantheamountcollected.Forexample,eachyearthePoliceDepartmentreachesseparateagreementswiththeSanFranciscoGiantsandtheSanFrancisco49ersregardingthelevelofpolicecoveragetobeprovidedateachbaseballandfootballgame,respectively.“UndertheseMemorandumsofUnderstanding(MOU),thesetwoteamsarealsonotrequiredtopayadministrativeoverhead,asisrequiredofotherprivateornon‐profitorganizationswhichutilizeSLESservices.Moreover,eachteamisonlyrequiredtopayforpolicecoveragethatisprovidedinsidethestadium.Thus,thecostofprovidingpolicecoverageongamedaysoutsidethestadium(inparkinglotsandonnearbystreets)isabsorbedbytheGeneralFund.InFY1995–96,thePoliceDepartmentprovided29,788hoursofpolicecoveragefor97sportingeventsat3ComPark,including86baseballgamesand11footballgames.Thetotalcostofprovidingpolicecoverageforthese97gamesbothinsideandoutsidethestadiumwas$1,105,361.Ofthisamount,only$340,069or31percentwaspaidforwithSLESfundsreceivedfromtheGiantsandthe49ers.ThisamountrepresentedthecostofSLESservicesinsidethestadiumduringathleticevents.Theremaining$765,292inexpenditureswerepaidbytheGeneralFund.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,from

http://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=5192.35RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/budanalyst_page.asp?id=5192.

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waivedtheoverheadchargestosomeorganizations.Asdescribedbelow,theControllershouldconductanauditoftheSLES[SpecialLawEnforcementServices]fundtodeterminethetotalamountduetothegeneralfundforoverheadpayments.”

SinceRusso&Reyesv.WillisCaseyetal.,15F.3d1089(9thCir.1993),itappearsthattheSFPD’s

monopolisticpracticeshaveincreased.Anyoneoftheabovemonopolisticpracticeswouldsubjecta

typicalenterprisetoriskoflitigationandcertainlyregulatoryattentionifnotpunishment.Butbecause

theSFPDisthelaw(andtheydecidehowtoenforceitwithrespecttotheirclosestcompetitor),todate

currentpracticeshavenotbeenlegallychallenged,butthisoversightcanandshouldchange.

4. EstimatingSomeoftheCostsofRegulationandMonopolization

IncreasedgovernmentmonopolizationofpolicingcoststhecitizensofSanFranciscoinatleast

twoways.First,asoptionstohireprivatepolicearereduced,citizenshavelessprotection,andless

protectioncanonlyleadmattersinthedirectionofmorecrime.36Second,aspeoplehavetorelymore

onhigher‐costalternativesforpolicing,peoplehavetopayforthosehigher‐costservicesnowandinthe

future.RestrictingcompetitionfromtheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)meansSanFranciscans

willhavetospendmoreontheSFPD,whichmeanstheywillbeabletospendlessonotherimportant

areas,suchashousing,food,education,andcharitabledonations.

Manypolicingneedsandsafetycircumstancesdonotrequireapoliceofficerarmedtothehilt;

theysimplyrequirethepresenceofsomeonetocheckthatthingsareundercontroland,ifneeded,

interveneearlyandeffectivelytodiffuseapotentiallargerissue.Forexample,itdoesnotmakesenseto

usechemotherapytodealwithsomeonewiththecommoncold,andintheareaofpolicingitdoesnot

36TheNewYorkTimesreportscrimewasreducedinanareaafterthePSPwerebroughtin,"Therewerelocalmuggings,veryaggressivepanhandlingandaproblemwiththehomeless.Thepresenceofapatrolspecialcleanedupthelocation.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.nytimes.com/1994/10/23/us/dispute‐in‐san‐francisco‐over‐use‐of‐special‐security‐patrols.html.Oncethatoptionforprotectioniseliminated,crimecanonlyincrease.

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makesensetohaveaone‐size‐fits‐allsolutionwhendifferentlevelsofpolicingservices(withdifferent

pricelevels)areappropriatefordifferentsituations.Iftheonlyoptionforpolicingservicesistopayfor

themostexpensivepublicpoliceofficer,thencostsgoupandSanFranciscanswillhavelessmoney

availabletospendoneverythingelse.

PolicebillsalreadycostSanFranciscansmoreperofficerthanmanyothercomparablecities,and

furthermovestowardmonopolizationwillfurtherexacerbatethesecosts.Figure5showstheaverage

expenditureperpolicedepartmentemployeeinSanFranciscoandothercitiesin2000.

Figure5.Annualoperatingexpenditureperpolicedepartmentemployee(2000).

$105,000

$100,000

$95,000

$90,000

$85,000

$80,000

$75,000

$70,000

$65,000

$60,000

$55,000

$50,000

NewYork

City

Honolulu

Sunnyvale

Phoenix

Austin

ChicagoBosto

n

DenverDalla

s

Las Vegas

Los Angeles

San Mateo

Portland

Orange

San Diego

BeverlyHills

Reno

San Francisco

Dataarefromhttp://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/lemas00.pdf.

Althoughthe2000basesalaryforanentry‐levelSFPDofficerwas$47,710,whichisjustoverthe

mediansalaryofpoliceofficersintheUnitedStates,onehastodosomediggingtofindoutwhatthey

areactuallygettingpaidsincetheSFPD(theonlyorganizationknownbythisauthorwithsuchastatus)

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isallowedtoissuetheirannualreportwithoutonesinglementionofcosts.37Throughvariousprograms

administeredbytheSFPD,regularofficersaugmenttheirbasecivilservicesalarybyasubstantial

amount,andthatamountisfarmorethantheaveragepersonmightsuspect.Asof2007theSFPDhad

1,784employeesmakingmorethan$100,000peryear,andofthem396weremakingmorethan

$150,000peryear.Thesefiguresarewellabovethe$47,460mediansalaryofpoliceofficersinthe

UnitedStates,nottomentiontheincomeoftheaveragepersoninSanFrancisco.SeeFigure6.

Figure6:HowmuchdoSFPDmembersmake?

$0

$20,000

$40,000

$60,000

$80,000

$100,000

$120,000

$140,000

$160,000

$180,000

$200,000

AverageincomeofcitizensofSanFrancisco

MediansalaryofPoliceOfficersintheU.S.A.

Medianpayamongallmembersofthe

S.F.P.D.(for2007notincludinganybenefits)

Medianpayamongthe75highestpaidmembersofthe

S.F.P.D.(for2007notincludinganybenefits)

$34,556$47,460

$120,600

$200,388

Dataarefromhttp://www.sfgate.com/webdb/sfpay/andhttp://swz.salary.com/salarywizard/.

Notonlydotaxpayerspayforthehighercostofmonopolizedpolicingtoday,theyarealsotaking

onobligationstopaylifetimepensionsforpublicpoliceafterretirement,andtotheirsurvivorsforthe

37Seetheirannualreport,retrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/police/information/annual_report_2007.pdf.

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indefinitefuture.Lifetimepensionsarefinancedfromcurrentcontributions(i.e.,currenttaxdollars)to

theSanFranciscoEmployees'RetirementSystem(SFERS)andconstituteobligationsthattaxpayerswill

payforyearstocome.Forexample,whenformerPoliceChiefHeatherFongretiredfromtheSFPDin

2009,thefifty‐three‐yearoldwillnow“bepullingdownabout$229,500ayearforlife.”38(Asian

Americanfemalesliveonaverageaboutninetyyears,thusFongwilllikelybereceivingwellover$8

millionfromgovernmentcoffersfortheyearsaftersheretired.)AsofJune2009,146retiredSFPD

officersarereceivingmorethan$100,000eachperyearfromSanFranciscotaxpayersfortherestof

theirortheirsurvivors’lives,39andthenumberofexpectedSFPDretireesincomingyearsisburgeoning.

SomepeopleclaimthattheSFPDispermittingitsofficerstoaugmenttheirsalariesunjustly

throughprogramssuchas10(b),andthustheirconcernwiththecostadvantagesofferedbythePSPand

disadvantagesofferedby10(b).SanFranciscoWeeklyreportsthat:

GaryDelagnes,thepoliceunionhead,vehementlydisagrees.“That'sbullshit,”hesays.“10(b)isa$10millionindustryinthistown.Sothey'vegot,what,30peoplevyingfor10(b)work?Howmuchcan[thePatrolSpecialPolicedo]?It’snotevenanissue.”40

ButanaccurateassessmentofthetruecosttothetaxpayerofpermittingSFPDofficerstoworkoffduty

onthe10(b)programwouldincludenotjustcurrentsalaryearnedbutseveraladditionalfactors,suchas

higherrisktotheirclientsfromfailuretoprovideliabilityinsurance,upchargesforpatrolcarsand

motorcycles,thepossibilityorprobabilityofoverlytiredpoliceofficersservingafteranormalpolicing

day,andadded‐onadministrativecharges,nottomentioncostsinthefuture.Sincepensionsare

calculatedbytakinganofficer’shighestsalaryandthenmultiplyingthatby90percent,41whenofficers

38RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL#ixzz0Plqt2TF1.39RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL#ixzz0Plqt2TF1.40RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/2.41Officersareableto“retireafter30yearsonthejobandreceiveretirementmoneyequalto90percentoftheirhighestpaycheck.”RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgate.com/cgi‐bin/article.cgi?f=/c/a/2009/06/01/BAN017TOP0.DTL.

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canboosttheirhighestincomebasethroughworkingin10(b)assignmentstheywillbepaidahigher

pensionfortherestoftheirlives.Forexample,ifanofficerworksjusttwoextrahoursofworkperweek

foroneyearon10(b)assignments,earningathisregularmaximumof$87perhour,henotonlywillearn

anextra$9,048forthetwohoursofworkperweekforthatyear,hispensionwillincreaseby$8,143per

yearfortherestofhisorhissurvivors’lives.WiththeaverageSFPDofficerretiringatagefifty‐five(with

atleasttwenty‐fivemoreexpectedyearsofpensionpayouts),42thosetwohoursofextra10(b)workper

weektranslateintowelloveranadditional$200,000inlifetimeincome.Thustheappropriate

calculationforfiguringoutthetruecostofthatofficerworkingthosehoursisnotthe$9,048for104

hoursofworkatacostof$87perhour,butinstead:$9,048for104hoursofwork+(0.90pensionrate)

x(9,048[theadditionalsalaryboost])x(25[numberofexpectedyearsinretirement])=$212,628.The

truecostforthosehoursisactually$2,044.50perhour(only$87ofwhichgetspaidnow,withthe

remainingbillpaidbyfuturetaxpayers).

In2009,theSanFranciscoCivilGrandJuryfoundwidespreadevidenceamongcityemployeesof

whatiscalledpensionspiking,theactofearningmoreinoneyearasameansofretiringwithapension

basedonthesalaryfromthatyear.43CurrentlytheSanFranciscoEmployees’RetirementSystemis

payingmorethan$125millionperyeartoPoliceRetiredMembersandSurvivorContinuationBenefits,a

figurethatisnotcountedintheSFPD’s$400+millionannual2009–2010budget.44Thisnumberislikely

togrowsignificantlyincomingyearsgiventhatamongallSanFranciscopublicemployees“40percentof

theactiveemployeesarecurrentlyeligibleforretirementandanother15percentwillbeeligibleinthe

next5years.”TheSanFranciscoCivilGrandJurystates,“Thiswillingnesstoacceptindebtednessintothe

42RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfers/SFERS%20AR%202008.pdf.43Forthecompletereportontheproblemsofpensionspiking,seehttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/courts/divisions/Civil_Grand_Jury/Pension_Beyond_Our_Ability_To_Pay_Final.pdfandhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3680.RetrievedSeptember1,2009.44RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/uploadedfiles/sfers/SFERS%20AR%202008.pdf,p.39.

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futureisproblematic.”Theirreportconcludes,“Thetimetopaybackthepensioncommitmentsmade

overthepast20yearsistoday,andtheCityofSanFranciscomaybeunpreparedtomeetitsobligations,

withoutseverecutsinessentialservicestotheresidentsoftheCityandthebusinessinterestswho

employthousandsofSanFranciscans.”45Thesecostsarerealandshouldnotbeignoredanylonger.

5. ConclusionandRecommendations

TheSanFranciscoPatrolSpecialPolice(PSP)provideservicesandprotectionthattheSan

FranciscoPoliceDepartment(SFPD)doesnotoffer.ThePSPprovideservicesandprotectionfocusedon

anddeliveredinanentirelydifferentwaythantheSFPD’sservices.PSPservicesareproactiverather

thanreactive.PSPofficersalsofocusonnarrowand,thuseasilyserviced,geographicneighborhoods

wheretheybuildlong‐termrelationshipsandbecometrustedmembersofthecommunity.PSPofficers

areresponsivetotheirclientsandtootherneighborhoodneedsfrominitiationofaservicecontract.

Theyhaveanincentivetolistencarefullytoclientopinionsandpriorities,andthenflexiblychange

servicecomponentsasdesiredandadvisable.Theyonlystayinbusinessiftheirclientsaresatisfied.

ThePSPhaveanincentivetorespondquickly,usuallybeforeanSFPDofficercanrespond,and

theyareknownforhandlingservicecallsbothforqualityoflifeandforserioussafetymatterswhenthe

SFPDchoosesnottorespondatall.PeoplesurveyedaboutthePSPindicatedanoverwhelmingsupport

fortheircontributiontoSanFrancisco,andtheyhadlimitedfaithinrelyingontheSFPDtomeetallof

theirsecurityneeds.Nevertheless,certainmembersoftheSFPDhaveviewedthePSPascompetition

andhaveerectednumerousbarriersattemptingtorestricttheirbusiness.Thereisalmostdefinitelya

conflictofinteresthere.

Immediatereformsshouldincludethefollowing:

45RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfgov.org/site/courts_page.asp?id=3680.

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(1) Anauditshouldbeconductedofthe10(b)program,includingsurveyingtheprecise

effectonpensionspikinganddetermininghowtoeliminatecross‐subsidizationof

10(b)workwithtaxpayerfunds.Taxpayersshouldnothavetopaytosubsidizework

forpolicewhowanttohavesidejobs.

(2) Regulationsthatobviouslyareusedtorestrictcompetitionandregulationswith

dubiouspublicsafetyrationale(suchasregulatinguniformcolorandmakingthePSP

turnoverinformationaboutprivatecontracts)shouldbeeliminated.

(3) Certainprogramadministrationchangesareneeded,includingsettingtimelimitsfor

processingPSPapplications.TheSFPDshouldnothavetheauthoritytoinexplicably

delayapplicationsformonthsoryearsonend,orevenlosethem,thuseffectively

preventingthePSPfromhiringadditionalemployees.Allevidencesuggeststhatthe

SFPDhasbeenactingmonopolisticallyattheexpenseofthegeneralpublictomake

itmoredifficulttogetwillingandablePSPofficersonthestreetstoservetheir

clients’needsandtoaffirmativelymarkettheirservices.

Fortunatelytherearesomepositivesigns.A2008newsarticlereports,“Aftermonthsofquiet

deliberation,amorepatrol‐special‐friendlyPoliceCommission,whichhasshownflashesofimpatience

withtheS.F.P.D.’shandlingofthepatrolprogram,hasannouncedplanstorevamptherules,perhaps

evenyankingtheS.F.P.D.’sgatekeeperroleentirely.”46ShiftingbacktothepolicyregimethatSan

Franciscohadforitsfirstcenturyandahalfwouldbeamoveintherightdirection.

SanFranciscohasanopportunitytorelymoreonaneighborhoodpoliceresource,whichtheir

clientsdesireandappreciate,aresourcethatcomesatnorealcosttotaxpayersandthecity.Inthe

clientsurveyquestionthataskedonascaleof1to10,“HowsatisfiedareyouwithyourPatrolSpecial

Policeofficertoday?”themedianresponsewas9outof10,withthemostpopularresponsebeing10

46RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/2008‐06‐04/news/to‐serve‐collect/.

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outof10.Peoplewantmoresafety,butcurrentregulations,rules,andadministrativepracticesmakeit

excessivelydifficultforthePSPtobeabletohireadditionalpeopleandanswertheneed.ThePSP

provideanopportunitythatisavailablenow,thatisdesirable,accountabletothecitizens,customer‐

serviceoriented,andcommunityoriented.SanFranciscocouldbe“puttingextracopsonthestreetand

costingthecitytreasurynexttonothing.”47ThePSPshouldbesupported,encouraged,andassistedin

publicizingtheirpolicingforceasaviablesafetyoptionthatcanbereliedonnowandinthefutureto

makeSanFranciscoasaferandmoredesirableplacetoliveandwork.

47RetrievedSeptember1,2009,fromhttp://www.sfweekly.com/1995‐04‐19/news/cops‐vs‐cops/5.

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Appendix:SurveyResponses48

Respondent WhatdoesyourPatrolSpecialPoliceofficerdoforyou?1 Comesinandasksifalliswellandtocheckforanyincidents.2 Respondstofrontdeskforhelpwithinebriated,raucous,troubleguests.Ejections;

undesirablepersonsnotguestsofproperty.3 Rounds,exteriorandinterior,nightsandweekends.4 Increasesneighborhoodsecurityingeneral.5 Enhancedsecurity.Firstrespondertoanyalarmcalls,quickestresponsewhenneeding

help.6 Patrolstheshoppingdistrict.7 Hepatrolsourneighborhood.8 Answersmycallsandshowsuptocheckonus.9 [Officer]patrols[our]neighborhood.10 Communicates,patrols,diffusesproblems,isaneighborhoodasset.11 Offersassistanceinpotentialdisastroussituations.12 Checksinduringeveninghours;oncallforrowdycustomers.13 Checksdoorsandlocks;evictstransientsonstreet.14 Patrolsmystreets.Helpspreventpettycrime.15 (1)Streetpatrolsfivedays/weekinneighborhood.(2)Safetyadvisetoall.16 Ihavenoidea.17 Visitalazonaapie,nospreguntasitodovavien,secomunicaconnuestrosempleadosde

cualquiereventquesucedainelvecindano.18 19 Helpstorepresentourneighborhoodbymaintainingacongenialpresenceandhopefully

showthatwevaluethesafetyandfriendlinessofourneighborhood.20 Providessafety.21 Patrols.22 Patrolsthebusinessareaofourneighborhood.23 Respondstoallemergencycallsandnon‐emergencycalls.Offersinformationonthe

neighborhoodandprovidessafety.24 Drivesby,stopsin.25 26 Patrolneighborhood,gettoknowwhobelongsandwhodoesn’t,keepaneyeon

troublemakers,preventloitering.27 Theofficerprimarilyworksinthebusinessdistrict,soresidentsfeelsaferwhileshopping,

banking,waitingforpublictransportation.28 Comesintocheckthatthereisnodisorderlyconduct.29 30 Checksbuildingsbetween10p–5atomakesuredoorsarelockedandnovagrants.

48Answersarereprintedinfullexceptwhenindividualpersonsorlocationswerementioned,inwhichcasebrackets,suchas“[Officer],”areincludedtopreserveanonymity.

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31 Protection.32 Patrols[neighborhood].33 Insuressafetyofstaff.34 Provideapolicepresenceinthecommunity.35 Patrol[neighborhood].36 Checkspropertyforhomelesssquatters.37 Patrols5pmto9pmmostdaysoftheweekonfoot.38 Muchmoreavailablewhenincidentshappen.39 Additionalsafetyandquickerresponse.40 After‐hourprotection.41 Walksareaduringhighcrimeoccurrence.42 43 Patrolarea.44 (1)Routinesecuritypatrols,7nightsaweek;9pm–5am.(2)Respondstocallsof

disturbances.45 Supportfornightshift9pm–5am.Dealswithnoisecomplaints,trespassers,inebriates,

etc.46 Dailycheck‐in.47 48 Apparentlydoessomecommunitywatching/patrolling.49 Ensureentryislockedatclose,verifynooneisinside,helpwithhomelessorother

businessnuisances.Awatchfuleyesinceweareaself‐servicefacility.50 Dailypatrolandcheck‐in.51 Walksneighborhood.52 Footpatrolofstreets.53 Theycometocheckeverythingisokay.Theyarerighttherewhenrequiredtoanswer

questionorsolveaproblem.54 55 Morefrequentdrive‐bysinneighborhood.56 Provideneighborhoodpolicepresence.57 Drivebysevendaysperweekdusktodawn.58 Heispresentin[neighborhood].59 Patrolmyarea,andwhenIhavecalledthemtheycamewithinminutes.60 Walkarea.Providepresence.61 Givesmeanextrasenseofsafetyandpeaceofmind.62 FortheCommunityBenefitDistrictThanksgivingthroughNewYear’sDay.63 Senseofsecurity;officialpresenceintown.

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Respondent WhydidyouhireaPatrolSpecialPoliceofficer?1 2 Supplementalsecurity.3 Reputation.4 Increasesneighborhoodsecurityingeneral.Nospecificordirectbenefitstomeasa

homeowner.5 SlowresponsetimebySFPD.6 Safety.7 Increasedcrimeinneighborhood.8 Communityandsupportofourneeds.9 Recentviolentcrimeactivityin[neighborhood].Neighborhoodpatrolservice.10 Goodbusinesssense.Protectmycustomersandneighborhood.11 ""12 13 ""14 Surgeofcrimeinneighborhood.15 August08wehadahorrificattackjust6doorsdownonlocalmarketowner,followedby

increaseinattacksandpropertycrimes.TheSFPDdisappearedafterfloodingtheneighborhood,andIdidnotfeelsafewiththeincreaseincrime.IrememberedthePatrolSpecials!IrefusetoletmyneighborhoodgointhedirectionofsameinSanFranciscowhichhaveoutrightgangwarfare.Weneededtostoptheincreaseincrimeearlyandconcentrateonprevention.

16 Tosupportthe[neighborhood].17 Lazonaeraaltamentepeligrosa—ventadeestupefacientes.18 19 Concernedwithcrimesoccurringinourneighborhood.20 Mostofthetimetheyareintheneighborhood.Theyrespondfasterthan911.21 Neighborhoodwasbecominglesssafe.22 Therehadbeenaseriesofviolentcrimesintheneighborhood.Thepoliceresponse

seemedinadequate.23 Ifirmlybelievecommunitypolicingisabsolutelynecessaryinatouristandnightlifearea.

Officersbecomefamiliarwiththebusinessesandpotentialproblems.24 Topromoteneighborhoodsafety.25 26 Increaseinmugginginneighborhoodwasworrisome,andpoliceofficersdon’tspend

enoughtimeinourpartoftheneighborhood.27 Crimehasbeenrisingintheneighborhood.Residentswantedtoprotectthemselves.28 29 30 Forsecurityreasons.31 Security.

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32 Rashofpettycrimeandviolence.33 Problemclients,communitysupport,andsafety.34 Tosupportthe[neighborhood’s]needforsecurityandprotection.35 Safety.36 Washavingaproblemwithhomelessandwastiredofcleaningupafterthem.37 Escalatingcrimeinneighborhood.38 Visibilityiskey.39 Additionalsafetyandquickerresponse.40 Goodprice.41 Highcrimerate.42 Tohopefullymaketheneighborhoodsafer.43 Communitysafety.44 (1)Highqualityofservicesoffered.(2)Responsiveness.(3)Value!45 Helpswithabove,“Dealswithnoisecomplaints,trespassers,inebriates,etc.”46 Violentcrimeincidentinvolvingfellowmerchant.47 48 Didnothiredirectly.Onlycontributetoacommunityefforttobesupportive.Wouldn’t

doitformyself.49 Seeabove“Ensureentryislockedatclose,verifynooneisinside,helpwithhomelessor

otherbusinessnuisances.Awatchfuleyesinceweareaself‐servicefacility.”50 Fasterservice,personaltouch.51 52 53 Security.54 Communitysolidarity.55 Forasaferneighborhood.56 Interestinprovidingasaferneighborhood.57 Wasinplacewhenwegotbuilding.58 Iampartofthe[neighborhood]groupmadeupofseveralbusinessesandindividuals.

Wefeltduetoseveralcrimesinourneighborhoodapatrolofficerwasneeded.59 Becauseoftheareaofmybusiness.60 Attackandrobberyofcornerstoreinneighborhood.61 FrustratedbyincreasedcrimeandlackofS.F.policepresence.62 Protectourclientsandcustomers.63 Thereweresomecrimesasoflate;thetownisalsoathoroughfare(BartandMuni).

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Respondent

WhydidyounotsimplyrelyonthelocalSanFranciscoPoliceDepartmenttomeetyoursafetyneeds?

1 2 PSPmoreresponsive,familiarwithpersonnelandsecurityissuesandsituationshere.3 Needextraservices.4 Insufficientneighborhoodpatrol.5 Slowordelayedresponse,thatitwasnoteffective.6 Policecannotsupplyseven‐day‐a‐weekbeatofficers.7 Becausethereislesspatrolinourneighborhood.Secondarytodemandsinotherareas

ofthecity.8 9 Wedidn’tfeellikewehadaconsistentpolicepresenceinneighborhood.10 Theyscareme;trustissues.11 Theytaketoolongtoarrive.12 PSPoffersfasterserviceandareknowninthecommunity.13 14 Toostretchedthin.15 Theyhavetoservicetoowideanareaanddoundercoverwork.Theywerenever/rarely

inevidenceonstreets.96–98IsawSFPDstrollbymyretailshop2–3timesonly!!16 Moreisbetter.17 18 19 Wasn’tworking;IfeelthatwiththeBARTstationcomingsoon(peopleandgoingto

work),andthefreewayexitsandentrancesmakeourneighborhoodmoreofatarget.20 Ittakethemlongtimetorespond,andweneedsomebodytobeintheneighborhood.21 Notsufficientcoverage.22 Theirbudgetandstaffingconstraintsdidnotallowthemtorespondtoourneedsina

completelysatisfactoryway.23 WhenIfirstboughtmyfirst24‐hourcaféin1972,SFPDwasveryhomophobicand

nonresponsive.Theyarebetternow,butstillthinkPatrolSpecialisahugebenefitforthearea.

24 Crimewasincreasingin[our]neighborhood.25 26 IthinkcanworktogetherwithPSPofficersandthattheirfocusisandshouldbe

different.IthinkofmyPSPofficerasproactivelawenforcement,notreactive.27 TheSFPDhasinstitutionalizedproblems.Theyhavebeenlargelyineffectiveandpermita

cultureofpassivityand“paperworkavoidance.”28 They’retoobusytorespondtominoraltercations.29 30 Becausetheydon’tpatroloftenenoughplustheydon’tcheckdoors/windows.31 32 That’sajokeright?IhavelittleconfidenceinSFPD.

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33 Notlocalorquickenoughforsmallproblems.34 Supportamoredirectcommunityneedforadditionalsecurity.35 Bettertohaverecognizablepersoninneighborhood.36 Notasresponsive.37 [Neighborhood]hashadahorrificincreaseincrime(someofitviolent)—muchofit

literallyoutsidemyfamily’shome,andtheSFPDwasunabletohandlealofit.38 SFPDwillsometimesnotconsidershopliftingveryimportant.39 PatrolSpecialPolicemorevisibleandavailable.40 Tooexpensive;notdependable.41 Thereisnotenoughofficersemployed,andretiredofficersdoublethecost.42 Feelweneedadditionalsafetymeasures.43 Notsufficient.44 ServicesandattentionsimplynotavailablefromSFPD.45 Responsetooslow.46 Iwouldprefertodothisandfeelthe$48Kincitytaxes/feespaidlastyearbymy

businessshouldcoveradequatepoliceprotection.47 48 Apparentlyfunding/staffingissuesforregularpresence.49 Policedon’thavetimetohelpwithnuisancetypeproblems—homeless,loitering,etc.50 Notasfamiliarwithlocalissues.51 52 Concernaboutlimitedresources.53 Ibelievewhenpeopleseeanelectronicdevicetheyhavetothinktwicebeforetheysee

something.54 55 Notenoughresources;Californiaisbroke.56 57 Wanteddaytimesecurity.58 Ifelttherejustweren’tenoughpoliceavailableforourarea.AlsoIfeltweneeded

someoneonfootpatrol.59 Inthepasttheyhavetakenmoretimetogettomybusiness.60 InsufficientpolicepresenceforregularS.F.PoliceDepartmenttodetercrime.61 Toomuchcrime,notenoughS.F.policeaction.62 Wewantmorethanonebeatcopbuttheyhavepulledthem,restoredthem,andpulled

them.It’spolitical.63