A research application of QNA methodology: The...

DRAFT: PLEASE DO NOT CITE WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE AUTHOR

A research application of QNA methodology:

The Urban Security Policy in Italy and The Experience of “Security Pacts” in 2007-2009

Presented to the

1st International Conference on Public Policy Grenoble, France June 26-28, 2013

Panel 29: Comparing Methodologies

Marco Calaresu, University of Sassari ([email protected])

Among emerging quantitative methodologies in public policy analysis, Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA) represents an approach that allows to structure the narrative information contained in documents with the purpose to collect data into a “story grammar” (an invariant structure of narrative approximately corresponding to the so-called WH-questions). Using software specifically designed for it, called PC-ACE (Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events), a relational database system may be generated. More specifically, the relational properties of the database make it possible to manage information via a Structured Query Language (SQL) that allows the conversion of words into numbers, and to analyze them by means of statistical techniques, analysis of qualitative data, network models and geographic information systems. This work shows a research application of the afore-mentioned methodology, focusing on the diachronic evolution of urban security policy in Italy, and aiming to delineate the range of morphological and dynamic aspects of this policy empirically. A Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA) and a Social Network Analysis (SNA) have been conducted on special security “contracts” known as “Security Pacts”, signed in Italy between governmental agencies and local governments, between 2007-2009. Our large collection of data (we analyzed 51 “Pacts” involving 11,652,444 inhabitants, living in 241 municipalities), is an attempt to show if, and to what extent, security policy networking activities were indeed embraced by the public administration, and if it is possible to define the massive adoption of “Security Pacts” as a turning point which served as a means to redefine the inter-organizational models of the policy, persistent between 1994-2007.


2

1. Introduction

Over the last fifteen years (1994-2009), the academic socio-criminological debate has often focused its attention to the “political good” of public security and to its “production” at urban or local level (Amendola, 2003; Mazzette 2003; Selmini 2004; Braccesi & Selmini 2005; Pavarini 2006).

Seen as part of the broader spectrum of the quality of life, the fight against vandalism, incivility, degradation and poor urban planning (Battistelli 2008, 62), as well as delinquency and the redevelopment of risk districts, the issue hereby explored may be seen as “one of the issues, or the issue (affecting) the overall city governance”1 (Pavarini, 2006, 58).

Consistently, the urban security issue may be regarded as an innovative topic for political science at first glance only, being enclosed within two well-established theoretical frameworks. Firstly, policy analysis as a framework aims to investigate the ability of the actors involved to manage, direct, and essentially steer their reference political community, through public policies (Dahl, 1961; Lowi, 1964, 1972; March & Olsen 1995). As a result, urban security policy, like any other public policy, may indeed be considered as an output of a political will that eventually informs an administrative action ruling a political community.

This contribution focuses on the Italian urban security policy between 1994 and 2007. In this perspective, dealing with urban security means posing apparently simple questions - such as “who” takes “which” decisions and “how” such decisions are taken, “who” implements them and “how” such decisions are implemented. These questions do set some traps. The main trap seems to be related to the central or peripheral level of analysis that is to be chosen as “appropriate” or “suitable” for a scholar to develop a research agenda.

This predicament can be solved through the second theoretical framework: the so-called “territorial” approach to political systems and political analysis (Rokkan & Urwin 1982; Dente 1989, Bobbio 2002; Della Porta 2002), focuses on the functional relation of interdependence between a decision-making centre and an increasingly demanding periphery. The territorial dimension - that formerly served as a principio localizzatore, that is a “locational principle” 2 of public policy generation - becomes a principio

1 Our translation. 2 Our translation.


3

organizzatore, that is an “organizing principle”3 (Vino, 2007, 135-136), resulting in some phenomena which are of great importance for policy analysis, such as, the need for public policy integration (see Bobbio 2000; Donolo 2006), and public policy contractualization processes (Bobbio 2000 & 2006; Lascoumes & Le Galés 2004).

The spread of contractualization practices, in particular, is “one of the most significant processes of political-administrative change”4 (Bobbio 2000 112) in contemporary democracies. The several practices which inform and implement such policies are different from each other in terms of subjects, objectives, stakeholders, location5 or scale; based on the proposed criteria, they may be regarded as part of explicit agreements dealing with issues of public concern6, issued in written form, “through which the actors publicly approve a project or a guideline, or mutually […] undertake to pull together resources (not necessarily of financial nature) with the purpose of implementing a shared action, having agreed its terms and modes of implementation”7 (ibid.). The implications of these developments are still unclear (Bobbio maintains, due to insufficient empirical research data), but “potentially disruptive”8 (ibid., 138).

In this light, the introduction of the 2007 “Security Pacts” and the following contractualization of urban security policy in Italy, may be seen as a potential turning point, through which the original model of security governance was redefined (1994-2007). Analysing the development of such a policy may not be considered “an easy task”9 (Bobbio 2000, 117), since a researcher is expected to tell “two parallel stories”: 1) “on the one hand, the history of legislation acts which sanctioned, encouraged or introduced specific contractualization measures”; 2) “on the other hand, the history of contractualization

3 Our translation. 4 Our translation. 5 Contracts may be “vertical”, when they involve different levels of

governments in different regions; "horizontal" when they involve different local institutions; or "functional", if the institutions involved are at the same level of government. In several empirical cases, a simultaneous presence of both dimensions is registered (Bobbio, 2006, 70).

6 The first aspect (that is, the nature of the agreements) helps make a distinction between the phenomenon under study and the traditional negotiation policies. On the other hand, the second one (that is, the matter of public interest as object of the contract) is necessary to tell apart public and private contracts (Bobbio 2000, 113).

7 Our translation. 8 Our translation. 9 Our translation.


4

practices actually pursued by public administrations”10 (ibid.). Based on these considerations, this paper is divided as follows: the

next section will recap the history of Italian urban security policy before the introduction of “Security Pacts” (1994-2007), with a twofold objective: to find an “original” and “persistent” security model of governance, able to endure in time, even after the development of different stages in the inter-organizational field (and the independent variables capable of generating the original model). And to identify the effects on the decision-making outcomes generated by the original model itself (1994-2007).

The third paragraph will explore the introduction of the contractual instruments known as “Security Pacts” (2007), with the purpose of controlling the formal structural level of the security policy network, and the modifications occurred in urban security governance, based on the “Pacts” signed between 2007 and 2009.

The fourth and final part will provide a critical interpretation of the results.

2. The evolution of urban security policy in Italy (1994-2007)

Theoretical and analytical issues

Analysing the complete “history of the legislation that sanctioned, encouraged or introduced specific contractual measures” 11 (Bobbio 2000, 117), and addressing the issues related to the regulatory framework, would require a comprehensive understanding of policy organizational features, before even starting the investigation of the reference regulatory framework. The basic hypothesis is that these measures mostly depend on how the organizational field was generated and consolidated, moulding the structural, morphological, operational and dynamic features of the network that steered decisions and their implementation.

In this context, while analysing some empirical studies already carried out in other relevant policy areas (Tebaldi, 1999 and 2010a), the level of institutionalization and the level of territorial decentralization seem to be able to affect (as an explanans) the different policy network models. Those variables are indeed able to generate different "original models" of urban security governance.

The term “institutionalisation” refers to the processes which give



5

public policies an “inter-organizational form and stability” – in addition to a “decision-making effectiveness and efficiency” – because “dominant or hegemonic coalitions” consisting of public stakeholders, or imbued with “public responsibilities”, are able to “generate coherent and consistent inter-organizational networks”12, both in the relations among them and with “third parties”13 (Tebaldi 2010b, 22-23).

When the level of institutionalization of the policy network is high, we expect to find “state-centric” decision-making networks, with a controlled access to the decision-making arenas and based on the centrality of the relationship among public political-administrative institutions, weakly influenced by private and partisan interests. Conversely, in weakly structured policy networks, “socio-centric” configurations will prevail: a central role is played no longer (or at least, not only) by political-administrative institutions and stakeholders' organizations, but by social actors and social institutions which are able to put pressure on governmental institutions.

The level of decentralization of the administrative bodies is considered to be equally important in defining the “rules of the game”, the distribution of resources and roles of authority within the policy network (Sharpe 1988; Le Galés 1993; Dente & Sharpe 1997; Della Porta 2002).

The level of territorial decentralization is also relevant to the topic under study due to the fact that the different local actors are given discretionary powers, including “the power to establish their own tools during the planning stages, by using their own funds and deciding how to spend powers, to act like a veto player [...] on specific actions during the implementation stages”14 (Tebaldi 2010a, 53).

The rules formally agreed within a given polity do indeed generate the framework of constraints and opportunities at every level of governance. This applies, in particular, to public policies implemented to very complex territorial contexts, which may be better understood in the framework of the “centre-periphery” clash. In terms of urban security policies, the most relevant role seems to be played by the relationships established between stakeholders operating at different

12 Our translation. 13 Noticeably, despite the “simplicity of the wording”, the above-mentioned

variable is undoubtedly a “complex” one (Tebaldi 2010a, 50, our translation). For further information on the dynamics of institutionalization and the operational and methodological features connected to it, refer to Lanzalaco (1995) and Tebaldi (ibid., 1999).

14 Our translation.


6

levels of governance, rather than those operating within a single level: a centre – responsible for the allocation of resources and the formal definition of rules; and one or more peripheries – requiring to tackle security-related issues through local planning instruments which intertwine with national frameworks and competences.

Provided that in a democratic regime, we are very unlikely to find either a “total centralization” model, or a government willing to give in its power to local authorities (Bobbio 2002), a greater fragmentation of local institutions, and their capacity to manage autonomously and effectively their resources within policy making processes, prove a high level of decentralization, and ultimately, a decentralized configuration. On the other hand, when local governments are less autonomous and capable of managing resources within the decision-making processes, a low level of decentralization may be found, and ultimately, a centralized configuration.

These hypotheses suggest that a high level of institutionalization and a low level of decentralization would coincide with a “state-centric centralized” model; while on the other hand, a low level of institutionalization and high level of decentralization would suggest a “socio-centric decentralized” model. Through their recombination, it would be possible to generate both a “state-centric decentralized” model and a “socio-centric centralized” model.

The levels of institutionalization and decentralization generate a peculiar policy network model and affect the outcomes of the decision-making process (as explanandum). More precisely, the highest level of decision-making capacity, that includes the “best case scenario” results (“anticipatory” policy style, high thematic integration and inter-institutional cooperation, high level of responsiveness and, ultimately, high quality decisions), may be regarded as a direct result of a “state-centric centralized” model. Unlike the “socio-centric decentralized” model, that is expected to generate the “worst possible scenario” decision-making level (“reactive” policy style, low thematic integration and inter-institutional cooperation, low level of responsiveness and poor quality decisions).

A description of the two models is provided in the following paragraphs. First of all, in terms of outputs and outcomes, the “state-centric centralized” model is able to secure programmes and objectives (through suitable regulatory standard instruments) and “responsive” policy (due to its screening and adaptive capability, providing suitable times of response), while, due to the multiplicity of legitimacy principles, the forms and organizational paradigms within


7

the centre/periphery frameworks, the “socio-centric decentralized” model is not capable of counterbalance external shocks. As a result, with a “socio-centric” model it will be easier to have more emergency-based policies, generating mostly emergency decisions, as well as “buffer-measures” during elections or sensational events. This also affects the allocation features of public action that is performed through micro-sectional legislation, a localized use of regulatory and financial instruments and more generally, a purely nominal programming of centre-generated actions.

Secondly, the “socio-centric” model does not guarantee a lower level of conflict among the stakeholders and it affects their co-operation and integration. Unlike the “state-centric centralized” model, several issues need to be constantly renegotiated by different bodies, often operating at different territorial levels of government, thus resulting in unspecified and undefined competences and guidelines. On the other hand, the “state-centric centralized” model provides an appropriate administrative and territorial consistency of action. There is no localism that might determine the outcome of the different implementations of local policy, and the imbalances involved in the implementation of the decisions taken are limited, as well as the incongruous elements of legal and administrative measures governing implementation. Multi-annual consistent projects may therefore be planned at central level, thus making it possible to achieve a fairly good level of integration of the action programmes and sub-programmes.

Lastly, the two models differ from each other in their effects on the level of quality and responsiveness of policies: if institutionalization is not kept at high levels and accompanied by an equally high concentration of powers on a local scale, the decision-making and implementation processes might be influenced by partisan interests and groups.

As far as Italy is concerned, this paper will test the hypothesis that between 1994 and 2007 a “socio-centric decentralized” model was in place.

The “socio-centric decentralized” model and its effects on the

outcomes of the decision-making process

While in France and Great Britain, since the 1970's and 1980's respectively, urban security-related institutional initiatives and experimental practices were developed, “the spread and the development of a new vocabulary and a new approach” to security in


8

Italy is “rather new”15 (Braccesi, 2005, 25). Such delay, with respect to the British and the French contexts, is but one peculiar feature in the Italian experience. In the first case, the input to develop new governance strategies comes directly from the central government, while in the second case, it is the result of a synergy between local leadership (at municipality level) and the central government will to reform. In Italy, the drive to tackle problems comes from the civil society and the peripheries. The drive for change is generated within “the relationship between socio-criminological research”16 (ibid., 12), such as, the cultural references explicitly directed to “a left-wing Anglo-Saxon criminological realism” 17 (ibid., 25 ff.), some universities and reference epistemic communities, scientific committees, the demands of the civil society, and, last but not least, the political and administrative experiences at local level. As Braccesi reminds (2005, 26): “the relationship between scientific computing and political-administrative choices” is often “an open relationship”, a “conflict”, “that is developed according to the constraints and the timing of each of them, and only rarely prompts a strong relationship of reciprocity”18. This certainly was the case for the “Sicurezza e Territorio” journal (1992) and the Regione Emilia-Romagna that was the first region to welcome the output of the publishing venture, both in political and cultural terms. Two years later, the “Città Sicure” project started (1994).

The Emilia-Romagna experience fits into a broader context of institutional and political crisis (the transition from the First to the Second Italian Republic), when the Government and the Parliament proposed a number of new laws, such as Law No. 142 of 8 June 1990 (New set of local authorities), and Law No 81 of 25 March 1993 (Direct election of the mayors and their councils, the presidents of the Provinces and their councils). Those reforms, especially in the North-Western area of Italy, generated “more charismatic mayor profiles” (Giovannetti, 2009), who were ready to meet the security requirements put forward by the citizens, represented by delegations, organizations, interest groups (Barbagli 1999). The development process has been characterized “by strong accelerations and rests” 19 since (Pavarini, 2006, 11).

That evolution could be divided into three different stages: 15 Our translation. 16 Our translation. 17 Our translation. 18 Our translation. 19 Our translation.


9

1) The first stage between the launch of the “Città Sicure” project (1994) and the introduction of the first protocol on urban security in the city of Modena (1998). “Security” then began to be included as part of the local public policies in Italy (Selmini, 2003, 611): “raising awareness and boosting acculturation on the matter”20, becoming part of the local agenda (ibidem, 614-615). A significant development of planning activities and local actions in the North and the Centre occurred, in particular in the Regione Emilia-Romagna (Bologna, Modena, Rimini), but also in the South of Italy (Naples and Catania). Moreover, medium to large sized cities developed (at least formally) their own security policy (Pavarini, 2006, 13).

The topic became a buzzword during electoral campaigns and was added top of the list in the agenda of city councils, both by centre-right and centre-left parties (Allulli 2010). It became more and more difficult to deal with it through traditional public security means of guarantee. Security thus became the good of exchange and a hot issue for institutional competition between the centre and the periphery, between agencies and local governments, between public authorities and the civil society.

The central government had not a proactive role, despite the events taking place. It did not seem to be able (or wish) to play a pivotal role against non-coordinated local actions, by institutionalizing and harmonizing different experiences.

Since its very beginning, the policy network had been characterized by a weak structure: not only did peripheral political and administrative institutions prevail over the central authority (high level of decentralization), but that was also the case for social stakeholders and institutions, which were capable of exercising pressure on the pluralistic governmental institutions (low level of institutionalization). Since its origin, the institutional-administrative system had depended mostly on sectoral and micro-sectoral interests, fragmented and inconsistent within the national territory, highly permeable (and unstable), due to its limited access and inability to keep under control access to the dominant coalition.

Italy is not an exception with regard to the above-mentioned policy contractualization processes. The Inter-ministerial Committee for Economic Planning (Comitato Interministeriale per la Programmazione Economica - CIPE) - Resolution of 21 March 1997 - granted the possibility to draw up territorial pacts and local contracts

20 Our translation.


10

to achieve and strengthen “integrated security”, provided that the contracting actors would not be required to bear financial burdens.

One year later, on February 9th, 1998 (with Romano Prodi's as Italian Prime Minister), the “first season” of inter-institutional cooperation on security started with the signing of the agreement between the sindaco and the prefetto of Modena.

2) The second stage (between 1998 and 2001, during the last

Giuliano Amato Government) was characterized by a great attention to urban security, with the successful contractualization of the policy launched with the Modena protocol: after just two years, the use of “first generation” protocols spread across “almost half of the administrative centres of the Province (49 cases, 47% of the total), while 14 new agreements were signed by other municipalities, with a total of 63 agreements”21 (Fiasco 2001, 26-27).

At the time of the first urban security policy contractualization experience, a further effort of network institutionalization was carried out at central level through the issuing of Leg.D. No 279 of 27 July 1999 and the supplementary provisions set out in the Legislative Decree No 112 of 31 March 1998.

The sindaco del comune capoluogo, the mayor of the chief town, together with the presidente della provincia, the president of the Province, could join the committee as a full member and submit proposals for the security agenda. At the same time (Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 12 September 2000, art. 7, paragraph 1), the importance of collaboration in the field of security between the State, the regional and local authorities was recognized by the law. Law No 78/2000 included the reform of the Carabinieri Legion that became the second national police force with general authority.

Those attempts, however, did not seem sufficient to ensure an increase in the level of network institutionalization. Complex issues were not dealt with at their early stages, and therefore had to be tackle as they emerged. Also at its second stage, the central level (government-parliament) did not seem to be willing (or be able) to take direct responsibility beyond the traditional forms of citizen protection, to control the territory and fight against crime; it seemed unable to undertake the advocated reforms, for instance, on the police forces, like in other EU countries.

On the eve of the new millennium, the relationship between public

21 Our translation.


11

policy - so far pertaining to the central authority - and urban security governance was yet to be clarified. That resulted in a legitimization of ambiguous positions carried out, first, by the mayors (Selmini 2005): on the one hand, some claimed new responsibilities in terms of land management and the production of the public security good, while others simply submitted the requests put forward by the civil society to the attention of the central government, believing to be lacking the formal or substantial powers that would have enabled them to deal with ordinary “security issues”. The process of evolution is therefore hindered by the inability of the centre to institutionalize the inter-organizational field of the urban security policy and deal with the centralization of powers.

Despite the ambiguities, local governments both steered and enlivened politics “disorderly” (Selmini 2003). The “socio-centric” and “decentralized” bond between researchers, epistemic communities, governments and the experiences of local governments competing with the centre played an important role. In particular, the Italian workgroup of the European Forum for Urban Safety, in collaboration with the Provinces and the regional governments, focused on raising awareness and disseminating information about urban security. The scope of the forum was broader, though: on its own initiative, the Ministry of Home Affairs established the following committees, although it later refused to install them. The first was intended to focus on the monitoring of “Security Protocols” (1998-2005); the second on the drafting of a proposal for a national law on urban security.

The centre-left wing coalition that had been ruling over the country for five years, had not managed to find its way to the heart of local governments. As Pavarini reminds (2006, 14), making a clear reference to the D'Alema (1998-2000) and Amato governments (2000-2001), “the movement of renovation began within the cities exploring the issues connected to the management of public security, but it does [...] not have any reflection at the national level”22.

3) The third stage of development (from 2001 to 2007, the year of

the introduction of the “Security Pacts”) was defined as “the stage of the failed agreement”23 (Braccesi, 2005, 29). The main actors involved in the “failed agreement” were the municipalities and the central government that, at that time, was chaired by Silvio Berlusconi (2001-2006).



12

Compared to the previous stage, the government started a lively law-making activity, although almost entirely focused on the exacerbation of criminal laws. The municipalities were not granted the financial and regulatory resources, which were needed to carry out their activities in a consistent way. Compared to France and Great Britain, this aspect may well be regarded as an “Italian anomaly”: in order to be successful, the process of “empowerment” of the municipalities (Garland 1996) - and more generally, local governments – had to be supported or driven by the centre.

Indeed, through the Unione Province Italiane (UPI) and the Associazione Nazionale Comuni Italiani (ANCI) submitted to the government (2003) a bill inspired by the national law developed two years before by the Italian Forum for Urban Safety (FISU). The parliament did not welcome the proposal, but that law is still regarded as the most advanced and innovative attempt to solve the issues connected to the security field (Braccesi 2005 and 2008).

The mayors had nothing but an advisory role together with the prefects and the police forces, and were just entitled to be informed of the activities carried out by local stakeholders. The level of coordination achieved was therefore “very poor”, and often ended up as “a simple bureaucratic communication between different offices of the government”24 (Pavarini, 2006, 46).

The fact that the public opinion, non-profit making and voluntary organizations, political and administrative actors, as well as the police force - at local level - all voiced their own values, priorities, actions and behaviours, so different among each other, made the network even more unstable.

Even at the end of the third stage, there was a substantial lack (or ineffectiveness) of central planning, coordination, implementation, and policy evaluation instruments.

In that framework, another peculiar feature emerges, making Italy so different from France and Great Britain: the role of compensation played by the regions, the mayors, and the local and municipal police forces, was the result of a high level of decentralization at local scale (the fragmentation of powers).

In no other European country, do regions play such an important role. The absence or passive role of the government and parliament, in addition to the provisions of Law No 59 of 15 March 1997, and the Constitutional Law No 3 of 18 October 2001, made it possible. The Regions and the Municipalities were given exclusive jurisdiction on

24 Our translation.


13

the management of local administrative and municipal police forces (except the management of the calls for competition), and have to carry out prevention or suppression actions, also connected to activities, which do not fall within the scope of action of the central Government. In addition to the traditional functions of “law, order and security” executed by the central Government, the Constitution (Article 117, paragraph 2, letter h of the Constitution) provides that the Regions were attached administrative powers connected to the promotion of public security; those functions could be associated, as provided by the Law, with order and security (Article 118, paragraph 3, of the Constitution).

In that framework, Regions can play crucial roles, performing tasks which in other countries were attached to “national governments” (Selmini 2005, 22): they serve as brokers and gatekeepers; they set priorities and restrict the scope of action during the planning stage; they steer and coordinate the decisions taken by local councils; they provide the reference regulatory framework and the instruments filling some national regulatory gaps; they provide technical, financial, logistic, planning and organizational support; and last but not least, they review both the submitted and the implemented projects (Calaresu 2011).

Since those activities were carried out as measures to support the mayors, rather than a barrier between the regions and the municipalities, they looked like “an unusual alliance” in the Italian scenario (Braccesi 2005 and 2008). The regions often provided regulatory instruments to the municipalities, the latter being unable to provide for themselves, in order to implement integrated security policies. They identified a “legitimate legislative and autonomous area”25 within the Italian constitutional system that recognized order and public security as an exclusive competence of the central government (Braccesi, 2005, 33).

Due to the inadequacy of the regulatory framework and the weakness of the central government, also the local and municipal police forces exercise a substitute function. That situation seems to be unique in the European context, where the municipal police forces were regarded as actors of “minor importance” (Selmini, 2005, 19-20). In Italy, however, even without formal competencies related to public order and security (Pavarini 2006), they gradually acquire a substitute function of surveillance and public order management, due to the shortage of police officers (Calaresu, 2011, 133).

25 Our translation.


14

3. The introduction of “Security Pacts” in Italy (2007-2009)

The second-generation contractualization instrument known as “Security Pacts” was introduced in Italy while a “socio-centric decentralized” model was in place. The latter was able to provide the “worst possible” decision-making capacity level (“reactive” policy style, poor integration and thematic inter-institutional cooperation, low level of responsiveness and poor quality decisions).

At least in terms of the will for change of the actors involved, the year 2007 may be seen as a turning point, when the original model of urban security governance was questioned and the level of institutionalization and centralization of policy networking increased.

On March 20th, 2007 – Law No 296/2006, art. 1 par. 439 (2007 Financial Act) – prefects were granted the power to undersign agreements with the Regions and the local authorities for the implementation of special programmes; the then Minister of Interior Giuliano Amato and the then ANCI President Leonardo Dominici undersigned a framework programme for the promotion of urban security with the mayors of the chief municipalities of metropolitan areas (Bari, Bologna, Cagliari, Catania, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Neaples, Palermo, Rome, Turin). The agreement was designed to build - within sixty days – as many other agreements in the framework of the relationship of subsidiarity between the public bodies and the regional and local authorities.

Ratified on Sept. 13th, 2008 with an agreement between the Associazione Nazionale Piccoli Comuni (ANPCI) and the Ministry of Home affairs (Law No 125/2008), the decree by law No 92 extended the power of implementation of “coordinated surveillance territorial plans” and the strengthening of the logistic, instrumental and financial collaboration between the Government and the local authorities (as provided for in the 2007 Financial Act), also to the small-medium sized municipalities, and to “unions of municipalities”, which could implement the “Pacts” on an experimental basis.

The above-mentioned occasions marked the start of the second period of inter-institutional cooperation in Italy (2007-2009).

We now need to understand whether the “Security Pacts” did affect the level of institutionalization and decentralization of the policy network, at least formally, thus questioning the previous “socio-centric decentralized” model. This seems to lead to what Bobbio defined as “the second history”: that is, “the history of public


15

contractualization as actually pursued by the governments”26 (2000, 117). In order to check whether the goals were achieved, the agreements undersigned among the public authorities should be analysed.

Methodological notes

Before starting the analysis, a definition of “the history of contractualization practices actually pursued by public administrations” should be provided. Indeed, it is possible to confirm the existence of a “formal” dimension of the practices (by considering the documents formally issued), and a “substantial” dimension of the very same practices (the implementation of the latter).

First, such “duplicity” should be resolved, by separating 1) the number, diffusion, distribution, and content of the practices (the formal dimension of the negotiations actually pursued); and 2) to post-contractualization events (their substantial dimension).

This paper will focus only on the formal dimension of the practices and not on the post-contractualization stage, considered as the substantial dimension of the contractualization process.

The analysis will be performed on the “Security Pacts”, intended as reference institutional practices, that is, written contracts of public content, which will be at the same time the “source”, and the “framework” of the analysed data.

A quantitative approach will be implemented to analyse the negotiations carried out in Italy between 2007 and 200927.

Quantitative Narrative Analysis (QNA). Based on the linguistic and textual characteristics of the analysed documents28, which may be considered as a generally “narrative” text, the QNA methodology will be implemented (Franzosi 1998; 2004; 2010), and the PC-ACE29 software will be used. Narrative is a text genre with distinct, and perhaps invariant, structural characteristics: 1) It is characterized by chrono-logically ordered sequences of events, 2) which are basically actors doing “things” to the benefit or detriment of other actors, as typically

26 Our translation. 27 Agreements undersigned between 18 May 2007 (the date of the first

“Security Pact”) and 31 December 2009 (the end of the period under study). 28 For further investigation, see Calaresu (2011, 69 ff). 29 Program for Computer-Assisted Coding of Events, available at: www.pc-

ace.com.


16

rendered linguistically by the simple structure SVO, Subject-Verb-Object (a structure also known as “story grammar”); 3) The number of steps in these sequences is limited and invariant within specific narrative types (Franzosi, 1998; 2004). A “story grammar” can be as simple as the basic “semantic triplet” SVO or very complex, with the addition of a number of modifiers for each element of the SVO triplet (such as type, number, organization, first name and last name of the Subject and Object and time, space, reason, outcome, instrument of the Verb). Thus, a story grammar broadly corresponds to the 5 W’s of journalism – Who, What, When, Where, Why – with the potential addition of several more elements. As a matter of fact, “Security Pacts” are indeed characterized by a Subject-Verb-Object structure (SVO): the signing actors (institutional bodies such as the prefect's offices, the municipalities, the regions) mutually commit (or engage other operators, such as the police forces) to achieve objectives (training activities, cooperation, organization…), through specific actions, mostly of relational nature (coordination, communication, funding, etc.). Unlike traditional content analysis coding schemes, the categories of a story grammar “are formally and explicitly related to one another throughout the coding scheme via a set of rewrite rules (e.g., subjects are linked to actions, actions to objects, and subjects, actions, and objects are linked to their modifiers)” (Franzosi 2010, 35). Through a rewrite rule, we can express the simple SVO structure (or semantic triplet) by means of its basic components: <semantic triplet> → {<subject>}, {<verb>}, [{<object>}] Where the symbol → refers to a rewrite rule (or production), whereby an element to the left of the rule can be rewritten in terms of the elements to its right. Each element of the triplet can then be further rewritten, down to its “terminal” symbols (those found in the language itself): <subject> → {<actor>} {<actor characteristics>} <actor> → crowd | fascists | socialists | police |... <actor characteristics> → <type> <number> <organization> <space> … … <verb> → <phrasal verb> <circumstances> < phrasal verb> → arrive | burn | shoot | kill | wound |...


17

< circumstances > → <time> <space> <reason> <instrument> outcome> … <object> → {<subject>}

The relational properties of a story grammar (with Subjects/actors related to Verbs/actions, in their turn related to Objects/actors and where all these relationships are rigorously expressed through rewrite rules) lend themselves to the implementation of such complex linguistic schemes in a computer environment within relational database systems. Without computer software there can be no application of a story grammar approach to narrative forms for a project on a large scale. The sheer complexity and sophistication of such schemes as story grammars would limit their use to trivial, illustrative examples.

The afore-mentioned PC-ACE software organizes information in a relational data format, with different text elements stored in different computer tables in the same database. PC-ACE does not do the hard work of automatically parsing text within the categories of a story grammar (Artificial Intelligence has yet to deliver on early promises of computer understanding of natural languages). All PC-ACE does (or any other currently available software of textual analysis, for that matter, except for basic word counts) is to provide a computerized tool that makes the task of sorting information within the categories of a story grammar easier and more reliable for a human coder.

In a nutshell, Quantitative Narrative Analysis - through its “rewrite rules” (Franzosi 2010 24) and through a specific designed software – allows the encoding of “events” (Rimmon-Kenan 1983, 2), which are present in the source text and set them within the organizational structure consisting of narrative data30. The characteristics of the relational database thus generated (07_SecuPacts_09) allow for the extraction of information through the use of SQL (Structured Query Language), and a relevant data processing. As a final result, by means of QNA, words are turned into numbers (Franzosi 2004).

The coding of the 51 “Security Pacts” under study - with a total of 487 pages of documents (and 2671 performed “semantic triplets”31) -

30 “Security Pacts”, however, also contain non-narrative text sections, which

include no factual verbs. In order to encode also the descriptive, rhetorical or justificatory sections of the text itself (Franzosi 2010 52) a coding scheme was created by implementing the rewrite rules laid down by the QNA (Franzosi 1998, 2010; Vicari 2010).

31 For a better understanding of the significance of the project, on the basis of the performed semantic triples, see Franzosi 2010, 139-140.


18

involves 11,652,444 inhabitants, distributed in 241 municipalities, 31 of which are provincial chief towns, out of a total of 103 municipalities, that is 30% of the Italian provincial chief towns (Calaresu 2011, 151 ff).

Social Network Analysis (SNA). The nature of the data collected via a computerized story grammar (PC-ACE) lends itself to novel approaches to the analysis of qualitative data: in particular, there is a homologous relationship between semantic grammars (with subjects/actors related to objects/actors) and network models (Franzosi 1998, 1999, 2004, 100-109) usually implemented in the SNA (Scott, 1992; Wasserman and Faust, 1994). As a result, network models could be used to map the network of social relations among the main social actors around specific spheres and/or scope of action (Diani 2003), by means of graphic tools. In this case, by means of UCINET-NetDraw32.

In order to check whether and to what extent “Security Pacts” were able to change the formal structure of urban security policy networks, some network “centrality” and “centralization” measures will be analysed: Network Centrality (Knoke e Yang 2008, 62), based on Freeman Degree in/out (Freeman 1979; Diani 2003, 100 ff), and the interposition of the actors, Betweenness Centrality (Wasserman e Faust 1994, 188). We shall use the above-mentioned measures as proxies of “power” for each “sphere of action” (Wada 2004).

An Application of QNA methodology: The formal structural level of the urban security policy network

This section will focus on the analysis of the structural level achieved in the policy network and is analysed based on the formal dimension of the “Security Pacts” signed by the public administrations.

Which are: 1) the boundaries of the network; 2) the decision-making powers which may be attached to core actors at different policy making stages; 3) the bonds and interactions connecting the core actors with the rest of the actors of the network; 4) the brokers, gatekeepers or intermediaries operating within the network; 5) the strength of the network barriers; 6) the planning, guidance, orientation, coordination, funding and evaluation instruments used at every level of governance.

32 UCINET 6 is available at http://sites.google.com/site/ucinetsoftware/home


19

Competences. The first “sphere of activity” is related to the “competences” connected to the actors operating in the field of urban security, and provides a reticular representation of the network.

FIG. 1. Network for the “competence” sphere of action in “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the Freeman outdegree centrality.

Source: Made by the author. Figure: UCINET-NetDraw.

As Figures 1 and 2 suggest, private actors and social institutions are

not included as “nodes” attached to specific competences, based on “Pacts” provisions. The above-mentioned network is based on the centrality of the relations among political-administrative institutions.

In this light, it is clear the centrality of the term “municipality”, “comune” (that is the origin of 11 connections). Municipalities include “exclusive responsibilities” in terms of implementation of


20

social policies, the redevelopment of urban areas, the implementation of shared social redevelopment plans (1 link connecting each node); both in terms of “shared responsibilities”.

FIG. 2. Network for the “competence” sphere of action in “Security Pacts”

(2007-2009) according to the Freeman indegree centrality.


Firstly, the “police headquarters”, “questura” and the “prefect’s office”, “prefettura” are connected to urban security issues (9 links); secondly, with other local institutions and agencies, such as the “province”, “provincia” and the “region”, “regione” (10 outdegree links), relating to local and situational prevention activities (8 links).

The “provincia” (6 outdegree links) enjoys coordination and liaison functions (6 indegree links), while the “questura” (3) and the


21

“prefettura” (5) share crime fight responsibilities (20). For the “questura” and the “prefettura” in their capacity as

provincial authorities for public security (3), an additional responsibility is included, related to the implementation of shared actions with other players in the field of “public security”, “sicurezza pubblica” (18).

The above-mentioned actors, which may be seen as a merely propagation of the central government at the local level, share their competences in the fight against crime also with the Government - one of the core actors of the security network as stated in by the “Pacts” (20 outdegree links). They also share such responsibilities with the “Carabinieri Legion”, “Arma dei Carabinieri” (6), the “police forces”, “forze di polizia” (6), and the “local health care centres”, “aziende sanitarie locali” (6). These three share their competences, which are connected with the management on the territory (9 indegree links).

In this configuration, that does not include interest groups, the core role is played by the established “joint work group”, “gruppo di lavoro congiunto” (24 outdegree links). It is imbued with exclusive responsibility in terms of analysis (11 indegree links), power to manage the “agreements definition”, “definizione delle intese” (2 indegree links) and coordination, as described by the label “esame congiunto di situazioni afferenti a più sfere di competenza istituzionali” (9 indegree links).

Before the formal ratification of the “Pacts”, the Regions were core actors; while the analysis shows that they were not granted specific nor direct responsibilities.

Communication and interaction. Should we analyse the bonds and the interactions connecting the core actors with each other, the actors carrying out their activities as brokers, gatekeepers or intermediaries, it would be necessary to assess their level of centrality and betweenness centrality, within the “communication” and “interactions” scopes of action33.

The model of governance designed by the “Pacts” shows that the core actors, within the communication sphere, (Figure 3), are once more the “comune” (41) and the “prefettura” (46). The two nodes are the only ones displaying a two-way link. The rest of the nodes display one-way connections. The “prefettura” engages a dialogue with the “questura” on one side (14), and with the “forze di polizia” (10) and

33 The application of the concept of betweenness centrality to the directed

graphs is based on the assumption that the links connecting two nodes on both ways may be converted into indirect links.


22

the “Ministry of Home Affairs”, “Ministero dell’Interno” (10) on the other side. The “comune” displays a (one-way) communication channel with the “local and municipal police force”, “polizia municipale e locale” (2), the latter being managed by the very same municipality.

FIG. 3. Network for the “communication” sphere of action in

“Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the mixed Freeman degree centrality.


In a less predictable way, the “Security Pacts” design shows that


23

the “prefettura” is in direct contact with the “population”, “popolazione” (7). Experience suggest that the inclination to establish a communication flow may be easily confirmed in a democracy when exploring the relationship between elected institutions and their voters (see the need to guarantee the responsiveness and accountability dimensions); but interestingly, the analyses of “Security Pacts” show that dialogue is also established between the citizens and other governmental and bureaucratic bodies.

When analysing node centrality by considering the interposition of actors within the “communication” sphere of action34, that is, their capability to play their role as brokers and gatekeepers within the network, the network configuration does not seem to change. Among the key players, we find the “comune” (40.8), and the “prefettura” (38.9), the latter being also in synergy with the “questura” actor (11).

The pattern of relationships changes slightly if the “regione” label is taken into account (12.8). The signing actors expect the above-mentioned body to play a pivotal role as an intermediary, although, as already noted, it is not officially granted any specific competence in the field of urban security. Unexpectedly, even the “armed force”, “forze armate” label (11) appears within the “Pacts” model, as broker, next to the “forze di polizia” (10).

The above-mentioned actors will carry out their activities as “communication channels” and “connectors”, and may be used to transfer or exchange information within the ruling coalition, but also strategic resources (Wasserman & Faust 1994). They can be regarded as particularly influential in the internal network communication flow (Hanneman 2001).

As far as the connections among the core actors are concerned, we shall now explore the “interaction” sphere.

Also from this perspective, the urban security network confirms the centrality of the interactions among political-administrative institutions. The central nodes are still the “prefettura” (91-7) and the “comune” (87-17). Interestingly, both the “comune” and the “prefettura” outdegree values are higher (91 and 87) than their indegree values (7 and 17); this is the result of their undisputed leadership within the coalition, as they are always the first to establish connections with other nodes in the network.

34 In this case, values have been normalized: the result was obtained by

dividing their actual value by the maximum potential value of the network.


24

FIG. 4. Network for the “interaction” sphere of action in “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the Freeman degree centrality35.


The thesis is confirmed by comparing the above-mentioned values

and the values connected to “polizia municipale e locale” (10-60), “forze di polizia” (4-57), and “community police”, “polizia di prossimità” (2-44). The indegree values are the highest (60, 57 and 44 respectively), thus confirming the centrality of these nodes and their role as merely “executors” and “receivers”, rather than being “leaders” within the coalition.

35 This figure (and the ones that will follow: Fig. 5, 6, 7) shows that a node

was marked with the “?” symbol. The symbol is used to underline the fact that texts often include impersonal forms, and during the coding stage, the subject (S), the object (O) and the action connected (V) could not clearly be identified.


25

FIG. 5. Network for the “implementation” sphere of action in “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the Freeman outdegree centrality.

evaluation.


By shifting the focus from the degree-based centrality values to the

betweenness-based values, the thesis is confirmed: the “prefettura” (37.3), the “comune” (15.1), the “polizia municipale e locale” (23.6), and more generally the “local governments”, “enti locali” (16), serve as “bridges” to connect other nodes of the network. In particular, empirical evidence underlines the connection between the prefect - a direct expression of the central government at local level - and the mayor of the town, that is both the representative of the local community and a governmental officer. This connection shows a


26

“centrality constant” for all the spheres of action included in the network designed by the “Pacts”.

If we consider the configuration prior to the introduction of the “Security Pacts”, this connection replaces the regions, which used to play a broker and gatekeeper role.

Surprisingly, in this sphere of action, the value connected to the “polizia municipale e locale” (23.6) is one of the highest within the network.

Implementation. To provide a comprehensive assessment of the formal structural level of the policy network, the analysis should start from the exploration of the discretionary powers granted to the actors involved, described as the ability of the actors to assert themselves during the planning stages and to select their implementation tasks.

Figure 5 highlights the discretionary power of the actors involved in the coalition.

As expected, the “comune” (134 outdegree links) was the main actor responsible for the implementation phase, followed by the “prefettura” (122).

The “iron connection” between the two actors appears in most of the configurations analysed and suggests that local signing actors built major barriers at the entrance of the decision-making arena. The configuration of the network seems to be focusing on a small number of actors, which are closely linked to each other.

The resulting arising model of governance is the result of a municipality-based process of centralization that places great emphasis on the connection between the public administrations and the prefect's offices. Those institutional bodies are responsible for the institutionalization of procedures and the implementation of actions to achieve the intended purposes, as well as the control of access to the decision-making field.

The configuration radically changes, however, if the analysis is performed on the funding granted to territorial entities (Figures 6 and 7).

Funding. Taking into consideration the “funding” sphere of action, the “prefettura” seems to play a marginal role, and have therefore a marginal position within the network (5 outdegree links). Also, the “Ministero dell'Interno” (7) seems to gain a peripheral position. The “comune” (58), and more generally local governments (“governi locali”) (65 links, including the collections related to the “provincia” and the “regione” labels), become the core players since they are


27

responsible for the allocation of the economic and financial resources necessary to achieve the goals. FIG. 6. Network for the “funding” sphere of action in “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the Freeman outdegree centrality.


28

FIG. 7. Network for the “funding” sphere of action in “Security Pacts” (2007-2009) according to the Freeman indegree centrality.


Specifically, the “comune”, the “provincia” and the “regione” are responsible for security-related investments, both indirectly - through funding, resources, contributions, or non-specific off-balance sheet funding (43 indegree links) - and directly, through a specific financial contribution (39), which is often associated with the provision of a


29

special fund earmarking economic contribution (31)36. With this in mind, the above-mentioned attempt to reroute resources

of a fund managed by the prefect's office, underlines the will (even when economic and financial resources are not available) of the central government to maintain its role in the management of expenses and keep its central position within the network.

4. Conclusions

Based on the analyses performed by means of the QNA and the PC-ACE software, we may conclude that: the pacts were intended to influence the level of institutionalization and decentralization of policy networks, questioning - at least formally - the original “socio-centric decentralized” model that used to be implemented in Italy between 1994 and 2007. The contractualization practices embraced by the public administrations seem to be intended to generate a “state-centric centralized” network model, based on the connection between the “sindaci” and the “prefetture” (resulting in a marginalization of the “regione”), and more generally on the relations among public political-administrative institutions.

“Security Pacts” were seen as a means to bring to a close the multi-centric transformation dynamics and the consequent fragmentation of the decision-making processes on urban security issue. This goal was pursued by trying to reduce the sector-specific, planning, decisional and implementation-related aspects involved in urban security, and enhancing the interdependence and integration of different institutional levels.

The effort is intended to reduce the complexity and the number of individual and collective stakeholders involved, both public and private in nature, with a consequent tightening of the bonds between local governments and security local offices.

The high level of institutionalization included in the “Pacts” result in a more balanced and defined distribution of competences among local actors (compared to the original model), on the basis of guidelines promoted by the central government, within a sufficiently organic and formalized relational system. Although the field-players

36 Great attention should be paid to the acquisition of new human resources

(“unità guardia di finanza, polizia di stato e arma dei carabinieri”) that is still exclusive responsibility of the Ministry of Interior.


30

found their (future) collaboration on rather non-specific actions or programs, which are also not subject to any sanctionary boundary in the event of non-compliance (Calaresu 2011, 186), they manage to design a sufficiently consistent framework, both from a territorial and administrative perspective.

In addition to potentially increase the number of connections among the network nodes, the legitimacy and the collaboration shared by the actors, the provision of diverse dedicated sector-specific joint coordination and planning structures (for each sphere of action) should be included in the agenda of the signing actors to reestablish the balance at network level. The lower level of fragmentation in local institutions suggests – at least formally – a high level of policy network centralization.

The coding and the analysis of the “Security Pacts” through QNA and the PC-ACE software, provided information on the formal dimension the contractualization of public administrations. Unfortunately, they could not explore the substantial dimension of contractualization practices. Due to the nature of the selected data, no information could either be extracted on the actual distribution of power within the network.

In a future agenda research seems to be appropriate to investigate the fundamental issues related to “Security Pacts” implementation and, more generally, related to post-contractualization stage, connected to the monitoring of the level of effectiveness and performance achieved by the contracts, and ultimately, to the achievement of the expected outcomes of the political decisions taken. Since the quantitative large-n analysis does not seem to be useful, another path should be trodden.

References

Allulli M. (2010), Le politiche urbane in Italia tra adattamento e frammentazione, Roma, CITTALIA – Fondazione ANCI Ricerche.

Amendola G. (2003), Paure in città. Strategie ed illusioni delle politiche per la sicurezza urbana, Napoli, Liguori Editore.

Barbagli M. (a cura di) (1999), Egregio Signor Sindaco. Lettere dei cittadini e risposta dell’istituzione sui problemi della sicurezza, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Battistelli F. (a cura di) (2008), La fabbrica della sicurezza, Milano, Franco Angeli.

Bobbio L. (2000), Produzione di politiche a mezzo di contratti nella pubblica amministrazione italiana, in «Stato e Mercato», LVIII, pp. 111-142.


31

— (2002), I governi locali nelle democrazie contemporanee, Roma-Bari, Laterza.

— (2004), La concertazione diffusa nelle pratiche pattizie, in «Quaderni di Rassegna Sindacale», V, 3 pp. 71-78.

— (2006), Le politiche contrattualizzate, in C. Donolo (a cura di), Il futuro delle politiche pubbliche, Milano, Mondadori, pp. 59-79.

Braccesi C. (2005), Le politiche di sicurezza urbana in Italia, in C. Braccesi e R. Selmini (a cura di), Sicurezza urbana e ruolo della polizia locale, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, Maggioli Editore, pp. 25- 45.

— (2008) Le politiche di sicurezza urbana in Italia, in G. Amendola (a cura di), Città, criminalità, paure. Sessanta parole chiave per capire e affrontare l’insicurezza urbana, Napoli, Liguori Editore, pp. 124-128.

Braccesi C. – Selmini R. (2005), Sicurezza urbana e ruolo della polizia locale, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, Maggioli Editore.

Calaresu M. (2011), Governare la sicurezza. La politica integrata di cooperazione interistituzionale in Italia attraverso l’esperienza dei Patti per la sicurezza (2007-2009), Roma-Firenze, Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane (tesi di dottorato).

Dahl R. (1961), Who governs? Democracy and power in an American city, New Haven, Yale University Press; trad. it. parz., Chi detiene il potere?, in G. Sartori (a cura di), Antologia di scienza politica, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1978, pp. 153-165.

Della Porta D. (2002), La politica locale. Potere istituzioni e attori tra centro e periferia, Bologna, Il Mulino.

Dente B. (1989), Il governo locale, in G. Freddi (a cura di), Scienza dell’amministrazione e analisi delle politiche pubbliche, Roma, Nuova Italia Scientifica, pp. 123-169.

Dente B. – Sharpe L.J. (a cura di) (1997), Governare con il federalismo, Torino, Fondazione Agnelli.

Diani M. (2003), Networks and Social Movements: A research Programme, in M. Diani – D. McAdam (a cura di), Social Movements and Networks: Relational Approaches to Collective Action, New York, Oxford University Press, pp. 299-319.

Donolo C. (a cura di) (2006), Il futuro delle politiche pubbliche, Milano, Mondadori.

Fiasco M. (2001), La sicurezza urbana, Modelli di prevenzione e gestione. Protocolli e contratti - Servizi dell’ente locale e delle Forze di Polizia, Milano, Il Sole 24 Ore.

Franzosi R. (1998), Narrative as Data. Linguistic and Statistical Tools for the Quantitative Study of Historical Events, in M. Van der Linden – L. Griffin (a cura di), «New Methods in Historical Sociology/Social History», Special issue of International Review of Social History, XLIII, pp. 81-104.

— (2004), From Words to Numbers: Narrative, Data, and Social Science. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

— (2010), Quantitative Narrative Analysis, Thousand Oaks, CA, Sage. Freeman L.C. (1979), Centrality in Social Networks: I. Conceptual


32

Clarification, in «Social Network», I, pp. 215-239. Garland D. (1996), The Limits of the Sovereign State, in «The British Journal

of Criminology», XXXVI, 4, pp. 445-465. Giovannetti M. (2009), Le politiche europee in materia di sicurezza urbana e

prevenzione della criminalità, in AA.VV., Oltre le ordinanze: I sindaci e la sicurezza urbana, CITTALIA – Fondazione ANCI Ricerche, pp. 173-210.

Governo Italiano – Ministero dell’Interno (2007), Patto per la sicurezza delle città metropolitane con ANCI, sito-web Ministero dell’Interno, http://www.interno.gov.it/

— (2008), Patto per la Sicurezza dei piccoli comuni con ANPCI, sito-web Ministero dell’Interno, http://www.interno.gov.it/

Hanneman R.A. (2001), Introduction to Social Network Methods, Berkeley, Department of Sociology, University of California.

Knoke D. – Yang S. (2008), Social Network Analysis, Thousand Oaks, Sage. Lanzalaco L. (1995), Istituzioni, organizzazioni, potere. Introduzione

all’analisi istituzionale della politica, Roma, Nuova Italia Scientifica. Lascoumes P. – Le Galés P. (a cura di) (2004), Gouverner par les

Instruments, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris; trad. it., Gli strumenti per governare, Milano, Mondadori, 2009.

Le Galés P. (1993), Politique Urbaine e Développement Local. Une Comparaison Francobritannique, Paris, l’Harmattan.

Lowi T.J. (1964), American Business, Public Policy, Case Studies and Political Theory, in «World Politics», XVI, 4, pp. 667-715; trad. it., «Politiche pubbliche, «case studies» e teoria politica», in T.J. Lowi, La scienza delle politiche, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 59-72.

— (1972), Four System of Policy, Politics, and Choice, in «Public Administration Review», XXXII, 4, pp. 298-210; trad. it., «Politica e politiche: quattro sistemi di relazioni», in T.J. Lowi, La scienza delle politiche, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1999, pp. 37-58.

March J.G – Olsen J.P. (1995), Democratic Governance, New York, The Free Press; trad. it. Governare la democrazia, Bologna, Il Mulino, 1997.

Mazzette A. (a cura di) (2003), La vulnerabilità urbana. Segni, forme, e soggetti dell’insicurezza nella Sardegna settentrionale, Napoli, Liguori Editore.

Pavarini M. (a cura di) (2006), L’aria delle città rende (ancora) liberi? Dieci anni di politiche locali di sicurezza, in M. Pavarini (a cura di), L’amministrazione locale della paura. Ricerche tematiche sulle politiche di sicurezza urbana in Italia, Roma, Carocci, pp. 11-64.

Rimmon-Kenan S. (1983), Narrative Fiction: Contemporary Poetics, London, Methuen.

Rokkan S. – Urwin D.W. (a cura di) (1982), The Politics of Territorial Identity, London, Sage.

Selmini R. (2003), Le politiche di sicurezza in Italia. Origini, sviluppo e prospettive, in M. Barbagli (a cura di), Rapporto sulla criminalità in Italia, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 611-648.

— (a cura di) (2004), La sicurezza urbana, Bologna, Il Mulino. — (2005), Le politiche di sicurezza urbana in Europa, in C. Braccesi – R.


33

Selmini (a cura di), Sicurezza urbana e ruolo della polizia locale, Sant’Arcangelo di Romagna, Maggioli Editore, pp. 15-24.

Sharpe L.J. (1988), The Growth and Decentralization of the Modern Democratic State, in «European Journal of Political Research», XVI, 4, pp. 365-380.

Tebaldi M. (1999), La politica dei trasporti, Bologna, Il Mulino. — (2010a), Le politiche di trasporto locale in prospettiva comparata:

idealtipi e modelli di governance in Italia, Francia e Regno Unito, in M. Tebaldi (a cura di), La governance della mobilità locale, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 29-104.

— (2010b), Introduzione, in M. Tebaldi (a cura di), La governance della mobilità locale, Bologna, Il Mulino, pp. 15-26.

Vicari S. (2010), Measuring Collective Action Frames: A Linguistic Approach to Frame Analysis, in «Poetics», XXXVIII, 5, pp. 504-525.

Vino A. (2007), Analisi. Politiche pubbliche e innovazione amministrativa. Indizi di un paradigma emergente, in «Rivista Italiana di Politiche Pubbliche», 3, pp. 135-158.

Wada T. (2004), Event Analysis of Claim Making in Mexico. How are Social Protests Trasformed into Political Protests?, in «Mobilization», IX, 3, pp. 241-257.

Wasserman S. – Faust K. (1994), Social Network Analysis. Methods and Applications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Date post:	21-Aug-2018
Category:	Documents
Upload:	nguyenkhanh
View:	213 times
Download:	0 times

A research application of QNA methodology: The...

Documents