200566943

PIED3750 Dissertation

Opportunities and challenges of China’s presence in Latin America

An assessment of ten years of the Sino-Argentine Strategic Partnership

(2004 - 2014)

Dr Soohyun Christine Lee

28th April 2014

University of Leeds

BA International Relations (International)

Word count: 11,890

Vice-president Li Yuanchao visit to the Argentine National Congress. Buenos Aires, 2013.

2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Abstract

The last decade has witnessed a tremendous shift in the global distribution of wealth

in favour of the developing world. This has sparked great expectations within the

South-South grouping for the establishment of a fairer international system.

However, behind the preached discourse surfaced the reproduction of a North-

South framework. Such criticism has especially arisen in regard to China’s dramatic

ascension in Latin America. With a focus on the case of Argentina, this paper

contends that China’s rise reproduces the historical subordination of the region.

Based upon the realist, liberal institutional and constructivist lenses of the

International Relations discipline, this study highlights the challenges, but also the

opportunities, posed by China’s new presence.

2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Table of Contents

Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………………..i

List of figures…………………………………………………………………………………ii

List of abbreviations…………………………………………………………………………ii

1. Introduction…………………………………………………………………………1

1.1 Purpose………………………………………………………………………..5

1.2 Theoretical framework……………………………………………………….6

2. Argentina, cycles of globalisation and hegemonic powers………………..8

2.1 Pax Britannica (1862-1947)…………………………………………………9

2.2 Pax Americana (1947-2001)……………………………………………….10

2.3 Pax Sinica?............................................................................................11

3. The reproduction of a North-South framework……………………………..14

3.1 The Realist view: A Zero Sum Game……………………………………..15

3.2 The Liberal Institutional view: A Positive Sum Game…………………...22

4. A nascent South-South imagined community……………………………....30

4.1 The Constructivist view: Towards a Smart Partnership?.......................31

5. Discussion and Conclusion…………………………………………………….38

6. Bibliography……………………………………………………………………….42

i | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Acknowledgements

First of all, I would like to thank the University of Leeds for granting me the opportunity

to study in Argentina during my year abroad. In Buenos Aires, I have had the chance

to meet a plenty of inspiring people from various horizons and learned much about the

country’s moving history. In addition, I would like to thank Dr Soohyun Christine Lee

for her support and fruitful feedbacks during the elaboration of this project.

ii | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

List of figures

Fig. 1 – Theoretical Framework……………………………………………………………7

List of abbreviations

CELAC – Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

FDI – Foreign Direct Investment

FTAA – Free Trade Area of the Americas

FTA – Free Trade Agreement

IDB – Inter-American Development Bank

IMF – International Monetary Fund

INDEC – National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina

ISI – Import Substitution Industrialisation

Latin America – Here, used to describe the area comprised of South America, Central

America, the Caribbean and Mexico

M&A – Mergers and Acquisitions

MERCOSUR / MERCOSUL – The regional trading bloc composed of Argentina, Brazil,

Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela

OAS – Organisation of American States

Pacific Alliance – The economic alliance composed of Chile, Colombia, Mexico, and

Peru

PRC – People’s Republic of China, also used interchangeably with China

R&D – Research and Development

SOE – State-Owned Enterprise, also referred to as national champion

South America – Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana,

Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela

ToT – Terms of Trade

UN – United Nations

WTO – World Trade Organisation

1 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

“Opportunities for South-South cooperation in trade, investment but also in other

matters are emerging (…) There are also challenges, especially when it comes to

avoiding reproduction of a centre-periphery pattern in which the region becomes over

dependent in primary products, something ephemeral in the long run.”

- Xulio Rios preface in Hardy, 2013, p.XII

1. Introduction

In the last decade, the emergence of a new geography of trade between developing

countries has given rise to expectations of a fairer international system. Indeed, the so

called South-South trade is now growing twice as fast as the one between developed

nations (Hardy, 2013, p.12). Such transformation is the consequence of a structural

and irreversible shift in wealth to the emerging economies (OECD, 2010). This change

in the pendulum’s direction has spawned new powers that have increasingly

questioned the legitimacy of the United States economic and political world

architecture. The new geography of trade generated a surge in commercial

interactions between developing countries which engendered further cooperation.

However, not all emergent economies have opted for the same developing

strategies. Whilst some nations have driven their growth from manufacture and low

key production, others have benefited from a boom in the price of commodities (Fanelli

and Albrieu, 2012). This led to different paces of development reflected in an unequal

distribution of power within the South-South grouping. As such, China has emerged

as a natural leader in terms of both its economic and political clout (Efstathopoulos,

2013). The concept of a Beijing Consensus - the Chinese alternative to the neoliberal

economic narrative - then arose in opposition to the historical Washington Consensus

(Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010b).

2 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

The Washington Consensus represented the climax of the global US-led world

system (Corigliano, 2007; Erazo, 2010). Born in the wake of the 1990s, it was

extensively applied in Latin America. In the region, it was perceived as the latest

occurrence of a centre-periphery pattern by which developing countries are

subordinated to developed ones. This North-South framework included an economic

as well as a socio-political aspect. To that end, the Washington Consensus professed

a decalogue of market orientated reforms, but also involved alignment with the US in

non-economic international regimes (Corigliano, 2007; Hardy, 2013). According to its

critics, its implementation dramatically weakened public institutions and caused a

surge in inequality (Escudé, 2011; Hardy, 2013). Following the economic crises of

1998, the original concept of the Washington Consensus was abandoned and regional

leaders adopted a more critical stance vis-à-vis the US.

It is in this context that the South-South trade gained traction within Latin American.

In the region, the South-South momentum is denoted by two dynamics. On the one

hand, it has witnessed an exponential growth of intra-regional trade; on the other,

China has emerged as a new major regional actor (Hardy, 2013; OECD, 2010).

However, it can be said that China’s new role has been by far the most potent and

novel force over the past decade. Firstly, it has been increasingly investing in the local

mining, transport, petrol, and financial industries. Secondly, as the most important

emerging commodity importer, it has offered a new market for Latin American

products, and by the mechanism of supply and demand substantially increased the

price of primary products (Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010; Iturre and Mendes,

2010; Strauss and Armony, 2012). In 2000, China was the seventh-largest export

market for Latin America; it is now third and soon to become second, only after the US

3 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

(ECLAC, 2010). It is also the third largest external investor in the region (Dadush,

2010).

To illustrate this dynamic Argentina offers an insightful case study. Poster child of

the implementation of the Washington Consensus by the Bretton Woods institutions

in the 1990s, it subsequently turned into one of the greatest sovereign defaults in

modern history. The 1999-2002 crisis marked the culmination of a tense experience

in which the animosity of the Argentine people against the global trade regime

eventually erupted into an institutional crisis in 2001 (Escudé, 2012). As such, studies

have found Argentina to be the country of Latin America with the most negative public

perception of the US (Oviedo, 2006).

China has been the crucial factor behind the country’s swift recuperation (Escudé,

2011; Hardy, 2013; Paz, 2013). It has surpassed the US to become Argentina’s

second export market, just after Brazil (ING, 2012). The country is the third largest

producer of soy bean in the world and China the greatest consumer. From 1990 to

2004, China’s demand for soy bean has increased by 460%, whilst global production

only by 32% (Castro, 2010). China’s hunger for soy bean is due to its growing middle

class. Soy bean is a crucial input in meat production, whose demand is positively

correlated with the size of a country’s middle class (Castro, 2010). Besides, China

hosts 22% of world’s population with only 7% of its arable land (Giuffre, 2010). This

imbalance makes the country dramatically reliant on foreign imports to feed its

population. According to Eurasia Group, a political risk consultancy, food and

commodity scarcity were among the top 2013 risks that the country faced (Eurasia

Group, 2013). In 2010, the main sources of China’s soy bean were the US (36%),

Argentina (19%) and Brazil (16%) (Castro, 2010).

4 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

In spite of the economic linkage between both countries, the relationship has been

characterised by its conflictive nature. Argentina is the Latin American country with

the most trade disputes against China (49%), followed by Brazil (28%) and Mexico

(11%) (Hardy, 2013, p.170). Argentine exports for the most part primary products to

China whilst it imports essentially manufactured goods. As of 2006, 84% of Argentine

exports to China were concentrated in basic foodstuff (Oliva, 2010, p.106). This

touches on the debate of China’s new role in the international system in general and

in Latin America in particular. The uncertainty about China’s rise concerns its capacity

to provide a comprehensive alternative to the current international system. As such,

some have questioned its revisionist potential and the singularity of its rise compared

to other hegemonic instances (Brutsch and Mihaela, 2012; Efstathopoulos, 2013).

In the case of Argentina, critics of China’s presence have emphasised the

asymmetry of the relationship and its similarity with past hegemonic instances (Brutsch

and Mihaela, 2012; Oviedo, 2006; Quintana, 2009). It has been argued that China has

embraced the US-led world system and is unwilling to build a fairer international

architecture. In that sense, the South-South discourse is denounced as hypocritical

and instrumental in serving China’s economic and political objectives. China’s

presence is perceived through a realist approach based upon a narrow vision of

national interest. They contend that China reproduces the historical process of

primarisation of Argentina. That is to say, an economic process characterised by the

concentration of the country’s exports in primary products. Hence, they claim that

China’s presence must be controlled, if not limited.

In contrast, some have contested that China does represent a novel opportunity for

Argentina (Escudé, 2012; Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010; Hardy, 2013; Paz,

2013). In that matter, they argue that the Asian superpower represents a lasting

5 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

partner. Here, the adopted approach concentrates on a more liberal view founded on

the premises of free trade. They support further bandwagoning with China and

compare it positively to Britain’s role in the region during the 19th and early 20th

century.

In spite of disagreements about the virtues of China’s presence in Latin America,

both sides agree on the crucial dynamic that links the Asian giant to Argentina. This is

what Fernández and Hogenboom identify by distinguishing between endogenous and

exogenous development models (2010, pp.25-26). On the one hand, China has

followed an atypical endogenous development model based on state intervention and

the constitution of a prominent industrial sector. This has empowered it to shape the

process of globalisation as reflected in its impact on the global demand for

commodities. On the other hand, Argentina has throughout history relied on an

exogenous development model based upon the exportation of primary products. This

has made it much reliant upon global tendencies such as fluctuations in the price of

commodities (Andrés, 2010; Corigliano, 2007; Escudé, 2011). As such, China’s new

role will dramatically continue to impact Argentina’s position in the international

economy. Therefore, in regard to the region’s historical subordination to hegemonic

powers, how far is China’s presence any different?

1.1 Purpose

The aim of this study is to explore the extent to which China’s interaction with

Argentina offers an alternative to the country’s historical relations with great powers.

Such relationships have been characterised by a centre-periphery pattern. To that

end, this paper investigates the dynamics of the Sino-Argentine association in regard

to previous hegemonic instances in the region. Those hegemonic instances

6 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

correspond to the Pax Britannica under the British informal empire (1862-1947) and

the Pax Americana under US supremacy through international regimes (1947-2001).

The chosen period (2004-2014) is identified as framing the new impulse of the

bilateral tie. In 2004, was signed between President Nestor Kirchner and Premier Wen

Wen Jiabao the joint-agreement which led to the instauration of the Strategic

Partnership (Oviedo, 2010, pp.451-461). Consequently, 2014 equates to the

celebration of ten years of the Sino-Argentine Strategic Partnership.

1.2 Theoretical framework

Such an ambitious analysis requires adopting a comprehensive methodology. In

fact, to better reflect on the nature of the Sino-Argentine relationship it is necessary to

outline its main political, economic and social components. To that end, this paper

uses the three central lenses provided by the International Relations discipline, namely

realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivism.

Each theoretic lens provides a systematic way of thinking about how the

international system operates (Bremmer, 2010, p.47). Adler and Barnett distinguish

the theories based upon their degree of materiality (see fig. 1 – next page). As they

contend (1998, p.10):

On one end is realism, which assumes that the structure of international politics is

defined by the distribution of power and thus a highly asocial environment, and

observes a series of discrete, exchange relations among atomistic actors. On the other

end is constructivism’s recognition that international reality is a social construction

driven by collective understanding, including norms, that emerge from social

interaction.

7 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

This difference is reflected in how each theory perceives the ‘rules of the game’ in

the realm of international politics. In the first place, realism - and to a lesser extent

liberal institutionalism -, assume that state’s preferences are fixed (Adler and Barnett,

1998, p.10). Both theories describe interactions between states as driven by political

and economic interests which mirror the unequal distribution of power within the

international system (Guzzini, 1998, pp.62-63). Thus, they mostly perceive the Sino-

Argentine relationship in terms of material asymmetry and dependency. In the second

place, constructivism postulates that states are cognitive actors with mutable identities

and changing preferences (Wendt, 1992, pp.391-392). As expressed by Adler: “(…)

cognitive structures – like games whose constitutive rules give meaning to the moves

– constitute identities, interests and behaviour, but are, in turn, also constituted by

them.” (1997, p.266). Hence, the constructivist theory perceives how the Sino-

Argentine interaction leads to changes in preferences that surpass the constraints

associated with the identified material asymmetry.

8 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

This paper adopts all three theories because it contends that each emphasises on

a different aspect of the relationship. Furthermore, in the logic of the constructivist

approach, it analyses how the normative structure affects the material one. That is to

say, how China’s South-South rhetoric affects and constrains the way in which it

projects its material power. As this paper will demonstrate, this specific process is

fundamental in understanding the transformation of China’s attitude with regard to the

developing world.

2. Argentina, cycles of globalisation and hegemonic powers

Throughout its history, Argentina’s destiny has been tied to cycles of globalisations

underlined by the rise and fall of great powers. This specific trait can be extended to

the whole Latin American region and derives from two main structural factors. Firstly,

since its independence from mainland European colonial powers, the region has

specialised in the exportation of basic commodities. In Argentina this has translated in

shifting specialisations from corn, wheat to - more recently - soy bean (Escudé, 2012).

The specialisation in a particular product is contingent to the evolution of technology

and global demand. Intimately linked to these transformations is the rise and fall of

great powers. As such, Argentina’s recent specialisation in soy bean can be traced

back to the emergence of China and subsequent boom in the global soy bean demand

(Escudé, 2012, Ferchen 2011). Secondly, the geographical proximity of the region to

the US explains, to a degree, its limited autonomy in the second part of the 20th

century (Erazo, 2010).

Argentina’s particular exogenous development model makes it important to identify

past cycles of globalisation in order to place the Sino-Argentine relationship in

historical perspective. Although the academic literature diverges on the exact number

9 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

of cycles of globalisation that have affected Argentina’s position in the world economy,

this paper identifies two main sequences. Furthermore, it also includes the prospects

of China leading a third wave of globalisation in the region.

2.1 Pax Britannica (1862-1947)

The first cycle of globalisation, identified from 1862 to 1947, corresponds to

Argentina’s subordination in a world economy led by Britain. In 1862, Argentina

emerged as a unified country under the presidency of Bartolomé Mitre. At the time,

the agricultural export sector represented the ruling class of the nascent Republic

(Hardy, 2013, p.189). Following Napoleon’s defeat and the subsequent 1814 Vienna

Congress, Britain ascended to a global superpower. This new hegemonic instance

ushered in a century of world domination and ‘peace’; commonly referred to as the

Pax Britannica (Corigliano, 2007). With its great agricultural potential, Argentina

became a crucial trading partner to Britain’s blossoming economy and a key actor to

sustain the process of industrial revolution in Europe (Erazo, 2010).

The economic linkage between both countries was in its initial stages a mutually

beneficial interaction. At this time, Britain invested heavily in Argentine infrastructures,

especially in railroads, port infrastructures, and refrigerated items (Andrés, 2010;

Corigliano, 2007). Most of these investments were aimed at enhancing the agricultural

exporting capacity of the country, also referred to as the agro-export model. From 1865

to 1914, Argentina received in average 8.6% a year of Britain’s investments abroad

(Erazo, 2010, p.30). However, this relationship engendered the formation of a dual

economy. On the one hand, capitalism was applied in the external world; on the other,

pre-capitalism was applied in the domestic economy (Erazo, 2010). That is to say, a

growing contrast emerged between a state-of-the-art agrarian complex and a marginal

10 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

and uncompetitive industrial sector. As a result, the agro-export model consolidated

the power of a landed aristocracy over a mostly deprived population, a region wide

pattern which is at the origins of Latin America’s unequal societies (Corigliano, 2007).

2.2 Pax Americana (1947-2001)

The second cycle of globalisation, identified from 1947 to 2001, corresponds to a

mix of periods of subordination and isolation. It relates to the diminishing presence of

Britain in the region as a result of the Second World War, and the rise of the US as a

global superpower (Andrés 2010; Corigliano, 2007). In 1947, Britain clogged the

convertibility of the sterling, stepping down from its central position in the global

economy. At the same time, the Bretton Woods institutions were established and the

US dollar emerged as the sole uncontested international currency. With the advent of

the Cold War, Latin America became what is known as the ‘US backyard’. The US

derived its right to intervene in the region’s domestic affairs with the revival of the 1823

Monroe Doctrine (Oviedo, 2006). However, this time-frame corresponds to both

preferential relations with the US and antagonism. In that sense, Argentina shifted

between the protectionist Import Substitution Industrialisation (ISI) model, and more

orthodox free-market policies at various times (Andrés, 2010). Entangled in the context

of the Cold War, this period was characterised by the succession of military

dictatorships in Argentina coupled with high inflation and weak growth.

From 1991 to 2001, Argentina was incorporated into a US-led renewed Bretton

Woods system (Corigliano, 2007). This was the result of both political and economic

factors. By 1991 the local elites had begun to question the merits of the isolationist

model. On the economic front, high inflation and crippling debts delegitimised the

virtues of the ISI system (Corigliano, 2007). On the political front, the defeat in the

11 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Falklands in 1983 was perceived in a new light which led to an abandonment of the

country’s non-alignment policy during the Cold War (Escudé, 2012). In this context,

arose an alternative vision of foreign policy in support for further bandwagoning with

the US (Escudé, 2012). The convergence of these elements led to high expectations

over the Washington Consensus. However, by 2001 the country was left disillusioned

as the neoliberal experiment had further deteriorated Argentina’s position in the

international economy.

2.3 Pax Sinica?

Within a decade, China has imposed itself as a major actor in the region. This new

role coincides with US lessened influence in Latin America. The failure of the Bretton

Woods experiment coupled with President George W. Bush’s War on Terror in the

Middle East dramatically diminished the relevance of Latin America in US foreign

policy (Corigliano, 2007; Escudé, 2012). This receding influence was most notable at

the Fourth Summit of the Americas held in the Argentine coastal city of Mar Del Plata

in 2005. The summit represented the last attempt to date of the US to enforce the Free

Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). It was characterised by a regional opposition to

the US sponsored neoliberal project and fierce popular protests (Fernandez and

Hogenboom, 2010b, p.187). As a result, some have referred to China’s expansion as

part of a new cycle of globalisation for Latin America. Accordingly, Fernandez and

Hogenboom label China’s presence as a new desembarco (arrival) in reference to its

similarity with the British, and later American, sway in the region (2010, pp.25-26). This

paper corroborates with this view and associates China’s new regional presence as

the beginning of a third wave of globalisation.

12 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

On the diplomatic front, two factors have driven China’s strategy in the region.

Firstly, China’s historical interest in Latin America has been motivated by the

international recognition of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) over the Republic of

Taiwan (Oviedo, 2010; Rios, 2010). This was particularly illustrated by China’s

‘Popular Diplomacy’ which involved a series of high-ranking officials’ tours in the region

(Oviedo, 2010). This dynamic still has resonance today. Most of the countries that

recognise the Republic of Taiwan are situated in the Caribbean (Rios, 2010, pp.222-

225). Secondly, China also uses its diplomatic connections in the region to bolster

support in international organisations. This was especially the case regarding the

recognition of the Asian giant as a market economy within the World Trade

Organisation (WTO). Indeed, the recognition of China as a market economy was a

fundamental pre-requisite in the establishment of the Sino-Argentine Strategic

Partnership (Oviedo, 2010; Quintana, 2009).

Over the past decade, China’s involvement in the region has shifted from a

diplomatic to an economic focus. This is the result of its new global strategy driven by

resource security (Iturre and Mendes, 2010). In effect, to sustain such high pace of

growth China has had to increasingly rely on foreign imports of raw material and

natural resources (Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010). To that end, Africa has been

the first region where State Owned Enterprises (SOE) and state officials have

proposed joint-agreements to foreign governments (Power et al, 2012; Sutter, 2008).

In this framework, China provided low interests loans to governments in exchange for

exploitation licences for its SOE. The broadening of China’s strategy to include Latin

America is motivated by its increasing reliance upon energy and food imports

(Ferchen, 2011). As such, most of China’s investments in the region concern public

infrastructures and resource extraction industries. It also proceeds to Mergers and

13 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Acquisitions (M&A) in order to take control of operating company’s stakes (Fernández

and Hogenboom, 2010, p.8).

This international division of labour dictated by the Chinese economy has impacted

the region in different ways. China’s initial specialisation in low key manufacture with

low wages has exacerbated competition with Latin America’s developing economies

(Phillips, 2010; Oviedo, 2013). In that respect, the case of Mexico stands out from

other countries of the region. The Mexican economy has adopted a similar

specialisation to the Chinese one in a way that their production chains enter in direct

competition (Di Masi, 2010). In contrast, South American economies have privileged

a commodity export model and although their own industry is at risk, the main drivers

of their growth remain untouched (Hardy, 2013, pp.168-170).

In response to China’s rising regional presence, states have adopted different

strategies. Countries like Brazil and Argentina have enforced protectionist measures

against Chinese goods, especially in order to protect their car parts industry (Di Masi,

2010). Other countries, such as Chile and Costa Rica, have signed free trade

agreements (FTA) with China, accepting the detrimental impact on their respective

industries (Hardy, 2013, p.156). Broadly speaking, two groups of countries within Latin

America seem to diverge on the role of China in particular and the virtues of free

market in general. On the one hand, the Pacific Alliance composed of Chile, Peru,

Colombia and Mexico stresses economic liberalism. On the other, the Mercosur

alliance composed of Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay, Venezuela and Paraguay promotes

more protectionist measures and a deepening of regional trade (The Economist,

2013).

14 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

This chapter has planted China’s growing regional presence in the context of

Argentine historical insertion in the international system. Argentine subordination to

great powers has proven to consolidate its marginalisation in the international

economy. Under the British informal empire, it managed to reach its golden age at the

expense of the establishment of an independent industry. In a different framework,

under the Washington Consensus, the domestic politics and economy were co-opted

by transnational interests. The political vacuum left by US contempt for the region has

bolstered China’s new role. In that sense, within the space of a decade China has

become Latin America’s leading commercial and financial partner (Oviedo, 2013).

3. The reproduction of a North–South framework

The North-South framework is an applied term derived from the concept of the

North-South divide. The concept of a North-South divide was initially coined to

distinguish a broadly defined socio-economic rift between the more developed

countries of the North and the less developed countries of the South (Kruger, 2009).

Based upon the Wallenstein model of core and periphery systems, Oviedo identified

how such asymmetry has emerged in the Sino-Argentine relationship (2013, p.5).

According to his analysis, the relationship initiated as semiperipheral–semiperipheral

when the Sino-Argentine tie was first normalised in 1972. Subsequently, as China rose

and Argentine stagnated, the relationship progressed to the actual periphery–core

model at the turn of the century. Therefore, the evolution of the balance of power has

exacerbated the asymmetric trait of the Sino-Argentine relationship.

Thus, the material aspect of the bilateral tie is similar to the North–South

framework. The repercussions of such an asymmetric relationship have different

bearings. This complexity is manifested by the diverging viewpoints between the

15 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

realist and liberal institutional theories of the International Relations discipline. Both

emphasise the importance of the balance of power in what is perceived to be an

anarchical international system (Wendt, 1992). They focus on states as main units,

although they also account to varying degrees for non-state actors, such as

multinationals and international organisations. However, whilst the realist doctrine

perceives asymmetric relations as mostly serving the interest of the stronger state

against the weaker one, the liberal institutional school presupposes that cooperation

emerges in the long-run (Keohane, 1988). In the first part, this chapter underlines the

main elements of the pessimistic realist perception of the relationship and draws

similarities with past hegemonic instances. In the second part, it discusses the more

optimistic liberal institutional perspective, and stresses its limits.

3.1 The Realist view: A Zero-Sum Game

The realist doctrine can be traced back to Ancient Greece and the narratives of

Thucydides on the Peloponnesian War. It perceives power defined in terms of military

capabilities as the main locus of politics (Bremmer, 2010, p.47). Contemporary realism

is constructed upon Hobbes account of the state of nature (Gallarotti, 2010). According

to Hobbes, individuals live in an anarchical system where only material capability can

ensure the sustainability of a sovereign. As Gallarotti notes: “Tangible power

resources can be used to repel acts of force, and they can be used to compel actors

into submission.” (2010, p.18). In that standpoint, sovereign states seek to collect

power in order to better ensure their security; this is also known as the security

dilemma (Bremmer, 2010, p.47). It is a zero-sum game, in that one’s increased power

results in the loss of power from another actor.

16 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

However, this does not only concern military power, but also includes socio-

economic elements in order to sustain such lethal force. To differentiate this objective

from military development alone, Meirsheimer opposes latent power to military power

(Gallarotti, 2010, p.17). This latent power has a bearing on the way economic

relationships are maintained. The relationship between the military and the economy

has historically been sustained through mercantilism. Originally, mercantilist policies

sought to support the military prowess through the accumulation of gold reserves. This

was possible by the means of a tightly associated trade sector with the state apparatus

so as to ensure a positive balance of trade. As Guzzini contends (1998, p.170):

Technological and organizational innovations in warfare bolstered the rise of

mercantilism (…) Both the production of gunpowder and the rise of professional armies

depended on the merchant trading system (to assure the provision of powder) and

wealth (to pay the armies).

Following the rise of Britain as a global hegemon in the 19th century, mercantilism

was progressively abandoned and Adam Smith’s liberal creed embraced (Silver and

Arrighi, 2003). Nevertheless, mercantilism has survived as a marginal practice and

resurged in times of crisis (Silver and Arrighi, 2003). Similar to the realist assumption,

it perceives international trade as a zero-sum game with gains of trade made at the

expense of others. In that matter, the mercantilist view of the international system

corroborates with the modern realist school of the International Relations discipline

(Jones, 1986, p.10-11).

Chinese economic policies have often been described as mercantilist (Leverett,

2010; Rodrick, 2010). The adoption of mercantilism as a driving force in China’s

international trade is based upon two factors, among others. Firstly, since the gradual

opening up of its economy, China has manipulated the yuan. Doing so, it has

17 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

strengthened its position as a chief exporter by under-valuating its national currency

(Rodrick, 2010). Secondly, China has adopted since the 2000s a strategy of resource

drain, also coined as ‘resource mercantilism’ (Leverett, 2010). To that end, China’s

‘Going Out’ strategy emerged in order to secure crucial raw material for its internal

development (Strauss and Armony, 2012). It was first put in motion in 2004 with the

‘Guidance Catalogue on Countries and Industries for overseas investments’ (Dittmer,

2010, pp.40-41). The official document ensured preferential loans for Chinese

companies investing in resource extraction industries, which for the most part were

concentrated in developing countries.

Furthermore, in 2007 China announced the creation of the ‘China Investment

Corporation’ which sought to invest in ‘strategic assets’ abroad using part of China’s

$ 2.4 trillion dollars reserves (Hardy, 2013, pp.162-163). This was motivated by the

increased needs of the domestic population but also in order to sustain the pace of

development of the productive sector. Such operations have been strengthened given

the particular bond between national companies and the state. Similar to the

mentioned adopted pattern in Africa, China has pursued its resource diplomacy

through the international deployment of its national champions, or SOE, as part of its

energy and food security agenda (Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010b).

In Argentina, this was illustrated by China’s acquisition of wide areas of arable land,

also known as ‘land grabs’, and concessions of mining sites. In that regard, in January

2011, Beidahuang Group - a conglomerate of state-owned agribusinesses -, leased

320,000 hectares of arable land from the Río Negro province for a 20-year period. The

agreement handed over thousands of hectares to the agribusiness SOE for the

production of soy beans, wheat and oilseed rape, among other crops (Grain, 2011).

Furthermore, it stipulated stringent closes in order to maximise the firm’s profits whilst

18 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

leaving it free from liability. This included, among others, the tax exemption of exported

crops as well as the use of a newly constructed port on the Atlantic coast, free of

charge (Grain, 2011). Conversely, Beidahuang Group has agreed to invest $1.45

billion dollars over the period, especially in infrastructures such as irrigation systems

(Hardy, 2013, p.163). Whilst the agreement brought some much needed inflows of

foreign capital, its environmental impact and the overall economic sustainability of the

project have received much criticism from the local population (Grain, 2011). In the

same province, in 2006 SOE China’s Metallurgical Group Corporation (MCC) acquired

70% of exploitation rights of Minera Sierra Grande's iron-ore mine, with a 30-year

concession (Oviedo, 2010).

China has also adopted an aggressive stance on equity stocks of resource

extraction industries operating in the country. In March 2010, China National Offshore

Oil Corporation (SNOOC) bought $3.1 billion dollars for a 50% stake in Argentine oil

and gas holding company Bridas Energy Holdings (Oviedo, 2010). Likewise, in

December 2010, refiner Sinopec Group purchased Occidental Petroleum Corporation

(OXY) Argentine oil and gas unit for $2.45 billion dollars (Escudé, 2011).

Moreover, China has expanded its financial hold on the country (Oviedo, 2010). In

2011, Industrial & Commercial Bank of China (ICBC), agreed to take over 80% of the

Argentine subsidiary of Standard Bank Group in a $600 million dollars deal. This was

the greatest takeover of the world's biggest bank, in market value, within the last three

years (Tong, 2011). As emphasised in the official ICBC statement: “This is the first

acquisition of a Latin American financial institution by a Chinese bank, also the first

time a Chinese bank acquires a mainstream commercial bank outside China

(excluding Hong Kong, Macau).” (ICBC, 2012).

19 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Consequently, following the realist logic, China’s South-South rhetoric serves three

purposes in the country’s gradual rise to power. Firstly, it creates a platform by which

to better sell its ‘Going Out’ mercantilist strategy. Secondly, it is used as part of China’s

‘Popular Diplomacy’ so as to gain support in multilateral organisations. Thirdly, it

serves as a soft-balancing tactic against US hegemony (Oviedo, 2010, pp.459). This

rhetoric was embedded in the 2008 Latin America White Paper. The document

represented the first-ever Chinese foreign policy paper on the region (Giuffre, 2010).

It expressed China’s interest in Latin America in terms of its ‘abundant natural

resources’ and its ‘good base for economic and social growth and tremendous

development potential’ (Castillo, 2009). The paper was filled with China’s narrative

about a ‘win-win’ situation and a ‘mutual benefit’ relationship (Ferchen, 2011). In

regard to China’s aim to rise as a global hegemon, this discourse is perceived by

realists as deceitful diplomacy.

In fact, it has been argued that China’s historical tradition of statecraft is still strong

today (Gurtov, 2010, p.20). This type of diplomacy was first used during China’s

imperial times in order to better rule upon its Asian neighbourhood. As Gurtov states:

“Ancient Chinese statecraft, passed down from the earlier days of China’s Imperial

history, reflects a tradition of deception and intrigue and a highly developed sense of

political strategy that enabled it to gain advantage over rivals.” (2010, p. 20). This still

resonates in modern times. This was notably echoed by Deng Xiaoping’s rhetoric

about ‘hide brightness, nourish obscurity’ which is at the backbone of China’s ‘peaceful

development’ discourse (Dittmer, 2010, p.225).

Such deception dramatically impacted the Sino-Argentine relationship in the wake

of the Strategic Partnership proclamation. In 2004, Argentina concluded an agreement

with China to concede it with market economy status at the WTO in exchange for

20 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

investments and the purchase of sovereign debt (Oviedo, 2010, pp.456-458). But the

Argentine government was left disillusioned as China’s purchase of Argentine debt

never materialised (Quintana, 2009, pp.6-7). Although, according to Hilton, China’s

refusal to pay Argentine national debt was due to pressures from the US which was

wary about its fading influence in the region (Hilton, 2013, p.3). Nevertheless, this

disenchantment has led some observers to characterise the relation as a cuento chino

(tall story) (Olivia, 2010, p.14; Oviedo, 2010, p.458).

Another particularity of China’s South-South relations is that they are for the most

part based upon bilateral ties. In its relationship with Argentina, China exclusively

relies upon bilateral agreements (Hilton, 2013). This is coherent with the realist tactic

of ‘divide and rule’ in international politics. In fact, China possesses much more

leverage when dealing with one country at a time, rather than as a bloc. Furthermore,

it also lessens the risk of retaliation (Hardy, 2013, p.181-185). According to

Shambaugh: “Advocates of Chinese realism tend to argue (…) that Western attempts

to enlist greater Chinese involvement in global management and governance is a

dangerous trap aimed at tying China down, burning up its resources, and retarding its

growth.” (2011, p.13). In that view, China’s preference for bilateral ties comes as a

consequence of its fear of multilateralism which empowers weaker states. Thus, China

pursues Strategic Partnerships with developing countries in order to enforce trade

agreements based upon its own terms.

The perception of China as a nation that follows mercantilist policies and a ‘divide

and rule’ strategy in its pursuit of global hegemony resembles to the region’s relation

with great powers. In that sense, China’s use of its economic and financial clout to

open developing country’s markets’ for exports and investments in resource extracting

industries has been compared to the resurgence of the ‘Gunboat Diplomacy’

21 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

(Shambaugh, 2011, p.12). Gunboat Diplomacy corresponds to the pursuit of a

diplomacy based upon the use or threat of the use of force, often by military means.

Such diplomacy was pursued especially by Britain and the US in order to impose free

trade agreements and access to natural resources in Latin America new born

Republics during the 19th and early 20th century (Graham-Yooll, 2002). Hence,

China’s presence in Latin America reproduces the pattern of emerging great powers

that sought global hegemony through the expansion of privileged economic relations.

The implications for Argentina are three-fold. Firstly, China’s mercantilist strategy

revolving around the appropriation of natural resources has deprived the country’s

control over its strategic assets. This is what Oviedo contends as he argues that non-

renewable resources should be employed to develop Argentina’s internal economy,

rather than to serve for exports (Oviedo, 2010, pp.483-484). This is most certainly true

concerning the petrol and gas sector, given that Argentina has become dependent on

energy imports since 2007 (Fanelli and Albrieu, 2012). Secondly, China’s ‘divide and

rule’ tactic has come at the cost of the regional integration process. In that sense, Oliva

states that China’s growing interaction with Latin America has halted processes of

regional integration (Olivia, 2010). Finally, China’s growing presence has engendered

a relationship of dependency. In fact, through the acquisition of companies in the

extracting and financial sector, China has increased its leverage upon the Argentine

government (Oviedo, 2013).

However, there are several limitations to the cynical portrait painted by the realist

doctrine. Firstly, it fails to account for the trade outcome of the Sino-Argentine

relationship. Since the outset of the Strategic Partnership in 2004, Argentina has

benefited from a surplus with China over its commercial balance (ECLAC, 2010). In

other words, Argentina exports more in absolute value to China than it imports from it.

22 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

This observation contradicts the principal axiom held by the mercantilist theory which

assumes that states must engage in trade only when it fosters a positive balance of

trade. Hence, the relationship can’t be perceived as a zero-sum game given that

Argentina benefits from the positive outcome of the bilateral trade. Indeed, China’s

purchase of Argentine goods has generated inflows of foreign capital that have much

assisted in the development of the economy over the past decade (Escudé, 2011;

Hardy, 2013).

Secondly, it fails to account for China’s increased presence in Latin American

multilateral organisations, and its efforts to build a trans-Pacific dialogue. Over the last

ten years, China has gained the status of permanent observer in a wide range of Latin

American international organisations, such as the Organisation of American States

(OAS) and the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB) (Escudé, 2012). Furthermore,

it has strived to create a multilateral dialogue through the Mercosur and Pacific

Alliance organisations (Oviedo, 2013). China has even set the agenda for such

process by designating the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States

(CELAC) as the most appropriate organisation to launch the Sino-Latin American

forum (Hardy, 2013, p.214). Therefore, this study will look at the liberal institutional

theory in order to shed light on these elements of the relationship.

3.2 The Liberal Institutional view: A Positive Sum Game

Liberal institutionalism arose as a coherent school of thought in the 1980s. Its aim

was to create a new paradigm that would transcend the traditional realist/liberal

dichotomy in order to account for a more multipolar world order. In fact, at the time of

the doctrine’s emergence, US hegemony was increasingly challenged by external

shocks reflected by changes in the international structure. This was most notable in

23 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

1971 with the US abandonment of the Gold Standard (Guzzini, 1998, p.62). It assumes

that in the absence of an hegemon, states will pursue agreements within the

international community in order to further their interests (Keohane, 1988).

In that matter, states are not solely driven by relative gains, but also by absolute

gains. This paradigm shift thereby rejects the realist zero-sum game logic in favour of

a positive-sum game, or win-win paradigm (Bremmer, 2010, p.48). That is to say that,

regardless of the material asymmetry of a relationship, states are naturally inclined

towards mutually advantageous endeavours. In other words, liberal institutionalism is

a middle-ground between an unrelenting ‘Hobbesian’ struggle of all against-all, and

the liberal vision of endless peace and harmony founded upon a laissez-faire global

economy (Jones, 1986, p.116). As expressed by Adler and Barnett: “While neo-liberal

institutionalism shares with neo-realism the assumption of anarchy, it is more

interested in how self-interested states construct a thin version of society through the

guise of institutions and regulative norms in order to promote their interests.” (1998,

p.11). Hence, liberal institutionalism accounts for instances of confrontation in the

international system but perceives cooperation as the final state of equilibrium

(Keohane, 1988).

The revival of the idealism of liberal thinking through a more pragmatic lens brought

to the fore the principle of comparative advantage. The concept of comparative

advantage is a basic tenet of David Ricardo’s free-market model (Jones, 1986). It

assumes that in an optimal version of international trade, states would specialise in

the sectors they are the most efficient in. This is a reversal of the mercantilist zero-

sum game thinking that seeks a relative positive balance of trade. As expressed by

Jones: “The power and subtlety of this principle is that it demonstrates that even where

one society is more efficient at producing the entire range of relevant goods and

24 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

services that any other, there may still be a sound basis for mutually advantageous

specialisation of production and subsequent trade between the two societies.” (1986,

p.33). When states specialise in specific sectors it creates instances of

complementarity. In that case: “(…) there is mutual benefit and increase in overall

production when specialisation and trade develop.” (Jones, 1986, p.33). Such

specialisation is distributed across the global economy according to factor

endowments (Jones, 1986). Those factor endowments correspond to country-specific

features that account for such mutually advantageous trade. Subsequently, under the

principle of comparative advantage, liberal institutionalism promotes the international

distribution of labour and gains from trade (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.51).

Following Deng Xiaoping’s Open Doors policy and the country’s gradual

development in the 1980s, China has become the ‘world’s factory’ (Zhang, 2006). By

2008, it had outpaced the US and became the world’s first trading nation (Zweig, 2010,

pp.37-38). Traditionally, China has benefited from the low wage of its labour force to

sustain its position as the world’s most competitive nation in light-manufacturing.

However, to support the comparative advantage of its development model, the country

has had to concentrate on its urban development. In that matter, through the Hukou

system the government ensures that the countryside population does not overcrowd

the richer coastal cities in the East (Spencer, 2011). But this also means that to occupy

these populations the country has had to maintain a labour-intensive agrarian sector

(Oviedo, 2010, pp.435-436). Moreover, for historical reasons, China’s agrarian sector

is mostly constituted of small independent farmers that are less efficient than their

South American counterparts who benefit from sophisticated large-scale farming

techniques (Hardy, 2013, p.156-158). Correspondingly, South America has been

described as the ‘Farm of the World’ (Hardy, 2013, p.158). Hence, there is a

25 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

complementarity between China’s industrial capacity and South America’s agricultural

potential.

The liberal institutional lens accounts for the conflicting nature of what Hardy calls

the ‘complex partnership’ between Latin America and China (2013). In the case of

Argentina, Oviedo has distinguished varying elements which are underpinned by the

liberal institutional theory and that account for the dual dynamic of the relationship

(2013). In the first place, the increased density of trade interaction between China and

Argentina has generated further confrontation. China’s rise has exacerbated

competition in three distinct domains. Firstly, it has amplified competition for

manufacture exports in local and third-markets. For instance, in 2006 Chinese

manufactured exports displaced Argentine exports in the Brazilian market. This was

the case in spite of the preferential arrangements provided in the Mercosur grouping

(Phillips, 2010, p.188). Secondly, it has increased competition for Foreign Direct

Investment (FDI). As such, China has become the second recipient of FDI after the

US (Zweig, 2010, p.47). Thirdly, and most importantly, China’s exports have

undermined the local industrial sector. According to Hardy, over 90% of Argentine

manufactured exports are under threat due to the competition from Chinese firms

(2013, p.168).

The 2010 Argentine soy crisis epitomised the confrontation between Argentine

protectionist policies and China’s manufacture export-led development model. In

2010, the Chinese government impeded cargos filled with Argentine soy bean to enter

its ports. The official reason was that Argentine soy bean did not comply with China’s

new health regulations for the import of such crops (Oviedo, 2010, pp.494-498;

Quintana, 2009). However, it was later revealed that China was pressing Argentina to

withdraw its anti-dumping policies against Chinese manufactured goods (Hilton,

26 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

2013). Only after Argentine President Cristina Fernández de Kirchner paid a visit to

Beijing was the dispute eventually settled (Quintana, 2009, p.7). This precedent

underscored the importance of further cooperation, but also exposed the asymmetric

aspect of the relation. Nevertheless, Argentina has demonstrated great resilience in

the face of the Chinese embargo as it managed to channel its exports to other

countries, such as Brazil. Consequently, the incident also proved that Argentine

dependency to China was only relative (Oviedo, 2013).

In the second place, increased interaction between Argentina and China has led to

further cooperation. Instances of cooperation were highlighted in the content of the

joint memorandums. In 2004, Argentina signed with China the ‘Memorandum of

Understanding between the Argentine Republic and the PRC’. The memorandum

stipulated Argentine recognition of China as a ‘market economy’ in exchange for

Chinese investments in infrastructures and the purchase of goods. Most of the

investments concerned railway and road transport infrastructures in the form of

interest-free loans. China had notably agreed to increment its level of purchases in the

country to $6 billion dollars within a five-year period (Oviedo, 2010, pp.452-453).

Furthermore, it stipulated the diversification in the basket of products that China would

purchase from Argentina (Oviedo, 2010, pp.453-454). Likewise, in 2007, Argentina

signed with China a ‘Memorandum of Understanding on Military Cooperation’. The

memorandum established a common commission of defence and included the

provision of military equipment at a discount price (Malena, 2010).

The perception of economic complementary in the Sino-Argentine linkage

resembles to Argentine’s relation with Britain from the end of the 19th to the beginning

of the 20th century. In that matter, Chinese investments in infrastructures that support

the agro-export model echoes with Britain’s investments in South America during the

27 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Victorian era. This parallel has been drawn by proponents as well as opponents of

China’s new role in the region. On one end, the proponents have argued that Britain

provided much needed finances to the country, ushering in Argentina’s golden era

during the Belle Époque (Escudé, 2011). On the other end, the opponents have

argued that this relationship has generated a state of dependency and resulted in the

primarisation of the South American economies (Oviedo, 2006).

This critique was first elaborated by the Argentine economist Raúl Prebisch, a

pioneer in dependency theory (Escudé, 2011). He argued that commodity exporting

countries were trapped in boom and bust cycles as they couldn’t climb up the value

chain. According to his thesis, this is because the Terms of Trade (ToT) - the difference

between the price of the average exported product to the price of the average imported

product - tended to decrease for economies relying on commodity exports (Escudé,

2011). This eventually led to the ‘middle income trap’, where developing countries

constantly failed to match the level of sophistication of their developed counterparts

(Hardy, 2013, p.XXIV). However, since the onset of China’s emergence and the

subsequent commodity boom of the 2000s, the ToT of commodity exporting

economies such as Argentina have dramatically improved as the price of

manufactured goods has decreased (Phillips, 2010).

In the case of Argentina, the liberal institutional theory poses several implications.

Firstly, the comparative advantage principle engenders sectorial and geographical

concentration of exportable goods. This means that whilst Argentine agribusiness has

boomed in the past decade, the local industry has been much hampered.

Nevertheless, the agribusiness has also developed to create further added value

production chains (Hardy, 2013, p.204-210). For instance, the ratio of produced

Argentine refined soy-oil to soy bean has gradually increased over the past decade

28 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

(Castro, 2010). Furthermore, geographical concentration has generated production

clusters that have enhanced productivity and innovation (Hardy, 2013, p.188). Yet it

has also reproduced what Hardy terms the 19th century Belinda syndrome, by which

a landed aristocracy has reaped most of the gains of international trade (Ferchen,

2011; Hardy, 2013, pp.189-199).

Secondly, China’s investments’ in infrastructures have bolstered Argentine

development. In contrast with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank

(WB) loans, those investments are for the most part interest-free and come with ‘no-

strings attached’ in terms of ideology and market orientated reforms (Fernández and

Hogenboom, 2010b). Nevertheless, Chinese loans are often in exchange of

preferential market entry for SOE and privileged access to natural resources (Oviedo,

2013). According to the liberal institutional theory, as the density of Sino-Argentine

interactions increases, so will the incentives for further cooperation (Keohane, 1988).

A careful analysis shows that the liberal institutional perspective sheds an over-

optimistic light on the Sino-Argentine relationship. In fact, in accordance with the

comparative advantage principle, through specialisation commodity-exporting

countries should gain in productivity so as to further their industrial capacity (Jones,

1986).Conversely, the international system, and more specifically the Bretton Woods

institutions, is believed to level the playing field for developing countries by outlawing

practices of unfair tweaking of factor endowments. However, China has emerged to

become what Zweig calls a ‘Trading Nation’ (2010). As he argues, against the

Ricardian idea of comparative advantage, through mercantilist policies the East Asian

model showed that states can create ‘comparative advantage’ by ‘getting the price

wrong’ (Zweig, 2010, p.38). Furthermore, instead of shifting to more sophisticated

chains of production, China has developed in the specialisation of labour intensive

29 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

industries (Dittmer, 2010). In other words, as China has developed it has also

improved its competitiveness in light manufacturing, thereby further marginalising

Latin America economies from the global production chain.

Another negative effect of China’s thirst for commodities relates to the caused

increase in the price of primary products. As mentioned, this has contributed to the

rise in the ToT for commodity exporting countries. However, it has also resulted in the

appreciation of the South American currencies (Fanelli and Albrieu, 2012; Hardy,

2013, p.171). This effect is known as the ‘Dutch Disease’ in which a rise in international

demand for primary products engenders the appreciation of the national currency.

Consequently, such appreciation gradually degrades the international

competitiveness of the domestic industry. In fact, this effect has historically catalysed

the process of primarisation of the South American economies (Iturre and Mendes,

2010).

This chapter has brought to light the inherent challenges posed by the material

asymmetry of the Sino-Argentine relation. The realist prism has presented China’s

incursion in Argentina in terms of a zero-sum game, in which China’s gains were made

at the expense of the country’s development. In contrast, the liberal institutional lens

has highlighted the underlying mutual gains of trade. However, a careful analysis

found that those gains are unequally distributed. That is to say, a relationship

characterised by a positive sum game with unequal gains of trade.

As discussed, China mostly imports raw materials and natural resources from the

region in order to process added-value products. In that regard, China’s interaction

with Argentina is perceived as no more different than the one of historical hegemons.

Both the mercantilist and the comparative advantage concerns drive China’s interests.

30 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

As a consequence, the centre-periphery character of the relationship has deepened

in the last decade. This is notably illustrated by the concentration of Chinese demand

and investments in capital intensive sectors. Such observation has ushered in a

double transformation of development thinking. On the one hand, commodity export-

led growth theories have made a comeback; and on the other, industrialisation has

been dismissed as an unviable alternative. Thus, China’s rise has further squeezed

the already constrained development spaces of Latin American economies (Phillips,

2010; Hardy, 2013). Yet a focus on the social aspect of the relationship reveals the

potential emergence of an alternative association.

4. A nascent South-South imagined community

The concept of a South-South community arose in opposition to the classic North-

South framework that characterised much of the interactions between developed and

developing nations in the past century (Kruger, 2009). In the preceding chapter, this

study demonstrated that the material aspect of the Sino-Argentine relationship, that is

to say its political and economic content, is in many ways similar to the historical North-

South framework. This is because China’s interest in the region is guided by a mix of

mercantilist and comparative advantage concerns.

However, the study has yet discussed the normative aspect of the relationship and

its present and potential impact on the material side of the bilateral tie. This dynamic

constrains how nations project their power. In fact, in contrast with Britain and the US,

China sees itself as a non-Western developing nation. As such, it has defined its

presence in Latin America in terms of non-interference in domestic affairs, respect for

state sovereignty and mutually beneficial trade (Strauss and Armony, 2012). As China

deepens its relationship with the region, it is increasingly pressed to develop a more

31 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

coherent strategy. Hence, using the constructivist prism this chapter will explore the

potential of such dynamic to engender a fairer relationship.

4.1 The constructivist view: Towards a Smart Partnership?

The International Relations strand of constructivism emerged in the late 1980s as

an alternative to both the realist and liberal institutional paradigms. It was developed

in the wake of the end of the Cold War and the subsequent implosion of the Soviet

Union to better reflect on the process of institutions and culture in affecting state

identity and interests (Bremmer, 2010, p.49). The theory takes its roots in the field of

Sociology and emphasises on the normative aspect of international politics. To that

end, it views the environment of international relations, and especially the idea of

anarchy, as socially constructed (Wendt, 1992). It perceives nations in terms of

communities as the main unit of study and discourses as the driving force in

international relations. As described by Wendt, its two mains canons are: “(1) that the

structures of human association are determined primarily by shared ideas rather than

material forces, and (2) that the identities and interests of purposive actors are

constructed by these shared ideas rather than given by nature." (1999, p.1).

Such theory has proven particularly relevant in the study of the developmentalist

discourse which is embedded in the South-South rhetoric. In that regard, the rise of a

South-South identity has been compared with Anderson’s concept of ‘imagined

communities’ (Efstathopoulos, 2013). According to Anderson, communities such as

sovereign states are not materially bounded, but rather represent social constructs

that are the consequence of the perception of a shared identity, a community of

interests (2006).

32 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Going beyond Anderson’s concept of imagined communities, Adler and Barnett

have developed a methodology for the identification of what they call ‘security

communities’. Accordingly, security communities are built upon “(…) the development

of shared understandings, transnational values and transaction flows to encourage

community-building.” (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.4). Such communities have emerged

with the broadening of security to encompass issues relating to economic,

environmental and social welfare concerns. It represents the next step in the

interaction between international actors as first exposed in the theory of liberal

institutionalism (Adler and Barnett, 1998). Adler and Barnett argue that as

confrontation in the international system will continue to occur, actors will result to

internal arrangements so as to promote order and security. As they contend: “(…) a

security community ‘gets out of the gate’ because of either push or pull factors that

cause states to reconsider how they organise their relations.” (Adler and Barnett,

1998b, p.52).

Such theory precisely pins down the ongoing process of the development of a

South-South community. As explained: “(…) a shared developmentalist ideology (…)

may promote not only transnational exchanges and policy coordination, but, more

fundamentally, a shared project (…)” (Adler and Barnett, 1998, p.4). Instead of

deepening a positive sum game with unequal gains of trade, a nascent imagined

community would give rise to a fairer relationship based upon long-term mutually

beneficial outcomes (Adler and Barnett, 1998b, p.57).

Since the formation of the PRC in 1949, ideologically China has remained an

outsider in the international system. As expressed by Hongying: “(…) in the post-Cold

War era, China has stood as an ideological outlier in the world, challenging the

universal validity of economic liberalism and political democracy.” (2010, p.210).

33 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Today, China represents the main rival to the US narrative on the international arena.

In fact, it perceives itself as essentially non-white, victim of the greed of colonial powers

(Hongying, 2010). Furthermore, China has constantly depicted itself as the ‘world’s

greatest developing country’ (Mitchell, 2007, p.XI).

This vision was first expressed in Deng Xiaoping’s 1974 speech at the United

Nations (UN) where he introduced Mao Zedong’s Theory of the Three Worlds

(Mitchell, 2007, p.17). The Theory of the Three Worlds constituted the backbone of

China’s foreign policy during the Cold War following the Sino-Soviet split at the end of

the 1950s. Its novelty lay in its triptych perception of international politics. According

to Mao’s thought, the world was divided into three segments; the first contained great

powers, such as the US and the Soviet Union; the second contained the industrialised

nations, such as Western Europe and Japan; and the third contained the non-aligned

Third World countries led by China (Oviedo, 2010, p.16). Mao’s vision was at the origin

of the formation of the Beijing Consensus underpinned by the Four No’s policy and the

New Security Concept that, respectively, promote non-intervention in domestic affairs

and multipolarity in the international system (Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010b).

China’s Third World leadership was also reflected in international organisations, where

it has demonstrated to be a fervent supporter to the cause of developing countries

(Dittmer, 2010, p.210).

To identify the formation of a nascent Security Community, the constructivist stance

separates ‘structure’ and ‘processes’ as two driving forces in international politics

(Wendt, 1992). The first pole, the structure, corresponds to how the community is

organised and how it is perceived by its members. In the first place, power is the uniting

force for the constitution of a security community. Power in that sense is perceived as

non-coercive; it is a magnet which brings states together as part of a voluntary

34 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

association. As put forward by Adler and Barnett: “(…) those powerful states who

belong to the core of strength do not create security per-se, rather, because of the

positive images of security or material progress that are associated with powerful and

successful states, security communities develop around them.” (1998b, p.40). This is

coherent with China’s self-image as the leader of the Third World. Indeed, its rhetoric

constitutes an alternative to the one upheld by Western powers and has been

acclaimed by many developing world leaders (Fernández and Hogenboom, 2010b).

In the second place, knowledge creates a shared understanding within the

community. As put by Adler and Barnett: “(…) what constitutes and constraints state

action is the knowledge that represent categories of practical action and legitimate

activities.” (1998b, p.40). This corresponds to the restrictions imposed by China’s self-

image within the South-South grouping. In that matter, Wang has demonstrated how

China’s self-image constrained its actions in ways contrary to its interests (2003). A

notable example was China’s unilateral decision not to devaluate its currency in the

midst of the Asian crisis in 1998 (Cox, 2010; Wang, 2003). According to Wang, China

refused to devaluate its currency given the harming effect that it would have had

incurred upon the economies of its neighbours (2003, p.65). In the case of Argentina,

China’s implicit support at the UN for the Falklands issue represents a unilateral action

that is accompanied with only marginal direct benefits (Wang, 2010; Oviedo, 2010).

As such, the South-South momentum revolving around China represents an

alternative structure that is not solely guided by the logic of direct costs and benefits.

The second pole of a security community is underpinned by the concept of

‘processes’. Processes correspond to the deepening of the relationship within the

community through increased transactions, institution building and social learning

(Adler and Barnett, 1998b, p.43). This is notably reflected in China’s strategy with the

35 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

developing world to create an alternative financial and commercial entente centred on

the internationalisation of the yuan (Ovideo, 2013; Rios, 2010). To that end, China’s

Central Bank has emerged as a major partner of its Argentine counterpart. In 2009, it

issued a yuan denominated $10 billion dollars currency swap arrangement for a three-

year period, which was renewed in 2013 (Parks, 2013). Such agreement facilitates

transactions between the two countries and diminishes Argentina’s reliance upon the

US dollar. Furthermore, it represented China’s first ever currency swap agreement in

the region (Redrado, 2010, pp.129-133). China has also assisted Argentine high-tech

sector by investing in INVAP, a cutting edge firm that specialises in the production of

nuclear devices for civil purposes (Escudé, 2011; Oviedo, 2010). In exchange,

Argentina has supported China’s implementation in Space and the Antarctic (Oviedo,

2010; Paz, 2013).

Moreover, China has pressed for the creation of multilateral institutions, such as

the Sino-Latin American forum on agriculture and trade (Oviedo, 2010, p.494).

Interactions within these institutions have generated processes of social learning.

According to Adler and Barnett, social learning represents: “(…) the capacity and

motivation of social actors to manage and even transform reality by changing their

beliefs of the material and social world and their identities.” (1998b, p.44).

This momentum has further been propelled by the interaction between the people

of both nations. In that matter, China’s growing diaspora has increased its exposure

in Argentina (Hang, 2013). An estimate of 80,000 Chinese descendants currently lives

in the country. The Chinese diaspora notably occupies a vital role in the country’s

chains of supermarkets in which it runs over 2,000 stores (Zampori, 2010). Cultural

events also play an important part in social learning. In that regard, Buenos Aires was

chosen as a host city for China’s 2008 Summer Olympics torch relay. The selection of

36 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

the Argentine capital for the Beijing torch relay was of great symbolic importance; not

only was it the sole country of Latin America to participate in the tour, but it was also

the only representative of the whole Spanish speaking world (Oviedo, 2010, pp.476-

477).

Such rapprochement between the people of the two respective nations has only

few precedents in Argentine history. In fact, during the 19th and 20th century, the

Argentine elite had bonded with its US and British counterparts. Yet these links were

for the most part limited to a wealthy class composed of land owners and the

intellectual elite (Corigliano, 2007). In terms of international organisations, the creation

of the Organisation of American States (OAS) in 1948, which reassembles American

states in a multilateral organisation that focuses on security issues, corresponds to a

form of security community. However, the development of such a community was not

the result of a voluntary association but rather imposed by US clout (Oviedo, 2006).

As such, the OAS has constantly been criticised by Latin American leaders for

embodying US supremacy in the region (Escude, 2012; Tiezzi, 2014). Hence,

historically Argentina has been incorporated into communities where it yielded to

external pressures. In contrast, China pursues the discourse of a developing nation

which resents Western imperialism (Dittmer, 2010, p.210).

Conforming to the constructivist perspective, the resilience of the Sino-Argentine

relationship is due to the emergence of a nascent imagined community. Whereas the

liberal institutional view assumes a gradual resolution of the dilemma of unequal gains

of trade, Adler and Barnett’s theory about security communities exposes how states

build order out of the traditional boundaries of international regimes (Adler and Barnet,

1998b, p.52). Among the implications for Argentina, this includes the diversification of

the elements of the bilateral agenda towards the constitution of a fairer relationship

37 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

(Oliva, 2010, p.99). This was notably highlighted by China’s commitment to reform

some aspects of the Bretton Woods architecture, and its passive support of the

Argentine Falklands claim. Consequently, China’s diplomacy has enhanced its image

among the Argentine people. This was underscored by a census which found that in

the past decade the Argentine perception of China as a reliable partner has

dramatically improved (PEW, 2013). Accordingly, in 2013 more than half of the

Argentine population (54%) perceived China favourably against only 41% for the US

(PEW, 2013).

The main limits for the development of a Sino-Argentine imagined community lie in

the lack of understanding and trust between both nations. Language and cultural

differences account to a great extent for such impediments (Velloso, 2010). For

instance, China’s foreign policy still tends to perceive Latin America as an

homogenous, collective region (Strauss and Armony, 2012). Yet recent developments

seem to demonstrate a gradual disaggregation of China’s diplomacy (Hardy, 2013,

p.221). Still, the relationship has been plagued by the absence of trust. Such trust is

fundamental as it propels the formation of security communities by forging mutual

expectations (Adler and Barnett, 1998b; Axelrod and Keohane, 1985; Keohane,

1986).The lack of long-term expectations was most notably exposed in the context of

the Argentine 2008 farm protests. During the protests, which opposed the powerful

peasant union against the government, the supply of soy bean was halted for several

months. As a result, China has blamed Argentina to be an ‘unreliable partner’

(Quintana, 2009, p.7).

The issue of trust has been further aggravated by the absence of reliable

information. In that sense, in 2007 the Kirchner administration reformed the

methodologies used by the National Institute of Statistics and Census of Argentina

38 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

(INDEC) so as to better suit its political agenda (The Economist, 2012). This has led

to the loss of credibility of published national economic statistics regarding matters

such as inflation and trade. In the same fashion, the reliability of Chinese official

statistics has also been questioned (Oviedo, 2010, pp.478-484). This has sparked

much conflict between the Argentine and Chinese economic ministers upon the extent

and content of the trade between the two countries (Oviedo, 2010, pp.498-502).

Furthermore, SOE have frequently clashed with Beijing’s foreign policy, causing

discontent among Latin American governments (Strauss and Armony, 2012; Zweig,

2010). A final constraint concerns the geopolitical aspect of the association. In fact, in

its dealing with the region, China has taken much care not to conflict with the US

interests (Hilton, 2013). As such, many have lamented China’s poor commitment in

strengthening the commercial relationship with an ideological content (Efstathopoulos,

2013; Escudé, 2012).

This chapter has demonstrated how the emergence of a South-South community

represents an opportunity in avoiding the reproduction of a centre-periphery pattern.

Such a dynamic is unique to the rise of China and shares little similarity with the

region’s past interaction with great powers. It represents a chance for Argentina, and

Latin America as a whole, to shift its association with China from a complex partnership

to a smart partnership. That is to say, an economic and political tie based on common

interest and long-term sustainable growth. However, such a scenario only represents

a potential which is yet to be fulfilled. In that regard, the lack of trust and understanding

between both nations has much hampered the constitutive process of a South-South

community.

5. Discussion and Conclusion

39 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Since the establishment of the Sino-Argentine Strategic Partnership ten years ago,

China has shown to be both a competitor and a partner. On the one hand, it has proven

to be a fierce competitor in manufacture production and ravenous in the acquisition of

strategic assets. On the other, it has presented itself as a partner in the realm of

international organisations, financial loans and research and development (R&D) in

the high-tech industry. This duality of China’s new presence represents both

challenges and opportunities for the region.

The main challenge arises from the reproduction of a centre-periphery pattern. This

North-South framework has characterised the relationship of the region with great

powers throughout the 19th and 20th century. It has been at the root of Latin America’s

problem of rampant inequality and weak public institutions. Furthermore, it has

incapacitated the region to climb-up the value chain, squeezing it into the ‘middle

income trap’ (Hardy, 2013, p.XXIV). In the past decade, China’s increased interaction

with Latin America has ushered in a new era of growth and a decreasing rate of

inequality thanks to vast programmes of wealth redistribution (Fernández and

Hogenboom, 2010). However, the content of this interaction has been increasingly

questioned as a sustainable framework for growth (Brutsch and Mihaela, 2012;

Oviedo, 2006; Quintana, 2009).

As this paper has shown, China’s interaction with Argentina corresponds to a

positive sum game with unequal gains of trade. Through the use of the realist and the

liberal institutional lenses this study found that China’s strategy in the region is driven

by both mercantilist and comparative advantage concerns. In the first place, China

fosters the importation of commodities; in the other, it is reticent to import added-value

products. This trait has been amplified by the ‘Going Out’ strategy which encompassed

the acquisition of foreign assets abroad, but also involved foreign investments and a

40 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

global increase in the price of commodities. This latter point has led to a rise in the

ToT to the advantage of the South American economies. But through various

mechanisms, the same process has hampered the competitiveness of national

industries and concentrated exports in capital intensive sectors. This has led to a

relative primarisation of the region similar to the one witnessed under the British rule.

Furthermore, as discussed, such interaction has also come at the cost of the process

of regional integration.

Nevertheless, there are also opportunities to transform the relationship into a fairer

one. This is what has been argued based on the constructivist lens. Indeed, China has

historically proven to represent the spearhead of a multipolar world and of a more

equal international society. As such, it has framed its relationship with the Latin

American region in terms of a mutually beneficial partnership (Giuffre, 2010). This

rhetoric represents a constraint to the projection of China’s power and in the formation

of its interests. Such a dynamic is already occurring although its achievements have

yet to be acknowledged. To that end, the Asian superpower has notably assisted in

the development of several China-Latin American negotiation platforms and has

proven to be a vital lender for the region (The Economist, 2014). As argued, the

development of this nascent South-South community has the potential to transform

the current complex partnership into a smart partnership. But the main limits to the

emergence of such a community concern the lack of trust and mutual understanding.

This observed dual dynamic in the Sino-Argentine relationship between the

deepening of the North-South framework and the emergence of a South-South

community is characteristic of China’s ‘schizophrenic’ foreign policy with regard to the

developing world (Hongying, 2010; Shambaugh, 2011). The inconsistency of China’s

discourse with its attitude has engendered a wide gap between its self-image and how

41 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

it actually projects its power. According to some, this is because the country is still in

the process of integration into the international community (Power et al, 2012). As

such, China is increasingly pressed to offer a coherent and more predictable stance

in its interaction with foreign nations. The coming issue is thereby which type of attitude

China will finally embrace; whether it will deepen the current North-South framework

or push for the creation of an alternative South-South community.

In that matter, China has shown some mixed signals. In fact, following the 2008

economic crisis its image has been enhanced in the region as it has increased its

financial commitments. This was especially highlighted by China’s financial assistance

in the aftermath of the 2010 Haiti disaster (Griuffe, 2010). Furthermore, in January

2014 was announced at the Second Summit of the CELAC meeting in Cuba’s capital,

Havana, the creation of the China-CELAC Forum. This was of great symbolic

importance given that the CELAC is conceived as the region’s alternative to the

Washington-led OAS (Tiezzi, 2014). Conversely, China’s economic strategy still

presses for the primarisation of South American economies. This was especially

outlined in China’s 12th Five-Year Guideline for the period 2011-2015. Developed by

the Chinese economic authorities, this last five-year plan notably stressed the

importance to bolster added-value activities in the realm of agribusiness by the means

of targeted protectionist measures (Balze, 2010). In practical terms, the new Chinese

economic policy would hinder the region’s food-processing industries and further

squeeze its industrial capacity.

China’s dramatic ascension in Latin America is likely to continue in the near future

at the expense of the US and other Western powers. In the case of Argentina, it is

forecasted that trade with China will double from 2011 to 2017 in terms of both its

volume in exports and imports (ING, 2012). Such numbers have generated great

42 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

expectations from Latin American leaders in their faith to broker a fairer relationship

which distinguishes itself from the historical centre-periphery pattern. However, much

will depend on China’s willingness to build an alternative South-South community and

the capacity of the region to foster the adequate environment for such an endeavour.

In that matter, further efforts should be made to enhance mutual understanding and

trust between Latin American nations and the Asian giant. But until words are matched

in practice, such unfulfilled potential is at risk of turning into another missed opportunity

for the region.

6. Bibliography

Adler, E. 1997. Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations.

Millennium - Journal of International Studies. 26. pp. 249-277.

Adler, E and Barnett, M. 1998. Security Communities in theoretical perspective. In: Adler, E and Barnett,

M. Security communities. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. pp. 3-21.

Adler, E and Barnett, M. 1998b. A framework for the study of security communities. In: Adler, E and

Barnett, M. Security communities. Cambridge : Cambridge University Press. pp. 29-60.

Anderson, B. 2006. Imagined communities: reflections on the origin and spread of nationalism. London:

Verso.

Andrés, M. 2010. Modelos de “relaciones especiales” adoptados en la política exterior argentina. In:

Programa Política Exterior Argentina 18. Buenos Aires: CAEI.

Axelrod, R and Keohane, R. 1985. Achieving Cooperation under Anarchy: Strategies and Institutions.

World Politics, 38(1), pp.226-254.

Balze, F. 2010. Propuestas para el Fortalecimiento de la relación Bilateral: Ámbito Político. In:

Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China 10. Buenos Aires: CARI.

Bremmer, I. 2010. The Fat Tail: The Power of Political Knowledge in an Uncertain World. New York:

Oxford University Press.

Brutsch, C. and Mihaela, P. 2012. Deconstructing the BRICS: Bargaining Coalition, Imagined

Community, or Geopolitical Fad? The Chinese Journal of International Politics. 6. pp.299-327.

Castillo, A. 2009. China in Latin America. The Diplomat. [Online]. 18/06/09. [Accessed 1 April 2014].

Available from: http://ow.ly/w3bBL

Castro, J. 2010. Los lineamientos de la relación bilateral con la República Popular China en la última

década (1991-2010). Fortalezas y debilidades en los campos político, comercial, financiero, educativo,

tecnológico y militar. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China 1. Buenos

Aires: CARI.

43 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Corigliano, F. 2007. Ciclos de globalización, modelos de crecimiento económico y paradigmas de

política exterior : el caso argentino (1862-2006). Temas y Debates. 13. pp.175-179.

Cox, RW. 1983. Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method. Millennium -

Journal of International Studies. 12(2). pp.162-175.

Cox, RW. 2010. Historicity and international relations: a tribute to Wang Gungwu. In: Yongnian, Z. China

and international relations: the Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu. London: Routledge.

pp. 3-17.

Dadush, U. 2010. China’s Rise and Latin America: A Global, Long-Term Perspective. Carnegie.

[Online]. 08/03/12. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/wcMu4

Di Masi, J. 2010. Las estrategias de relacionamiento de América Latina con China: estrategias

comparadas. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China 10. Buenos Aires:

CARI.

Dittmer, L. 2010. China's Rise, Global Identity, and the Developing World. In: Dittmer, L and Yu, GT.

China, the developing world, and the new global dynamic. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp. 197-220.

ECLAC. 2010. The People's Republic of China and Latin America and the Caribbean: towards a

strategic relationship. Santiago: United Nations Research Centre.

Efstathopoulos, C. 2013. Emerging Powers and Post-Crisis Governance in Global Trade. In: Annual

Conference of the British International Studies Association: 20/06/13, London. London: British

International Studies Association, pp. 1-27.

Erazo, OG. 2010. De la Hegemonía Británica a la Hegemonía Estadounidense. Una Transición

Económica en Argentina y Brasil, 1870-1930. Revista. 5(2), pp.13-38.

Escudé. C. 2011. La inserción internacional de Argentina frente al ascenso de China. 1st ed. Buenos

Aires: University of CEMA.

Escudé, C. 2012. Principios de realismo periférico: vigencia de una teoría argentina ante el ascenso

de China. Buenos Aires: Lumiere.

Eurasia Group. 2013. Top Risks of 2013. [Online]. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from:

http://ow.ly/w3bK0

Evans, P. 2010. Historians and Chinese world order: Fairbank, Wang, and the matter of 'indeterminate

relevance'. In: Yongnian, Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and the contribution of

Wang Gungwu. London : Routledge. pp. 42-58.

Fanelli, JM and Albrieu, R. 2012. La enfermedad holandesa en Argentina. In: Albrieu, R. et al. ed. Los

recursos naturales como palanca del desarrollo en América del Sur:¿Ficción o Realidad? Buenos Aires:

Red Mercosur, pp.157-203.

Faust, JR. and Kornberg, JF. 1995. China in world politics. London : Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Ferchen, M. 2011. China–Latin America Relations: Long-term Boon or Short-term Boom? Chinese

Journal of International Politics. 4(1). pp.55-86.

Fernández, J and Hogenboom, B. 2010. Latin America and China: South-South Relations in a New Era.

In: Fernandez J. et al. Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations beyond the Washington

Consensus. Oxford: Berghahn. pp.1-33.

44 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Fernández, J and Hogenboom, B. 2010b. Latin America from Washington Consensus to Beijing

Consensus? In: Fernandez J. et al. Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations beyond the

Washington Consensus. Oxford: Berghahn. pp.181-195.

Fernández Taboada, E. 2010. La estrategia del “Go Out”: su impacto en la región y en nuestro país.

Oportunidades que ofrece una relación estratégica. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la

República Popular China 3. Buenos Aires: CARI.

Gallarotti, GM. 2010. Cosmopolitan power in international relations: a synthesis of realism,

neoliberalism, and constructivism. New York : Cambridge University Press.

Giuffre, M. 2010. Comprendiendo la idiosincrasia y visión de China sobre América Latina, a la luz del

primer Libro Blanco sobre la región. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China

5. Buenos Aires: CARI.

Graham-Yooll , A. 2002. Imperial skirmishes: war and gunboat diplomacy in Latin America. Oxford :

Signal.

Grain. 2011. New agricultural agreement in Argentina: A land grabber’s “instruction manual”. [Online].

11/01/11. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3bPY

Guerra Zamponi, C. 2010. La Diáspora China. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República

Popular China 6. Buenos Aires: CARI.

Gurtov, M. 2010. Changing Perspectives and Policies. In: Dittmer, L and Yu, GT. China, the developing

world, and the new global dynamic. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp.21-37.

Guzzini, S. 1998. Realism in international relations and international political economy: the continuing

story of a death foretold. London: Routledge.

Hardy, AT. 2013. The world turned upside down: the complex partnership between China and Latin

America. Hackensack: World Scientific Publishing.

Heginbotham, E. 2007. Evaluating China's Strategy toward the Developing World. In: Eisenman, J et

al. China and the developing world: Beijing's strategy for the twenty-first century. London : M.E. Sharpe.

pp.189-218.

Hilton, I. 2013. China in Latin America: Hegemonic challenge? Oslo: The Norwegian Peacebuilding

Resource Centre.

Hong, L. 2010. Chinese overseas and a rising China: the limits of a diplomatic 'diaspora option'. In:

Yongnian, Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu.

London : Routledge. pp.102-117.

Hongying, W. 2010. Understanding the intangible in international relations: the cultural dimension of

China's integration within the international community. In: Yongnian, Z. China and international relations

: the Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu. London : Routledge. pp.203-221.

Hsiung, JC. 2010. A re-appraisal of Abrahamic values and neorealist IR theory: from a Confucian-Asian

IR perspective. In: Yongnian, Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and the contribution

of Wang Gungwu. London : Routledge. pp.17-42.

ICBC. 2012. ICBC Holds Ceremony to Celebrate Acquisition of Standard Bank Argentina. [Online].

03/12/12. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w2YMM

45 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

ING. 2012. ING International Trade Study: Developments in global trade: from 1995 to 2017 - Argentina.

Amsterdam: ING Economics Bureau.

Iturre, MJ. and Mendes, CA. 2010. Regional Implications of China’s Quest for Energy in Latin America.

East Asia. 27. pp.127-143.

Jones, RJB. 1986. Conflict and control in the world economy: contemporary economic realism and neo-

mercantilism. Brighton: Wheatsheaf.

Keohane, R. 1988. Después de la hegemonía: cooperación y discordia en la política económica

mundial. Buenos Aires: Grupo Editor Latinoamericano.

Kruger, L. 2009. North-North, North-South, and South-South relations. In: Inayatullah, ST. Global

Transformations and World Futures: Volume I. Paris: UNESCO- Eolss Publishers.

Leverett, F. 2010. Resource mercantilism and the militarization of resource management. In:

Alexandroff, AS and Cooper, AF. Rising states, rising institutions : challenges for global governance.

Washington: Brookings Institution Press.

Malena, J. 2010. Las relaciones Sino-Argentinas 1972-2010: un análisis de su dimensión política. In:

Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China 2. Buenos Aires: CARI.

Mitchell, D. and McGiffert, C. 2007. Expanding the 'Strategic Periphery': a history of China's Interaction

with the Developing World. In: Eisenman, J et al. China and the developing world : Beijing's strategy for

the twenty-first century. London : M.E. Sharpe. pp.3-29.

Moneta, C. 2010. La estrategia china de inserción internacional y su incidencia en América Latina y

Argentina: del "Go Out" a un crecimiento equilibrado. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la

República Popular China 4. Buenos Aires: CARI.

OECD. 2010. Perspectives on Global Development 2010: Shifting Wealth. Paris: OECD Development

Centre.

Oliva, CV. 2010. Argentina’s Relations with China: Opportunities and Challenges. In: Fernandez J. et

al. Latin America Facing China: South-South Relations beyond the Washington Consensus. Oxford:

Berghahn. pp.99-115.

Oviedo, ED. 2006. China en América Latina: ¿influencia o hegemonía? Rosario: National University of

Rosario

Oviedo, ED. 2010. Historia de las relaciones internacionales entre Argentina y China: 1945-2010.

Buenos Aires: Editorial Dunken.

Oviedo, ED. 2013. Argentina Facing China: Modernization, Interests and Economic Relations Model.

Observatory of Chinese politics. 7. pp. 4-35.

Paz, GS. 2013. Argentina and Asia, 2000-2010: Re-emergence of China, Recovery of Argentina. In:

Reaching Across the Pacific: Latin America and Asia in the New Century, 20/06/13, Washington.

Washington: Wilson Centre, pp. 1-30.

Parks, K. 2013. Argentina, China Negotiating $10B Currency Swap. The Wall Street Journal. [Online].

13/05/13. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3c1W.

PEW. 2013. America’s Global Image Remains More Positive than China’s - But Many See China

Becoming World’s Leading Power. Washington: Pew Research Center.

46 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Phillips, N. 2010. China and Latin America: Development Challenges and Geopolitical Dilemmas. In:

Dittmer, L and Yu, GT. China, the developing world, and the new global dynamic. Boulder: Lynne

Rienner. pp. 177-197.

Power, M et al. 2012. China's resource diplomacy in Africa : powering development? Basingstoke:

Palgrave Macmillan.

Quintana, JU. 2009. The Argentina-China Relations: A Peripheral Realist Analysis. In: XXI IPSA World

Congress, 12/07/09, Santiago. Montreal: IPSA. pp.1-27.

Redrado, M. 2010. Sin Reservas: un limite al poder absoluto. Buenos Aires: Planeta.

Rios, X. 2010. China en 88 Preguntas. Madrid: Catarata.

Rodrick, D. 2010. Is Chinese Mercantilism Good or Bad for Poor Countries? Project Syndicate. [Online].

09/10/10. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3vn2

Shambaugh, D. 2011. Coping with a Conflicted China. The Washington Quarterly. 34(1). pp.7-27.

Silver, BJ and Arrighi, G. 2003. Polanyi's 'Double Movement': The Belle Époques of British and U.S.

Hegemony Compared. Politics & Society. 31. pp.325-355.

Sotillo, JA. and Ayllon, B. 2006. América Latina en construcción. Sociedad, política, economía y

Relaciones Internacionales. Madrid: Catarata.

Spanakos, T and Xiao, Y. 2010. Has the rise of China made Latin America more unsafe? In: Yongnian,

Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu. London

: Routledge. pp.121-245.

Spence, M. 2011. Changing China’s Growth Path. Project Syndicate. [Online]. 14/04/11. [Accessed 1

April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3c6r

Strauss, JC. and Armony, C. 2012. From the Great Wall to the New World: China and Latin America in

the 21st Century. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Sutter, RG. 2008. Chinese foreign relations: power and policy since the Cold War. Plymouth: Rowman

& Littlefield Publishers.

Teng, C. 2007. Hegemony or Partnership: China's Strategy and Diplomacy towards Latin America. In:

Eisenman, J et al. China and the developing world: Beijing's strategy for the twenty-first century.

London: M.E. Sharpe. pp.84-113.

The Economist. 2012. Official statistics: Don’t lie to me, Argentina. 25/02/12. Print.

The Economist. 2013. Latin American geoeconomics: A continental divide. 18/05/13. Print.

The Economist. 2014. Chinese lending to Latin America: Flexible Friends. 12/04/14. Print.

Tiezzi, S. 2014. China’s Push Into ‘America’s Backyard’. The Diplomat. [Online]. 08/02/14. [Accessed

1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3cfb

Tong, S. 2011. ICBC Pays $600 Million for Standard Bank’s Argentina Stakes. Bloomberg. [Online].

05/08/11. [Accessed 1 April 2014]. Available from: http://ow.ly/w3caT

Velloso, MA. 2010. Emprendimientos conjuntos para dinamizar la relación política, económica y

cultural. In: Estrategias de Relacionamiento con la República Popular China 11. Buenos Aires: CARI.

47 | 2 0 0 5 6 6 9 4 3

Wang, H. 2003. National Image Building and Chinese Foreign Policy. China: An International Journal.

1(1). pp.46-72.

Wendt, A. 1992. Anarchy is what States Make of it: The Social Construction of Power Politics.

International Organization. 46(2). pp.391-425.

Wendt, A. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Xiao, R. 2010. Traditional Chinese theory and practice of foreign relations: a reassessment. In:

Yongnian, Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and the contribution of Wang Gungwu.

London : Routledge. pp.102-117.

Yongnian, Z. 2010. Organizing China's inter-state relations: from 'tanxia' (all-under-heaven) to the

modern international order. In: Yongnian, Z. China and international relations : the Chinese view and

the contribution of Wang Gungwu. London : Routledge. pp.322-342.

Zhang, KH. 2006. China as the World Factory. New York: Routledge.

Zweig, D. 2010. The Rise of a New "Trading Nation". In: Dittmer, L and Yu, GT. China, the developing

world, and the new global dynamic. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. pp.37-55.