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A Review of the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake Event
A Review of the March 11 Great East Japan Earthquake Event
Event Data
Time – The Great East Japan Earthquake occurred at 14:46 JST (01:46 US EST) on Friday, 11 March 2011.
Location - The epicenter was approximately 70 kilometers (43 mi) east of the Oshika Peninsula at a depth of approximately 24 km (15 mi).
Maximum intensity – It was the most powerful known earthquake to have hit Japan, and one of the five most powerful EQ events in the world overall since modern record-keeping began in 1900. It was a magnitude 9.0 Richter event and it rated as a 7 on the JMA scale.
Major Tsunami Event - Tsunami waves up to 40 meters (128 ft.) in height traveled up to 10 km (6 mi) inland.
Property Damage Estimate – Insured losses are approximately $30 - $35 billion U.S.
EQ Intensities
Japan Overview Area Overview
Magnitude Vs. Intensity of Earthquakes
The Magnitude indicates the amount of energy released at the source (or epicenter) and is measured by the open-ended Richter Scale.
The Intensity of an earthquake at a particular locality indicates the violence of earth motion produced there by the earthquake. It is determined from reported effects of the tremor on human beings, furniture, buildings, geological structure, etc.
Many countries have adopted the Modified Mercalli Scale (MMS) to describe intensity. It is somewhat comparable to the JMA scale although there are 12 vs. 10 subdivisions.
Some Magnitude Examples
Richter Magnitude
Approximate TNT Equivalent for Seismic Energy Yield Example
4.3 43 metric tons Kent, UK 20075 480 metric tons Lincolnshire, UK, 2008
6.3 43 kilotons Christchurch, New Zealand, 20116.9 340 kilotons San Francisco, California, USA, 19897 480 kilotons Haiti, 2010
7.1 680 kilotons Canterbury, New Zealand, 20107.5 2.7 megatons Izmit ,Turkey, 19998 15 megatons San Francisco, California, 1906
8.5 85 megatons Chile, 2010,9 480 megatons Tōhoku earthquake and tsunami 2011
9.15 800 megatons Valdivia, Chile, 1960
JMA Number Damage to Reinforced-Concrete Buildings Peak ground acceleration
0 Less than .8 gal1 .8 – 2.5 gal2 2.5 – 8 gal3 8 – 25 gal4 25 – 80 gal
5-lower Occasionally, cracks are formed in walls of less earthquake-resistant buildings. Loading/Unloading stops. 80 –140 gal
5-upper Occasionally, large cracks are formed in walls of less earthquake-resistant buildings. Process Plants shut down. 140 – 250 gal
6-lower Occasionally, walls and pillars of less earthquake-resistant buildings are destroyed. 250 – 315 gal
6-upper Occasionally, less earthquake-resistant buildings collapse. 315 – 400 gal
7 Occasionally, even highly earthquake-resistant buildings are severely damaged. Greater than 400 gal
JMA EQ Intensity Scale1 Gal = 0.01 m/s² and 1g = 981 Gal
Mercalli vs. JMA
Upper V
Upper VI
Tsunami Damage
Why Was It So Big?
The current thinking is that the massive size was due to a large amount of sediment (accretionary wedge) deposited over the fault / trench area. When the fault snapped, the upthrow of sediment from an associated splay fault in the sediment deposit caused a spike in the wave to hit 7 meters which then reached upwards of 14 meters as it reached the shore. Coastal subsidence also added to the size of the event.
“Channeling” through geographical features caused the heights to hit 40 m.
Splay Fault
GPS Wave Gauge Locations
First WaveLargest Wave
Japan Nationwide Ocean Wave Network for Ports and Harbors
Why Was It So Big?
Sendai Fujtsuka Area - Miyagi Prefecture 2008/2011
Sendai Yuriage Area - Miyagi Prefecture 2008/2011
Sendai Port and Refinery Area
Digitally Enhanced Satellite Photo Helicopter Photo
Refinery Area
The tsunami moved inland over 6 km into the Sendai Plain
Japanese Refining Industry Damage
EQ Intensity at Refineries
gal
Epicenter（Mw 9.0）
SendaiIntensity : 1,517 gal （K-NET Sendai）Tsunami height : 7.2 m (Sendai port)
ChibaIntensity : 114gal (on site/ NHK news)
130gal (K-NET Anesaki)
KashimaIntensity : 651 gal (K-NET Kashima)Tsunami height : 3 m (Kashima port)
Source: K-NET (National Research Institute for Earth Science and Disaster Prevention)
Loss Event at Chiba
Loss Event at Chiba
Event - During an aftershock ½ hour after the initial EQ event, a sphere leg collapsed on a tank undergoing hydrostatic testing. This led to a major fire and BLEVE event after a 1¾ hour exposure.
Damage - Loss of 17 LPG sphere tanks plus damage to asphalt tanks and the FCCU CCR as well as several piers and offices. The RCV loss is placed at 10 billion Yen. Six (6) personnel were injured – none fatal
Fire was extinguished after 10 days.
No process area releases or fires reported.
Production will partially resume in late November 2011. Replacement of the spheres will take 2 years and require spacing and other design changes.
BLEVE
Cause - Failure of Bracing Led to Leg Failure
LPG Sphere 364 met all the HPGSL earthquake design structural requirements. At the time of the event the tank was undergoing testing and had been filled with water for 12 days.
The initial earthquake apparently cracked the leg bracing and several of them fractured completely destabilizing the sphere when an aftershock occurred closer to the site off the coast of Ibaraki Prefecture. The collapse initiated piping failures and then fires and finally the BLEVES.
Overhead View Of Aftermath
FCC Control Bldg.
Seaside Office Bldg.
110 meters
Sphere 364
Loss Event at Sendai
Loss Events at Sendai
Fire Event – Fire outbreak in truck loading area which was destroyed. This area handles over 50% of the product shipment for the plant. Fire spread to several tanks which were also destroyed.
Tsunami Event – Heavily effected the plant with salt water damage to pumps, electrics and DCS instrumentation system as well as the required checks for mechanical integrity to the refinery process areas. Tanks and dikes were damaged as well. Some sloshing occurred.
Total Damage – The budget to rebuild the site including planned power upgrades has been placed at roughly ¥38 billion or $500 million. Fire damage is estimated at ¥7 billion or $90 million on RCV basis.
No process area releases or fire reported.
Site will be offline until Spring 2012.
Sendai - Fire
Tsunami Event at Sendai
The site had never experienced tsunamis but the 100-year computer model done by the Port of Sendai initiated the construction of two concrete breakwaters in 1997 & 2000 in order to augment the existing ones that protected the internal port area. Their height was 5.4 m above MSL.
New Breakwaters
Sendai – Tsunami Flooding
It was reported that the water reached a maximum height of 5 – 6 meters inside the plant and that personnel in the Admin. Building sought refuge on the roof of the 3 story building.
The sign reads “Safety Comes First of All”.
Sendai – Tsunami Flooding
Significant damage to sea walls and the CCR.
Source: National Research Institute of Fire and Disaster Management Agency
Tsunami came up approx. 3.5m high from the bottom plate of the tank. This tank did not get lifted or moved although it was empty. atthattime.Much deformation damage to piping leading to crude oil leakage
The height of sloshing wave approx. 1m leading to crude oil leakage on the floating roof
Sea Wall damage and CCR Flooding
Sendai – Tank Sloshing
Height Estimated at 1.8 metersRoof Covered with Oil Due to Sloshing
Source: National Research Institute of Fire and Disaster Management Agency
Sendai – Spheres
Note the rectangular reinforcement plate – Did it help?
Sendai – Overhead – Before/After
Fire Area
CCR
Admin
Loss Event at Kashima
Loss Event at Kashima
Event & Damage - Tsunami damage to shipping piers for local product transfer and to the VLCC berth.
Indications are that a sphere was also undergoing hydrostatic testing at the site and that the bracing cracked similar to the one at Chiba but that it did not totally collapse. There was no fire.
No process area releases or fires reported.
The site started up the 1st week of June at 60% capacity. They are finishing repairs to the piers and the VLCC berth with an end of October 2011 expected date of completion.
Kashima Port – Breakwater
Kashima – Tsunami Damage
Kashima – Some Tsunami Damage
Japanese EQ Design Assessment and Protection Requirements
EQ Design Basis for Processing Sites
Before 1977, almost all of the tanks/vessels were designed using a static seismic coefficient of 0.2 - 0.3 (200 – 300 gal).
The current basis for earthquake design for the tanks and vessels which contain high pressure gases or liquefied flammable gases was established as the part of the High Pressure Gas Safety Law in 1981.
Upgrades were made to the law in 1986 and 1996 (post the Kobe event) and process unit design requirements can now be over 500 gal depending upon the soil condition, the size of the hold up, the elevation of the vessel and its distance to the fence line.
All locations are required to verify compliance with the current laws and to submit proof of compliance to the local governmental authority.
There is no grandfathering of EQ improvements in Japan.
LPG Spheres and Atmospheric Tanks
LPG Spheres are subject to the HPGSL and are required to be piled down to firm soil/bedrock. Designs up to 550 gals are normal.
The atmospheric storage tanks are subject to the Fire Service Law criteria. Atmospheric tanks generally sit on pre-stressed or compacted soil and in some cases concrete rings. In general these tanks are not piled. Designs up to 300 gals are normal.
Additional Requirements for Long Period EQ Events
After the 2003 Hokkaido event, the Fire Service Law was updated and the level of storage was reduced by up to 9% to prevent sloshing.
Large Capacity Foam Monitors – 12 Regions
Monitor Capacities up to 80,000 l/min
Foam Proportioning Equipment
Tsunami Assessment
Tsunami Assessment
Japanese Government earthquake event assumptions– Tohoku Area and Hokkaido - Tohoku EQ of 2011 - Mag：9.0– Tokyo Inland EQ Event – Scenario –Mag 7.3 event occurring at 6 p.m. on a
weekday in the winter. • A significant tsunami is not anticipated due to the inland event
epicenter. – Ise Area (SW of Tokyo) to Southwest Honshu - Conjunction of Tokai/
Tonankai/ Nankai EQ – A Mag 8.7 event – This is the current Japanese Government Model for the next expected major tsunami event.
Tokai/Tonankai/Nankai EQ Tsunami Estimation
Tokyo
Nagoya
Osaka
Source : Central Disaster Prevention Council
Tsunami Estimation for Tokai/Tonankai/Nankai EQ
Play a movie
Nagoya
Significant Points to Takeaway - 1
Tsunami was the major cause of damage in all areas
No process area releases or fires were reported.
Assuming no sphere testing taking place (Chiba) the only fire event was the truck loading rack and tank fire at Sendai
If no Tsunami or a relatively lower one occurred then we are left with only the truck loading rack and tank fire at Sendai as plant damage
This can be attributed to the above average EQ design requirements and good construction practices at the Japanese processing sites
Significant Points to Takeaway - 2
The major damage and losses occurred in the ‘secondary’ or ‘support’ areas.
As a result of the loss to these ‘secondary’ areas the input/output of the facilities was impeded and compounded the BI/downtime impact to the site.
These areas are not normally considered in major PD or BI insurance scenarios and are generally not given the same level of scrutiny or critical investigation as the process units in the form of HAZOPs or What-If analyses at the plant level.
Any Questions?
