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CHER 2014 Conference

Universities in transition: shifting institutional and organizational boundaries

Track 4: Core Themes in Higher Education Research

8-10 September 2014, Rome

A (segmented) EHEA organizational field emerging?

(Preliminary analysis of) Institutional isomorphism and policy

convergence amongst organizations representing stakeholder

interests in the European Higher Education Area

Martina Vukasovic (martina.vukasovic@ugent.be)

Centre for Higher Education Governance Ghent (CHEGG), Department of Sociology

Ghent University

DRAFT VERSION

Work in progress, please do not cite!

Abstract

The study provides preliminary analysis of structuration of EHEA as an organizational field by

focusing on policy convergence between six interest groups representing stakeholder interest in the

Bologna Follow Up Group: EUA, EURASHE, ESU, ENQA, EI and BusinessEurope. The

theoretical framework combines two strands of literature – institutional isomorphism in an

organizational field and policy convergence – to minimize their blind spots: lack of solid

operationalization of institutional isomorphism and lack of robust mechanisms to account for policy

convergence. The empirical basis consists of approx. 150 policy documents spanning the period

from 1998 (pre-Bologna) until present day. The study provides evidence of structuration of EHEA

field overall, as well as what can be termed as ‘segmented’ structuration, i.e. more prominent

isomorphism/convergence amongst five of the six interest groups.

Key words: EHEA, policy convergence, isomorphism, organizational field, stakeholder

organizations, interest groups

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Table of contents

Introduction................................................................................................................................. 3

Theoretical approach ................................................................................................................... 5

Interest groups ......................................................................................................................... 6

Organizational field and isomorphic pressures ......................................................................... 9

Isomorphism and policy convergence .................................................................................... 11

Operationalization and theoretical expectations ..................................................................... 13

Research design, data and method ............................................................................................. 14

Presentation and discussion of results – preliminary .................................................................. 17

Pre-conditions for ‘delta’ convergence .................................................................................. 17

‘Sigma’ convergence for all ................................................................................................... 18

‘Sigma’ convergence for some – segmented structuration? .................................................... 20

(Preliminary) conclusions .......................................................................................................... 23

References ................................................................................................................................ 26

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Introduction

The emergence of the European governance layer in higher education and policy coordination

taking place on the European level has so far been the focus of much scholarly work (e.g. Beerkens,

2008; Corbett, 2003, 2005, 2011; De Ruiter, 2010; Enders, 2004; Gornitzka, 2009, 2010; Lazetic,

2010; Maassen & Musselin, 2009; Maassen & Olsen, 2007; Veiga & Amaral, 2006). Said

coordination is supported by two pillars: (1) the EU pillar1 and (2) the pan-European

(Bologna/EHEA) pillar (Maassen & Musselin, 2009) and is marked by “many smaller, composite

and intricate processes of change” (Maassen & Stensaker, 2011, p. 766) which target different

governance levels, resulting in a multi-level multi-actor governance arrangement (Piattoni, 2010).

These arrangements are essentially marked by three distinct yet related dynamics –

supranational, intergovernmental and transnational – resulting from the type of actors involved.

Some EU structures bring in a supranational dynamic (European Commission) and some bring in an

intergovernmental dynamic (Council of Ministers). The intergovernmental dynamics, in particular

in EHEA, is further reinforced through participation of national higher education authorities and

European intergovernmental organizations (Council of Europe) participating in the Bologna Follow

Up Group. Finally, various interest groups operating on the European level (such as European

University Association and the European Students’ Union) “add a transnational flavour” (Elken &

Vukasovic, 2014, p. 132).

This complexity with regards to different governance dynamics is not an idiosyncrasy of

higher education, but is rather a hallmark of European integration in general (Börzel, 2010).

Moreover, participation of interest groups in European policy-making is also not a higher education

invention; some argue that the EU institutions and the European interest groups actually co-evolved

(Eichener and Voelzkow 1994a, 1994b quoted in Eising, 2008). The involvement of interest groups

is often seen in light of the expectation that the consultation with interest groups will decrease the

democratic deficit of European policy making (Saurugger, 2008), although there are also

disagreements concerning the extent to which the European policy-making actually suffers from

such a deficit (see the response by Follesdal & Hix, 2006; to the work of Majone, 1999; Moravcsik,

2002). Regardless of the potential deficit, the questions of interest for those focusing on interest

groups are why these actors engage in European policy making and what are the effects of said

1 The EU pillar includes the Lisbon Strategy from 2000 and related developments as well as various programmes

supporting cooperation in the area of education and research (latest incarnations being the Erasmus+ and the Horizon

2020 programmes).

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engagement, e.g. whether they become co-opted into the European structures, therefore distancing

themselves from the interests of their constituents (Kohler-Koch & Quittkat, 2011). Related to this

is the question to what extent and through what mechanisms the participation in EU policy-making

and the European governance layer leads to professionalization of the interest groups (Klüver &

Saurugger, 2013).

Concerning European coordination in higher education, the inclusion of different interest

groups into the governance of the EHEA has been connected with the increase in legitimacy (Elken,

Gornitzka, Maassen, & Vukasović, 2011; Klemenčič, 2012; Neave & Maassen, 2007) and the

overall corporate-pluralist character of steering (Gornitzka & Maassen, 2000; Jungblut &

Vukasovic, 2013). However, the interest groups involved in EHEA governance have not been the

object of much scholarly research thus far. Despite having only consultative status in various fora

(various EU consultation procedures as well as the Bologna Follow Up Group) they contribute

significantly to policy outputs (Elken & Vukasovic, 2014), even more so than some national

governments who do have formal decision-making power. Thus, it is important to analyse these

organizations in more detail, what are their policy positions and how these positions have evolved

over time. The point of the departure, elaborated below, is that these organizations represent

different interests, so evidence of policy convergence on the European level would be indicative of

emergence of an EHEA organizational field but potentially also of policy convergence between the

constituents of these interest groups on the national or sub-national level. Therefore, this study will

seek to answer the following research questions:

1. What are the current similarities and differences of policy positions of EHEA interest groups?

2. How have the policy positions of these organisations evolved over time, namely since the

beginning of the Bologna Process until the present day?

3. If there is evidence of policy convergence, how can it be accounted for, i.e. what are the

mechanisms at play and what are the implications concerning the level of structuration of an

EHEA organizational field?

The specific contribution to higher education research is not only empirical – studying under-

researched phenomena – but the study will also seek to provide a theoretical contribution, namely

by combining the literature on institutional isomorphism in the organisational field and the literature

on policy convergence. The study is designed as a qualitative longitudinal comparative study,

tracing back to 1998 (i.e. before the Bologna Process) policy positions of six interest group

organizations which have consultative status in the Bologna Follow Up Group (BFUG), namely: the

European University Association (EUA), the European Association of Institutions in Higher

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Education (EURASHE), the European Students’ Union (ESU), the European Association for

Quality Assurance in Higher Education (ENQA), the Education International (EI) and

BusinessEurope.2 The comparison of policy positions, as well as whether these policy positions

increase in similarity over time is based on content analysis of policy documents of the selected

organizations. The paper continues with a presentation of the theoretical approach and the research

design. The presentation and discussion of results is organized in line with the research questions

above. The concluding section summarizes the key insights, reflects on the theoretical and empirical

contributions of this study and outlines some possible avenues for further research.

Theoretical approach

The basic idea of this study is to combine two strands of literature – institutional isomorphism

and policy convergence – into framework suitable for exploring and explaining the similarities and

differences between policies of EHEA interest groups. While institutional isomorphism literature

provides the basis for analysing both organizational and field level dynamics, as well as

mechanisms behind isomorphic processes, its foundational work (the ‘Iron Cage revisited’ article)

does not provide clear guidelines about how to operationalize isomorphism – “…Nor have we

addressed the issue of the indicators that one must use to measure homogeneity” (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983, p. 156). However, more recent interpretations of the isomorphism concept highlight

the difference between convergence (actual isomorphism) and surface compliance (allomorphism)

(Ashworth, Boyne, & Delbridge, 2009; Vaira, 2004). Interestingly, the literature on policy

convergence makes a distinction between convergence towards each other (sigma convergence) and

convergence towards a model (delta convergence, Heinze & Knill, 2008). Thus, while the

convergence literature has the potential to fill the gap in isomorphism literature with regards to

operationalization of the key concept (convergence/isomorphism), the isomorphism literature

provides necessary elements for analysing inter-organizational dynamic, mechanism of convergence

and emergence of an organizational field.

This section will first introduce the concept of interest groups and briefly outline the key

insights from the studies of interest groups in EU policy-making, as well as introduce the interest

2 The two other organizations that have consultative status within the BFUG are the Council of Europe and UNESCO

(CEPES). As intergovernmental organizations, they do not fit the selection criteria (see research design section). For

similar reasons, the European Commission (EC), a full member of the BFUG, is not treated in the study in the same

way as the stakeholder organizations.

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groups that are in the focus of this study. This will be followed by a summary of main points of

institutional isomorphism and policy convergence literature, presenting also implications for the

study of interest groups within EHEA. The section will conclude with an outline of the theoretical

framework for the study, namely operationalization of the key concepts and theoretical

expectations.

Interest groups

“Interest groups have been steady companions of European integration. They have responded

and contributed to the growing importance of European Union/European Community politics by

promoting their cases readily before EU institutions” (Eising, 2008, p. 4). In an effort to pin down

which collective actors can be considered an interest group, Beyers, Eising, and Maloney (2008)

propose to focus on three key characteristics: (1) organization – implying that broad social

movements may not be considered an interest group, (2) political interest – stressing that these

actors seek to influence public policy at various levels, and (3) informality – indicating that, unlike

political parties, interest groups do not run for elections or seek to hold public office but rather

attempt to influence those holding it through lobbying, provision of expert knowledge etc. Thus,

given the transfer of some political authority to the European level, it is of little surprise that the

number of interests groups operating on the EU level has increased significantly since the early

days of European integration (Eising, 2008).

There are many ways of classifying interest groups (see Beyers et al., 2008; Eising, 2008). An

important distinction for this study is the strategy employed by the interest groups to influence the

policy process. Some groups can be considered as ‘insiders’ – they have privileged status in the

policy arena and therefore have easy access to the key decision-makers and can engage with them

directly, while others prefer to act as ‘outsiders’ – opting for public pressure and use of media to

influence the decision-makers indirectly. The choice of strategy is neither permanent nor all-

encompassing; an organization can shift from one to the other and it can also choose which strategy

to adopt depending on which issue it is pushing forward and which decision-makers it is seeking to

influence (Beyers et al., 2008).3 The choice of strategy is not without consequence, e.g. too much

‘insider’ behaviour may alienate the constituents of the interest group from their European level

representatives (Lowery & Marchetti, 2012).

3 See Maloney, Jordan, and McLaughlin (1994) for a discussion on the ‘insider’-‘outsider’ distinction and warning not

to conflate the differences in strategies with differences in status.

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Such an understanding of the concept of ‘interest group’ highlights organization’s policies

and strategies and sees these aspects (and not structure) as key organizational features. This mirrors

the distinction made by Ashworth et al. (2009) between core and peripheral features of

organizations. They essentially argue that it is the culture of an organization - “values shared by the

members of an organization… beliefs about organizational purposes and how they should be

achieved” (Ashworth et al., 2009, pp. 172-173) – that should be the focus of explorations about

organizational isomorphism, which is relevant for the approach to operationalizing isomorphism

that has been adopted in this study (see below).

Before introducing the interest groups that will be the focus of this study, a short clarification

concerning the use of the term ‘European’ may be useful. In the field of European studies, the term

‘European’ is very often taken to implicitly refer to ‘EU’. Having in mind the two pillars of

European integration in higher education – (a) EU’s Lisbon Strategy and related initiatives and (b)

the pan-European Bologna Process – within this study the term ‘European’ would be used in its

wider, pan-European sense. This is an acceptable extension in this context, i.e. it does not amount to

the problematic concept stretching as defined by Sartori (1970), given that in the case of European

governance of higher education the transfer of political authority has been made both partly to the

EU institutions (though not to the same extent as in areas of hard EU competence) and partly to the

pan-European Bologna Follow Up structures.

The interest groups that are in the focus of this study (a) are operating on the European level,

(b) have been given the mandate by their constituents (members) to represent their interests on the

European level (as expressed in their statutes, founding documents etc.), and (c) were recognized as

representative by national governments participating in the Bologna Process, or EU institutions

(including the EC). Thus, all of the selected organizations are ‘insiders’, although they have not

started out as such in the very early days of the emerging European governance layer (see Elken &

Vukasovic, 2014 for an account on when and how each of these organizations became a

consultative member of the BFUG).

The organizations are different with regards to constituencies they represent: EUA and

EURASHE represent higher education institutions (EURASHE in particular those belonging to the

non-university sector), ESU represents students, EI academic staff, ENQA quality assurance

agencies and BusinessEurope employers (or their associations). The organizations also have

different histories. EUA is a result of a merger in 2001 between two well established organizations

representing universities (CRE – The Association of European Universities and the Confederation

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of EU Rectors’ Conferences). EURASHE was established in 1990. Both EUA and EURASHE

membership consists of individual HEIs and national associations (e.g. national rectors’

conferences). ESU started in 1982 as a student information bureau connecting primarily national

student unions from Western Europe (WESIB), but now is a pan-European umbrella organization of

national unions of students involved in both policy-making on the European level as well as in

supporting their members through trainings etc. EI is a global federation of trade unions from all

levels of education (i.e. not just higher education). In the BFUG it is actually represented by its

European branch EI-ETUCE, which was founded in 1977 as an organization separate from EI and

in 1998 established a committee focusing in particular on higher education and research. ENQA has

been established after an EU Council recommendation on cooperation in quality assurance (1998)

to facilitate cooperation in quality assurance agencies across Europe. BusinessEurope has origins in

the early days of European integration, founded in 1958 (then called UNICE) and is an association

of various national associations of business and industry.

Given the difference in their constituencies and their different origins, the selected interest

groups may be expected to exhibit differences concerning breadth of policies, issues they focus on,

preferences concerning these issues and normative basis used to legitimize said preferences. First,

the extent to which their policies focus on EHEA specifically; some organizations are distinctly

European and focus only on higher education while others have connections to global networks

(e.g. EI) or interests wider than higher education (e.g. EI and BusinessEurope). Contrary to this,

some organizations focus on comparatively narrow aspects of higher education – ENQA on quality

assurance. Second type of variance relates to the core policy topics that are in their focus, e.g.

students focus more on access/affordability and less on research, HEIs more on funding/institutional

autonomy and research, staff more on individual academic freedom and working conditions,

employers on relevance of the study programmes on the labour market etc.). Third, there may be

differences with regards to specific preferences concerning same issues, e.g. students seeking more

access to the third cycle, HEIs opposing such massification in fear of decreasing quality. Fourth,

supporting same preferences can be argued for on the basis of different ideology, e.g. use of student

surveys to evaluate quality of teaching can be argued for using ‘student as partner in teaching and

learning process’ view (expected from student unions), while the same preference can be argued for

using ‘customer protection / students are customers’ view. The extent of each of these types of

variance is to be empirically determined and the distinction between these types will be utilized to

nuance the operationalization of isomorphism and convergence (see below).

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Organizational field and isomorphic pressures

This study employs the DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 148) understanding of an

organizational field as comprised of “organizations that, in aggregate, constitute a recognized area

of institutional life: key suppliers, resource and product consumers, regulatory agencies, and other

organizations that produce similar services or products” and recognizes the potential that EHEA

may have become an organizational field, with organizations’ belonging to the field having as their

primary activity is policy coordination and as their key ‘products’ outputs of the policy process, i.e.

policy documents such as communiqués, recommendations and similar standard setting documents

in which preferences concerning issues are defined.

The ‘borders’ of an organizational field are to be determined empirically (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983), focusing on the top-down dynamic that stresses rules and regulations as indicative of

organizational field boundaries, as well as on the bottom-up dynamic that focuses on organizations

themselves and initiatives they take to distinguish themselves as a more ‘recognized area of

institutional life’ (Frølich, Huisman, Slipersæter, Stensaker, & Bótas, 2013). Organizational fields

emerge through a process of structuration which is marked by (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148):

increasing interaction between organizations, increasing prominence of inter-organizational

coalitions and power relationships, increasing information load and increasing “mutual awareness

among participants in a set of organizations that they are involved in a common enterprise”.

Organizations involved in the EHEA have been increasingly interacting, not only through official

events such as ministerial summits and the so-called ‘Bologna seminars’ but also through joint

projects (often funded by the European Commission), regular bilateral or multilateral meetings etc.

Some patterns of coalition have been already identified, e.g. between EUA and ESU, or ESU, EI

and Council of Europe (Elken & Vukasovic, 2014; Yagci, 2014) and it could be argued that there

has been also some indication of stabilizing power relationships, not only through formal

recognition of status within the BFUG, but also through less formal indications of differences (e.g.

EUA and ESU are more prominently featured in programmes of ministerial summits than the other

interest groups). Increasing number of events and projects, as well as pressure to provide and use

information, participation in consultation processes and be aware of policy positions of other

organizations leads to an increase in information load, which is a pre-requisite for bounded

rationality. Finally, all these organizations indicate very prominently in public (through websites,

publications etc.) their own involvement in the building and consolidation of EHEA, as well as

involvement of other organizations, thus signalling that they are indeed aware of being ‘involved in

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a common enterprise’. These developments give ground to an expectation that EHEA may have

become an organizational field and the next step would be to assess the extent of its structuration.

Before moving to the issue of structuration, it should be clarified that the EHEA

organizational field, in line with the idea of a ‘totality’ of actors, does not comprise only interest

organizations that are in the focus of this study, but also (1) other trans-national organizations which

do not have a formal status within BFUG but provide information and analysis (e.g. Academic

Cooperation Association) or part of the normative basis for the EHEA (Magna Charta Observatory),

(2) other European organizations, institutions and agencies (e.g. EURYDICE, European Quality

Assurance Register which is in essence a product of EHEA, etc.), (3) consultancy firms and

researcher networks that also provide information and analysis, (4) intergovernmental organizations

(Council of Europe and UNESCO-CEPES) and (5) national authorities responsible for higher

education. Focus on formally recognised interest groups facilitates structuration (see above) and

limits the analysis to similar actors in order to streamline the comparison (hence exclusion of EU

institutions, intergovernmental organizations and consultancy firms and researcher networks).

The extent of structuration is closely related to the extent of homogeneity one might find: “In

the initial stages of their life cycle, organizational fields display considerable diversity in approach

and form. Once a field becomes well established, however, there is an inexorable push towards

homogenization” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 148). Turning the argument around, one could

argue that evidence of homogeneity between EHEA interest groups can be used as an indication of

the extent of structuration of the EHEA organizational field. Before turning to the problem of

measuring said homogeneity, a brief reminder of the three different mechanism of isomorphism

(coercive, mimetic, normative) through which structured organizational fields lead to isomorphism

may be necessary.

Coercive isomorphism essentially relies on the existence of power structures and patterns of

dependency in the organizational field and highlight the “formal and informal pressures exerted on

organizations by other organizations upon which they are dependent” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983,

p. 150). The interest groups in the focus of this study are essentially independent from each other,

but they are dependent on the full members of the BFUG (i.e. national governments and the

European Commission) with regards to recognition of their status, they are also dependent on the

Commission for recognition within the EU policy consultations and for funding of both operational

costs and project activities. In this regard, the focus is on interest groups first of all recognizing the

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centrality of EC by developing policies specifically in response to the EC and also becoming similar

in their policies to the policy positions of the European Commission.

Mimetic isomorphism appears under conditions of uncertainty and organizations might

consider imitating other organizations they deem successful. The conditions of uncertainty with

regards to EHEA were particularly present in the early years when the follow-up structure and

procedures concerning policy making were not fully institutionalized (see Elken & Vukasovic,

2014; Ravinet, 2008 for an account of said institutionalization). From this perspective as well as

from the point of view that mimetism also can be part of a particular political strategy to gain

recognition and legitimacy (Radaelli, 2000, p. 28), the comparison between interest groups based on

when they were recognized as participants in decision-making would be of interest – from EUA (or

rather its predecessors CRE and Confederation of EU Rectors’ Conferences) which participated

already after Sorbonne 1998, to inclusion of ESIB and EURASHE after Prague 2001, to ENQA, EI

and Business Europe who were recognized as consultative BFUG members in 2005 at the Bergen

Ministerial Summit. Here the focus would be on interest groups becoming similar to each other.

Normative isomorphism “stems primarily from professionalization… “ (DiMaggio & Powell,

1983, p. 152), and two main features of professionalization can be identified: requirement of

specific academic credentials and existence of professional networks across organizations. This

enables selection of staff that takes place from within the organizational field, facilitates

cooperation between organizations and enables organizations to “fit into administrative categories

that define eligibility for public and private grants and contracts” (p. 153). Although individuals

involved in interest groups are not required to possess specific academic credentials and there is no

formal professional network, there is evidence of staff moving from one interest organization to

another (ESU being the key ‘exporter’, Elken & Vukasovic, 2014), as well as significant

socialization through joint events and projects. Similar to mimetic isomorphism, normative

isomorphism concerns interest groups in EHEA becoming similar to each other over time.

Isomorphism and policy convergence

While the ‘Iron Cage’ article provides elaborated accounts of different mechanisms of

isomorphism as well as a set of testable hypotheses concerning organizational level and field level

dynamics, the article is far less explicit concerning ways of measuring isomorphism. Although the

authors state themselves that it concerns “homogeneity in structure, culture, and output”

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(DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 147, emphasis added) where exactly one should look for similarity

and which organizational aspects should be in focus is far less clear. This is even admitted in the

article: “… Nor have we addressed the issue of the indicators that one must use to measure

homogeneity” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983, p. 156).

Having this in mind, it is first important to reiterate that the basic approach to studying

isomorphism as envisaged by DiMaggio and Powell allows for the focus on organizational culture

and organizational outputs, and not only on organizational structure and processes (as is the case

with many studies employing the concept of isomorphism). The reference to structure, culture and

output by the authors of the ‘Iron Cage’ article essentially provides support to the distinction

between core (culture) vs. peripheral (structure) aspects of organizations made by Ashworth et al.

(2009). In the context of studying isomorphism of interest groups, as stated earlier, this means that

policies are considered as their key organizational outputs. Therefore, isomorphism of interest

groups is understood as homogeneity of their culture and outputs, in particular their policies. In

other words, isomorphism is for the purposes of this study understood primarily as policy

convergence, taking cue from Radaelli (2000) who employed the concept of isomorphism to policy

transfer within the EU and acknowledging the linkages between the process of policy transfer and

its possible outcome – convergence (for the connection between transfer and convergence see Knill,

2005; Vukasovic & Elken, 2013).

Paraphrasing Kerr (1983),4 interest group policy convergence can be defined as increasing

similarity over time with regards to their policies. This approach on the one hand puts focus on

effects of processes in the first place (how similar are the policies?) and then adds a temporal

dimension (is similarity increasing over time?). Knill (2005) further specifies that policy

convergence concerns increasing similarity over time of “one or more characteristics of a certain

policy (e.g. objectives, policy instruments, policy settings)” (p. 5), which mirrors also Gornitzka’s

conceptualization of policy content – objectives, problems, instruments, normative basis and

linkages (Gornitzka, 1999). Interest groups, as stated earlier, do not seek to hold public office and

are thus less directly, if at all, involved in developing specific policy instruments. Furthermore, they

often have a narrow focus on particular policy issues and thus may be less interested in

“coherence/consistency of policy positions over time and over policy fields” (Gornitzka, 1999, p.

21, emphasis in original). Thus, they key elements of interest for this study is convergence of

objectives, problems and normative basis of policies of interest groups (elaborated below).

4 Concerning definition of cross-national policy convergence as “the tendency of societies to grow more alike, to

develop similarities in structures, processes and performances” (Kerr, 1983, p. 3).

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Of interest for this study is a distinction between the so-called ‘sigma’ and ‘delta’

convergence (Heichel, Pape, & Sommerer, 2005; Heinze & Knill, 2008). The former “comes

closest to the conventional understanding of convergence as the decrease in variation of domestic

policies over time” (Heinze & Knill, 2008, p. 498), essentially focusing on increasing similarity of

policies to each other. The latter assumes the existence of a model which provides direction for

convergence, i.e. policies are converging towards a specific model. Heinze and Knill (2008)

employed this distinction, reflecting on evidence of persistent diversity, to explore the potential of

the Bologna Process to bring about cross-national policy convergence(s). The distinction however is

also relevant for this policy convergence of interest groups – they may indeed converge towards

each other (‘sigma’ convergence) or they may converge towards policies of central organizations in

the field, in this case the European Commission (‘delta’ convergence).5

Operationalization and theoretical expectations

A three-step operationalization of policy convergence/isomorphism is envisaged:

1. Increasing similarity of core issues addressed, i.e. convergence of problems and objectives. In

other words, interest groups increasingly focus on similar topics in their policies;

2. Increasing similarity of specific organizational policy preferences related to these issues – i.e.

convergence of policy solutions;

3. Increasing similarity of arguments used to advocate particular solutions, i.e. convergence of

normative basis of policies.

The step-wise operationalization of convergence allows for a more nuanced assessment of the

extent of structuration. From the first to the third step, the extent to which interest groups are

changing their policies increases; the shift in normative basis, i.e. change of ideology which may

lead to convergence of normative basis of policies comprises the highest, paradigmatic level of

policy change (Hall, 1993).

As indicated before, the basic idea is that the extent of policy convergence of interest groups

within EHEA is indicative of the extent of structuration of EHEA as an organizational field.

Combining hypotheses about organizational-level predictors of isomorphism (DiMaggio & Powell,

1983) and the distinction between ‘sigma’ and ‘delta’ policy convergence (Heichel et al., 2005;

Heinze & Knill, 2008), the following claims will be used to guide the analysis:

5 Similar distinction was made by Ashworth et al. (2009) in an attempt to unpack the concept of isomorphism:

conformity to a model (cf. ‘delta’ convergence) and convergence to each other (cf. ‘sigma’ convergence).

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- Increasing similarity of interest group preferences with preferences of the European

Commission, i.e. ‘delta’ convergence, will be considered as indicative of EC’s central

position within the field and existence of primarily coercive mechanisms of isomorphism.

Pre-condition for this is recognition by the interest groups of EC’s centrality, operationalized

here through the number of policy documents specifically targeting EC or other EU

institutions, in relation to the total policy production of an interest group.

- Increasing similarity between policies of interest groups, i.e. ‘sigma’ convergence, will be

considered as indicative of creeping professionalization of interest groups and individuals

involved with them (primarily normative mechanisms). More specifically, increasing

similarity of ‘late-comer’ interest groups (namely ENQA, EI and BusinessEurope) to ESU

and EURASHE, and even more so to EUA, will be considered as indicative of imitation of

organizations considered as more successful (primarily mimetic mechanism).

Research design, data and method

The study is designed as a qualitative comparative longitudinal one. It is qualitative with

regards to type of data and approaches to analysis – content analysis of policy documents of

selected organizations: declarations specifically addressing the participants of the Bologna

ministerial summits, statements specifically addressing the European Commission (or other EU

institutions) and documents explicitly designated as ‘policies’ or ‘positions’ by the organizations

themselves, available online (either on organizational websites or websites dedicated to the Bologna

Process). The data set does not comprise other public documents of these organizations, such as

activity reports, speeches of those in leadership positions, press statements etc. This was done in

order to limit the data set to include only documents that reflect the organization as a whole and not

its leadership (they were adopted by the relevant structures within the organization).

In line with the step-wise operationalization of policy convergence, and given that this paper

presents the preliminary analysis, the policies were first coded with regards to (1) main issues

addressed (e.g. funding, mobility, quality) and then with regards to (2) policy preferences

concerning these issues (e.g. against tuition fees, portability of grants, accreditation of

programmes). The second round of coding was done only for the policy positions addressing the

same or very similar issues. An example of the latter is analysing a more general policy on funding

if it also addresses tuition fees (or the other way around). The third round of coding is still to be

done. The coding will follow the approach in the first two rounds and will be done only for policy

15

positions which exhibited convergence in the second step. Being preliminary analysis, this version

of the paper focuses on: (a) pre-conditions for ‘delta’ convergence – recognition of the central

position of the Commission and other EU institutions and (b) ‘sigma’ convergence based on the

first two rounds of coding of policy positions. Concerning the analysis of ‘sigma’ convergence of

late comers, at this stage this still remains to be done. Thus, the present analysis will provide an

answer to expectations concerning normative isomorphism and pre-conditions for coercive

isomorphism, while the full exploration of expectations concerning coercive and mimetic

isomorphism is still to be done.

The study is comparative and longitudinal. The policy positions of each interest group are

mapped for periods determined by the Bologna timeline (i.e. timespan between two ministerial

summits). The positions are then compared (a) across time for each interest group to uncover how

its policy positions change over time (longitudinal aspect) and (b) across interest groups within the

similar span of time to uncover how similar are policy positions of different interest groups at a

specific point of time (comparative aspect). The longitudinal approach is necessary given that “the

concept of isomorphism requires that longitudinal studies be undertaken in order to examine the

dynamic nature of isomorphic change” (Slack & Hinings, 1994, p. 805), while the comparative

approach is necessary for measuring policy convergence.

The data set consists in total of 150 documents (see Table 1). The data set for EURASHE is

incomplete (earliest policy document publicly available online is from 2008) and this will be

reflected in further analysis. For EI and BusinessEurope, which have policy documents concerning

other levels of education or issues beyond education, a selection has been made to focus on policy

documents which focus (at least indirectly) on higher education and research. For pragmatic

reasons, among others, the analysis at this stage does not include documents specifically targeting

the European Commission or other EU institutions. These documents are reactions to particular

communications from the EU or constitute an input for public consultations organized by the EC.

The analysis presented in this paper focused on the documents explicitly labelled as ‘policy paper’

or ‘position paper’ and this was done for two reasons. First, such explicit labelling by the interest

groups themselves indicates that these documents represent the output of the policy-making

processes within these organizations. Secondly, the ‘EU-targeting’ documents are based on policy

or position papers, often including explicit references to them. Thus, it is considered that no

additional issues or policy positions countering those expressed in the ‘policy’ or ‘position’ papers

will be expressed in the ‘EU-targeting’ documents.

16

Table 1 – Number of policy related documents, including statements explicitly addressing the Commission or other European institutions

group type 1998 1999-2001

2001-2003

2003-2005

2005-2007

2007-2009

2010 2010-2012

> 2012 TOTAL

per group

EUA general audience 1 1 3 6 8 2 3

24

targeting EC/EU 4 3 7 3 10 3 30

ESU general audience 9 10 17 11 8 8 11 13 87

targeting EC/EU 1 6 6 4 3 3 23

EURASHE general audience 1 1 3 5 10

targeting EC/EU 1 1

ENQA general audience 1 1 1 1 1 2 7

targeting EC/EU 0

EI general audience 1 4 2 3

1 1 2 14

targeting EC/EU 1 4 11 9 2 3 9 39

BusinessEurope general audience

1

1 3 3 8

targeting EC/EU 1 1 1

3 2 8

TOTAL per period

general audience 1 12 16 22 22 18 13 23 23 150

targeting EC/EU 1 1 5 9 24 15 9 19 18 101

N.B. The data set on EURASHE is incomplete because their public archives available online do not include any policy documents prior to 2008.

Request has been made to be granted access to documents prior to 2008.

17

Presentation and discussion of results – preliminary

The interest groups differ significantly in terms of the number of policy documents they

produce, which is related to comprehensiveness and length of said documents. For example, EUA

tends to produce a comprehensive policy statement every two years, while ESU has both shorter

and very focused (e.g. focusing on vertical mobility only) and longer comprehensive policy papers.

These differences were taken into account in the analysis, as presented below.

Pre-conditions for ‘delta’ convergence

To analyse pre-conditions of ‘delta’ convergence one needs to observe the ratio between the

two types of policy documents distinguished in Table 1 and how that ratio changes over time across

interest groups. It should be stated that the amount of ‘EU-targeting’ documents depends also on

EU’s own policy-making dynamics; note (1) the 24 documents in total in 2005-2007, i.e. right

before the start of the 2007-2013 Lifelong Learning Programme and including 2006 in which the

Commission’s ‘Delivering on the Modernisation Agenda’ communication came out, and (2) the

high number of documents since 2010 which coincide with the discussions about the new

arrangements which eventually became Erasmus+. Furthermore, the ratio between ‘general

audience’ and ‘EU-targeting’ documents for one interest group reflects, amongst other, groups’ own

policy-making approach; if the group has primarily comprehensive policies (as EUA does), the

number of ‘EU-targeting’ documents, which tend to be often rather specific, is higher. It also

reflects the prior connections the group had with the EU institutions and group’s overall policy

focus; those with a wider policy focus (EI and BusinessEurope) and with longer tradition of being

involved with the EU-institutions (EI, BusinessEurope and EUA through its predecessors) may be

both invited more often and more used to providing inputs to the EU on specific initiatives. The

lack of ‘EU-targeting’ documents by ENQA may be connected to its rather narrow focus (quality

assurance) and it being essentially a product of the Commission supported cooperation in this area

in the 1990s (see EU Council, 1998). The case of EURASHE, due to missing data, cannot be

conclusively interpreted at this point.

In policy areas in which European treaties have shifted the competences fully to the European

level, i.e. areas of the so-called ‘hard law’, the centrality of EU institutions (EC included) is

established by default. By virtue of having regulatory and/or executive power in such areas the EU

institutions have, basically by definition, coercive mechanisms at their disposal. However, EU’s

18

competences in the area of higher education – governing through ‘soft-law’ and use of OMC –

mean that the interest groups in the area of higher education, strictly speaking, can almost ignore

both the EU’s initiatives and the European governance layer altogether. Therefore, the steadily

increasing number of documents targeting EU institutions (in particular the Commission) is

indicative of the recognition of its centrality from the point of view of the six interest groups

analysed.

Although at the first glance the differences in the ratio between two types of documents

suggest that the EC is considered to be rather central to EI and not so central for ESU or ENQA,

this needs to be explored further because, as stated earlier, the analysed interest groups differ with

regards to their internal dynamics, approaches to and procedures for developing policies. In

addition, further analysis focusing on convergence between issues addressed by the interest groups

and issues addressed by the European commission, as well as convergence of their preferences and

the normative basis is still to be done.

‘Sigma’ convergence for all

Given the aforementioned differences between interest groups with regards to policy-making

dynamics, the analysis of ‘sigma’ convergence focused on policy positions across the different

documents within the same ‘time-slots’ and not on individual documents.

At present, there are two issues that all six interest groups focus on. The first one is the central

issue that frames most of the policies of these organizations and concerns the support for European

coordination in higher education research. This is expressed in various ways: (1) as more general

commitment to EHEA and ERA and the Europe of Knowledge, e.g. EUA, EI, ESU, and

EURASHE; (2) with particular reference to EU programmes and initiatives (EU2020, EIT, ERC),

e.g. EUA and BusinessEurope; (3) using the EU’s so-called knowledge triangle (education-

research-innovation) as the overall framing of the policy positions, e.g. EURASHE and

BusinessEurope; or (4) referring to ‘Bologna’ and ‘Lisbon’ and positioning the group’s views in

relation to them; e.g. ESU and EI expressing strong support for ‘Bologna’ but being more

concerned about ‘Lisbon’ and its focus ‘competitiveness’. The other is the issue of employability,

but here the differences with regards to how the issue is treated are more prominent. For example,

EI and ESU are concerned that too much focus on employability provides a narrow view of higher

education, while BusinessEurope treats this as a very important aspect of European coordination

19

(almost as its only purpose) and frequently refers to ‘skills gap’ and consequences of it for

European competitiveness. For ENQA, the issue of employability is secondary to quality, i.e.

employability is discussed only to indicate the importance of solid quality assurance mechanisms,

not as a stand-alone issue.

Tracing these issues back, commitment to EHEA/ERA/Europe of Knowledge appears very

early in the process, for EUA, ESU and EI already in the 1999-2001 period, for ENQA and

BusinessEurope in 2001-2003. Although the dataset does not include EURASHE policies for this

period, based on convergence since 2008 it may be assumed that it will also express the general

support for European cooperation. Concerning employability, the issue appears rather early in

ESU’s policies (even before 1999), and only in 2005-2007 period in ENQA’s policies, with EUA,

BusinessEurope and EI being somewhere in between. For EURASHE, given its focus on

professional higher education, it can be assumed that it has also been focusing on employability

even before 2008.

It is important, however, to reiterate that while ‘sigma’ convergence with regards to European

coordination of higher education ‘survives’ also the second step of operationalization (convergence

of positions), while the same cannot be said for the issue of employability. Thus, if only the first

step of operationalization of policy convergence is employed, the common denominator consists of

two policy issues, and it drops to only one – support for European coordination – if the second step

is included as well. On the one hand, such a small common denominator between all of the six

interest groups can be seen as indication of very limited structuration of the European higher

education organizational field. However, the issue concerns the basic aspect of its dynamic (should

there be coordination on the European level or not) and it has all-around support. This testifies to

the awareness of all six interest groups that they are part of “a common enterprise” (DiMaggio &

Powell, 1983, p. 148) and that this awareness has been present from early on.

One peculiarity concerns some issues which actually featured rather prominently in the

policies of all six interest groups, but eventually dropped off. Mobility, recognition of

qualifications, quality of higher education and lifelong learning (LLL) were at some point or

another in the focus of policies of all six interest groups. However, BusinessEurope does not

address them any longer – recognition ‘disappeared’ in 2003, quality, LLL and mobility in 2007

onwards, while these issues remain prominent in the policies of the other five interest organizations

throughout the whole period, often used as the basic foundation for their position (e.g. ENQA, as

can be expected, frames other issues in relation to quality). BusinessEurope policy documents

20

actually touch upon much fewer issues related to higher education than do the policy documents of

the other five organizations. Throughout the period under analysis, their policies are very much

focused on innovation and relevance to the labour market and European competitiveness, but not

much else.

‘Sigma’ convergence for some – segmented structuration?

In order to further uncover such finer elements of ‘sigma’ convergence, the next part of the

analysis focused on what happens when one of the interest groups is excluded from the analysis.

If BusinessEurope is dropped from the analysis, the common denominator for the five

remaining interest groups (EUA, EURASHE, ESU, EI and ENQA, hereinafter: E5) increases to

include issues related to degree structure, qualification frameworks, recognition, use of ECTS and

DS, quality assurance and European QA instruments and structures (ESG and EQAR), student

participation in governance and QA, and student-centred learning. Moreover, the five interest

groups do not exhibit profound differences with regards to their positions concerning these issues;

the key differences are primarily in relation to prominence of particular topics: e.g. QA is central for

ENQA, student-centred learning and student participation for ESU. In essence, the topics that the

E5 converged towards reflect very closely the main Bologna action lines as formulated in the

Bologna Declaration (1999) and subsequent ministerial communiqués, and the priorities of

Stocktaking exercises. The ‘origins’ of this convergence in some cases are rather recent – SCL

appeared relatively recently as a distinct issue, though one could argue that it was ‘latently present’

from early on in the guise of ‘learning outcomes’. Student participation, however, has been present

since early on, from at least 1998 for ESU (as can be expected), followed by EI, ENQA (in relation

to QA) and later on by EUA (from 2003-2005 onwards). Again, given EURASHE’s position on this

issue for the data presently available – e.g. explicitly referring to ESU as one of the major

stakeholders, it can be speculated that EURASHE converged on this issue also rather early.

If ENQA is dropped from the analysis and BusinessEurope included, there is also

convergence with regards to focus on funding issues and research. All organizations but ENQA

explicitly raise the issue of sufficient and sustainable funding, though there are differences

concerning the relationship between public and private funding. While ESU continuously and

explicitly opposes tuition fees, EI demands “as much public funding as possible”. EUA asks for

both more public funding but also possibilities to diversify the funding base (which ESU sees as

21

opening the door for fees) while BusinessEurope rather generically suggests increasing both public

and private investment. The issue of funding is inextricably connected to how each of these

organizations sees higher education – as public or private good. EI and ESU are in this respect most

explicit, including clear opposition to commodification of higher education in the fear that it would

jeopardize the contribution of higher education to developing critical thinking and democratic

citizenship. EUA primarily refers to higher education as being “a public responsibility”, while

BusinessEurope seems to be inclined towards a predominantly economistic view of higher

education, judging by its references to importance of investment into human capital.

Concerning research, ENQA actually does touch upon the issue only once (the 2007-2009

period) in its policy documents in relation to evaluation of study programmes, stating that said

evaluation should also take into account the linkage between teaching and research. All other

organizations feature research very prominently: (1) as one of the basic elements of their policies –

“research is integral to higher education” (EUA), (2) in relation to innovation and its contribution to

economic development and Europe’s competitiveness (Business Europe), (3) academic freedom,

early-career researchers and academic careers in general (EI), (4) doctoral students or research and

education being ‘intertwined’ (ESU) or (5) stressing their ‘broad interpretation of research’

(EURASHE in one of its very recent policy papers). EI and EUA are the first to focus on research

(from the beginning of the period under analysis), followed by ESU (from 2003-2005 period

onwards) and BusinessEurope (from 2005-2007).

The fact that ‘sigma’ convergence is more prominent if one of the organizations is dropped

from comparison suggests segmentation, i.e. existence of what can be termed ‘advocacy coalitions’

(see Sabatier & Jenkins-Smith, 1993; Sabatier & Weible, 2007) which share a larger common core

of issues and preferences concerning higher education. An indication of one such coalition was

already made – EI and ESU, supported by the Council of Europe, pushing the issue of social

dimension forward (Yagci, 2014).6 The differences in participation in such coalitions may be linked

to the characteristics of the interest groups. For example, BusinessEurope is indeed distinct from the

so-called E5 because it is an organization which deals with issues far beyond higher education.

Higher education is actually addressed by BusinessEurope as part of its focus on skills, which is one

of the five subtopics under ‘employment and social affairs’ theme, itself being one of the nine

overarching themes of the organization. Moreover, other themes that BusinessEurope focuses on

concern policy issues in which the EU has more competences (trade, overall financial regulation,

6 Another grouping to be explored in further analysis is the so-called E4 (EUA, EURASHE, ESU and ENQA) which

developed the European Standards and Guidelines for Quality Assurance (see concluding section).

22

environmental standards, single market etc.). Essentially, higher education is for BusinessEurope a

rather marginal policy focus, while for the interest groups belonging to E5 it is quite the opposite.

There are further distinctions within E5. Contrary to BusinessEurope’s breadth with regards

to policy issues addressed, ENQA’s focus is rather narrow – quality assurance. Although one could

see quality as an issue underlying many others – and ENQA surely frames its own policies in that

way – there is another difference between ENQA and other E5 interest groups analysed in this

study. EI and ESU are in their essence trade unions; EI more explicitly so than ESU, though ESU’s

focus on student rights and student learning conditions and well-being, as well as its members

acting as student ‘trade‘ unions within their national contexts justifies the trade-union label. As

such, they focus on a variety of issues relevant for their constituencies. EUA and EURASHE are

umbrella organizations for higher education institutions, one of which can be traced back to early

days of European integration (EUA's predecessor CRE, Corbett, 2005, p. 42) while the other is

younger (EURASHE was established in 1990) but nevertheless older than European cooperation in

the area of quality (first EU Pilot project began in 1994). Focus on quality assurance and existence

of quality assurance agencies is, compared to universities or polytechnics, a rather new

phenomenon in Europe, even in QA pioneers such as UK or the Netherlands. Finally, ENQA is

essentially a product of EU cooperation in one of the many areas of higher education and research

cooperation, which may have further contributed to its comparatively narrow policy focus.

Further in relation to the second step of operationalization of convergence within the E5

group, preliminary analysis shows first of all a significant consistency of preferences throughout the

period of analysis. Policies change in relation to how detail and specific they are, following the

branching and linking of the different issues or appearance of new topics, e.g. when discussions of

degree structure and recognition lead to discussions of qualification frameworks or when the

concept of learning outcomes is introduced. Although some old policies may be substituted by new

ones (e.g. ESU substituted its 2006 paper on doctoral studies in 2010), there are no direct retractions

of previous policy positions.7

Overall, one could argue that, in particular if analysis is limited to E5, there is significant

‘sigma’ convergence, both in terms of issues addressed and in terms of position concerning these

issues. Further support to the claim of significant ‘sigma’ convergence can be found in overall

scarcity and gradual disappearance of idiosyncratic topics. For example, in the beginning of the

7 Further analysis comprising comparison of normative basis of preferences (third step of operationalization of

convergence) still remains to be done.

23

period under study, ESU (then ESIB) was focusing also issues beyond higher education, such as

racism, intercultural learning, sexual harassment and freedom of expression. These issues are no

longer featured in its policies, though it continues to maintain its focus on student well-being.

Similarly, EI used to put the issue of teacher education as the integral part of higher education rather

prominently in its policies, while more recently the focal point was more on academic staff working

conditions in general, possibly indicative of changes in power dynamics between trade unions of

different levels of education within EI. Other interest groups do not have idiosyncratic topics; even

BusinessEurope (being the most distinct) shares the interest in university-industry partnerships with

EUA and EURASHE (though with different preferences).

(Preliminary) conclusions

These conclusions are based on analysis of pre-conditions for ‘delta’ convergence and

exploration of ‘sigma’ convergence employing two out of three steps of operationalization of

convergence. As such, they offer some preliminary insights with regards to research questions

guiding this study.

At present, the six interest groups are similar primarily in their commitment to contributing to

EHEA and overall European coordination in higher education. They also share a focus on

employability, though with different preferences and framing – some see it as the core and

underlying issue (BusinessEurope), while others consider it just one of the many aspects of

coordination and are more cautious about seeing higher education too strongly through ‘the

employability lens’ (EI and ESU). Five of the six organizations (i.e. E5) exhibit strong similarities

with regards to core Bologna policy issues, including preferences concerning these issues. Even the

organization that does not belong to E5, BusinessEurope, has at some point touched upon some of

these core Bologna issues, such as mobility, recognition and quality. The similarities are somewhat

weaker with regards to funding issues, given that although five out of six interest groups (ENQA

being the exception) address this issue, the preferences are rather different. The differences between

organizations are therefore primarily concerned with the preferences on particular issues, as only a

limited amount of idiosyncratic issues has been identified.

Concerning the issue of structuration of EHEA as an organizational field, the following can be

concluded at this point. ‘Sigma’ convergence concerning the underlying rationale of EHEA

indicates that these organizations consider themselves as part of a common endeavour. Further

‘sigma’ convergence within subsets of the six interest groups suggests existence of inter-

24

organizational coalitions. In addition, all interest groups recognize the centrality of the Commission

(and other EU institutions) and this implies that there are power imbalances. These aspects are

essential ingredients of an organizational field structuration process and therefore it could be argued

that the current study, even at this preliminary stage, provided evidence of structuration of EHEA as

an organizational field. The fact that policy convergence is more prominent in five out of six

organizations analysed in this study can be interpreted as a case of ‘segmented’ structuration; i.e.

some organizations within the organizational field are more subject to isomorphic pressures (in this

study operationalized through policy convergence) than others. This should not be taken as reason

for excluding the sixth organization from the EHEA organizational field, given that it shares with

other five organizations the commitment to the common endeavour.

The key theoretical contribution is twofold. First, by combining two strands of literature –

isomorphism in organizational fields and policy convergence – a clearer operationalization of

isomorphism is provided. For organizations whose key organizational outputs are policies,

isomorphism is understood as policy convergence which can have three levels: from least

isomorphism to most isomorphism as (1) convergence of issues addressed, (2) convergence of

preferences concerning these issues, and (3) convergence of normative basis used to support said

preferences. Second, the combination of the two strands of literature, more robust mechanisms are

offered for policy convergence – highlighting the difference between (a) ‘sigma’ convergence

resulting primarily from normative and, in this paper not yet explored, mimetic pressures and (b)

‘delta’ convergence resulting primarily from coercive pressures. Although its full potential remains

to be exploited through thorough analysis of ‘delta’ convergence and exploration of ‘sigma’

convergence (mimetic isomorphism) of ‘late comers’ to the organizational field, the theoretical

framework employed in this study seems to be sufficiently robust to uncover both the overall

dynamic as well as the nuances related to the EHEA organizational field.

Apart from completing fully the analysis envisaged in this study, possible avenues for further

research include a more in-depth analysis of ‘segmented’ structuration by focusing in particular on

the so-called E5 group or smaller inter-organizational coalitions. A more nuanced analysis of

centrality of certain organizations is also warranted; although there is strong evidence of

Commission and the EU being the central organization(s), other organizations may be ‘runner-ups’

for the centrality position, e.g. EUA being a model for EURASHE. Noting that organizational fields

do not necessarily lead to complete uniformity, yet another focus concerns the ways in which

interest groups aim to distinguish themselves within the field; following the previous example the

question then would be whether and how EUA and EURASHE try to signal that they are different

25

organizations and thus are both worthy of participating in European policy coordination. Finally, it

would be interesting to explore in more detail not just the policy outputs of these interest groups,

but also processes through which these policy outputs are formulated.

Going inside the interest groups and particularly focusing on the relationship between the

‘Brussels side’ of the interest group and their national or sub-national constituents essentially also

has wider implications for European integration, its dynamics and overall legitimacy. In the ‘Iron

Cage’ article, DiMaggio and Powell (1983, p. 158) warn about the dangers of homogeneity in

public policy deliberations:

“To the extent that pluralism is a guiding value in public policy deliberations, we need

to discover new forms of intersectoral coordination that will encourage diversification

rather than hastening homogenization”.

While existing convergence of interest groups on the European level coupled with lack of

convergence of their national or sub-national constituents may be indicative of a democratic deficit

of European integration, evidence of convergence of national and sub-national constituents is not

essentially less worrying – it just shifts the problem of democratic deficit ‘one level down’.

26

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