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A Software Agent with a Self?A Software Agent with a Self?
Machine Consciousness: Complexity Aspects 29 Sept to 1st October '03,
ISI, Torino, Italy
Stan Franklinand the
“Conscious” Software Research Group
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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IDA: an Intelligent Distribution Agent
IDA: an Intelligent Distribution Agent
Detailer
Telephone
Dialogue with sailors
Read personnel data
Check job requisition lists
Enforce Navy policies
Choose jobs to offer members
Negotiate with them about jobsInternet
IDA
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Global Workspace Theory
• A psychological theory of consciousness
• The nervous system is a distributed parallel system with many different specialized processors
• Global workspace contains a coalition of processors
• Broadcasts globally to all other processors
• Recruit other processors needed for any degree of novel or problematic situation
• Explains limited capacity and seriality
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Contexts at work
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Processing in IDAProcessing in IDA
A continuing iteration of a cognitive cycle of activities involving:
• Perception• Working memory• Transient episodic memory• Long-term declarative memory• ‘Consciousness’• Action selection• Motor activity
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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The Various SelvesThe Various Selves
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Baars—Self as the enduring contextBaars—Self as the enduring context
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Baar’s Self-SystemBaar’s Self-System
• Higher Levels of the dominant context hierarchy• Overarching • Enduring• Includes both goal contexts
and conceptual contexts• Not available to introspection• Includes self-concept • Executive function (volitional self)
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Damasio’s Proto-SelfDamasio’s Proto-Self
• Moment to moment
• Unconscious
• Tracks state of
organism
• Proprioception
• Homeostasis
• Implement in IDA
• Operating system parameters
• Behavior net parameters
• Memory (SDM) parameters
• Number of threads
• Computer memory usage
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Minimal (Core) SelfMinimal (Core) Self
• Gallagher, Damasio, Donald, many others
• Self as subject—self-as-subject fringe codelets
• Self as experiencer— fringe codelets (?), always present (?),
function (?)
• Self as agent— intention codelets (are generated when one creates an intention to look for opportunities to do something).
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Extended SelfExtended Self
• Autobiographical Self—Hierarchical autobiographical memory (SDM?)
• Self-concept (Blackmore—Selfplex)
• Self-beliefs—Semantic Memory (SDM?)
• Intentions—Intention Codelets
• Volitional Self (Baars—Executive Function)
• Ideomotor theory as a behavior stream
• Intention codelet for each volitional goal (intention)
• Narrative Self (Gazzaniga—Interpreter)
• Understanding report requests and making reports
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Understanding Requests for a Report
Understanding Requests for a Report
• Perception codelets
• Slipnet nodes and links
• Working memory tags
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Making ReportsMaking Reports
• Motivation—pleasure at responding to queries about self
• Conscious of request—request attention codelets
• Report contents of consciousness • Report behavior streams• Report message scripts
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Is IDA a conscious artifact?Is IDA a conscious artifact?
• Functional vs. Phenomenal Consciousness
• IDA is functionally conscious
• I doubt IDA is phenomenally conscious
• No good argument to support that doubt
• Can you give me one?
• Would IDA with a self be phenomenally conscious?
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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PredictionsPredictions
SERIOUSWe humans will build “conscious”software agentsand/or “conscious” robots,so intelligent, so sophisticated, and so communicative that people will simply
assume that they are sentient.
SPECULATIVE (Sloman)Some day, these same “conscious” software agentswill find themselves discussingwhether or not humans canreally experience qualia.
September 30, 2003 Stan Franklin—Machine Consciousness—Torino
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Web and Email AddressesWeb and Email Addresses
• Stan Franklin • [email protected]—• www.cs.memphis.edu/~franklin
• ‘Conscious’ Software Research Group• www.cs.memphis.edu/~csrg