A Study on the Cryptographic Module Validation in the CC Evaluation From Vendors Point of...

A Study onthe Cryptographic Module Validationin the CC Evaluationfrom Vendors' point of viewNobuhiro TAGASHIRA

Canon Inc.

Copyright (C) 2007, Canon Inc. All rights reserved.

Contents

BackgroundThe Common Criteria Evaluation vs The Cryptographic Module ValidationProposal 1 (Developers Explanation)Proposal 2 (new framework)Conclusion


Background in JapanCommon Criteria (CC) Evaluation :In 2001, JISEC was establishedIn 2003, JISEC became a member of CCRA

Cryptographic Module (CM) Validation :In 2006, JCMVP was started a shadow testingIn 2007, JCMVP was established* JISEC : Japan Information Technology Security Evaluation and Certification Scheme* JCMVP : Japan Cryptographic Module Validation Program


Activities in CanonCommon Criteria (CC) Evaluation :CCEVS-VR-04-0063 from CCEVS (US Scheme)C0010/C0012/C0020/C0027/C0032/C0036/ C0050 from JISECCryptographic Module (CM) Validation :F0002 from JCMVP


The Common Criteria EvaluationStandard :ISO/IEC 15408 (Common Criteria)Methodology :CEMTarget :TOE (a set of S/W, F/W and/or H/W)Top Description :Security TargetFlow :ST Evaluation -> TOE EvaluationLevels :EAL1 to EAL7Action : EvaluationEtc :8 Security Assurance Classes


The Cryptographic Module ValidationStandard :ISO/IEC 19790 (FIPS 140-2)Methodology :DTR (Derived Test Requirements)Target :Cryptographic ModuleTop Description :Security PolicyFlow :Algorithm Testing -> Module TestingLevels :Security Level 1 to 4Action : TestingEtc :11 security areas


CC Evaluation vs CM ValidationThe CC Evaluation and CM Validation are different inAbstractnessFocus of tests [B2-04][B2-05]

[B2-04] Nithya Rachamadugu, FIPS-US Cryptographic Testing Standard, ICCC 2005[B2-05] Axel Boness, A FIPS 140-2 evaluation could authorize CC-like tests, ICCC 2005But these are the same in the point of the view of Third Party Validation Scheme in the IT security world.In some cases, the CM validation is very effective in the cryptographic functionality of the CC Evaluation.


Question!Have the CC Evaluation and CM validation produced a synergistic effect?AnswerNO


Problems and Countermeasuresunder the CC Evaluation and CM ValidationProblems1. It is difficult for an end user to understand the validity of the CC Evaluation and CM Validation.CountermeasuresCNTM1. A developer has to explain the validity of the CC Evaluation and CM Validation to an end user in the ST.CNTM2. The CC Specifications has to define the new framework for using the CM Validation.


Proposal 1 for CNTM1 (Developers Explanation)Write a ST, which clearly describes the TOE and the CM, so that an end user can understand.

Point :It is NOT necessary to change a structure of the ST.There are some sections, which describes the CM.


ST Description (Chap. 1) for Proposal 1ST referenceTOE referenceIdentify the Cryptographic Module,which is in the TOE.TOE overviewTOE descriptionIn the description of the physical scope of the TOE, describe the physical scope of the CM, and a relationship between the TOE and the CM.In the description of the logical scope of the TOE, describe the logical scope of the CM, and a relationship between the TOE and the CM.If the CM has some modes of the operation (e.g. CMVP mode), describe the usages of the modes of the operation of the CM in the logical description.


ST Description (Chap. 2/3/4/5) for Proposal 1Conformance claimsSecurity problem definitionSecurity objectivesExtended components definition

Same descriptions as the normal ST


ST Description (Chap. 6.1) for Proposal 1Security functional requirementsRefinement operations are required.e.g. From The TSF shall to The TSF (CM) shall .If the ST selects some componentsfrom FCS/FPT classes, the developer has to do Refinement operations of the requirement that the CM enforces. FCS_COP : Cryptographic services FCS_CKM : Cryptographic key management FPT_TST : Self-tests FPT_PHP : Physical security (if the CM is validated at the level 3 or 4)


ST Description (Chap. 6.1) (cont)Security functional requirementsIf the CSPs in CM are user data of the TOE,the developer may have to doRefinement operations ofsome components in FDP classes.If the CSPs in CM are TSF data,the developer may have to do Refinement operations of some components in FMT classes.If the CM is validated at the level 1 or higher, especially level 3 or 4, the developer may have to do Refinement operations of some components in FIA classes.

CSP : Critical Security Parameter. (e.g. Cryptographic keys, authentication data)


ST Description (Chap. 6.2/6.3) for Proposal 1Security assurance requirementsSecurity requirements rationale

Same descriptions as the normal ST


ST Description (Chap. 7) for Proposal 1TOE summary specificationSame descriptions as the normal ST


Proposal 2 for CNTM2 (new framework)Define the new CC framework, which effectively reuse the CM Validation.

Point :The Cryptographic Module may be a COTS product, and a developer may be a user of that. In this case, it is difficult for the developer to make design documents for the CC Evaluation.This situation is a very similar problem to a composed TOE, so we could use the same analogy as ACO class.


Study 1 (I/F, functionality) for Proposal 2Interfaces and functionalities of the CMare tested while testing.There are NO big impact on Composition rationale (ACO_COR),Development evidence (ACO_DEV),Reliance of dependent component (ACO_REL),And Composed TOE testing (ACO_CTT).


Study 2 (vulnerability) for Proposal 2There are no vulnerability analysis of the CM.There are big impact onComposition vulnerability analysis (ACO_VUL).


Countermeasures for Proposal 21. Propose to ISO/IEC 19790 WG that vulnerability analysis is tested while testing the CM.

or

2. Define a new family that supports a new Composition vulnerability analysis (ACO_VUL) for an independent cryptographic module test.


ConclusionThis paper showsthe problem between the CC Evaluation and the CM Validation.the proposal for the developer, and CC schemes.This paper is also useful, during the acquisition of the some CC/CM validated products.

Future workWe have to examine a proposal 2 in detail in the viewpoint of feasibility.FIPS 140-3 is planned. We have to examine between the CC Evaluation and the new CM Validation.


Thank you

Nobuhiro [email protected]

Canon Inc.


1 -> A ST guidance to clear the CC and FIPS.2 ->

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