A Tale of Two Cities: Climate ChangePolicies in Vancouver and Melbourne —Barometers of Cooperative Federalism?
STEPHEN JONES
Abstractijur_1083 1..26
The failure of the United Nations negotiations on climate change in Copenhagen presentsgovernments with an opportunity to consider new approaches to implementing climatechange policy. Developed nations like Canada and Australia continue to fall short of theircommitments to Kyoto targets and predict that their greenhouse gas emissions willcontinue to rise. The planning and development of metropolitan areas continues topromote high levels of consumption and increased dependence on fossil fuel-basedenergy. City governments in Vancouver and Melbourne have strong commitments to bothmitigation and adaptation policy action against the impact of global warming. Bothargue they are constrained in their efforts by federal institutional arrangements andrequire improved cooperation from other levels of government. This article uses theconceptual framework developed by the OECD to support greater levels of cooperationbetween governments in multilevel systems when implementing climate change policies.The article examines the contextual factors inherent in the institutional arrangements anduses the experiences of Vancouver and Melbourne to explore the factors that encourageor discourage cooperation in climate change policy.
IntroductionBoth Vancouver and Melbourne city councils have been concerned about the likelyimpacts of global warming within their city boundaries. In reflecting the concernsidentified within their communities these councils argue climate change is an issuerequiring a public policy response. Current research shows these cities are likely to besubject to extreme weather events, higher temperatures and rising sea levels (COV,2008a; MCC, 2008). Based on this research these councils have implemented policiesaimed at both reducing greenhouse gas emissions and adapting to the impacts of globalwarming. Activities such as construction, land use planning and transport are seen tosignificantly influence overall consumption patterns and contribute to global warming(Sánchez-Rodríguez et al., 2005). Of major concern is the continued increase ofgreenhouse gas (GHG) emissions, based on current consumption and developmenttrends, as a result of rising populations (Sathaye et al., 2007). This is an issue ofparticular relevance in Canada and Australia where average consumption patternsproduce greenhouse gas emissions on a per capita and per unit GDP basis that are amongthe highest in the world (OECD, 2004: 187; 2008). City government policies, includingsustainability and climate change initiatives, focus on the reduction in the impact of
I would like to thank Professor Ken Wiltshire and the IJURR reviewers for their helpful insights andsuggestions during the completion of this article.
International Journal of Urban and Regional ResearchDOI:10.1111/j.1468-2427.2011.01083.x
human activities on the environment. Without the introduction of these policies, thesegovernments argue, there is a reasonable likelihood extreme weather events will have anegative impact on infrastructure, property, public health and safety, and the ecology ofeach city (CSIRO, 2007; Henstra and McBean, 2009).
Despite policy commitments by city leaders there are arguments that city governmentsare constrained by federal institutional arrangements that place limitations on the typesof policies they can introduce (Kousky and Schneider 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006).Recent examination of city-based climate change policies suggests that while citygovernments have been policy activists they have not pursued all available options.Instead they have introduced measures that are largely symbolic and focus primarily ontheir own activities (Kern and Alber, 2008). Evidence suggests city governments havebeen reluctant or unable to pursue regulatory policy instruments to mitigate against andadapt to the impact of climate change (ibid.).
National and state/provincial governments are seen to place limitations on citygovernments, thereby restricting their capacity to implement effective climate changepolicies. As a result they remain constrained by a situation in which they have no controland little influence (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2005). Underlying this argument is the viewthat national and state/provincial governments have been reluctant to align climatechange policy with city development issues resulting in city governments being largelyignored in current national and international debates. In addition, where thesegovernments have introduced climate change policies, they have been reluctant tocoordinate their efforts and as a result there are questions over waste, duplication andoverall effectiveness (Charbit and Michalun, 2009). As a result questions arise over thefuture development of cities and their impact on global warming. A shift to moreeffective regulatory climate change frameworks in federal systems like Canada andAustralia depends on cooperative relationships between the layers of government.
Both Canadians and Australians place a high value on a cooperative approach topolicy development in their federal systems. There is strong support in both countries fora cooperative style of federalism on most issues (Cutler and Mendelsohn, 2001; Brown,2010; Fafard et al., 2010). Climate change is variously described as a wicked (Head,2008) or diabolical (Garnaut, 2007) policy problem and one of the ‘most pressing issuesof our new century’ (Kamal-Chaoui, 2008: 29). Solutions will require both vertical andhorizontal cooperative approaches by governments if effective policies and regulatoryinstruments are to be established (OECD, 2009). The focus of this article will be onclimate change policies in Canada and Australia with a particular emphasis on theVancouver and Melbourne city governments. These cities have a strong commitment toclimate change policies that cover both mitigation and adaptation. The experience ofthese cities is instructive for cities generally and particularly for those in federal systemsseeking to improve intergovernmental cooperation. Representatives of these citygovernments argue they have been constrained by federal arrangements in effectivelyimplementing their policy initiatives. This research shows that these constraints are forcontrasting reasons and therefore provide the opportunity to examine the contribution ofthe institutional context, the relationships between governments and insight into thepotential for cooperative action on sustainability and climate change issues.
The OECD argues that when national and state/provincial governments do not workin partnership with local governments they risk establishing climate change policies thatwill be ineffective (OECD, 2009). The contribution of this article is to extend the debateon the critical elements to building cooperative arrangements in federal systems likeCanada and Australia particularly those urban/metropolitan factors impacting on globalwarming. The article uses the conceptual framework developed by the OECD to supportgreater levels of cooperation between governments in multilevel systems whenimplementing climate change policies (OECD, 2009). Analyses of policy developmentsand governance in complex systems like Canada and Australia can be gainfullyconducted using qualitative- and case-study-based approaches. This article will utilizequalitative analysis based largely on personal interviews with key policy actors in
state/provincial governments, city government agencies and representatives of non-government organizations with special interest in municipal policy and climate change.Both primary and secondary resources have been consulted to support the conclusions.This approach will provide understanding of the policy process through observation ofactual practice and deeper understanding of the nature and complexity of the subject(Meredith, 1998).
A framework for analysisThe debate on climate change policy in federal systems tends to focus on issues such assubsidiarity, barriers and constraints, capacity and the most effective policy instrumentsto mitigate against and adapt to climate change (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2007).Policymaking capacity is also an increasingly important issue. Recent studies suggestthat, even in countries with advanced economies such as Canada and Australia, thecapacity to undertake policy analysis found in many government and non-governmentalactors is low, potentially contributing to failures in both evidence-based policymakingand the ability to deal effectively with many complex contemporary policy challenges(Howlett, 2009). Of particular concern is the argument that policymaking skills seem tobe on a sliding scale with the greatest capacity at the national level. State/provincial andlocal governments are seen to have the weakest capacity for policy analysis in both theCanadian and Australian systems (Kloot and Martin, 2007; McArthur, 2007; Stewart andSmith, 2007). Such findings increase the need for the identification of appropriate rolesand responsibilities for governments in federal systems to develop and implementpolicies to deal with complex multidimensional issues.
A review of the literature reveals four general factors that shape local capacity toaddress climate change, these are: commitment of political leadership, the competency ofmunicipal practitioners and policymakers, the availability of adequate resources and thenature of urban political economies (Bulkeley and Betsill, 2003; Betsill and Bulkeley,2007; Kern and Alber, 2008; Schreurs, 2008; Gore et al., 2009). Work by Bulkeley et al.(2009) provides recommendations for policymakers at the local, sub-national andnational level regarding a series of priorities for raising capacity and improvingcooperative arrangements for climate change action. At the local level priorities include;mainstreaming of climate change decisions across the policy spectrum, the centralizingof the climate change function within the bureaucracy, localizing climate change issuesto garner political support, and stakeholder engagement to establish a comprehensivelocal strategy. The priorities for national and sub-national governments include therecognition of the role of local governments, the allocation of resources to support localaction and the coordination of policy effort between levels of government over climatechange and other social, economic and environmental priorities (Bulkeley et al., 2009:83). These recommendations present important lessons for policymakers in multilevelsystems and they have provided useful theoretical foundations for climate change action.
It is difficult to find a neutral framework for comparing policy experience betweenfederal systems; comparisons will always have intrinsic noise. A framework (Table 1)developed by the OECD, after examining initiatives by a number of member countries,attempts to shape more comprehensively the context for more cooperative policyimplementation for climate change in multilevel systems and account for andaccommodate policymaking capacity. The methodology of the OECD framework is acrude instrument relying on published data, formal structures and announced processes,which will not necessarily reflect nuances in different political systems. But theframework is a logical place to start as it adds details such as specific areas ofresponsibility, legislative capacity, resource allocation and monitoring responsibilitiesfor each level of government and, as such, provides a starting point which this article willsupplement with Australian and Canadian comparative material. According to the
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framework the three drivers that shape approaches by each level of government are first,government functions and roles; second, key institutions or actors and third, theappropriate tools for decision making (see Table 1). The central argument is that ‘howeach of these different clusters join up to work together across [a] scale will determinethe boundaries for decision making and alter the outcomes at any particular level’(OECD, 2009: 46).
According to Himmelman (2002: 2) cooperation becomes possible when there is anexchange of information, altering activities and resource sharing for mutual benefit inpursuit of a common purpose. In cooperative arrangements, formal agreements can beused that require shared resources, common methodologies and higher levels of time andtrust, in contrast to less-binding strategies of networking and coordination. Critical tosuccess in cooperative arrangements is the allocation and coordination of roles and theidentification of responsibilities and accountabilities between the levels of government.More formal or contractual agreements can help to maximize the relevance of eachcontribution in accordance with capacity, based on principles of subsidiarity in allocatingtasks that avoid duplication and overlap (Himmelman, 2002). Under such conditions theweaknesses of less formal and structured approaches can be reduced and the potentialbenefits of federal frameworks can be maximized. The OECD framework does notprescribe such levels of formality for political responsibility or accountability tocooperative arrangements, and this may be seen as a weakness particularly in federalsystems based on Westminster principles. The framework does, however, provide for thedevelopment of measurement protocols and performance monitoring which are keyingredients for the establishment of contractual obligations between relevant policyactors. The value of cooperation in federal systems comes when there are opportunitiesfor bottom-up as well as top-down approaches to decision making and implementation:‘experimentation and learning at the local level can provide essential experience and,when successful, lead to bottom-up diffusion of approaches between cities and regions aswell as to influence national and even international levels of actions’ (OECD, 2009: 45).
The city as contextThe development of cities is seen to contribute to higher consumption patterns,unsustainable land use management and poorly designed transport systems. These factorscombine to generate a significant proportion of the world’s greenhouse gas emissionsthereby contributing disproportionately to climate change (Sánchez-Rodríguez et al.,2005). Supporting these conclusions is research by the OECD that identifies consumptionpatterns within developed-nation cities as the most significant contributors to globalwarming, producing up to 70% of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions (OECD, 2009: 16).
Population concentration is predicted to continue as a central driver of climate changeissues in both developed and developing nations. UN research argues ‘urban areas of theworld are expected to absorb all the population growth expected over the next fourdecades’ (UN, 2010: 1). Vancouver and Melbourne are part of this phenomenon as theyare predicted to experience high rates of population growth over the coming decades. InAustralia, 80% of the population already live in metropolitan areas. Melbourne isAustralia’s second largest, and fastest growing state capital city — its population ispredicted to grow from the current 3.7 million to 5 million by 2026 (ABS, 2008).Canadians also prefer city living, with 80% living in urban areas and with Vancouverbeing the third most populous city. The Vancouver metropolitan area is expected to growfrom approximately 2 million to over 3 million by 2030 (Metro Vancouver, 2009).
Alternative views on the role of cities suggest they can be developed in ways thatcould have a more positive impact in reducing global warming. Dodman (2009) arguesthere has been a failure to recognize that the varied consequences of globalenvironmental change are likely to affect different urban areas in a variety of ways.
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Satterthwaite (2008) argues many of the processes implicit in urbanization can have apositive overall effect on the environment as urban residents can generate a substantiallysmaller volume of GHG emissions than rural and regional residents. The argument hereis that well-designed urban developments can reduce the impact of high populationdensities on global warming. The approaches to high-density urban/metropolitanplanning in many European cities, for example Copenhagen and Amsterdam, areheralded as providing a high quality of life without the same levels of energyconsumption of low-density cities typical in Australia and Canada.
Vancouver is widely recognized as one of the best planned cities in North America(Punter, 2003). Practices such as stopping freeway intrusions into the city, promotingneighbourhood conservation and replacing redundant industrial land with high-densityresidential neighbourhoods has endeared Vancouver to city planners as an example forothers to follow in terms of traffic management and the control of urban sprawl(Sandercock, 2005; Mees, 2007). Melbourne is also recognized for its approach to urbandesign. An award winning planning framework developed by the city government placesemphasis on supporting higher density settlement patterns and incentives for low-impacttransport alternatives (Adams, 2009). Both cities consistently rank highly oninternational quality of life indices that include perceptions of cultural, social, economic,political and environmental factors (Mercer Human Resources, 2009). For writers suchas Dodman and Satterthwaite (2009) well-planned and governed cities provide the onlyhope of ‘de-linking high quality of life from high levels of consumption’, which theyargue is the critical factor leading to reducing human contribution to global warming.
National approachesThe potential for cooperative national action on climate change in Canada and Australiawill be determined by political will and shaped by institutional arrangements. Historyshows Australian federal relationships trending towards the centre with political andeconomic power gradually shifting to the national government (Craven, 2005; Wiltshire,2005). Australian states have ceded much of their constitutional power through fiscalpressure from the national government to comply with its objectives. In Canada the trendhas been less centrist with provinces willing to resist national pressure and in some caseswork together to develop their own national policies in those areas where they haveconstitutional responsibilities (Cameron and Simeon, 2002; Lecours and Beland, 2010).In both cases however, there has been a considerable degree of federal involvement inmunicipal and urban affairs despite the lack of constitutional formality for thearrangements (Troy, 1995; Berdahl, 2004; Bradford, 2005; Lightbody, 2006; Stoney andGraham, 2009; Gleeson et al., 2010). Most recently the implementation of the Gas TaxFund by the Canadian government has seen funding directed towards local infrastructureprojects, GHG emissions reduction initiatives and clean air and clean water projects(Stoney and Graham, 2009). Federal–municipal relations tend to be determined byfederal interest in issues that have a local focus but with national political consequences.In 2003 the Martin Government in Canada undertook a series of municipal-levelinitiatives in areas such as infrastructure, declining economic competitiveness, urbansprawl and environmental degradation. More recently, the Harper Government hasreflected the federal tradition of being less inclined to be involved with what it regards asmunicipal affairs.
The national governments of Canada and Australia are both signatories to the KyotoProtocol which binds them to reducing GHG emissions to at least 5% below 1990 levelsin the commitment period 2008–12. Both governments express support for reducingGHG emissions but do not have legislated targets. In complying with their commitmentsto the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC) bothgovernments have passed legislation establishing a framework for a national greenhouse
and energy measurement and reporting system for business and government. Australiahas established a central agency (Department of Climate Change and Energy Efficiency)to administer climate change programmes and coordinate initiatives with other levels ofgovernment; at the time of writing no comparable agency operates at the national levelin Canada. In both cases constitutional arrangements require the cooperation of state/provincial governments if federal initiatives are to have an effect, particularly in areascritical to climate change like energy supply, urban development planning and transport.
Despite the rhetoric of commitment the Canadian Government has only been willingto issue a ‘Notice of Intent’ to develop and implement regulations and other measures toregulate industrial GHG and air pollutant emissions. Details of these proposals areprovided in the Turning the Corner plan (EC, 2010a) which outlines the Canadianapproach for reducing greenhouse gas and air pollution emissions from industry. Theplan proposes regulatory measures to reduce emissions from the transportation sector,action on consumer and commercial products, and policies to improve indoor air quality.However, the combined effect of all Canadian government initiatives is ‘not expected toresult in quantifiable reductions in emissions by 2012’ (EC, 2010b: 29). In an attempt tobuild on its commitment to the Kyoto Protocol the Canadian government announced in2008 a commitment to work with provincial and territorial governments to developbilateral agreements, such as a North America-wide cap and trade system for greenhousegases. However, since the announcement there has been no serious action on developingsuch agreements. The current Prime Minister, Harper, has failed to build on previousattempts to pursue the federal/provincial negotiations of his predecessors (Macdonald,2009). Regional economic interests have contributed to resistance to cooperation.Provinces reliant on fossil fuel exports, like Alberta and Saskatchewan that also providecritical political support for the minority Harper Government, have been opposed toagreements that attempt to limit GHG emissions. A private members bill, ClimateChange Accountability Act (Bill C-311), outlining national regulations and policies toattain a long-term target of reducing greenhouse gas emissions was introduced in thenational parliament, but was subsequently defeated by the government in the Senate inNovember 2010.
The Australian government established its first Climate Change Strategy in 2004. Keythemes that continue in subsequent iterations of the strategy are: (1) internationalcooperation to secure an effective global response to climate change; (2) research anddevelopment to further improve understanding of climate change processes andconsequences; and (3) emissions control to lower GHG emissions per unit GDP overtime. In terms of emissions control the Australian government has been moving towardsa domestic emissions trading system, with the support of the states, with an aspirationalgoal of 5% below 2000 levels by 2020 to commence no later than 2012. Prior to 2007 thestates and territories had been working independently of the national government toexamine the possibility of establishing a joint emissions trading scheme. The election ofthe Rudd Government in late 2007 resulted in the federal government signing the KyotoProtocol and gaining the agreement of the states to establish a national approach toclimate change. In May 2010 the national government, without consulting with thestates, ‘postponed’ commitment to the introduction of climate change legislation until2013 due to what it argued were international difficulties emerging from the failure of theCopenhagen climate change negotiations and domestic political issues (CA, 2010).Other factors contributing to delay included the blocking of the proposed legislationthrough the Senate and a lowering of public support for the Rudd Government’sapproach to climate change and an emissions trading scheme (Lowy Institute, 2010).
Cooperation between the levels of government in both countries on a number ofclimate change issues is facilitated through intergovernmental Ministerial Councils likethe Canadian Council for Ministers of the Environment, and the Australian Council ofEnergy Ministers. Unlike the central coordinating function of the Australian Council ofAustralian Governments (COAG), the Canadian system has not had a formalized centralarrangement for vertical and horizontal coordination of climate change policies
Climate change policies in Vancouver and Melbourne 7
developed by these Ministerial Councils for over a decade. Under the COAG frameworkall states and territories agreed to review their existing climate change programmes andto develop measures that were to be complementary to the national emissions tradingscheme (DCC, 2010). Australian state and territory governments, under the leadership ofPrime Minister Rudd, agreed to a standard national approach to greenhouse and energyreporting under the National Greenhouse and Energy Reporting Act 2007. The Canadiangovernment has resisted placing climate change on the agenda of the ‘occasional’meetings of first ministers. Aligning climate change policies with those of the US hasbeen the most critical element of Prime Minister Harper’s overall approach since early2010. It will, therefore, be unlikely for an effective Canadian climate change strategy toemerge without the US taking the first step (Gore, 2010). Canadian sensitivity to theeconomic advantage of its powerful neighbour determines a ‘wait and see’ approach andthe close integration of any commitments to US proposals to GHG emissions. The twogovernments established the Clean Energy Dialogue in 2009 with the intent ofcooperation on the development of clean energy science and technologies to reducegreenhouse gases and combat climate change.
A number of national programmes in both countries provide incentives to localgovernment to encourage sustainability through energy efficiency in buildingconstruction, and support for energy efficient retrofits for houses and commercialbuildings. Canadian programmes that provide federal funds to local governments forsustainability demonstration projects, such as the Green Municipal Fund, bypassprovincial government involvement. Other policies provide tax credits for the use ofpublic transport, and financial incentives for the purchase of fuel-efficient vehicles. Somesuggest such programmes often serve as the drivers for city government interestin climate change initiatives (Sancton, 2006). National measures to support citygovernments are restricted in their scope in Canada partly by resistance from provincialgovernments to interference in their concerns. An important example is the attempt bythe federal government to influence urban development through the New Deal for Citiesand Communities programmes between 2004 and 2006 which were outside traditionalCanadian intergovernmental arrangements and suffered from lack of support for whatbecame a federal intrusion in provincial affairs (Bradford, 2007). A more successfulinitiative has been the Vancouver Agreement, a project-based tri-level agreement dealingwith homelessness in Vancouver. The Agreement has been praised as a model for whatcan be achieved at the city level when the three levels of government work together(Canada, 2005; Stoney and Graham, 2009). Similarly, the Australian government’sBetter Cities programme in the early 1990s provided national funding for demonstrationprojects for cooperative approaches to sustainable urban development (Diver et al.,1996). While the projects achieved some success, the programme was abandoned bysubsequent national governments on the basis that urban issues are the responsibility ofstate and local governments. In both countries there has been criticism over the lack ofnational sustainable development strategies to support coherence and coordinationof government policy (HSCEH, 2005; ECO, 2009).
Do these federal initiatives provide opportunities for cooperative arrangements withother levels of government, particularly city governments, in keeping with the OECDframework? Recent assessments of the Canadian situation point to the difficulty ofobtaining domestic consensus on the Kyoto Protocol largely due to concerns over thesharing of costs to achieve the proposed targets (OECD, 2004: 191). It is the lack of aprice on carbon as a driver of change that is preventing reductions in GHG emissionsthrough the development of more comprehensive climate change programmes. Lack ofcommitment on this issue in both countries serves as a major obstacle in implementingeffective measures on climate change. As the head of the Australian Department ofClimate Change argues:
Putting an economy-wide price on carbon is a fundamental requirement to meet our climatechallenge. Without an overarching carbon price, there will be a resort to a complex patchwork
of regulatory and other measures across the Commonwealth and the States, all interacting inunpredictable ways and creating large and unnecessary compliance costs for business(Parkinson, 2010: 6).
Without the political will to establish national near and long-term targets Canadaand Australia are failing to meet one of the fundamental requirements of the OECDframework and the common purpose needed for effective intergovernmentalcooperation on climate change. Unfortunately the record in both countries of federalinvolvement in complex environmental and sustainability issues has not beenencouraging. The Canadian government confirmed it expected Canada’s emissions tocontinue rising every year from 2009 to 2012, even with the reduction measures it isimplementing (EC, 2010a: 34). The Canadian Environment Commissioner continues tobe critical of the federal government’s implementation of the Kyoto Protocol Act 2007arguing that:
While Environment Canada has a system in place to report on Canada’s total greenhouse gas(GHG) emissions, it has no system for reporting the actual emission reductions achieved fromeach measure in the annual climate change plans — a requirement under the Act (OAG, 2009).
A lack of political will to assume national leadership has contributed to a situation wherepoor policy integration and coordination between governments continues to be a centralweakness in successful implementation of environmental sustainability and climatechange policy (Bernstein et al., 2008; Ross and Dovers, 2008: 256; Henstra and McBean,2009: 4).
State/provincial approachesThe lack of serious commitment to climate change policy by the majority of state/provincial governments in Canada and Australia places limitations on cooperation withcity governments. States/provinces in both systems have the most direct control overareas that have an impact on climate change such as exploitation of fossil fuel resources,energy supply, transport infrastructure and regional planning. In both cases the mix ofconstitutional responsibilities, economic priorities and political convenience has set thefoundations for areas of policy commitment and cooperative approaches. In Canadasome provinces have established GHG reduction targets but most have failed to outlineclearly how they will be achieved (Pembina Institute, 2009). Provinces such as BritishColumbia and Quebec have introduced a small carbon tax that is focused on a limitednumber of emissions sources (Pembina Institute, 2010). The tax has been criticized onequity grounds as it only focuses on the purchase of fossil fuels rather than theirproduction (Lee, 2010). British Columbia and Ontario have outlined major investmentsin public transport as part of an overall planning process to reduce traffic congestion.Provinces such as British Columbia, Ontario, Manitoba and Quebec have joined with USstate governments in developing regional cap and trade schemes such as the WesternClimate Initiative. In reflecting a key element of the OECD framework, British Columbiahas progressed further than most by passing Bill 44, GHG Reductions Targets Act 2007,legislating a 2020 target of 33% of 2007 levels and 80% of 2007 levels by 2050. Incontrast, Australian states and territories, on the basis of arguments about economies ofscale and interstate competitiveness, have avoided responsibility for setting their owntargets by agreeing to support a national target. Those states proposing climate changeplans and strategies have premised their efforts on a price on carbon from the proposednational legislation. Victoria has progressed further than other Australian states inthis regard and has released a green paper to advance the development of a ClimateChange Act.
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Canadian and Australian states/provinces have introduced some climate-changerelated policies that impact on local government, including green building codes, targetsto reduce emissions from government buildings, and the redrafting of land-use planninglegislation. Many have implemented measures to encourage the reduction of the GHGemissions intensity from waste management, and support energy efficiency in industry,but comparatively little has been done to reduce emissions from transport. As a resultroad transport emissions, an important issue in major cities where they constitute15–20% of all GHG emissions, continue to grow in both countries by approximately 5%per year (Statistics Canada, 2009; DCC, 2010). Australian states and territories areresponsible for road transport infrastructure and, like their Canadian counterparts, investin these areas to reduce road congestion and improve traffic flow rather than as a climatechange measure. This ad hoc approach fails to comply with the policy coherence andconsistency the OECD framework requires.
In both countries the prime focus of the states/provinces has largely been on energyefficiency measures. Burke and Ferguson (2010) argue that the Canadian provincial‘climate change response begins and ends in the energy sector’ and that the economicbenefits of energy efficiency are the prime rationale for these efforts. Urban andmetropolitan issues impacting on GHG emissions are largely ignored in the policyagenda. In Australia energy supply is a particularly sensitive political issue with over70% of stationary energy produced by fossil fuel-based sources, the sector contributes toover half of all GHG emissions (DCC, 2010). Mitigation efforts, like the development ofa renewable energy industry, have been limited partly due to the continuation of stateownership of fossil fuel-based electricity assets (IA, 2008: 79). Emissions from thissector are predicted to continue to increase by 65% over 1990 levels by 2020 (DCC,2010). The Canadian Council of Federation has agreed to coordinate provincial efforts toshare best practices in energy efficiency and to highlight the importance of green energytechnologies, including carbon capture and storage (COF, 2008). Australian stategovernments take a similar focus with the majority of their programmes aimed at energyefficiency rather than a targeted shift away from carbon-intensive sources.
Reflecting inconsistency across policy domains, there has been a general reluctance inboth countries for states/provinces to pursue a broader mix of mitigation and adaptationmeasures in urban areas. For example, while there are policies to encourage energyefficiency and fuel efficient vehicles, little serious effort is made to control urban sprawlthrough planning controls. Australian states have been particularly poor at this withresearch showing expansion of urban boundaries increasing consumption patternsthrough housing and transport costs (Gleeson et al., 2010). Similar situations emerge inCanada where provincial governments have failed to pursue all options available to them.The Ontario government’s Climate Change Action Plan is often hailed as one ofCanada’s most ‘cohesive’ strategies (Burke and Ferguson, 2010: 15), yet the OntarioEnvironment Commissioner has been critical of the province’s restricted approach.The Commissioner’s 2009 and 2010 reports argue insufficient weight is given toenvironmental planning and protection in Ontario’s land-use planning system. TheCommissioner argues more could be done that could consider ‘alternative transportationoptions such as revisiting provincial highway expansion plans, providing moreopportunities for active commuting’ (ECO, 2009; 2010: 6). Changes in this area couldhelp reduce emissions from transportation which accounts for 36% of GHG emissions.Factors contributing to this situation include a lack of integration between Ontario’sclimate change objectives and planning policy, and a lack of incentives for localgovernments and developers to make it preferable to choose smart growth objectives oversprawl (Pembina Institute, 2008: 1).
In developing their climate change policies state/provincial governments have tendedto impose their will rather than cooperate with local authorities and help provide themwith the information and tools necessary to be policy partners. This reflects theconstitutional relationships in both countries where local governments are ‘creatures’of state/provincial governments. A typical example is the approach of the Victorian
government in drafting its Climate Change Act where local governments are just part ofthe mix of stakeholders invited to comment in the consultation phase of the policyprocess (MAV, 2009). States/provinces tend to recognize the importance of cities toeconomic development but, and perhaps as a consequence, there is a reluctance toestablish climate-change policies specifically for these cities. Canadian and Australianstate/provincial governments have tended to each make different use of theirconstitutional authority over metropolitan governments. The result is a situation that failsto meet many of the key elements of the OECD framework and as a consequence thereare mixed views on the capacity of city governments in both countries to develop andimplement climate change policies (Betsill and Bulkeley, 2006; Sancton, 2006; Jones,2009; Gore, 2010).
City government approachesCity governments in both countries have been particularly sensitive to the relationshipthey have with state/provincial governments. The caucus of ‘Big City Mayors’ in Canadaand the ‘Council of Capital City Lord Mayors’ in Australia have both been lobbying theother levels of government to recognize the importance of capital cities and theseriousness of urban issues. They have been seeking recognition of their individual andjoint efforts and stress the need for national and state/provincial governments to workcooperatively with them in dealing with sustainability and climate change issues as theyare affected by, and impact on, urban areas (CCCLM, 2007; FCM, 2009). Without moreformal cooperative arrangements city governments in both countries argue currentclimate change policies will continue to be ineffective in tackling global warming.
Some suggest Canadian city governments are national and international leaders inclimate action (Gore et al., 2009). Holders of this view contend that, while the otherlevels of government have failed to take serious action and have been reluctant torecognize the role of city governments in climate change initiatives, major Canadiancities have been establishing policies to reduce GHG emissions and adapt to likelyimpacts of global warming. The capacity to introduce policies in this area is influencedby the range of local government responsibilities in the Canadian federal system.Robinson and Gore (2005) argue that Canadian municipalities have direct and indirectcontrol over 52% of domestic GHG emissions as a result of their influence and controlover land use through zoning, official planning documents, building permits anddevelopment approvals, the supply and cost of parking, roads and public transit, parksand recreational reserves, and, for some, their regulatory and management roles in powerand gas. Vancouver City Council (COV) has been at the forefront of these efforts byestablishing policies that focus on business and community action to reduce GHGemissions. Examination of the climate change policies of the COV provides an importantinsight into the potential role for city governments in taking action on global warming.
VancouverThe COV has a longstanding commitment to pursue a climate change policy agenda.Since the early 1990s successive Vancouver mayors, with citizen support, have beenfavourable towards implementing sustainability policies with a climate change focus.Under the Vancouver Charter, the COV has the authority to pass by-laws to regulate landuse, buy and sell property, collect certain taxes, take on debts, and give grants. Under theauthority of the Charter the COV has undertaken much of its sustainability agendawithout the need for provincial approval. The policy development approach favoured bythe COV, reflecting a key requirement of the OECD framework, has been the appointment
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of specialist climate change taskforces with representation from government and non-government agencies. The COV established the Clouds of Change taskforce in 1990 as anattempt to coordinate policy action with local environment groups, academics, state andfederal government representatives as well as community and industry groups indeveloping a climate change mitigation strategy (COV, 1990). The taskforce contributedto the COV’s City Plan: Directions for Vancouver in 1995 which established Vancouver’sapproach to sustainability in land use planning and initiatives for mitigating GHGemissions.
In extending their commitment to a climate change policy the COV established theCool Vancouver taskforce in 2003 and charged it with establishing Climate ChangeAction Plans for both the Vancouver community and the city’s corporate operations(COV, 2005b). In reflecting the local political culture the council adopted a highlyconsultative approach to the climate change policy and followed a pattern of ‘meetingswith community and stakeholder groups, public education and feedback mechanismslinked to the enabling tools’ (COV, 2005a: 9). The COV also takes a cooperativeapproach with surrounding metropolitan local governments as a member of MetroVancouver. This federation of municipalities provides services to the Vancouvermetropolitan area, including sewage and waste management, regional parks and amodest housing programme, and public transit investments and operations (Hutton,2009; Metro Vancouver, 2009). Made up of appointed elected municipal officials MetroVancouver also conducts regional planning for growth, and provides advice to assistlocal governments in formulating policies in areas such as climate change adaptation.
The COV’s 2004 Climate Change Actions Plans (Corporate and Community) linkclimate change and sustainability principles to council facilities, local planning andenvironmental management. In 2003 the COV approved a corporate GHG emissionsreduction target of 20% of 1990 levels and later agreed it could meet the Kyoto target andreduce community GHG emissions 6% from 1990 levels by 2012 (COV, 2005a). Someof the first measures introduced were designed to improve the energy performance ofnew residential and commercial buildings. The council has added ‘green building’requirements to its by-laws to support its sustainability objectives (COV, 2008a).Amendments have been aligned with BC and federal building regulations but exceedtheir specific requirements in these areas. These policy instruments, according to theCOV, will move the city toward its targets for GHG emission reductions in thecommunity and its eventual goal of carbon neutrality for all new construction (COV,2008a).
COV reports from 2005 suggest there was some concern among councillors as to whatthe implications would be in pursuing the community actions and recommendedapproaching the other levels of government and nongovernment agencies for help incoordinating and implementing the plans (COV, 2005a). While provincial and federalagencies contributed to the taskforce recommendations, the COV was left to implementand fund the programmes largely from its own resources. The approach taken by theother levels of government at the time was to coordinate with the COV in providinginformation and guidance but not to cooperate in the implementation of these policies. Insome concession to the leadership of the COV the climate change policies have beenused by the province as an example of best practice for others to follow. The COV wonthe BC Most Innovative Cities Award in 2007 for its planning and urban design, and itsGreen Building Strategy is also recognized by the province. As a result of the range ofinitiatives the COV has pursued it now has a reputation for policy innovation, acommitment to sustainability values, urban transformation and for ‘instructive casestudies in multilevel governance across a spectrum of policy fields’ (Hutton, 2009: 3).
The COV experienced difficulties coordinating climate change policies within its owncorporate structure. The implementation of the Clouds of Change recommendations meta number of barriers including a lack of resources and the overwhelming complexity ofmany of the policy measures. The uncertainty about outcomes contributed to an overalllack of precision at the implementation stage (Moore, 2000). The organizational culture
within the COV also became a barrier to the coordinated and integrated approach neededwith climate change policies. The absence of a long-range sustainability plan came torestrict the municipality’s efforts to ensure that ‘all departments’ goals are aligned andsynergistic’ (Burch, 2010). The COV established a Sustainability Unit in 2005 to workfrom the City Manager’s office with other levels of government and encouragecooperation, attract resources and encourage alignment across the council’s climatepolicy efforts. COV success in increasing the number of commuters walking, cycling andusing public transit to over 40% by 2006 is attributed to improved cooperation betweencity transport engineers and land use planners. The COV is currently focused onadaptation issues (COV, 2008b) and coordinating climate change initiatives across thecouncil as the climate change policies outlined in the new Greenest City agenda haveimplications for all council operations.
Since 2009 there has been an increased commitment by the BC government to climatechange initiatives; the passing of the Carbon Tax is seen by some as evidence of thestrength of this commitment (Burke and Ferguson, 2010). There has been a consultativeprocess in establishing the BC Climate Action Charter following initial resistance fromlocal government to the new tax. By signing the agreement the COV and members of theUnion of British Columbia Municipalities (UBCM) agree to undertake climate changeactions under the charter, making them exempt from the tax. While the Charter is notlegally binding, thereby avoiding any application of responsibility and accountability foroutcomes, all signatories agree to a GHG reduction target for the community to 33%below 2007 levels by 2020 and 80% below 2007 levels by 2050. To its credit the Charterrequires alignment of provincial and local policies along with the introduction ofprovincial resources to contribute to the development of standardized measurementmethodologies and improved accuracy in reporting. Funds from the tax are distributed asan incentive back to those local governments meeting the goals of the Charter throughthe Provincial Climate Action Rebate Incentive Program (CARIP). However, in directcontrast to the requirements of the OECD framework, the Charter does not includeparticipation by federal agencies and nor could the arrangement be regarded ascooperative. Local governments are compelled to sign the Charter if they want to avoidthe tax and they must comply with the conditions determined by the BC government.Experience of local councils under similar joint agreements in BC suggests the provinceis prepared to use its constitutional authority to overturn local initiatives if they do notalign with its priorities (Stewart and Smith, 2007).
In 2008 the COV claimed GHG emissions within the city boundaries had returned to1990 levels. Success was attributed to COV commitments to not increasing the capacityof roads for personal vehicles, encouraging the increase in residents choosing to live inmedium-high density housing and supporting the reduction in emissions from buildings(COV, 2009; Pembina Institute, 2010). By 2009 the COV was claiming its climatechange policies were on track to achieve its targets at both the corporate and communitylevel (COV, 2009). However, COV staff concede a lack of resources limited the precisionof their assessment. They argue their estimations are in accordance with InternationalCouncil for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI) protocols and would suggest a dropin emissions within the city. In future years the COV will need to conform to UNFCCreporting methods as agreed under the BC Climate Action Charter to comply with theKyoto agreement requirements. This methodology reflects the OECD requirement thatstate/provincial governments provide local policymakers with the tools and informationnecessary for more effective action.
Currently discrepancies between the GHG emissions reports from the COV, MetroVancouver and the BC government fall short of the requirements of the OECDframework and illustrate the lack of cooperation in reporting in the Province. Reportsfrom other agencies do not share the COV’s optimism for emissions for the broadermetropolitan area and the province. Surrounding metropolitan governments have notbeen as enthusiastic as the COV in climate change initiatives. As a result MetroVancouver reports metropolitan GHG emissions from 1990 to 2005 had actually
Climate change policies in Vancouver and Melbourne 13
increased (there had been a slight reduction between 2000 and 2005 due to the reducedoperation of the Burrard Thermal Power Generation Plant) and were projected tocontinue to increase due to population growth, expansion of the urban boundary andeconomic activity. Figures from the BC government illustrate an increase of GHGemissions of 13% over 1990 levels by 2007 (BC, 2009). Contributions to this rise wereattributed to fossil fuel energy sources such as manufacturing industries, space heatingrequirements in buildings, the use of natural gas for electricity generation, kilometrestravelled by on-road vehicles, and marine vessels. The combination of these energy-related issues became the largest single contributor (37%) to BC’s overall emissions. TheBC government concedes individual British Columbians are among the world’s highestenergy users, being responsible for about 30% of provincial GHG emissions, whichamounts to about 5 tonnes on a per capita basis. Energy accounts for more than 80% ofBC emissions and the largest sources of consumption of energy are household factorssuch as cars and trucks and heating and cooling which together contribute over 70% ofhousehold emissions (BC, 2009).
Metro Vancouver, through its Livable Region and subsequent growth managementplans dating back to the mid-1970s, has consistently argued more needs to be done by theBC government to contain the spread of the urban boundary. Continuation of currentgrowth patterns will promote the growth of household emissions through increased fuelconsumption in both the housing and the transportation sector (Metro Vancouver, 2009).Without some check on this expansion, household GHG emissions will continue to grow.The improved cooperation recommended by the OECD between governments on theseissues will be critical to the effectiveness of climate change policies in the city and theprovince. In the meantime both the COV and Metro Vancouver agree they have limitedauthority over the most significant sources of GHG emissions. They recognize that, ifthey are to be effective in achieving a significant impact on reducing GHG emissions inthe city, they need to align their climate change programmes with the BC government(Metro Vancouver, 2008).
MelbourneIn Australia there has been little focus on the role of city government policies inmitigating GHG emissions (Adams, 2009; Trubka et al., 2009; ALGA, 2010). Most stategovernments see local government playing a role in monitoring the effects of state andnational climate change policies on local and regional communities, industries andeconomies. Under current arrangements the majority of states limit the role of localgovernments to assessing local climate change impacts and consideration of ways tobuild community capacity to respond and adapt to climate change. Melbourne CityCouncil (MCC) has been one of the leading Australian local governments to recognizeclimate change as a policy issue it needs to address.
The potential contribution of the MCC to climate change action and its capacity tocooperate with other governments is prescribed by the changing needs and politicalchoices of the Victorian government. The jurisdiction of the MCC covers the centralbusiness district of the capital city of Melbourne. The city centre covers 37.6 squarekilometres and has a residential population of around 89,759; it serves as the core of ametropolitan area with a population of around 3.9 million. Historically there has been astrained relationship between the MCC and the state government over the developmentof Melbourne (Dunstan, 1998). In Victoria, government activities that supportmetropolitan development have traditionally been the responsibility of a mixture ofstatutory authorities and state government agencies. Planning powers were transferredfrom local governments to the state in the 1980s under the guise of a more effectiveless contentious approach to regional development (Mees, 2007). Local governmentresponsibilities are restricted to planning for growth within their own jurisdictions. Since
1996 the powers of the MCC like all Victorian local governments have been largelyreduced to those of a service agent of state government policies and programmes. So thenotion of cooperative arrangements between governments in Victoria does not sitcomfortably with history and falls well below the essential elements of the OECDframework. The reforms, however, have not prevented the MCC from pursuing anagenda, albeit restricted, that it argues is important to the future of the city. Climatechange has become one of the issues the MCC sees as critical and it has been a policyactivist in this area.
Climate change was first raised as a public policy issue for the city by the MCCthrough its Environment, Community and Cultural Development Committee in the late1990s. At the Committee’s recommendation the MCC joined ICLEI in 1998 and adopteda range of sustainability policies based on the Agenda 21 framework which contributedto an environment plan for the city in 1999. As part of its ICLEI membership and itscommitments to Cities for Climate Protection and Greenhouse Challenge the Councilbegan considering ways in which it could contribute to mitigating GHG emissions in thecity. This action reflected a degree of frustration with the state government over climatechange issues. The Council argued it needed to take the first step because ‘someoneneeds to stand up and paint a strategic vision for the city, including the setting ofchallenging targets’ (MCC, 2003: 86). The MCC appointed consultants to undertake alimited consultation process to establish a ‘roadmap’ for climate change action. In anattempt to encourage cooperation with other levels of government the project wasmanaged by a steering group consisting of MCC officers, state and federal officers, andbusiness representatives from the property and development industries. The MCCundertook limited stakeholder consultations restricting their focus to representativesfrom the property and building owners in the city. The outcome of the process was a setof policy proposals detailed in Zero Net Emissions by 2020: A Roadmap to a ClimateNeutral City (MCC, 2003).
The approach outlined in the roadmap reflects the weak position of local governmentwithin the Victorian system. The recommendations were a mix of meagre regulatorymeasures as well as limited enabling incentives to encourage some action on climatechange in the city. The document reflects an economic focus by arguing climate changeprovides ‘opportunities’ for the Council and local businesses if early action is taken(MCC, 2003). The plan outlines actions that the MCC argues will help promote the cityas a leader in the global context and the subsequent economic benefits that will flow from‘opportunities and commercial benefits associated with early action’ (MCC, 2008). Theoverarching approach taken by the council is to adopt what it argues is a strategy thatprovides ‘market-driven, commercial solutions to keep business and household costs toa minimum, while at the same time reducing emissions’ (MCC, 2003: 9).
The roadmap does not follow the parameters of the Kyoto Protocol but establishesambitious targets for the reduction of GHG emissions for MCC corporate emissions(50% reduction on 1996–97 emission levels by 2010) and a community target (35%decrease in 2020 emissions and a 15% decrease on 2005–06 levels). The Councilacknowledged its targets are a long-term initiative requiring the cooperation of the otherlevels of government. The Council avoids responsibility and accountability issues byconceding that its community targets will be unachievable without the implementation ofthe national emissions trading scheme. The MCC has targeted emissions reduction fromenergy efficiency measures in commercial buildings within the city; in this area it has adegree of influence through its building approval processes.
The key focus of the MCC is to pursue economic opportunities by establishingMelbourne as a location for leading edge design in the area of green buildings. Its ownA$ 51 million 6 Green Star energy efficient building has become a showpiece forinnovation in this regard. To achieve its objective the MCC is implementing a 10-yearprogramme that is a mix of incentives and mandatory measures in collaboration with theClinton Carbon Initiative (CCI). The Council has encouraged a cooperative approach byacting as broker with 1,200 commercial building owners and the state and federal
Climate change policies in Vancouver and Melbourne 15
governments in retrofitting buildings to reduce their energy and water consumption. TheMCC has also considered, but not passed, local laws that would impose a special levy onbuilding owners who have not met minimum greenhouse performance standards by a setdate or a stepped rates system according to greenhouse performance. The MCCintroduced a number of regulations in terms of energy requirements for new commercialand residential properties, but argued retrofitting existing buildings would be difficultbecause ‘building owners have little incentive because the savings tend to be minor ontotal rent earned’ (MCC, 2008).
The MCC argues it has undertaken policy initiatives in those areas where it can beginto impact on climate change action. Despite these actions the MCC reported that by 2008the carbon footprint of the municipality had increased by at least 59% since 2002 (MCC,2008). This dramatic increase, the Council argues, was largely due to an increase inpopulation and an increase in per capita emissions (23 tonnes in 2006) because of thedominant use of coal for electricity generation and the increase in heavy vehicles movingthrough the city. These figures are difficult to confirm, and as a reflection of a key failingagainst the OECD recommendations there is no cooperation on a standard measurementprotocol between the city and the other levels of government (DSE, 2008: 127). Figuresfrom the national government do confirm an 11% increase in Victorian emissions,primarily from stationary energy and transport, from 1990–2008 (DCC, 2010). TheMCC argues it could be more effective if the state government worked cooperativelywith local governments and made greater use of regulations in building, planning andwaste management (MCC, 2009; MCC and VDOT, 2009: 8–9). This view is supportedby research in areas such as land use planning and transport where there are haphazardgovernance arrangements, an absence of clear institutional arrangements and poorcoordination of urban development (Mees, 2007; Low, 2008; Gleeson et al., 2010). Stategovernment reports on sustainability issues and metropolitan planning argue thatfragmentation of responsibilities across government agencies blurs accountability andcontributes to the current difficulties, and serves as a disincentive to cooperativearrangements with local government on climate change issues (CES, 2007; Audit ExpertGroup, 2008).
Land use planning has become the most contentious issue in terms of cooperativeaction on sustainability and climate change in the relationship between the state and localgovernments in metropolitan Melbourne. The lack of horizontal consistency acrosspolicy areas reflected in the state’s planning framework for the metropolitan area,Melbourne 2030, has been the source of frustration for local councils and the communitysince its introduction in 2002. The state government’s Audit Expert Group (AEG) (2008)review of the framework highlighted restrictions and poor implementation as the keyfactors preventing effective climate change policy in the city. The AEG argued there wasa need for ‘urgent action’ to be taken in terms of cooperating with local governments indeveloping strategies for addressing climate change. Evidence suggests GHG emissionsfor Victoria will continue to increase primarily from the dependence on fossil fuels forstationary energy and transport (DCC, 2010: 5). State government research shows thatthis trend could be reversed through cooperative action in introducing complimentarymeasures to a national emissions trading scheme (ETS). Even in the absence of an ETS,combined action by state and local governments in areas like behaviour change insustainable production and consumption, energy efficiency in residential, commercialand industrial sectors, building performance and travel demand management, couldreduce emissions by over 50% of 1990 levels by 2030 (DPC, 2007; EV, 2008).
The key documents that offer insight into the potential of a more cooperative approachwith the MCC by the state government in dealing with climate change are the ClimateChange Green Paper for the introduction of a Climate Change Act, the Planning for Allof Melbourne response to the Melbourne 2030 audit and its Melbourne @5 Millionupdate. As a reflection of how far the Victorian government needs to move to meet manyof the fundamental requirements of the OECD framework these documents maintain thegovernment’s top down approach to policy development. Each reinforces the position of
local government being consulted and involved to a small extent despite being majoractors in metropolitan governance (Kroen, 2009). The focus of the Green Paper is onadaptation and economic opportunities from a low carbon economy: mitigation is seen asthe responsibility of the national government. Interestingly, the Green Paper doesmention the metropolitan issue of encouraging a more compact city to reduce transportcosts and greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles. But the planning documents donot support this, suggesting a lack of horizontal cooperation within the government overthe commitment to an urban boundary to prevent urban sprawl. The issue of the need forurgent cooperative action with local government on these issues has been ignored. At thispoint the political will does not exist to support greater cooperation on this issue. Historicprecedent suggests the MCC will continue to push for recognition but the state is likelyto impose its will and continue to hinder more cooperative arrangements.
Conclusion: cooperative possibilities?This study extends the research on whether national and state/provincial governmentshave largely ignored city governments and urban/metropolitan issues in their climatechange policy choices. The findings contribute to the debate that there is littlecooperation between levels of government, particularly in federal systems, inimplementing climate change policy. In the context of the OECD recommendations thelack of cooperation has served to constrain the nature and effectiveness of policycommitments of both the COV and the MCC. The federal institutional arrangements inCanada and Australia have largely determined the climate change policy response byboth cities. Where the national and state/provincial governments have establishedclimate change policies they have tended to ignore the contribution of metropolitangovernments, particularly in terms of mitigation. The commitment of the BC governmentto climate change as a policy issue requiring a joint approach with local government hasbeen the turning point in improving the potential contribution of the COV to bothmitigation and adaptation action. This positive shift in attitude and the progress of the BCClimate Change Charter in conjunction with the carbon tax offers considerable potentialfor improvement and as such warrants continuing analysis.
There is strong public support in both countries for cooperative approaches tomultidimensional issues like sustainability and climate change. If the seriousness of theclimate change problem requires a shift from the purely economic arguments that haveso far dominated the debate to significant changes in individual behaviour, then the locallevel provides the place to examine policies with the potential for greatest impact. In bothcountries the per capita consumption patterns reveal a reliance on fossil fuel for energybased largely on current land use planning regimes in metropolitan areas. Policy activismby city governments such as the COV and MCC offers an opportunity for allgovernments in these federal systems to demonstrate to citizens that they can workcooperatively through bottom-up measures to develop and test effective options to reduceGHG emissions. Cooperation could also introduce additional resources from higherlevels of government that would establish measures to help improve the capacity forpolicy analysis and implementation by city governments.
The value of the OECD framework in these cases is that it provides a comprehensiveoutline of requirements from which the three levels of government can begin to reassesstheir individual contributions to more effective cooperative arrangements. While many ofthe features of the framework are present in each country, this research has shown thereare some fundamental shortfalls in key areas. Table 2 outlines the measures andprocesses established in Australia and Canada within the OECD framework as a tool toillustrate the features of both systems. The findings illustrate the shortcomings againstthe framework of each country at each level of government. The difference between theexperiences of Vancouver and Melbourne suggests Australia has the greatest distance to
Climate change policies in Vancouver and Melbourne 17
travel in meeting OECD recommendations. Table 2 outlines a comparison between thetwo federal systems and illustrates some of the institutional constraints faced by eachcity.
With respect to functions and roles Vancouver maintains a level of control over manyareas relevant to climate change action that Melbourne has lost. The COV has been in aposition to introduce measures relating to community emissions like building codes andenergy efficiency programmes. Significantly the COV has been a major influence oversubstantial high density residential development that in the Melbourne context fallsoutside the responsibility of the city government. The COV has also been in a positionto restrict major road infrastructure development within the city, which in Melbourne isunder the direct control of the state government. In the Vancouver case the provincialgovernment has a strong interest in climate change policy and has introduced regulatorymeasures such as the Carbon Tax and the Climate Change Charter, both of which provideadditional resources to the COV for climate change action. In both cases some of themost significant constraints on the city government are from the actions of the state/provincial level. The COV is constrained by the dominance of the climate change andmetropolitan development agendas of the BC government and the MCC has beenconstrained by both the lack of serious action by the Victorian government and the lackof its own powers and responsibilities over policy areas relevant to climate change. In thisregard, the MCC provides an important example of the consequences of sub-nationalgovernments reducing the power and influence of local government when taking actionon climate change.
In both cases the national and state/provincial governments fail to benefit from thefeatures of federal systems that encourage experimentation and innovation, particularlyat local and regional levels of governance. Details in Table 2 reinforce the point that thedecision-making tools utilized by the higher levels of government continue to largelyignore city governments as legitimate partners in those areas of decision making thatimpact on climate change. This is despite the fact that both the COV and the MCC haveencouraged cooperation with the other levels of governments through their decision-making processes. These cities continue to be restricted in their access to the tools andinformation needed to contribute to their policy effectiveness and their capacity toparticipate as serious policy partners in climate change action.
Most importantly, both cities and state/provincial governments are constrained bythe lack of a central element of the OECD recommendations: a unifying nationalframework. While development of centralized measurement protocols has beenintroduced in both systems as part of Kyoto commitments, these have not been backedby a legislated national reduction target or a price on carbon. The OECD refers to theexperiences of Norway, France, Portugal and the UK to illustrate the value of nationalenabling and/or regulatory frameworks that support local level action. One of the centralvalues of national programmes is that they can support the initiatives of local authoritiesthat lack the resources to follow the pioneers (Kern and Alber, 2008). National supportcan help ensure climate policies are not confined to a few ‘front runner’ municipalities,like the COV and MCC. Nationally consistent monitoring protocols and performanceindicators are critical elements of the OECD framework. While there has been someimprovement in measurement protocols at the country level, improvements have notbeen applied at the city level (McCarney, 2009). According to McCarney (2009) morerigorous data-driven policy analysis at the city level will facilitate more effectiveintergovernmental cooperation on climate change action. National policies can helpreduce implementation barriers to both mitigation and adaptation policies illustrated inthe cases of both the COV and MCC where city governments are constrained becauseof emissions’ sources or land-use planning regulations that fall outside their jurisdiction(OECD, 2009: 50). Without this central guiding ‘common purpose’, city governmentswill continue to face an increasingly difficult set of circumstances without what theOECD recognizes as policy coherence working both vertically across levels ofgovernment, and horizontally across different actors and issues within a given scale of
governance (OECD, 2009). Effective cooperation in such circumstances will continue toprove to be illusory.
It is important to note that the OECD framework itself has a considerable weakness interms of not clarifying responsibility and accountability requirements for each level ofgovernment. Lessons from the Canadian and Australian experience are for responsibilityand accountability to become blurred under tri-level cooperative arrangements. Climatechange programmes introduced in both countries certainly avoid the application ofresponsibility for outcomes to any level of government. Such avoidance is problematic,particularly in systems based on Westminster principles where the identification ofresponsible parties and the acceptance of accountability are core political values.The OECD framework does require a national commitment to monitor and report onpolicy outcomes and this could form the basis for the development of accountabilitymeasures if contractual arrangements are developed for joint policy development andimplementation.
GHG emissions projections for both Canada and Australia show an upward trend inthe short and long term. As governments in both countries reassess their climate changepolicies following the failure of the United Nations Climate Change Conference inCopenhagen it is an opportune moment to consider more cooperative approaches topolicy implementation. The Canadian and Australian examples provide points ofsimilarity and difference that warrant further research. The trend of centralizing powertoward the Australian national government is reinforced as state governments areunwilling to make serious policy efforts with city governments toward climate change. InCanada the national government is in a weaker position than in Australia, yet here alsothe approaches have failed to recognize the contributions of city governments. In bothfederal systems political will to repair the current policy failures requires a renewedemphasis on cooperation across all levels of government.
Stephen Jones ([email protected]), Business School, University of Queensland,St Lucia Queensland, Queensland 4072, Australia.
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RésuméL’échec de la conférence des Nations Unies à Copenhague sur les changementsclimatiques offre aux gouvernements l’occasion d’envisager de nouvelles approches depolitiques publiques dans ce domaine. Les nations développées telles que le Canadaet l’Australie ne tiennent toujours pas leurs engagements sur les objectifs de Kyotoet annoncent que leurs émissions de gaz à effet de serre vont encore croître.L’aménagement et le développement des zones métropolitaines continuent de stimuler laconsommation des énergies fossiles, donc la dépendance à leur égard. Les municipalitésde Vancouver et de Melbourne se sont fortement impliquées dans des actions publiquesvisant à atténuer l’impact du réchauffement climatique, ou à s’y adapter. Selon elles,leurs tentatives sont gênées par les dispositifs institutionnels fédéraux, et il faudrait unemeilleure coopération avec les autres niveaux de gouvernement. À l’aide du cadreconceptuel élaboré par l’OCDE, cet article défend une coopération accrue entre lesgouvernements des systèmes à plusieurs niveaux lorsque sont mises en place despolitiques liées à l’évolution du climat. Il étudie les facteurs contextuels inhérents auxdispositifs institutionnels et s’appuie sur les expériences de Vancouver et Melbournepour examiner les facteurs qui encouragent ou découragent la coopération dans cedomaine d’action publique.
