A Theory of the Origin of the State - r Carneiro

17/05/2015 ATheoryoftheOriginoftheState

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ATheoryoftheOriginoftheState

RobertL.Carneiro

For the first 2 million years of hisexistence, man lived in bands orvillages which, as far as we can tell,were completely autonomous. Notuntil perhaps 5000 B.C. did villagesbegintoaggregateintolargerpoliticalunits. But, once this process ofaggregation began, it continued at aprogressively faster pace and led,around4000B.C., totheformationofthefirststateinhistory.(WhenIspeakof a state I mean an autonomouspolitical unit, encompassing manycommunities within its territory andhavingacentralizedgovernmentwiththe power to collect taxes, draftmenfor work or war, and decree andenforce laws.) Although it was by allodds the most farreaching politicaldevelopment in human history, theorigin of the state is still veryimperfectly understood. Indeed, notoneof thecurrent theoriesof theriseof thestate isentirelysatisfactory.Atone point or another, all of them fail.There is one theory, though, which Ibelieve does provide a convincingexplanationofhowstatesbegan. Itisa theory which I proposed oncebefore1, and which I present heremorefully.Beforedoingso,however,it seems desirable to discuss, if onlybriefly, a few of the traditionaltheories.

Explicit theories of the origin of thestate are relativelymodern. Classicalwriters like Aristotle, unfamiliar withother forms of political organization,tended to think of the state asnatural, and therefore as notrequiring an explanation. However,the age of exploration, by makingEuropeans aware that many peoplesthroughout the world lived, not instates, but in independent villages ortribes, made the state seem less



natural, and thus more in need ofexplanation.

Ofthemanymoderntheoriesofstateorigins that have been proposed, wecanconsideronlyafew.Thosewitharacial basis. for example, arenowsothoroughly discredited that they neednot be dealt with here. We can alsoreject the belief that the state is anexpression of the genius of apeople2, or that it arose through ahistorical accident. Such notionsmake the state appear to besomething metaphysical oradventitious,andthusplaceitbeyondscientific understanding. In myopinion, the origin of the state wasneither mysterious nor fortuitous. Itwasnottheproductofgeniusortheresultofchance,buttheoutcomeofaregular and determinate culturalprocess. Moreover, it was not aunique event but a recurringphenomenon: states aroseindependently in different places andat different times. Where theappropriate conditions existed, thestateemerged.

VoluntaristicTheories

Serioustheoriesofstateoriginsareoftwo general types: voluntaristic andcoercive. Voluntaristic theories holdthat, at some point in their history,certain peoples spontaneously,rationally, and voluntarily gave uptheir individual sovereignties andunitedwithothercommunitiestoforma larger political unit deserving to becalled a state. Of such theories thebestknown is theoldSocialContracttheory, which was associatedespecially with the name ofRousseau.Wenowknowthatnosuchcompact was ever subscribed to byhuman groups, and the SocialContracttheoryistodaynothingmorethanahistoricalcuriosity.

Themostwidely acceptedofmodernvoluntaristic theories is the one I callthe automatic theory. According to



thistheory,theinventionofagricultureautomatically brought into being asurplus of food, enabling someindividualstodivorcethemselvesfromfood production and to becomepotters,weavers,smiths,masons,andso on, thus creating an extensivedivision of labor. Out of thisoccupational specialization theredevelopedapoliticalintegrationwhichunited a number of previouslyindependent communities into astate. This argument was set forthmost frequently by the late BritisharcheologistV.GordonChilde.3

Theprincipaldifficultywith this theoryis that agriculture does notautomatically create a food surplus.We know this because manyagricultural peoples of the worldproduceno such surplus.Virtually allAmazonianIndians,forexample,wereagricultural, but in aboriginal timesthey did not produce a food surplus.That it was technically feasible forthem to produce such a surplus isshown by the fact that, under thestimulus of European settlers desirefor food,anumberof tribesdid raisemanioc in amounts well above theirown needs, for the purpose oftrading.4 Thus the technical meansfor generating a food surplus werethere it was the social mechanismsneeded to actualize it that werelacking.

Anothercurrentvoluntaristic theoryofstate origins is Karl Wittfogelshydraulic hypothesis. As Iunderstand him, Wittfogel sees thestate arising in the following way. Incertainaridandsemiaridareasoftheworld, where village farmers had tostruggle to support themselves bymeansofsmallscaleirrigation,atimearrivedwhentheysawthatitwouldbeto the advantage of all concerned toset aside their individual autonomiesandmerge their villages intoa singlelargepoliticalunitcapableofcarryingout irrigation on a broad scale. Thebodyofofficialstheycreatedtodevise



and administer such extensiveirrigationworksbrought thestate intobeing.5

This theory has recently run intodifficulties. Archeological evidencenowmakes it appear that in at leastthreeof theareas thatWittfogel citesas exemplifying his hydraulichypothesisMesopotamia, China,and Mexicofullfledged statesdeveloped well before largescaleirrigation.6 Thus, irrigation did notplay thecausal role in the riseof thestate that Wittfogel appears toattributetoit.7

This and all other voluntaristictheories of the rise of the statefounder on the same rock: thedemonstrated inability of autonomouspolitical units to relinquish theirsovereignty in the absence ofoverriding external constraints. Weseethisinabilitymanifestedagainandagain by political units ranging fromtinyvillagestogreatempires.Indeed,one can scan the pages of historywithout finding a single genuineexception to this rule. Thus, inorderto account for the origin of the statewe must set aside voluntaristictheoriesandlookelsewhere.

CoerciveTheories

A close examination of historyindicates that only a coercive theorycan account for the rise of the state.Force, and not enlightened selfinterest, is the mechanism by whichpolitical evolution has led, step bystep,fromautonomousvillagestothestate.

The view that war lies at the root ofthe state is by no means new.Twentyfive hundred years agoHeraclituswrotethatwaristhefatherofallthings.Thefirstcarefulstudyofthe role of warfare in the rise of thestate,however,wasmadelessthanahundred years ago, by HerbertSpencer in his Principles of



Sociology.8 Perhaps better knownthan Spencers writings on war andthestatearetheconquesttheoriesofcontinental writers such as LudwigGumplowicz9, Gustav Ratzenhofer10,andFranzOppenheimer.11

Oppenheimer, for example, arguedthat the state emerged when theproductive capacity of settledagriculturists was combined with theenergy of pastoral nomads throughthe conquest of the former by thelatter11 (pp. 5155). This theory,however, has two serious defects.First, it fails toaccount for the riseofstates in aboriginal America, wherepastoral nomadism was unknown.Second,itisnowwellestablishedthatpastoralnomadismdidnotariseintheOldWorlduntilaftertheearlieststateshademerged.

Regardless of deficiencies inparticular coercive theories, however,thereislittlequestionthat,inonewayoranother,warplayedadecisiverolein the rise of the state. Historical orarcheologicalevidenceofwarisfoundin the early stages of state formationinMesopotamia, Egypt, India, China,Japan, Greece, Rome, northernEurope, central Africa, Polynesia,MiddleAmerica,Peru,andColombia,to name only the most prominentexamples.

Thus,with theGermanickingdomsofnorthern Europe especially in mind,Edward Jenks observed that,historicallyspeaking, there isnot theslightest difficulty in proving that allpolitical communities of the moderntype [that is, states] owe theirexistence to successful warfare.12And in reading Jan VansinasKingdoms of the Savanna13, a bookwith no theoretical ax to grind, onefinds that state after state in centralAfricaroseinthesamemanner.

But is it really true that there is noexceptiontothisrule?Mighttherenot



be, somewhere in the world, anexample of a state which arosewithouttheagencyofwar?

Untilafewyearsago,anthropologistsgenerally believed that the ClassicMayaprovidedsuchaninstance.Thearcheological evidence then availablegave no hint of warfare among theearlyMayaandledscholarstoregardthem as a peaceloving theocraticstatewhichhadarisenentirelywithoutwar.14However,thisviewisnolongertenable. Recent archeologicaldiscoveries have placed the ClassicMaya in a very different light. Firstcame thediscoveryof theBonampakmurals,showingtheearlyMayaatwarand reveling in the torture of warcaptives. Then, excavations aroundTikal revealed largeearthworkspartlysurrounding that Classic Maya city,pointingclearlytoamilitaryrivalrywiththe neighboring city of Uaxactun.15Summarizingpresentthinkingonthesubject,MichaelD.Coehasobservedthat the ancient Maya were just aswarlikeasthe...bloodthirstystatesofthePostClassic.16

Yet, thoughwarfare issurelyaprimemover in the origin of the state, itcannot be the only factor. After all,warshavebeen fought inmanypartsof the world where the state neveremerged.Thus,whilewarfaremaybea necessary condition for the rise ofthestate,itisnotasufficientone.Or,to put it another way, while we canidentifywarasthemechanismofstateformation,weneedalsotospecifytheconditionsunderwhich itgaverise tothestate.

EnvironmentalCircumscription

How are we to determine theseconditions? One promising approachistolookforthosefactorscommontoareas of the world in which statesarose indigenouslyareas such asthe Nile, TigrisEuphrates, and Indusvalleys in the Old World and theValley of Mexico and the mountain



and coastal valleys of Peru in theNew. These areas differ from oneanother in many waysin altitude,temperature, rainfall, soil type,drainage pattern, and many otherfeatures.Theydo,however,haveonethingincommon:theyareallareasofcircumscribed agricultural land. Eachofthemissetoffbymountains,seas,or deserts, and these environmentalfeatures sharply delimit the area thatsimple farming peoples could occupyand cultivate. In this respect theseareasareverydifferentfrom,say,theAmazon basin or the easternwoodlands of North America, whereextensive and unbroken forestsprovided almost unlimited agriculturalland.

But what is the significance ofcircumscribedagricultural land for theoriginofthestate?Itssignificancecanbest be understood by comparingpoliticaldevelopmentintworegionsoftheworldhavingcontrastingecologiesone a region with circumscribedagricultural land and the other aregionwheretherewasextensiveandunlimited land. The two areas I havechosen to use in making thiscomparisonare thecoastalvalleysofPeruandtheAmazonbasin.

Our examination begins at the stagewhere agricultural communities werealready present but where each wasstill completely autonomous. LookingfirstattheAmazonbasin,weseethatagricultural villages there werenumerous,butwidelydispersed.Evenin areas with relatively denseclustering,liketheUpperXingubasin,villages were at least 10 or 15milesapart. Thus, the typical Amazoniancommunity,eventhoughitpracticedasimple form of shifting cultivationwhich required extensive amounts ofland, still had around it all the forestland needed for its gardens.17 ForAmazonia as a whole, then,population density was low andsubsistencepressureonthelandwasslight.



Warfare was certainly frequent inAmazonia, but it was waged forreasons of revenge, the taking ofwomen, the gaining of personalprestige, and motives of a similarsort.Therebeingnoshortageofland,there was, by and large, no warfareoverland.

The consequences of the type ofwarfare that did occur in Amazoniawere as follows. A defeated groupwas not, as a rule, driven from itsland.Nordidthevictormakeanyrealeffort tosubject thevanquished,or toexact tribute from him. This wouldhave been difficult to accomplish inanycase,sincetherewasnoeffectivewaytopreventthelosersfromfleeingtoadistantpartof theforest. Indeed,defeated villages often chose to dojust this, not so much to avoidsubjugationastoavoidfurtherattack.With settlement so sparse inAmazonia,anewareaofforestcouldbe found and occupied with relativeease, andwithout trespassing on theterritory of another village.Moreover,since virtually any area of forest issuitable for cultivation, subsistenceagriculture could be carried on in thenew habitat just about as well as intheold.

It was apparently by this process offight and flight that horticultural tribesgradually spread out until they cametocover,thinlybutextensively,almosttheentireAmazonbasin.Thus,undertheconditionsofunlimitedagriculturalland and low population density thatprevailed in Amazonia, the effect ofwarfarewas todispersevillagesovera wide area, and to keep themautonomous. With only a very fewexceptions,notedbelow,therewasnotendency in Amazonia for villages tobeheld in placeand to combine intolargerpoliticalunits.

Inmarked contrast to the situation inAmazonia were the events thattranspiredinthenarrowvalleysofthePeruviancoast.The reconstructionof



these events that I present isadmittedly inferential, but I think it isconsistent with the archeologicalevidence.

Here too our account begins at thestage of small, dispersed, andautonomous farming communities.However, instead of being scatteredovera vast expanseof rain forest astheywere inAmazonia, villages herewere confined to some 78 short andnarrow valleys.18 Each of thesevalleys,moreover,wasbackedbythemountains, fronted by the sea, andflankedoneithersidebydesertasdryas any in the world. Nowhere else,perhaps, can one find agriculturalvalleys more sharply circumscribedthanthese.

As with neolithic communitiesgenerally, villages of the Peruviancoastalvalleystendedtogrowinsize.Since autonomous villages are likelyto fission as they grow, as long asland is available for the settlementofsplinter communities, these villagesundoubtedlysplit from time to time.19Thus, villages tended to increase innumber faster than theygrew insize.This increase in the number ofvillages occupying a valley probablycontinued, without giving rise tosignificant changes in subsistencepractices, until all the readily arablelandinthevalleywasbeingfarmed.

At this point two changes inagricultural techniques began tooccur:thetillingoflandalreadyundercultivation was intensified, and new,previouslyunusablelandwasbroughtunder cultivation by means ofterracingandirrigation.20

Yettherateatwhichnewarablelandwas created failed to keep pacewiththe increasing demand for it. Evenbefore the land shortage became soacute that irrigation began to bepracticedsystematically,villageswereundoubtedly already fighting oneanother over land. Prior to this time,



when agricultural villages were stillfew innumberandwell suppliedwithland,thewarfarewagedinthecoastalvalleysofPeruhadprobablybeenofmuchthesametypeasthatdescribedabove for Amazonia.With increasingpressure of human population on theland,however,themajor incentiveforwar changed from a desire forrevenge to a need to acquire land.And, as the causes of war becamepredominantly economic, thefrequency, intensity, and importanceofwarincreased.

Once this stage was reached, aPeruvianvillage that lostawar facedconsequences very different fromthose faced by a defeated village inAmazonia. There, as we have seen,the vanquished could flee to a newlocale, subsisting there about aswellas they had subsisted before, andretainingtheir independence.InPeru,however, this alternative was nolonger open to the inhabitants ofdefeatedvillages.Themountains, thedesert,andtheseatosaynothingofneighboringvillagesblockedescapein every direction. A village defeatedinwarthusfacedonlygrimprospects.If itwasallowedtoremainon itsownland,insteadofbeingexterminatedorexpelled, this concession came onlyataprice.And thepricewaspoliticalsubordination to the victor. Thissubordination generally entailed atleastthepaymentofatributeortaxinkind,whichthedefeatedvillagecouldprovide only by producingmore foodthan it had produced before. Butsubordination sometimes involved afurtherlossofautonomyonthepartofthe defeated village namely,incorporation into the political unitdominatedbythevictor.

Through the recurrence ofwarfare ofthis type, we see arising in coastalPeru integrated territorial unitstranscendingthevillageinsizeandindegree of organization. Politicalevolutionwasattainingthelevelofthechiefdom.



As land shortages continued andbecame even more acute, so didwarfare.Now,however,thecompetingunits were no longer small villagesbut,often, largechiefdoms.Fromthispoint on, through the conquest ofchiefdom by chiefdom, the size ofpolitical units increased at aprogressivelyfasterrate.Naturally,asautonomous political units increasedin size, they decreased in number,with the result that an entire valleywas eventually unified under thebannerof itsstrongestchiefdom.Thepolitical unit thus formed wasundoubtedly sufficiently centralizedandcomplextowarrantbeingcalledastate.

The political evolution I havedescribed for one valley of Peruwasalso taking place in other valleys, inthe highlands as well as on thecoast.21 Once valleywide kingdomsemerged, the next step was theformation of multivalley kingdomsthrough the conquest of weakervalleys by stronger ones. Theculmination of this process was theconquest22 of all of Peru by itsmostpowerfulstate,andtheformationofasinglegreatempire.Althoughthisstepmay have occurred once or twicebefore in Andean history, it wasachieved most notably, and for thelasttime,bytheIncas.23

PoliticalEvolution

While theaggregationof villages intochiefdoms, and of chiefdoms intokingdoms, was occurring by externalacquisition, the structure of theseincreasingly larger political units wasbeingelaboratedbyinternalevolution.Theseinnerchangeswere,ofcourse,closely related to outer events. Theexpansion of successful statesbrought within their bordersconqueredpeoplesandterritorywhichhadtobeadministered.Anditwastheindividuals who had distinguishedthemselvesinwarwhoweregenerallyappointed to political office and



assigned the taskof carryingout thisadministration. Besides maintaininglaw and order and collecting taxes,the functionsof thisburgeoningclassof administrators included mobilizinglabor for building irrigation works,roads, fortresses, palaces, andtemples.Thus, their functions helpedtoweldanassortedcollectionofpettystates into a single integrated andcentralizedpoliticalunit.

These same individuals, who owedtheir improved social position to theirexploits in war, became, along withtherulerandhiskinsmen,thenucleusof an upper class. A lower class inturnemergedfromtheprisonerstakeninwarandemployedasservantsandslavesbytheircaptors.Inthismannerdidwarcontributetotheriseofsocialclasses.

Inotedearlierthatpeoplesattempttoacquire their neighbors land beforethey have made the fullest possibleuse of their own. This implies thatevery autonomous village has anuntappedmargin of foodproductivity,and that thismargin is squeezed outonly when the village is subjugatedand compelled to pay taxes in kind.The surplus food extracted fromconquered villages through taxation,which in the aggregate attained verysignificantproportions,wentlargelytosupport the ruler, his warriors andretainers, officials, priests, and othermembers of the rising upper class,whothusbecamecompletelydivorcedfromfoodproduction.

Finally, those made landless by warbutnotenslavedtendedtogravitatetosettlements which, because of theirspecialized administrative,commercial, or religious functions,were growing into towns and cities.Here theywereable tomakea livingas workers and artisans, exchangingtheirlaborortheirwaresforpartoftheeconomicsurplusexactedfromvillagefarmersby the rulingclassandspentbymembersofthatclasstoraisetheir



standardofliving.

The process of political evolutionwhich I have outlined for the coastalvalleys of Peru was, in its essentialfeatures, by nomeans unique to thisregion. Areas of circumscribedagricultural land elsewhere in theworld, such as the Valley of Mexico,Mesopotamia,theNileValley,andtheIndusValley,sawtheprocessoccurinmuch the same way and foressentiallythesamereasons.Intheseareas, too, autonomous neolithicvillages were succeeded bychiefdoms, chiefdoms by kingdoms,and kingdoms by empires. The laststage of this development was, ofcourse, the most impressive. Thescale and magnificence attained bythe early empires overshadowedeverything thathadgonebefore.But,in a sense, empires weremerely thelogicalculminationoftheprocess.Thereally fundamental step, the one thathadtriggeredtheentiretrainofeventsthat led to empires, was the changefromvillageautonomy tosupravillageintegration.Thisstepwasachangeinkind everything that followedwas, inaway,onlyachangeindegree.

Inadditiontobeingpivotal,thesteptosupracommunity aggregation wasdifficult, for it took 2 million years toachieve. But, once it was achieved,once village autonomy wastranscended, only two or threemillenniawererequiredfor theriseofgreat empires and the flourishing ofcomplexcivilizations.

ResourceConcentration

Theories are first formulated on thebasis of a limited number of facts.Eventually, though, a theory mustconfrontallofthefacts.Andoftennewfactsarestubbornanddonotconformto the theory, or donot conformverywell.What distinguishes a successfultheory from an unsuccessful one isthat it can bemodified or elaboratedto accommodate the entire range of



facts. Let us see how well thecircumscription theory holds upwhen it is brought facetoface withcertain facts that appear to beexceptions.

For the first test let us return toAmazonia. Early voyagers down theAmazon left written testimony of aculturealongthatriverhigherthanthecultureIhavedescribedforAmazoniagenerally. In the 1500s, the nativepopulation living on the banks of theAmazonwasrelativelydense,villageswere fairly large and close together,and some degree of socialstratification existed. Moreover, hereand there a paramount chief heldswayovermanycommunities.

Thequestion immediatelyarises:withunbroken stretches of arable landextending back from the Amazon forhundreds of miles, why were therechiefdomshere?

Toanswerthequestionwemustlookclosely at the environmentalconditions afforded by the Amazon.Along the margins of the river itself,andonislandswithinit,thereisatypeoflandcalledvrzea.Theriver floodsthislandeveryyear,coveringitwithalayer of fertile silt. Because of thisannual replenishment, vrzea isagricultural land of first quality whichcan be cultivated year after yearwithouteverhavingtoliefallow.Thus,among native farmers it was highlypriced and greatly coveted. Thewaters of the Amazon were alsoextraordinarily bountiful, providingfish,manatees,turtlesandturtleeggs,caimans, and other riverine foods ininexhaustible amounts. By virtue ofthis concentration of resources, theAmazon, as a habitat, was distinctlysuperiortoitshinterlands.

Concentration of resources along theAmazonamountedalmosttoakindofcircumscription. While there was nosharp cleavage between productiveand unproductive land, as there was



in Peru, there was at least a steepecological gradient. So much morerewardingwastheAmazonRiverthanadjacentareas,andsodesirablediditbecomeasahabitat,thatpeopleweredrawn to it from surrounding regions.Eventually crowding occurred alongmany portions of the river, leading towarfare over sections of river front.And the losers in war, in order toretainaccesstotheriver,oftenhadnochoicebuttosubmittothevictors.Bythis subordination of villages to aparamountchieftherearosealongtheAmazon chiefdoms representing ahigher step in political evolution thanhad occurred elsewhere in thebasin.24

The notion of resource concentrationalso helps to explain the surprisingdegree of political developmentapparentlyattainedbypeoplesof thePeruvian coast while they were stilldepending primarily on fishing forsubsistence, and only secondarily onagriculture.18 Of this seeminganomalyLanninghaswritten: To thebestofmyknowledge,thisistheonlycase in which so many of thecharacteristics of civilization havebeen found without a basicallyagriculturaleconomicfoundation.25

Armed with the concept of resourceconcentration,however,wecanshowthat this development was not soanomalous after all. The explanation,itseemstome,runsasfollows.Alongthe coast of Peru wild food sourcesoccurred inconsiderablenumberandvariety.However,theywererestrictedto a very narrow margin of land.26 Accordingly,while the abundance offoodinthiszoneledtoasharpriseinpopulation, the restrictedness of thisfood soon resulted in the almostcomplete occupation of exploitableareas. And when pressure on theavailable resources reacheda criticallevel, competition over land ensued.The result of this competition was toset inmotion thesequenceofevents



of political evolution that I havedescribed.

Thus,itseemsthatwecansafelyaddresource concentration toenvironmental circumscription as afactor leading to warfare over land,and thus to political integrationbeyondthevillagelevel.

SocialCircumscription

But there is still another factor to beconsidered in accounting for the riseofthestate.

In dealing with the theory ofenvironmental circumscription whilediscussing the Yanomam Indians ofVenezuela, Napoleon A. Chagnon27has introduced the concept of socialcircumscription. By this he meansthatahighdensityofpopulationinanarea can produce effects on peopleslivingnear thecenterof thearea thatare similar to effects produced byenvironmental circumscription. Thisnotion seems to me to be animportant addition to our theory. Letus see how, according to Chagnon,social circumscription has operatedamongtheYanomam.

The Yanomam, who number some10,000, live inanextensive regionofnoncircumscribed rain forest, awayfromanylargeriver.Onemightexpectthat Yanomam villages would thusbe more or less evenly spaced.However,Chagnon notes that, at thecenterofYanomamterritory,villagesare closer together than they are atthe periphery. Because of this, theytendtoimpingeononeanothermore,with the result that warfare is morefrequent and intense in the centerthan in peripheral areas.Moreover, itis more difficult for villages in thenuclear area to escape attack bymovingaway,since,unlikevillagesonthe periphery, their ability tomove issomewhatrestricted.

The net result is that villages in the



central area of Yanomam territoryare larger than villages in the otherareas, since large village size is anadvantage for both attack anddefense. A further effect of moreintensewarfare in thenucleararea isthat village headmen are stronger inthat area. Yanomam headmen arealso the war leaders, and theirinfluence increases in proportion totheir villages participation in war. Inaddition, offensive and defensivealliances between villages are morecommon in the center of Yanomamterritory than in outlying areas. Thus,while still at the autonomous villagelevel of political organization, thoseYanomam subject to socialcircumscription have clearlymoved astep or two in the direction of higherpoliticaldevelopment.

Although the Yanomam manifestsocial circumscription only to amodest degree, this amount of it hasbeenenough tomakeadifference intheir level of political organization.What the effects of socialcircumscription would be in areaswhere it was more fully expressedshould, therefore, be clear. Firstwouldcomeareductioninthesizeofthe territory of each village.Then, aspopulation pressure became moresevere, warfare over land wouldensue.Butbecauseadjacent land formilesaroundwasalreadythepropertyof other villages, a defeated villagewouldhavenowheretoflee.Fromthispointon,theconsequencesofwarfarefor that village, and for politicalevolution in general, would beessentially as I have described themfor the situation of environmentalcircumscription.

ToreturntoAmazonia,itisclearthat,if social circumscription is operativeamong the Yanomam today, it wascertainlyoperativeamongthetribesoftheAmazonRiver400yearsago.Andits effect would undoubtedly havebeentogiveafurtherspurtopoliticalevolutioninthatregion.



We see then that, even in theabsence of sharp environmentalcircumscription, the factors ofresource concentration and socialcircumscription may, by intensifyingwar and redirecting it toward thetaking of land, give a strong impetustopoliticaldevelopment.

With these auxiliary hypothesesincorporated into it, thecircumscription theory is now betterable to confront the entire range oftestcasesthatcanbebroughtbeforeit.Forexample,itcannowaccountforthe rise of the state in the HwangValleyofnorthernChina,andeveninthe Petn region of the Mayalowlands, areas not characterized bystrictlycircumscribedagriculturalland.InthecaseoftheHwangValley,thereis no question that resourceconcentration and socialcircumscription were present andactive forces. In the lowland Mayaarea, resource concentration seemsnot to have been amajor factor, butsocial circumscription may well havebeen.

Some archeologists may object thatpopulationdensityinthePetnduringformative times was too low to giverise to social circumscription. But, inassessing what constitutes apopulation dense enough to producethis effect, we must consider not somuch the total landareaoccupiedastheamountoflandneededtosupportthe existing population. And the sizeof this supporting area depends notonlyon thesizeof thepopulationbutalsoonthemodeofsubsistence.Theshifting cultivation presumablypracticed by the ancient Maya28required considerably more land, percapita, than did the permanent fieldcultivationof,say,thevalleyofMexicoorthecoastofPeru.29Consequently,insofarasitseffectsareconcerned,arelativelylowpopulationdensityinthePetnmayhavebeenequivalenttoamuchhigheroneinMexicoorPeru.



We have already learned from theYanomam example that socialcircumscriptionmay begin to operatewhile population is still relativelysparse.Andwe can be sure that thePetnwas farmore densely peopledin Formative times than Yanomamterritory is today. Thus, populationdensity among the lowland Maya,while giving a superficial appearanceof sparseness, may actually havebeenhighenough toprovoke fightingover land,and thusprovide the initialimpetusfortheformationofastate.

Conclusion

Insummary, then, thecircumscriptiontheory in itselaborated formgoes fartowardaccountingfortheoriginofthestate. It explains why states arosewheretheydid,andwhytheyfailedtoariseelsewhere. Itshowsthestatetobe a predictable response to certainspecific cultural, demographic, andecologicalconditions.Thus,ithelpstoelucidate what was undoubtedly themost importantsinglestepevertakeninthepoliticalevolutionofmankind.

NOTES

1 R. L. Carneiro, inThe Evolution ofHorticulturalSystems inNativeSouthAmerica:CausesandConsequences:A Symposium, J. Wilbert, Ed.,Antropolgica (Venezuela), Suppl. 2(1961), pp. 4767, see especially pp.5964.

2 For example, the early Americansociologist Lester F. Ward saw thestateastheresultofanextraordinaryexercise of the rational. . . facultywhich seemed to him so exceptionalthatitmusthavebeentheemanationof a single brain or a few concertingminds. [Dynamic Sociology(Appleton,NewYork,1883),vol.2,p.224].

3See,forexample,V.G.Childe,ManMakesHimself(Watts,London,1936)pp.8283TownPlanningRev. 21, 3



(1950),p.6.

4Ihaveinmyfilesrecordedinstancesof surplus food production by suchAmazonian tribes as the Tupinamba,Jevero,Mundurucu,Tucano,Desana,Cubeo, and Canela. An exhaustivesearch of the ethnographic literaturefor this region would undoubtedlyrevealmanymoreexamples.

5Wittfogelstates: Thesepatterns [oforganization and social controlthatis,thestate]comeintobeingwhenanexperimenting community of farmersorprotofarmersfindslargesourcesofmoistureinadrybutpotentiallyfertilearea. . . .anumberof farmerseagertoconquer[agriculturally,notmilitarily]aridlowlandsandplainsareforcedtoinvoke the organizational deviceswhichon the basis of premachinetechnologyoffer the one chance ofsuccess: they must work incooperation with their fellows andsubordinate themselves toadirectingauthority. [Oriental Despotism, YaleUniv. Press, New Haven, Conn.,1957),p.18].

6ForMesopotamia,RobertM.Adamshas concluded: In short, there isnothing to suggest that the rise ofdynastic authority in southernMesopotamia was linked to theadministrativerequirementsofamajorcanalsystem.[inCityInvincible,C.H.Kraeling and R. M. Adams, Eds. (Univ. of Chicago Press, Chicago,1960), p. 281]. For China, theprototypical area for Wittfogelshydraulic theories, the FrenchSinologist Jacques Gernet hasrecently written: although theestablishment of a system ofregulation of water courses andirrigation, and the control of thissystem, may have affected thepolitical constitution of the militarystates and imperial China, the factremains that, historically, it was thepreexisting state structures and thelarge, welltrained labour forceprovidedbythearmiesthatmadethe



great irrigation projects possible.[Ancient China, from the Beginningsto the Empire, R. Rudorff, Transl.(Faber and Faber, London, 1968), p.92].ForMexico,largescaleirrigationsystems do not appear to antedatetheClassicperiod,whereasit isclearthat the first states arose in thepreceding Formative or PreClassicperiod.

7 This is not to say, of course, thatlargescale irrigation, where itoccurred, did not contributesignificantly to increasing the powerand scope of the state. Itunquestionablydid.TotheextentthatWittfogel limits himself to thiscontention,Ihavenoquarrelwithhimwhatever.However,thepointatissueis not how the state increased itspower but how it arose in the firstplace.Andtothisissuethehydraulichypothesis does not appear to holdthekey.

8 See The Evolution of Society:Selections from Herbert SpencersPrinciples of Sociology, R. L.Carneiro,Ed.(Univ.ofChicagoPress,Chicago,1967),pp.3247,6396,153165.

9 L. Gumplowicz, Der Rassenkampf(Wagner,Innsbruck,1883).

10G.Ratzenhofer,WesenundZweckderPolitik(Brockhaus,Leipsig,1893).

11 F. Oppenheimer,The State, J. M.Gitterman, Transl. (Vanguard, NewYork,1926).

12 E. Jenks, A History of Politics(Macmillan,NewYork,1900),p.73.

13 J. Vansina, Kingdoms of theSavanna (Univ. of Wisconsin Press,Madison,1966).

14 For example, Julian H. Stewardwrote: It is possible, therefore, thattheMayawereabletodevelopahigh



civilizationonlybecausetheyenjoyedanunusuallylongperiodofpeacefortheirsettlementpatternwouldseemtohavebeentoovulnerabletowarfare.[Amer.Anthropol.51,1(1949),seep.17].

15 D. E. Puleston and D. W.Callender, Expedition 9 No.3, 40(1967),seepp.45,47.

16 M. D. Coe, The Maya (Praeger,NewYork,1966),p.147.

17 See R. L. Carneiro, in Men andCultures.SelectedPapersoftheFifthInternational Congress ofAnthropological and EthnologicalSciences,A.F.C.Wallace,Ed.(Univ.of Pennsylvania Press, Philadelphia,1960),pp.229234.

18 In early agricultural times(Preceramic Period VI, beginningabout 2500 B.C.) human settlementseemstohavebeendenseralongthecoast than in the river valleys, andsubsistence appears to have beenbased more on fishing than onfarming. Furthermore, somesignificant first steps in politicalevolutionbeyondautonomousvillagesmay have been taken at this stage.However, once subsistence began tobe based predominantly onagriculture, the settlement patternchanged, and communities werethenceforth concentratedmore in theriver valleys, where the only land ofany size suitable for cultivation waslocated. See E. P. Lanning, PeruBefore the Incas (PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1967),pp.5759.

19InmyfilesIfindreportedinstancesofvillagesplittingamongthefollowingAmazonian tribes: Kuikuru,Amarakaeri, Cubeo, Urubtl, Tupari,Yanomam, Tucano, Tenetehara,Canela,andNorthernCayapo.Underthe conditions of easy resettlementfound in Amazonia, splitting oftentakes place at a village population



leveloflessthan100,andvillagesizeseldomexceeds200.IncoastalPeru,however, where land was severelyrestricted,villagescouldnotfissionsoreadily, and thus grew to populationlevels which, according to Lanning[PeruBefore the Incas (PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs, N.J., 1967), p. 64],mayhaveaveragedover300.

20 See R. L. Carneiro, Ethnograph.archol.Forschungen4,22(1958).

21Naturally, this evolution tookplacein the various Peruvian valleys atdifferent rates and to differentdegrees. In fact it is possible that atthesametimethatsomevalleyswerealready unified politically, others stillhad not evolved beyond the stage ofautonomousvillages.

22 Not every step in empire buildingwas necessarily taken through actualphysical conquest, however. Thethreat of force sometimes had thesameeffectasitsexercise.Inthiswaymany smaller chiefdoms and stateswere probably coerced into giving uptheirsovereigntywithouthavingtobedefeatedonthefieldofbattle.Indeed,itwasanexplicitpolicyoftheIncas,inexpanding their empire, to trypersuasionbeforeresortingtoforceofarms. See Garcilaso de la Vega,RoyalCommentariesoftheIncasandGeneralHistoryofPeru,Part1,H.V.Livermore, Transl. (Univ. of TexasPress,Austin,1966),pp.108,Ill,140,143,146,264.

23 The evolution of empire in Peruwas thus by no means rectilinear orirreversible. Advance alternated withdecline. Integration was sometimesfollowedbydisintegration,withstatesfragmenting back to chiefdoms, andperhapseventoautonomousvillages.But the forces underlying politicaldevelopment were strong and, in theend, prevailed. Thus, despitefluctuations and reversions, thecourse of evolution in Peru wasunmistakable: it began with many



small, simple, scattered, andautonomous communities and endedwith a single, vast, complex, andcentralizedempire.

24 Actually, a similar politicaldevelopmentdidtakeplaceinanotherpart of Amazoniathe basin of theMamor River in the Mojos plain ofBolivia. Here, too, resourceconcentrationappearstohaveplayeda key role. See W. Denevan, TheAboriginal Cultural Geography of theLlanos de Mojos of Bolivia, Iberoamericana No. 48 (1966), pp. 4350,104105, 108110. In native NorthAmerica north of Mexico the highestculturaldevelopmentattained,MiddleMississippi, also occurred along amajorriver(theMississippi)which,byproviding especially fertile soil andriverine food resources, comprised azone of resource concentration. SeeJ.B.Griffin,Science156,175(1967),p.189.

25 E. P. Lanning, Peru Before theIncas(PrenticeHall,EnglewoodCliffs,N.J.,1967),p.59.

26Resourceconcentration, then,washere combined with environmentalcircumscription. And, indeed, thesame thing can be said of the greatdesert rivervalleys, suchas theNile,TigrisEuphrates,andIndus.

27N.A.Chagnon,Proceedings,VIIIthInternational Congress ofAnthropological and EthnologicalSciences (Tokyo and Kyoto, 1968),vol.3(EthnologyandArchaeology),p.249 (especially p. 251). See also N.Fock,Folk6,47(1964),p.52.

28 S. G.Morley andG.W. Brainerd,The Ancient Maya (Stanford Univ.Press, Stanford, Calif., ed. 3, 1956),pp.128129.

29One canassume, I think, that anysubstantial increase in populationdensity among the Maya wasaccompanied by a certain



intensification of agriculture. As thepopulation increased fields wereprobably weeded more thoroughly,and they may well have beencultivated a year or two longer andfallowed a few years less. Yet, giventhe nature of soils in the humidtropics, the absence of any evidenceof fertilization, and the moderatepopulation densities, it seems likelythatMayafarmingremainedextensiveratherthanbecomingintensive.

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A Theory of the Origin of the State - r Carneiro

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