A Ticking Time Bomb: Counterterrorism Lessons From The U.S. Government's Failure To Prevent The Fort...

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A TICKING TIME BOMBCOUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM THE U.S. GOVERNMENTS

FAILURE TO PREVENT THE FORT HOOD ATTACK

A Special Report by

Joseph I. Lieberman, Chairman

Susan M. Collins, Ranking Member

U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs

Washington D.C. 20510February 2011


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A TICKING TIME BOMB

COUNTERTERRORISM LESSONS FROM TH EU.S. GOVERNMENT'S FAILURE TO PRE VE NTTH E FO R T HOOD ATTACK

A SPECIAL R E P O R T BYJOSEPH I . LIEBERMAN, CHAIRMAN

SUSAN M. COLLINS, RANKING MEMBER

UNITED STATES SENATE COMMITTEE ONHOMELAND SECURITY ANDGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS

FEBRUARY 3, 2011


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"A Ticking Time Bomb:"Counterterrorism Lessons FromThe U.S. Government's fai lure To Prevent The Fort Hood Attack

ByJoseph I. Lieberman, ChairmanSusan M. Co llins , Ranking MemberCo mmittee On Homeland Security And Governmental AffairsUnited States SenateTable of Contents

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 5PART I: INTRODUCTION 13Chapter I: Purpose Of The Investigation 15Chapter II : The Ideo logy Of Violent Islamist Ex tremism And The Growth Of

PART II :Homegrown Radica lization 17MAJOR HA SAN'S RADICA LI ZATION TO VIOLENT ISLAMISTEXTREM ISM AND THE STRfNG OF GOVERNM ENT FAILURES TOINTERVENE AGA INST HI M PRIOR TO THE FORT HOOD ATTA CK 23

Chapter III : "A Ticking Time Bomb:" DoD's Failure To Respond To Major Hasan 'sPublic Displays Of Radicalization To Violent Islamist Extremi sm 27

Chapter IV: "That 's Our Boy:" The FBI 's Superficial Inquiry Into Major Hasa n PriorTo The Attack 35PART III: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROV ING U.s. DEFENSES AGA INST

VIOLENT ISLAM 1ST EXTREM ISM 4 1Chapter V: Strengthening 000 Policies And Training To Prevent Radicalization Of

Servicemembers To Violent Islami st Extrem ism 45Chapter VI: Strengthening The FBI To Prevent Domestic Terrorist Attacks 51Chapler VII : The United States Needs A Co mprehensive Approach To Co unteringThe Threat Of Homegrown Terrorism 79 .APPENDI X: COMP ILATION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 83


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"A Ticking Time Bomb:"Counterterrorism Lessons FromThe U.S. Government's Failure To Prevent The Fort Hood Attack

ByJoseph I. Lieberman, ChairmanSusan M. Collins, Ranking MemberCommittee On Homeland Security And Governmental AffairsUnited States Senate

Full Table of Co ntentsEXECUT IVE SUMMARY 5PART I:Chapter I:Chapter II :

A.

INTRODUCTIOPurpose OfThe In ves tiga tionThe Ideology Of Violent Islamist Extrem ism And The Growth OfHom egrow n Radica lizationThe Id eo logical Principles, Radicalization Process, And RecruitmentNarrative Of Vio lent Islami st Extremism

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17B. The In ternet's Criticality For Radicalization To Violent Islamist

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PART II :

Extremism, And The Di ve rsi fication OfThe Homegrown Terrori st Threat 18The Role Of "Virtual Spiritual Sanctioners" Exempli fied By Anwaral -Aul aq i 20MAJOR HASAN'S RADICA LIZATION TO V IOLENT ISLAM1STEXTREM ISM AND TH E STRrNG OF GOVERNMENT FA ILURES TOINTERVENE AGAINST HIM PRIOR TO THE FORT HOOD ATTACK 23

Chapter III : "A Ticking Tim e Bomb:" DoD's Failure To Respond To Major Hasa n'sPublic Di splays Of Radicali zat ion To Violent Islamist Extrem ism 27

Chapter IV: "That's Ou r Boy:" The FB I's Superfic ial Inqu iry Into Major Hasan PriorTo The Attack 35

PART JJI : RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPROVrNG U.S. DEFENSES AGAINSTVIOLENT ISLAM1ST EXTREM ISM 41Chapter V: Strengthening DoD Policies And Train ing To Prevent Radica lization orServicemembers To Violent Islamist Extremism 45

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A. Major Hasan Sho uld Have Been Removed From Military ServiceDespite Deficiencies In Poli cy And Training Concerning ViolentIslamist Extremism Among Servicemembers 45B. DoD' s Review Of The Fort Hood Attack And DoD 's Fo llow Up To

The Rev iew Do Not Confront The Threat Of Violent Islami st ExtremismAmong Servicemembers DirectlyC. DoD Shou ld Update Its Policies And Training To Id entify And Protect

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Against Violent Islamist Extremism Among Servicemembers 48Chapler VI: Strengthening The FB I To Prevent Domestic Terrorist Auacks 51

A. FBI Transfonnat ion Begins After 9/ 11 52B. The FBI's Inqui ry Into Hasan Was Impeded By Division Among Its

Field Offices, In sufficient Use Of Intelli gence Analysis, And OutdatedTradecraft 5SI. The Hasa n inquiry was plagued by disj unction between two fie ld

offices and the lack of coordination by FBI headquarters 552. The FBI 's inquiry into Hasan failed to utilize intelligence analysts

fu lly in order to dr ive the purpose of the investigation and assessHasan 's communications 613. The FBI did not update its tradecraft used in the investigation of

the Suspected Terrorist, which contributed to the FBI's fa ilure tounderstand th e s ignificance of Hasan's communications with thatindividual 64

C. The Inquiry Into Hasan Focused On The Narrow Ques tion Of Whether HeWas Engaged In Terrorist Ac tivities And No t Whether He Was Radica lizingTo Vio lent Islamist Extremism And Thus Co uld Become A Th reat 66

D. Our In vestigation Of The Hasan Case Raises Questions About WhetherThe 10int Terrorism Task Forces Have Become Fully Effective In teragencyCoordination and Information-S haring Mechanisms 67I. 000 and the FBI di sagree concerning whi ch agency has the lead

for counterterrori sm in ves tigat ions of servicemembers 67

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2. DoD and the FBI disagree concerning the status of detailecs toJTIFs as primary informa tion-sharing channels of JTTFinformation back to 000 70

3. FBI co rrective action since the Fort Hood attack facil itates information-sharing with DoD but does not reso lve the larger policy issues 72

4. The FBI 's failure to link Hasan's first [REDACTED] communicat,ionsto the Suspected Terrorisl to hi s later ones stemmed in part from JTTFde ta ilees' lack of access to key information, wh ich suggests a majorimpediment to JTfFs' overal l effectiveness 73

5. We are concerned that JTTFs are not fu lfilling the FBI 's vi sion ofbeing interagency informa tion-sharing and operational coordinationmechan isms but rather may merely be appendages of the FB I 74

E. The FBI 's Training Materials Contemporaneous To The Hasan Inqui ry DidNot Adequately Cover The Ideology OfYiolent Islamist Extremism 76

Chapter VII : The Un ited States Needs A Comprehensive Approach To CounteringThe Threat Of Homegrown Terrori sm 79

APPENDIX: COMPILATION OF FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 83

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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On November 5, 2009, a lone attacker strode into the deployment center at Fort Hood,Texas. Moments later, 13 Department of Defense (DoD) employees were dead and another 32were wounded in the worst terrorist attack on U.S . so il since September I I, 200 I.

The U.S. Senate Committee on Home land Security and Governmenta l Affairs launchedan investigation of the events preceding the attack wi th two purposes: (I) to assess theinformat ion that the U.S. Government possessed prior to the attack and the actions that it took orfai led to take in response to that infonnation; and (2) to identify steps necessary to protect theUnited States against fu ture acts of terrorism by homegrown vio lent Islamist extremists . Thi sinvestigation flows from the Committee's four-year, bipartisan review of the threat of violentIslamist extremism to our home land wh ich has included numerous briefings, hearings,consultations, and the publicat ion of a staff report in 2008 concerning the internet and terrorism.

In our investigation of the Fort Hood attack, we have been cogn izant of the record ofsuccess by 000 and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FB I) in the ten years si nce 9/ 11. Werecognize that detection and interd iction of lone wol f terrorists is one of the most difficultchallenges facing our law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Every day, these agencies arepresented wi th myriad leads that require the exercise of sou nd judgment to determine which topursue and which to close out. Leaders must allocate their time, attention, and inherently limitedresources on the highest priority cases. In addit ion, the individua l accused of the Fort Hoodattack, Army Major Nidal Ma lik Hasan, is a U.S. citizen. Even where there is evidence that aU.S. cit izen may be radicalizing, the Constitution approp riately limits the act ions thatgovernment can take.

In presenting our findings and recommendations below, we are gratefu l for the servicegiven by our nation 's military, law enforcement, and intelligence personnel. Our aim in th isinvestigation was not to single ou t individual neg ligent judgment; such instances are for th eagencies to deal with, as appropriate. Nor do we seek to second-guess reasonable judgments.Instead, we act under our Const itutional duty to oversee the Executive Branch's pcrfonnance andthus to detennine - independently from the Executive Branch's own assessment - what, ifany,systemic issues are exposed by the Hasan case. The specific facts uncovered by the Committee'sinvestigation necessa rily led us to focus our key findings and recommendations on 000 and theFBI. But the Hasan case also evidences the need for a more comprehensive and coordinatedapproach to counterradicalization and homegrown terrorism across a ll agencies, includingfederal, state, and local entities, wh ich are critical to keeping our country safe.

Our bas ic conclusion is as follows: Although neither 000 nor the FB I had specificinformat ion concerning the time, place, or nature of the attack, they collectively had suffic ientinformation to have detected Hasan 's radica lization to violent Islamist extremism but failed bothto understand and to act on it. Our investigat ion found specific and systemic fai lures in thegovernment's hand ling of the Hasan case and raises additional concerns about what may bebroader systemic issues.

Both the FB I and 000 possessed information indicating Hasan's rad icalization to vio lentIslamist extremism. And, to the FB I's cred it, it flagged Hasan from among the chaff of

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intell igence co llection for add itional scrutiny. However, the FBI and DoD together fai led torecogni ze and to link th e information that they possessed about Hasan: ( I) Hasan was a militaryofficer who lived under a regimented system with str ict officership and security standards,standards which his behavior during his military medical train ing violated; and (2) thegovernment had [REDACTED] communications from Hasan to a suspected terrorist,[RE DACTED], who was involved in antiwAmerican activities and the subject of an unrelated FBIterrori sm investigation. This individual will be referred to as the "Suspected Terrorist" in thisreport. I Although both the public and the private signs of Hasan's radicalizat ion to violentIslami st ex tremi sm while on ac tive duty were known to government officials, a string offailuresprevented these o fficials from in tervening against h im prior to the attack.

Evi dence of Hasan 's radica liza tion to violent Islamist ext remism was on full display tohi s superiors and co lleagues during his military medical training. An in structor and acolleague each re ferred to Hasan as a "ti cking time bomb." Not only was no action takento di scipline or di scharge him, but al so his Officer Evaluation Report s sanitized hi sobsession wi th violent Islamist ex tremism into praiseworthy research oncounterterrorism.

FB I Joint Terrorism Task Forces (JTfFs) are units in FBI field offices that conductcounterterrorism investigations and are staffed by FBI agents and employees from otherfedera l, state, and local agencies. A JTT F learn ed that Hasan was communicat ing withthe Suspected Terrorist, flagged Hasan's initial [REDACTED] communications forfurther review, and passed them to a second JTTF for an inquiry. However, the ensuinginquiry fai led to identi fy the totality of Ha san 's communications and to inform Ha san 'smi li tary chain of command and Army security officials of the fact th at he wascommunicating with a suspected violent Islamist extremi st - a shocking course ofconduct for a U.S. mi li tary officer. Instead, the JTTF inquiry relied on Hasan 's erroneousOfficer Evaluation Reports and ult imately dismissed his communicat ions as legitimateresearch.

Th e JTTF that had reviewed the initial [REDACTED] communications di smi ssed thesecond JTTF 's work as "slim" but eventually dropped the matter rather than cause abureaucratic confrontation. The JTTFs now even dispute the extent to which they werein contac t with each other in this case. Nonetheless, th e JTTFs never raised the dispute toFBI headquarters for resolution, and entities in FB I headquarters responsibl e forcoordination among field offices never acted. As a result, th e FB I's inquiry into Hasanend ed premature! y.As noted, DoD possessed compelling evidence that Hasan embraced views so extremethat it should have discipl ined h im or discharged him from the military, but DoD failed to takeaction against him. Indeed, a number of po licies on commanders' authori ty, extremi sm, and

1 The redactions in this report were required by the Inte lligence Community pursuant to Executive Branchclassificalion policies and are the result of intensive negotiations spanning three months. We take issue with theextent of these redactions, some of wh ich we believe are unjustified, but we have consented to them in order toproduce this report in a timely mann er. 8


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personnel gave supervisors in hi s chain of command the au thority to take such ac tions. It is clearfrom thi s failure that 000 lac ks the institutional culture, through updated policies and traini ng,sufficient to infonn commanders and all levels of service members how to identify radicalizationto vio lent Islam ist ex tremism and to dist inguish th is id eology from th e peaceful practice ofIslam.

To address this fa il ure, th e Department of Defense shou ld confront th e threat ofradica liza tion to violent Islami st extremism among servicemembers explic itl y and directly andstrengthen associated policies and training. 000 launched an ex tensive internal review after theFort Hood attack by comm issioning a review led by two former sen ior 0 00 officials (fonnerArmy Secretary Togo West an d retired Chi ef o f Naval Operations Admiral Vern Clark) andrequi ring multip le reviews across th e Military Services of force protection and related issues.000 has also inst ituted a regimented process for instituting and monitoring implementation ofrecommend at ions from these reviews, which in clud ed two memoranda from Secretary ofDefense Robert Gates assessing and adopting particular recommendations from the West/Clarkreview. However, 0 00 - including Secretary Gates's memoranda - still has not specifica llynamed the threat represented by the Fort Hood attack as what it is: violent Islami st extremism.Instead, DoD's approach sub sumes this threat within workplace violence or undefined "v iol en tex tremism" more genera ll y. DoD's failure to identify the threat of violent Islamist extremismexpl ici tly and direc tly confli cts with DoD 's hi story of directl y confronting white supremacismand other threaten ing activ ity among serv icemembers. DoD should revise its po licies andtraini ng in order to confront the threat of violent Islamist extrem ism directl y.

More specifically, DoD should update its policies on extremism and religiousaccomm odat ion to ensure tha t violen t Islamist ex tremism is not tolerated. 0 00 should al so tra inservicemembers on violent Islami st extremi sm and how it differs from Islamic religious beliefand practices. Without this improved guidance and training, the behavioral tendency amongsupe riors could be to avoid proper app lication of the curren t general policies to situationsinvolving violent Islami st extremism.

Th e 911 1 attacks led the FBI Director, Robert Mueller, to act to trans rorm the FBI'sinstitut ional and operational architecture. He declared that the FB I's top prior ity wouldhenceforth be preventing domestic terrorist attacks and that the FB I needed to become ane l l i g c n c e ~ c e t r i c rather th an purely l a ~ e n f o r c e m e c e organi zation. The FB I has madesubstantial progress in transforming itself in these ways. The FB I is more foc used on producin gcounterterrorism in tell igence and more integrated than it had been. Its init iatives arc headed inthe righ t direction. To its credit, the FBI moved swiftly after the Fort Hood attack to conduct aninternal review, identify gaps, and implement changes in response; the FBI also commi ssionedan outside review by fo rmer FB I Director and Director ofCentral Intelligence Judge William

Webster. No netheless, our in vestigation finds that the Fort Hood attack is an indicator thaI thecurrent status of the FBI's transfonnation to become intelligence-driven is incomplete an d thatthe FB I faces internal challenges - which may include cultural barriers - that can frustrate theon -going institutiona l rerorms. The FBI needs to accelerate its transformation.

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In the Hasan case, two JTTFs (each located in a different fi eld office) disputed thesignificance of Hasan' s communications with the Suspected Terrorist and how vigorouslyhe should be investigated. The JTTF th at was less concerned about Hasan contro lled theinq ui ry and end ed it prematurely after an insufficient examination. Two keyheadquarters units - the Counterterrori sm Division, th e "National JTTF" (which wascreated specifica lly to be the hub among JTTFs), and the Directorate of In telligence were not made aware of the dispu te. This unresolved conflict ra ises concerns that,despite the more assertive role that FBI headquarters now plays, especially since 9/11 inwhat historically has been a decentralized organization, fie ld o ffi ces still prize and protecttheir autonomy from headquarters. FBl headquarters also does not have a written planthat articulates the divis ion of labor and hierarchy of command-and-control authoritiesamong its headquarters units, fi eld offices , and the JTTFs. Th is issue mu st be addressedto ensure that headquarters establishes more effective strategic control of its fi eld offi ceoperations. In the Hasan case, the FBI did not effective ly ut ilize in te lligence analysts who could haveprovided a different perspective given the evidence that it had. The FBI 's inquiryfoc used narrowly on whether Hasan was engaged in terrorist activ ity - as opposed to

whether he was radicalizing to vio len t Islarn ist extremi sm and whether this radicalizationmight pose counterintelligence or other threats (e.g., Hasan mi ght spy for the Taliban ifhe was de ployed to Afghan istan). Th is cri tica l mistake may have been avo ided ifintell igence analys ts were appropriately engaged in the inqui ry. Si nce 9/1 1, the FBI hasincreased its in te lligence focus by creating a Di rectorate of Intelligence and FieldInte ll igence Groups in the fie ld offices and hi ring th ousand s of new and better qualifiedanalys ts. However, the FB I must ensure that these analysts are effectively uti lized,including th at they ach ieve sign ifi cant stature in the FB I. The FB I must also ensure thatall of its agents and analysts are trained to understand violent Islamist extremism.

In the Hasan case, the FB I did not identify the need to update its tradecra ft (i.e., themethods and processes fo r conducting investigative or intell igence acti vities) regardingthe process ing and analys is of communications (REDACTED] until a fter the Fort Hoodattack. This de lay led to a failure to iden tify all of Hasan 's communica tions with theSuspected Terrorist and the ex tent of the threat contained wi th in them. The FBI has hadnumerous successes aga inst homegrown terrorist cells and indiv iduals s ince 911 1 thathave saved countless American lives. However, the FB I should still ensure that all of itstradecra ft is systemically examined so that flaws can be corrected prior to failu res. TheFBI leadership should continue to oversee this element of its transformat ion to a fi rstclass, in te ll igence.driven coun terterrorism organi zation.

In the Hasan case, the JTfF model did not live up to the FB I' s strong vision of JTTFs asan effective in teragenc), information-shari ng and operational coord ina tion mechanism.JTTFs have been expanded significant ly since 9111 and are now the principal domesticfedera l operationa l arm for counterterrorism investigat ions and intelligence co llection.They perfonn critica lly important homela nd securi ty functions and have producednum erous successes in dis rupting and ap prehend ing potential lerrorists. However, the10


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specific hand ling of the Hasan case, and systemic disputes between DoD and the FB Iconcerning JITFs which remain unreso lved, rai se concerns that the JITF model requiresadditional review and improvement in order fo r JTTFs to function as effectively as ourna tion requires.We ask that DoD and the FBI review and respond to the concerns identified in this reporton an urgent basis.Fina lly, we request thaL he National Security Council and Homeland Security Councillead in the developm ent of an integrated approach to law enforcement and inte ll igence

domestica lly and a comprehensive national approach to countering homegrown radicalization toviolent Islamist extrem ism. The threat of homeg rown rad icalization goes beyond the capabi litiesof the law enforcement, in te ll igence, and homeland security agencies and requires a responsefrom a broad range of our government which w ill produce plans to translate and implemen t thi scomprehensive national approach into spec ific, coordinated, and measurable act ions across th egovernment and in coopera tion with the Mus lim-American community.

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PART I: INTRODUCTION

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I. Purpose OfThe Invest igation.On November 5, 2009, 13 Americans - 12 servicemembers and one civi lian employee of

000 - were killed and 32 were wounded in an attack at the mil itary base at Fort Hood, Texas.Thi s tragedy was the deadliest terrorist attack w ithin the Un ited States since September 11 ,2001.Major Nidal Ma lik Hasan, a U.S. Army officer and psychiatrist, was arrested and is standing tria lfor murder and other charges in mil itary court-martial proceedings.

On November 8, 2009, the Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmen talAffairs launched an investigation of the events preceding the attack pursuant to the Committee'sauthority under Rule XXV(k)( I) of the Standing Rules of the Senate, Section 10 1of S. Res 445(108 th Congress), and Section 12 ofS. Res. 73 ( I 11th Congress). Our jurisdic tion includeslegislative authority concern ing the organization and reorganization of the Executive Branch andinvestigative authority re lated to "the efficiency and economy of operations of all branches andfunctions of the Government with particu la r re fe rence to . . . the effecti veness of present nationalsecurity methods, staffing, and processes as tested against the requirements imposed by therapidly mounting complexity of nat iona l security problems."

President Barack Obama himself acknowledged the importance of a congressionalinvestigation of the government 's performance. As he said during hi s weekly radio address onNovember 14,2009, "I know there wi ll also be inquiries by Congress, and there shou ld.,,2

The purpose of the Co mmittee's investigation is two-fo ld : ( I) to assess the in formationthat the U.S. Government possessed prior to the attack and the actions that it took or fai led tota ke in response to that information, and (2) to identify steps necessary to protect the UnitedStates aga inst fut ure acts of terrorism by homegrown violent Islamist extremists - that is, byterrorists radicalized largely within the Un ited States to violent Islamist extremism. ) Notably,our invest igation has not examined Hasan's cul pability fo r the attack or the facts of whathappened during the auack, which are the subj ect of an Army court-martial proceeding.

This investiga tion into the Hasan case nows from our Comm ittee's four-year, bipartisanreview of the threat ol' violent Islamist ex tremi sm to our homeland . Thi s work has included 14hearings, numerous br iefings fro m the Ex ecutive Branch on threat trends and specific plots,ex tensive and sustained consultations with non-government experts and former governmentofficials, and the 2008 release o f a staff report. Viofenllslamist Extremism, rhe Internet, and theHomegrown Terrorist Threat , wh ich argues that the internet's exploi tat ion by terroris ts wouldlead to an increase in homegrown terrorism. In add ition, our assessment of the government' scounte rterrorism capabi lities builds upon the Commiuee's leadership in enacting the HomelandSecurity Act of2002 (whi ch created the Department of Homeland Security) and the Committee 's2 See http://www.whitehouse.govlblogl20091l 1/1 4/weekly-address-veterans-day-and-fort-hood. For a transcript ofthe address, see htlp:llm idd leeast about.com/od/document I qllobama-fort-hood.htm.J Th e Congressional Re search Service defines homegrown violent lslamist extremism as "terrorist activity or plotsperpetrated within the United States or abroad by American ci tizens, legal pennanenl residents, or visitorsradicalized [to violent Islami st extremism] largety within the United States." John Rollins, American JihadislTerrorism: Combatillg a Complex Threat, Congressional Research Service (2010).

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authorship of the Intelligence Refonn and Terrorism Prevention Act 0[2004 (wh ich created theDirector of Na tional In te lligence and the National Counterterrorism Center).This in vestigation has centered on th e act ions of DoD and the FB I with respect to Hasan.In examining 000 and FB I actions, we have been cogni zant of DoD 's and the FBI's record ofsuccess in the nine years since 9/ 11 . Th e FBI , in partnership with other federal agencies andstate and local law enforcement, has ac hieved dramatic successes in protecting the United Statesagainst homegrown terrorism. The men and women of DoD and the FB I have taken aggressiveaction to undennine the capabilities of foreign terrorist networks. These efforts, both at homeand abroad, have made our nation safer. Nonetheless, the tact ics o f our terrorist adversariescontinue to evol ve, and our nation's counterterrorism efforts must continue to improve in orderto dete r, detect, and di srupt fut ure terrorist attacks.In condu cting our review, we have been cogni zant of three risks confronting every

in vest iga tion of government performance, part icularly those rela ting to intelligence and lawen forcement ac ti vities. First, hindsight can obscure the ambiguity that officia ls faced at the time.To avoid thi s pitfall, we focused our investigation on what in formation was readily ava ilable toand actually considered by the key government personnel at the time and whether their actionswere reasonable based on that inform atio n. Second, hindsight can obscure the competingprior ities that officials faced. Accordingl y, we sought to detennine what priority they placed onth e information th at they possessed and how con fli cts over priorities were reso lved. Th ird, toavoid the temptat ion to hold individual personnel to unrea listic standard s, our in vestigation ha sfocused primarily on what, if any, systemic prob lems were exposed by th e government 'sperformance in thi s particular incident. Nonetheless, we expect DOD and the FB I to holdindiv id ual personnel accountable for performance deficiencies identified in this and other reportson the Hasan case.

The findings an d recommendations of ou r investigation require that the report explainviolent Islam ist extremi sm and the signs of Hasan 's radi cali zation to vio lent Islamist extremism.We provide th at in format ion in this report wi th the explicit intention of di stingui shing violentIs lami st extremi sm from the mill ions of Muslim-Americans and Muslims around the world whoreject that ideology and practice their faith in pcace. We acknowledge with gratitude thecontributions of Muslim-Americans to this nalion and the patriotism of Mu slim-Americanservicemembers in defending our freedoms.

Fu rthe rm ore, our report's fin dings and recomm en dations shou ld not be construed asim plying that the Executive Branch has learn ed nothing from the Fort Hood attack. In fact,Pres ident Obama ordered a review after th e attack, the FB I instituted several systemic changes,and DoD has been engaged in an extensive review effort in volvi ng an independent panel, theOffi ce of th e Secretary of Defense, and the Mi litary Services. Our conclusion is not that th eExecu ti ve Branch has avo id ed learning lessons but rather there are more lessons to be learnedand changes to be implemented.

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II. The Ideology Of Violent Islamist Extremism And The Growth Of HomegrownRadicali7..atio n.America 's enemy today, just as it was seven years ago when the 9111 Commissionreleased its report, is not simply terrorism or a particular terrorist organ ization such as al Qaeda

or its affi liates. The enemy is in fact the ideo logy of violent Islamist extremism - the ideologythat inspired the attacks of 911 1 as well as a myri ad of attacks large and small around the worldpri or to and after 9111. As the 9111 Commission report stated, we are not fighting '''terrorism,'some generic ev il ," and "our strategy must match our means to two ends: dismantling the alQaeda network and prevai ling in the longer term over the ideology that gives rise to Islamistlerrorism.,,4

Despite the remarkable work of America 's mi li tary, inte lligence, and law en forcemen tagencies in preventing indi vidual terrorist attacks, the ideo logy that in spired 9/ 11 and otherattacks and plots around the world continues to moti vate individuals to co mmit terrorism. Thethreat is exemplifi ed by Omar Hammami, an American from a typical upbringing in Alabamawho now fig ht s for the violent Islamist extremist group al-S habaab in Somalia and recruitsWe sterners to its cause in English over the internet. As Hammami said, "they can't blame it onpove rty or any of that stuff .. . They will have to rea lize that it's an ideology and it's a way of lifethat makes people change."s

A. The Ideological Principles. Radicalization Process. And Recruitment Narrative OfViolen t Is lamist Extremism.

The core pr incip les of violent Islamist extremism are essen tia lly as follows: A globalstate - or caliphate - should be created in which the most radical interpretation of Shari 'ah(Islamic re ligious law) will be enforced by the governmen t Ad herents to violent Islami stextremism should priorit ize the g lobal Islami st community - the ummah - ahead of thecommunity and coun try in which they live. To accomp lish these goa ls, violence is justified,including aga in sllh e West generally, military personn el, and civilians. Muslims who opposeth ese principl es and reject its perversion of the Islamic fa ith are a lso cons idered by violentlslamist extremists to be the enemy.

The process by wh ich an individual transitions to a violent Islamist extremist is known asradi calization. Research into radicalization has continued to evolve as it becomes moreprevalent, but experts have generally identified four phases or such rad ica lizat ion.6 Preradicalization is the period before the individuals begin the ir journey to violent Islami stextremism. They possess or acquire psychological or other precursors that underlie theind ividuals' eventual ope nness to this ideo logy. During Self-Identification, individuals4 National Commission on Tcrrorist Attacks Upon the Unitcd States, 9/ / / Commiss ion Report (2004), at 363. The9/ 11 Commi ssion used the lenn "Islamistterrorism" - what this report ca lls "v iolent Islamist extremism" - todescribe the most radical manifestat ion of Islam ism or ls lamist ideology.s "The Jihadi51 Nex l Door", The New York Times (January 31,2010).6 This framework is adapted from a publicly available description of the radicalization process by the New YorkPolice Department's ("NYPD ") Intelligence Division. New York Pol ice Department , Radicaliza fion in the Wesl:The Homegrown Threat (2007).

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experien ce a crisis or have a grievance - whether social, economic, political, or personal - thattriggers a "cognitive" opening that compels them to search for answers to their gr ievances.7During Indoctrination, individuals adopt violent Islamist extremist ideology and begin to see theworld as a strugg le aga inst the West. Finally, they reach the Violence stage in which they accepttheir individual duty to commit violence, seek tra ining, and plan attacks.8Individuals often enter the radicalization process after being exposed to a commonrecruitment narrative. The narrative's main thrust is that the West, led by the United States, isengaged in a war against Islam.9 Purveyors of the narrative are particularly effective in tying thenarrative to personal, local, or regional grievances - in other words, in convincing aggrievedindividuals that their grievances result from the West being at war with Islam and that theseindividuals must ri se up to defend Islam via terrorist activity.B. The In ternet's Criticality For Radicaliza tion To Violent Islamist Extremism. And TheDiversification OfThe Homegrown Terrorist Threat.In the past, face-to-face interactions were essential for violent Islamist extremist groups

to iden tify followers and to facilitate the radicalization process. However, face-to-faceinteractions have begun to be replaced by the internet as the primary means by which violentIslamist extremism has spread globally. Al Qaeda and other violent Islamist extremistsrecognized the potency of the internet after 9/ 11 when they created a relatively structured, onlinemedia campaign that targeted western audiences. Over time, violent Islamist extremists havecontinued to evolve and improve their ability to use the Web to broadcast the ideology. Theirviolent propaganda has spread from password protected forums to include "mainstream" sites.The Committee's 2008 staff report concluded that the threat of homegrown terrorism inspired byviolent Islamist extremist ideology wou ld increase due to the focused online efforts of thatideology's adherents and how indiv iduals were using the internet to access this propaganda. lOIndeed, the incidence of homegrown terrorism has increased significantly in the past two years ascompared to the years since 9/ 11 . From May 2009 to November 2010, there were 22 differenthomegrown plots , contrasted with 21 such plots from September 200 I to May 2009. 11

71d.Mitchell D. Silber, Director of In telligence Analysis, New York City Police Department, Statement before theSenate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (November 19,2009).

9 Th e importance of the narrative in the recruitment and radicalization of homegrown violent Islamist extremistscannot be understated. An American recruit to violent lslamist extremism is unlikely to have read or fullyunderstood the ideological writings ofSayid Qutb, Yousefal-Ayyiri, or Abdullah Azzam, bUi the narrative is easierfor such an individual to comprehend. The narrative provides a way to explain contemporary events through thelens of the ideology and to motivate potential adherents to take action.10 Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Govemmenlal Affairs, Majority and Minority Staff Repon, ViolentIsfamist EXlremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Terrorist Threat, (May 8, 2008).I I American }ihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat, Appendix A. Many of these plots are recountedelsewhere in this report, particularly the list of cases in which Anwar al-Au laqi's literarure played a role. Cases notmentioned elsewhere in this report include the apprehension of Ho sam Smadi (plot to blow up a Dallas skyscraper,2009) and Michael Finton (alleged plot to blow up a Federal building in Illinois, 2009). Since 9111, only two plotsresulted in American casualties domestically (the attack by Carlos Beldsoe and the Fort Hood attack).

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The homegrown terrorist threat also has become "d iversified" in two ways, which ha shelped cause the number of attacks to reach its current peak over the last two years.12First, the need for interaction between individual terrorists and outside groups isevolving. Individual plotters are identifying with an increasingly varied number of foreign

terrorist organizat ions o r may no longer need to be tied directly to outside groups. The threat cancome from al-Qaeda (in September 2009, Najibullah Zazi was allegedly under al-Qaeda'sdirection when planning suicide attacks on New York City transit systems);13 al-Qaeda affiliates(in 2008 and 2009, at least 20 young men from the United States jo ined al-Shabaab in Somaliaincluding Shirwa Ahmed, the first known American suicide bomber); al-Qaeda's ideo logicalallies (in May 2010, Faisal Shahzad, a U.S. citizen who had received training from Tehrik-iTaliban Pakistan, 14 attempted to set of f a ve hic le-based explosive device in Times Square);homegrown groups (in July 2009, seven individuals allegedly attempted to receive trainingoverseas and plan attacks on the homeland, including a small-arms assault on the Marine base inQuantico, Virginia); 15 and individual homegrown terrorists or " lone wolves" (in June 2009,Carlos Bledsoe, a self-described follower of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), 16alleged ly killed one soldier and wounded a second outs ide ofa recruiting station in Little Rock,Arkansas).

As the Committee warned in its 2008 report, lone wo lf terrorists present a uniqueproblem for law enforcement and intelligence a g e n c i ~ s . 1 7 These lone actors, inspired by violentIslamist extremist ideology, plan attacks without specific guidance from foreign terrori storganizations. Because much of their radicalization process is isolated from others, lone wolvesare less likely to come to the atten tion of law enforcement and intelligence agencies. IS FromSeptember II Ih until the Fort Hood attack occurred, the only attack on the homeland that resultedin deaths was perpetrated by a lone actor Carlos Bledsoe.

Second, the threat is diverse because there continues to exist no single profile of violentIslamist extremists, especially in the United States where individuals from va rious backgroundshave grav itated to violent Islamist extremism. 19 Nor is there a general time frame over which theprocess of radicalization to violent Islamist extremism occurs, although the internet has almostcertainly accelerated the radicalization process overthe past couple ofyears. 2o Indeed, as aresult of the internet and other variables, the time frame between the beginning of radicalization

12 Michael Le iter, Director, National Counterterrorism Center, Statement before the Senate Homeland Security andGovernmental Affairs Commiltee (September 22, 2010).tJ u.s. v. Medunjanin, Naseer. EI Shukrijumah, Rehman, Lnu, Superseding Indictment (July 7, 2010).14 u.s. v. Shahzad, Sentencing Memorandum (September 29, 2010).15 u.s. v. Boyd, Indictment (July 22, 2009).16 Carlos Bledsoe, Letter to Judge Herben Wright (January 14,2010).17 Senate Comm ittee on Homeland Security and Governmental AfTairs, Majority and Minority StafTReport, Violenthlamist Extremism, the Internet, and the Homegrown Threat, (May 8, 2008).18 Id.

Peter Bergen and Bruce Hoffman, Assessing the Terrorist Threat (B ipartisan Policy Center, Septemb er 10, 2010).20 Garry Reid, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense, Special Operations and Combating Terrorism, Statementbefore the Senate Armed Service Subcommillee on Emerging Threats and Capabilities (March 10,2010).

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and the onset of terrorist activity has decreased substantia lly, further exacerbating the cha llengeto law enforcement and intelligence agencies to detect and disrupt auacks.

C. The Role Of "V irtual Sp iritual Sanctioners" Exemplified By Anwar al-Aulagi.Proceeding in the radica lization process from the leve l ofSelf-Identification to the levels

of Indoctrination and Violence has been made easier by "v irtual spiritual sanct ioners.,,21 Theseind ividuals prov ide a false sense of re ligious j ustification for an act of terrorism over the internet.Though many individuals around the globe have become purveyors of violent Islami stextremism, a foremost example ofa "virtual spi ritual sanctioner" is Anwar al-Aulaqi, a U.S.citizen now operat ing from Yemen. 22 In 2008, then-Department of Homeland SecurityUndersecretary for Inte lligence and Ana lysis Charlie A llen stated publicly, "Another example ofal Qaeda reach into the Homeland is U.S. citizen, al Qaeda supporter, and fo rmer spiritual leaderto three of the September 11th hijackers Anwar al-Aulaqi - who targets U.S. Muslims withradical on line lectures encouraging terrorist attacks from his new home in Yemen.,,23

Al-Aulaqi's role as an on line provocateur of homegrown terrorism has been we ll knownto the U.S. Government, including the FBI:

Over four years prior24 to the Fort Hood attack, Mahmud Brent, a man who admitted toattending a Lashka r-e-Taiba training camp in Pakistan was found with "audiotapes oflectures by Anwar A l_ Awlaki.,,25 Nearly three years prior26 to the Fort Hood attack, six individuals planned to attack FortDix, New Jersey, and to kill "as many soldiers as possible .'.27 The FBI arrested the group

in May 2007. Accordi ng to expert test imony at the trial , al-Aulaqi's lectu re explainingConstants on the Path to lihadwas a cornerstone of their radicalization to vio lentIslamist extremism. 28

2t Mitchell D. Si lber, Director of In telligence Analysis, New York City Police Department, Stalemenl before theSenate Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs Committee (November 19,2009).n Other examples of virtual spiritual sanct ioners include the Jamaican citizen Abdullah el-Faisal, Australian Fe izMohammad, and American Samir Khan.B Charles E. Allen, Undersecretary for Intelligence and Analysis IChief Intelligence Officer, Keynote Address atGEOINT Conference (October 28, 2008), available athttp://www.dhs.gov/xnews/speeeheslsp_ 122537763496 l.shtm.U.s. v. Mahmlld Faqllq Brent, Sentencing Memorandum (July 23, 2007). The al-Aulaqi audiotapes were round ina FBI search of Brent's residence on August 4, 2005. In addition, the sentencing memorandum cites the 9/11Commission that describes al-Aulaqi as the "sp iritual advisor to two of the September II hijackers."H /d.26 Evan F. Kohlmann, Expert Report II, U.S. v. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer el al. (September 2008). The recordedconversations between Shain Duka and another individual regarding al-Aulaqi took place on March 9, 2007.27 Department of Justice, Five Radical/slamisls Charged with Planning Attack on Forr Dix Army Base in NewJe/'sey (May 8, 2007).28 Evan F. Kohlmann, Expert Report 1[, U.S. v. Mohamad Ibrahim Shnewer et al. (September 2008).20


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Nearly a year and a half9 prior to the Fort Hood attack, U.S. citi zen Barry Bujol wasalleged ly seekin g al -Aulaq i's advice and counsel on how to join a terrorist organiza tion.In June 2009, the FBI arrested him for attempt ing to provide material support to AQAP.Bujol had emailed al-Aulaqi requesting assistance on '"'"jihad" and wanting to help the""mujahideen," and in response al -Au laqi sent his 44 Ways ojSupportinli,Jihad. Bujolbelieved that al-Aulaqi' s ema il would attest to his bona fides to AQAP. 0

A year and three months31 prior to the Fort Hood attack, Hysen Sherifi , one of seven menin North Carolina charged in a plot to attack the Marine base in Quantico, Virginia,allegedly told an informant that he was going "to send [the informant] more books onIslam and jihad and that one of the books was '44 Ways to Help the Mujihadin' byAnwar Aleki [sic].,,32

Four months prior to the Fort Hood aHack,33 in a case investigated by the FBI 'sWashington Fi eld Office, U.S. citi zen Zachary Chesser reached out to al-Aulaqi throughal-Aulaqi's Web si te fo r spiritual guidance and solicited al-Aulaqi 's recommendations onhis desire to jo in al-Shabaab in Soma lia. In charging documents aga in st Chesser, the FBInoted that "various Islamic terrorists we re in contact with Aulaqi before engag ing interrorist acts." Chesser exp lained to investigators that ""Aulaqi inspires people to pursuejihad. ,,34 He watched on line vid eos and listened to digitized lectures ""almostobsessively" including those by hi s favorite spiritual leader, al-Aulaqi. Al- Au laqiresponded to two ofChesser' s me ssages.Al -Aulaqi's role as a virtual spiritual sanctioner in U.S . terrorism cases has continuedsince the Fort Hood attack.3) Furthermore, al -AuJaqi has taken an operat ional role in terroristplots including, but no t limited to, the Christm as Day attack by Umar Faruk Abdulmutallab.36

29 U.s. v. Barry Bujol, Application for Search Warrant (May 28, 2010), Affidavit of TFO Sean McCarroll, FB IJTTF. According to the search warrant, Bujol began his communication with al-Aulaqi in "mid-2008.")O/d.J I Us. v. Hysen Sherifi. et 01., Application for Search Warrant (July 27,2009). According to the search warrant, theconversation be tween Sherifi and the infonnant occurred on February 7, 2009.J2 Jd. The search warrant continues, "Sherifi trans lated the book an d put it on a website and he told [the infonnant]that translating is one of the 44 ways to help the Mujihadin."] J US. v. Zachary Chesser, Application for Search Warrant (July 21,2010), Affidavit of FBI Special Agent MaryBrandt Kinder. According to the FBI Affidavit, "a court-ordered search ofChesser's email [email protected], revealed that on July 13,2009, Chesser contacted Anwar Awlaki directly through Awlaki'semail address."3. Id.J 5 U S. v. Alessa, Almonle, Criminal Complaint (June 4,2010), Us. v. Shaker Masri, Criminal Complai nt (August 3,2010), us . v. Palll Rockwood, Sentencing Memorandu m, (August 16,2010), Us. v. Abdel Shehadeh, Complaint inSupport ofArrest Warrant (October 21, 2010), Us. v. Farooque Ahmed, Search and Seizure (October 26, 2010),Us. v. Antonio Martinez, Cri minal Complaint (December 8, 2010).36 Janet Napolitano, Secretary of Department of I-lomeiand Security, Slatement before the Senate Ho meland Securityand Governmental Affairs Committee (Sep te mber 22, 2010); Michael Leiter, Director, National CounterterrorismCenter, Statement before the Senate Homeland Securily and Governmental Affairs Comm il1ee (September 22 ,2010) .

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PART II : MAJOR HASAN'S RAD ICALI ZATION TO VIOLENT ISLAM 1STEXTREM ISM AND THE STR ING OF GOVERNMENT FAILURES TOINTERVENE AGA INST HI M PRIOR TO THE FORT HOOD ATTACK

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Both the public and the private signs of Hasan's radicalization to violent Islami stextremism whil e on active duty were known to government offic ials, but a stri ng of failuresprevented these officials from intervening aga in st him. His radicalization was well knownduring his military medical training to his superiors and colleagues, but no action was taken todiscipline or di scharge him. In fact, signs o f hi s radica lization to violent Islamist extremism thattroubl ed many of his sup eriors and colleagues were saniti zed in hi s Officer Evaluation Reportsinto praise of hi s supposed research on violent Islami st extremi sm. Hasan's radicalization toviolent Islamist ex tremism subsequently [REDACTED] engaged in communication with theSuspected Terrorist [REDACTED] that were clearly out of bounds for a military officer. Theensuing JlTF inquiry, however, was only aware of his in itial [REDA CTED] communications(despite the fact that the FBI had obtained info rmat ion on subsequent communicat ions prior tothe attack) and was conducted superficially - dismi ss ing these fi rst [REDACTED]communi cations as benign because of the mi s leading Officer Evaluation Repo rts praising hisresearch.

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III. "A Ti cking Time Bomb:" DoD 's Fa ilure To Re spond To Major Hasan's Public DisplaysOf Radicalization To Violent lslami st Extremism.Major Nid al Hasan 's pub lic displays of radicaliza tion toward vi ol ent Islamist ex tremismduring hi s medical residency and post-residency fe llowship were clear and led two officers todescribe him as a "t icking time bomb.,,37Born in Arlington, Virginia, in 1970, he graduated from Vi rgi nia Tech with anengi ne ering degree in 1992 and began active duty with the U.S. Army in 1995. In 1997, he

en tered medical school at the Uniformed Services Un iversity of the Health Sciences ("USUHS"),the Military Services' leading educational institut ion for medical professionals, and graduated in2003. From 2003 to 2007, Hasan was a resident in the psychiatric program at Walter Reed ArmyMedical Center, an d from 2007 to 2009 he was a fellow in a post-residency graduate program atUS UH S. During hi s medical residency and post-residency fellowshi p, hi s views were no secretto hi s superiors and co lleagues, and he showed clear evidence of esca lating radica lization toviolent Islam ist extremi sm. Witnesses repo rted th at Ha san ex pressed support in open cl asspresentations fo r many of the principles of viol ent Islamist extremi sm, and this support isreflected in written academ ic papers Ha san prepared during th is time frame.That conduct di sturbed many of hi s sup eriors and colleagues, yet no action was takenaga inst him. In fact, his Officer Evaluation Reports were uniforml y positive - and evendescri be d his exploration of violent Islamist extremism as something praiseworthy and use fu l toU.S. counterterrorism efforts. Notwithstand ing his mani festations of violent Islami st extremismand hi s concomita nt poor performance as a psychiatrist, Hasan was not removed from the

mi li tary but instead was promoted to the rank of maj or in May 2009 and eventually ordered to bedeployed \0 Afg han istan in the fall of2009.Many servicemembers have deepl y hel d religious views (whether Christian, Jewish,

Muslim, Hindu, or Buddhist), but such views arc not a cause for concern. The issue that must becountered is the adoption a fradical ideology that is a corruption of religion and leads tointol erance or vio lence or is detrimental to military operations. An indi vi dual who embracesviolent Islami st extremist ideology clearly is un fit \0 serve in th e U.S. military.38 What followsis a summary of the key facts regard ing Hasan 's deepen in g embrace of violent Islamistextremism and DoD 's failure to respond.

During the invcstigation, Commitllcc stafT was briefcd by DoD about relevant military policies and procedures.These briefings will be referenced by the name ofthc briefer. In addition , DoD prov ided three Hasan-specificbriefings to HSGAC slafT. Two oflhcse briefings provided the contents of 30 interviews of wi tnesses conducted bythe DoD Criminal Investigat ive Di vision (CID ) and the FB I in November 2009 immediately after the Fort Hoodattack. Those briefings will be referenced as "Cl O-FBI Briefing, Wi tness _ " and "CID-FBI Briefing 2, Witness". Th e third Hasan-specific briefing provided the contents of 34 interviews that were carried out by the stafTconducting the DoD internal review, headed by fonne r Secreta ry of the Anny Togo West and Admiral Vern Clark(ret.), the fomler Chief of Naval Operations, which led to the PrOTecting fhe Force report and separate DoD HasanAn nex. Th:1I briefing will be referenced as "Panel Re vicw Briefin g. Witness _ ".J l Panel Review Briefing, Witness 14 an d Witness 19.J8 Kelly R. Bu ck et ai, Screening f or Po/ential Terrorists in rhe Enlisted Military Accessions Process, DefensePersonnel Security Research Center (Apri l 2005), at 67.27


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While Ha san 's evident radicalization to v iolent Islamist extremism occu rred graduallyand esca lat ed over time, the fact that he obv ious ly had strong religious views that createdconflicts with his mili tary service manifested during the early part of his residency (2003-2006).One classmate told investigators that Hasan openly questioned whether he cou ld engage incombat against other Muslims.39 During the third year of hi s residency, Hasan's conflicts withservice obl igations ripened to the point that one o f his supervisors tried twice to convince him toleave the military. The fir st time, Hasan 's superior told him, "I don't think you and the militarywi ll fit," and offered Hasan "a way out" to ''just say goodbye.,,4o Later, after that adviser andHasan unsuccessfu lly ex plored whether Hasan qualified for conscientious objector status, thatsupervisor again tri ed to convince Hasan to resign.41

The next two years were the final year of Hasan 's Walter Reed residency and the firstyear of hi s USUHS fellowship (2006-2008), and it was then that hi s radicaliza tion to violentIslamist extremi sm came in to plain view. In the last month of his residency, he chose to fulfillan requ!rement to ~ a k e a s c h ~ l a r ~ ~ presentation psychiatric by giving antOpiC lecture on Violent Islaml st extremi sm. - The presentatIOn was a reqUirement for gradualionfrom the residency, common ly referred to at Walter Reed as "Grand Rounds.,,43 Hasan's draftpresentation consisted a lmost en tirely of references to the Koran , without a single mention of amedical or psychiatric term .44 Hasan's draft also presen ted ex tremist interpretations of the Koranas supporting grave physical harm and killing of non-Mus lims.4s He even suggested thatrevenge might be a defense for the terrorist attacks ofSeptember 11, 200 1.46 Hasan' s superiorswamed him that he needed to revise the presentation ifhe wanted to graduate41and concludedthat it was "not scientific, " "not scholarly, " and a mere "recitation o f the Koran" that "might beperceived as proselyt izing.,,48

At about the same time, the Psychiatric Residency Program Director, who was one of thesuperiors who reviewed the draft Grand Rounds presentation, questioned whether Ha san was fitto graduate. 49 He thought Ha san was "very lazy" and "a relig ious fanatic."so Ultimately, Hasanim proved the presentation sufficiently to receive credit, although a review of the PowerPoint

19 Panel Review Briefing, Witness 2.Id., Witness 27.Id.Id., Witness 20.Id.

44 Using the Koran to Understand Muslims and Ihe Establishment o fan Islamic Slale, 000 Production, Stamp 000000973-001020 ("Draft Presentation"). Documenls that were produced by DoD to HSGAC during the investigationare ciled as "000 Production, Stamp DoD #".4S /d.46 /d., Stamp DoD 001016.47 Memorandum for CPT Nidal Hasan, Re "Scholarly Project," From Program Director, NCC Psychialry ResidencyTraining (May 21,2007), Hasan DoD File, Stamp 20091202-127. Documents from Hasan's pcrsonnel, training andcredenlials files, which were made avai lable by 0 00 for HSGAC review, but which were not kept or retained byHSGAC, arc cited as "Hasan 0 00 Fi le , Stamp if'.Panel Review Briefing, Witness 17 .

elD-FBI Brie fing, Witness 20.5() Id . 28


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presentation and a v ideo of th e event shows that it was still essentially a col lection o f Koranicverses with mini mal scholarl y content.Sl According to the Program Director, a major reason thathis presentation was acceptable was because standards for such presentations did not yet ex ist. 52He graduated despite the Program Director 's reservations.

The most chilling feature of both the draft and final presentation was that Hasan statedthat one of the risks of having Muslim-Americans in the mi li tary was the poss ibility of fratri cidalmurder of fe llow servicemembers.Hasan advanced to a two-year fe llowship at USU HS. As a threshold matter, hadestabl is hed procedures been followed, he would not have been accepted into the fe llowship.According to the Army Surgeon General, fellowships are typically reserved for elite medicalprofessionals. 53 Officers in volved in th e fellowship selection process recounted th at Hasan wasoffered a fellow ship because he was the only Army applicant and the Anny did not want to ri sklosing that fellowship if it was not filled. 54 Hasan confided to a colleague that he app lied for the

fe llowship to avo id a combat deployment in a Mus li m country; one of Hasan' s supervisorsrealized that he had the wrong motivation fo r app lying and warned aga inst accepting him. 55Hasan's radicalization became unmistakable alm ost immediately into the fe llowship, andit became clear that Hasan embraced violent Islamist ex tremist id eology to such an ex tent that hehad lost a sense of the conduct expected ofa military officer. Classmates - who were militaryofficers, some outrankin g Ha san - descri bed him as havin g " fi xed radical beliefs about

fu ndamenta list Islam" that he shared "at every possible opportun ity" or as having irrationalbeliefs.56Le ss than a month into the fellowship, in August 2007, Hasan gave another off-topicpresentation on a violent Islamist extremist subject instead of on a health care subject. This time,Hasan' s presentation was so controversial that th e instructor had to stop it after just two minutes

when the class erupted in protest to Hasan's views. The presentat ion was entitl ed, Is the War onTerror a War on Islam: An Islamic Perspective? Hasan's proposal for this presentationpromoted this troubling thes is: that U. S. militar.x operations are a war againsl lslam rather thanbased on non-religious security cons iderat ions. 7 Hasan's presentation accorded with thenarrative of violent Islamist extremism that the West is at war with Islam. Hasan 's paper wasfuJI of empathetic and supportive recitation of other violent Islamist ex tremi st views, includingdefense of Osama bin Laden, slanted historical accounts blaming the United States fo r problemsin the Middle East, and arguments that anger at the Un ited States is justifiable.58 Several51 Draft Presentation, Stamp DoD 001 OJ 8; Powerpoint presentation, Tile Koranic World View as it Relates toMllslims in fhe u.s. Military, at 13,50.n Panel Review Briefing, Witness 20.H Schoomaker Briefing.

Panel Review Briefing, Witness 9 and Witness 20.5S Id., Witness 2 and Witness 27; CIOIFBI Briefing, Witness 2.S6 /d., Witness 25.S7 Nidal l-l asan. Is the Wor on Terror a War on Islam: An Islamic Perspective?, DoD Production, Stamp DoD201 00205-466.SA Id., at 1-3. 29


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col leagues who witnessed the presen tation described Hasan as justifying suicide bombers. Thesecolleagues were so alarmed and offended by what they described as hi s "dysfunctional ideology"and "extremist views" that th ey interrupted the presentation to the point where the instructorchose to stop it. S9 The instructor who stopped the presentation sa id that Hasan was sweating,quite nervous, and agitated after being confronted by the class.6o

Hasan's promot ion of violent Islamist extremist beliefs continued after the presentation.One class mate sa id th at Hasan supported suicide bombings in another class.61 He told severalclassmates that his re ligion took precedence over th e U.S. Consti tution he swore to support anddefend as a U.S. military office r. It is cri tica lly important to view Hasan's statements in thecontext of all of hi s conduct. Hi s statement was not part of an abstract discussion on there lationship between duty to religion and duty to country, nor was it framed with in the context offaith-based following of the mili tary directive that servicemembers not follow illegal orders.Rather, Hasan's statements about the primacy of religious law occurred as he was support ing aviolent extremist interpretation of Islam and suggesting that this radica l ideology justifiedoppos ition to U.S. policy and could lead to fratricide in the ranks. Perhaps for this reason,Hasan's comments on his loyalty to religio us law, wh ich he made more than once, were sodisturbing to his co lleagues that they reported Hasan to superiors.62

Later in the fellowship, Hasan pursued another academic project in the ambit of violentIslamist extremism.63 Ha san's written proposal for thi s project framed it in clinical terms,namely as a research study of whether Muslims in military service had religious conflicts. It wasperceived as less controversial than his prior presentations. Nonetheless, it was the third projectin the span ofa year that Hasan dedicated to violent Islamist extremist views. Moreover, Ha sanproposed to give Muslim soldiers a survey which implicitly questioned the ir loyalty and wasslan ted to favor the violent Islamist extremist views he had previously expressed. In onequestion, Hasan wanted to ask whether the religion of Islam creates an expectation that Muslimso ldi ers would help enemies of the United States in Iraq and Afghanistan.64 And again, Hasanraised the ominous possibility of fratricide by Muslim-American servicemembers against fellowservicemembers as a centra l reason for hi s survey.65

In sum, Hasan engaged in the following conduct in front of or as reported to his superiorswithin little more than one year: Making three ofT-top ic presentations on violent Islamist extremist top ics instead of

medical subjects.

SQ Panel Review Briefing, Witness 19; CIDFBI Briefing, Witness 10 and Witness 25.60 Panel Review Briefing, Witness 19.61 Id. , Witness 14.61 CID-FBI Briefing, Witness 10, Witness 14, and Witness 25.6] Nidall-l asan. Religious Conflicts Among US Muslim Soldiers, June 2008. DoD Production, Stamp DoD20100205469.64 Id., at 23.M /d., at 3. 30


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Giving a class presentat ion perceived as so supportive of violent Islamist extremistconn ic t against the Un ited States th at it was almost immediately stopped by an in struc torafter classmates erupted in opposition to Hasan's views. Justifying suicide bombings in class at least twice, according to the accounts of

classmates. Suggest ing in writing in hi s proposals for presentations that some actions ofOsama binLaden may be justified. Telling several classmates that his religion took precedence over the U.S. Constitution hesw ore a military oath to support and defend. Stat ing th ree t im es in writing that Muslim-Americans in the military could be prone tofratricide.

Despite Hasan's overt displays of radica lization to violent Islamist extremism, Hasan' ssuperiors failed to di scipline him, refer him to counterintelligence officials, or seek to di schargehim. One of the officers who reported Hasan to superiors opined that Hasan was permitted torema in in service because of "political correctness" and ignorance of religious practices.66 Thatofficer added that he be lieved that concern about potential discrimination complaints stoppedsome individuals from cha llengi ng Hasan.67 We are concerned that exactly such worries about"political correctness" inhibited Hasan 's superiors and co lleagues who were deeply troubled byhi s behavior from taking the actions against him that could have prevented the attack at FortHood. However, none of the superiors cited "political correctness" as the reason for not actingagainst Ha san. In stead, the reasons given for their failure to act varied and included:

A belief that Hasan 's ideological views were not problematic or were at leastunderstandable: Several of Hasan's superiors were simply not concerned with his views.One superior concluded that he was devoutly rel igious but not an ex tremi st,68 adding thathe was not alarmed by hi s religious expressions because similar expressions of otherreligions would be accepted.69 Another superior thought that hi s religion was part of hi sidentity and that Hasan's inner confl ict concerning mi li tary operations in Muslimcountri es was an understandable in ternal reaction by a servicemember to combat againstthat servicemember 's co-religionists. 7o

Academic freedom and absence of academic standards: Hasan was given a passing markfor his Grand Rounds project in his res idency despiLe the fact that some of hi s superiorsbelieved il virtually ignored legitimate psychi atric iss ues and was un scientific in its

66 Panel Review Briefing" Witness 14.6J Id.6Z Id., Witness 3.691d.70 Id.

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analysis. 71 Hi s superiors offered the fo llow ing reasons fo r givi ng Hasan academic creditfor the presentation: (I ) it fit with in broad parameters of academic freedom to studysubjects of choice,72 (2) he presented a controversial subj ect with thoufhtfuiness andret1ecti on,73 (3) there were no set standards fo r judging such projecls ,7 (4) spiritualitywas part or mental health,75 and (5) although it was not among the best projects, it wasgood enough to pass.76

A desire to preserve the USUHS fe llowship by filling it with an Arm y app licant:According to o fficers involved in the fellowship selection process, Hasan was admitted tothe USU HS fellowship because (I ) he was the only Army candidate for the position hesought,77 (2) the fellowship director was concerned that the fellowship would beterminated if it went unfilled ,1s (3) he rece ived recommendations from senior o fficiais,79and (4) it would have been problematic to rescind the fellowship offer once Hasan wasaccepted.8o A be lief that Hasan provided understanding of violent Islamist ex tremism as we ll as theculture and bel iefof Islam: Some of Hasan's superiors thought that his controversialprojects on vio len t Is lamist extrem ism werc constructive. A senior Walter Reed officialconcluded that Hasan 's Grand Round s presentation addressed "a controversial topic witha degree of thoughtfu lness and a degree ofretlection that . . . was evenhanded."s l Onesuperior regarded Hasan 's proposed USUHS survey on Muslim servicemembers'cont1i cts as a challeng ing but legitimate public health project that contributed to cullUra!

understanding.s2 Even Hasan 's final Program Director at the Walter Reed residency, whoquestioned whether Hasan should be permitted to advance, felt that "Ha san was a uniqueindividua l who could help understand Muslim culture and beliefs."sl A belief that Hasan could perform adequatcly in an in stallation wi th other psychiatrists toassist him: Hasan was assigned to Fort Hood in part because some superiors thought itwould be best to place him at a large base where there would be many psychiatrists to

71 Residell! Evaluationsfor Psychiatry Scholarly Acrivity, Oral Presenfalion, June 20, 2007, Nidal Hasan, MD.,I-hlsan DoD File, Stamp 20 I 00224-490R-488R; Emai l, Subject Re: Hasan Scholarly Projeci (UNCLASSIFIED)(June 22, 2007), DoD Production, DoD Stamp 20091202-307; Email, Subject Re: Hasan Scholarly Projecl(UNCLASSIFIED) (June 21, 2007), DoD Production Stamp 2009 1202-309.72 Panel Review Briefing, Witness 3.7) Id.74 'd.; Witness 20.15 Id.

'd., Witness 2." 'd., Witness 3 and Witness 20.78 'd. , Witness 3.79 Id., Witness 9.80 Id., Witness 3.II /d .B! /d. , Witness 9; Witness 13.U !d., Witness 20. 32


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Thus, desp ite his overt di splays of radicalizat ion to violent Islamist extremism and hi spoor perfonnance, Hasan was repeatedly advanced instead of being di scharged from the mil itary.He graduated from the residency in 2007, was enrolled in the fellowship that same year, rece ivedhi s promotion to major in 2008, was assigned to Fort Hood later that year, and ultimately wasselected for deployment to Afghanistan in October 2009 - all by officers who had knowledge ofhis poor performance and expressions of violent Islamist extremism. Hasan had stated that hewas comfortable with a deployment to Afghanistan as opposed to Iraq.94 The same officer whoass igned Hasan to Fort Hood - and who witnessed at least one of Hasan' s ex press ions of violentIslamist extremist radicalizat ion at USUHS and was aware that there were serious concernsabout Ha san - made the decision to deploy Hasan to Afghanistan.9s In other words, despiteHasan's hi story of rad icaliza tion to vio lent Islami st extremism, Hasan was scheduled fordeployment to provide psychiatric care under stress fu l conditions in a combat zone in which theU.S. military is battling violent Islamist extremists.

In sum, the officers who kept Ha san in the military and moved him steadily a long knewfull well of his problematic behavior. As the officer who assigned Hasa n to Fort Hood (and la terdecided (0 dep loy Hasan to Afghani stan) admiued to an officer at Fort Hood, "you're getting ourworst.,,96 On November S, 2009,12 serv icemembers and one civilian employee ofDoD losttheir lives because Hasan was still in the U.S. military.

94 Panel Review Briefing, Witness 3.95 Id., Witness 40 and Witness 21. One witness stated that the officer who ultimately made the deployment decisiong,reviously instructed a course at USUI-IS in which Maj or Hasanjustified suicide bombings. Id., Witness 14 .

Id., Witness 21. 34


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IV. "That's Our Boy:" The FBI's Superficial Inquiry Into Major Hasan Prior To The Attack.Hasan's public displays of radicalization toward violent Islam ist extremism while onactive duty reached a crescendo during the first year of hi s fellowship, the 2007-2008 academic

year, after which his pub lic displays ended. Yet hi s radica lization continued [REDACTED]during the second yea r of hi s fellowship, the 2008-2009 academic year, as he begancommunicating with the subject of an unrelated terrorism investigation, the Suspected Terrorist,[REDACTED]

The Suspected Terrorist was we ll known to the FBI as the subject of severalinvestigation s, including investigations by FBI JTTFs. [REDACTED] The current, thirdinvestigation is led by the JTTF in the FBI 's San Diego Field Office, [REDACTED] . JTTFs areunits in FBI field offices that conduct counterterrorism investigations, with one in each of theFBI 's 56 field offices. 97 JTTFs are staffed not only by FB I agents but also by governmentemployees on detail ("detailees") from other federal agencies - such as agencies within 000 -and state and loca l govemmen ts.98 After 9/ 11, preventing terrorism domestica lly became theFBI 's top priori ty, and a major FB I in itiative involved increasing the number of JTfFs fromthirty-five on 9/ 11 to 106 in 2010.99 The FBI also created a National JTTF in 2002 to "manage"the JTTF program, to coordinate between the JTTFs and FB I headquarters ,l OO and to be a "po in tof fusion" for terrorism intelligence among JTIFs such as by coordinating terrori sm projectsinvolv ing JTTF intelligence co llection.101

The San Diego JITF was responsible fo r reviewing the [REDACTED]. Ha san's in itialcomm unication with the Suspected Terrorist sparked concern with in the San Diego JTTFbecause it suggested that Hasan was affiliated with the U.S . military and sought the SuspectedTerrorist ' s opinion [REDACTED]. 000 detai lees at the San Diego JTTF checked a militarypersonnel database and mi stakenly concluded that Hasan was a military com munications officer,not a military physician , by mi sread ing "comm. o fficer" in Hasan 's mil itary fil e as referring to acommunicat ions officer ra ther than a commiss ioned offi cer. For operational reasons, the SanDiego JTTF decided not to d isseminate Hasan' s com mun icat ions through normal intelligencech annels [REDACTED] ; instead, the San Di ego JITF decided to keep the informat ion aboutHasan solely within the JTTF structure. In the interim, the San Diego JTTF learned of anothercommunication from Hasan to the Suspected Terrorist which should have rai sedcounterintell igence concerns because it [REDACTED].

97 U.S. Department of Justice, Office of the In spector General, The Department ofJustice's Terrorism Task Forces,at 16.93 Id. , at IS. The FB I and other federal agencies refer to dela ilees 10 JTTFs as " task fo rce offi cers."99 Federal Bureau of Investigat ion, Protecting America Against Terrorist Allack: A Closer Look at Our lointTerrorism Task Forces, ava ilable al www.fbi.gov /page2/may09/jllfs_052S09.hlm l.100 Federal Bureau of Investigalion, Prorec/ing America: Na tional l oin! Terrorism Task Force Wages Wal' a llTerror, avai l


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In li eu of sending a normal in telligence communi cation, the FB I agent at the San Di egoJTTF [REDACTED] sent a detailed memorandum to the Washington, DC , JTTF on January 7,2009. (Hasan was stationed at Walter Reed in Washington, DC , and therefore was in theinvestigative jurisdiction of the JITF at the FB I's Washington, DC , Fi eld Office .) TheWa shington JlTF had led th e post-9I11 inv estigation into the Suspected Terrorist (the second ofthe three FBI in vestigations into that individual). Copies of that memorandum were also sent bythat FBI agent to relevant agents in the FBI 's headquarters-based Counterterrorism Division.The memorandum surveyed Suspected Terrori st's significance [REDACTED]. Thememorandum included the content of Hasan' s initial [REDACTED] communications andreq uested an inquiry into Hasan. The request was not a mandatory order for the Wa shingtonJITF to investigate but rather a "discretiona ry lead," which was a type of lead that did notspecify wh at if any actions th e rece iving JITF should take . The FB I agent wrote in thememorandum that the commun ications would be problemat ic if Ha san indeed was a militarycommunications office r.On February 25, 2009 - more than six weeks after the January i h memorandum from theSan Diego JITF - th e FBI leadersh ip at th e Washington JTTF ass igned the lead to a detaileefrom the Defen se Criminal In vestigati ve Service (DCIS). DCIS is the la w enforcement arm ofthe 000 O ffi ce of the Inspector General, whi ch is a semi-autonomous entity with in DoD andresponsibl e for in vestigat in g waste, fraud, and abuse such as in military procurements. DCIS isnot a counteri ntelligence or counterterrori sm agency. In contrast, each Mi li tary Service has itsown co unterintelligence agency or agencies, which also pl aya counterterrorism ro le. The Army,for exam ple, has the Criminal In vestigat ive Di vision for crim inal matters and Army In telligenceand Security Command (i ncluding the 902 nd Military Intelligence Group) for intelligencematters. 102The OCIS agent 's FB I supervisor at the Washington JTTF did not specify any actionsthal lhe DCIS agen t should take. The DCIS agent d id not beg in the inqui ry un til the last da y of

the sta ndard ninety-day deadline for completing inquires based on discretionary leads. Theinquiry was conducted, concluded, and summarized in a reply memorandum to the San DiegoJlTF in four hours on a sin gle day: May 27, 2009.

As later recounted in the reply memorand um to th e San Di ego JTTF, the WashingtonJlTF 's focus was on wheth er Hasan was engaged in terrorist activ it ies - not whether he wasradicalizing to violen t l slamist extremism. The DCIS agent in Washington queried the DoDpersonnel databa se and determined that Hasan was a military ph ysician, not a communicationsofficer. He also queried the FB I's investigative databases to determine wh ether Hasan hadsurfaced in any prior FBI counterterrori sm or other investigat ions and found nothing. Finally,the DCIS agen t obtained a series ofroutine personn el files from a 000 manpower center. Th ese

102 For a review of DOD's counterintelligence organizations, legal authorities, and oversight, see Michael 1. Woodsand William King, "An Assessment of the Evolution and Oversight of Defense Counterintelligence Activities," inJournal ofNational Security Law and Policy vol. 3 (2009), at 169. An examination oflhe effi cacy of the Amly' sorganizational division between investigating criminal conduct versus co unterintelligence is ou tside the scope of lhisrepon. For an analysis of this "anomaly," see Merle V. Bickford , The Organizational Anomaly afUS ArmyStrategic COllmerimelligellce, Thesis for the U.S. Anny Command and General Staff College (2003).36


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files included Hasan's an nu al Officer Evaluation Reports from 2004 to 2008. The OfficerEvaluation Reports for 2007 and 2008 - the years in which Ha san's public di splays ofradicali za tion 10 violent Islami st extremism were most pronounced - praised hi s researchconcerning violent Islamist ex tremism as having potentially significant applicability tocounterterrorism and recommended promotion to major. The record s also indicated that Hasanwas recently promoted to major. The only expl icitly negative infonnation in the files wasHasan 's failure to pass fitness requirements. The OCIS agent believed it was relevant that Hasanhad not tried to hide his identity [REDACTED] in his communications with the SuspectedTerrorist, which the agent believed implied that the communications were legitimate researchefforts.

The Washington JTTF 's DCIS agent considered interviewing Hasan or hi s superiors andcolleagues bu t decided not to do so for two reasons: First, the DClS agent believed that, as theHa san communications were an outgrowth of the San Di ego JTTF 's investigat ion of theSuspected Terrorist, the Washington JTTF needed to tread carefully to avoid di srupting thatinvestigation [REDACTED1. The DCIS agent was concerned that interviews of Hasan'ssuperiors and co lleagues would cause that investigation to be revealed given that the DCIS agentbelieved that such officers wou ld brief their superiors about the interviews. Second, the DClSagent felt that interviews might jeopardize Hasan's career and thus potentially violate therequirement that FBI in vest igations use the "least in trusive means" possible.The Wash ington JTTF's DCIS agent concluded that Ha san's communications wereexplained by the research described in the Officer Evaluation Reports into Islamic culture andbeliefs regarding terrorism. He discussed hi s methodology, rationale for not conducti nginterviews, and conclusions wi th his FBI supervisor, who approved. Nei ther the DCIS agent northe FBI supervisor contacted the San Diego JITF to discuss and validate these concerns, andthere is no indication that they considered [REDACTED). Thcre is no indication that the DClSagent and thc FBI supervisor consulted any other officials wi th in the FBI on whether

disseminating the information on Hasan or taking additional investigative steps such asinterviews would be precluded by law [REDACTED} or the FBI's Domestic InvestigationsOperations Gliide. The DCIS agent then sent a memorandum - approved by his FBI supervisor- back to the San Diego JTTF, with copies to re levant FBI headquarters-based Counterterrori smDivision personnel, describing his investigative process and results.

Th e FBI agent in San Diego who had asked the Washington JTTF to conduct the inquiryfound the Washington JTTF 's work to be "s lim." The FBI agent was critical that the DCIS agenthad not probed more deeply in to Hasan 's background and had not interviewed Hasan's superiorsan d colleagues or Hasan himself. In fact, the FBI agent even thought that Hasan might be aconfiden tial human source of the Washington JTTF given how superficial he believed theWashington JTTF 's inquiry was. To avoid making the FBI " look like the heavy" vis-a.-v is theDCIS agent, the FBI agent askcd one of hi s DCIS detailee colleagues at the San Di ego JTIF tocontact the DC IS agent at the Washington JTTF in order to register concern. That DCIS agent inSan Di ego tried to contact the DClS agent in Washington by tclephone but eventually sent anemail instead to register concerns about the depth of the inquiry and the lack of interviews. TheDCIS agent in Washington relayed the San Diego JITF's concerns to his FB I superv isor, who

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reiterated his approval of how th e inquiry had been condu cted - including the decision not tointerview Hasan 's superiors and colleague s in order to avoid disclosing the San Di ego JTTF 'sinvestigation of the Suspected Terrorist, [REDACTED ]. Following this consultation, the DCISagent in Washington responded by email and defended the decision not to interview Hasan or hissuperiors and colleagues in ord er to avo id revealing the investigat ion, [REDACTED]. The DCISagent in Washington then asked the San Di ego JTTF whether it could provide any evidence ofterrorist links by Hasan or had req uests for speci fi c action.

A few days la ter, the FBI agent in San Diego talked again with the DCIS agent in SanDiego and registered that he was upset with the Wa shington JTfF's response. The FBI agentasked him to place another call to the DCIS agent in Washington. The DCIS agent in San Diegoclaim s that he did, although the DCIS agent in Washington denies that he received this call.(The FBI does not have records of telephone ca lls made from the San Diego JITF.) The DCISagent in San Diego recounts th at he told the DCIS agent in Washington, "If the San DiegoDivision had received a lead like this on a similar Subject (e.g., an Anny officer communicatingto a subject of a terrorism investigation], the San Diego Di vision would have at least opened anassessment and interviewed the Subj ec t." Nor d id the FBI agent at the San Di ego JITF - whowas responsible for [REDACTED] analyzing the communications - express any concern to theWa shin gton JITF about interviews of Ha san 's superiors and coll eagues [REDACTED].Neither the San Di ego nor the Wa sh ington JITFs linked Ha san 's first [REDACTED]communi ca tions - the communications that trigge red the San Diego JTfF 's January 7thmemorandum to the Wash ington JITF - with the [REDACTED] subsequent communicationsbetween Hasan and the Suspected Terrorist (REDACTED] . Ind eed, the San Diego JTTF did notreal ize th at the additional communications [REDACTED], and the Washington JTIF neverlea rned of any of them.[REDACTED]. The [REDACTED] database is not open to queri es by all FBI or JlTF

detailee personn el but rather by such personnel whom the FBI deems need the access in order toperfo rm their job duties. FBI personne l and JTTF detailees without database access could onlyaccess [REDACTED] information [REDACTED] ifit wa s forwa rded to them by someone withaccess [REDACTED]. [REDACTED]. An analyst or agent looking at a communication would not automaticallyrece ive infonnation concerning previous communications [REDACTED]. Instead, acommunication could only be linked with previous communications [REDACTED] byagen ts' or analysts ' memory or by th e agents or analysts actively searching the database[REDA CTED]. Thus the San Di ego JTTF was prevented from easily linking Hasan'ssubsequent comm unicat ions wi th his first (REDACTED ] communications. In addition,

the San Diego JITF never linked Ha san's subsequent communications to hi s in itia l[REDACTED] communications ei ther from memory or by act ivel y running a databasesearch under Ha san's name. The San Diego JTIF believed that the relevant investigators at the Wa shington JTTF hadaccess to the [REDACTED] database and wo uld check it for subsequent communications

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when condu cting the inquiry into Ha san. Yet the DC IS agent at the Washington JITFleading the inquiry in to Hasan lacked access to the [REDACTED] database whichcontained [REDA CTED ] commun ications and in fac t did not even know that theda tabase existed. The DC IS agent ex pected th at th e San Diego JTfF or FBI headquarterswould send him any add itional communications, as had happened to him in previousin

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