In this issue… Airbus Golden Rules 2 Caution! Visual Approaches in Use 2 Radio Altimeter Update 4 Recycling Revisited 6 Mountain Wave TPs 7 Single-Engine Taxi Caution 7 Go-Around! 8 Barometric Altimetry 9 Flaps and No Gear 12 Checklist Change 12 BDA Overweight Landings 13 FMS Descent Issues 14 Flight Plan Verification 16 Those Pesky Speed Limits 18 Setting Takeoff Thrust 18 Summer is on the Way 19 High Workload- Who’s Running the Box? 20 RNP Update 21 EFB and Surface Tips and Tricks 21 ASAP Events 25 Misc. Interesting Bus Stuff 26 A319/320 Incidents 27 Performance Reports 29 Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports 30 Interested in being a LCP? 31 Fleet Article ‘Airbus Golden Rules’ 31 This newsletter is published by the A319/320 Fleet and Pilot Standards Teams. It is intended to provide additional detail surrounding operational policies and procedures and aircraft technical information for the line pilots. The discussion of flight procedures herein is not intended to override or replace official guidance in the flight manuals. Where a conflict exists, the current flight manual governs. The opinions expressed are those of the Chief Line Check Pilot, Fleet Captain and/or the Fleet Technical Manger. May 2015 A319/320 Fleet Newsletter Captain Rich Kaynor Fleet Captain [email protected]404-715-0333 Captain Bruce Graham Chief Line Check Pilot [email protected]404 715-1956
Transcript
In this issue…
Airbus Golden Rules 2
Caution! Visual Approaches in Use 2
Radio Altimeter Update 4
Recycling Revisited 6
Mountain Wave TPs 7
Single-Engine Taxi Caution 7
Go-Around! 8
Barometric Altimetry 9
Flaps and No Gear 12
Checklist Change 12
BDA Overweight Landings 13
FMS Descent Issues 14
Flight Plan Verification 16
Those Pesky Speed Limits 18
Setting Takeoff Thrust 18
Summer is on the Way 19
High Workload- Who’s Running the Box? 20
RNP Update 21
EFB and Surface Tips and Tricks 21
ASAP Events 25
Misc. Interesting Bus Stuff 26
A319/320 Incidents 27
Performance Reports 29
Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports 30
Interested in being a LCP? 31
Fleet Article ‘Airbus Golden Rules’ 31
This newsletter is published by the A319/320 Fleet and Pilot Standards Teams. It is intended to provide additional detail surrounding operational policies and procedures and aircraft technical information for the line pilots. The discussion of flight procedures herein is not intended to override or replace official guidance in the flight manuals. Where a conflict exists, the current flight manual governs. The opinions expressed are those of the Chief Line Check Pilot, Fleet Captain and/or the Fleet Technical Manger.
Airbus Golden Rules If you were to create a list of Golden Rules for flying the Airbus, what would you include? Well, Airbus recently published their 8 ‘Operational Golden Rules’. They came up with a very good list for all pilots to consider- and it isn’t even in “Franglish”. A lot of our ASAPs and incidents could have been prevented if the pilots involved had followed these simple rules.
Want to read more? See new Fleet Article ‘Airbus Golden Rules’ attached at the end of this newsletter.
Caution! Visual Approaches In Use
What’s the toughest type of approach we fly? When looking at FOQA and ASAP data, you might conclude it’s a visual approach from a downwind or abeam position. Recently our fleet has experienced two low altitude FSI events, both occurring on daytime visual approaches.
KORF FSI Event The first event occurred on a visual approach to runway 23 at KORF:
FOQA: While on a visual approach an A319 descended to a minimum of 763 feet height above touchdown (HAT) approximately 5.4 nautical miles (NM) from the threshold. The FO was PF and the captain PM during the approach. As the aircraft was descending through 2,000 feet on a left downwind to base turn (AP and A/THR engaged) the PF selected an OP DES to 400 feet. As the aircraft descended through 1,150, the PF changed the selected altitude from 400 to 1,100 feet. The aircraft continued to descend and received a low altitude alert from ATC. As a result, the PF disengaged the autopilot, arrested the descent, and climbed to 1,000 feet HAT before continuing the approach and landing.
Likely the crew thought they were above the glidepath and selected OP DES with the low FCU altitude to avoid altitude capture. The PM also got caught up in the automation and stopped monitoring the flight path of the aircraft. The result was the aircraft strayed nearly 900 feet below the desire flight path.
Pilot’s Takeaways: • Being cleared for the approach from a downwind can be a real challenge for the
Airbus pilot. We don’t want to appear “wimpy” and go too far out on final. So instead have a tendency to cut the turn in too close, which creates a tough situation to meet stabilized criteria. In the same way, the PM may hesitate to speak up, as they don’t want to be seen as the “wimp”. But a far better plan is to be a bit conservative and advice ATC that you’d like to join final at the FAF or even a bit beyond. Remember, a good pilot is one who avoids situations where he or she must demonstrate their excellent flying skills.
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• After being vectored onto long ILS finals at our hubs, it’s easy to forget some basic pilotage tools:
- 3 to 1: At 5NM you should be 1,500 feet above the TDZE, at 4NM 1200 feet, at 3NM 900 feet, etc.
- With Gear, flaps 3, and speedbrakes, idle descent rate is approximately 3000 fpm or about 1000 feet per NM.
- Never descent below 1,500 feet above TDZE until established on the 3-1 descent path (5NM from the runway). At 1,000’ above AFE the aircraft must be aligned with the landing runway (unless circling or on a published deviation (e.g. KDCA 19).
- Never set the FCU altitude below 1,000 feet during a visual approach. There is an aircraft limitation against use of the OP DES or DES modes below 1,000 feet in VMC conditions, or below the FAF or glideslope intercept altitude in IMC.
• One thing unavailable from this report is what direction they were turning onto the final. Was it cross-cockpit, as we’ve seen in other incidents?
• There should never be a time when both pilots are heads down working the FMS or FCU. One pilot must continue to monitor the flight path of the aircraft. Sound familiar? It’s one of those Airbus Golden Rules.
• Back up all visual approaches with a glidepath, whether it is an ILS, RNAV, or FMS generated glidepath.
• Pilot Monitoring is the most difficult duty during any leg. Pilot monitoring is the most important duty on the flight deck. You have to wonder what the PM was thinking? Was he or she getting uncomfortable? How would this have ended if the PM had just advised ATC that they needed to join final at the FAF or beyond?
KDLH FSI Event The second FSI event occurred while on a visual approach to runway 27 at KDLH, with the ILS 27 as backup. On left base, flaps 2, gear up, and 3,000 feet (already 200’ below the FAF altitude) they entered 2,000 in the FCU and engaged OP DES mode (TDZE for runway 27 is 1,419 feet). As the aircraft descended to 2,000 feet they received the gear warning (occurs at 750 feet AGL). The PF turned off the FD and AP, flew the aircraft back to 2,500 feet and continued the approach to landing.
Pilot’s Takeaways: • Very similar to the previous event, with the added possibility of the crew losing
situational awareness of the airport elevation.
• Delta’s visual approach policy is to descend no lower than 1,500 feet above TDZE until intercepting the descent path (ILS G/S, VASI, RVAV path, or 3-1).
Note: Maintaining the 3-1 descent path (from the approach clearance altitude) generally prevents the aircraft from descending below Class B airspace. Not an issue at KDLH, but can be at our hub airports.
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• Here is an excellent technique to ensure the aircraft will fly the approach in compliance with Delta visual approach policy. On the downwind leg, enter a DIR TO the FAF, but don’t insert it. The path to the FAF will be amber. After receiving approach clearance, but no earlier than abeam the FAF, execute the DIR TO. Enter the FAF altitude in the FCU and descend using OP DES, DES, or V/S. Use gear, flaps and speed brakes to ensure crossing the FAF at the FAF altitude.
If the runway does not have an approach procedure, enter the VFR runway. Then add 1,500 feet to the runways TDZE and enter that as an altitude constraint at the CF. Following the same procedure as above ensures the aircraft will remain at or above 1,500 feet until reaching the descent path to the runway.
It sounds like a simple technique, but it will keep a crew out of the world of FSI!
Radio Altimeter Update Those of you who’ve been with the fleet for a while can recall when RA transients and their possible associated False LAND, FLARE, and IDLE modes were a hot item. While the rate of occurrence has definitely decreased (due to the sterling efforts of Tech Ops), the threat still remains. In this article we’ll review the history of the issue, actions to be taken if one of the False Modes occurs, and the possible long-term solution.
History In the late 2000s the fleet first started to hear reports of transient RAs. These were usually identified by a “RETARD, RETARD” callout early during an ILS approach. In some cases, the RA was cycling so quickly that the numbers themselves were just a blur. Airbus was not familiar with the problem and FOQA was instrumental in identifying what was going on.
In February 2009, a Turkish Airlines 737 (right) stalled while on an ILS approach to AMS. Contributing factor: an erroneous RA transient that triggered a false IDLE mode, retarding the TLs to idle while the aircraft was still approximately 2,000 feet AGL.
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Airbus issued a high-priority Bulletin following this accident and the Airbus fleet began simulator training of crew procedures to mitigate the threat. As Airbus investigated the issue further, it became apparent that the A319/320 was vulnerable to a similar stall scenario, as Alpha Protection is inhibited during the landing flare.
Tech Ops Tech Ops began a series of actions to reduce the incidence of RA transients. These are still in place and include:
• Shrink wrapping and gel sealing the RA antenna connection to prevent water buildup.
• Regular cleaning of antennas to prevent dirt accumulation.
• Replacement of RA antennas when FOQA detects transient spikes, or at 10,000 hours regardless.
• A new ECAM caution (NAV RA DEGRADED), which notifies the crew post-flight that a significant difference between the two RA systems occurred during the flight.
This work by Tech Ops has greatly decreased the incidence of erroneous RA transients and improved the reliability of the RA system.
However, this doesn’t guarantee that you won’t have an errant RA, with the associated possible False Modes on your next flight. So let’s review the indications and response.
Pilot Response Note: The two Fleet Bulletins (10-12 and 10-15), which address this threat will be removed later this year as information they contain is moved into the FCTM and QRH. For now, however, they are the pilot’s primary reference and should be reviewed.
During the climb, cruise, or descent phase of flight, an RA transient may produce “RETARD” or false GPWS warnings. Though these audio warnings may sound, the trajectory of the aircraft will not be affected (i.e. current FD, AP, and A/THR modes will not change). The real threat of the False LAND, FLARE, and IDLE mode occurs during an ILS approach, after the LOC and G/S are captured (i.e. the autoflight system is armed for an autoland).
RA transients may be identified by any of the following:
• A “RETARD” callout above the normal flare altitude.
• An inappropriate GPWS warning (e.g. “TOO LOW GEAR” or “TOO LOW FLAPS”) when above 1,000 feet AGL.
• A cycling or incorrect PFD RA altitude display.
If any of the above is observed, scan the FMA. If ‘LAND’, ‘FLARE’, or ‘THR IDLE’ are observed when they shouldn’t be, the AP, A/THR, and FDs must be disconnected. Why?
• Disconnecting the AP prevents (or recovers) the aircraft from an early FLARE.
• Disconnecting the A/THR prevents (or recovers) from a thrust reduction to idle and possible stall.
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• Turning OFF the FDs prevents the pilot from following bad guidance (i.e. if a False
FLARE has occurred, the FDs will be in a flare mode, ignoring the G/S and resulting in the aircraft getting high or low on final).
Remember that any or all of the above can occur following an RA transient on an ILS approach. The aircraft could continue to track the LOC and G/S correctly, but the thrust may be commanded to idle (False IDLE mode only), leading to a gradual slowdown and possible stall.
If after taking control manually a safe approach can be made, the approach may be continued. If there is any doubt though, go-around! Automation can be reinstated if desired, but the crew should be extra vigilant for another RA transient.
Post-flight; ensure a logbook write-up is made. Use of the keywords “erroneous” or “retard” in the write-up highlights the item in the MX Sceptre system. MX may allow the flight to continue after CFDS interrogation, however, the aircraft will be tracked for additional follow-up.
Long-Term Airbus has been working on a long-term solution to the RA problem since 2009. It is coming in the form of an ELAC and FG upgrade, which should be available around year-end. Once available, Tech Ops will begin installation.
Summary Be prepared! Although the number of RA transients has decreased substantially, all it takes is one to ruin your day. Be familiar with the threat and ready to perform the actions you’ll need to take if it occurs.
Recycling Revisited In the March Flywire we published an article describing how Airbus defines the ECAM/QRH term ‘recycle’ when it comes to certain landing gear non-normals (i.e. L/G DOORS NOT CLOSED and L/G GEAR NOT UPLOCKED). Wouldn’t you know it, in the latest Airbus FCOM, they’ve changed their minds. Their new language is:
Note: To recycle the landing gear, the flight crew must perform the following actions: ‐ Move the landing gear lever down ‐ Wait for the landing gear to downlock and for the landing gear doors to close. Simultaneously monitor the WHEEL page on the System Display (SD) ‐ Move the landing gear lever up. The active LGCIU changes when the landing
gear is recycled.
No explanation on the reason for the change. But, we’ll abide with their guidance and this new language will be incorporated into the QRH and FCTM in their next revisions.
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Mountain Wave TPs Though we’re (hopefully!) getting away from Mountain Wave season, there’s still been activity this spring. Truthfully, the TP system is not as user friendly as it could be, or will be in the future. However, it’s still the crew’s responsibility to avoid the designated Mountain Wave areas when active. What tools are available to help with this?
• The Jeppesen HIGH 1+2 chart is marked with Mountain Wave areas (e.g. MWMWDENMWMW). Yes, the green font may be hard to see at times, and we’ve suggested that Jepp use a bolder font, but they are on there.
• The Airway Manual (Ref. AM SUP-4WX.2.11) includes the general graphic shown at right.
• The Airway Manual (Ref. AM SUP-4WX.2.17) lists LAT/LONGS that define each Mountain Wave area. These can then be plotted in the Secondary Flight Plan for reference. Below are the DEN Mountain Wave area coordinates:
• Another option is a friendly ACARS to your Dispatcher to verify an alternative or direct routing will keep you clear of any Mountain Wave areas, prior to accepting the clearance.
Single-Engine Taxi Caution Note: Due to the importance of the subject, this article is repeated from the April Flywire.
The fleet experienced an unusual incident a couple of months ago. With an APU inoperative, the crew performed an external air start on engine two at the gate. After a successful start, the crew pushed back and initiated taxi.
As they began to move an aluminum fitting in the vicinity of the brake transfer valves sprung a leak resulting in the loss of the yellow hydraulic system. With no yellow fluid to drive it, the PTU stopped functioning, resulting in a loss of the green system pressure as well. To make for a really bad day, the location of the leak resulted in the loss of accumulator brake pressure.
With no means available to stop or steer the aircraft, it fortunately merely bumped into a ground cart at slow speed and came to a stop.
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Tech Ops has investigated the cause and history of the leak. It turns out the aluminum fittings have some history of failure, and they’re beginning a campaign to replace these fittings with a stainless steel part. Airbus confirms that leaks in this part have occurred at other carriers. However, this is the first known occurrence that resulted in a “runaway” aircraft.
Pilot’s takeaway? SE taxi is normally conducted using engine one. This allows the redundancy of the green engine driven pump, combined with the yellow system electric pump.
SE taxi on engine two is intended only for the unusual circumstance where a crossbleed start cannot be safely performed at the end of pushback position (with the parking brake set). It is not a normal configuration and extreme caution should be used when taxiing on engine two only.
There are a number of airports that do restrict where a crossbleed start can be conducted. This is a holdover from the DC9/B727 days where high power settings (think jet blast and noise) were required. The A319/320 generally requires less thrust to perform a crossbleed start than it takes to initiate taxi on a single engine.
Revised language will be introduced into Vol. 1 in the next revision discussing the cautions associated with SE taxi using engine two.
Go-Around! Note: Due to the importance of the subject, this article is repeated from the April Flywire.
By now you’ve probably read about another fleet’s incident involving a go-around and have thought: Whew, glad I’m flying an Airbus!
Well, not quite so fast. What would happen if you selected the FLEX/MCT detent, instead of TOGA when conducting a go-around?
Airbus has documented another carrier’s incident of this very situation. As shown at right, thrust increased to MCT, but the aircraft continued the descent (note ‘LAND’ displayed on the FMA) toward the runway. The PF disengaged the AP, however continued to follow the FDs, while being distracted by flap overspeeds.
Eventually (after several GPWS warnings) the crew selected the FDs off and rotated away from the runway, but the aircraft came uncomfortably close to the ground.
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Something to consider is that with the prevalence of FLEX takeoffs, we may have developed “muscle memory” to stop the TLs advance at the FLEX/MCT detent. How to combat this? Think about how you would fly a go-around while still on the approach. Remember that you will need to push through two clicks to reach TOGA, three if using manual thrust.
Sounds too complicated? When executing a go-around, just push the thrust levers until they stop!
Q: How do you verify the aircraft has transitioned to the go-around phase?
A: By looking for ‘SRS’ in column 2 of the FMA. With go-around NAV capability, column 3 may display GA TRK for a few seconds. However, it will be followed by NAV shortly afterwards (unless there is
no missed approach segment or a HDG has been previously selected). But, in all cases, SRS is the key.
Want to know more? See Fleet Article ‘Go-Around!’ available on the fleet page.
Barometric Altimetry What could be simpler, right? Well, not so fast. There are several unique characteristics of the Airbus that are worth discussing and several common problem areas as well.
PERF APPR
Looking at the PERF page example at right, the first thing you may notice is that the QNH is entered in millibars. To enter a MB setting, the value must be within an Airbus considered “normal” range and is entered without a decimal place. Not something we normally do, but it is a capability of our FMS.
Q: What is the PERF APPR QNH value used for?
A: Actually, quite a bit. As follows:
1. First, it’s used to “locate” the arrival airport’s runway in space. You might think this is done using only GPS/IRS position reference, but the QNH setting is used as well. Once the QNH is entered, the FMS is able to build an accurate vertical path from the runway back to the aircraft’s current altitude. If the QNH is inaccurate, the vertical path will be inaccurate as well (one inch HG. equals 1,000 feet).
2. It’s also used to set the destination airport cabin altitude. An inaccurate setting will result in a cabin altitude discrepancy of 1,000 feet per inch HG.
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Pilots have inadvertently transposed numbers when entering the QNH value resulting in the cabin depressurizing several thousand feet above airport elevation.
3. It’s also used to define the ‘TRANS FL’. The transition level is where the FMS plans on the pilot switching from STD altimeter to the local QNH value. TRANS FL is initially set by the database. In this European example the database level is FL60, in the US and Canada FL185, and in Mexico FL195. However, the TRANS FL is also variable, based on the QNH setting. With a low (less than 29.92 setting) the TRANS FL shifts upwards in 500-foot intervals. This works well in a European environment, where the transition level and altitude vary. It doesn’t work so well in the US, where the two are the same and ATC makes the adjustment for low altimeter settings (i.e. lowest useable Flight Level). An error in entering the QNH can result in the TRANS FL shifting upward, causing the PFD ‘STD’ indication to flash prematurely. This can also result in a missed altitude constraint, as the FMS is planning on the pilot changing to the entered BARO value when passing through the TRANS FL.
Q: That’s a lot more complicated than I thought, what’s the pilot’s takeaway from this?
A: We enter the QNH value on every flight and the other pilot doesn’t usually check it afterwards. Take a moment to verify all your PERF page entries after making them.
Q: Why does Airbus use FL185 as the TRANS FL in the US? If I’m level at FL180 in the descent the PFD ‘STD’ flashes continuously. Is there any way to stop this?
A: We’ve asked the same question of Airbus and have explained the difficulty the database value poses for us in the good old US. So far they haven’t agreed to a change. What you can do when cleared to FL180 is to overwrite the TRANS FL value with ‘179’. This prevents the ‘STD’ from flashing until descending below the actual transition level and also allows for accurate descent predictions.
Note: Descent predictions affected by the TRANS FL are usually only those within a few thousand feet of the changeover point.
FCU BARO Setting What could possibly go wrong here, right? Almost every week, an ASAP is received with a crew reporting a missed changeover (usually in the climb phase) or an incorrect BARO setting (usually in the descent phase), both resulting in altitude deviations.
The missed changeover to STD during climb is usually the result of the distraction of a radio frequency change around the transition altitude. Another factor is the natural “let-down” we all experience after the busy preflight, taxi, and takeoff phases. We have to be on guard to prevent this letdown from leading to complacency. Checklist discipline is the best way to combat complacency, both in calling for the Climb Checklist in this case and in really looking at the altimeter settings (all three) before saying, “crosschecked”. Remember, it doesn’t matter what your FCU BARO setting is when the other pilot’s AP is the one that’s engaged.
Another climb issue is in pre-setting the landing ATIS baro setting and not going back to ‘STD’ afterwards.
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I’m sure we’ve all either done this, or have seen it done (sometimes on a 4-hour flight!). If you change something that’s covered by a checklist after the checklist has been completed, you really should redo the checklist. Otherwise it has no meaning. Nuff said.
A descent issue that’s also easily fixable is misreading a written-down baro setting on the ATIS printout. If you’re going to write out the baro setting to make it more readable, ensure it’s written out correctly and in a readable fashion. Otherwise, don’t do it!
International
There aren’t many places we (currently) fly to that use a non-standard transition level/altitude. Mexico is one with a transition altitude (climbing) of 18,500 feet and a transition level (descending) of FL195. Generally, this doesn’t cause many problems as most Mexican arrivals and departures don’t include constraints close to the transition. But it is non-standard and should be included in the WARTS and NATS brief.
San Salvador is another destination with a non-standard transition altitude of 19,500 and transition level of FL200.
Q: When I flew to SAL last week the FMS showed a TRANS FL of FL205. Why would it display this if the transition level is FL200?
A: By definition, the transition level is less than 500 feet above the transition altitude. Because of this, aircraft are not normally assigned to fly at the transition level, as this does not guarantee separation from other traffic flying (using QNH) at the transition altitude; the lowest usable flight level is the transition level plus 500 feet. The FMS is doing this math for you. If you are assigned a descent to FL200 inbound to SAL, confirm the clearance and ‘199’ can be entered for the TRANS FL to prevent the PFD ‘STD’ from flashing early.
Warm Weather Effects
We all know about cold weather altimeter errors, what about warm weather? Generally, warm weather works to your advantage as the aircraft is higher above the ground for a given altimeter height. However, this can be an issue as well, as we’ll examine next.
Let’s say you’re descending into KSLC on the ILS 16L on a hot summer day. Cleared for the approach, you push the APPR pb and descend on the ILS G/S just as you’ve done all winter long. This time though, ATC calls saying you’re low crossing TOOME and would you “please contact them at the following phone number…”. You look at your PFD and see you’re 400 feet lower than the designated TOOME crossing altitude.
What happened? When flying on a glideslope, you’re flying a fixed angle from the runway. However, the crossing altitude at TOOME is barometric and thus is higher above the ground in warm weather.
How to avoid this situation? “Managed descent to the feather”; it’s even more important in warm weather.
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Flaps and No Gear A pilot’s relationship to their aircraft is like that with their significant other. You love their good qualities and learn to live with those (few) other “quirks”. As Airbus pilots we love the Airbus. But, we have to admit, just amongst ourselves of course, that it does have one or two quirks. And these, if we’re smart, we learn to live with.
One of these quirks is that it’s probably the only airplane you’ve flown where you can select landing flaps, without the gear being down, and not be alerted immediately. The OE Guide (Ref. OE.3.126) says the following about this threat:
Unlike other aircraft, it is possible to select final flaps prior to extending the gear and not receive any immediate warnings. Recall that with RAs working normally, the gear warning is triggered by radio altitude, not flap position. Several crews have received “TOO LOW GEAR” GPWS warnings at 750 feet AGL. The common scenario? A busy ATC environment with a frequency change to Tower simultaneous with the PF calling for “gear down, flaps 3." The PM only hears “flaps 3" and the PF assumes the gear has been placed down. The PF then calls for “landing checklist” and both crewmembers respond with what they expect to see. Lesson learned? Be skeptical. Flaps 3 with the gear up is an acceptable configuration, but one that is rarely employed. Also, be skeptical when responding to any checklist. Finally, if you do receive a configuration warning below 1,000, go-around! Unlike the crew in the following report: ASAP: Visual approach 16L at Denver. PM duties - at the call “flaps full-landing check” I read the checklist and called out each item. At approximately 500 feet we received a warning “gear unsafe.” I observed the gear not down and lowered the gear at this time. By the time we had three green we were approaching 400 feet. It was my decision to continue the approach to a landing as the gear extended in adequate time for a normal landing. I obviously did not put the gear down at an appropriate time and my checklist call out of “gear down” was strictly a verbal reaction without verifying the actual position of the gear handle. I'm new to the airplane and have never been on a plane that would let you get the flaps to full with the gear not down.
Checklist Change All Delta fleets will see a change to the current Pushback Checklist– TCAS ON will be return as a checklist item. Here’s the background, crews have been requesting the return of TCAS to the checklist. Also, during the very low visibility days in ATL a few weeks ago, it was determined that crew compliance wasn’t good enough – too many aircraft were taxiing without the transponder in the ON position, requiring a call from Ramp Tower or ATC. In low visibility of course, ATC uses the transponder to track taxiing aircraft.
As this change takes effect, it is important to remember that the Pushback Procedure and Checklist should be run prior to requesting pushback clearance.
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The procedure should be accomplished after the flight deck door and all exterior doors are closed and the cabin is ready for pushback. This could happen before the ground crew is ready for pushback.
• Check exterior doors are closed (slides armed) and flight deck door is closed. • FA – “Cabin ready for pushback”. • Run the Pushback Procedure and Checklist – including the TCAS to ON. • When ground crew is ready, obtain push clearance, turn the beacon ON, parking
brake OFF, and announce, “Beacon ON, brakes released, cleared to push”.
Note: It’s okay to turn the TCAS to the ON position during the procedure even if the aircraft will not move for a short period of time.
Summary
With this change, selecting the transponder to the ON position has been relocated earlier within the Pushback Procedure and has been added to the Pushback Checklist. When all exterior doors are closed and the cabin is ready for pushback, accomplish the Pushback procedure and call for and accomplish the Pushback checklist. Do not wait for pushback clearance to turn on the transponder. This may result in the transponder being on for a short period of time prior to aircraft movement. This does not pose an issue for ATC.
Delta’s on time and gate latency goals have not changed. Completing both the Pushback Procedure and Checklist prior to D-0 will ensure the aircraft is ready for an immediate pushback when pushback clearance is received.
BDA Overweight Landings Flying to Bermuda (ICAO TXKF) can be an interesting change of pace as it allows an opportunity to practice those international procedures such as HF and SELCAL. (Note: The fleet site has a Fleet Article on ‘HF Communications’ that’s a great resource if you’ve not used these for a while).
However, there has been an issue with these flights. FOQA data has shown a continuing trend of overweight landings at BDA. Because of the large alternate fuel requirement, the flight is generally planned to land at max landing weight. Almost all the overweight landings are just a few hundred pounds is excess of maximum landing weight, but they still need to be entered into the logbook.
As a review, overweight landing is permitted provided the crew has an operation reason for landing overweight. Considering an overweight landing? The QRH has a section on ‘Overweight Considerations’ as well as an ‘Overweight Landing’ checklist. This checklist includes guidance on the required post-landing logbook entry. A maintenance inspection is required as part of the logbook signoff.
Pilot takeaway? Watch your weight when flying to BDA. If possible, land below the maximum landing weight to avoid the MX inspection. If however, there is an operational reason that requires an overweight landing, remember to enter the overweight landing write-up into the aircraft logbook.
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FMS Descent Issues Our current Thales RLS 1A FMS is probably the best commercial FMS available. New A330s and future A321s all will come so equipped. However, the current S6 software version does have several known errors, in which an altitude constraint may be ignored in the descent phase. While these are fairly rare occurrences, they do happen, so crews must be on guard for them.
The good news is Airbus has confirmed the issues and we’ve been advised the S7 version of FMS software (now available) does address these. The fleet is currently pursuing a plan to have Tech Ops install this upgrade later this year. While we’re awaiting that, let’s review the current issues (Ref. OE.3.90):
1. “At or above” to “at or below”: When an arrival includes an “at or above” altitude constraint followed by an “at or below” (e.g. KLAS TYSSN RNAV arrival), the FMS ignores the second constraint in its vertical path construction. The good news is the constraint will be displayed in amber, if the FMS calculates it will be missed by more than 250 feet, but the pilot will need to intervene to ensure the altitude is met. Changing the “at or below” to a hard altitude eliminates the problem. A FPR is included for KLAS to remind crews of this issue, however new RNAV arrivals are being constructed at other airports, which may have the same issue.
2. “Window” Issues: When an arrival contains one or more window constraints (e.g. KDEN or KBOS), the FMS may ignore a window constraint, or an “at” constraint prior to a window. The ignored constraint will again be depicted in amber if the FMS predicts it will miss the altitude by more than 250 feet. In some cases the normal geometric path is replaced by a level segment and new idle path. Weird! Changing the “window” constraint to a hard altitude eliminates the problem. FPRs are also out for both KBOS and KDEN, however this issue may be encountered at other airports as well:
ASAP: During managed NAV descent on KLNDR RNAV STAR into DFW, aircraft failed to honor constraint at KLNDR and we crossed fix 500 feet high. We began descent from FL 380 early to cross the BERIE intersection in the block FL300-FL260. We crossed BERIE at FL300, but the aircraft leveled at FL300 and did not continue descent to FL260. We had a blue descent arrow approximately 2-3 miles passed BERIE intersection. PF deployed speed brakes to get us back on vertical path, which showed us approximately 700 feet high on the PROG page. We got back on profile, then approaching KLNDR aircraft began to slow from 290-280 KT and we started getting a bit high on vertical path. PF redeployed speed brakes, but aircraft went into ALT* approaching FL230 and we crossed KLNDR 500 feet high. Remainder of arrival was uneventful.
3. Dropped Constraints: An anomaly seen on certain arrivals which contain a number of branches to different runways (e.g. KATL, KDFW), dropped constraints may occur when a new runway is selected in the FMS. This is due to the way these arrivals are coded in the database and interpreted by the FMS.
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It is corrected in S7, however for now crews are cautioned to verify any pilot entered arrival constraints following a runway change.
4. Descent Phase Issue: This occurs when the descent is initiated outside of 200 miles from the destination. For example, a flight is cleared to descend from a cruise altitude of FL390 to FL310 while still 220 miles from the destination. To review the transition from the cruise to descent phase; it occurs with any of the following:
• A lower altitude is selected in the FCU when less than 200 NM to the destination, or
• A descent to FL200 (or lower) is selected through the FCU, or
• A descent is initiated to an FCU altitude that is equal to (or below) the highest constraint altitude.
As the example clearance does not meet any of the triggers mentioned above, the FMS flies a cruise descent of 1,000 feet/min to the new cruise altitude of FL310. When the aircraft does subsequently transition to the descent phase (in this example when less than 200 miles to the destination), the FMS creates a descent path from FL310, even if this altitude has not yet been reached in the cruise descent. If this occurs the VDEV path appears below the aircraft, though a proper TOD should be well ahead. Crews should always verify the reasonableness of the descent path by using a 3 to 1 calculation. This FMS design issue is also corrected in S7.
5. Speed Constraint Issue: For variety let’s discuss a speed issue. The FMS has a tough time calculating a decel point while on a geometric descent path. Using the MEM BRBBQ1 arrival as an example, the aircraft is on a geometric path all the way to 4,000 feet when landing north. It looks ahead at the final speed constraint (210 KT at BOWEN) on the geometric path and plans on slowing to meet this constraint. What can happen next is the FMS begins to have difficulty with the number of variables and decides to go conservative to meet the last speed constraint. When this occurs, the decel point for the 210 KT restriction is typically around 18-20,000 feet on the arrival, and the aircraft will be slower than the “at 250” speed at BEERT.
The crew’s workaround is of course to use selected speed. This issue is actually a complicated one from the software designer’s standpoint and is not addressed in S7.
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Pilot’s Takeaway?
As always, trust but verify! The good news is the FMS does display a missed altitude constraint correctly (i.e. in amber). However, it is up to the pilot to ensure the aircraft makes the constraint and then is in the proper mode to make all ensuing constraints.
Flight Plan Verification Speaking of deviations, a navigation deviation is a good way to spoil the otherwise perfect trip.
The good news is that most navigation deviations are easily preventable during the preflight phase of flight, as most result from FMS flight plan errors. So why do we continue to have navigation deviations? Consider the following recent ASAP:
ASAP: After waiting for late arriving aircraft, we were finally able to start the pre-flight around 30 minutes prior to departure. I accomplished the walk around and the Captain accomplished the cockpit preflight. He also loaded my flight plan while I was doing the exterior inspection. I added the departure runway, SID and STAR for the flight. We rushed to try to get the aircraft out on time. Once the PDC arrived the Captain read it to me and I checked the routing by the route displayed on the PILOT ROUTES page. I concentrated on the SID and STAR and assumed that three points (ILLIE, TORRR, MIE) were part of the STAR, but did not physically see them on the PILOT ROUTE page. I read back the departure runway, SID and STAR for verification. We taxied out expecting 3L and got 4R for departure. The taxi route from gate A-1 was short so we had to change the runway, takeoff data, and start the second engine. We had to advise Tower that we needed two minutes to load takeoff numbers and allow the second engine to warm up. We took off normally and enroute ATC asked if we were going to TORRR or FWA. We advised that we were going to FWA and we got clearance MIE. ATC asked what was our filed routing we discover that ILLIE, TORRR & MIE had dropped out. I realized that I loaded the FWA5 to FWA and the CLANG5 arrival with the FWA transition instead of the MIE transition. That had caused the three points to drop out. ATC stated that there was no problem and cleared us to descend on the CLANG5 arrival. I learned a valuable lesson that rushing to do things can cause the crew to miss things no matter what their experience level is. Preventive Measures: First, never rush and put yourself in a situation that can cause missing important items or procedures. Second, use the FMS Flight Plan page versus the PILOT ROUTES page to verify the PDC routing. The PDC verification process is something that has been around for about a year so those of us who have been flying the Airbus for many years use various methods to accomplish the verification. In short the fleet really does not have a set standardized procedure on how to do the verification. In fact the Captain and I have different methods so when we rushed ourselves looked at different places to do the verification and we really did not accomplish the verify the proper routing on this occasion. I also skipped verifying the routing by the FIX LIST on the release and on the flight plan loaded in the box in my rush to get things done. That was a huge omission.
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The reporter brings up a number of good points. Let’s examine these in more detail. First, Vol. 1 includes the following for the PF Preflight (Ref. Vol. 1 NP.20.13):
Admittedly, not a whole lot of detail and the fleet is pursuing a standard text change to provide further guidance. However, note the ‘confirm routing’ line falls under ‘FMS F-PLN…Set’.
Next, let’s look at what the OE Guide (Ref. OE.3.29) has to say:
Flight Plan Verification ASAP reports indicate that accurate flight plan verification prevents most navigation deviations. Most deviations result from incorrect departure or arrival (and associated transitions) entry, or in not catching a change in the ATC clearance.
• Crews should not rely on the distance check alone to ensure F-PLN accuracy. A waypoint could be missing and the mileage would be approximately the same.
• The fleet recommends comparing each FMS F-PLN waypoint to the FPS Flight Plan 'FIX LIST' as this provides the most accurate means of verifying the filed route.
• After receipt of the PDC or ATC clearance, the PM references the clearance while the PF verifies the route in the FMS. Particular attention should be placed on looking for any changes in the cleared (as compared to the filed) route.
Technique: The 'PILOT ROUTES' page provides a similar format to the PDC clearance and may be used for verification of the ATC cleared route. Note that this should not take the place of the 'FIX LIST' verification accomplished as part of both pilots FMS preflight, however.
Summary Both pilots are required to confirm the FMS routing matches the Flight Release and ATC Clearance. These are two separate things and the fleet’s Best Practice is to accomplish them separately, as follows:
1. ‘FIX LIST’ vs. F-PLN Comparison: Accomplished by both pilots separately as part of their respective FMS preflight.
2. PDC/ATC Clearance vs. FMS Comparison: Accomplished by both pilots together and can be done using either the F-PLN or ‘PILOT ROUTES’ pages.
Q: What if the PDC is a simple “departure, then as filed” clearance? What routing should I use to compare to the FMS?
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A: Because the routing was checked by both pilots during their FMS preflights, just the
routing on the PDC must be verbally verified. However, a great technique is to read the filed route from the FPS Flight Plan and compare this to the FMS routing (either F-PLN or ‘PILOT ROUTES’).
The fleet is not trying to create additional work here; rather the goal is prevent something from spoiling that perfect trip!
Those Pesky Speed Limits Departure speed limits are becoming more prevalent. Weekly ASAPs indicate they do pose a challenge for us; so what is the best way to prevent a deviation?
Let’s consider a (new) frequent offender, DTW. The FWA5 departure is typical with a speed limit of “280 KT until advised by ATC”.
You could assign the speed limit to a downrange waypoint, like ANNTS. However, what happens if you’re departing on the 3s or 4s to the north? While in HDG mode (above 10,000) the aircraft will accelerate to normal climb speed. Once cleared direct to ANNTS, the aircraft would slow to meet the constraint, however, you would be deviating from your clearance until that time.
Likewise, the constraint at ANNTS would also be ignored if you were cleared direct to ILLIE, instead of ANNTS. So, what to do?
Perhaps a better option to manage the speed limit is through the PERF CLB page. The trick here to insert ‘250’ as the ‘SELECTED’ speed target during preflight. Why 250? If you insert 280 as the target, the aircraft will accelerate to 280 at the thrust reduction/acceleration altitude. By using 250, the aircraft stays within the common 250 KT below 10,000 restriction. Once at or above 10,000, the selected speed is manually dialed up to 280 through the FCU. After ATC releases you from the restriction, you simply select managed speed. Easy!
Takeoff Thrust Setting A couple of recent incidents highlight the reason we need to maintain the discipline of advancing the thrust levers to 50% N1 and allowing the engines to wind-up, prior to just advancing the thrust to FLEX or TOGA.
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In each case, the crew was able to identify an engine that was stagnating or would not properly accelerate. The crew correctly aborted the takeoff (well below 80Kts) and returned to the gate for maintenance.
ASAP: When FO advanced power on takeoff to 50% N1, power advanced normally. When he further advanced thrust levers the right engine lagged and aircraft started to veer to the right. The takeoff was rejected at a very slow speed, probably less than 30 KT. We exited the runway and contacted dispatch and maintenance, then returned to the gate and changed aircraft. The aircraft taxied fine inbound, but it was a slow taxi. We were able to change to another aircraft and continued to ELP.
ASAP: During the beginning of takeoff roll power was increased to 50% N1. The right motor spooled up in a timely manner to 50%, however, the left motor never increased above idle. We actually left the TL at a position commanding 50% for 10 to 15 seconds with no response. We discontinued the takeoff roll and exited the runway. When clear we ran the after landing checklist, received a gate and taxied back in.
The OE Guide offers the following guidance on setting takeoff thrust (Ref. OE.3.55):
Vol.1 requires the pilot to advance the thrust levers to 50% N1 to ensure symmetric acceleration.
• RTOs have occurred after the pilot sensed an inordinate amount of rudder input to maintain centerline control. Flight data recorder information confirmed that the pilot failed to comply with Vol. 1, guidance. Because of the difference in age and condition of the engines, a significant lag can develop below 50% N1. CFM advised DAL that the time difference from 21% N1 and 31% N1 to takeoff thrust can be 5-20 seconds!
• Although it is not necessary to let the engines stabilize at 50% before selecting the takeoff detent, the pilot should not advance the thrust levers any further until ensuring that both engines are accelerating symmetrically.
• After ensuring symmetrical thrust, Vol. 1 advises the pilot to advance the thrust levers to the desired takeoff detent.
• Performance requirements demand that the takeoff thrust be set by 40 knots and achieved by 60 knots.
Technique: Do not advance the thrust levers faster than FADEC will allow the engines to accelerate (i.e. don't slam the thrust levers to the T/O detent!).
Summer is on the Way With summer coming, now is a good time to review procedures for mitigating warm weather challenges. Available on the fleet’s website under ‘Archived Communications’ are Fleet Articles (formerly Bus Bites) ‘Windshear!’, ‘Weather Radar’, and ‘Hot Brakes’.
Unfortunately, with the arrival of summer also come the hot cabin issues. Keeping the cabin comfortable for our passengers is a very high priority. Here’re a few things to keep in mind this summer:
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1. Monitor the cabin temperature throughout the boarding process:
• Upon arriving at the aircraft, ensure external air is connected.
• If the cabin temperature is above 90 degrees, coordinate with the gate agent to delay boarding.
• If external air is connected, but the cabin temperature rises above 76 degrees, go ahead and start the APU.
2. Plan Ahead:
• Ensure both air conditioning packs are used (open the cross bleed if SE) during taxi.
• During the FA brief, ask the Flight Attendance to make their “hot weather” PA asking the passengers to open all the gasper vents and close the window shades.
• As you start your descent from cruise altitude, precool the cabin.
• If external air is not connected after block in, leave the APU air ON until passenger deplaning has been completed.
3. Report Cooling Problems Via ACARS. Delta has an active program to monitor cooling issues: failure to connect conditioned air in a timely manner; inadequate cooling from ground carts or jetway conditioned air and inadequate APU cooling capacity. Here’s how you report the problem:
• Flt Progress Reports
• Pink Sheet
• GND OPS
• Ground Equipment
• Type a free text massage describing the problem
What not to do: Use low-pressure ground conditioned air simultaneously with air from the air-conditioning packs [Vol. 1 Limitations L.10.7] Doing so can damage the aircraft.
High Workload – Who’s Running the Box?
High workload isn’t really defined in Delta policies and procedures. In the fleet’s OE Guide, the fleet has adopted a best practice of using 10,000 AFE as a logical point where the MCDU duties should be transferred to the PM (Ref. OE.3.63):
Vol. 1 states the following (Refer to Vol. 1, NP.12, Multi-purpose Control Display Unit (MCDU).): In flight, MCDU entries will normally be made by the PF. When the autopilot is off, or when operating in a high workload environment, the PF should direct the PM to make MCDU entries. Both pilots should verify MCDU entries affecting lateral or vertical flight path. The fleet recommends using 10,000 feet (AFE) as the dividing line for what is and isn't a high workload environment. This sets a standardized expectation for the crew. If something other than this is required, it should be communicated (e.g. “You've got the box”).
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Why is this an issue? What we see from ASAP and FOQA is that the PF commonly continues to operate the MCDU far too long - even into the approach phase. Transfer of the MCDU often occurs when the PF becomes saturated by the PF duties and the PM jumps to the rescue. That’s too late! A “capitulation transfer” of the MCDU creates a clear threat to the safe and efficient conduct of the flight.
The fleet’s best practice is to transfer MCDU duties to the PM in an organized fashion, before the workload has a chance to put pressure on the operation of the flight. The fleet advocates that every Bus driver develop the habit of transferring MCDU operation to the PM at a phase in the flight were a controlled and deliberate transfer of duties can take place. At a time before workload generally increases. Briefing that time or altitude either in the initial crew brief or as part of the NATS will go a long way toward facilitating the smart transfer of FMS programming duties.
RNP Update Well, they say “no news is good news” and we hope that’s the case here. As of April 22nd, the FAA in Washington, DC still has our RNP application (all 7 inches thick of it). Delta’s Regulatory Compliance folks (who assembled the application), have asked several times if there are any questions and have been politely told “no, thank you”. What’s that saying about a “watched pot”?
EFB and Surface Tips, Tricks, and ‘How To’s’
Unauthorized EFB Mounts and Electronic Devices Reports indicate that some pilots are using homemade or other unapproved mounts to hold the EFB. Such mounts are strictly forbidden. Please use the company-supplied device. Additionally, the use of any GPS product on the flight deck is contrary to Delta policy
Loaner Tablets If your device is lost, stolen, broken, or forgotten and you are within 48 hours of your flight time, you are eligible to receive a loaner device from the lockbox at the CPO. You must call 4-Help first to receive a ticket number if this is for a lost, stolen, or broken device. Ticket numbers are not required for forgotten devices. Once you arrive at the CPO, fill out the loaner inventory log located inside the lockbox with all requested information.
• call 404-714-HELP or toll-free 1-888-714-0529 • Email: [email protected]
A loaner cannot be issued and a permanent replacement will not be mailed to you if you do not call 4-Help first.
Should you experience difficulties in downloading a flight plan prior to departure, load only the departure and destination airports in the route drawer along with the appropriate taxi and departure charts. There is no specific requirement to enter the route.
Flight deck preparation and proper flight planning/briefings should occur per Delta policy. Should the flight plan have to be manually loaded after departing the gate, make data inputs at cruise while one pilot is designated as the pilot monitoring. Do not allow route entry to become a distraction or degrade your situational awareness.
Flight Operations is in the process of developing a connectivity solution, which will allow the route to be loaded electronically. OK – So I am in CUN and I have to get in touch with Flight Control. I can’t use my personal cellphone as I do not have coverage in Mexico. Any ideas? There have been several ASAPS, FCR and Calls concerning accessing company communication frequencies. Our primary way to get to this information:
Airway Manual information published by Jeppesen is now located in the Jeppesen FD Pro application on the Surface. To access this information:
• Open Jeppesen FDPro • From either en-route or terminal chart section, select the book icon on the left side
of the upper tool bar (you have to make sure that you have checked off the manuals to be viewed on the update page)Manuals available in here are:
o Communications
o Emergency o Introduction o Notices
All other Airway information is still located in the Airway Manual in SCL.
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The “Backup” method would be to access the Airside Kit Airway Manual
Communication section. This will not be available after FAA approval. I had to do an ASAP because I missed the speed restriction on the SID out of O’Hare. My point is, I have a hard time sometimes getting all the information to fit on the screen. In my case, the important info had been in the upper corner and I simply missed it. How do I fit everything in once place? This narrative was taken from an actual ASAP filed. The fleet cannot emphasize enough about the importance of thorough briefings. We must always take extra caution when reviewing SIDS and STARS as they very often have “hard to find” speed restrictions located on the arrival or departure pages. ( the new MSP RNAV arrivals are a good example!) We can also program these speed constraints in the CLIMB phase on the MCDU Perf Page. (Caution: When entering a speed in the PERF/Climb page, this will OVERRIDE the managed 250kts/10,000 preprogrammed speed!) Remember, to enlarge or shrink a particular page, we simply “pinch” or “expand” the index and thumb until the image we want is in view.
EFB Updates Explained Windows Updates
When to perform: Anytime outside of the monthly blackout period - Never during a rotation When should you perform: Within 24 hours prior to reporting for duty - unless in the blackout period. This guidance was not included in APB 14-06 but will be published as policy in the post-validation bulletin. The Windows Update Calendar is available in the Secure Content Locker and on the EFB Webpage. The purpose of the calendar is to illustrate when it is permissable to perform Windows updates. Windows Update Calendar Blackout Days – Do not perform any Windows updates The monthly blackout period is always the Monday through Monday that includes the second Tuesday of the month.
Content Updates: Jeppesen and Secure Content Locker When to perform: Anytime
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When must you perform: Within 24 hours of reporting for duty When must you perform mid-rotation updates – If your rotation includes a red day, you must update once during the preceding yellow band. Note: SCL updates can include timely information such as, critical ops updates and bulletins. Consider updating during IROPS for important ops updates.
Jeppesen Update Calendar The Jeppesen update calendar is available in the Secure Content Locker and on the EFB webpage. The purpose of the calendar is to illustrate the Jeppesen update schedule and help you determine when you MUST update your Jeppesen content. Yellow Days – Indicate that a Jeppesen update is AVAILABLE to download. Red Days – Indicates the effective date of the new revision. Your update must be completed prior to flying duty. Jeppesen will notify you of content updates via a banner popup and a badge on the settings icon: Secure Content Locker will notify you of available content downloads via the “Must Read” and “Download” badges within the app.
Do I need to update Jeppesen/SCL during my rotation? All pilots must update within 24 hours of reporting for duty (APB 14-06). Since we do not have rotations greater than 6 days, we do NOT need to perform any updates during our rotation.
App Updates When to perform: Anytime before or after a rotation – Never during a rotation. When must you perform: Within 24 hours prior to reporting for duty after receiving an APB announcing the update. Flight Ops will issue an APB announcing the release of any app updates and any special guidance regarding the updates.
TIP: After you update your password on DeltaNet, you must manually update your email password on your Surface (this applies only if you set up the “Work” side with your company Delta email) Note: Changing your password on DeltaNet does NOT change your password to LOG into the Surface tablet! TIP: The current Fleet Newsletter is located in the Secure Content Locker-Flight Ops Communication-Monthly Update-Fleet Newsletter Future enhancements to the secure content locker will have the Fleet Articles (Old Bus Bites) and other communication tools. Help Desk:
• call 404-714-HELP or toll-free 1-888-714-0529 • Email: [email protected]
ASAP Events Expanding the Team This crew did an outstanding job of expanding their team to include dispatch and the MCC. With the concurrence of MCC and the crew, the aircraft safely continued to their destination. ASAP: Shortly after takeoff the Lead FA called to alert us to smoke in the cabin. She stated that smoke was odorless and appeared to come from the FWD FA reading light. She also stated that the smoke stopped as soon as she turned the light off and that she was comfortable with the situation. The FO flew and communicated with ATC while I handled the problem. There was no ECAM message so I looked at QRH 8.7 Cabin Smoke/Fire/Fumes. That checklist directed an immediate return or diversion. Since the FA was certain the smoke had stopped I decided to expand my team and bring Dispatch and MTC Control into the loop. Dispatch and MTC Control both agreed that if the source of the smoke was
identified and eliminated that we could continue the flight to ATL. I then consulted FOM page 10.3.14 Irregularity: Smoke, Fumes or Odor Events. I completed the smoke questionnaire as directed by that FOM section. I also made a logbook write-up and requested a mechanic in ATL.
Caution! Flying Mud ASAP: Enroute from SMF to SLC we were aware of strong surface winds and reduced vis. in blowing dust at SLC. Our dispatcher informed us that the front should pass and the winds should die down before our arrival.
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When we arrived in the terminal area the winds had reduced and the visibility had increased to reasonable levels so we continued the arrival and were sequenced for the approach behind 2 other aircraft. One of the preceding aircraft reported moderate ice at 9000 feet in the clouds. As we descended in the clouds we started picking up the "ice" they were reporting. The only thing was this "ice" wasn't building on the probe, it was just obscuring the windshield. Just about this time a preceding aircraft said it was mud rather than ice. We definitely agreed with his assessment. Once we descended out of the clouds at around 2500 feet we could see that the windshield was covered with a whitish mud. There was a very light rain falling so I asked the FO to turn on his wiper to see if it would improve or degrade out visibility. It slightly improved so I ran mine as well. I had marginally adequate forward visibility and landed the airplane normally. Misc. Interesting Bus Stuff
A very interesting animation created by BAE regarding Air France 447 Accident:
BWI-DTW Ship 3123. Emergency declared into DTW due to a HYD Y RSVR OVHT message.
• Approximately 10 minutes after departure ECAM: HYD Y RSVR OVHT • CA=PF, transferred controls - worked ECAM, completed QRH • Referenced ODM landing data - contacted Dispatch/MC - continued to DTW • 20 minutes later RSVR OVHT out - declared emergency with DTW APP control • Reactivated YELLOW ENG 2 PUMP and PTU per QRH (10 minutes prior to landing) • Uneventful landing with DTW CRFF clearing aircraft to continue to gate • OVHT reappeared on taxi in • Parked at gate safely with MX clearing aircraft before ramp crew serviced • Crew rotation complete
Follow-up
Maintenance removed and inspected the case drain filter – no debris found. The case drain filter was replaced and the yellow hydraulic system serviced. The system checked normal and had no history of problems. The aircraft was returned to service.
During a subsequent flight (7 minutes after takeoff), the HYD Y RSVR OVHT message appeared. A loud squealing noise was reported in the cabin. The noise stopped when the #2 hydraulic pump and PTU was selected off. Maintenance replaced a check valve, pressure relief valve and low pressure filter. No leakage of or discrepancies noted during operational checks.
SLC-MSP Ship 3114. ATB due to bird strike.
• Flight departed SLC RW 16L; shortly after liftoff, experienced a bird strike on the left engine
• Engine continued to run, but emitted significant vibrations • Crew declared an emergency and returned to SLC for uneventful landing and
return to gate • Crew cleared to continue
Follow-up
Reports indicate that the bird strike occurred at approximately 1,000 AGL.
Maintenance discovered five (5) fan blades with damage, but no damage to the engine’s hot section. A complete fan change (36 blades) was accomplished, a bird strike inspection performed and the aircraft was returned to service.
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ATL-PAP Ship 3210. Divert to MIA due to a lightning strike.
• Just after level off on departure and flying through light rain the crew heard a pop • The crew was concerned that they may have been hit by lightning • Captain contacted dispatcher/MCC who requested the flight divert to MIA for
inspection • Overweight landing at 145,000 LBS/ MLW 142,198 – 200 FPM VVI at touchdown • Initial maintenance inspection revealed a charred static wick on the
horizontal/vertical stab • FODM debriefed – crew will continue
Follow-up
Maintenance performed the required inspection and found one (1) damaged static wick at the top of the rudder. There were no other discrepancies or faults found. The static discharger was deferred in accordance with the Configuration Deviation List (CDL) and the aircraft was returned to service.
ATL-MBJ Ship 3237. Emergency declared to destination for gear unsafe indication.
• On final approach lowered gear and got nose gear not locked with LGCIU 1 Fault
• Followed QRH guidance for LGCIU 1 FAULT which resulted in verification of 3 gear down and locked
• Crew then referenced QRH procedure L/G GEAR NOT DOWNLOCKED and continued to LANDING GEAR GRAVITY EXTENSION
• Emergency declared with ATC and PA made, but no specific emergency given to f/a crew
• Landed and cleared the runway at the high speed turnoff with ARFF standing by, then was towed to gate due to n/w steering inoperative
• No known crew/pax/media concerns • All standard debrief items complete • Crew placed on CPAR and will DH to base tomorrow
Follow-up
Maintenance found the NLG downlock sensor at fault. A downlock proximity sensor was swapped from the cargo door location and gear indication checked normal.
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The cargo door indication system was deferred in accordance with the MEL and the aircraft was returned to service.
Performance Reports
Flaps 3 Landings
From the chart below (Oct 2014), you can see that Flaps 3 landings are slightly increasing. During the summer’s warmer OAT, a decrease in Flaps 3 approaches/landings was expected. With the cooler weather, the fleet is hoping to see Flap 3 utilization improve. Year over year, Flaps 3 approaches have increased about 3.5%. A Flaps 3 approach/landing reduces fuel burn by about 50 lbs. Airbus also recommends Flaps 3 approaches for higher crosswinds and approaches with potential for windshear.
As we’ve mentioned before, Flaps 3 is the fleet’s preferred landing configuration. However, keep in mind that every landing needs to be analyzed and the best flap configuration chosen. In the summer months, we see hotter brake temperatures. Short runways, higher altitude airports or quick turn time may mean a Flaps 3 landing isn’t the best choice.
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Other factors like tailwinds or light aircraft weight may make a flap FULL landing the best choice. Both Flaps FULL and 3 landing configurations are considered “normal” - choose the landing flap configuration that best fits the landing environment.
Thank You for Filing ASAP Reports
These reports are invaluable to the fleet and to Delta. We use the information from ASAPs to develop or revamp policies and procedures and to monitor safety. Without your reports, the quality of Flight Standards would be dramatically decreased.
Honestly, we really appreciate your reports! That said, when you file reports, we need details. A report that identifies a date and place and simply says “and we missed the restriction” does the program no good – and it could cost the crew the opportunity for the protections afforded by ASAP. The ASAP program is a two way street. The crew gives the program valuable information and the program provided protections. Please, for the good of the program and to assure you receive the protections afforded by the ASAP program, file detailed reports.
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One final request: As a common courtesy to your flying partner, if you plan to file an ASAP report, please inform your crewmate. Each week we have several incidents where only one crewmember filed a report. Each pilot must file an independent report to receive ASAP program protections. Thank You!
Interested in being a Line Check Pilot?
By: Dave McNeill, ATL Lead Line Check Pilot
With the large training load at our New York City base, the A319/320 fleet needs to hire additional NYC Line Check Pilots. We are asking for a two-year "hand shake" commitment to stay in NYC as an Airbus LCP before transferring bases or fleets. Of course, this is not a binding agreement; we’re just trying to maintain our LCP staffing in NYC.
Although we’re currently "right staffed" in ATL and DTW, we may need to hire a very small number of Line Check Pilots at these bases to assist with NYC training. We’re presently overstaffed with LCPs in MSP and SLC.
Delta Air Lines requires 200 hours Pilot in Command (PIC) time on the A319/320 and 1,000 total PIC at DAL. Or, 200 hours PIC on the A319/320, 600 total PIC at DAL and 1,000 hours PIC or SIC on the A319/320. (A330 First Officer time is great but it doesn't count toward this SIC requirement.) The Director, Flight Standards, must approve exceptions to the above.
The A319/320 fleet prefers to hire someone with well above the DAL minimum requirement of 200 hours of A319/320 PIC time. We are currently looking for a minimum of 600 hours of Airbus PIC time, but exceptions may be approved on a case-by-case basis. (Some factors considered: former A319/320 AQFO or FO Simulator Instructor and/or former LCP on another DAL aircraft.)
Thank You!
Fleet Article: ‘Airbus Golden Rules’
What does Airbus consider to be the most important rules of flying the A319/320? The following Fleet Article ‘Airbus Golden Rules’ explains.
Note: All the Fleet Articles are outstanding. Each article was drafted by highly experienced Training Instructors or Line Check Airman.
Read the Fleet Article – ‘Airbus Golden Rules’
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Introduction
Airbus promotes eight ‘Operational Golden Rules’ for all pilots flying their aircraft. In this Fleet Article we’ll
examine their list in the context of Delta procedures, illustrated by actual ASAP reports.
1. The aircraft can be flown like any other aircraft
For a lot of pilots, the Airbus is their first “fly through computer” aircraft. In initial training the new
Airbus pilot is schooled on flight control laws, protections, and stabilities. All this, combined with very
capable autopilot, Flight Director, and autothrust systems can be a bit intimidating. So it’s important to
remember that the Airbus is simply an airplane, which can be flown manually just like any other. The OE
Guide (Ref. OE.3.125) includes the following somewhat humorous example from a new captain
observation:
Nice VFR day with captain flying on a seven mile final. Then ATC advises spacing is inadequate with
slower aircraft ahead. As PF has already slowed as much as possible, ATC offers the visual approach
to the close spaced parallel runway. Crew accepts and PM offers to insert new approach. PM does so,
but also inserts STAR, realizes mistake, then starts to clear out each unnecessary point. Meanwhile
aircraft (AP still engaged) is continuing original approach and is still closing on traffic ahead. PF
finally asks for “direct to the FAF” of the new runway, which is now abeam the aircraft. Aircraft does
an interesting “S” turn to join the new final, but is now above the G/S. PF selects V/S to intercept
from above and approach just meets stable requirements. After shutdown captain asks, “how could
we have handled that better?” Response from LCP, “How would you have handled it in previous
(lower level of automation) aircraft?” “By turning off the AP, FDs, and manually flying the approach,
using the VASI for visual reference and......oh.”
As the OE Guide goes on to say:
The lesson learned is the Airbus can be flown just like any other aircraft. If things aren't going the
way you want them to, consider “de-automating” and flying the aircraft back where you want it (e.g.
into a stable situation where you can recover the automation as desired). Of course, if things are
really going badly, a go-around is the best call and provides a chance to regroup and regain crew
situational awareness.
2. Fly, navigate, communicate - in that order
Many of us learned this as “aviate, navigate, communicate”, but either way it’s still good advise. One
situation where this is especially important is when dealing with a non-normal. The QRH has the following
guidance (Ref. QRH NNCI.1.5):
Use the following guidelines when dealing with a non-normal situation:
Fly the aircraft
Do not hurry
Cancel the warning
Identify the emergency or Non-Normal
Accomplish recall items from memory (if applicable)
Read the ECAM/checklist
Interestingly, ASAPs indicate crews do a better job of this with major emergency situations. However,
they have a harder time when working through minor non-normals. As the following ASAP illustrates:
ASAP: The captain (PF) dialed FL250 into the FCU, but did not initiate the descent as the top of
descent was further ahead of us. As we approached the TOD we received a ‘COND LAV + GALLEY
FAULT’ ECAM message. The captain stated that he had the aircraft and the radios and directed me to
work the ECAM message and QRH. As I was working the fault, I thought about our descent and looked
Airbus Golden Rules
A319/320 Fleet Articles
Fleet Article #39: “Airbus Golden Rules” Original 4/28/2015
Page 2
up at the FMA and altitude indicator on my PFD. I saw DES in green and the altitude descending
through the upper FL300's. Satisfied that the descent had started, I returned to working the fault. As I
finished the QRH procedure, ATC called us to inquire as to whether we would make the crossing
restriction. This was 6 miles from the fix descending through FL330. We quickly saw that we would not
make the altitude and I informed ATC of such, as the PF started an aggressive OP DES to FL250. The
controller stated: "Don't worry about making an uncomfortable descent, just get down to FL250 as fast
as comfortable."
3. One head up at all times
A frequent observation made during line checks is “both pilots were heads-down at the same time”. One
area where this is particularly dangerous is during ground operations, as the following ASAP illustrates:
ASAP: Departed the C gates in MSP. Assigned 30L via Quebec, Charlie, and Alpha. Looking back I
didn't recall feeling fatigued, but now believe I was more tired than I realized. Another threat was
complacency, as we were both familiar with the airport and traffic was very light at the time. I also
wrote the assigned taxi instruction on my flight release, but failed to reference it until I had erred. As
we turned west along taxiway Quebec, I evaluated the radar return to the west along our departure
path where some rain showers were developing. The FO had received the performance data and was
head down reviewing same, as I turned from Quebec onto Delta. I can't say why I turned early, except
perhaps taxiing from the "inner" taxiway to another "inner" taxiway is generally normal convention,
(but not here). After turning, we both immediately realized the error at the same time that Ground
noticed it. There was no immediate traffic conflict as traffic was very light at the time. He instructed us
to remain on Delta and later instructed an aircraft on Alpha to proceed north on Charlie.
A good technique is for the FO to say, “I’m heads-down” while doing tasks such as changing runways or
inserting TDU. Of course, the captain should not attempt to taxi the aircraft and analyze data or program
the FMS at the same time. As Vol. 1 says:
(Ref. Vol. 1 NP.20.36) The captain's analysis of the WDR shall not be completed while the captain is
taxiing the aircraft.
(Ref. Vol. 1 NP.12.1) Make MCDU entries before taxi or when stopped, when possible. If MCDU entries
must be made during taxi, the First Officer makes the entries.
4. Cross check the accuracy of the FMS
ASAP reports indicate the majority of navigation deviations occur due to preflight FMS entry errors. The
good news is that these types of errors are easily prevented by proper FMS verification procedures. So
why do we continue to have navigation deviations? Consider the following recent ASAP:
ASAP: After waiting for late arriving aircraft, we were finally able to start the pre-flight around 30
minutes prior to departure. I accomplished the walk around and the Captain accomplished the cockpit
preflight. He also loaded my flight plan while I was doing the exterior inspection. I added the departure
runway, SID and STAR for the flight. We rushed to try to get the aircraft out on time. Once the PDC
arrived the Captain read it to me and I checked the routing by the route displayed on the PILOT
ROUTES page. I concentrated on the SID and STAR and assumed that three points (ILLIE, TORRR,
MIE) were part of the STAR, but did not physically see them on the PILOT ROUTE page. I read back
the departure runway, SID and STAR for verification. We taxied out expecting 3L and got 4R for
departure. The taxi route from gate A-1 was short so we had to change the runway, takeoff data, and
start the second engine. We had to advise Tower that we needed two minutes to load takeoff numbers
and allow the second engine to warm up. We took off normally and enroute ATC asked if we were
going to TORRR or FWA. We advised that we were going to FWA and we got clearance MIE. ATC asked
what was our filed routing we discover that ILLIE, TORRR & MIE had dropped out. I realized that I
loaded the FWA5 to FWA and the CLANG5 arrival with the FWA transition instead of the MIE transition.
That had caused the three points to drop out. ATC stated that there was no problem and cleared us to
descend on the CLANG5 arrival. I learned a valuable lesson that rushing to do things can cause the
crew to miss things no matter what their experience level is.
Fleet Article #39: “Airbus Golden Rules” Original 4/28/2015
Page 3
Preventive Measures: First, never rush and put yourself in a situation that can cause missing important
items or procedures. Second, use the FMS Flight Plan page versus the PILOT ROUTES page to verify
the PDC routing. The PDC verification process is something that has been around for about a year so
those of us who have been flying the Airbus for many years use various methods to accomplish the
verification. In short the fleet really does not have a set standardized procedure on how to do the
verification. In fact the Captain and I have different methods so when we rushed ourselves looked at
different places to do the verification and we really did not accomplish the verify the proper routing on
this occasion. I also skipped verifying the routing by the FIX LIST on the release and on the flight plan
loaded in the box in my rush to get things done. That was a huge omission.
The reporter brings up a number of good points. Let’s examine these in more detail. First, Vol. 1 includes
the following for the PF Preflight (Ref. Vol. 1 NP.20.13):
