Accelerating Luhmann

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DOI: 10.1177/0263276406067098

2006 23: 49Theory Culture SocietyOle Bjerg

Accelerating Luhmann: Towards a Systems Theory of Ambivalence

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Accelerating LuhmannTowards a Systems Theory of Ambivalence

Ole Bjerg

Our analysis has given no indication whatsoever that sometime during thiscentury, and presumably during its second half, an epoch break has occurredregarding the system of society, which would justify claiming a transformationfrom a modern to a postmodern society. (Luhmann, 1997: 1143)1

IN LUHMANNS systems theory we do not find a concept of post-modernity.2 The reason for this is the very obvious one that Luhmanndoes not recognize society as being postmodern, hence there is no needfor a concept of postmodernity. Luhmann does indeed agree with the propo-nents of postmodernism that the time we live in is permeated by a certainkind of paradoxicality. He believes, however, that this paradoxicality isalready adequately incorporated in systems theorys description of contem-porary society as consisting of a multitude of differentiated self-referentialfunction systems. Luhmanns account of modernity is, in his own opinion,already sufficiently equipped to grasp what some people have chosen to callpostmodernism (1997: 11445).

I believe, however, that Luhmanns dismissal of the problem ofpostmodernity is somewhat too hasty. The paradoxicality that we face inpostmodern society is more radical than just the coexistence of a multitudeof different world descriptions. In postmodern society we see an implosion(or explosion if you like) of meaning, whereby differentiated functionsystems are confronted with complexity in an ambivalent form, which theyare not able to handle without dissolving themselves. This ambivalence notonly questions the validity of a particular systems observations of theenvironment. It puts the systems fundamental possibility of observation,and thereby its very existence, at stake. The aim of this article is to proposea conception of the postmodern condition of social systems compatible with

the terminology of Luhmanns systems theory.

Theory, Culture & Society 2006 (SAGE, London, Thousand Oaks and New Delhi),Vol. 23(5): 4968DOI: 10.1177/0263276406067098

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The Possibility and Impossibility of Society

Luhmanns social theory is constructed around the classical sociologicalquestion: how is society possible? This type of question connects back tothe old Hobbesian problem of order and is later appropriated within thesociological tradition by authors like Durkheim (1893) and Simmel (1908).In an early article, titled precisely Wie ist soziale Ordnung mglich? (Howis Social Order Possible?) (1981), Luhmann poses the question very explic-itly as the central question of the development of social theory. And in themajor work, Social Systems (1984), we find it in a version accommodatinghis by then fully accomplished linguistic turn. To Luhmann, society is nowtantamount to communication systems and, accordingly, the formulation ofthe question becomes: How is communication, that is, coordinated selectiv-ity, possible at all? (Luhmann, 1984: 157). Luhmanns detailed studies of

particular function systems are also based upon this type of How is Xpossible? question (e.g. 1982: 19, 1990a: 910).

This article revolves around an inquiry into the other side of thisquestion. By taking the possibility of society as his starting point, Luhmannmakes himself blind to essential features of contemporary society. Thesefeatures may be illuminated by posing the question: How is society imposs-ible? or How is communication as a system impossible? The thesis I wantto propose is that in society, in its postmodern condition, communicationand systems are at the same time both possible and impossible. To fully

grasp what is going on in postmodern society, theory must be able to operatewith both the possibility and the impossibility of society. In other words, ifsystems theory and the analysis generated from it are to be in step withcontemporary society, it has to incorporate the question: How are systemsimpossible?

Systems theory does indeed take the improbability of communicationas its basis, i.e., the improbability that a communicative operation will findconnection in a subsequent operation (Luhmann, 1984: 157, 1990c: 96).Probability, however, is a measure for the likelihood of a specific outcome

within a field of possible outcomes. Improbability indicates a low likelihoodof an outcome, yet it still is possible. Improbability therefore presupposespossibility. Central to the notion of autopoiesis is the notion ofAnschlussfhigkeit3 (Luhmann, 1984: 36). Being autopoietic, systems areintrinsically vested with the ability to connect with subsequent operations,vested with the possibility of their own meaningful reproduction. Thequestion of the impossibility of systems is intended to open an inquiry intothe impossibility of connectivity,Anschlussunfhigkeit.

The argument will consist of two stages. First a deconstructive critique

exposing those problems or obstacles in systems theory, which make it blindto certain features of function systems in their postmodern condition. And,second, a reconstructive stage attempting to incorporate this critique intosystems theory, enabling it to grasp both the modern and the post incontemporary society.

50 Theory, Culture & Society 23(5)



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The Problem of Complexity

A central component if not the central component of systems theory isthe distinction between system and environment. A system, according toLuhmann, is only possible as one side of this distinction (1984: 176). Thedifference between system and environment is furthermore constituted by adifference in gradients of complexity between environment and system(1984: 1815). We may speak of a drop in complexity (Komplexitts-geflle). The capacity of systemic self-reproduction hereby consists in theability to reduce the complexity that is present in the environment. Reduc-tion of complexity is carried out in a process where the system selects andactualizes potential observations in the environment. Complexity works asa generator for system creation and Luhmann speaks of a complexitypressure (1990b: 68) whereby the system is being forced to select (1984:

25) by the surplus of possible observations in the environment. But forcomplexity to function as a catalyst for the creation and reproduction ofsystems, we must assume that complexity in the form of potential observa-tions is presentprior to the system, that is, prior to the actualization of theobservation (for an exposition of this problem see Habermas, 1971: 153). Ifthe environment complexity only comes into being with the systems obser-vation of the environment, it cannot function as the compelling force behindthe creation of the system (for a discussion on this topic see Bjerg, 2000).Neither will it make sense to ascribe a complexity-reducing function to the

system, since then the system would have first produced the complexity thatit later reduces. It would be like a pyromaniac fireman who puts out a firethat she herself has started. So Luhmann has to work with the assumptionof an environment, which is in some way complex an sich.

As will be demonstrated, it does not suffice to assume that systemsjust select from a horizon of pre-existing possible observations, therebyreducing complexity. We must also have an eye for the fact that systemsthemselves, in a more radical way than Luhmann conceives, producecomplexity, not only in the system but also in the environment.4 This prob-

lematic of production and reduction of complexity is expressed in the formof ambivalence.Referring to Spencer Brown, Luhmann constantly states that the basic

operation of observation is the drawing of a distinction. But what happensif the object one is observing seems to appear on both sides of the distinc-tion at the same time? What if an object seems to be both an artwork anda non-artwork or if it seems to be neither? In other words, what if theobservation is ambivalent? Bauman approaches this problem in an analysisthat can be read as a description of what happens in function systems with

the emergence of postmodernity:Through its naming/classifying function, language posits itself between asolidly founded, orderly world fit for human habitation, and a contingent worldof randomness, in which human survival weapons memory, the capacity forlearning would be useless, if not downright suicidal. Language strives tosustain the order and to deny or suppress randomness and contingency. . . .

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The situation turns ambivalent if the linguistic tools of structuration proveinadequate; either the situation belongs to none of the linguistically distin-guished classes, or it falls into several classes at the same time. None of thelearned patterns could be proper in an ambivalent situation or more than

one of the learned patterns could be applied; whatever is the case, theoutcome is the feeling of indecision, undecidability, and hence loss of control.The consequences of action become unpredictable, while randomness,allegedly done away with by the structuring effort, seems to make an unso-licited come-back. (Bauman, 1991: 12)5

In Luhmannian terms, what Bauman is describing here is a situation inwhich the system is confronted with a form of irreducible complexity. Whena system is observing a given phenomenon in the environment according toits semantics, the phenomenon may be ambivalent in the sense that logi-cally it can appear on both sides of the systems code of observation, orperhaps on neither side. Postmodernity can be described as a situationwhere it is becoming increasingly difficult to distinguish unambiguouslybetween the two sides of the systems observations, e.g. art/non-art, prof-itable/non-profitable, healthy/sick. This ambivalence is radical in the sensethat it cannot simply be settled through a selection in which the systemdogmatically places the phenomenon on one side or the other of the distinc-tion, since such a selection would be inconsistent with the systems ownsemantics.

The problem of ambivalence is treated in systems theory under theheadline of paradoxicality. As already noted, Luhmann does admit that para-doxicality is an intrinsic part of life in contemporary society. What separ-ates him from Baumann and other proponents of postmodernity is his beliefin the systems ability to cope with paradoxicality. Luhmanns trust inmodernity in the form of differentiated function systems may be summar-ized in his statement: Paradoxicality is not a question of existence for thesystem (1985: 415). The main argument of the current article may be statedas the precise opposite of this formulation. It is precisely the failure to recog-

nize the extent of the problem that paradoxicality constitutes for the systemwhich prevents Luhmann from being able to fully conceptualize post-modernity.

In the Luhmannian conception, a paradox occurs when the conditionsof the possibility of an operation are at the same time the conditions of theimpossibility of this operation (Luhmann, 1986: 269). However, this is onlypossible on the level of observation, and therefore paradoxicality alwaysemerges on the level of observation and never on the level of the observed,the level of operation. Luhmann argues in his exposition of the conscious-

ness as a system (which may be generalized to social systems):With classical logic and epistemology we assume that real processes proceedfree of paradoxes. This is also possible in self-referential systems. In theconstitution of a paradox, the parallel view of a negation is necessary, i.e. theuse of a schema of difference, i.e. observation. The progression from thought




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to thought lets itself be carried by a necessity free of negation. The thoughtbeing actual in this very moment disappears anyway. It does not have to benegated. And a subsequent thought takes its place anyway . . . without thenegation of the previous thought being necessary for the production of the

new thought. This happens unnoticed. Only to the observer of this progres-sion do the thoughts form distinct entities; only to the observer is one thoughtnot the other; only to the observer do the thoughts differ from each other; onlyto the observer does the single thought attain its unity from being distin-guished from other thoughts; therefore, only to the observer can paradoxesoccur . . . (1985: 41415)

According to systems theory, the paradox emerges when the systemobserves itself, thereby realizing its own contingency. But the stream ofthoughts constituting the autopoiesis of the system continues, affected only

momentarily by the realization of the paradoxicality on the level of self-observation. Since the paradox emerges on the level of observation, it consti-tutes only a meta- and not a fundamental or existential problem to theautopoiesis of the system. The system may therefore be able to afford to justignore the problem and simply continue operation on a lower-order level(Luhmann, 1997: 578). The necessity free of negation will automaticallyforce the system into making a selection on a first-order level, regardless ofthe meta-problem constituted by the paradox. One way of continuing mayeven be a further self-observation, identifying the first self-observation as a

paradox. The paradox is hereby deparadoxificated by being identified as aparadox through a meta-meta-observation, which in itself is an operationand a continuation of the autopoiesis of the system. A paradox may consti-tute a logical problem, but since the autopoiesis of a system is basicallyoperational and not necessarily logical, a system may overcome a paradoxby jumping between orders of observation, thus escaping (or dodging onemight say) the paradox without necessarily solving it. It [the system]releases itself from the paradox by moving on to another distinction(Luhmann, 1993: 201). As long as the system just keeps making observa-

tions, it avoids being stopped in its operations. The problem of paradoxical-ity becomes a question of how, and not whether, the system reproducesitself. This is how Luhmann reaches the conclusion quoted above: Para-doxicality is not a question of existence for the system.

In the following I will demonstrate how systems in postmodernity areconfronted with a peculiar form of paradoxicality. In a radical sense thisparadoxicality puts the very existence of the systems at stake, since it doesnot lend itself to immediate deparadoxification by switching between ordersof observation. To illustrate the logic of this paradoxicality I have

constructed a kind of Gedankenexperiment in the form of a very simplesystem. I would like to demonstrate how a paradox emerges as a result ofself-observation (Luhmann would probably agree with this part) but also howthe paradox cannot necessarily be dissolved by either continuing the oper-ations of the system on a lower order, or escalating to higher orders of self-observation. The Gedankenexperiment may also be read as a metaphor for




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postmodernity in the sense that it demonstrates the impossibility ofmodernity in the form of the ambition of being able to rationally process anykind of complexity, eliminate randomness by way of calculation and turnchaos into order. To paraphrase Bauman (1991: 2), the idea is to illustrate

the unsolicited come-back of the randomness, allegedly done away withby the structuring effort.

Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma

Two friends, Max and Sam, have been arrested, convicted and sentenced tothe death penalty for a very serious crime.6 They are now sitting in neigh-bouring prison cells awaiting the execution of their penalty, due by the endof the week. It is now Monday. Through the bars they are discussing howthey feel about their impending death. Max is very afraid. Not so much about

death itself, but about knowing exactly when it is going to come. He hadalways hoped to be surprised by death. To help his old friend, Sam nowoffers to kill Max by strangulation (he can just about fit his arms throughthe bars) in his sleep on one of the nights before the execution on Sunday,thus relieving Max of having to face his own death. Max welcomes the idea,but stresses that to make it work, the murder has to take place on a nightthat Max cannot anticipate, since Max would not be able to fall asleepknowing that he was going to die on that particular night. If he were able toanticipate his own murder, the crucial element of surprise would be lost.

There are six nights until the execution, and Sam immediately startsconsidering which night to choose to kill Max. He reasons as follows:Saturday night, i.e. the last night before the execution, is out of the question.When Max wakes up alive on Saturday morning, he will then be able tofigure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is thelast possible night before the execution. The element of surprise will be lostand Max will not be able to fall asleep in the evening. But what about Fridaynight? Sam now continues his reasoning: if Max is able to anticipate thekilling if it is to be carried out on Saturday night, then Friday night is not

a valid option either. On Friday morning when Max wakes up alive, he canfigure out that he is going to be killed the following night, since this is thelast possible night before the execution, now that Saturday night has beenruled out.

Now Sam is starting to get confused: if both Saturday and Friday nightcan be ruled out as valid options beforehand, then Thursday night cannotbe valid either, since in this case as well, when Max has woken up aliveand realized that Thursday night is the last possible night, he will be ableto anticipate the time of his death and will therefore not be surprised whenSam starts to kill him. In fact he will not even be able to fall asleep. Samsconfusion turns into utter frustration when he realizes, that according tothe logic of his reasoning, neither Wednesday, Tuesday nor Monday nightscan be used as the time for the killing, since in these cases as well, Maxwill be able to anticipate the killing on the previous morning, and hencethe element of surprise will be lost. But how is it possible that a surprise




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murder is not possible, when initially there are six different nights tochoose from?

Sam now realizes that in his logical considerations he has beenworking with a hidden premise, namely that Max is thinking as logically as

himself. For instance, Thursday night is only an impossible time for thekilling if Max has logically calculated that it cannot be Saturday or Fridaynight, and is therefore not going to be surprised. This gives Sam a momentof relief, and he considers whether Max is thinking as logically as himselfand drawing the same conclusions, or whether he can assume that Max isnot thinking as logically about the situation as himself, allowing him to seta random night for the killing. While considering this, he strikes uponanother hidden premise in his reasoning. Not only is the validity of hisreasoning based on the assumption that Max is thinking logically, but Max

also has to assume that Sam is thinking logically and not just setting arandom night for the killing without any further speculation. If Max isthinking logically, but is assuming that Sam is not thinking logically, thenMax cannot make any predictions, since he cannot be sure that Sam has notsimply chosen, for example, Friday night, unaware that this night is actuallynot possible.

Sams momentary relief now again turns into confusion as he realizesthat not only must he consider whether Max is thinking logically or not, healso has to consider whether Max believes he (Sam) is thinking logically.

And his confusion increases as he thinks about the fact that logical thinkingmight not be a question of either/or, but rather a question of degree: Maxmay indeed think as far as to rule out Saturday and Friday nights, butperhaps he does not realize that Thursday night is not possible either, andwould therefore be surprised if Sam decided to kill him on Wednesday night.Max may also indeed come to the conclusion that all nights are logicallyimpossible, but he may also assume that Sam is not thinking further aheadthan to rule out Saturday and Friday. He might then expect the killing tobe on Thursday night, and therefore be surprised if Sam settles on Wednes-

day night.Sam has now reached a level of confusion that makes him too tired tospeculate any more. He decides to stick with his promise to kill Max, butgives up on the ambition of logically finding a night on which he can besure Max is going to be surprised. Instead he simply throws a die and letsit decide the night of the killing. The die lands on four, and Sam prepareshimself for killing Max on the Wednesday night (four nights before Sunday).Before he falls asleep in the evening, he cannot help wondering whetherMax is going to be surprised on the night after all. He also thinks aboutwhether his solution to the problem was the most rational or the mostirrational. He falls asleep without finding an answer to any of the questions.

The Paradox

Sams considerations can be viewed as operations in a system. The code ofthe system is kill on this night/not kill on this night, and the semantics,




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which discriminate the observations, consist in the rule that only a nightwhen Max cannot logically anticipate his own death may be used as apossible night for the killing. The system is confronted with a complexenvironment with six possible observations in the form of the six nights (in

the following, Saturday night will be referred to as N1, Friday night as N2,Thursday night as N3 . . . Monday night as N6). It has to select one of thesepotential observations and thereby reduce complexity.

The paradox is, however, that as soon as the system starts working onthe situation to make the complexity-reducing observation, it also startsproducing a complexity in the environment that was not there beforehand.Had Sam never become aware of the logical problems involved in finding aproper time, and had he immediately rolled the die or chosen a night to killMax in a similar random fashion, the problems would never have emerged.

The calculations of the system work as a sort of doubling of the environ-mental complexity. With the realization of the hidden assumptions, entirelynew possibilities of observation emerge that the system now has to deal withand select between. Instead of just selecting between the possibilities N1,N2, N3 . . . N6, the system now also has to select whether Max is to beobserved as thinking logically or randomly, i.e. between N1ml, N2ml, N3ml. . . N6ml and N1mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr (ml = Max is logical; mr =Max is random). And when the system becomes aware of the second hiddenassumption about Maxs assumptions about Sam, we get yet another

doubling of the first row, so that N1ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6ml becomesN1mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl and N1mlsr, N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . .N6mlsr (sl = Max assumes that Sam is logical; sr = Max assumes that Samis random). The production of added complexity can go on eternally, sincewe can add not only the assumption about Maxs rationality and the assump-tion about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, but also an assump-tion about Maxs assumptions about Sams assumptions about Maxsrationality, and an assumption about Maxs assumptions about Sams assump-tions about Maxs assumptions about Sams rationality, and so on. The only

way of stopping this process is by appealing to some form of randomness.But when the system makes this move it actually dissolves itself byadmitting its own redundancy. If the observation in the last instance canonly be made with recourse to a random decision anyway, why even botherto activate the system in the first place? All that Sam has gained by hislogical speculations is half a day of puzzles that make his head ache. Hecould have saved himself the trouble by doing from the beginning what heeventually ended up doing anyway, namely rolling the die. His consider-ations have given him neither more nor less confidence that Max will besurprised than if he had left his decision to chance from the beginning. Andyet! What if the die had landed on one and not on four? Would it not thenhave been too obvious to plan the killing on the last day? And would notthe logical reflections have had some value after all in this case? Further-more, the system and the logical reflections are necessary in another way,since it is only by going through these reflections that Sam reaches the




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conclusion that he might as well make a random decision regarding the nightfor the killing. So the system is necessary for the realization of its own redun-dancy!

Acceleration and Repression of ComplexityIn system-theoretical terms, the paradox in the example may be describedas follows: the system is confronted with an ambivalence that threatens itsdrop in the degree of complexity in relation to the environment. Asmentioned above, the precondition for the existence and reproduction of asystem is that the degree of complexity within the system is lower than thedegree of complexity in the environment. We may express this in theequation: Sc < Ec (Sc = system complexity; Ec = environment complexity).In the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma Gedankenexperiment we see two

types of operations. One we may call acceleration of reflection and the otherrepression of reflection. Both types of operations involve not only anelement of complexity reduction but also an element of complexity produc-tion.

(1) As Sam gradually realizes the impossibility of calculating a specifictime for the killing (first he sees that N1, N2, N3 . . . etc. are all impossibleand then he discovers the different layers of hidden assumptions in hisreflections) the operations of the system are, so to speak, accelerated. Layerupon layer of new reflections and self-observations are added. These reflec-

tions are not just system-internal complexity processing. They simplyproduce a complexity in the environment, which was not there before. Theoriginal environment complexity consisting in six possible dates (N1, N2,N3 . . . N6) has now been doubled with the inclusion of the possibility thatMax is either thinking logically or randomly (N1ml, N2ml, N3ml . . . N6mlor N1mr, N2mr, N3mr . . . N6mr). And this set of possibilities is thendoubled again in relation to the assumption about whether Sam is thinkinglogically or randomly (N1mlsl, N2mlsl, N3mlsl . . . N6mlsl or N1mlsr,N2mlsr, N3mlsr . . . N6mlsr). As mentioned above, this doubling can go on

eternally, making it more and more impossible for the system to reduce thecomplexity, i.e. it becomes more and more difficult for Sam to make adecision. Escalating into higher orders of self-observation does not dissolvethe fundamental paradoxicality, on the contrary, it only seems to accelerateit. The system is in a situation homologous to that of the pyromaniac firemanwho starts a fire that grows to such a size that she is subsequently unableto put it out. It produces a complexity in the environment that it is subse-quently unable to process.

Thus the balance in the complexity drop between system and environ-ment is being inverted, since the system is responsible for part of thecomplexity in the environment. The environment complexity consists of anoriginal part, and a part produced by the system. The equation Sc < Ecbecomes Sc < Eoc + Espc (Eoc = original complexity in the environment;Espc = system-produced complexity in the environment). But since thesystem is responsible for Espc, one could ask which side of the equation




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Espc should actually belong to. One could, for instance, argue that it shouldbe placed on the system side. We could then imagine a situation where Sc+ Espc = Eoc, or maybe even Sc + Espc > Eoc. In this case, the systemwould have produced as much or even more complexity than it had reduced,

and it would be at best redundant and at worst simply counterproductive.In other words, there would no longer be any complexity drop from systemto environment. It is exactly this realization that makes Sam terminate hisaccelerating reflections by appealing to randomness and rolling the die.

(2) But appealing to randomness is not unproblematic either. Thisoperation can be said to imply an element of repression. By letting hisdecision be determined by the die, Sam introduces an element of chance,which stops the operations of the system (i.e. his own reflections). However,this is an operation of complexity destruction rather than of complexity

reduction. The operation does not follow logically from the semantics of thesystem, but rather constitutes a break with these semantics just as if youflipped a coin to determine whether you were in love with a person or not.The system imposes a kind ofDenkverbot on itself. The fact that Sam cannotcompletely let go of his reflections, but is still speculating before fallingasleep, illustrates how the system cannot completely obey its ownDenkver-bot. The operations of the system are unavoidably still processing on a latentlevel. We cannot, as Luhmann thinks, just ignore the paradoxicality on ameta-order, in the belief that the operations of the system will continue on

a lower order of observation driven by a necessity free of negation. We maysee this as showing how complexity does not lend itself to destruction butis only being repressed, and how paradoxicality does not lend itself to beingignored. In this way, the system has absorbed a quantity of unreduced,unprocessed complexity. The complexity in the system (Sc) then consists intwo parts described in the equation: Srdc + Srpc < Ec (Srdc = reducedcomplexity in the system; Srpc = repressed complexity in the system).

The problem is now the same as in (1). The complexity drop fromsystem to environment is being threatened since we can imagine a situation

where Srdc + Srpc = Ec, or maybe even Srdc + Srpc > Ec. These situationsoccur if the extent of the repressed complexity takes on such dimensionsthat the system complexity equals or exceeds the environment complexity.In the example of the two prisoners, such a situation would occur if Samsspeculations before bedtime become so pressing that he simply cannot sleepand ends up withdrawing his decision to let the die determine the night. Hewould then get out of bed to resume his reflections on the problem only torealize, again, that he has to throw the die to reach a decision. Since thedecision to do the killing on Wednesday night is not a logical consequenceof the semantics of the system, but rather constitutes a break with thesesemantics, the decision creates a form of latent unease within the system.Just as we could imagine that if the coin had told us we were not in lovewith the woman in question, it would still be difficult if not impossible tostop thinking about her, and asking ourselves whether we were not in lovewith her anyway.7




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The two equations in (1) and (2): Sc + Espc > Eoc and Srdc + Srpc >Ec might actually be seen as two sides of the same coin, since Espc andSrpc express the same thing. The complexity that the system represses, isthe complexity that it has itself produced in the environment, and vice versa.

We may express this in an aggregated equation: Srdc + Ac > Eoc. Ac is aquantity of ambivalent complexity that may consist of either Espc or Srpc,or a combination of both in which it is impossible to distinguish betweenthe two. In accordance with Baumans account of ambivalence above, Ac isa quantity that may figure on both sides of the difference between systemand environment. In fact, we may say that it oscillates between the two sidesand, concurrently with this oscillation, the sign of the equation turns backand forth. There is a constant inversion of the relationship between thedegree of complexity in the system and the environment, so that it changes

from constituting a drop of complexity (Srdc < Ac + Eoc) to a rise incomplexity (Srdc + Ac > Eoc) and back again. The complexity drop occurswhen Sam succeeds in accepting the random basis of his decision, ceaseshis speculation and carries out the killing on Wednesday night as planned.In this case, we may say that the system succeeds in reproducing itself. Thecomplexity increase occurs when Sam cannot fall asleep, starts speculatingagain and changes his decision about when to do the killing. He is then stillunable to fall asleep, starts his speculations again and changes his decisionagain to another night, tries to fall asleep again but fails, starts speculating

again, etc. In this case, we may say that the system stutters and is there-fore on the edge of breaking down.

Towards a Theory of Complexity Production

The argument here is not that we should reject systems theory altogether.But, in order to describe systems in their postmodern condition, we have tobe able to conceptualize how the occurrence of ambivalent complexity in aradical way threatens the existence and further reproduction of the system.Even though Luhmann talks about ambivalence and terms his systems

theory a radical constructivism (1996: 41), I still do not think his theory issufficiently equipped to make this kind of conceptualization. I will there-fore supplement systems theory with Baudrillard and his theory of simu-lation.

In a key text in the postmodernism literature, Lyotard definesmodernism (based on an analysis of science) as having an inherent teleo-logical belief in the form of some grand narrative, and the postmodern ishence defined as a breakdown of such beliefs and an incredulity towardmetanarratives (1979: xxiiixxiv). What Baudrillard has to offer is a theor-etical conceptualization of this radical incredulity in postmodernity. Ratherthan reading him in opposition to the Luhmannian theory of communication,I will read him as an acceleration of the same. Luhmann and Baudrillardagree on the point that communication cannot be seen as a direct represen-tation of a non-verbal reality. But while Luhmann sees communication as acomplexity-reducing contingent constructing observation of reality,




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Baudrillard goes one step further by saying that communication is able tosimulate reality, thereby producing a hyperreality.8

To maintain his concept of systems as complexity reducing, wherebythe system is constituted by a drop in complexity in relation to the environ-

ment, Luhmann has to state an absolute difference between communicationand reality. The systems observation consists of a selection from a range ofpossible observations of the environment. So the environmental complexityin the form of the possible observations must be present before the actual-ization of the observation. Otherwise it does not make sense to speak ofselection, and otherwise we cannot be certain that the environment is morecomplex than the system (see also Bjerg, 2000). This way, Luhmann isworking with the conception of a real reality, that is indeed complex andopen to an almost unlimited number of possible observations, but still real

in the sense that the potentiality exists before the emergence of the systemas a complexity-reducing selection. In Husserlian terms, complexity toLuhmann is the noematic correlate of the intentional act of observation.When he then compares the difference between noesis and noema to thedifference between self-reference and other-reference (Fremdreferenz)(Luhmann, 1996: 34) he installs an absolute asymmetry in the act of obser-vation in that complexity is always by definition the other. Complexity isalways real.

Baudrillard, however, does not speak of selection but of aproduction,

whereby communication creates a simulated hyperreality. This is not to saythat reality disappears in favour of a simulated hyperreality. Instead, I readBaudrillard as saying that simulation collapses the difference between realreality and simulated reality. This means we cannot uphold the absolutedifference between observed and observation (noema and noesis) and there-fore, in a Luhmannian sense, between environment and system either. Thisis not to say that the act of observation does not have both a noetic and anoematic correlate. However, we can never be sure, that the noematic corre-late is always an other-reference. Communication is asimulacra producing

a simulation of reality so perfect that no instance in the world (neither God,reason nor anything else) is able to distinguish between a simulated and areal reality. And even if we were able to distinguish, we would not be ableto make any conclusive arguments as to why the real reality is more realthan the simulated one. In other words, there is a perfect symmetry betweenthe observation and the observed, between the system and its environment:

It is no longer a question of imitation, nor duplication, nor even parody. It isa question of substituting the signs of the real for the real, that is to say ofan operation of deterring every real process via its operational double, a

programmatic, metastable, perfectly descriptive machine that offers all thesigns of the real and short-circuits all its vicissitudes. . . . A hyperreal hence-forth sheltered from the imaginary, and from any distinction between the realand the imaginary, leaving room only for the orbital recurrence of models andfor the simulated generation of differences. (Baudrillard, 1981: 23)




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Luhmann does indeed agree that we cannot make any conclusive argu-ments as to why one observation of reality is more real than the other, sincethe relationship between observation and reality is fundamentally contin-gent. However, this point can be radicalized and accelerated with

Baudrillard. With Baudrillard, we might say that the system can not onlyselect between pre-existing possibilities of observation, but out of itself itis able to produce these very possibilities of observation. This process,whereby the system not only selects but also produces possibilities of obser-vation, can also be described exactly as a process whereby the system isnot only reducing but also producing complexity in the environment. Aradical recursivity is created in which the complexity drop between systemand environment can no longer be taken for granted, and in which the verydifference between system and environment is in danger of collapsing.

This was precisely the problematic I wanted to demonstrate in theGedankenexperiment above. Baudrillards concept of simulation is a concep-tualization of the release of the ambivalent complexity (Ac). In hyperreal-ity, this ambivalent complexity can figure on both sides of the equation, i.e.on both sides of the difference between system and environment. We cannotconclusively determine whether Ac is a real complexity that the systemshould take seriously and try to reduce, or whether it can be rejected as amerely simulated complexity that the system does best to ignore or justforget.

To further illustrate my point I will put forward a couple of examplesinvolving the paradox of ambivalent complexity. These examples also servethe purpose of indicating implications for empirical analyses and therebydemonstrating that the above discussion has concrete relevance and cannotbe dismissed as mere theoretical sophistry.

Hypochondria as Ambivalent Complexity

Let us take the example of a hypochondriac who goes to the doctor withpains in the chest and a conviction that she has heart disease. From a purely

Luhmannian perspective this may be described as a complex situation,where the health system has two possibilities: (1) it can observe the patientas being not sick by referring to the fact that she has no symptoms like highblood pressure or anything else that may justify her belief that she has heartdisease; or, (2) it can observe the patient as psychosomatically sick, in thather pains may be imagined but nevertheless real. In this analysis, the systemonly has to select one of the two options, whereby complexity is reducedand the system can continue operating undisturbed. The paradox is solvedby way of selection. However, introducing Baudrillards perspective addsyet another dimension to the analysis. The system is still indeed confrontedwith the same choice, but both options can imply fatal consequences for thecontinuing existence of the system.

If the system selects option (1), it has to ignore the reality that theimagined false pains may have for the patient. This leaves an unansweredquestion as to how a simulated pain differs from a real pain, and how the




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one can be said to be less real and less relevant to the health system thanthe other. The system is aware of this problem, but to be able to continueit has to not take it into consideration. The selection implies the above-mentioned repression, where the system acknowledges that there is

complexity in the environment which it cannot process and reduce, andtherefore has to absorb in unreduced form. This constitutes a problem inrelation to the maintenance of the difference in complexity between systemand environment, and henceforth also in relation to the very maintenanceof the system. The greater the share of unreduced complexity compared toreduced complexity in the system, the smaller the drop in complexity fromenvironment to system. In other words, a system with many repressions isapproximating the degree of complexity that is to be found in the environ-ment (Srdc + Srpc = Ec).

Practically, this means that the doctor can do nothing for thehypochondriac other than sending her away with the diagnosis that her painsare not real according to the health systems definition of real. Unless thisdiagnosis makes the hypochondriacs pains disappear by themselves, thehealth system must give up reducing the complexity that the hypochondriacand her pains constitute. As long as the proportion of hypochondriacs in thetotal number of patients in the health system is fairly modest, the systemwill still be able to justify itself as complexity reducing by referring to itssuccessful and well functioning observation and treatment of real diseases.

But with an increase in the incidence of hypochondria and other psychoso-matic diseases, which the system must give up treating, just sending thepatients away, this basis of justification will disappear. These patients willconstitute an increasing amount of complexity, which the system has to giveup reducing beforehand, whereby the systems existence and relevance asan observation system is threatened by a kind of deflation.

Instead the system might select option (2) and recognize the reality ofthe simulated pains for the patient. Hypochondria is then recognized as areal disease relevant to the health system. However, another problem then

arises. The health system now has to recognize that hypochondria as adisease is not present as a possibility prior to the existence of the healthsystem. Hypochondria is a condition where the patient falsely observesherself as being sick. This observation is only possible when the healthsystem has made its code of observation available to the patients self-observation. To be a hypochondriac you have to have certain knowledgeabout different diseases, otherwise you are not able to imagine having them.The health system has not only made it possible that we may observeourselves as sick or healthy, but it has also made possible a form of obser-vation, which in itself is able to create real disease (i.e. a simulated diseasewhich is impossible to distinguish from a real disease). The hypochondriacis not only sick because the system observes her otherwise undecidedcondition as sick. She is simply sick because the systems very facilitationof the observation produces her condition of sickness. If the system selectsthis option (2) and observes the hypochondriac as really sick, it has to




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acknowledge at the same time that the complexity that she constitutes isproduced by the system itself. With the production of more and morehypochondriacs, the number of uncured hypochondriacs will approximate thenumber of patients successfully cured of traditional diseases. In this case,

the amount of complexity produced by the system will again approximate theamount of complexity reduced, and the degree of complexity in the systemwill approximate and possibly exceed that in the environment (Sc + Espc >Eoc). We then have a health system that is unable to justify its own function-ality and existence since it produces more disease than it cures.

Slashing as Ambivalent Complexity

This example from the art system relates an episode that actually happenedin the Stedelijk Museum in Amsterdam. In 1986, an unknown artist named

Gerard Jan van Bladeren made a slashing, with a knife, of one of themasterpieces of modernistic art, Barnett Newmans Whos Afraid of Red,Yellow and Blue III (1967), while it was on show at the Stedelijk. VanBladeren was arrested and Newmans picture underwent a costly restorationto be brought back to its original state. In 1997, van Bladeren returned tothe Stedelijk, but since Whos Afraid of Red, Yellow and Blue IIIwas not ondisplay at the given time, he attacked another Newman painting, Cathedra(1951), and cut it seven times.

Again, from a purely Luhmannian perspective, the art system is faced

with a choice between two selections. On the one hand, it may dismiss vanBladerens acts as meaningless vandalism perpetrated by a sick person,i.e. as non-art. This was in fact the reaction from the museum and manyothers within the conventional art world. On the other hand, instead ofseeing the act as destructive vandalism, the system may also choose to seeit as a productive work of art constituting an artistic comment on and a breakwith abstract art. This was exactly van Bladerens own account of his actions.The slashing in itself was an artistic act.

The analysis may, however, be expanded with attention to the complex-

ity-producing aspects of either of the two selections. The second interpret-ation of van Bladerens acts as art is obviously problematic, insofar as itbreaks with conventional notions about the integrity and conclusiveness ofthe artwork, and taken to its extreme it could lead to true anarchy aroundmuseums and galleries. But the first interpretation is not unproblematiceither. If the museum management and others reject van Bladerens acts asmeaningless vandalism by referring to a notion of the integrity of theoriginal artwork, how can they justify restoring the painting? According tothe logic of the argument, the restoration is vandalism against van Bladerenswork in the form of the first slashing. Van Bladeren defends his secondslashing (which was actually intended for Whos Afraid of Red, Yellow andBlue III) precisely by saying that he wanted to restore the damage hebelieved the conservators had done to his work (the first slashing).

In other words, the slashing constitutes an ambivalent complexitythat confronts the art system with a paradox. It can either repress the




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complexity by dismissing the slashing as meaningless vandalism (however,such dismissal would, taken to its full logical consequence, also imply adismissal of the restoration work of bringing the painting back to its originalstate. Once the slashing had taken place, the art system would have to

accept the integrity of the new artwork in the form of the slashed painting),or the art system can accelerate the complexity by seeing slashing as a legit-imate artistic expression. However, this would also imply acceptance of theanarchic situation that would follow from giving up conventional notions ofthe integrity and inviolability of artwork.

The Paradox of Ambivalent Complexity as Catastrophe

The purpose of introducing the notion of complexity production is to sharpenthe systems theoretical sensitivity to the way in which a certain form of

ambivalence throws the system into a state of paradoxicality, a situation ofundecidability.9 What may be observed in systems in their postmoderncondition is almost a momentary doubling of the system. The system simu-lates itself. We cannot, however, as systems theory traditionally does, speakof a differentiation of the system into subsystems, since the two sides of thedoubling are connected in such a way that they both imply and exclude eachother. The situation is comparable to the way light, in quantum mechanics,may be both waves and particles at the same time, while the two states alsoexclude each other. It is this doubling that makes the system as complex as,

and perhaps even more complex than, the environment. Using Baudrillardsdistinction between crisis and catastrophe, we may say that Luhmann seemsto conceive of complexity as putting the system in a state of crisis:

Crisis always brought with it its share of tensions and contradictions; it is thenatural movement of our history. But we are no longer in crisis; we are in acatastrophic process not in the sense of a material apocalypse, but in thesense of an overturning of all rules. Catastrophe is the irruption of somethingwhich no longer functions according to the rules, or functions by rules we donot know, and perhaps never will. Nothing is simply contradictory or irrational

in this state; everything is paradoxical. (Baudrillard, 1999: 18)

Complexity in the form of crisis makes communication improbable,but the functional solutions that we do find to the crisis by way of selection,develop and move the system forward. [B]eing forced to select meanscontingency; and contingency means risk (Luhmann, 1984: 25). However,this is only the risk that the system may not select the best solution, not therisk that it will not select at all. Crisis is a problem to the system, but crisisnever puts the very existence of the system in danger. In crisis, the system

always remains possible.Ambivalent complexity, however, is a catastrophe, since it opens thepossibility of the impossibility of the system. Continuation may only bepossible as a radical break with the rules of the system (e.g. giving up theambition of finding a night to kill Max which cannot be foreseen by choosing




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one randomly; ignoring a pain which is real to the hypochondriac patient;or violating the integrity of the art work by restoring it after the slashing).In other words, continuation may only be possible as discontinuity, andtherefore exactly impossible. Catastrophe collapses the system by forcing it

into selections that produce rather than reduce complexity, thereby tippingthe balance of complexity between system and environment, blurring thevery distinction that precisely constitutes the existence of the system.

Whether an operation leads to a solution to the problem posed bycomplexity, or whether it instead leads to a doubling of the problem, cannever be foreseen, either by us as observers of the systems, or by the systemsthemselves: the doctor may reject the hypochondriac, telling her that herdisease is nothing but imagined, and this might be exactly what she needsto hear to rid herself of this very imagining. Or the doctor may recognize

the pains of the hypochondriac and start listening to all of her problems, inthe hope of discovering the true psychological cause of her chest pains,only to find she comes back to his clinic the following week with pains notonly in her chest, but now also in her legs.

In other words, the system is Anschlussunfhig, since it cannotconnect to the following operation by way of a meaningful continuation ofthe system. Everywhere in the universe, discontinuity alone is probable.. . . Infinitesimal as is the passage from one form to another, it is always a

jump, a catastrophe (Baudrillard, 1999: 9). Discontinuity opens a void in

the autopoiesis of the system, and in the absence of a bridge of meaning thevoid may only be overcome by a jump.Luhmann may be content to accept the void as a void of randomness

and the jump as a jump of contingency. But perhaps the void does containsomething, though something that is not a system and therefore not visiblein the optics of systems theory. Schopenhauer criticized Kantian epistem-ology for being too focused on the way in which the world appears as repre-sentation, thereby lacking sensitivity to the way in which the worldmanifests itself as something which is not representation, and therefore

also cannot be represented (Schopenhauer, 1818: 17). This critiquepaved the way for Schopenhauers vitalism in the form of his metaphysicsof the will. Perhaps a similar critique of Luhmanns programme of obser-vations of observations would be in place here (Bjerg, 2005). The paradoxof ambivalent complexity reveals not only theAnschlussunfhigkeit of thesystem but also the insufficiency of the systems theoretical account ofsocial processes, limited to the observation of observation. Thus the under-standing of the reproduction of postmodern society and of the move fromone operation to the next in situations of catastrophe, may call for a height-ened sensitivity to something outside the realm of allegedly self-sufficientsystem observations. A vitalism not in the positive form of a Schopen-hauerian metaphysics of the will, but in the negative form of a resistanceor antithesis to the recurrent possibility of reduction, and to the tempta-tion of premature satisfaction (Greco, 2005: 18) may be required.Baudrillard suggests:




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The act of thinking is an act of seduction which aims to deflect the world fromits being and its meaning at the risk of being itself seduced and led astray.This is how theory proceeds with the systems it analyses. It does not seek tocriticize them, or set limits for them in the real. It maximizes them, exacer-

bates them, by following their every movement; it seduces them by pushingthem to the limit. The object of theory is to arrive at an account of the systemwhich follows out its internal logic to its end, without adding anything, yetwhich, at the same time, totally inverts that system, revealing its hidden non-meaning, the Nothing which haunts it, that absence at the heart of the system,that shadow running alongside it. (Baudrillard, 1999: 149)

Notes

1. Citations from works by Luhmann not available in English are my own trans-lations.

2. I thank Jakob Demant and Hans Henrik Bruun for helpful comments and sugges-tions.3. The English word is connectivity. However, this does not quite catch the senseof it being an ability. I will therefore retain the original Anschlussfhigkeit.4. It should be noted that the conception of complexity production that I want topropose is not covered by Luhmanns description of the way in which the complex-ity-reducing operations of one system constitute a production of complexity foranother observing system. As will be demonstrated, my concept of complexityproduction is more radical in the sense that it fundamentally threatens to confuse

the difference between system and environment.5. Bauman continues:

The ideal that the naming/classifying function strives to achieve is a sort ofcommodious filing cabinet that contains all the files that contain all the itemsthat the world contains but confines each file and each item within aseparate place of its own (with remaining doubts solved by a cross-referenceindex). (1991: 2)

Isnt this archive exactly Luhmanns famous Settelksten!?

6. As hinted in the title, this dilemma has a certain affinity to the very famousgames theory Prisoners Dilemma. Likewise, the set-up of the present dilemma mayalso appear to be a case of double contingency, such as we find it in systems theory.However, there is a noteworthy difference between the Postmodern PrisonersDilemma and the conventional Prisoners Dilemma and the system theoreticalconception of double contingency. In the conventional Prisoners Dilemma we havea situation (two prisoners each faced with the choice between confession and non-confession) of uncertainty and complexity. However, using logical and systematicoperations we can calculate the various outcomes of different strategies (generallypresented in the 2 by 2 matrix) from which the two prisoners can then choose ration-

ally. Our calculations create an ordered situation, if not one of perfect certainty orunambiguity then at least one of less uncertainty and less complexity. The system-atic operations in the form of our rational calculations reduce complexity. The samegoes for the concept of double contingency when Luhmann uses it to show howcontingency and uncertainty between alter and ego work as a catalyst for the emer-gence of systems. Double contingency is defined as a problem of complexity, and




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system creation as a complexity-reducing solution (Luhmann, 1984: 10336). Thepoint of the Postmodern Prisoners Dilemma is to pose a situation where therelationship between the complexity and the system is reversible. The dilemmademonstrates that we cannot take for granted that the system in form of our rational

reflections and calculations will always reduce the immediate complexity of thesituation. On the contrary, the system may even produce more complexity, uncer-tainty and eventually ambivalence, than it reduces, whereby it becomes part of theproblem of complexity rather than part of its solution.7. In his essay, The Dice Man (1999: 5866), Baudrillard makes a deconstruc-tive reading of Luke Rheinhardts novel, The Dice Man, in which he shows thatleaving our entire fate to chance in the form of a die can never free us from thefreedom of our own will. Even if the die can show us what to do, we will stillconstantly be confronted with the choice between following the die and not follow-ing it. The responsibility of this decision, and the doubt that follows from it, we can

never escape.8. The difference between Luhmann and Baudrillard here is not a question ofrealism versus constructivism but rather a question of degrees of radicalness intheir respective forms of constructivism. We might say that if Luhmann is aconstructivist Baudrillard is a productionist.9. The undecidable is not merely the oscillation or the tension between two

decisions; it is the experience of that which, though heterogeneous, foreignto the order of the calculable and the rule, is still obliged . . . to give itselfup to the impossible decision, while taking account of law and rules. (Derrida,1992: 24)

And: Undecidability should be literally taken as that condition from which nocourse of action necessarily follows (Laclau, 1996: 78).

References

Baudrillard, Jean (1981) Simulacra and Simulation. Ann Arbor: University ofMichigan Press.Baudrillard, Jean (1999)Impossible Exchange. London: Verso.Bauman, Zygmunt (1991)Modernity and Ambivalence. Cambridge: Polity Press.

Bjerg, Ole (2000) Hvordan er systemteorien mulig? [How is Systems TheoryPossible?],Dansk Sociologi 11(2): 6580.Bjerg, Ole (2005) Die Welt als Wille und System, oder: Eine SchopenhauerischeKritik der Systemtheorie Luhmanns [The World as Will and System: A Schopen-haurian Critique of Luhmanns Systems Theory], Zeitschrift fr Soziologie 3:22335.Derrida, Jacques (1992) Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority,pp. 367 in Drucilla Cornell, Michael Rosenfeld and David Gray Carlson (eds)

Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice. New York: Routledge.

Durkheim, mile (1893) Om den sociale arbejdsdeling [The Division of Labour inSociety]. Kbenhavn: Hans Reitzels Forlag.Greco, Monica (2005) On the Vitality of Vitalism, Theory, Culture & Society 22(1):1527.Habermas, Jrgen (1971) Systemtheorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie?Eine Auseinandersetzung mit Niklas Luhmann [Systems Theory of Society or Social




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Technology? A Debate with Niklas Luhmann], pp. 142290 in Jrgen Habermasand Niklas Luhmann, Theorie der Gesellschaft oder Sozialtechnologie Was leistetdie Systemforschung? [Theory of Society or Social Technology: What Can SystemsTheory Accomplish?]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Laclau, Ernesto (1996)Emancipation(s). London: Verso.Luhmann, Niklas (1981) Wie ist soziale Ordnung mglich? [How is Social OrderPossible?], pp. 195285 in Gesellschaftstruktur und Semantik 2. Opladen: West-deutscher Verlag.Luhmann, Niklas (1982) Liebe als Passion [Love as Passion]. Frankfurt am Main:Suhrkamp.Luhmann, Niklas (1984) Social Systems. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.Luhmann, Niklas (1985) Die Autopoiesis des Bewutseins [The Autopoiesis ofConscience], Soziale Welt 4: 40246.

Luhmann, Niklas (1986) Ecological Communication. Chicago, IL: University ofChicago Press.Luhmann, Niklas (1990a)Die Wissenschaft der Gesellschaft [The Science of Society].Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Luhmann, Niklas (1990b) Haltlose Komplexitt [Unsteady Complexity], pp. 5976in Soziologische Aufklrung 5 [Sociological Enlightenment]. Opladen: West-deutscher Verlag.Luhmann, Niklas (1990c) Gleichzeitigkeit und Synchronisation [Simultaneity andSynchronization], pp. 95130 in Soziologische Aufklrung 5 [SociologicalEnlightenment]. Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.Luhmann, Niklas (1993) Die Paradoxie der Form [The Paradox of Form],pp. 197212 in Dirk Baecker (ed.)Kalkl der Form [Problems of Form]. Frankfurtam Main: Suhrkamp.Luhmann, Niklas (1996)Die neuzeitlichen Wissenschaften und die Phnomenologie[Contemporary Science and Phenomenology]. Wien: Picus Verlag.Luhmann, Niklas (1997) Die Gesellschaft der Gesellschaft 12 [The Society ofSociety]. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.Lyotard, Jean-Franois (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge.Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.

Schopenhauer, Arthur (1818)Die Welt als Wille und Vorstellung 12 [The World asWill and Representation]. Kln: Knemann.Simmel, Georg (1908) Exkurs ber das Problem: Wie ist Gesellschaft mglich?[Excursus on the Problem: How is Society Possible?], pp. 4262 in Gesamtausgabe11. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Ole Bjerg is postdoc at the Institute of Public Health, University of Copen-hagen. He is the author of the dissertation Den mystiske etik Om at vre

til i det hyperdifferentierede samfund (Mystical Ethics On Being in aHyperdifferentiated Society) (2005) and several articles on systems theory.He is now working on a book, Pathology and Postcapitalism.


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Accelerating Luhmann

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