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Philosophy East & West Volume 61, Number 1 January 2011 221–231 221© 2011 by University of Hawai‘i Press

BOOK REVIEWS

Buddhadāsa: Theravada Buddhism and Modernist Reform in Thailand. By Peter A. Jackson. Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2003. Pp. 375.

Reviewed by Steve Odin University of Hawai‘i

Buddhadāsa: Theravada Buddhism and Modernist Reform in Thailand by Peter A. Jackson is a splendid work that critically examines the life and thought of Buddhadāsa Bikkhu (1906–1993), modern Thailand’s most profoundly original and influential, as well as controversial, Buddhist philosopher. Yet one of the most valuable contribu-tions of this volume is how it discloses the radical influence of Zen Buddhism on the otherwise conservative Theravāda Buddhist teaching and practice of Ajahn Buddhadāsa. Jackson’s study comes as a revelation when it discusses Buddhadāsa’s endeavor to reinterpret Theravāda Buddhist theory and practice based on the Pali canon from the standpoint of Zen teachings from China, Japan, and Vietnam. Further-more, he considers the strong critical reactions to Buddhadāsa’s Zen reformulation of Theravāda doctrine by more traditional Thai Buddhist monks and scholars. The focus of Jackson’s study is to show, by using his Zen-inspired reinterpretation of Theravāda thought based on the idea of chit wang or “void mind,” how Buddhadāsa sets forth a new vision of Thai Buddhism as a socially, politically, and intellectually progressive force leading to modernism, reform, and socioeconomic development.

‘Void Mind’ and Buddhadāsa’s Zen Reinterpretation of Theravāda Buddhism

Throughout his study Jackson underscores how one of the most distinctive contribu-tions of Buddhadāsa to Theravāda scholarship is to have immersed himself in the Pali canon, searching for the Buddha’s own teachings on suñña or “void,” and suññatā or “voidness.” He thereby attempts to demonstrate how the fundamental doctrine of Theravāda Buddhism, like Mahāyāna Buddhism, is the doctrine of voidness. How-ever, Jackson then makes clear that the cornerstone of Buddhadāsa’s original reinter-pretation of Theravāda Buddhist philosophy is the Zen-inspired notion of chit wang, void mind:

The theoretical pivot of Buddhadāsa’s reinterpretation of Theravada doctrine is the notion of chit wang, “voided-mind” or “freed mind”. . . . But while Buddhadāsa’s interpretation of chit wang is based on notions found in the canonical literature, in particular the notion of suññatā or “voidness,” it has not historically received much attention in Theravada Buddhism. Suññatā or chit wang has in general been a secondary concept used to explain more central notions such as anattā, nonself, and anicca, impermanence. (p. 69)

It is explained that suñña, or void, and suññatā or voidness, rendered by Buddhadāsa into Thai as chit wang or void mind, itself denotes a liberated buddha mind freed of egoism. Because of the peripheral character of the notions of voidness and void mind in the traditional reading of the Pali canon in Thailand, Buddhadāsa cannot justify his

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emphasis on them by referring to either the Thai tradition of scriptural interpretation or the later commentary literature used to support that tradition. He therefore goes on to clarify the Zen justification for this emphasis on the doctrine of void mind to rein-terpret Theravāda doctrines:

In placing chit wang at the centre of his presentation of Theravada doctrine, Buddhadāsa has in fact drawn heavily on Mahayana and Zen Buddhist teaching. (p. 69)

Hence, in chapter 7 of this volume, “Chit Wang and Zen,” Jackson expounds in detail how Buddhadāsa uses Zen to reformulate the Theravāda doctrines of Thai Buddhism in terms of void mind (pp. 177–200).

As will be examined below, Buddhadāsa’s middle-way notion of chit wang or void mind, like the Buddha’s own notions of suñña or void and suññatā or voidness, resists any form of eternalism or substantialism in that it designates a psychological void, not an ontological void functioning as a substratum underlying all things. More-over, again like the Buddha’s own notions of suñña or void, and suññatā or voidness, in their specific meaning of anattā or nonself, Buddhadāsa’s Zen-inspired idea of chit wang as void mind does not signify nihilism, a mere negative emptiness or vacuity. Hence, Buddhadāsa rejects the usual translation of suññatā into Thai as suñ plau, denoting zeroness, vacancy, or nothingness. The idea of chit wang does not indicate a blank mental vacuum emptied of all content: rather, void mind is emptied of a specifiable content, insofar as it is devoid of self, thus becoming free of craving and suffering. In Buddhadāsa’s words:

This chit wang is not a vacuous mental state. It is not “void” of content. All objects are there as usual and the thinking processes are going on as usual, but they are not going the way of grasping and clinging with the idea of “I” and “mine.” (p. 133)

In contrast to nihilism, then, Buddhadāsa holds that chit wang or void mind, like suññatā or voidness, is not a total absence, that is, an emptiness in the sense of “noth-ingness,” which means “totally empty of everything,” but instead denotes only a particular absence — a mind void of ego, void of self, or void of “I” and “mine.”

The more positive, affirmative, and anti-nihilistic view of his Zen-colored notion of chit wang is shown by Buddhadāsa’s description of void mind as having a natural, radiant character of shining brightly, as designated by the Pali term pabhassara or “luminous.” In this context, Jackson discusses Buddhadāsa’s analysis of Buddha’s own words: “Bikkhus, this mind is luminous and is freed from adventitious defile-ments” (p. 187). Hence, for Buddhadāsa, chit wang does not signify the nihilistic idea of a mental vacuum, but instead denotes the originally pure mind of light, freed of defilements, shining brightly as luminous voidness.

One of the most profound consequences of Buddhadāsa’s Zen idea of chit wang is that since the luminous mind is originally void or freed of mental disturbances, the salvation of nibbāna or peace is available to all persons:

The most important result of Buddhadāsa’s equation of chit wang with the basis of Bud-dhist salvation is that nibbāna is not a transcendent condition attainable only after years or perhaps lives spent purging the mind of impurities, but, like chit wang, is the original

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condition of the mind. In other words, in Buddhadāsa’s system, nibbāna is the mind’s basic condition. (pp. 137–138)

Buddhadāsa’s view is that the void mind of chit wang, like the supreme void of nibbāna, functions as the original condition of the mind, and is thus reminiscent of the Zen doctrine of “original enlightenment,” which is the precondition for “sudden enlightenment.” Furthermore, Buddhadāsa applies his Zen notion of void mind in its ethical dimension as being devoid of moral impurities, thus resulting in selfless altru-istic conduct rooted in compassion, loving-kindness, and giving as the basis of non-violent social activism. Hence, Sulak Sivaraksa, the most famous social activist in modern Thailand, has become a leading advocate of Buddhadāsa’s radical Zen r eformulation of conservative Theravāda doctrines, a vision that he has termed Buddhadāsa’s “radical conservatism” (pp. 255, 256, 265).

Buddhadāsa’s Hermeneutic Method of ‘Phasa Khon-Phasa Tham’

As developed especially in chapter 3, Phasa Khon-Phasa Tham, while chit wang or void mind establishes the conceptual hub of Buddhadāsa’s Zen reinterpretation of Theravāda Buddhism, the hermeneutic theory of phasa tham functions as its method-ological basis. Buddhadāsa’s Zen reinterpretation of Theravāda Buddhism is itself based on his underlying two-level hermeneutic method of scriptural interpretation: “He calls this interpretive theory phasa khon-phasa tham, ‘everyday language–Dhamma language’” (p. 70). Buddhadāsa distinguishes two hermeneutic levels of the Buddha’s words in the canonical Pali scriptures, calling these two levels phasa khon, or everyday language, and phasa tham, or Dhamma language. While at the herme-neutic level of phasa khon the Buddha’s words are taken literally, phasa tham reveals the hidden meaning of the Buddha’s words. The aim of this deeper hermeneutic level of phasa tham is “Buddhadāsa’s demythologization of the Theravada scriptures” (p. 79). Jackson asserts that “Buddhadāsa uses phasa tham . . . as a method to effect a rationalist demythologization of Buddhism” (p. 84). While phasa khon or the every-day language of popular Buddhism functions to reify entities, thereby leading to what Buddhadāsa considers an eternalistic, mythological, and superstitious worldview, phasa tham or Dhammic language functions to demythologize, deontologize, and deconstruct all reified entities into a dynamic process of dependent coarising.

Again, while phasa khon or everyday language results in a substantialistic, other-worldly, and supernatural worldview, phasa tham or Dhammic language results in a nonsubstantialist, this-worldly, and naturalistic worldview. The hermeneutic of phasa tham or Dhammic language demythologizes reified notions such as celestial beings, cosmological states of heaven and hell, literal rebirth, and other superstitious, myth-ological, and magical beliefs operating at the hermeneutic level of phasa khon or everyday language. Thus, in chapter 4, “Buddhadāsa on Rebirth and Paticcasamup-pāda,” it is explained how Buddhadāsa directs his hermeneutic of phasa tham to articulate a new Zen-influenced interpretation of the Buddha’s words, thereby demy-thologizing traditional views on the reincarnation of the soul. The Dhammic- language

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demythologized view of Buddhadāsa is that birth (jāti) means the moment-by- moment birth or rebirth of an egoistic sense of “I” and “mine” through the twelvefold links of causation in the process of dependent coarising. In this context Buddhadāsa uses the hermeneutic of phasa tham to critically undermine traditionally accepted canonical scriptures such as Abhidhamma and authoritative commentaries such as Visuddhimagga, arguing that both erroneously justify a mythologized worldview.

Overall, the aim of phasa tham or Dhammic language is to demythologize all supernatural beliefs to initiate a Zenlike shift from an otherworldly to a this-worldly model that emphasizes instant awakening to void mind, freed of egoism in the here and now. At the same time, Jackson discusses various critical reactions leveled against Buddhadāsa’s use of phasa tham to demythologize all hypostatized entities, to argue that literal rebirth, celestial beings, and cosmological realms are canonical teachings in the Pali scriptures and important to the Theravāda worldview of Thai Buddhism (pp. 122–123).

Next, Jackson discusses how the aim of Buddhadāsa’s hermeneutic of phasa tham or Dhammic language is the demythologization of supernaturalism in Buddhist doctrine, not only for theoretical purposes but also for the purpose of shifting from an otherworldly to a this-worldly paradigm as the basis for modernization, reform, and economic development through nonviolent social activism: “This indicates that the deeper function of Buddhadāsa’s theory, over and above the demythologization of Buddhist scriptures, is the establishment of the social world as a domain with reli-gious importance” (p. 82). After discussing various problems with Buddhadāsa’s her-meneutical theory of phasa khon-phasa tham, he concludes:

But in judging Buddhadāsa’s work it is also important to note that, independent of the theoretical status of the theory, phasa tham has a broader social and ideological signifi-cance in Thailand. This is because of its use in the demythologization of Buddhist doctrine and the related conferring of religious value on activity in the social world. (p. 99)

For Buddhadāsa, then, the shift from phasa khon to phasa tham, or from everyday language to Dhammic language, designates a radical Zenlike paradigm shift from otherworldliness to this-worldliness, from supernaturalism to naturalism, or from the transcendent to the immanent level of hermeneutical analysis, whereby the deeper hidden meaning of the Buddha’s words is disclosed.

Buddhadāsa’s Translations of Zen/Chan Texts into Thai

At the core of Buddhadāsa’s Zen reinterpretation of Theravāda Buddhism in Thailand is his translation of key Zen/Chan texts from English into the Thai language: “It has been Buddhadāsa’s own translations into Thai of various Zen works which have led to the popularization of that sect’s ideas among a formerly uninterested Thai reader-ship” (p. 182). Jackson adds that there are two most important Zen/Chan texts trans-lated into Thai by Buddhadāsa: (1) The Zen Teachings of Huang Po, translated from Chinese into English by John Blofeld (1958), and translated by Buddhadāsa from English into Thai as Khamson Khong Huang Po (1977) (as Blofeld indicates in the

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Translator’s Introduction, dated 1957, he completed his English translation in Bang-kok, Thailand); and (2) The Sutra of Wei Lang (or Hui Neng), translated from Chinese into English by Wong Mou-lam (1973), and translated by Buddhadāsa from English into Thai as Sut Khang Wei Lang (1977) (p. 339 n. 12).

As will be examined below, a careful reading of the English translations of both these classic Zen sources clarifies the meaning of Buddhadāsa’s own key notion of chit wang, in that a fundamental teaching of both texts is that the enlightened mind of a buddha or bodhisattva is like a void, thus to be freed of all attachments to self-hood. Moreover, for Buddhadāsa, the key Zen doctrine that the mind of a buddha or bodhisattva is naturally void and pure of defilements, so that chit wang is the original condition of the mind, itself establishes the possibility for sudden enlightenment by anyone at any moment, whether male or female, monk or layman.

Vietnamese Zen Buddhism and Buddhadāsa’s Sociopolitical Writings

In his social and political writings, wherein Buddhadāsa uses the Sino-Japanese Zen/Chan theory and practice of void mind as a basis of modernization, political reform, and socioeconomic development, he is also deeply influenced by the Vietnamese Zen teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh:

It is significant that the interpretation of Zen which seems to have most influenced Buddhadāsa is contained in a Vietnamese book whose author was to develop a Zen Bud-dhist foundation for social activism in what was then South Vietnam. The book, The Mir-acle of Being Awake — A Manual on Meditation for the Use of Young Activists by Thich Nhat Hanh, was originally written in Vietnamese. . . . For political reasons, Thich Nhat Hanh’s book was not published in South Vietnam and in fact was first published in trans-lation, both in Thai and English, and subsequently became very popular in Thailand. (pp. 198–199)

As explained in the preface to the 1976 English version, Thich Nhat Hahn’s Zen manual on social activism was translated and published in Thailand on the special request of Buddhadāsa Bhikku (p. 199). It is further pointed out that Buddhadāsa’s emphasis on sati or “mindfulness” as the practice of directing full attention to chit wang or void mind, and on the state of chit wang as the underlying basis for produc-tive work and social activism, is closely paralleled in Thich Nhat Hahn’s The Miracle of Being Awake (p. 199).

Buddhadāsa, Zen, and Japanese Culture

Along with the Zen teachings of Huang-po, Hui-neng, and others in China, as well as the Zen teachings of Thich Nhat Hanh in Vietnam, Buddhadāsa has been deeply inspired by the Zen teachings of D. T. Suzuki in Japan. Moreover, Buddhadāsa holds up Japan and Japanese culture developed under the aegis of Zen as a paradigm for modernization, reform, and socioeconomic development through productive work in Thailand.

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Jackson asserts that although the roots of Buddhadāsa’s philosophy are in Thera-vāda Buddhism, at the same time “there is no denying the significant influence of various aspects of Zen doctrine on his work” (p. 193). Here he emphasizes the strong impact on Buddhadāsa’s thought from D. T. Suzuki’s writings on Zen Buddhism and its influence on traditional Japanese culture: “Buddhadāsa finds a soulmate in such Zen authors as Suzuki, who writes: ‘Zen disregards conventionalism, ritualism, insti-tutionalism, in fact anything that is binding or restricting’” (p. 193). In this context, various other citations are taken from D. T. Suzuki’s writings on Zen, including Zen and Japanese Buddhism (1958) and The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind: The Significance of the Sutra of Hui-Neng (1949). Quoting directly from the work of D. T. Suzuki, Jackson writes:

It is not the specific term suññatā which Buddhadāsa has borrowed from Zen, for this term does occur in the Pali canon. Rather, it is the view that chit wang [voided mind, freed mind] is the fundamental state of mind which has been taken from the Zen school. S uzuki quotes from the Zen master Hui-neng as making the following statement on this point: “Mind as it is in itself is free of ills. . . . The Mind as it is in itself is free from d isturbances. . . . The Mind as it is in itself is free from follies.” (p. 182)

According to Jackson, “Buddhadāsa offers Japan, home of Zen, as evidence for the productive power of social activity informed by the spiritual condition of ‘freed-mind’ or chit wang to provide a basis for all-round welfare” (p. 203). Here the words of Buddhadāsa are quoted directly:

Japan took the path of mental instead of material development and now Japanese mate-rial development has progressed to the point that foreigners are afraid of the birthplace of this mental development. Japan has a high level of mental development. . . . [I]t is in everyday life in the very culture, that is, the kind of Buddhism we call Zen. (p. 203)

Jackson then sums up Buddhadāsa’s views on Zen-influenced Japanese culture as a model for modernization, socioeconomic development, and political reform in Thai-land:

Buddhadāsa regards Zen-influenced mental development as promoting qualities such as resoluteness, industriousness, vigor in work and forbearance as well as politeness and gentleness. Buddhadāsa would like to see a Zen-styled mental culture promoted in Thai-land in order to promote the kinds of qualities which would lead to Thai workers becom-ing more efficient agents of material development. (pp. 203–204)

A fundamental characteristic of Buddhadāsa’s Zen-inspired reconstruction of Thai Buddhism, then, is his emphasis on achieving salvation or nibbāna, not only by re-nunciate monks leading a monastic existence, but also by ordinary laypersons prac-ticing the mindfulness of chit wang during productive work in everyday life.

It is also explained how Buddhadāsa, influenced by his younger brother Dham-madāsa, “was particularly impressed by the propagation of Buddhism in the West by Japanese and Ceylonese Buddhists” (p. 54). Here it is discussed how Buddhadāsa’s effort toward modernist reform in Thailand, based on Buddhist values as symbols of Thai national identity, was itself influenced by the reformist work of the Anagarika

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Dhammapada in Ceylon (Sri Lanka), and how both reformers were inspired espe-cially by “the achievements of Japan”:

The similarities between the Anagarika’s and Buddhadāsa’s views are striking. Each of the above points — interest in a this-worldly religion, concern for laypeople, a desire for the integration of scientific and religious approaches, and admiration of Japan — are paral-leled in Buddhadāsa’s work. (p. 40)

At one point Jackson discusses former Thai prime minister Kukrit Pramoj’s criti-cism of Buddhadāsa’s use of Zen paradoxical language to express his Zen-influenced reinterpretations of Theravāda Buddhism in Thailand. In this context, he cites from a heated public debate wherein Kukrit proclaimed to Buddhadāsa: “You should go and teach the Japanese, you speak like a Zen Buddhist” (p. 96). Yet Buddhadāsa’s re-sponse to the frequent criticism that he is a heretic who has abandoned Theravāda Buddhism for Zen and Mahāyāna teachings is that Zen meditation on voidness and the Zen doctrine of void mind is neither Theravāda nor Mahāyāna, but the pristine Dharma at the core of all true Buddhism (pp. 180–182).

Finally, it must be pointed out that while Buddhadāsa uses Japan as an exemplar for a Zen-influenced cultural model that applies the inner cultivation of mental void-ness to promote modernization, reform, and socioeconomic development, he aims not just at material prosperity through productive work, but at a spiritual society con-ducive to achieving salvation. In his political writings Buddhadāsa rejects both capi-talism and Marxist communism for what he terms a “dhammic socialism” that is directed toward the realization of the highest soteriological goal of nibbāna (pp. 240–243). Buddhadāsa’s use of his Zen-inspired idea of chit wang or void mind as the basis for social activism thus leads to his view that the highest ideal is not that of an arahant in quest of solitary awakening, but the compassionate bodhisattva who returns to society for the altruistic purpose of guiding others to the salvation of nibbāna as the supreme void (p. 232).

Jackson’s Objections to Buddhadāsa’s View of Zen

Jackson writes that Buddhadāsa agrees with “the Zen doctrine that the mind is fun-damentally pure and that attacking defilements is the wrong way to attain enlighten-ment” (p. 184). But he then adds: “A fundamental confusion arises from Buddhadāsa’s identification of his notion of chit wang with the Zen idea of One Mind or Original Mind. . . . [T]he Zen teaching of One Mind, unlike the notion of chit wang, has an explicitly ontological component. This contrasts sharply with both Buddhadāsa’s view and the traditional Theravāda view of anattā” (p. 184). That is, the Zen doctrine of One Mind taught by Huang-po is ontological, whereas Buddhadāsa’s idea of chit wang or void mind is deontological:

In contrast, however, the Zen One Mind as the source of all being, is much more than a state of the conscious mind. That is, chit wang, as a condition of the conscious mind, is markedly different from the all-encompassing character of the Zen One Mind, and

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Buddhadāsa’s attempt to identify the two only creates confusion as to the actual character of chit wang, and of One Mind. (p. 185)

To sum up Jackson’s critique of Buddhadāsa, then, he argues that while Buddhadāsa’s deontologized notion of chit wang or void mind is psychological and deontological, the Zen doctrine of One Mind is ontological, positing suñña or void and suññatā or voidness as the substratum underlying all phenomena.

Critical Remarks

One of the more philosophically stimulating aspects of this volume is that although Jackson is clearly sympathetic with Buddhadāsa’s Zen reconstruction of Thai Bud-dhism, he at the same time discusses the many critiques leveled against Buddhadāsa’s thought by conventional Theravāda monks and scholars, while also undertaking his own sustained critical analysis of Buddhadāsa’s writings. While Jackson raises many critical objections to Buddhadāsa’s thought, I will focus here on one of his main points of contention: namely, whereas Buddhadāsa’s deontologized view of anattā or nonself as chit wang or void mind is psychological, the Zen doctrine of One Mind is ontological, insofar as it is posited as the substratum underlying all phenomena. Jack-son thus asserts: “Buddhadāsa takes the extreme position of identifying his central notion of chit wang with Zen ideas of One Mind . . . even though this requires a stretching and management of the Zen sources” (p. 192). However, it is somewhat misleading for Jackson to focus so much on the ontological character of One Mind as a substrate versus the deontological and psychological character of void mind in Buddhadāsa’s writings. Here it would have been edifying if Jackson had cited more from the actual Zen/Chan texts that Buddhadāsa himself translated from English into Thai. A reading of these English texts especially clarifies the meaning of his key term — chit wang or “void mind.” For instance, in The Zen Teachings of Huang-po, translated by John Blofeld, it is said: “Mind is like the void” (Blofeld 1958, p. 3). Again, “Mind is the Buddha. . . . Mind resembles a void” (p. 67). Similarly: “The Bo-dhisattva’s mind is like the void” (p. 49). Elsewhere, “One Mind is co-extensive with the void” (p. 71). Hence, Buddhadāsa’s key Zen notion of chit wang or void mind, which states that mind is originally pure and devoid of ego-self, is itself directly in-spired by the language of Huang-po as found in the Blofeld translation, which pro-pounds that the enlightened mind of a liberated buddha or bodhisattva is like a void.

Likewise, in The Sutra of Wei Lang (or Hui Neng), translated by Wong Mou-lam, the Chinese Zen master Hui-neng proclaims: “Your Essence of Mind is exactly like the void” (Wong 1944/1973, p. 76). As opposed to the Northern school “gradual” view of practice as dusting, polishing, and wiping clean the accumulated dust cover-ing the mirror of mind of its defilements, the Southern-school “sudden” view taught by Hui-neng asserts: “Since all is void, Where can the dust alight?” (1944/1973, p. 19). For both the texts of Huang-po and Hui-neng translated by Buddhadāsa from English into Thai, the key teaching reveals how the originally pure mind of a liberated buddha is like a void, in the sense of being devoid of selfhood, thus being freed of

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grasping at and clinging to an egoistic feeling of “I” and “mine.” Moreover, it should noted that in these and other Zen texts propounding the voidness of buddha mind, there is a fundamental tension between ontological and deontological trends.

In accordance with what has been presented above, it should further be pointed out that although Jackson discusses various citations of D. T. Suzuki’s writings on Zen, he fails to underscore a central point of contact between the views of Suzuki and Buddhadāsa. While in his Bibliography (p. 357) Jackson makes reference to D. T. Suzuki’s The Zen Doctrine of No Mind, which is a partial translation of and running commentary on The Platform Sutra of the legendary Sixth Patriarch Hui-neng, he does not elucidate what I would regard as a direct correlation between Buddhadāsa’s core Zen-influenced notion of chit wang or “void mind,” conceived as the liberated buddha mind devoid of “I” and “mine,” in relation to D. T. Suzuki’s explicit analysis of “emptiness” as “no-self,” now explicated in terms of Hui-neng’s concept of “no-mind,” indeed, a term that might also be translated as “void mind.” In one revealing footnote, Jackson does provide the following vital information:

The Chinese term which Blofeld translates as “One Mind” has almost as many renderings into English as there have been translations of Zen texts. Wong Mou-lam, translator of The Sutra of Wei Lang (or Hui Neng), says the original Chinese term denotes “Self-nature” but nevertheless chooses to render it by “Essence of Mind.” Suzuki, on the other hand, draw-ing on the Japanese tradition, variously uses the terms “Mind” and “No-mind.” (p. 338 n. 2)

Hence, just as D. T. Suzuki interprets Hui-neng as positing the Zen doctrine of no-mind, Buddhadāsa interprets Hui-neng as declaring the Zen doctrine of void mind, both of these thinkers underscoring how no-mind or void mind is itself the funda-mental, the natural, and the original condition of the mind as the precondition of universal salvation and sudden enlightenment.

Throughout his study, Jackson asserts that “both the theoretical and social impli-cations of Buddhadāsa’s work are of equal importance” (p. 2). Yet I would emphasize here that of equal importance to both the Zen doctrine of void mind and the use of void mind as the basis for modernization, socioeconomic development, and political reform is Buddhadāsa’s teachings about vipassanā or “insight meditation” on void-ness, especially his teachings on ānāpānasati or “mindfulness of breathing” as the fundamental practice of Buddha for realizing the enlightened void mind freed of clinging to “I” and “mine.” Jackson is no doubt aware of the central importance of ānāpānasati or mindfulness of breathing to realize chit wang as void mind, since at one point he writes:

He [Buddhadāsa] maintains that the most appropriate practice is the practice of chit wang or sati, mindfulness of breathing (p. 161). Buddhadāsa proposes that in practicing the most basic form of Buddhist meditation, mindfulness of breathing or ānāpānasati, suffi-cient concentration or samādhi is developed to permit insight into reality. (p. 161)

Nonetheless, I would argue that Buddhadāsa’s views on ānāpānasati or mindfulness of breathing for realizing chit wang or void mind, as the Buddha’s own stated method

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of seeing clearly into suññatā or emptiness and anattā or nonself, which is itself the basis of nibbāna or peace as the supreme voidness, is so vital to Buddhadāsa’s own life, teachings, and practice that ānāpānasati mandates a full chapter devoted to its exposition.

Final Summary and Evaluation

While current students of Buddhism have now generally become familiar with the Zen/Chan Buddhist traditions of China, Korea, Japan, and Vietnam, this is the first book in English to clarify the profound impact of Zen teachings on modern Thai Bud-dhism through its widespread propagation in Thailand by Ajahn Buddhadāsa Bikkhu. Indeed, at least part of Buddhadāsa’s remarkable accomplishment is constituted by his innovative use of chit wang or void mind as the basis for a brilliant new creative synthesis of Vietnamese, Japanese, and Chinese traditions of Zen teachings in order to reinterpret Theravāda Buddhism. While Buddhadāsa’s Zen-colored idea of chit wang or void mind is the doctrinal key to his reinterpretation of Theravāda doctrine, the hermeneutic theory of phasa tham or Dhammic language is its methodological basis, functioning to demythologize the supernatural, otherworldly belief system of popular Buddhism by shifting to a naturalistic, this-worldly model of instant awaken-ing through mindfulness of breathing in the hear and now. Buddhadāsa’s notion of chit wang or void mind as the natural and original condition of mind enables salva-tion by insight into the supreme voidness of nibbāna to be instantly accessible by all people, including laypersons and renunciate monks. Moreover, Buddhadāsa’s under-standing of chit wang or void mind as having an ethical dimension whereby the originally pure mind is devoid of moral impurities such as egoistic craving and at-tachment, functions as the basis of altruistic nonviolent social activism rooted in compassion. Again, the use of chit wang as the basis of social activism is directed toward modernization, political reform, and socioeconomic development in Thai-land, with the aim of realizing a “dhammic socialism,” establishing suitable condi-tions for all persons to realize the supreme voidness of nibbāna or peace, including both individual and social peace.

This illuminating and important volume is an extremely valuable work that is guaranteed to expand the horizons of all interested in Zen Buddhism, as well as those concerned with a modern reconstructive interpretation of Buddhist philosophy in general and Thai Buddhism in particular.

References

Blofeld, John, trans. 1958. The Zen Teachings of Huang-Po. New York: Grove Press.

Buddhadāsa Bhikku. 1994. Heartwood of the Bodhi Tree: The Buddha’s Teaching on Voidness. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

———. 1997. Mindfulness with Breathing. Translated by Santikaro Bikkhu. Boston: Wisdom Publications.

Philosophy East & West Volume 61, Number 1 January 2011 231–237 231© 2011 by University of Hawai‘i Press

Nhat Hanh, Thich. 1974. The Miracle of Being Awake: A Manual on Meditation for the Use of Young Activists. Translated by Mobi Quynh Hoa, edited by Jim Forest. Bangkok: Sathirakoses-Nagapradipa Foundation.

Suzuki, D. T. 1949. The Zen Doctrine of No-Mind: The Significance of the Sutra of Hui Neng (Wei Lang). London: Rider and Co.

Wong Mou-lam, trans. 1973. The Sutra of Wei Lang (or Hui Neng). Edited by Christ-mas Humphries. Westport, CT: Hyperion Press.

The Philosophy of Mahatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century. Edited by Douglas Allen. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2008. Pp. xviii + 263. Paper $29.95.

Reviewed by Veena Rani Howard University of Oregon

For decades, Gandhi’s revolutionary ideas and techniques have drawn wide atten-tion from scholars and activists. Gandhi is one of modern history’s most analyzed thinkers: a sustained flow of scholarship on his life, thought, and methods presents a testimony to a vital interest in his philosophy. While there is a sense of continuity in Gandhian thought, literature about Gandhi has gone through various phases, in an evolution from romanticization or criticism of his ideas to a serious examination of his philosophy for addressing conflicts.

Among the challenges that contemporary Gandhian scholars face is discovering the relevance of Gandhi’s philosophy for the twenty-first century. The overarching questions in recent years have been directed at Gandhi’s nonviolent strategy and its relevance to solving personal, social, and political conflicts. The Philosophy of Ma-hatma Gandhi for the Twenty-First Century, edited by Douglas Allen, a professor of philosophy and a peace and justice scholar and activist, is a collection of essays by prominent scholars in the field of Gandhian studies exploring the urgent questions: “to what extend [sic] can we even speak of Gandhi’s ‘philosophy’?” and “to what extent are Gandhi’s thought and action relevant for the twenty-first century?” (p. vii).

Setting the stage for this multidimensional volume in his comprehensive intro-duction, Allen reminds us that in spite of the broad reception of Gandhi’s thought, “the question of Gandhi’s relevance remains controversial. There have always been critics who have viewed and continue to view Gandhi’s approach as naïve, utopian, escapist, negative, and completely irrelevant” (p. viii). Even some of his admirers submit that Gandhi “has limited or no relevance for a twenty-first century of shrink-ing decentralized villages and new, interconnected, global structures of corporate economic, military, and media power relations” (p. viii).

However, in contrast to these views, Allen argues that “the authors in this vol-ume, while not romanticizing Gandhi or the past and while cognizant of changing contemporary contexts, submit that Gandhi’s thought and action are significant, rel-evant, and urgently needed for addressing problems of the twenty-first century” (p. viii). In this era of religious, economic, environmental, social, and moral challenges,