Acquisition Reform Lessons Learned –Breakout...

Acquisition Reform Lessons

Learned – Breakout SessionLearned – Breakout Session

CQSDI

Jim Schultz

March 15, 2010

NASA Acquisition Reform

• History

• Contractor Mergers & Acquisitions

• NASA Failures

• Troubled Practices That We Must Not Repeat

• Lesson’s Learned & Plan Forward

15-March-2010 2

NASA Acquisition Reform History

• Faster, Better, Cheaper started at NASA in 1992 timeframe.– Concept of being more competitive is good.

– No guidance given on achieving “faster, better, cheaper”

• Problem: 1) More competent competition drives down cost and improves quality. Companies were gobbling each other up creating little competition.

• 2) NASA, not sure how to implement, turned oversight over to Contractors.

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• Space Station Program was way over budget and under threat of being cancelled.

• In late 1987, Space Station costs sky rocketed to a projected cost of $21B.

• Space Station Freedom was stripped down and Congress approved budget of $17.7B.– Congress never met yearly funding obligations which resulted in yearly re-designs of Space Station.

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• In June 1993, a bid in Congress to kill the Station failed by a single vote (215-216).– Space Station redesigned again with inclusion of international partners.

– Renamed International Space Station.

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• Federal Acquisition Streamlining Act (FASA) introduced in 1994.– Overhauled federal procurement law in an effort to reform acquisition processes and reduce project costs.

– Reduce the Civil Servant workforce.– Reduce the Civil Servant workforce.

– Streamlining the Bureaucracy through reengineering.

– Reengineering through Information Technology.

– Reducing Intergovernmental Administrative Costs.

– Changes in individual Agencies.• 75 laws passed by Congress including Department of Agriculture's reorganization bill, the Customs Modernization Act, and a wide range of appropriations bills.15-March-2010 6


• Pendulum swung– Lots of NASA oversight to little NASA oversight

• “but the contractors don’t want to fail”

– Complicated costly projects to simpler lower-cost projects.

– Shift from Government Standards to Industry – Shift from Government Standards to Industry Standards

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• Contractor mergers and acquisitions (1980’s to Present)– Over 100 Companies combined into Six

• Lockheed Martin

• Northrup

• General Dynamics• General Dynamics

• Boeing

• Raytheon

• Alliant Techsystems (ATK)

– Creates “Must Win / Do-Or-Die” environment to win contacts.

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ID Task Name

1 Affiliated Computer Services (Federal Systems) – 2003 to Lockheed Martin

2 Orincon Corporation International – 2003 to Lockheed Martin

3 OAO Corporation – 2001 to Lockheed Martin

4 Com Sat – 2000 to Lockheed Martin

5 GE Aircraft Engine Controls – 1995 to Lockheed

6 General Dynamics (Fort Worth) – 1993 to Lockheed

7 Sanders Associates – 1986 to Lockheed

8 Lockheed

9 MEL Defense Systems – 1991 to Lockheed

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

Acquisition Reform History -Contractor mergers and acquisitions

• Lockheed Martin

10 GE Aerospace – 1993 to Martin Marietta

11 Gould (Ocean Systems) – 1988 to Martin Marietta

12 Martin Marietta – 1996 to Lockheed Martin

13 General Dynamics (Space Systems) – 1994 to Martin Marietta

14 IBM Federal Systems – 1994 to Loral

15 LTV (Missiles) – 1992 to Loral

16 Fairchild Weston Systems – 1989 to Loral

17 Goodyear Aerospace – 1987 to Loral

18 Loral – 1996 to Lockheed Martin

19 Honeywell (Electro-Optics) – 1989 to Loral

20 BDM International – 1988 to Ford

21 Ford Aerospace – 1990 to Loral

22 Librascope – 1992 to Loral

23 Unisys (Defense Systems – Paramax) – 1995 to Loral

24

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ID Task Name

36 Sealed Composites – 2007 to Northrup Grumman

37 Essex Corp. – 2007 to Northrup Grumman

38 XonTech, Inc – 2002 to Northrup Grumman

39 TRW – 2002 to Northrup Grumman

40 Newport News Shipping – 2001 to Northrup Grumman

41 Computer Associates / Sterling Software – 2000 to Northrup Grumman

42 Allegheny Teledyne – Ryan Aeronautical – 1999 to Northrup Grumman

43 International Research Institute (INRI) – 1999 to Nor thrup Grumman

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010


• Northrup

43 International Research Institute (INRI) – 1999 to Nor thrup Grumman

44 Westinghouse Electronic Systems Group – 1996 to Northrup Grumman

45 Grumman – 1991 to Northrup Grumman

46 Northrup

47 Vought Corp / LTV Aircraft Division – 1991 to Northrup

48 Harnischfeger Industries – Syscon Corporation – 1995 to Logicon

49 Logicon – 1997 to Northrup Grumman

50 Hadson Corporation - Ultrasystems Defense – 1991 to Logicon

51 Geodynamics – 1996 to Logicon

52 DBC Technologies – 1999 to Northrup Grumman

53 Comptek Research, Inc. – 2000 to Northrup Grumman

54 Federal Data Corporation – 2000 to Northrup Grumman

55 GenCorp Aerojet General – Electronics and Informaiton Systems (EIS) – 2001 to Nor thrup Grumman

56 TASC, Inc. – 1998 to Litton Industries

57 Steerage Corp. / Sperry Marine, Inc. – 1996 to Litton Industries

58 General Instrument Defense – 1991 to Litton Industries

59 Litton Industries – 2001 to Northrup Grumman

60 Varian (Solid State Elect) – 1991 to Litton Industries

61 PRC, Inc. – 1996 to Litton Industries

62 Avondale Industries – 1999 to Litton Industries

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• BoeingID Task Name

25 Jeppensen Sanderson – 2000 to Boeing

26 Rockwell International (Aerospace) – 1996 to Boeing

27 Argo Systems – 1987 to Boeing

28 Boeing

29 Litton Precision Gear – 1995 to Boeing

30 GD Convair Aircraft Structures Unit – 1994 to McDonnell Douglas

31 McDonnell Douglas – 1997 to Boeing

32 Hughes Helicopters – 1984 to McDonnell Douglas

33 Hughes Electronics Satellite – 2000 to Boeing

34 Autometric – 2000 to Boeing

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

• Alliant Techsystems (ATK)

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ID Task Name

101 Swales Aerospace ) – 2007 to Alliant Techsystems

102 PSI Group ) – 2004 to Alliant Techsystems

103 Mission Research Corp (MRC) ) – 2004 to Alliant Techsystems

104 GASL ) – 2003 to Alliant Techsystems

105 Micro Craft ) – 2003 to Alliant Techsystems

106 Science and Applied Technology, Inc (SAT) ) – 2002 to Alliant Techsystems

107 Boeing (Ordnance) – 2002 to Alliant Techsystems

108 Hercules Aerospace – 1995 to Alliant Techsystems

109 Alliant Techsystems (ATK) (formally Honeywell (Defense Division))

110 Systems Integrated, Government Systems Division – 1992 to Alliant Techsystems

111 Motorola (Fusing) – 1997 to Alliant Techsystems

112 Alcoa – 2000 to Morton Thiokol

113 Morton Thiokol – 2001 to Alliant Techsystems

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

ID Task Name

64 Anteon International Corp – 2006 to General Dynamics

65 Engineering Technology, Inc. – 2004 to General Dynamics

66 Galaxy Aerospace – 2001 to General Dynamics

67 Gulfstream Aerospace – 1999 to General Dynamics

68 K – C Aviation – 1998 to Gulfstream Aerospace

69 National Steel and Shipbuilding Co (NASSCO) – 1998 to General Dynamics

70 Lucent (Advanced Technology Systems) – 1997 to General Dynamics

71 Bath Iron Works – 1995 to General Dynamics

72 Chrysler Defense – 1982 to General Dynamics

73 General Dynamics

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010


• General Dynamics

73 General Dynamics

74 Cessna Aircraft – 1985 to General Dynamics

75 Teledyne (Vehicle Systems Division) – 1996 to General Dynamics

76 Lockheed Martin (Defense Systems & Armament Systems) – 1997 to General Dynamics

77 Ceridian (Computing Devices International) – 1998 to General Dynamics

78 GTE (Government Systems Corp) – 1999 to General Dynamics

79 Primex Technologies – 2001 to General Dynamics

80 Motorola (Integrated Information Systems Group) – 2001 to General Dynamics

81 Veridian Corporation – 2003 to General Dynamics

82 Spectrum Astro – 2004 to General Dynamics

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• RaytheonID Task Name

84 JPS Communications, Inc. – 2002 to Raytheon

85 Allied Signal Communications Systems – 1998 to Raytheon

86 Texas Instruments Defense – 1997 to Raytheon

87 E – Systems – 1995 to Raytheon

88 Raytheon

89 British Aerospace Corporate Jets – 1993 to Raytheon

90 Chrysler Tech Airborne – 1996 to Raytheon

91 Link – 1988 to CAE Industries

92 CAE Industries – 1995 to GM Hughes Electronics

93 Rediffusion Simulation, Ltd – 1988 to GM Delco

94 Hughes Aircraft – 1985 to GM Delco

1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010

94 Hughes Aircraft – 1985 to GM Delco

95 GM Delco – 1997 to Raytheon

96 M/A – Com Telecommunications – 1987 to GM Delco

97 General Dynamics Missile Operations – 1992 to GM Hughes Electronics

98 Magnavox Electronics – 1995 to GM Hughes Electronics

99 ATK Marine Systems Group – 1997 to GM Hughes Electronics

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Acquisition Reform History –NASA Failures

The Orbiting Carbon Observatory (OCO)

Satellite

The Mission: NASA intended the OCO to

provide an orbiting platform from which

scientists would be able to look at how

carbon dioxide moved through the

atmosphere. Hyped as a space-down atmosphere. Hyped as a space-down

look at global warming, the OCO was

supposed to help researchers figure out

climate change.

The Problem: Sadly, the OCO never

made it into orbit, as the case containing

the satellite failed to separate from the

rocket during launch, leading the whole

assembly to crash into the ocean 17

minutes after lift off.

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Demonstration for Autonomous

Rendezvous Technology (DART) Spacecraft

The Mission: Upset with the expense and

risk of launching the shuttle every time a

satellite needed maintenance, NASA created

the DART to show that a robotic satellite

could dock with other satellites. DART was could dock with other satellites. DART was

supposed to autonomously navigate

towards, and then rendezvous with, an

existing communications satellite.

The Problem: The computer controlling

DART incorrectly estimated the distance

between the two satellites, causing DART to

bump right into the other satellite. DART

then used up all of its fuel, eventually

crashing into the ocean.

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NASA Helios

The Mission: Not actually a space probe,

Helios was the last in a line of high altitude,

solar powered atmospheric research platforms

designed to fly in the upper atmosphere.


The Problem: About 30 minutes after taking

off, Helios hit some powerful wind shear and

crashed into the Pacific.

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The Hubble Space Telescope

The Mission: The first in a series of space

telescopes, the Hubble would allow

astronomers to look at the stars without

atmospheric interference. This would, and

eventually did, provide the most detailed

images of the distant universe ever produced.


images of the distant universe ever produced.

The Problem: When grinding the original

camera lens, engineers failed to compensate

for the minute shape change the lens would

undergo when moved into a zero gravity

environment. The solution? Glasses. Once a

corrective lens was added, the Hubble was

able to look deep into the universe.

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Acquisition Reform History –Hubble turns into huge success

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Genesis

The Mission: Designed to catch pieces of the

sun itself, Genesis flew into space to collect

solar winds in specially designed sheets of

gold, diamond and sapphire. By studying

actual pieces of the sun, scientists hoped to

learn about the original composition of the


learn about the original composition of the

solar system.

The Problem: NASA planned to catch the

capsule in mid air by hooking its parachute

with a helicopter. The parachute never

deployed and the satellite slammed into the

Utah desert. Fortunately, scientists managed to

recover many of the samples for testing.

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Space-Based Infrared System (SBIRS)

The Mission: A series of classified surveillance

satellites, SBIRS was supposed to answer the

Air Force’s need for tracking ballistic missile

launches. SBIRS consists of high and low orbit

satellites.


satellites.

The Problem: One of the first SBIRS satellites

shut down only seven seconds after reaching

Earth Orbit. The satellite’s safety mechanism

malfunctioned, putting the satellite into safe

mode, and reducing it to what the then Deputy

Under Secretary of the Air Force called a

“useless ice cube.”

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The Mars Polar Lander (MPL)

The Mission: The Mars Polar Lander was part

of an extensive 1998 push to study the red

planet. The program consisted of a soil probe,

a lander, and a satellite. The MPL was

supposed to study the climate and surface of


supposed to study the climate and surface of

Mars.

The Problem: No one really knows what

happened to the MPL. The spacecraft

successfully reached Mars, but NASA never

made contact with the MPL. Anything from a

faulty transmitter to a complete crash to

interference from Marvin could have caused

the failure. NASA still hopes to one day find the

MPL and figure out what went wrong.

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Deep Space 2

The Mission: Sent to Mars on the same

spacecraft as the Mars Polar Lander, the Deep

Space 2 was a penetrator, designed to burrow

into the Martian soil and collect data on water

and chemical composition.

The Problem: Much like the MPL, the fate of


The Problem: Much like the MPL, the fate of

the Deep Space 2 remains a mystery.

Eventually judged as a failure, NASA had been

tasked to generate a greater number of less

expensive projects rather than the small

number of large projects that dominated most

of the agency’s history.

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The Mars Climate Orbiter (MCO)

The Mission: The brains of the 1998 Mars

Missions, NASA intended the MCO to serve the

dual function of studying the Martian atmosphere

and relaying radio signals from the two surface


and relaying radio signals from the two surface

probes.

The Problem: Thruster software was created that

used Imperial units, not the metric units used by

NASA. NASA did not know this, never converted

from pounds to newtons, and the probe

eventually hit the atmosphere at the wrong angle

and burned up.

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NOAA-19

The Mission: NOAA-19 was the last in a series

of weather satellites that monitor atmospheric

conditions, follow volcanic eruptions and

conduct climate research.


conduct climate research.

The Problem: During final servicing, engineers

failed to check if the satellite was bolted down

before moving it, and accidentally knocked the

multi-million dollar piece of equipment onto

the ground, breaking a number of

components. Whoops!

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Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR)

The Mission: The Comet Nucleus Tour (CONTOUR) was

developed to gain insight into the nature of comets.

While in orbit, CONTOUR fired its motor to put itself on

the trajectory toward its first comet. The control team did

not have telemetry coverage during the burn, but they


not have telemetry coverage during the burn, but they

expected to regain contact once the burn was over. The

signal did not return after the burn, and the team spent

the next several months trying to locate the spacecraft.

Communication was never reestablished.

The Problem: There was inadequate project team Solid

Rocket Motor expertise. There was insufficient rigor in

contracting and design reviews and significant reliance on

subcontractors who were not integrated into the project.

There was also a heavy reliance on heritage designs and a

focus on project goals at the expense of programmatic

objectives.15-March-2010 25

Lewis Spacecraft

The Mission: Demonstrate advanced science

instruments and spacecraft technologies for

measuring changes in Earth's land surfaces.

The Problem: The loss of the Lewis Spacecraft


The Problem: The loss of the Lewis Spacecraft

was the direct result of an implementation of a

technically flawed Safe Mode in the Attitude

Control System. This error was made fatal to

the spacecraft by the reliance on that

unproven Safe Mode by the on orbit

operations team and by the failure to

adequately monitor spacecraft health and

safety during the critical initial mission phase.

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Solar Heliospheric Observatory Spacecraft (SOHO)

The Mission: SOHO began its 2-year mission to study

the Sun and solar winds in 1995 and experienced

tremendous scientific success, earning it multiple

mission extensions through 2009.


mission extensions through 2009.

The Problem: Critical errors in the software code

modified to conserve gyro usage configured the gyros

incorrectly and caused inaccurate thruster firings

which progressively destabilized the spacecraft.

Root causes included:

•Lack of Change Control

•Failure to Follow Procedures

•Overly Aggressive Task Scheduling

•Inadequate Staffing and Training

15-March-2010 27

Wide-Field Infrared Explorer (WIRE) Spacecraft

The Mission: Four month infrared survey of starburst

galaxies and luminous protogalaxies to measure

starburst galaxy growth rates and gain a better

understanding of how these galaxies form and


understanding of how these galaxies form and

evolve.

The Problem: After WIRE attained orbit on March 4,

1999, a transient signal prematurely fired pyrotechnic

devices that released the cryostat cover, exposing the

spacecraft interior to solar heating. All onboard

frozen hydrogen supplies for the four-month mission

sublimated within thirty-six hours of launch. This

coolant loss disabled telescope function and sent the

spacecraft into an uncontrolled spin.

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Troubled Practices That We Must Not Repeat

• “Trust Me” is based on the presumption that the Contractor knows how to do their job and wants to succeed.

• Reducing Government oversight based on presumption that Contractor’s processes, presumption that Contractor’s processes, measurement devices, and practices are accurate and have a proven success track record.

• Overuse of analysis in lieu of test.

15-March-2010 29


• Misuse of Qualification by similarity.

• Ineffective Quality Metrics

• No focused Continuous Improvement• No focused Continuous Improvement

• Ineffective Corrective Action System

• Cost and Schedule induced risk used to justify reduction in Quality Assurance.

15-March-2010 30


• Breakdown of internal controls/discipline.

• Poor oversight of sub-contractors (2nd, 3rd, 4th-tier suppliers).

• Releasing contracts before requirements are developed.

History has shown that we don’t seem to learn from our mistakes.

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The “learning of the lesson learned” is not enough in

itself to effect a change. There must be a dedicated

effort put forth.

i.e.“…their implementation is culturally and situationally constrained”

Lesson’s Learned - Dedicated Effort

“…lessons learned analysis, by itself is not enough”

“…there must be a dedicated…effort to bring about any significant

change”

“…change will not happen by itself”

Taken from ISS Lesson’s Learned presentation – July 2004

15-March-2010 32

“…obvious mistakes and weaknesses have been repeated”

“…the cultural acceptance of practices…made all but impossible to

change”

Lesson’s Learned - Dedicated Effort(continued)

“…change must be planned”

“…knowing that a problem existed…no indicator it can be avoided in

future”

“…plan the change; a deliberate process of planning is vital”


15-March-2010 33

The way we structure and manage our contracts

provides the largest potential leverage for change and

management gain within the space cultural paradigm.

i.e.“…keep requirements fixed”

“…specify performance…not how to achieve the results”

Lesson’s Learned – Contract Management

“…specify performance…not how to achieve the results”

“…minimize or eliminate government imposed changes”

“…incentivize the contractor to keep costs low”

“…cost-plus environments is contradictory to faster, better,

cheaper…inadequate cost control and real cost measurements”


15-March-2010 34

“…specify data required (taxonomy, format)… be flexible to accept data

in contractor’s format if possible”

“…reduce interaction between NASA and contractors”

“…explore fee arrangement to place more emphasis on performance”

Lesson’s Learned – Contract Management(continued)

“…explore fee arrangement to place more emphasis on performance”

“…allow maximum autonomy in deciding on how best to meet

government requirements”


15-March-2010 35

“…use competition in the market place”

“…over control is a deterrent to good performance”

“…formal Performance Measurement System employed were largely

ineffective”

Lesson’s Learned – Contract Management(continued)

ineffective”


15-March-2010 36

The typical NASA bureaucratic management

organization, structure, and style does not promote

the efficiency and innovation required for successful

management.

i.e.“…minimize government involvement”

Lesson’s Learned – Organization & Style

i.e.“…minimize government involvement”

“…force people off development programs when development is

complete”

“…use data-driven leadership approach to fact-based decision-

making…use quantifiable six sigma tools and metrics when possible”

“…establish clear understanding of roles, responsibilities, and authority”

15-March-2010 37


“…demand a commitment to excellence…competent dedicated people”

“…provide open communication in all directions”

“…motivate all to succeed”

Lesson’s Learned – Organization & Style(continued)

“…delegate authority with provisions to keep management informed”

“…utilize small, hand picked government program offices…”

“…functions hand off people during peak problem period…”

“…put lots of smart people on a program early and get them off early”

“…appoint people you trust and then don’t over-manage them”

15-March-2010 38


“…include all key individuals in major decision areas”

“…authority and responsibility for direct control over all agencies”

“…flexible organizational structure and management systems”


“…freedom from traditional government bureaucratic impediments”

“…reduce the number of management levels”

“…work with Office of Personnel Management to explore the further

relaxation in flexible hiring”

“…stress delegation of responsibility”

15-March-2010 39


“…performance/reward system provides insufficient rewards…too slow

and many managers provide few or no rewards”

“…implement performance/reward to reward for real prevention of

problems…people are rewarded for finding a quick fix for a problem;


problems…people are rewarded for finding a quick fix for a problem;

not for preventing problems from recurring or never happening in the

first place”

“…eliminate appraisal process…has no value other than to demotivate

employees”

“…accountability should be understood and accepted”

“…responsibility should be clear and unambiguous”

15-March-2010 40


Programs should only begin when there is a balance

between technical content and readiness, schedules,

and budget availability and support.

i.e.“…ensure all technologies are proven prior to the end of competition”

Lesson’s Learned – Ready, Aim, Fire (not Fire, Aim, Ready)

i.e.“…ensure all technologies are proven prior to the end of competition”

“…don’t start a program until cost estimates and budget available

match”

“…defer flight hardware construction until technological uncertainties

are resolved”

“…peak funding availability is most significant single factor”15-March-2010 41


“…baseline requirements prior to initiating contracting process…cost

studies show largest cause of cost overrun is premature starts

“…develop and implement data architecture infrastructure prior to any

Lesson’s Learned – Ready, Aim, Fire (not Fire, Aim, Ready) (continued)

“…develop and implement data architecture infrastructure prior to any

flight or test hardware or software development”

“…realistic budgets and schedules must be set to avoid wasted

management energy”

“…program content and capability must be consistent with expected

budgets”

15-March-2010 42


Programs must establish and follow sound work practices and processes.

i.e. “… determine and get Program Management agreement on set of tests that are mandatory or the Program is cancelled…flight tests, first article tests, qualification tests”

Lesson’s Learned – Work Practices

article tests, qualification tests”

“… set up comprehensive/effective audits (pre- and post-contract award)…ensure requirements are understood, followed, and flowed down to sub-tier suppliers”

“…identify critical safety items early in design phase to drive down risk”

“…design in sustainment processes and procedures during design development.”

15-March-2010 43

“…must have proactive Quality and Supply Chain Management”

“…leverage lessons learned and best practices observed”

“…commit to measurable and enforceable results”

Lesson’s Learned – Work Practices(continued)

“…commit to measurable and enforceable results”

“…exercise the leadership required to develop, influence, and enforce manufacturing systems that adhere to the fundamentals of sound quality assurance”

“…implement and respond to “Real-Time” metrics and information...focus on ensuring process control; not just inspections”

15-March-2010 44

“…must have data/information collaboration across the community…including Program, Projects, and Contractors”

“…cost reductions nearly always take the form of removing program content…unnecessary, risky, and counterproductive (e.g., removing

Lesson’s Learned – Work Practices(continued)

content…unnecessary, risky, and counterproductive (e.g., removing testing to save money)”

15-March-2010 45

• Implement a “real” Lean Six Sigma program

–Data-Driven Leadership approach to Fact-Based Decision-Making

• Incremental Change

Plan Forward

• Process Improvement

–Not just manufacturing or assembly operations but all processes.

–Must have effective metrics• What get’s measured and rewarded is what get’s done. If the measurements don’t change, then neither do the results.

15-March-2010 46

• Process Improvement (continued)

–Control bureaucracy• Bureaucracy happens when processes take a life of their own.

• Bureaucracy is not people slowing work, it is a process that forces people to work at tasks much longer and harder than they need to.

• Train employees; don’t rely on the process to train employees.

Plan Forward

• Train employees; don’t rely on the process to train employees.

• Review and update/improve processes frequently.

15-March-2010 47

Acquisition Reform Lessons Learned –

Conclusion

Questions?Questions?

15-March-2010 48

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