Acta Cogitata Issue 4Acta Cogitata continues to adapt to its institutional circumstances. I am sad...

A C T A

C o g i t a t a

An Undergraduate Journal in Philosophy Issue 4

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Acta Cogitata

Issue 4 October 2016

Editor in Chief

Professor W. John Koolage

Student Editor

Katie Coulter

SubmissionInformation:http://www.emich.edu/historyphilosophy/journals.phpJournalHome:http://www.emich.edu/historyphilosophy/actacogitata/actacogitatamain.phpISSN2330-5118

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Editor’s Note: Issue 4

Ifrequentlywonderwhatisthehallmarkofphilosophicalthought.Whateverelseitmightbe,asustainedandcarefulattempttounderstandtheworldinallitscoarseandfinegraineddetailseemsacriticalcomponent.Thisyear’sauthorsprovideuswithnolessthanarobustphilosophicaltakeonissuesrangingfromtheenduringdamageofcertaindualismstoconcernsaboutthepossibilityofagroundingformoraljudgements.Iam,onceagain,struckbythesheerpowerofdeepthinkingandcarefulwritingwhenitisbroughttobearonthequestionsthatinterestthosewhohavefoundthemselvesintheearlyphasesoftheirloveofwisdom.Iampleasedtoprovidetheirworkforyourreflection,andequallypleasedtoreflectonthesequestionsthatcapturetheimaginationofthenewestmembersofourlongandstorieddiscipline.ActaCogitatacontinuestoadapttoitsinstitutionalcircumstances.Iamsadtosaygoodbyetomytwo-yearcollaboratorandstudenteditor,KatieCoulter.Iwishherwellonhernewadventures.Iamalsoextremelypleasedtoacceptherpaperforpublicationinthisyear’sedition.Herthoughtfulworkhasmadethejournalsomuchstronger.Onceagain,thejournalfindsitselfinnewcircumstances.Ihavenodoubtitwillcontinuetogrowinnewandinterestingways,whileofferingworkofthehighestqualitytoourreaders.Thankyoutoourauthors,theirmentorsandteachers,andtheinstitutionsthatencouragephilosophicworkasavaluableandworthwhilepartofourhumanplaceintheworld.Ourhumanstorywouldbelessrichwithoutyourdedicationandwork.Dr.W.JohnKoolage

Mission and Purpose Statement

ActaCogitataisdedicatedtoprovidingavenueforundergraduateauthorsoforiginalphilosophicalpaperstohavetheirworkreviewedand,possibly,published.Publicationacknowledgestheworkofoutstandingundergraduateauthors,rewardstheirefforts,andprovidesahomeforsomethought-provokingprojects.Inlinewiththispurpose,ActaCogitata’sauthorsretaintheircopyrightsothattheymaycontinuetodeveloptheseprojects.Thejournal,however,doesnotpublishworkthathaspreviouslybeenpublishedelsewhere.

Thejournalacceptsphilosophicalpapersfromallareasofphilosophyandseekstopromotephilosophicaldiscourseinanyareawheresuchdiscoursemaybeilluminating.

Thejournalispublishedannually,inOctober.

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Contents

5 The Purpose, Praxis, and Future of Academia: An Exploration of Fichtean Approaches to Education

EriSvenson,HarperCollege

14 The Science of Communication: A Bayesian Account of

Communication Strategy Selection DanielleClevenger,EasternMichiganUniversity

23 No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil BrandonWright,GrandValleyStateUniversity

33 Minds and Bodies: Early Modern Social Justice ClareÁineKeefer,EasternMichiganUniversity

41 Predicting the Truth: Overcoming Problems with

Popper’s Verisimilitude Through Model Selection Criteria K.RaleighHanson,WashingtonStateUniversity

51 Solving Frege’s Substitution Puzzle: Analyzing it in Light of Descriptivism and Direct Reference Theory AyeshaRehman,CityCollegeofNewYork

59 Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case for Moral Feeling and the Human Relationship to Nature KatieCoulter,EasternMichiganUniversity

EriSvenson FichteanApproachestoEducation

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The Purpose, Praxis, and Future of Academia:

Fichtean Approaches to Education Eri Svenson, Harper College

Abstract

FollowingthepublicationofSchulze’s“Aenesidemus”,whichdetailedaskepticalcritiqueoftranscendentalidealism,philosopherJohannGottliebFichtefoundhimselfundergoingan“intellectualrevolution”.HavingagreedwithmanyofSchulze’sarguments,heconcludedthattopreservethespiritofKantianismhewouldhavetoestablishafoundationallyreworkedconceptualizationofit.Fichteemergedfromthisprocesswithaframeworkgroundedupontheinnovativeclaimthatweshouldregardthatthereisnothingforusbeyondourownconsciousness,whichcreatesbothourselves,andtheworldthatweexperience.Furthermore,becausewecreateourownexperiences,itispossibleforustoaccessdirectknowledgeaboutourexperiencesthroughour“productiveimagination”,andgainknowledgethroughexperience.Thisapproachpiquedmyinterestbecauseprevailingacademicapproachestoknowledgeproductionarebaseduponmaterialistassumptions,Baconianprocedure,andproduction-basedoutcomes,oftenattheexpenseofqualitativeandexperientialprocedures.WonderingifFichte’sphilosophiesmightbeabletoofferalternative,morebalancedapproachesforacademia,inthispaperIparticipateinanexploratoryprocessexaminingFichte’sperspectivesonpedagogy,scholarship,andeducation.Beginningwiththequestion:ifhewroteonthematter,whatwereFichte’sperspectivesonpedagogy?Idiscusshisrelationalpedagogyandthechallengesheexperiencedbalancinghisstudents’autonomywithhispositionasaninstructor.Next,Iask:didFichteaddressthepurposeofscholarshipandeducationinthebroader,socialsense?Isuggestthathiswritingsconceptualizescholarshipasapublicgoodnecessaryfortheprogressivedevelopmentofhumankind.Finally,IreconsiderFichte’splaceincontemporaryacademia,wondering:wheredowegofromhereandcanFichtehelpusgetthere?Ultimately,IarguefortherelevancyofFichteanapproachesinaddressingtheproblemsfacingacademiatoday.

The Purpose, Praxis, and Future of Academia: An Exploration of

Fichtean Approaches to Education


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I.Imagination,Experience,andCreativeGenius:Fichte’s“IntellectualRevolution”Followingitspublicationin1792,G.ESchulze’s“Aenesidemus”,whichdetailsaskeptic’s

critiqueofKantandReinhold’stranscendentalidealism,wasforwardedforreviewtoKantianphilosopherJohannGottliebFichte.Thoughinitiallypromisingthathisanalysiswouldbepromptlyreturned,heultimatelyspentmonthstoilingoverthetextashewrestledwiththerealizationthathefoundhimselfinagreementwithmanyofSchulze’scritiques.Specifically,amongotherclaims,“Aenesidemus”interrogatedKant’sconceptof“thethinginitself”,whichheusedtodescribeobjectsastheyexistoutsidethelimitsofourownconsciousnessand,consequentially,outsideofwhatcanbeconsideredknowable.Ifwecannotdevelopknowledgeoftruthsoutsideofourownconsciousness,however,howcanwepresumetoknowthethinginitselfexistsatall?Bythesameprinciple,SchulzealsorejectedKantandReinhold’sargumentthatwecandeduceknowledgeofobjectiverealitiesfromourmind’srepresentationsofthem,asthatnotonlypresupposestheexistenceofparticularobjects,butalsoanunknowablecausallinkbetweenthe“thinginitself”andourexperiences.Inaddition,hecritiquedReinhold’sestablishmentofconsciousnessasthe“highestprinciple”ofmetaphysics,callingintoquestionifphilosophycouldeverestablishsuchathinginthefirstplace.Combined,Schulzeconcludedthattheseproblemspointedtoirreconcilablecontradictionsintranscendentalidealism,whichhadfailedtoprotectitselffromskepticalcritiques.

WhileFichteconcededtothesoundnessofmanyofSchulze’sarguments,heremainedcommittedtothecontinuationoftranscendentalidealistphilosophy.Schulze’scritiques,however,calledforhimtoundergoan“intellectualrevolution”,fromwhichheemergeddedicatedtopreservingthespiritofKantianism,buthavingconcludedthattosucceedindoingsohewouldhavetodevelopafoundationallyreworkedconceptualizationofit.Bythetimehis“ReviewofAenesidemus”wascomplete,itcontainedanarticulationoftheframeworkthatwouldallowhimtoengageinathoroughundertakingofthisproject.Specifically,Fichte’srevolutionofthoughtleadhimtotaketheinnovativephilosophicalleapofarguing,contrarytoKant’sconsistentpresumptionoftheexistenceofthethinginitself,thatweshouldinactualityregardthatthereisnothingforusbeyondconsciousness.Becauseourmindsarethecreatorsofbothourselvesandtheworldweexperience,tospeakofanythingoutsideofthemcontradictsthespiritoftranscendentalidealism.Throughmakingthisclaim,FichtedeactivatedthecontradictionsthatSchulzehadhighlightedinhiscritique.

Fromthisinnovation,hemadetwomoreclaims.First,thatbecauseweareproducingexperiencesforourselves,wecandevelopexperimentaltechniquesthatwillallowustoobserveandcuratefirsthandknowledgeofhowtheexperiencesarebeingproduced.Throughtheseprocedures,wecandevelopknowledgeaboutrepresentationswithouthavingtodefaulttounfalsifiableconceptslike“thethinginitself”.Second,whileFichteagreesthatconsciousnessisapoor“highestprinciple”,henonethelessdefendsReinhold’sclaimthatweoughttodevelopsuchaprinciple.Todefendagainstskepticalcritiques,however,weshouldnotconstructaprinciplethatdemandsuponclaimsoffact,butonanactthatwecaneachexperienceforourselves.Inotherwords,ratherthanaclaimoffactaboutconsciousness,weshouldaimtoestablishareplicable“highestprinciple”thatspeakstotheactofcreatingconsciousness.ForFichte,thisisnecessarybecauseifphilosophyistobecomescientific,itmustbemorethanthoughtabout;itmustbeexperientiallydone.Itisfree,experienceddiscovery,ratherthandiscarnatearguments,thatshouldbeattheheartofthediscipline.


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Theestablishmentofthisframeworkisalsotheplacewheremyownexploratoryprojectbegan.FrommyfirstencounterwithFichteanphilosophy,Ifoundmyselffascinatedwithhisclaimthatweshouldconsidertheuseofourproductiveimaginationstobeasourceoftruthabouttheworld,ratherthanasadistractionfromobjectiveanalysis.Heinsiststhatitispossibleforusto,andthatweinfactshould,experiencethemeritsofphilosophicalconclusionsforourselves,grantinganexceptionalamountofagencytoindividualsintheacademicprocess.Notonlyareweactivelycreatingourownconsciousexperiences,butweshouldalsobeinvolvedindiscoveringtruthsaboutthem.Whilethisapproachtophilosophicalknowledgeproductionisinclinedstronglytowardsthescientificinitsfocusonexperimentationandduplication,itnonethelessremainsaprocedurethatputsqualitativeexperiencesandcontributionsatitscenter.ForFichte,inthisregardthe“creativegenius”issomethingthatshouldbeencouragedandregardedasvaluable,ratherthandismissedasimpracticaloroutoftouchwithtrueknowledge.

Whilethisclaimisinterestingonitsown,itwasparticularlynoteworthytomebecausecontemporaryacademiatakesamarkedlydifferentapproachtoknowledgeproduction.Ratherthancenteringimagination,“creativegenius”,andqualitativeexperienceinitsscientificprocesses,academicresearchisorganizedaroundtheaforementionedmaterialistassumptions,Baconianprocedure,andproduction-basedoutcomes.Claimsoftruthfromlivedexperiencesareoftenconsidered,atbest,insufficient,andatworst,inadmissiblebecausethisformofdataisnormativelyconsideredtobemorebiasedthandataobtainedthroughclassicalBaconianprocedures,suchasexperimentationwithinthenaturalsciences.Inaddition,studentsaretaughttobereceiversofinformationandareoftennotencouragedtobeactiveparticipantsinitsdiscovery.Knowledgeissomethingthatisexternallyadsorbedandparroted,notexperiencedorcreated. WhileIcedethatthereisvalueintheseprocedures,itistroublingwhentheyproduceanuncriticalvalorizationofthenaturalandquantitativesciencesattheexpenseofqualitativeandparticipatorydiscovery.Contrarytopopularmythos,these“realer”sciencesarenotimmunefrombiasandhavebeenculturallyshapedalongwithqualitativeformsofknowledgeproduction.Furthermore,ifweweretocompletelyacceptthismaterialism,therewouldbenospaceforhumanfreedom,renderingusmereproductsofmatteranddenyingrecognitionofourexploratoryagency.AsIcontinuedreadingFichte’swork,Ioftenwonderedifhisapproachtoknowledgeproductionmightbeabletooffermorebalancetothesemethods,offeringalternativeapproachesforthebroaderacademiccommunitythatwouldsynthesizeopportunitiesforscientificmethodologyandqualitativeexperiences.ThisinquiryiswhatIhavesoughttoexplorethroughthispaper,beginningwiththequestion:ifhewroteonthematter,whatwereFichte’sperspectivesonpedagogy?II.Language,Autonomy,andManipulation:Fichte’sRelationalPedagogy

InsearchingforpotentialsourcesonFichteanpedagogy,thefirstarticlethatIfoundwaswrittenbySeanFranzelandtitled“‘WelchesGesetzistderMenschinseinerWirksamkeit?’:PedagogyandMediainFichte’sEncounterwithMesmerism.”Franzel’spieceexaminestheparallelsFichteperceivedamongtherelationshipsbetweenmesmeristswiththeirpatients,andinstructorswiththeirstudents.Whilethearticleofferedrichandcomplexanalysesonamultitudeoftopics,muchofitinitiallyseemedtoonlybeperipherallyrelatedtomyspecific


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inquiry.Fortunately,IwasabletorecognizeoncloserreexaminationthatnestledamongthiscontentwasadirectandsalientexplanationofFichte’spedagogicalapproach.Theauthorswritethat“ForFichte,educationisfirstandforemosttoawakenastudent’sabilitytothinkactivelyandfreely”(7),aperspectivehegroundedinafundamentalconcernforfreedomandautonomy.ThepapergoesontofurtherexplainthatFichtespecificallybelievedthatreadingonlyleadtopassivelearning,andsoinsteadheoptedtoutilizeinteractionalandexperimentallectures,engenderinghisstudents’independentthinkingthroughrelationalpedagogicalapproaches.

GiventhecontentofFichte’smetaphysicalphilosophies,learningthiswasunsurprisingtome,butitnonethelesswasstillexcitingtoimaginethepossibilitiesforlearningandcreativitythatsuchaclassroom,ifsuccessful,wouldengender.Whileitwasoftenimplicitthroughouthisgroundbreakingworks,hispedagogicalphilosophymakesitclearhowcentralthemesofagencyaretohim,recognizingtheinextricablelinkbetweenfreedomandthecapacitytoengageinauthenticintellectualdiscovery.Thisissomethingthatisignoredinmanynormativeformsofinstruction,whichcanbehighlydictatorialandinflexible.Consequently,studentsnevertrulyexperienceordevelopasenseofownershipovertheirlearning,makingitmoredifficultforthemtovalue,internalize,andcontributetotheknowledgetheyencounter.Theybecometrainedtoacceptthestatusquoandstruggletobecomeawareofthecomplexitiesoftheworldtheyexperienceandtheirplacewithinit.Byseekingtofacilitateopportunitiesforguided,independentstudy,Fichteflipsthisscript,respectinghisstudents’creativeprocesses,givingthemthenecessarytoolstoexperiencetruthforthemselves,andopeningupthespaceforthedialecticalprocesstocontinue.

Franzel’sarticledoes,however,describeinstancesinwhichthisunderlyingphilosophywaschallengedandcreatedinnerconflictsforFichte.Afterobservingamesmeristpatientbeginspeakinginamannerthatseemedoutofhercontrolundertheinfluenceofherpractitioner'swords,hebecametroubledaboutthepotentialmanipulativepowerofspokenlanguage.Rethinkinghisownbeliefinthefreeingcapacitiesoforalinstruction,hewasremindedofstudentswhoweresuccessfulatanactivitywhilehewasfacilitatingitforthem,butwhoquicklylostthatcapacityonceoutoftheclassroom.Thepoweroftherelationalauthorityinherentinhispositionbecameatensionforhimashisdeepcommitmenttoautonomyandclashedwiththepracticalrealitiesofhisprofession.Hetaughtsothathisstudentscouldlearntoengageinaprocessoffreediscoveryforthemselves,buthewasboundtodoingsoinawaythatseemedtoinherentlyreducestudents’autonomy.

WhileconsideringFichte’sstrugglesonthismatter,Icouldnothelpbutrecognizetherelevancytothecontemporaryacademicclassroom.Regardlessofthediscipline,ithasbecomeanearlyuniversalexperiencetohearfacultyexpressfrustrationoverthedifficultiesmanystudentshavewhenexpectedtothinkandparticipatewithoutdirectandimmediateguidance.Evenwiththisguidance,iftheactivityasksstudentstotakethereinsontheirrationalcapacities,theywilloftenhesitateorevenstopparticipatingaltogether.ThepossibilitystrikesmethatmanyofthesefacultylikelyshareinthespiritofFichte’saimsinthattheydeeplyrespectandseektobringoutstudents’owncriticalthoughtsbutarethenforcedtoreconcilethatwithstudentswhostruggleafterbeingofferedintellectualfreedom.Ifaninstructoracceptsthatatleastoneofthepurposesofeducationistofosterstudents’freedomofthought,itseemsasifitthiswouldquicklybecomeapressingpedagogicalchallengebycreatinga


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conflictbetweenone’sintellectual,professional,andmoralideals,andthelivedrealitiesoftherelationshipsbetweenstudents,theirinstructors,andtheinstitutionsthatformthem.

Evenbasedwithinmyownexperiencesasastudent,ifIwereaskedtoimaginewhatanidealclassroomexperiencewouldbe,IcansaywithconfidencethatIwouldfindFichte’sapproachinspiring,butIamonlycautiouslyhopefulaboutthepossibilityofitbeingrealizedonabroaderscaleafterhavingwatchedamultitudeofinstructorsexperimentwithsimilarapproachesandcomeupagainstwallsthatwereseeminglyofstudents’owncreation.Ifwesincerelyare,asFichteposits,agentsofourownexperience,whyhavewebeensoquicktodenyitandcedetothemanipulativepowerofothers’language?Whydoweshyawayfromembracingopportunitiestotakeagencyoverourownexperiencesandknowledge?Therootsofthisphenomenonareclearlymultifaceted,andIwouldnotseektodenythecomplexassortmentofrelational,intellectual,andsocioculturaldynamicsproducingthem.Thatbeingsaid,thoughFichte’srelationalconcernsdidintuitivelyresonatewithme,Icouldnothelpbutthinkaboutwhatelsemightbeshapingthisexperience.

WhatIkeptcomingbacktoiswhat,atleastincontemporarytimes,wehavebeentaughtaboutthepurposeofscholarship.Eitherasacauseitselforasamissedopportunitytogeneratesolutions,thevalueofourinherentimaginativeandcreativecapacitiesisrarelygivenexperientialspace.Weareincreasinglytaughtthatoureducationismerelyameanstomoreimminently“practical”ends,suchascredentialsandemployableskills.Thearts,literature,andhumanitiesaredemeaned,whilestudentarepushedtoentertechnicalfieldsregardlessoftheirindividualpreferencesoraptitudes.Thepurposeoftheinstructorandtheclassroomisnolongertoassiststudentsinfullyexperiencingtheirfreedom,buttomerelypreparethemformoremateriallyfunctionaldemands.Theexpectationthatoureducationandworkwillbehierarchalandroteisnormalized,andwedismissasnaïvethosewhoaspiretomorecreativepursuits.TheseapproachesclearlycontradictFichte’spedagogicalphilosophyandwouldpreventitsincorporationthroughoutcontemporaryacademia.Consequentially,Ibegantowonder:didFichteprovideacounter-perspectivetothis,addressingthepurposeofscholarshipandeducationinthebroader,socialsense?III.Scholarship,Education,andHumanProgress:Fichte’sScholarlyVocation

Tobeginexploringthisquestion,IsearchedforsourcesonFichte’s“TheScholar’sVocation”,aseriesoflecturesarticulatinghisperspectivesonthesocialpurposeofthescholarandtheirwork.WrittenbyDavidJames,thearticle“FichteontheVocationoftheScholarandthe(Mis)useofHistory”providesadiscussionoftheselectures.WhileJamesisspecificallycriticalofFichte’suseofhistoryasaninstrumentaltool,heoffersabroaderdiscussionofhisphilosophies,aswell.Accordingtothearticle,Fichtebelievedhumanshavebeentrackedontoaseriesofpredeterminedstagesofdevelopment,whichwillultimatelyculminateinaperfectreflectionofrationality.Atthetimeofhislectures,hebelievedthathumanswereontheprecipiceofenteringahigherstageoftheprocess,andthatitwasthescholar’smoralobligationtogrowacompleteunderstandingofhistoryandphilosophysothattheycouldfacilitatetheelevation.ForFichte,thepurposeofscholarshipwastocultivatethecapabilitiesofhumankindasprogressivebeings.

Thisclaimshouldnotbemistakentomeanthathedidnotalsorecognizethepursuitoftruthasitsownend;asarticulatedinhispedagogicalphilosophies,suchavalueisinactualityat


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theheartofhiswork.Consequentially,hewouldlikelyrespondtoJames’sconcernsbyarguingthathisuseofhistoryasaninstrumentshouldnotbetakenasbeingameanstothatendonlyorthatitsintegritywouldbesacrificed.Rather,hisclaimthatthepurposeofscholarshipisinparttobringabouthumanprogresssimplygroundsthescholarlypursuitoftruthinanadditional,broadercontext.Initsessence,“TheScholar’sVocation”articulatesthesocialapplicationofFichte’smetaphysicalandpedagogicalphilosophies.Whereasintheclassroomhesoughttoawakenindividualstudents’criticalcapacities,herehepositionsthatindividualgrowthasonepieceofalargerhumanitarianpuzzle.Iconsiderthemostmeaningfulcontributionofthisinsighttobeitsrecognitionofintellectualexplorationasamoralconcern.Thestrengtheningofourproductiveimaginationsandtheexperiencestheyunlockaresuchaninnatepartofourhumanityandsuchaninextricablepartofourquestforhumanprogressthatthereisanobligationtobringthoseskillsandrevelationstoalarger,moreaccessibleforum.Thinkingbacktohisgroundbreakingmetaphysicalphilosophies,IwouldsuggestthistaskshouldberegardedasastepinFichte’sprojecttoreconceptualizephilosophyasaparticipatoryprocess,ratherthanamereargumentativediscipline,asittakesitsconclusionsintothepublicspherewheretheycanbeexperiencesandapplied.Throughthis,scholarshipitselfbecomesapublicgood.

Thisprovidesacompellingcounterperspectivetothegrowingchorusofvoicesdecryingtheliberalartsasdisconnectedfromtheexperiencesandnecessitiesofsocieties,claimingthatliberalartsstudiesmerelydistractfrom“real”work.Ofcourse,thisisnottosuggestthatmore“practical”disciplines,suchastechnologyortradework,arenotofhumanvalue,astheyarevitaltothefunctioninganddevelopmentofcivilizations.Rather,whatthisissaidtosuggestisthatthescholar’svocationshouldalsobeconsideredanuncompromisablepillarintheactivitiesofhumansociety.Whilebuildingroadsandinnovatingtechnologyhelpusadvanceinproductionandtrade,itisthroughtheembraceofintellectualfreedomandanimaginativepursuitoftruththatwewillprogressinourhumanity.

After“TheScholar’sVocation”,Fichtegaveaseriesoflecturestitled“AddressestotheGermanNation”,throughwhichhesoughttoinspireanincreasinglydemoralizedandfalteringnation.Inthearticle“FichteonEducation”,G.H.Turnbellhighlightsthecentralplacethateducationoccupiedinthisvision.Whilethelecturesdocontainaformofnationalismthatinhistoricalcontextwewouldnowfindtroubling,Ibelievethecoreofhismessagecanstillbeabstractedandbreathedamorecontemporarylife.Attheirheart,Fichte’saddressesadvocatedthateducationshouldberegardedanessentialfoundationforasuccessfulnation,andconsequentiallyshouldbemadeuniversallyaccessibletoallregardlessoftheirclass.Ratherthantocreateaskilledworkforce,however,Fichte’seducationalvisionsoughttodeveloptheinnatecapacitiesandcharacteristicsnecessaryforhumanitytoreachprogressivelyhigherstates.Relegatingeconomicefficiencytoasecondaryrole,thespiritofthissystemwasapedagogybasedinourpotentialaswhole,free,andimaginativebeings,capableoftakingownershipofthoseexperiencesifgiventhenecessarytrainingandopportunity.ThinkingbacktoFichte’stroublewithhisstudents,itishardformetoimaginethatanationbuiltuponsuchafoundation,valuingintellectualexplorationasanecessaryanduniversalright,wouldnotbemorelikelytohavedevelopedtheclassroomexperienceshewasseekingforhisstudents.IV.Technology,Economics,andChangingInstitutions:Fichte’sModernUniversity


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Thisbringsustomyproject’sfinalquestion:WheredowegofromhereandcanFichtehelpusgetthere?WhileIwouldnotposittohaveadefinitiveanswer,Icanlookbackatwherethisexploratoryprocesshastakenme.ThoughIhadalwaysexpectedtofindmaterialthatwouldcontributemeaningfullytomyunderstandingofthepraxisandplaceofacademia,Icouldnothaveanticipateditwouldbesoimminentlysalienttotheconversationswearehavingnow.Fromhisstrugglesintheclassroomtohiseducationalvisions,ithasbecomeclearthattheconflictsandpotentialsofFichte’sidealsareverymuchaliveandpoisedforourpresentmoment.

Thisis,furthermore,nocoincidence.WritingintheChronicleforHigherEducation,ChadWellmonrevealsthatFichtewasfacingalandscapenotentirelydissimilartoourown.AtthetimeofFichte’swriting,therecentdevelopmentoftheprintingpresswasmakingtextsaccessibletoadegreenotpreviouslypossible,rapidlyexpandingthepercentageoftheliteratepublicthatcouldaccessthem.Priortothispoint,universitieshadfunctionedprimarilyas“oralsubstitutes”forbooksthatwouldhaveotherwiseonlybeenavailableinsmall,scatteredlibraries.Withtheprintingpress,however,thisoralpracticewasnolongernecessary,andconsequentiallythebasicpurposeoftheuniversitywasbeingcalledintoquestion.Manywerearguingthatacademiashouldabandonitsplaceasahomeforideasentirely,astheywerenolongerseenaseconomicallyrelevant,andacademiashouldinsteadtransformintohighlyspecializedvocationalschools.Fichte,however,advocatedagainstthis,proposingamodelthatwouldplacefree,intellectualexplorationatitsheart:theuniversity,accordingtohim,shouldbecomeaplacewherethosewithspecializeddisciplinaryknowledgecouldgototeach,experiment,andcreatenewideas,ratherthansimplyreciteexistingones.Thisvisionwouldbecomethebasisfortheuniversitysystemweknowtoday.

Theinternethascatalyzedsocietyinpreviouslyunfathomabledirections,makinginformationandlearningaccessibleinwaysthatitneverwasbefore.Ideaexchangesthatwereonceconsideredthehallmarkoftheacademicinstitutionarenowhappeningthroughouttheweb,andeachnewtechnologicaladvancedrivestheneedforworkersskilledindevelopingandimplementingthem.Asitwasthen,politicians,administrators,andconsumersareincreasinglycallingustostepbackfromintellectualdiscoveries,markingthecurrentmodelofinstructionobsolete,andadvocatingforthecreationoftechnical,skill-baseduniversities.Evenwithinmyowninstitution,Ihavebecomeincreasinglyconsciousofanddisheartenedtohearconversationsaboutinnovativepedagogicalproposalsturnintonothingbutanassessmentoftheirimpactoncompletion,retention,andemployability.Whiletheseoutcomesareundeniablyimportant,themostmeaningfulacademicexperiencesIhavehad,theonesthatinspiredmeandcausedmetogrowasathinker,havebeenthosethathavetakenplaceinclassroomsthatsoughttobelaboratoriesfordiscussionanddiscovery,notthosethatimpartedtomeskillswhichIcouldlistonaresume.Furthermore,asIhaveentereddeeperintotheworkforce,itisthecreativeandsyntheticabilitiesIdevelopedintheseclassroomsthathavemostcontributedtomyprofessionalsuccess.

Inhisarticle,WellmonarguesthatFichte’sinnovationsandtheirparallelstothecontemporarymomentshouldhelpusrecognizethevalueinkeepingacademiaasitis.Bydoingso,wewillbeabletoensurethatscholarship’sfreeexchangeandcreationofideasisprotectedfromthesocietalcurrentsseekingtoquestionitsbasicvalue.ThoughIconcurwiththeimportanceofthislattermission,IrespectfullydisagreewithWellmon’sconclusions.Rather


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thanasareasontoremainstagnant,themessageofhisarticleoughtinsteadtobethat,inthefaceofchangingcircumstances,wemustremainwillingandabletoreimagineourpurpose;ifwedon’t,ourhomeofideasmightbedevaluedentirely.Withacademiaoncemoreatthisprecipiceofchange,however,Fichte’sphilosophiesshouldremindusthatthisreimaginingdoesnothavetocomeattheexpenseofourinalienablepursuitofcreativity,imagination,andtruth.Thoughwemightberequiredtochange,weshouldbethinkingabouthowtodosoinwaysthatallowustopreservethespiritofourinstitution:institutionsthatvalueintellectualexplorationforitsownsake,whilealsorecognizingthatwithoutintellectualexplorationwecannotdiscoverknowledgeorimaginegreaterpossibilitiesforhumanbeings.Farfrombeingdistractions,inaninformationageincreasinglyoverwhelmedwithfalsitiesandsubsumedwithbottomlines,preservingthesevaluesismoreimportantthaneverbefore.Ratherthanreimagingtheuniversityasatechnicalinstitute,wecanreimagineitasaspacethatencouragesopportunitiesforrelationalpedagogy,experientialpursuitsoftruth,andgenerationsofnewknowledgeandideas.


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References

Franzel,Sean."WelchesGesetzIstDerMenschInSeinerWirksamkeit?":PedagogyAndMediaInFichte'sEncounterWithMesmerism."GermanicReview84.1(2009):3-25.AcademicSearchComplete.Web.16Dec.2015.James,David(2010).FichteontheVocationoftheScholarandthe(Mis)useofHistory.ReviewofMetaphysics63(3):539-566.Turnbull,G.H.(1923).FichteonEducation.TheMonist33(2):184-201.Wellmon,Chad."InDefenseOfSpecialization."ChronicleOfHigherEducation61.30(2015):B4-B5.AcademicSearchComplete.Web.17Dec.2015.

DanielleClevenger BayesianCommunicationStrategySelection

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The Science of Communication: A Bayesian

Account of Communication Strategy

Selection Danielle Clevenger, Eastern Michigan University

Abstract

ThispaperwilldetailhowBayesianepistemology,traditionallyatoolofphilosophersofscience,canbeusedtoselectamethodofcommunicationthatismostlikelytoproduceadesiredcommunicationgoalfromatargetedsubject.UsingtheframeofBayes’TheoremintheformofPosteriorProbabilityRatios,itwillshowhowacommunicator,focusingonagencyandawareness,canusesaidframetodeliberatelyandpurposefullyselectanevidentiallyfavoredcommunicationstrategy,intendedtoelicitacertainresponsefromtherespondent.BytranslatingtheepistemicversionofBayes’Theoremintoacommunicationsetting,thisstrategypresentsanalternativemethodtousewhennavigatingtypicalsocialinteractionsthatwouldbeusefulforthosewhohavetroublegraspingtraditionalcommunicationdynamics.Furthermore,thepaperexplainshowthisstrategyiseasyandnaturaltousebecausethehumanbrainhasevolvedinsuchawaythatitremembersandweightsrelevantoccurrencesforanygivensituation,whichcanthenactasdataforthecomparativeratios.

The Science of Communication: A Bayesian Account of Communication Strategy Selection

IntroductionIthaslongbeensaidthatcommunicationisanart,asopposedtoascience.However,

thepsychologicalcommunityhasdemonstratedthattherearemanyunderlyingscientificprinciplesthateffectcommunication.ThispaperwilldetailhowBayesianepistemology,traditionallyatoolofphilosophersofscience,canbeusedtoselectamethodofcommunicationthatismostlikelytoproduceadesiredcommunicationgoalfromatargetedsubject.UsingtheframeofBayes’Theorem,intheformofPosteriorProbabilityRatios,Iwillshowhowacommunicator,focusingonagencyandawareness,canusesaidframeto


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deliberatelyandpurposefullyselectanevidentiallyfavoredcommunicationstrategy,intendedtoelicitacertainresponsefromtherespondent.Thisstrategypresentsanalternativemethodtousewhennavigatingtypicalsocialinteractions.Forinstance,thismethodcouldhelpanindividualdecideiftheyshouldtellafriendthattheirsignificantotherischeatingonthem.Thismethodencouragesindividualstopauseandreviewimportantevidencebeforedecidinghowtocommunicateinanygivenscenario.Thispauseandadditionalconsiderationenablesindividualswhoarelessadeptatcommunicatingtoconsiderhowtheiractionswillaffectthegivensituation,anditteachesthemtomakedecisionsbasedonhowlikelyitisthatthecommunicationstrategywillresultintheirgoal.

BayesianEpistemology

ReverendThomasBayesdevelopedthemathematicaltheorem,whichisderivablefromasimpledefinitioninprobabilitytheory,makingituncontroversialasapieceofmathematics(Sober,2000).However,ithasbeenappliedinotherareas,suchasphilosophy,whereitbecomesmorecontroversial.ThemainpremiseofBayesianepistemologyisthatknowledgeandbeliefarenotbinary(i.e.trueorfalse,knownorunknown),butratherareacohesivesystemofvaryingdegreesofbeliefinnumerouspropositions.Thedegreeofbeliefinanygivenpropositionisknownasacredencevalue,andcredencevaluesallowepistemologistsamorenuancedwayofconsideringtraditionalepistemicconcerns.CredenceValues

Itiscommonsensicaltounderstandthatweholdsomebeliefsmorestronglythanothers.Forexampleconsidertwopropositions:

A:The moon landing was faked.

B:My keys are on the table.

Ifaskedwhichtheyweremostsureof,mostpeoplewouldreplythattheyaremostsurethattheirkeysareonthetable.Additionally,considersomeonewhohaslosttheirkeys.Ifaskedwheretheybelievetheirkeystobe,theywouldprobablysaythattheyarethelastplacetheycanremember,suchasonthetable.Thepersonmaynotbesureofthis,buttheysayitbecausetheybelievetheirkeystobetheremorethantheybelievethemtobesomewhereelse,likeintherefrigerator(Koolage,2013).Bayesianepistemologytranslatesthesedegreesofbeliefintoprobabilitiessothattheycanbeusedinvariousequations,justlikeatraditionalmathematicprobability.

Theseprobabilitiesdonothavetobetheobjectiveonesoftraditionalmathematics;infact,mostBayesianstaketheprobabilitiestobesubjectiveandoftenuniquetotheuser.Thejoboftheuseristothenexamineandemploytheseprobabilitiesintheireverydaylife.Bayes’Theoremcanbeusedasatoolthatallowsonetocomparecompetinghypothesestoseewhichoneisbettersupportedbyagivensetofdata.BayesianEpistemologyprovidestheuserwithausefulsetofparametersthatallowsthemtoconverttheirbeliefhypothesesintoanactionguidethatassessesthecostsassociatedwithactingonaparticularhypothesis(Hartman&Sprenger,2010).Bayes’Theoremalsoallowstheusertointroducenewdataandseetheeffect


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ofthisdataontheprobabilityofthehypothesis.Inotherwords,userscandeterminewhetherthenewobservationmakesthehypothesismoreorlesslikelytobetrue.1ThetraditionalmathematicversionofBayes’Theoremisasfollows:

Pr(𝐴 𝐵) = !" ! ∗!" (! !)

!" (!)

Asanequationitstatesthat,theprobabilityofAgiventhatBistrueisequaltotheprobabilityofAmultipliedbytheprobabilityofBgivenAistruedividedbytheprobabilityofB.Aspreviouslynoted,philosophershaveexpandedtheuseofBayes’Theoremintoepistemologybecauseitallowedthemanewmannerofconsideringtraditionalepistemicconcerns.ThisledphilosopherstocreateanepistemicversionofBayes’Theoremthatisasfollows,whereHstandsforahypothesisandOforagivenobservation:Pr (𝐻 𝑂) = !" ! ∗!" (! !)

!" (!)

ObservationOisconsideredconfirmingevidenceforhypothesisHifthePr(H/O)isgreaterthanthepriorprobabilityofH(Pr(H)).ThepriorprobabilityofHistheprobabilityofthehypothesispriortotheconsiderationofthegivenobservation.AccordingtoBayesianepistemology,anoften-updatedbeliefhasbeenthroughthisequationmultipletimes,andthepriorprobabilityofthemostcurrentequationisthefinalprobabilityfrompreviouscalculations.Usingthisequation,onecandetermineifanobservationactsasareasontobelieveinahypothesis.Moreusefulhowever,arecomparativeratios,whichallowtheusertocomparewhetheragivenobservationbettersupportsonehypothesisoveranother.TheLawofLikelihoodstatesthatahypothesisismorelikelytobetruethanacompetinghypothesisiftheobservationinquestionwasmorelikelytooccurgiventhatthatparticularhypothesiswastrue.Mathematically,thatlawisrepresentedbythefollowinginequality:

H1ismorelikelygivenobservationOiffPr(O/H1)>Pr(O/H2)(Sober,2000).

Comparativeratiosarederivedbydividingtheprobabilityfunctionforeachhypothesis,andthisresultsinthecancellationoftheprobabilityofthegivenobservation.Whenallofthisisdone,thetheoremlookslikethis:!" (!! !)

!" (!! !)= !" !! ∗!" (! !!)

!" !! ∗!" (! !!)

Usingthisupdatedversionoftheequation,onecanthendecide,basedonevidentialsupport,whichhypothesisismorelikelytobetruegiventhenotedobservation.Inotherwords,isitmorelikelythatHypothesis1orHypothesis2istruegiventhatonehasobservedObservationO.Thoughonecouldconceivablydetermineobjectivemathematicprobabilitiesfor

1Itispossibleforevidencetoneitherconfirmnordenyahypothesis,butforsimplicity’ssakethatwillnotbedealtwithinthispaper.ForfurtherinformationseeSobercitation.


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communicationscenarios,thisisimpracticalfordailylife.Additionally,asreallifecasesareoftencomplicatedandconvoluted,itisunlikelythateachindividualuserwouldmakethesamedeterminationsasanother.ForthisreasoncombinedwiththefactthatmostBayesiansconsiderallcredencevaluestobesubjective,theprobabilitiesareconsideredsubjective.Thestepofusingsubjectivecredencevaluesinthetheoremallowsonetoconsiderusingthetheoremintherealmofcommunication.

ThenovelideathispaperdetailsisthetranslationoftheepistemicversionofBayes’Theorem,intheformofcomparativeratios,intoacommunicationsettingwherethecommunicatorcanuseittodecidewhichcourseofactionismorelikelytoleadtotheircommunicationgoal.Seeingthehypothesesascommunicationstrategieswithvaryingconsequencesandtheobservationasthecommunicationgoal,onecouldthenusedatatodecidewhichstrategywasmorelikelytobeobservedifthedesiredresponseoccurred.Furthermore,thispaperexplainshowthisstrategyiseasyandnaturaltousebecausethehumanbrainhasevolvedinsuchawaythatitremembersandweightsrelevantoccurrencesforanygivensituation,whichcanthenactasdataforthecomparativeratios.

Thenextstepistonowconverttheequationintocommunicationterms,asopposedtomerelymathematicorscientificones.Inthiscase,oneisdecidingwhichcommunicationstrategy,ifenacted,wouldbemorelikelytoproducethecommunicationgoalbasedonpriorevidence.Thecommunicationgoalisnowactingasapieceofdata.Thecommunicationversionoftheequationwouldlooklikethefollowing:

Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 1 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙)Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐴𝑐𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2 𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙) =

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐶1 ∗ Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝐶1)𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐶2 ∗ Pr (𝐶𝑜𝑚𝑚𝑢𝑛𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝐺𝑜𝑎𝑙 𝐶2)

Forthecommunicationversionoftheequation,thehypothesis(H)willstandforthecommunicationstrategybeingconsidered.Thegivenobservation(O)willbethecommunicationgoal,thedesiredoutcomeofaparticularcommunicationstrategy,andthepriorprobability(Pr(H))wouldbethesubjectiveprobabilityofthehypothesis.Thisprobabilitywouldbebasedonallpastdata,takingintoconsiderationvarioussourcesofdatasuchasthesuccessofthehypothesisinobtainingtheresponseinthepast,aswellasotherrelevantinformationrelatedtothegivensubject.Thismeansthatforcommunicationpurposes,theequationwouldread:Theprobabilitythatthegivencommunicationstrategywouldresultgiventhecommunicationgoal(Pr(H/O)),isequaltothepriorprobabilityofthecommunicationgoal(Pr(H))multipliedbytheprobabilitythatthecommunicationgoalwouldoccurgiventhecommunicationstrategy.Thisthenallowsthecommunicatortoweightwoormorecompetingcommunicationstrategiestoseewhichismorelikelytoproducethegivencommunicationgoal.Thiswouldallowthecommunicatoralogical,evidencebasedreasonforchoosingtocommunicateinacertainway.Asopposedtotheepistemicversionofthetheorem,whichtellstheuserwhattobelieve,thecommunicationversiontellstheuserhowtheyshouldact,giventheevidenceandtheircommunicationgoal.Asimpleexampleoftheequationincommunicationtermswouldlooksomethinglikethefollowingscenario.JennyandSallyarefriends.SallyhasdiscoveredthatJenny’sboyfriendischeatingonher.Sallydoesn’tknowifsheshouldtellJennyorlietoher.Sally’sconsiderationwouldthenbethis:


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Goal:ForJennynottobemadatSallyC1:LietoJenny.C2:TellJennythetruth.

Pr (𝐿𝑖𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦 𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑑)Pr (𝐷𝑜𝑛!𝑡𝑙𝑖𝑒 𝑡𝑜 𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦 𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦 𝑛𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑑) =

𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑃𝑒𝑜𝑝𝑙𝑒 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑙𝑖𝑒𝑠 ∗ (𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑑 𝐿𝑖𝑒)𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑜𝑟 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝐽𝑒𝑛𝑛𝑦 𝑏𝑒𝑖𝑛𝑔 𝑚𝑎𝑑 𝑏𝑒𝑐𝑎𝑢𝑠𝑒 𝑜𝑓 𝑡𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ ∗ Pr (𝑁𝑜𝑡 𝑚𝑎𝑑 𝑇𝑟𝑢𝑡ℎ)

ThecommunicatorisdeterminingiflyingtoJennymakesitmoreprobablethatJennywillnotbemadatSally,oriftellingJennythetruthismorelikelytoyieldthatparticularcommunicationgoal.ThePriorProbabilityoftheHypothesis

Thefirstpartoftheequationrequiresthatthepriorbeliefinthehypothesisbetakenintoaccount.Forthepurposeofcommunication,determiningantecedentbeliefinvolveslookingathowoftenthegivencommunicationstrategyhasproducedthedesiredresponseinthepast.Figuringthisoutintoaquantifiablenumberispossibletosomedegree,butforpracticalcommunicationpurposesisunnecessaryasthebrainhasevolvedasystemforrankingandweightingrelevantoccurrences.Thebrainnaturallyextrapolatesandstoresfactsabouthoweverypersonyouhaveinteractedwithhasdealtwithcertainsituations.(Wilson,&Sperber,2004).

Therearetwofactorsthatmustbeweightedwhendeterminingthepriorprobabilityofagivencommunicationstrategy.Thefirstisthenumberoftimesthestrategyhasproducedthedesiredoutputinthegeneralpast.Meaning,howoftenthecommunicatorisawarethatsometime,somewhere,thegivenstrategyhasproducedthedesiredbehavior.Thesecondishowoftenthestrategyhasproducedthedesiredresponseinthegivenindividual.Thedatathatonehasaccesstoforagivenindividualisobviouslyincreasedandmoreaccuratethemoreoneinteractswiththatindividual.Thatistosay,onewillhaveahigherrateofaccuracyindeterminingtheprobabilitythatagivencommunicationstrategywillsucceedwithawell-knownsubject.Evenwithlimitedpastscenarios,wherethereisrestricteddataeitheronthesituation,subject,orboth,thehumanbrainiscapableofusinggeneralpastknowledgeandsmalldetailstoassumeareasonablyaccuratedegreeofpriorbelief.ItisalsointerestingtonotethatmostsubjectiveBayesianswouldarguethatthepriorbeliefdoesn’thavetobeveryaccurateatall,especiallyintheinitialapplication(Koolage,2013).Thismakestheequationverypracticaltouseineverydaylife.Becausehumaninteractioniscloselytiedtofactorssuchascharacter,values,andnorms,evenwithouthavingtheadvantageofpreviouslyencounteringacertainsituationonecouldmakeareasonablepredictionastoadegreeofbeliefthatthegivencommunicationstrategywouldproducethedesiredcommunicationgoalinagivenindividual.Foranexampleofthis,rememberSallyandJenny.SallyhasfoundoutthatJenny’sboyfriendischeatingonher.Sallydoesn’twantJennytobemadather.ShecanlietoJennyandriskJennybeingmadthatSallydidn’ttellher,orshecantellJennyandriskherbeingmadthatSallytoldherbadnews.

Inthisinstancetheconsiderationlookslikethis:

Goal:ForJennynottobemadatSally.


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C1:LietoJenny.C2:TellJennythetruth.

GiventhatSallyhashadaconversationwithJennyabouthowmuchJennydisapprovesofplagiarism,SallyisabletodeducethatJennyhighlydisapprovesofpeoplewhoaren’thonest.Therefore,SallycanassignahighpriorbeliefthattellingJennythetruthislesslikelytomakehermadthanlyingtoher,eventhoughthepairhasneverencounteredasimilarsituation.TheProbabilityoftheObservationGiventheHypothesis

Thesecondportionoftheequationistheprobabilityoftheobservationgiventhehypothesis.Followingtheaboveexample,thismeansthatonewouldobtaintheprobabilityforC1(lying),bydetermininghowprobableitisthatJennywouldbemadatSallyifSallyliestoher.ForC2(honesty)onewoulddeterminehowprobableitisthatSallytellingJennythetruth,thatherboyfriendischeating,wouldmakeJennymadatSally.Thispartoftheequationwouldinvolveonlygeneralhistoricalconsiderations.Thisisbecause,inordertomaintainmentalcohesion,thecommunicatormustbeabletoseparatehowlogicalitisforadesiredresponsetohappengiventhestrategy,versushowprobableitisthattheresponseisgoingtohappengiventheindividual.ConstructingAStrategy

NowthatitisshownhowonecoulduseBayes’Theoremwithcommunicationstrategies,itisworthlookingathowonearrivesatagivenhypothesis.Itisimportanttonotethatforthepurposesofthispaper,oneisusingthismethodofcommunicationasahighlevelmeta-cognitivestrategyformakingdecisions.Thismeansthattheindividualusingthemethodisconsideringallofthefollowinginformationcarefullyandconsciously.Constructingastrategyisthenaverydeliberateaction.Constructingaviablecommunicationstrategynecessitatesthattheuserconsidertheendgoal(s),andwhatactionseemstoresonatewithachievingthesegoals.ThecomputingoftheBayesianPosteriorRatiothenfurtherpushestheusertoconsidertheimportantpastdatatheyhaveregardingthepossibleactions.Itisthispausetocomputethatisvaluableinpracticalapplications.Itrequirestheusertostopandconsiderwhatdata,ifany,theyareconsideringandifthisdataisrelevanttothesituationathand.

EmployingtheChosenCommunicationStrategy

Toincreasecompetenceinanycommunicationsituation,thecommunicatormustnotonlyknowwhatcommunicationstrategytoselect,butalsohowtoenactit,onceithasbeenchosen.Knowinghowtosayordosomething,withwhatphrasing,tone,timing,andplace,isjustasimportantintheprocessasknowingwhattodo.Thismeansthatonceacommunicatorhaschosenthefavoredstrategy,theymustthendecidehowtoemploythatstrategy.Communicationisacomplicatedgiveandtakeprocessthatinvolvesnotonlyexplicitlystatedcontentbutalsoimpliedcontentandnon-verbalcues,suchasbodylanguage.“Themeaningofawordcomesentirelyfromtheword,andentirelyfromthespeaker,althoughonlythelattercontrolsthecontextwhichhelpsdeterminetheword’seffectivemeaning…”(Hamer,1970).Itisthiscontrolofcontextthatthecommunicatormustbewellawareofastheyemploythechosen


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communicationstrategy.Anerrorincontextdeterminationcanresultinawell-chosen,evidentiallysupportedstrategythatdoesnotresultinthegivencommunicationgoal.Ahighlysimplifiedexampleofthisimportancecanbeseeninthefollowingcase.AlexhasbrokenKelsey’sglassbowlthatwasleftprecariouslyonthecounter.AlexwantsKelseytoforgiveherforbreakingthebowl.

Goal:Forgiveness

C1:Alexshouldapologize.C2:Alexshouldsaynothing.

AlexhasdeterminedthattheprobabilitythatKelseywillforgiveherforbreakingthebowlismuchhigherifAlexapologizes.However,thisishighlydependentonthemannerinwhichAlexapologizes.

Goal:ForgivenessC1:Alexapologizessincerely.C2:Alexapologizesinsincerely.

TheprobabilitythatKelseywillforgiveAlexisjustasdependentonhowAlexapologizesasitisonthefactthatsheapologizes.Thisisatricky,addedlayerthatmustbeconsideredbythecommunicatorwhenseekingandimplementingacommunicationstrategythatwillproduceadesiredcommunicationgoal.Implications

Thismethodofconsideringcommunicationcertainlycreatesquestions.Someofthesequestionsareareasforfurtherresearchandsomeofthemareethicalquestionsthatarealsoworthfurtherinquiry.Theclaimsmadeinthispaperareintendedtobenormativeratherthandescriptive.Furtherresearchcouldbedoneindeterminingmoreclearlyhowagivenindividualweightscompetingstimuli;Sperber’sresearchdoesn’texplainwhatmechanismdoesthis,orhowitdoesthis.Ethically,thecommunicatorusingtheequationwouldneedtohavehighstandards.ThereisnoquestionthatusingBayes’theoreminthismannerrepresentsanelementofmanipulation.Apracticedandsensitiveuserwouldbecapableofusinghisorherconsiderationstodeceiveorelicitaresponsethatcouldcauseharm.Thismeansthatiftaught,thereshouldbeemphasisplacedonchoosingconstructiveasopposedtodestructivegoals.Atrulyconstructivegoalwouldbenefitboththeuserandthetargetedrespondent.

Despitetheseconcerns,therearenumerousinstancesinwhichindividualscouldbenefitfromconsideringcommunicationinthismanner.First,itwouldbebeneficialingeneral,everydaylife.Manydisputesarecausedbecausetherewasanerrorinwhatwascommunicated.Thismethodforcestheusertocarefullyexaminemultiplefacetsofcommunication.Theusermustidentifytheendgoaloftheircommunication,questionwhatisrelevant,determinetheprobabilitythatagivenactionwilloccur,andchoosehowtoenactachosenstrategy.Thisgreatlyreducesthechancesthatanunintentionalmistakewillbemade.Additionally,thisstrategycouldbeusedtoexplaincommunicationtothosewhohavetroublegraspingitinmoretraditionalforms.Anexcellentexamplewouldbeasubjectthatsuffersfrom


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autisticdisorderssuchasAsperger’sSyndrome.Theycouldbetaughttolookforsimplerelevancepoints,andthenconsideringtheirgoalcouldconstructstrategiesthattheycouldthenconsiderandpossiblyimplement.Thereisalotofgoodthatcancomefromcombiningdisciplinesandconsideringcommunicationinanewframework.


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References

Andrews,Kristin.DoApesReadMinds?:TowardaNewFolkPsychology.Cambridge,MA: MIT,2012.Print.

Hamer,Colin."MeaningThingsinWords."Ed.DermotMoran.PhilosophicalStudies19.0 (1970):5-10.Web.

Hartman,Stephan,andSprenger,Jan."BayesianEpistemology."(n.d.):1-19.17Aug.2010. Web.5July2014.

Koolage,WilliamJ."LikelihoodTheorem."EasternMichiganUniversity.28Oct.2014.Lecture.

Ramsey."TruthandProbability."HughMellorFoundations:EssaysinPhilosophy,Logic, Mathematics,andEconomics.(1926):58-100.Web.

Sober,Elliot.“IntroductiontoBayesianEpistemology”.31Jan.2000.Teachingmaterialfrom UniversityofWisconsinwebsite.

Wilson,Deirdre,andSperber,Dan."RelevanceTheory."HandbookofPragmatics(2004): 249-280.Web.24Nov.2014.

BrandonWright NoSoftDoctrine

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No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of

Evil Brandon Wright, Grand Valley State University

Abstract

Becauseoftheubiquityofevil,religioussystems,whichaimtoinfluencethewayweliveourlives,mustanswerthreequestions:whatisevil,whydoesevilexist,andhowcanweeliminate,oratleastmanage,evil?Callthisthebroadproblemofevil,asopposedtothetraditionalnarrowproblemofevil.IreconstructtheanswertothebroadproblemofevilfoundinJosiahRoyce’slaterwritingsinthesecondsectionofthispaper.Then,Iexplainwhytraditionaltheodiciesaredeficientanswerstothenarrowproblemofevil.IarguethatRoyce’sanswertothebroadproblemofevilmeritsaresponsefromphilosophersintheAbrahamictraditionsbecause,whileitistheistic—andeventeleological—innature,itdoesnotpresupposetheAbrahamicconceptionofGod,nordoesitsufferfromthedeficienciesoftraditionaltheodicies.

No Soft Doctrine: Royce on the Problem of Evil I.Introduction

TheproblemofevilpresentsoneofthemostseriouschallengestotheAbrahamicconceptionofGod.Theproblemariseswhentwostatementsareconjoined:(1)ifGodexists,Godisomniscient,omnipotent,andomnibenevolent,and(2)evilexists.IfGodisomniscient,thenGodmustknowifevilexists.IfGodisomnipotent,thenGodhasthepowerandabilitytoeliminatethatevil,giventhedesiretodoso.Andfinally,ifGodisomnibenevolent,thenGodmustdesiretoeliminateevil,or,attheveryleast,allunnecessaryevils.Yet,evilexists.ThisseemstoimplythatGodeitherdoesnothavethethreetraditionalattributesasdefinedordoesnotexist.2Callthisthenarrowproblemofevil.

However,evil—henceforthdenotingundesirablestatesofaffairs—affectseveryone,nomattertheirreligiousbeliefs.Sinceevilisamajoraspectofthehumanexperience,religioussystemsmustshoulderthetheoreticalburdenofexplainingit.Threemajorquestionsstandout:

1.MichaelTooley,"TheProblemofEvil,"inTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Summer2015

Edition),EdwardN.Zalta,ed.accessedJuly16,2015,http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/evil/,Introduction.


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whatisevil,whydoesevilexist,andhowwecaneliminate(oratleastmanage)evil?Allreligioussystemsshouldprovideanswerstothesequestions,whichmaycollectivelybetermedthebroadproblemofevil,whetherornottheypresupposetheAbrahamicconceptionofGod.3OnesystemthatanswersthesequestionspersuasivelyanddoesnotpresupposetheAbrahamicconceptionofGodisthephilosophyofreligionproposedbyJosiahRoyce(1855-1916).4

Inthenextsection,IreconstructtheanswertothebroadproblemofevilthatJosiahRoyceoffersinhislaterwritings.5Inthethirdsection,Ioutlinetwotraditionaltheodicies6andarguethattheyaredeficientresponsestothenarrowproblemofevil,drawinginspirationfromRoyce’smid-careeressay“TheProblemofJob.”IthenarguethatphilosophersintheAbrahamictraditionsshouldaddressRoyce’sanswertothebroadproblemofevilbecauseitseriouslychallengesthestatusquoinWesternphilosophyofreligion.First,itdoesnotpresupposethetraditionalconceptionofGod,whileremainingtheistic.Second,whileitdoesnotsufferfromthedeficienciesofsometraditionaltheodicieswhichtrytojustifyGod’sdecisiontocreateaworldwithevil,itstillprovidesateleologicalaccountoftheexistenceandresolutionofevil.

II.Royce’sAnswertotheBroadProblemofEvil

ImentionedthatRoycedoesnotpresupposethetraditionalconceptionofGodandthatthishasmajorimplicationsforhisanswertotheproblemofevil.7WewilldiscussRoyce’sconceptionofGodtowardtheendofthissection,afterlayingthefoundationofRoyce’sviewsonevil.Royceunderstandsevilinthetypicalsensebutwithapragmatictwist.AccordingtoRoyce,“evil”denotesanyundesirablestateofaffairswhichservestounderminethepurposesofarationalagent.8Wecanalsoderiveadefinitionformoralevilfromthis:anyundesirablestateofaffairscausedbyanagent’swillfulactionorinactionwhichservestounderminethepurposesofarationalagent.Royce’scommitmenttopragmatismcomplements,ratherthan

3.Philosopherswhoattempttoanswerthenarrowproblemofevilwillfindthemselvesansweringthe

broadproblemalongtheway,thoughtheymaysimplytaketheanswerstothe“management”questionforgrantedfromtheparticulartraditiontheyareworkingin.Forexample,aChristianphilosopherwhoproposesasoul-makingtheodicywillcertainlydefineevilandsaywhyitexists(i.e.,tofacilitatethesoul-makingprocess).ThatsamephilosophermaythenimplicitlyorexplicitlydefertotheBibleforitsteachingsoncopingwithevil.

4.IwillnotspeculateastowhetherornotRoyce’sconceptionofGodcanbeconsideredanon-traditional,butstillChristianconceptionofGod,thoughRoyceseemstoindicatethathethinksthisisthecase.

5.ForthereconstructionofRoyce’sanswer,IlimitmyinquirytoTheSourcesofReligiousInsight(1912)andTheProblemofChristianity(1913).

6.SeeTooley,Section4.AtheodicyisanattempttogiveareasonwhyGod(traditionallyconstrued)mightalloweviltoexist,andhowGodcouldremainomnibenevolentindoingso.Thisisincontrasttoatotalrefutation—anattempttoprovethattheexistenceofevildoesnotofferevenprimafaciegroundtoargueforthenon-existenceofGod.Also,afullexplicationofthedistinctionbetweenacommunalunderstandingoftheproblemofevilandanindividualisticonewouldbemuchtosolongforthepresentwork.Instead,thisdiscussionwillfocusonthefirstnovelfeatureofRoyce’sanswer:thenon-traditionalconceptionofGod.

7.JacquelynAnnK.Kegley,JosiahRoyceinFocus,(Bloomington,Ind.:IndianaUniversityPress,2008),80.8.JosiahRoyce,TheSourcesofReligiousInsight,(WashingtonD.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,

2001),216.


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conflictswith,thestandarddefinitionofevilsinceGodisarationalagentandactsofmoralevilostensiblyundermineGod’swillintheworld(oratleast,God’sintentionsfortheworld).RoycedoesnotdefendtheAbrahamicconceptionofGodfromthenarrowproblemofevil.Still,heagreeswithtraditionalmonotheiststhatpeopleexistinafallenstate,fallshortofadefinite,ideallife,andneedasaviortoachievethatlife.9However,onRoyce’sview,peoplearenotevilbynature.Theyperformevilactionsbecausetheyaremorally-detachedindividuals.Inotherwords,eachindividualhasinterests,goals,anddesireswhichcanobjectivelyconflictwiththoseofothers.10Ifleftunrecognizedandunattended,moraldetachmentleadspeopletoignoretheneedsofothersandtotakesomuchprideintheirownstrivingsthattheyfailtoseethevalueinother’sconflictingstrivings.11Roycecallsthisunhappystate“socialblindness.”12Inordertofindthecurefortheafflictionofsocialblindness,wemustinvestigatetheoriginofthemorally-detachedindividual.

Peoplearemorallyindividuatedinthreeways:bythedistinctnessoftheirexperience,theoutwardinaccessibilityoftheirthoughtsandintentions,andbythepresumptionthat“deedsandtheirdoersstandinone-onecorrespondence,”13or,inotherwords,peoplepresumethatcollectiveactionismerelythesumofindividuals’actions.Roycearguesthatthislastideaisofrecentvintageandisnotsupportedbyexperienceindailylife.14Onhisview,acommunityisasuperhumanbeingthatiscomposedof,butnotreducibleto,itsmembers.Byextension,thatbeing’sactionsaremorethanthesumofitsmembers’actions.15Membersofacommunityovercometheirmoral-detachednessbyunitinginthe“spirit”oftheircommunity.Thatis,bytakingupsharedvaluesandpurposesandactingintheworldtogetherasone.TheseRoyceancommunitiescomeinvarioussizesandpersuasions,sowehaveplentyofcandidatestochoosefromforanillustration.Ahypotheticalyouthsoccerleaguewilldonicely.

Imaginethat,someyearsago,agroupofparentsdecidedthatthelocalneighborhoodchildrenshouldhavemoreopportunitiestoplaytogetherandgettoknoweachother.Theypitchedintobuyavacantfieldandsoccerequipmentandstartedholdinggameseveryweekend.Thoseparentsformedacommunitybyactingtogetherforthesakeofasharedpurpose.Eachmembernowconsidersthepastactionsoftheleagueaseventsthatbelongtotheirownpast,andthefutureactionsoftheleagueaspartoftheirownfuture.Forexample,BillandSarahbothrememberpaintingthelinesonthefieldbeforetheveryfirstgame,andlookforwardtothedaywhentheleaguecanaffordascoreboard.Likeanindividualperson,acommunityactsintheworldpresently,hasapast,andwillhaveafuture.Thesumofallthosesharedandanticipatedexperiences—andthemeaningsthoseeventsholdforthemembers—

9.Ibid.,28-29.10.JosiahRoyce,TheProblemofChristianity,(WashingtonD.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,

2001),194.11.Kegley,JosiahRoyceinFocus,93.12.Royce,ProblemofChristianity,378.13.Ibid.,238.14.Ibid.,240.15.Ibid.,123.


26

constitutethe“self”ofthecommunity.16Yet,noteverycommunityhasthesamepeacefulexistenceasourhypotheticalsoccerleague.Often,thepurposesofacommunityaresubvertedby—orexistentiallyopposedto—instancesofevil,andmembersmustthwartthatevil.Roycecallspeople’spracticaldevotiontoahighercommunallife—includingstrugglingtogetheragainstevil—“loyalty,”17anditistothatconceptthatweturnnow.

Recallthataninstanceofevilisanyundesirablestateofaffairsthatunderminesthepurposesofarationalagent.Underthisheading,wewoulddowelltoincludepain,disease,andpestilence.Finitebeingscanonlysurvivewithinaverynarrowrangeofacceptableconditionsandareseverelylimitedintheirabilitiestomaintainthoseconditions.Sincehumanbeingsarelimitedintheirindividualexperienceandknowledgeoftheworld,theyformcommunitiestosurvive.Asamatterofcourse,thosecommunitiescreateandfollowmoralcodesthatvarywidely.Thismeansthatthepracticesofonecommunityareoftenconsideredevilbyanother.Howcanwereconcilecompetinganddiametricallyopposedloyaltiesthatareequallymoralontheirownterms?Andhowcanwedosowithoutembracingrelativism?Towardthisend,wewillneedaregulativeprinciple:aprinciplewhichislogicallypriortothemoralcodeofanyparticularcommunity,butthateverycommunitycanactupon.Furthermore,nocommunityshouldhavereasonedgroundstorejectoursought-forprinciple,nomatterhowfiercelytheymightopposeanyotherparticularcommunity.

Thatprincipleisthis:recognize“thespiritualunityofalltheworldofreasonablebeings”asthetruecauseofloyalty.18Then,seektoactualizethatunitythroughtheparticularcausesthatmakeupone’scommunallife.Itisnecessaryandhonorabletodevoteoneselftoone’scommunity,butitisnecessarytoensurethatone’scommunitycontributestotheoverallgrowthofloyalty.Communitiesthatarerootedinhatinganddestroyingothercommunitiesarenotobjectsofgenuineloyalty.Thosecommunitiesretardorreversetheoverallgrowthofloyalty,becausetheyexistsolelytodividepeoplefromoneanother.Theyexplicitlyunderminethetruecauseofloyalty,which,aswewillsee,isdivineinnature.Onthecontrary,solongasapersonisloyal,andthatloyaltyisnotgiventoahatefulcause,thatpersonisdoingtheirmoralandspiritualduty.19Atthispoint,itwouldbetemptingtoinferthatthehighestmorallifeisasingle-mindedcampaigntoridtheworldofevil.Yet,Royce’skeenestinsightintotheexperienceofevilisthatthisisblatantlyfalse.

Sofar,wehavebeentreatingevilassomethingthatsimplyshouldnotexist.Thatseemsintuitive.Afterall,curing100%ofmalariacasesisnecessarilybetterthancuring99%ofmalaria

16.SeeChapter2ofKegley’sJosiahRoyceinFocusforathoroughexplicationofRoyce’sviewsontheself.17.Royce,ProblemofChristianity,269.Seealso:FrankOppenheim,Royce’sMaturePhilosophyofReligion,

(NotreDame,Ind.:NotreDamePress,1987),142.“Higherlife”hereismeantintwosenses.First,inthesensethatdevotionenrichesaperson’slife,and,second,inthesensethattheperson’slifebecomesmoreattunedtothedivinelife.

18.Royce,SourcesofReligiousInsight,205.Emphasisremovedfromtheoriginal.19.Moreprecisely,thatpersonisdoingtheirmoralandspiritualdutyaswellasafinitebeingcan.On

Royce’sview,nofinitebeingcanfullyliveuptothedemandsofmorality.SeeDwayneA.Tunstall,“Royce’sEthicalInsight:ItsRelevanceforToday”,PaperpresentedatJosiahRoyce:Pragmatist,PhilosopherofReligion,Ethicist,Hamburg,Germany,October2,2015.


27

cases.20Still,onRoyce’sviewtheretrulyareexperiencesofevilthatnoonewouldwishtoremovefromtheirlives.21

Whethertheyoccurthroughconsciousseparationoraccidentaldeath,theevilsthatoftencausethemostpsychological,emotional,andspiritualdamagearethelossesoflovedones.22Supposingthatonecanforgiveanunfaithfulspouseorafriend-turned-enemy,thatperson’sbetrayalcanneverbeforgotten.Evenso,thatgriefisnotsomethingwewouldwanttodisposeofentirely.Onemightwishtonumboneselftothepainifitisunbearable,butnottothesensitivityorconnectionthatcausesthepain.Forexample,apersonmaywishtonolongergrieveadepartedlovedone,butthatpersonwouldcertainlynotwishtoloseallthememoriesoftheirlovedone,norwouldtheyhopetoneverloveanotherpersonagain.Spiritualstrengthisacquiredbyrecognizingandretainingsocialsensitivitythroughthegrievingprocessandusingittodeepenrelationswithothers.23Theresultofthatstruggleissorrow.

Inordertorecognizethestrengththatsorrowoffers,wemusttakeastepbackfromthepainofgriefandrecognizewhyitexists.Aseveredtiebetweenintimatelyconnectedpeoplegivesrisetotheworstimaginablepain.Thisimpliesthathumansareprofoundlysocialbeingswhohavethecapacitytointimatelyconnectwithothers.Sorrow’sunsettlingprevalencepresentsareligiousinsight:spiritualstrengthisnotwonbymerelyavoidingpossiblesufferingbecause,inthisworld,everyonewillhavesorrows.Neitherone’sworldnorone’sfellowsareperfect.Individualsgainspiritualstrengthbydevelopingthepatienceandcouragetofaceafuturefullofmeaningfulrelationswithoutbitternessorresentment.

Withthisinmind,thenextstepistoendurethehardship.Finally,itisnecessarytodrawupontheinsightofsorrowandreinvestoneselfinthesocialreality.Onemustdeepenrelationshipsorformnewoneswhileremainingawarethatsorrowinthefutureisguaranteed.24Thereisnopain-freewaytorestorebalancetolife,butlifecanbecomemuchmoremeaningfulintheprocess.Byspinninggriefintosorrow,onecanenjoynewandrenewedloyalties—thededicationtovitalcommunitiesandcausesthatenrichone’slife.However,thissolemnworkbecomesespeciallydifficultwhenone’sgriefiscausedbybetrayal.

Whenapersonbetraystheircommunity,theysetoffagrievingprocesswhichisoftenfatalforthecommunity.Thelossesincurredbythebetrayalarepermanentbecausethebetrayercannotundothedestructivedeed.Asmuchasthebetrayermaywishtheycouldturnbacktime,punishmentonlyremindsthemthattheirdeedisirrevocable.Moreover,thecommunity’smemoryoftheevildeedscarsanyremainingaffectionorsympathythatthecommunitycanextendtothebetrayer.However,astraumaticasitis,theaftermathofabetrayalisfertilegroundforthecreativepowerofcommunalaction.Memberswhoarewilling

20.Assuming,ofcourse,thateliminatingtheremainderdidnotinvolvedoinganythingterriblyimprudent.21.Royce,SourcesofReligiousInsight,239.22.Thesecasesofpersonallossmaybecategorizedaseithermoralornon-moralevils.Anelderly

grandmotherdyinginhersleepisobviouslynotcommittingamoralevil,sincethegrandmotherdidnotchoosetodevastateherfamily.However,ifthatsamegrandmotherwasintentionallygivenafataldoseofmedicationbyatwistedattendant,herdeathwouldbeaninstanceofmoralevil.

23.Royce,SourcesofReligiousInsight,252.24.Ibid.,253.


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tobearthesorrowofbetrayalandworktoreestablishtheircommunitybringaboutgoodsthatwouldhavebeenimpossiblehadthebetrayalnottakenplace,bymanifestingthespiritoftheircommunity.25Toillustratethispoint,weneedtooutlinetheprocessofatonement.IntheProblemofChristianity,RoyceillustrateshisideaofatonementthroughaninterpretationoftheBiblicalstoryofJoseph.26Joseph’sbrotherssoldhimintoslaverybecausetheywerejealousofthepreferentialtreatmenthereceivedfromtheirfather.YearslaterduringatimeofgreatfamineJoseph’sbrotherstravelledtoEgypt,whereJosephservedasPharaoh’strustedadvisor,tobuysupplies.Josephrevealedhisidentitytohisbrothersandsentthembacktotheirfatherwithampleprovisions.OnRoyce’sview,whenJosephprovidedforhisfamilyhewasengagedinacreativereversalofhisbrothers’betrayalor,inotherwords,anactofatonement.Therearethreecentralelementstosuchactsofatonement.Thefirstisthattheactisperformedbysomepersonotherthanthebetrayer.Thesecondisthattheactismadepossiblebythespecificbetrayalforwhichitatones.Thethirdelementisthattheactofatonementmakestheworldbetterthanitwasbeforethebetrayal.27Inthiscase,Josephcouldnothavehelpedhisbrothersifhewerenotsoldasaslave.Josephchosetoseethroughhisgrief,endureit,andmakeitpartofaprocessofreconciliation.Coincidencemayhavebroughtthemtogetherspatially,butonlyJoseph’sactionscouldhavereunitedthefamilyspiritually.NowthatthefoundationofRoyce’sviewshasbeenlaid,wecanmakethedivinethreadrunningthroughthediscussionexplicit.

Recallthat,forRoyce,acommunityisasuperhumanbeing.Assuch,communitiescanbeafflictedbyakindofsocialblindnessliketheonethatwediscussedatthebeginningofthesection.Whenmemberssetouttodothingsonbehalfoftheircommunity,theyareexpressingloveforoneanotherandforthatbeingthatunitesthem:thespiritoftheircommunity.28However,theloveforacommunitycan,itself,becomeastumblingblockonthepathtowardcreatingmoreinclusivecommunities.Idonotneedtoregalethereaderwithhorrificstoriesfromourspecies’past.Sufficeittosaythatpeopleareinconstantdangerofallowingthelovetheyhavefortheircommunitytobecomeobsessiveandexclusionary.29Whenmembersrefusetorecognizethevalueofexternalcommunities,theirowncommunitiesstagnate,ossify,orturnmalignant.Thisissocialblindnessscaleduptothecommunallevel.Themembersmistaketheirfinite,falliblecommunityforthehighesthumangoodanddonotseektoactualizeanyhighercommunity.Onthecontrary,Royce’sviewisthatthegreatestgoodisthestruggletoactualizethehighestcommunity,i.e.,theUniversalCommunity.

TheUniversalCommunityispreciselythat“spiritualunityofalltheworldofreasonablebeings”mentionedabove.30Finitecommunitiesandtheirmembersworktowardactualizingthisidealbyguardingagainstencroachingblindnessandremaininginclusive,uplifting,and

25.Royce,ProblemofChristianity,180.26.Ibid.204.27.Ibid.180.28.Ibid.265.29.Kegley,JosiahRoyceinFocus,93.

30.Royce,SourcesofReligiousInsight,205.Emphasisremovedfromtheoriginal.


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faithfultotheSpiritoftheUniversalCommunity,whichguidesthecommunity-buildingprocess.TheSpiritoftheUniversalCommunity,whichisRoyce’squasi-analoguetotheAbrahamicGod,isthedivinebeingwhocallsuponindividualstoconquerevilbyexercisingtheirloyaldevotiontocommunities—especiallythroughatoningdeeds—andcallsuponcommunitiestoseekcommongroundandsolidaritywitheachother.

Thecommunity-buildingprocessisalsothe“evil-overcoming”processbecausecommunity-buildingharmonizesthewillsofrationalbeingsandunitesthemundercommoncauses.Thismeansthatallindividualsandcommunitiesaretaskedwiththetemporal,yetendless,processofovercomingevil.ThetaskistemporalbecauseittakesplacewithintheprocessesoftheworldastheSpiritovercomesevilstepbystepthroughthetriumphsofitsmembers.Thetaskisendlessbecause,whileindividualscanworktowardactualizingtheidealoftheUniversalCommunity,theywillnecessarilyfail.Aslongastherearefinitebeingstherewillbeinhospitableconditionsandconflict.31Eveninprinciple,wecannotatoneforeveryinstanceofevil.However,thosewhoacttowardthatidealstateofatonement,andstrivetobringlastingpeacetothisfallenworld,takeuptheSpirit’scauseastheirown,andtherebyfindtheirplaceinthedivinelife.32

ReaderswhoarefamiliarwiththeargumentfromevilandthetypicalrebuttalsitdrawswillwonderwhatRoyce’sanswerhastooffertothediscussion.InthenextsectionIwillofferapreliminaryanswertothatquestion.III.TwoTraditionalAnswerstotheProblemofEvil

InthissectionIwillarguethatRoyce’sanswertotheproblemofevilhasdistinctadvantagesovertwotraditionaltheodiciesbecauseitdoesnotpresupposethetraditionalconceptionofGod.Tomaketheadvantagesexplicit,however,wewillneedtoacquaintourselveswiththosetwotraditionaltheodicies:soul-makingandfreewill. Soul-makingtheodiciespresumethathumanspiritualdevelopment,culminatingintheachievementofaspiritualidealordainedbyGod,issupremelyvaluable.Infact,theypresumethatGodcreatedhumanbeingsfortheexpresspurposeofattainingthatidealandearningtherighttodwellwithGod.33Thatbeingsaid,spiritualdevelopmentcomesataprice.PeoplemustendureevilinordertoacquirethecharactertraitsnecessarytodevelopaccordingtoGod’splan.SinceGodcreatedaworldwherepeoplecandevelopthroughtheirstruggleswitheviland—atleastpotentially—achievethespiritualidealsetoutforthem,Godremainsmorallyperfect.Withthisunderstanding,theexistenceofGodisconsistentwiththeexistenceofevil.Nowwemovetofreewilltheodicies. Freewilltheodiciespresumethatlibertarianfreewill,whenitisusedtoworshipGodandwhenitisinaccordancewithGod’smoraldictates,issupremelyvaluable.Thesetheodices

31.Indeed,therecouldbenofinitebeingsatallwithouttherealsobeingsomeconditionswhich

underminetheirexistence.32.Royce,ProblemofChristianity,186.33.RenéVanWoudenberg,“Chapter12:ABriefHistoryofTheodicy,”inTheBlackwellCompaniontothe

ProblemofEvil,ed.JustinP.McBrayerandDanielHoward-Snyder(Somerset,NJ.:JohnWiley&Sons,Incorporated2013),177.


30

positthatGodcreatedpeoplewithfreewillsothattheycouldworshipandactmorallyoftheirownaccord.34Althoughpeoplemaymisusetheirfreewillandactimmorally,thegreatvalueofitsproperusemorethanjustifiestheexistenceofevil.Therefore,GodmusthavecreatedpeoplewithfreewillinordertocreateamorallyperfectworldandtheexistenceofGodisnotinconsistentwiththeexistenceofevil.

Roycewouldarguethatonbothviews,Godisresponsiblefortheexistenceofunnecessaryevils.35Anall-lovingGodwhoisresponsiblefornecessaryevilscanremainall-loving,butaGodwhoallowsunnecessaryevilstotranspirecannotbeconsideredall-loving.Therefore,thetheodiciesareinadequateanswerstothenarrowproblemofevil.Todelineatetheseunnecessaryevils,wewillbeginwiththesoul-makingaccount.Onthisview,Godisresponsibleforthesufferingrequiredbythedevelopmentalprocessasitexistsnow.ItmayverywellbethecasethatpersonsdevelopspirituallybystrugglingwithevilandeventuallyearntherighttodwellwithGod.Butifthatisthecase,itisonlysobecauseGoddesignedtheworldinsuchawaythatsufferingisnecessaryforspiritualgrowth.Allotherthingsbeingequal,aworldwherepeopledonothavetosuffertoacquiregodlycharactertraitsisbetterthanoneinwhichtheymust.Anyattempttojustifythesoul-makingprocessbyappealingtothegoodsaffordedbythatprocessfailsbecause

[T]alkofmedicinalanddisciplinaryevil,perfectlyfairwhenappliedtoourpoorfate-boundhumansurgeons,judges,jailors,orteachers,becomescruelly,evencynicallytrivialwhenappliedtoexplainthewaysofaGodwhoistochoose,notonlythephysicalmeanstoanend,buttheveryPhysisitselfinwhichpathandgoalaretoexisttogether.36

Beingomnipotent,Godcouldhavejustaseasilydesignedasoul-makingprocessthatdidnotinvolvetheexperienceofsufferingbutchosenottodoso.Now,weconsiderthefreewillaccount.

Ifsomeonewatchedamanstumbleoutofabar,fumblewithhiskeys,andproceedtodriveawayclearlyintoxicated,wewouldholdthatpersonaccountablefornotinterveningiftheywereabletodoso.Ofcourse,anomniscient,omnipresent,andomnipotentGodisperfectlyabletointervenewhenever,wherever,andinwhateverfashionthatGoddesires.Soevenifthevalueoffreewillisgranted,Godcouldensurethatinnocentpeopledonotdiewhendrunkpeopletakethewheel.Drivingundertheinfluenceneednotcauseanyonebutthedriverand,perhapshiswillingriders,tosuffer.Yet,therearemanyinnocentvictimseveryyear.ThetheodiciesproposethatGodteststheinnocentbylettingthemsufferatthehandsoftheguiltyandpurifiestheirsoulsthroughpain.Thosearenotexpressionsofomnibenevolence.Becauseofthis,neitherafreewilltheodicynorasoul-makingtheodicycanrescuethetraditionalconceptionofGodfromthenarrowproblemofevil.

34.VanWoudenberg,“BriefHistoryofTheodicy”,185.35.JosiahRoyce,“TheProblemofJob”,inStudiesinGoodandEvil,(NewYork:D.AppletonandCompany,

1898).Seealso:Kegley,JosiahRoyceinFocus,79-80.36.Royce,“TheProblemofJob”,9.


31

UnlikethetraditionalconceptionofGod,theSpiritoftheUniversalCommunitydoesnotcreatetheworld,butexpressesitselfthroughtheexistingprocessesoftheworld.37ThismeansthattheSpiritcannotconceivablybearresponsibilityfortheexistenceofevil.Furthermore,whilethetraditionalGodallowseviltoexisttosuititsownsalvifictastes,theentireaimoftheSpiritistoovercomeevilbybringingfinitebeingstogetherincommunity.

AfullcomparisonofRoyce’sanswertothetraditionalanswerswillhavetowaitforanotherwork.However,IhaveshowninthisworkthatRoyce’sanswerisinnowaydeflationaryordismissiveoftheproblemofevil,solongastheproblemisproperlyunderstood.Roycedoesnotconcedethat“evil”is,say,anon-cognitivistascriptioninthewaysomephilosophershavetriedtoarguethat“murderiswrong”cantranslateto“boomurder!”Norisevilreducibletoanaturalistictruismsuchas“eviliswhateverhomosapiensdonotpreferintheirenvironmentsorcondoneinthebehavioroftheirfellows.”Royceprovidesateleologicalanswertotheproblemofevilthathasclearadvantagesovertraditionaltheodicies,butwhichdoesnotsufferfromtheattendantdifficultiesofthosetheodicies.HisanswermeritsscholarlyattentionbecauseitposesaseriouschallengetotheAbrahamicstatusquointhephilosophyofreligion.IV.Conclusion Inthispaper,IintroducedthenarrowproblemofevilandJosiahRoyce’sanswertothebroadproblemofevil.AfterIreconstructedRoyce’sanswer,Igavesomepreliminaryreasoningastowhytwotraditionalanswerstothenarrowproblemofevilfail.ThenIshowedthatRoyce’sconceptionofGoddoesnotfaceevenaprimafacieexistentialthreatfromtheexistenceofevil,anditssolemissionistobringabouttheresolutionofevilbybringingfinitebeingsintocommunity.Thus,Royce’sansweristheisticandteleological,butitdoesnotsufferfromthedeficienciesfoundinsometraditionalanswerstotheproblemofevil.Forthesereasons,andthefactthatanswerstothenarrowproblemofevilarefraughtwithdifficulties,IarguethatRoyce’sanswertothebroadproblemofevilmeritsaresponsefromphilosophersofreligionintheAbrahamictraditions.

36.SeeKegley,JosiahRoyceinFocus,157-8.ForabriefsummaryofRoyce’sviewsonthemonotheisticdoctrineofcreation.


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References Foust,MatthewA.“ConfessYourContradictions:Schelling,Royce,andtheArtofAtonement.”Journalof

SpeculativePhilosophy26,no.3(2012):516-530.

Garchar,Kim.“Sin,Sorrow,andSuffering:ARoyceanResponsetoTheseDeeperTragediesofLife.”AmericanJournalofTheology&Philosophy,vol.33,no.1(January2012):57-73.

Kegley,JacquelynAnnK.JosiahRoyceinFocus.Bloomington,Ind.:IndianaUniversityPress,2008.

––––.“JosiahRoyce.”InternetEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.AccessedJuly15,2015.http://www.iep.utm.edu/roycejos/.

Oppenheim,FrankM.Royce’sMaturePhilosophyofReligion.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,1987.

––––.ReverencefortheRelationsofLife:ReimaginingPragmatismviaJosiahRoyce’sInteractionwithPeirce,James,andDewey.NotreDame,Ind.:UniversityofNotreDamePress,2005.

Parker,KellyA.“JosiahRoyce.”InTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Summer2014Edition).EditedbyEdwardN.Zalta.AccessedJuly15,2015.http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2014/entries/royce.

Royce,Josiah.TheSourcesofReligiousInsight.NewYork:C.Scribner’sSons,1912.Reprint.WashingtonD.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,2001.

––––.TheProblemofChristianity.Chicago:TheMacMillanCompany,1913.Reprint.WashingtonD.C.:CatholicUniversityofAmericaPress,2001.

——.“TheProblemofJob”,inStudiesofGoodandEvil.D.AppletonandCompany,NewYork:1898.

––––.ThePhilosophyofLoyalty.NewYork:TheMacMillanCompany,1908.AccessedonlineJuly25,2015.https://goo.gl/G5mzA4.

Smith,JohnE.“Royce’sSpirituality:TheIntegrationofPhilosophicalReflectionandReligiousInsight.”IntroductiontoJosiahRoyce:SelectedWritings.EditedbyJohnE.SmithandWilliamKluback.Mahwah,NJ:PaulistPress,1988.AccessedonlineJuly24,2015.https://goo.gl/J1kQ7u.

Tooley,Michael."TheProblemofEvil."inTheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Summer2015Edition).EditedbyEdwardN.Zalta.AccessedJuly16,2015.http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2015/entries/evil/.

VanWoudenberg,René.“ABriefHistoryofTheodicy,”inTheBlackwellCompaniontotheProblemofEvil.EditedbyJustinP.McBrayerandDanielHoward-Snyder.Somerset,NJ.:JohnWiley&Sons,Incorporated2013.ProQuest.

ClaireAineKeefer EarlyModernSocialJustice

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Minds and Bodies: Early Modern Social

Justice Clare Áine Keefer, Eastern Michigan University

Abstract InASeriousProposaltotheLadiespartsIandII,MaryAstellarguesthatsocialconditioningimpactswomen’sself-imageinsuchawayastopreventthemfromstrivingforscholarlyachievement.Astell’ssolutionistoallowwomentowithdrawfromsocietyintodedicatedschoolsforwomenandbywomen,asanalternativetomarriageandfamilylife.Inthispaper,Iwillexploresomeoftheimplicationsofthatargument,howitmightbeexpandedtoothermarginalizedpopulations,andarguethatdespiteAstell’sproposedsolutionbeingproventocreateatleastasmanyproblemsasitsolves,thegroundworklaidinherargumentscanformabasisforafunctionalmodelofeducationaljusticetoday.Wehavelearnedthat“separate,butequal”educationisnotasolutiontotheproblemof“achievementgaps”betweenprivilegedandmarginalizedpopulations.Ifsocialconditioningimpactseducationaldriveandachievementforwomen,thenitalsoimpactsotheroppressedpopulations.Imaintainthatsubvertingthisstructuraloppressionisakeytodismantlingitandachievingeducationaljustice.Thetypicalfoundationsforeducationaljusticecomefromtheimperativethateducationmakesbettercitizensorthateducationallowsfurthereducationonatopic.Imaintainthatifthegoaliseducationaljustice,itisnecessarytoovercomethedeterminantsofsocialconditioning.

Minds and Bodies: Early Modern Social Justice

Introduction

RenéDescartesisfrequentlycitedasthe“fatherofmodernphilosophy”.Hisimpactuponthefieldischallengingtooverstateastherearestillphilosopherswrestlingwiththequestionsheraisedsomefourcenturiesago.MuchlesswellknownisMaryAstell,saidtobethe“firstEnglishfeminist”(Batchelor,2002).Thoughshewasnotprogressivebytoday’sstandards,beingaroyalistandbothpoliticallyandreligiouslyconservative,stillshewroteandpublishedinthelateseventeenthandearlyeighteenthcenturiesonthetopicofwomen’sintellectualadvancementandequalityofreason.WhileDescarteshimselfexpressedabeliefinequalitybetweenthesexes,hisconceptofmind/bodydualismhasoftenbeencitedbyscholarsascontributorytothesystemic,institutionaloppressionofwomen,onthebasisoftheirbeing


34

deemedlessrational,andmorecloselyaffiliatedwiththebodyanditssensualnaturethanmen.Muchscholarshiphasbeendoneonthistopic,andafullexplorationofthatconnectionisoutsidethescopeofthispaper,butabriefsurveywillbeincludedforcontext.Thereaderisencouragedtoexaminemorecloselytheworksreferencedforadetailedtreatmentofthattopic.AstellpresentedaphilosophicalaccountofmindsandbodiesthatdifferedsignificantlyfromthatofferedbyDescartes,holdingthathumansareaunionofmindandbody,andthatonecanactupontheother.Shepositsametaphysicsofdifferentiatedindividuals,eachwithuniqueabilities,whereinexperiencedirectlyimpactsanindividual’sabilitytoreason.Itisuponthisgroundthatshebuildstheargumentthatwomenarenolesscapableofreasonthanmen,butthatsocialconditioningleadsthemtobelieve–andthusactasif–theyare.Inthispaper,IwillexploreAstell’sargumentsincontrastwiththoseofDescartestoexplicatethisearlymodernexampleofasocialjusticeorientatedepistemologyandsomeofitsimplications,aswellastoexploretheapplicabilityofherconceptstoday.MindBodyDualism InhisDiscourseontheMethod,RenéDescartesclearlyanddefinitivelyestablishedmind/bodydualism:“thisme—thissoulthatmakesmewhatIam—isentirelydistinctfromthebody,iseasiertoknowthanthebody,andwouldstillbejustwhatitisevenifthebodydidn’texist”(Descartes,p.15).IntheculminationofMeditationsonFirstPhilosophy,herevisitedthis,writing:

Myessenceconsistsentirelyinmybeingathinkingthing.[…]becauseontheonehandIhaveaclearanddistinctideaofmyself,insofarasIammerelyathinkingthingandnotanextendedthing,andbecauseontheotherhandIhaveadistinctideaofabody,insofarasitismerelyanextendedthingandnotathinkingthing,itiscertainthatIamreallydistinctfrommybody,andcanexistwithoutit.(p.51)

Thoughmind/bodydualismwashardlyanewwayofthinkingaboutbeing,Descartes’formulationoftheideacametobebroadlyembraced.Apositiveresultofthiswasthefurtheranceofmedicine.AdoctrineoftheCatholicChurchcalled“theresurrectionofthebody”maintainsthatforapersontogotoHeavenattheResurrection,thebodyneedstobeintact.Asaresultofthisdoctrine,manycountriesprohibitedorseverelylimitedthestudyofanatomythroughdissection.Dr.NeetaMehta,inherarticle,“Mind-bodyDualism:ACritiquefromaHealthPerspective”,writes:“[T]herewasareligiousprohibitiononthestudyofhumananatomythroughdissection.Descartes,throughmind-bodydualism,demythologizedbodyandhandedoveritsstudytomedicine”(Mehta,2011).Whilethisiscertainlyapositiveoutcome,noteveryuseofDescartes’workwassobenign.AsElizabethV.Spelmanwrites:

[W]henonerecallsthattheWesternphilosophicaltraditionhasnotbeennotedforitscelebrationofthebody,andthatwomen'snatureandwomen'sliveshavelongbeenassociatedwiththebodyandbodilyfunctions,thenaquestionissuggested.Whatconnectionmighttherebebetweenattitudestowardthebodyandattitudestowardwomen?(1982,p.110)


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Dr.SarahE.JohnsonhasananswertoSpelman’squestion:“Asallegedlymoresubjecttothebodythanmenwere,womenpossessedlessreasonandlackedcontrolovertheirpassions,determinedinlargepart,ofcourse,bythebody’shumouralbalance”(p.12).Johnsongoesontoexplainthat“[n]otonlywerewomenmorebodilythanmen,buttheirbodieswerealsophysiologicallyinferior[…]matchingtheireasilyswayedmentalconstitutions”(2014,p.12).WhilstthismisogynydidnotoriginatewithDescartes,hisformulationofmind/bodydualismattheveryleastcontributedtothejustificationsfortheattitudetowardwomen,andthustotheoppressionengagedinundersuchjustification.GenevieveLloydprovidesastarkexample,quotingHegel:

Womenareeducated–whoknowshow?–asitwerebybreathinginideas,bylivingratherthanbyacquiringknowledge.Thestatusofmanhood,ontheotherhand,isattainedonlybythestressofthoughtandmuchtechnicalexertion.(qtd.inLloyd,38)

Lloydadds,“Inwesternthought,malenesshasbeenseenasitselfanachievement,attainedbybreakingawayfromthemore‘natural’conditionofwomen”(1984,p.38).Thisisnottosaythatthesejustificationshaveeverbeenrequiredinhumanhistorytofuelprejudiceagainstanymarginalizedgroup–infact,itisoftenthattheseargumentsareposedasameansoflegitimizingalreadyextantprejudices.JustaswiththeprejudiceagainstBlackpeopleinthewritingsoftheearlymodernperiodofphilosophy–asexploredbymanycriticalracetheorists,includingEmmanuelEze,BarbaraHall,andDebraNails,justtonameafew–misogynyhasalonghistoryofpseudo-scientificandostensibly“rational”argumentsmadebypredominantlywhitementoattachaveneerofreasontoamarkedlyunenlightenedemotionalreactiontoperceivedthreatstotheirhegemony.Theveryconceptof“reason”carriesabiastowardwhite,Europeanmasculinity.EqualityandGenderingofReasonWecanlookbackasfarasPythagorasandsee“female”equatedwith“bad”,and“male”with“good”inhisfamoustableofopposites.PhyllisRooney,in“GenderedReason:SexMetaphorandConceptionsofReason,”writesthat,withtheriseofEnlightenmentideals,manyoftheimagesofmaleasdominant,causal,andactiveandfemaleasincomplete,insubjugation,andpassivemayappeartobeleftbehind,“butwegetwhatisatbestashiftinthearticulated,explicitclaimsaboutreasonandmind”(p.82).ShegoesontonotethatDescartes“allowedthat‘evenwomen’coulddevelophisrationalmethod.”InspiteofDescartes’generositytowardwomen,SusanBordofindsinDescartesaculminationofa“rebirthingofnature(asmachine)andknowledge(asobjectivity)”,resultingina“supermasculinizedmodelofknowledgeinwhichdetachment,clarity,andtranscendenceofthebodyareallkeyrequirements”(p.50).GenevieveLloyddelvesintothisconceptinherbook,ManofReason:“Male”and“Female”inWesternPhilosophy.Shewrites,“through[Descartes’]philosophy,Reasontookonspecialassociationswiththerealmofpurethought,whichprovidesthefoundationsofscience,andwiththedeductiveratiocinationwhichwasoftheessenceofhismethod”(p.49).Shecontinues:


36

WeowetoDescartesaninfluentialandpervasivetheoryofmind,whichprovidessupportforapowerfulversionofthesexualdivisionofmentallabour.WomenhavebeenassignedresponsibilityforthatrealmofthesensuouswhichtheCartesianManofReasonmusttranscend,ifheistohavetrueknowledgeofthings.(1984,p.50)

This“CartesianManofReason”isonewhohassufficientfreetimetospendlongperiodsinmeditation,whoholdsfasttoreason(therealmofthemind),asopposedtonon-reason(therealmofthebody),henotonlyjudges,butspecificallyjudgeswell,and,asDescartesenumeratesinhisDiscourseonMethod,heiscapableof“tellingthetruefromthefalse”;heisabletolearnanythingjustaswellasanyoneelseiftheysimplytaketheirthoughtsalongtheappropriatepath(p.1).ThoughDescartesheldthat“evenwomen”coulddevelophisrationalmethod,commonsentimentofthedayheldthatwomen“arenaturallyincapableofactingprudently”and“necessarilydeterminedtofolly”(Astell,2014).Hereisenshrinedthebinarybetweenmindandbody,andthus,betweenmenandwomen.Mind/BodyUnions

IncontrasttoDescartes’dualism,MaryAstellassertsthatpeopleareunionsofmindsandbodies.InASeriousProposaltotheLadies,shewrites:“WeknowandfeeltheUnionbetweenourSoulandBody,butwhoamongstusseessoclearly,astofindoutwithCertitudeandExactness,thesecrettieswhichunitetwosuchdifferentSubstances,orhowtheyareabletoactuponeachother”(Astell,1994,1994,p.101)?

Ifallpeopleareunionsofbothmindandbody,thenthemarginalizationofwomenonthebasisoftheir‘naturalcondition’isrevealedasproblematic.Ratherthanbeingcreaturesof‘purereason’,menarejustas‘bodily’aswomen,justassusceptibletopassions,tempers,andtheotheraspectsoftheirphysicalityasimpedancestotheirreason.ItisuponthisgroundthatAstellbuildsherargumentthatwomenarenolesscapableofreasonthanmen.Butifthisisso,howdoweexplainthegrossdisproportionalityofeducationalachievementbetweenmenandwomenduringtheearlymodernperiod?AccordingtoAstell,itisnothingmorethanthenaturalresultoftheoppressionresultingfromthebeliefinmind/bodydualism,andthenatureofwomenas“morebodilythanmen.”

SocialConditioninganditsEffectsuponReason

Astellarguesthatsocialconditioningisthecauseofanachievementgapbetweenwomenandmen,educationally.Inrespondingtotheaccusationthat“womenarenaturallyincapableofactingprudentlyorthattheyarenecessarilydeterminedtofolly”shewrites:

Theincapacity,iftherebeany,isacquired,notnatural...Thecausethereforeofthedefectswelaborunderis,ifnotwholly,yetatleastinthefirstplace,tobeascribedtothemistakesofoureducationwhich...spreadsitsillinfluencethroughallourlives.(Astell,2014,pp.55-56)

Shegoesontomoreclearly,andratheracerbically,casttheblameatthefeetofpatriarchalsociety:


37

Womenarefromtheirveryinfancydebarredthoseadvantageswiththewantofwhichtheyareafterwardsreproachedandnursedupinthoseviceswhichwillhereafterbeupbraidedtothem,sopartialaremenastoexpectbrickwheretheyaffordnostrawandsoabundantlycivilastotakecareweshouldmakegoodthatobligingepithetofignorantwhichoutofanexcessofgoodmannerstheyarepleasedtobestowonus!(2014,p.56)

Herargumentisthatexperiences,particularlyexperiencesofoppressionanddegradation,trainapersontobelievethatalltheyarecapableofisthattowhichtheyareconstantlybeingtoldtheyarelimited.Itispopular,particularlyineducationalcircles,tosumthisupas“studentsrise(orfall)tothelevelofexpectations.”Themajorityofwomeninherdaywereuneducatedanddidnotactivelyseekouteducation,notbecausetheywereincapableofbeingeducated,butbecausesocietyhadconditionedthemtobelievethatGodcreatedthemas“lesser”andincapable.Insuchacircumstance,Astellassertsthatwomenadoptthenotionthattheyareconstantlybeingtold,thattheyare“naturallyproudandvain,”anddonotstrivebeyondthat.Thisleadsintoafeedbackloop,whereinwomendonotstrive,thustheydonotachieve,confirmingtheperceptionthattheyareincapableofachievement,andtherefore,opportunitiesforself-improvementare“wasted”onthem.Thisscenariocaneasilybeseeninmanytimesandplacesoverhumanhistory,continuingtothepresentday,andwomenarebynomeanstheonlyvictimsofsuchoppression.SocialJusticeImplicationsoftheEffectsofSocialConditioning

Thisfeedbackloophappenstopeopleoccupyingmanyotheraxesofoppression.Wespeaktodayofachievementgapsininnercityschools.Wesegregatedifferentlyabledstudentsinto“specialeducation”classes,regardlessofthenatureorseverityoftheirdifferentiationofability.WehadaSupremeCourtJusticecommentingaboutthosewhobelievethat“itdoesnotbenefitAfrican-Americanstogettheminto[eliteuniversities]wheretheydonotdowell,asopposedtohavingthemgotoaless-advancedschool,[…]wheretheydowell”(Fisherv.UTAustin,2015).Astell’ssolutionwastoestablishseparateschoolsforwomen,butUnitedStateshistoryhasclearlydemonstratedtheresultsofa“separatebutequal”educationalsystem.How,then,canthissituation–whichisobviouslystillaproblemtoday–beresolved?

SociallyConsciousEducation

Anyattempttorectifythestructuralinjusticebuiltintoeducationalmodelsneedstoaddressbothsidesofthisissue.JoséMedina,inhisbook,TheEpistemologyofResistance:GenderandRacialOppression,EpistemicInjustice,andResistantImaginations,assertsthattheexperienceofbeingoppressedcan,insomeways,presentanepistemicadvantage,inthatoppressionprovokestheformationoflearningprocessesthattheprivilegedhavelessopportunitytodevelop.Theoppressed,hewrites,“tendtobebetterlisteners,havingamoreacuteattentivenesstohermeneuticalgaps”(Medina,2012).Oppressedagentsseemoreoftheoppressivestructuresthanprivilegedagents,astheyaretheoneswhokeenlyfeeltheeffectsofthosestructures.Privilegedagentsoftenstruggletoseeinstitutionaloppressioninthestructuresofsociety,muchlessthewaysinwhichtheyareparticipatory.Thisiswhy,ifwewishtodismantlestructuraloppressionandcreateajusteducationalsystem,educationmust


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activelyaffirmthelucidityandcapabilitiesofvulnerableagentsandworktocounterthesocialconditioningtheseagentsoftenhavetoovercome.Further,suchasystemmustalsoactivelyengageineducatingtheignoranceofprivilegedagentsonthetopicofsystemicoppression.Educationalprogramsmust,atalllevels,bothreflectandteachdiversity.Thestudyofculturesandpeopleoccupyingaxesofoppressionmustceasetobesegregatedintovarioustracksofculturalstudies,and,instead,beincludedaspartofcorecurriculaatalllevels.IfwewouldliveuptoDescartes’beliefintheequalityofability,wemustfollowinthestepsofMaryAstell,andacceptthatthedifferencesbetweenusarejustthat:differences,notlimitations.Differentbodiesarenotlesserbodies,andneitherarethemindsorcapacitiestoachieveassociatedtherewith.


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References

Uebel,M.(1996).UnthinkingtheMonster:TwelfthCenturyResponsestoSacreanAlterity.InJ.Cohen,MonsterTheory:ReadingCulture.Minneapolis:univeristyofMinnesotaPress.

Wright,A.(2013).Monstrosity:TheHumanMonsterinVisualCulture.London:I.B.Tauris&CoLTD.

Asma,S.T.(2009).OnMonsters:AnUnnaturalHistoryofOurWorstFears.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress.

Astell,M.(2014).ASeriousProposaltotheLadies.(S.L.Jansen,Ed.)Saltar'sPointPress.

Astell,M.(1994).SelectionsfromASeriousProposaltotheLadies,PartII.InM.Atherton(Ed.),WomenPhilosophersoftheEarlyModernPeriod(pp.99-125).Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.

Batchelor,J.(2002,March21).MaryAstell.RetrievedNovember7,2015,fromLiteraryEncyclopedia.

Benhabib,S.(1994).InDefenseofUniversalism.YetAgain!AResponsetoCriticsofSituatingtheSelf.NewGermanCritique.

Bordo,S.(1999).SelectionsfromTheFlighttoObjectivity.InFeministInterpretationsofRenéDescartes(pp.48-69).UniversityPark,PA:ThePennsylvaniaStateUniversityPress.

BrownUniversity.(n.d.).LiberMonstrum:TheBookofMonstersoftheSea.RetrievedOctober7,2014

Cohen,J.(1996).MonsterTheory:ReadingCulture.Minneapolis:universityofMinnesotaPrintingPress.

Creed,B.(1994).TheMonstrousFeminine:Film,Feminism,andPyschoanalysis.NewYork:Routledge.

Eagleton,T.(2014).TheBodyasLangauge.CanadianReviewofComparativeLiterature,11-16.

Descartes,R.(2005,June).DiscourseontheMethodofRightlyConductingone’sReasonandSeekingTruthintheSciences.(J.Bennett,Trans.)

Descartes,R.(1993).MeditationsonFirstPhilosophy.(D.A.Cress,Trans.)Indianapolis:HackettPublishingCompany,Inc.

Fisherv.UniversityofTexasatAustin,etal,14-981(SupremeCourtoftheUnitedStatesDecember9,2015).

Foucault,M.(1999).Abnormal:LecturesattheCollegeDeFrance.NewYork:Picador.

Johnson,S.E.(2014).StagingWomenandtheSoul-BodyDynamicinEarlyModernEngland.Surrey:AshgatePublishingLimited.

Kimmel,M.(2002).TowardaPedagogyoftheOppressor.TikkunMagazine.

Kristeva,J.(1982).PowersofHorror:AnEssayonAbjection.NewYork:ColumbiauniversityPress.


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Lloyd,G.(1984).ManofReason:"Male"and"Female"inWesternPhilosophy.Minneapolis:UniversityofMinnesotaPress.

Nuzzo,L.(2013).FoucaultandtheEngimaoftheMonster.IntJSemiotLaw.

Nanda,S.(1996).Hijra.RetrievedNovember4,2014

Martins,H.(2010).Wittgenstein,thebody,itsmetaphors.DELTA.

Medina,J.(2012).TheEpistemologyofResistance:GenderandRacialOppression,EpistemicInjustice,andResistantImaginations.OxfordUniversityPress.

Mehta,N.(2011).Mind-bodyDualism:AcritiquefromaHealthPerspective.MensSanaMonographs,9(1),202-209.

Pender,S.(1996).NoMonstersatResurrection.InJ.Cohen,MonsterTheory.Minneapolis:theuniversityofMinnesotaPress.

SymbolicandStructuralApproachestoPlace.(n.d.).RetrievedNovemeber23,2014,fromPegasServer-univeristyofCentralFlorida:http://pegasus.cc.ucf.edu/~janzb/courses/hum3930b/foucault1.htm

Spelman,E.V.(1982,Spring).WomanasBody:AncientandContemporaryViews.FeministStudies,8(1),pp.109-131.

Richter,D.(n.d.).LudwigWittgenstein(1889—1951).RetrievedNovember12,2014,fromInternetEncylopediaofPhilosophy.

Rooney,P.(1991).GenderedReason:SexMetaphorandConceptionsofReason.Hypatia,6(2),77-103.

KRaleighHanson PredictingtheTruth

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Predicting the Truth: Overcoming Problems with Poppers Verisimilitude Through Model Selection Theory K Raleigh Hanson, Washington State University

Abstract

Thepurposeofthisresearchistoinvestigatethepossibilityofusingaspectsofmodelselectiontheorytoovercomebothalogicalproblemandanepistemicproblemthatpreventsprogresstowardsthetruthbeingmeasuredwhilemaintainingarealistapproachtoscience.KarlPopperbegansuchaninvestigationintotheproblemofprogressin1963withtheideaofverisimilitude,buthisattemptsfailedtomeethisowncriteria,thelogicalandepistemicproblems,forametricofprogress.AlthoughphilosophershaveattemptedtofixPopper’sverisimilitude,nonehaveseemedtoovercomebothcriteriayet.MyresearchanalyzesthesimilaritiesbetweenPredictiveAccuracy(PA)andAkaike’sInformationCriterion(AIC),bothpartsofmodelselectiontheory,andPopper’scriteriaforprogress.Ifindthat,inidealdatasituations,itseemsthatPAandAICsatisfybothcriteria;however,innon-idealdatasituations,thereareissuesthatappear.Theseissuespresentaninterestingdilemmaforscientificprogressifitturnsoutthatourtheoriesareinnon-idealdatasituations,yetPAandAICseemtobebetteroverallindicatorsofscientificprogresstowardsthetruththanotherattemptsatovercomingtheproblemsofPopper’sverisimilitude.

Predicting the Truth: Overcoming Problems with Popper’s Verisimilitude Through Model Selection Criteria

Oneproblemwhendiscussingscientificprogressiswhetherornotourcurrenttheorieshavemadeanyprogresstowardsthetruth,orhavejustbecomebetterpredictivetools.Thereisanintuitivenotionthatnewertheoriesaretruerthanoldertheoriesbecausetheyappeartoidentifymoretruecausesofatargetsystem.However,itturnsoutthatitisnotoriouslydifficulttoprovideananalysisofwhatitmeansforonetheorytobeclosertothetruththananothertheory.Theissueisevenmorepronouncedwhenconsideringthepessimisticmeta-induction:sinceallofourpasttheorieshavebeenfalse,itislikelythatallofourcurrenttheorieswillalsobefalseandourfuturetheoriesaswell.Thisposesaproblemforscientificrealismwhichholdsthatidentifyingthetruecausesofatargetsystemisanimportantaimofscience.


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Whilethediscoveryofnewcausesthataffecttargetsystemsdoesseemtobeanimportantpartofscientificprogress,itisnotclearthatincreasingtheabilitytopredictthebehavioroftargetsystemswillalwayscorrespondtoknowingmorecausesofthatsystem(ForsterandSober1994).Infactthereissomeevidencethatourbestpredictivemodelsandtheoriesmightnotalwaysbeourbestexplanatorymodelsandtheories(Goldsby2013).However,ifwewanttodefineprogressinrealistterms,thereneedstobesomeaccountofwhatproximitytothetruthisandhownewertheoriesgetusclosertothetruth.Iwillrefertothesetwoconcernsasthelogicalproblemandtheepistemicproblemrespectively.

AnearlyattempttoovercomethelogicalandepistemicproblemswasintroducedbyKarlPopperinhisworkConjecturesandRefutations.Popper(1963)calledhisattempttoovercomethetwoproblemsverisimilitude.Theconceptbehindverisimilitudeisintuitiveinnature–atheoryisclosertothetruthifitmakesmoretrueclaimsandfewerfalseclaims–buthislatercommentatorswouldpointoutcriticalflawssuchthatverisimilitudewasfoundtobeinadequateforsolvingeitherthelogicalortheepistemicproblem.AnumberofattemptshavebeenmadetoreviseorfixPopper’slanguagetomakeverisimilitudework,butnonehaveovercomeboththelogicalandepistemicproblems.However,ifprogresscanbedefinedasovercomingthelogicalandepistemicproblems,thenitispossibletheremayexistaframeworkelsewherethatsatisfiesthatcriteria.

Onepossibleframework,predictiveaccuracy(PA),isameasureoftheabilityofamodeltopredictnewdatagivenolddata.Oneplausibleassumptionisthatthetruemodelwillbemaximallypredictivelyaccurate,soincreasingpredictiveaccuracywillgetoneclosertothetruth.AccordingtoForsterandSober(1994),PAmaybeestimatedusingAkaike’sInformationCriterion(AIC).IfPAcanbeameasureofclosenesstothetruth,thenusingamodelselectionframeworklikeAICcanselectmodelsclosertothetruth.If,inturn,AICcanselectamodelthatisclosertothetruthbecauseitismorepredictivelyaccuratethancompetingmodels,AICcanbeusefulforestimatingprogress.Inthisway,PAovercomesthelogicalproblembybeingameasureofhowonemodelcanbeclosertothetruththananother,andAICovercomestheepistemicproblembyshowingthat,whenanewmodelisselected,itisbecauseofbothitsincreasedproximitytothetruthaswellasitsabilitytopredictnewdata.

ThemainconcernforthispaperistoinvestigatewhetherPAandAICactuallycanovercomethelogicalandepistemicproblems.Iwillbeginbyexplainingwhyanotionofverisimilitudeisimportantfortheprogressofscience.IwillthenprovidesomebackgroundtoPopper’saccountofverisimilitude,andIwillintroducemodelselectiontheoryandexplainhowPAandAICappeartosatisfythecriteriademandedbyverisimilitude.IwillarguethatPAandAICcanovercomebothproblemswhileinanidealdatasituationanddiscusswhatmayoccurwhileinnon-ideadatasituations.Finally,IwilladdresstheproblemsofPAandAICasaformofverisimilitudeanddiscusswhatsortofprogresswemayactuallyhavemade.WhyisProgressTowardstheTruthImportant?

Therearetwobasicaccountsofthegoalsofscientificinquiry:realismandinstrumentalism.Scientificrealismmaintainsaconcernforunderstandingthetruthbehindphenomenaincludingthingsthatcan’tbedirectlyobserved.Evenifthepessimisticinductionisright,realismholdsthatnewertheoriescanbeclosertothetruththanoldertheories.For


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example,itseemscorrecttosaythateventhoughCopernicus’sheliocentricmodelofthesolarsystemisfalse,itisstillclosertothetruththanPtolemy’sgeocentricmodel.

Unlikerealists,instrumentalistsviewscientifictheoriesastoolsthathelpcaptureorpredictobservablephenomenaregardlessofthetruth-valueofthetheoriesthemselves(Chakravartty2014).Inthisway,aninstrumentalistvaluestheoriesthatcanpredictoraccountforobservablephenomenaevenifwecan’tknowthetruthabouttheunobservablecommitmentsofthattheory(VanFraassen1980).Instrumentalistsbelievethatthetruthofunobservablesisinaccessibleandscienceshouldbeaimedatpredictingobservablephenomenaratherthanidentifyingallandonlytruecauses. AlthoughPopperwasarealist,hiscriticswouldpointoutthathishypothetico-deductiveapproach38tosciencebyfalsifyingtheoriesonlywinnowsawayataninfinitesetoffalsetheoriesandthisdoesnotconstituteactualprogress.Popper’s(1963)verisimilitudewashisattempttoshowthatfalsetheoriescouldhavedegreesofclosenesstothetruth,andthatremovingfalsetheoriesdoesconstituteprogresstowardsthetruth.Popperhopedthatverisimilitudewouldallowhimtobearealistwhilestillholdingtohishypothetico-deductiveapproachtoscientificinquiry.IfprogresstowardsthetruthisthegoalofscienceasPopperclaims,thendiscardinganinstrumentalistapproachisanimportantstep.Popper’sVerisimilitude

Poppercorrectlyidentifiedthelogicalandepistemicproblemsthatmustbeovercomeforverisimilitudetoprovideameasureofprogress.Theaimsofverisimilitudecanbeeasilyformulatedasthefollowingquestions:

(A)Canweexplainhowonetheorycanbeclosertothetruth,orhasgreaterverisimilitudethananother?(B)Canweshowthatscientificpracticehassometimesledtotheorieswhichareclosertothetruththantheirpredecessors?(Forster;ms)39

Thefirstquestionaddressesthelogicalproblem:wemusthaveanaccountofhowonetheoryisclosertothetruththananother.Thesecondquestionaddressestheepistemicproblem.Givenourepistemiclimitations,wemustbeabletodeterminethattheselectionofonetheoryoveranotherisactuallyprogresstowardsthetruth. Ofcourse,Popperhadtoclarifyhowthedegreesoftruthwouldbemeasured.Popper's(1963)intuitivedefinitionofverisimilitude,Vs,oftheoryAisbaseduponameasureofthetrueandfalsecontentsofA.TheCt(A)ismadeofallofthelogicalconsequencesofAandcanbedividedintotruthcontent,CtT(A),andfalsecontent,CtF(A).TruthcontentofAisthesetofallclaimsthataretrueinCt(A),andfalsecontentisthesetofallclaimsthatarefalseinCt(A).CtF(A),subtractedfromCtT(A)providesameasureofverisimilitude:

38Popper’s(1959)hypothetico-deductiveapproachwaspresentedinhisLogicofScientificDiscovery.AccordingtoPopper’smethod,ahypothesisshouldbeformedinawaythatcanbedeductivelyfalsifiedratherthansupportedbyevidence.39ForstercreditsanunpublishedmanuscriptbyAlanMusgraveforthisformulationofthelogicalandepistemicproblems.


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Vs(A)=CtT(A)-CtF(A)(Popper1963,234)

ThisintuitivedefinitionprovidesthebasicnotionbehindverisimilitudewithinasingletheorybydeterminingthenumberoftrueandfalselogicalconsequencesoftheoryA.Theintuitivenotionbehindthismeasureissimple;itprovidesameasureVs(A)baseduponCtT(A)andCtF(A).Byquantifyingthetrueandfalsecontentoftheories,thisdefinitionwouldallowtwotheories,AandB,tobecomparedasfollows: 𝑉𝑠 𝐴 > 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 > [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 − 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ] Theintuitivedefinitionisagoodfirstpassatthelogicalproblem,butrealtheoriesaremorecomplicated.Forexample,assumetherearetwotheories,AandB,andthattheoryAandtheoryBarebothfalse.Toexplainthisconcept,Popper(1963)offersthefollowingexampleforanygiventheory:assumethattodayisMondayandtheoryAstatesthattodayisTuesday;althoughtheoryAisfalse,itstillentailstruelogicalcontentsuchastodayisnotWednesdayandtodayiseitherMondayorTuesday(Popper1963).Becausethereareaninfinitenumberofconsequences,thePopper’sfirstpasscan’tactuallyserveasameasureofverisimilitude.

Popperimproveduponhisfirstpassbyusingset-theoretictermstocreateacontrastivedefinitionofverisimilitude.Popper’s(1963)contrastiveverisimilitude(PCV)canbestatedasfollows:

(PCV)𝑉𝑠 𝐴 < 𝑉𝑠 𝐵 ↔ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ⊂ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ∧ [𝐶𝑡! 𝐵 ⊆ 𝐶𝑡! 𝐴 ]

ThatistosaythatforBtohavegreaterverisimilitude,BmustmakeeverytrueclaimmadebyAandatleastoneadditionaltrueclaimnotmadebyA,andeveryfalseclaimmadebyBmustalsobemadebyAwithoutanyadditionalfalseclaims.

Asanexample,considerPtolemaicastronomyandCopernicanastronomy.Forthesakeofsimplicity,supposethattheonlydifferenceincontentbetweenPtolemaicastronomyandCopernicanastronomyisthelocationofthesunandtheEarth.CopernicanastronomymakesonetrueclaimnotmadebyPtolemaicastronomy,theEarthrevolvesaroundthesun.PtolemaicastronomymakesonefalseclaimnotmadebyCopernicanastronomy,thesunrevolvesaroundtheEarth.IfPCVholds,CopernicanastronomyhasgreaterverisimilitudebecauseitmakesallthetrueclaimsthatPtolemaicastronomymakesplusanadditionaltrueclaim,allthefalseclaimsmadebyPtolemaicastronomyarealsomadebyCopernicanastronomy,andCopernicanastronomymakesonefewerfalseclaim.PopperhadexampleslikethisinmindwhenhedevelopedPCVtosatisfythecriteriaforverisimilitude.

TheProblemwithPopper’sVerisimilitude PCV,however,isalsoproblematicinasimilarmannertoPopper’sintuitivedefinition.Workingindependently,PavelTichý(1974)andDavidMiller(1974)bothdiscoveredacriticallogicalflawtoPCV.TichýandMillerbothpointedoutthattwocompetingfalsetheorieswillnevermeetthesubsetrelationsPCVlaysoutbecausewheneveranewtrueconsequenceisadded,anewfalseconsequenceisaddedaswell.Considerthefollowingclaims:


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P1:ThesunrevolvesaroundtheearthP2:TheplanetsmoveinperfectcirclesC3:TheEarthrevolvesaroundthesun

Ofcourse,wenowknowthatP1andP2arefalseandC3istrue.ThePtolemaicmodelsaysP1andP2aretrue.TheCopernicanmodelsaysP2andC3aretrue.Nowconsiderthefollowingclaim: C4:P2andC3C4isfalsebecauseanyconjunctionthatcontainsonefalseconjunctisalwaysfalse.ItisalsoafalseclaimthatisnotcontainedwithinthePtolemaictheory.Thiscanbecalledtheconjunctionproblem.AtrueclaimmadebytheoryBbutnotmadebytheoryAcanbeconjoinedwithafalseclaimmadebytheoryBtocreateanewfalseclaimnotmadebytheoryA.Thus,PCVwillfail.

TheincomparabilityoffalsetheoriesisoneoftheconsequencesthatdevelopedfromanalysisofPopper'stheoryofverisimilitude.Tichý’sandMiller’streatmentsofPopper'sworkshowthatitisimpossibletoaddtrueconsequencestoatheorywithoutalsoaddingfalseones,andequallyimpossibletosubtractfalseconsequenceswithoutalsosubtractingtrueones.TwotheoriescannotbecomparedintermsofscientificprogresstowardsthetruthasPopperhasdefinediteitherasanintuitivenotionorthroughPCV.

ApplyingModelSelectionasVerisimilitude Iftheconcernofverisimilitudeistoproduceresultsthatshowtheoryprogressionismovingtowardsthetruthbyovercomingthelogicalandepistemicproblems,itmaybepossibletolooktoformsofmodelselectionthatcouldservethesamepurpose.Amodelissimplyasetofequationsthatcontainanumberofadjustableparametersthatisusedtoexplainorpredictaphenomenon(Forster2000).Amodelcanbebrokendownintothefollowingparts:parameters,variables,anderrorterms.Considerthefollowingtoymodels: 𝑀1 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒 𝑀2 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒 𝐹𝐼𝑇 𝑦 = 7𝑥! + 0Intheabovemodels,yisthedependentvariable,x1andx2areindependentvariables,a,andbareadjustableparameters,andeisanerrortermtocorrectforobservationalerrors.FITisafittedmodelwherealltheparametersarefixed.M1andM2representfamiliesofcurvesorfittedmodels.Forexample,M1representsallthecurvesthatcouldoccurwhenvaluesareappliedtotheparameters.NotethatFITisamemberofthefamilyoffittedmodelsofM1(andM2).40Thedependentvariableisthemeasurablequantityofinterest,andtheindependentvariablesarethecausesthatinfluencethatquantity.

Modelselectionisconcernedwithfittingmodelstodata,aprocesscalledcurvefitting.Consideragraphofcollecteddata.Fromarealistperspective,itisassumedthatthereisatrue

40AllofthefittedmodelsofM1arewithinthefamilyofM2wherebequals0.


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curvethatgeneratesthedata(giveortakeobservationalerror).Thegoalofmodelselectionistofindamodelthatisasclosetothetruecurveaspossiblegiventheavailabledata.Practicingscientistsknowthatwhenthedatasetissmall,simplermodelstendtobebetterpredictorsthanmorecomplexmodels.Infact,itiswellknownthatcurvesthatperfectlygothrougheverydatapointtendtobepoorpredictorsbecausetheyoverfitthedata.Theproblemwithoverfittingisthatitmistakesobservationalerrorforatruecauseofthetargetsystem.Ifthegoalofscientificrealismistodiscovertruecauses,andmodelselectioncanbeusedtoidentifytruecausesofatargetsystembyavoidingoverfittingandincreasingPA,itmaybepossibletousemodelselectioncriteriatoovercometheproblemsofverisimilitude.PredictiveAccuracyandAIC

Predictiveaccuracy,asdefinedbyForsterandSober(1994),istheabilityforaselectedmodeltopredictnewdatagivenexistingdata.Insituationswherethereislittledataavailable,asimplemodelmaybemorepredictivelyaccuratethanamorecomplexone,butasmoredatabecomesavailable,thechoiceofmodelsmayberevisedbecausethesimplermodelfailstobeaspredictivelyaccurate.Forexample,indatapoorsituations,asimplemodellikeM1maybemorepredictivelyaccurate,but,astheamountofdataincreases,amorecomplexmodellikeM2maybeselectedbecauseofitsgreaterabilitytopredictnewdata.

Althoughtherearemanytypesofmodelselectiontheories,thispaperisconcernedwithAICduetoitsrelationtoverisimilitude.Forster(2000)explainsthatanimportantpartofAICisthat“theconclusionsofAICare...aboutitsclosenesstothetruth”(213).Ifthetruecurveismaximallypredictivelyaccurate,andifAICchoosesthemaximallypredictivelyaccuratecurvegiventhedataavailable,increasingPAcanovercomethelogicalproblemandAICshouldovercometheepistemicproblem.

ThepurposeofAICistominimizetheKullbach-Leiblerdistance41(K-L)betweenpotentialfittedcurveswithinafamilyandthetruecurverepresentedbythedata(Forster2000).K-Ldistance,asdefinedbyBurnhamandAnderson(2002),indicatesthedistancebetweenacandidatemodelandthetruecurve.However,sinceK-Ldistancecannotbecomputedwithoutapriorknowledgeofthetruecurve,aselectioncriterionlikeAICmustbeused(BurnamandAnderson2002).AIC,then,issupposedtoprovideanestimationoftheclosenesstothetruthofamodel.Sober(2008)providesthefollowingformulationofAIC:

𝐴𝐼𝐶(𝑀) =!" 𝐿𝑜𝑔 Pr 𝐷𝑎𝑡𝑎 𝐿 𝑀 − 𝑘

Inthisformulation,L(M)representsthelikeliestfittedmodelofMgiventhedataavailable.AIC(M)isfoundbytakingtheloglikelihoodofL(M)andsubtractingapenaltyforcomplexity,k.ThetermkrepresentsthenumberofparametersinthemodelandisusedtopreventAICfromoverfittingamodelgiventhedatawhenmodelsarebeingcompared.Complexmodelsalwaysfitthedatabetterthansimplermodels,butasnotedearlier,complexmodelsarenotalwaysbetterpredictorsduetoproblemsofoverfitting.Byhavingthecorrectionforcomplexity,AICis

41ItisworthnotingthattheK-Ldistanceisnotatruedistancebecauseitdoesnotsatisfythetriangleinequality.However,forthepurposesofthispapertheterm“distance”workstoclearlyrelatetheconceptofclosenessorproximitybetweencurves.


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abletoprovideareliableestimateofthemodel’sPA.Thus,AIConlyselectsamodelwithagreaternumberofparameterswhentheloglikelihoodovercomesthekpenalty. BecauseAICscoresaredependentonthesizeofthedataset,astheamountofdataincreases,AICcouldselectmorecomplexmodels.Forexample,assumethattherearethreecandidatemodels: 𝑀1 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑒 𝑀2 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑒 𝑀3 𝑦 = 𝑎𝑥! + 𝑏𝑥! + 𝑐𝑥! + 𝑒Inadatapoorsituation,AICmightfavorthesimplermodelsuchthatthefollowinginequalityholds:AIC(M1)>AIC(M2)>AIC(M3).Aswegathermoreevidenceandthesizeofthedatasetincreases,theAICmightrecommendM2overM1iftheAICscoreofM2isgreaterthanM1.Ifitistruethatx2isanewcauseaffectingthesystem,thenitmayseemthatincreasingPAwilllikewiseincreaseclosenesstothetruth.Inthisway,theuseofPAandAICmakesgreatprogressdealingwithboththelogicalandepistemicproblems.ForsterandSober(1994)indicatethatminimizingK-Ldistancetothetruecurveisthesameasmaximizingpredictiveaccuracy.WhenselectingamodelwiththebestAICscore,themodelbeingselectedistheclosestmodeltothetruecurvegiventheavailabledata. ThecontrastivenatureofPAandAICalsoseemtoovercometheepistemicproblemthatPCVfailedtodo.Asnewdataisgathered,AICmayselectadifferentfamilyofcurveswithgreaterpredictiveaccuracythanthecurrentmodel.BecausethereisanexistingmetricoftruthwiththeAICscore,obtainingabetterscoreandincreasingPAprovidesacontrastiveviewofprogresssimilartowhatPopperhadattemptedtodowithPCV.IntheexamplesofM1,M2,andM3above,whenAICselectsM2overM1,anincreaseinclosenesstothetruthisbeingmadealongwithanincreaseinpredictiveaccuracy.Thatis,thenewmodeliscapturingmoretruecausesofthetargetsystemwhileincreasingtheabilitytoaccuratelypredictnewdata.WhenAICFails However,theabilityforPAandAICtoovercomethelogicalandepistemicproblemsisbasedonidealdatasituation.Indatapoorordatarichsituations,therearecomplicationsthatariseandcreateinterestingdilemmas.Assume,forexample,thereisatargetsystemthathasthreecausespreviouslyidentified;however,thesizeofthedatasetissmall.Eventhoughwemayknowtherearethreecausesofthetargetsystem,AICmayselectasimplermodelwithonlyonecausebecauseitwillhavegreaterpredictiveaccuracyinsteadofamodelthatincludesallthreecausesandisclosertothetruth.Thiswrinklemayseemminor,butitshowsthatAICmaybetrackingourabilitytopredictnewdataratherthantrackingatheory’sclosenesstothetruthinsuchawaythat,whileitcanovercomethelogicalproblem,itonlydoessoinidealdatasituations.However,theepistemicproblemisstillansweredsince,asdataincreases,AICselectsmodelsthatdoidentifymoretruecausesofthetargetsystemasthepredictiveaccuracyincreasesforthosemodels. Beforeturningtothenextdilemma,theetermforobservationalerrormustbediscussed.Allofourscientificinquiryissubjecttoobservationalerrorornoisethatisincludedinadataset.AICassumesthatobservationalerrorispresentandaccountsforit,butthevery


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presenceofobservationalerroriswhatleadstoagreaterproblembehindAIC.ThereisapossibilitythatAICwillfailindatarichsituationsbyselectingmodelsthatarefurtherfromthetruth.Whiletheerrortermincludedinmodelsissupposedtodealwithobservationalerrors,asdatasetsgetlarger,thereisachancethatAICwillrecommendanadditionalparameterthatisnotacauseofthesystembeinginvestigated.Inotherwords,ourmodelselectionframeworkmightbetrackingthecauseofobservationalerrorandmistakenlyattributingitasacauseofthesystemunderinvestigation.ForsterandSober(1994)explainthatAICwasdesignedtoestimatethesizeoftheoverfittingfactor,buttheyalsomentionthattheprocessisfallible.GiventhepossibilityforAICtorecommendanerrortermasanewcause,wearenowleftwithaninterestingdilemmawhereineitherthelogicalproblemortheepistemicproblemwillreassertitself.Iwillconsidereachhornofthedilemmaseparately. Iwillbeginbyaddressingthefirsthorn.Ifourgoalistodiscoverallthetruecausesaffectingthetargetsystem,thenindatarichsituationswecannotbesurethatanewlydiscoveredvariableisrepresentingacauseofthetargetsystemoracauseofourobservationalerror.IfAICisidentifyingcausesofsomethingoutsideofthetargetsystem,thentherearesomecaseswherewecannottellwhetherprogressisbeingmadeevenifweareincreasingpredictiveaccuracy. Toillustratethesecondhornofthedilemma,wecanconsiderhowadefenderofthemodelselectionframeworkmightreplytothefirsthorn.OnemightmaintainthatincreasingPAalwaysgetsusclosertosometruth.However,thetruthbeingidentifiedbyincreasingPAceasestobeaboutthetargetsystem,butbeginstotrackthetruthaboutthesystemthatgeneratesthedata.Thisnewsystemwouldtakeaccountofboththetargetsystemandthecausesofourobservationalerror.Insuchasituation,wegiveupthenoumenainfavorofthephenomena–weexchangeourrealistnotionofthetruthofatargetsystemfortheappearancecreatedbythedata.Itishardtoseehowsuchasolutionwouldbepalatabletoscientificrealists.Sincethelogicalproblemwassupposedtoallowforscientificrealism,itseemsthatsuchastepgivesuponthelogicalproblemaltogether. ThesetwohornsofAICcreateatradeoffwhendealingwiththelogicalandepistemicproblems.Eitherweacceptthatourchoiceinmodelscanselectbettertheoriesbutwecannotalwaystellifwearegettingclosertothetruth,orwegiveuponscientificrealisminfavorofthenotionthatmodelswithgreaterPAareclosertothetruthaboutthesystemthatgivesrisetothedatabutnotthetruetargetofourinquiry.Conclusion

PAandAICseemtobeheadingintherightdirectioninunderstandingprogress.However,ifprovidinganswerstoPopper’slogicalandepistemicquestionsarethecriteriabywhichatruesenseofprogresscanbedetermined,PAandAICseemtofallshortofthemarkifwewanttomaintainarealistapproachtoprogressinallcases.Theproblemofdatapoorsituationscanbeovercomebyincreasingthesizeofthedatapool,andprogresstowardsthetruthcanstillbemade.However,indatarichsituationsthatmaynotbethecase.AlthoughAICrunsintothisproblemattheextremelimit,andit’slikelythatourextanttheorieshaveyettorunintoit,thereisapossibilitythatAICwillstopmodelingthetruecausesofthetargetsystematsomepoint,andincreasingPAwillnolongerbeprogresstowardsthetruthofthetargetsystem.Ofcourse,increasingPAandselectingamodelwiththebestAIC,inidealdata


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situations,doesseemtosatisfyboththelogicalandepistemicproblem,soitmaygiveprogresshope.Intermsoftheoriesthatcancaptureclosenesstothetruthandthemovementofprogress,PAandAICseemtocomecloserthanPopper’sfirstattempt.ReminiscentofPopper’shypothetico-deductivemethod,PAandAICseemtoholduptomoresevereteststhanPopper’stheoryofverisimilitudedid,and,insomeways,thatseemslikeitisprogressinitself.


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References

Burnham,KennethP.andDavidR.Anderson.ModelSelectionandMultimodelInference:APracticalInformation-TheoreticApproach.NewYork:Springer,2002.

Chakravartty,Anjan."ScientificRealism."TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Lastmodified2015.

http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2015/entries/scientific-realism.Forster,Malcolm.“KeyConceptsinModelSelection:PerformanceandGeneralizability.”Journalof

MathmaticalPsychology44(2000):205-231,http://philosophy.wisc.edu/forster/papers/JMP2000.pdf.

Forster,Malcolm.“VerisimilitudeandLikelihood.”Manuscript,UniversityofWisconsin:Madison,2004.Forster,MalcolmandElliotSober.“HowtoTellWhenSimpler,MoreUnified,orLessAdHocTheories

WillProvideMoreAccuratePredictions.”TheBritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience45,No.1(1994):1-35,http://www.jstor.org/stable/687960.

Goldsby,Michael.“The“Structure”ofthe“Strategy”:LookingattheMatthewson-WeisbergTrade-off

andItsJustificatoryRolefortheMultiple-ModelsApproach.”PhilosophyofScience89,no.5(2013):862-873,http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/673728..

Miller,David.“Popper’sQualitativeTheoryofVerisimilitude.”TheBritishJournalforthePhilosophyof

Science25,No.2(1974):166-177,http://www.jstor.org/stable/686821.Oddie,Graham."Truthlikeness."TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.Lastmodified2014.

http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/truthlikeness.Popper,Karl.ConjecturesandRefutations.London:Routledge,1963.Popper,Karl.TheLogicofScientificDiscovery.NewYork:Routledge,1959.Sober,Elliot.EvidenceandEvolution:TheLogicBehindtheScience.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversity

Press,2008.Tichý,Pavel.“OnPopper’sDefinitionofVerisimilitude.”TheBritishJournalforthePhilosophyofScience

25,No.2(1974):155-160,http://www.jstor.org/stable/686819.VanFraassen,Bas.TheScientificImage.Oxford:OxfordUniversityPress,1980.

AyeshaRehman AnalyzingFrege’sSubstitutionPuzzle

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Solving Frege’s Substitution Puzzle: Analyzing it in Light of Descriptivism and Direct Reference Theory Ayesha Rehman, City College of New York

Abstract

Althoughreplacingonepropernamewithanotherthatreferstothesamepersondoesnotchangethetruth-valueofadeclarativestatement,itaffectsthetruth-valueofpropositionalattitudereports,whicharecognitiverelationsthatpeopleholdtowardspropositions.Frege’sSubstitutionPuzzleaboutpropositionalattitudereportsessentiallyasksanimportantquestion:iftwopropernamesco-referinacertainlinguisticcommunity,thenwhydoestheirintersubstitutabilityproducepropositionalattitudereports(thatcontainthosepropernames)withoppositetruth-values?ThispaperattemptstoexplainhowDescriptionTheoryofNamesandDirectReferenceTheory,twotheoriesofpropernames,solveFrege’sSubstitutionPuzzle.AccordingtotheDescriptionTheoryofNames,apropernamehasbothasenseandareference.Inotherwords,apropernameexpressesitssenseasadescriptivemeaninganditdesignatesaspecificreferent.DescriptivistssolvethepuzzlebyrejectingthePrincipleofIntersubstitutabilityofnamesduetotheirreferenceshiftinattitudecontexts;becausetwopropernamesdonotentailthesamesense,theycannotco-referinattitudecontextandthereforearenotintersubstitutableinindirectdiscourse.ContrarytotheDescriptionTheoryofNames,DirectReferenceTheoryarguesthatapropernameisarigiddesignatorwithoutanyconnotativeattributes.Itsimplypicksoutobjectsandlivingthingsinpossibleworlds.DirectReferenceTheoristsolvethepuzzlebystatingthattheseemingcontradictioninthetruth-valuesofpropositionalattitudereportscontainingco-referentialnamesoccursbecauseofthedifferingtruth-valuesofthepragmaticallyimplicatedstatements.Furthermore,thisessayconcludeswithanargumentforwhyDirectReferenceTheoryisastrongerviewthanDescriptionTheoryofNames.

Solving Frege’s Substitution Puzzle: Analyzing it in Light of Descriptivism and Direct Reference Theory

ThispaperexaminesanexampleofGottlobFrege’sSubstitutionPuzzleaboutpropositionalattitudereportsinviewoftwotheoriesofpropernames.BoththeDescription


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TheoryofNamesandDirectReferenceTheorygiveusanexplanationofthesemanticvalueofapropername.WhileDescriptivistssuchasFregeandJohnSearleassertthatnameshavebothasenseandareferent,42DirectReferenceTheoristssuchasSaulKripkeandJohnStuartMillstatethatpropernamessimplypickoutindividuals/objectsinpossibleworlds.43First,IwillexplainFrege’sSubstitutionPuzzleaboutbeliefreportsusingtheSuperman/ClarkKentexample.Second,IwilllayoutboththeDescriptionTheoryofNamesandDirectReferenceTheory,andwillexplainhoweachtheorysolvesthepuzzle.Third,IwillarguethatDirectReferenceTheoryisastrongerviewthanDescriptivism.Frege’sSubstitutionPuzzleaboutBeliefReports

InthefictionalAmericancityofMetropolis,SupermanandClarkKentarethesameperson.Theyhavethesamereference,whichissuchthattheidentityrelation‘Superman=ClarkKent’holds.IfSupermanandClarkKentarealternativenamesforthesameindividualinMetropolis,thenreplacingonepropernamefortheothershouldbesalvaveritate.Thisreplacementshouldnotaffectthetruth-valueofadeclarativestatementthatisrelevanttothelinguisticenvironmentorcontextofMetropolis.44Theprinciplethatexpressesthiscanbeformulatedasfollows:

PrincipleofIntersubstitutability:Ifaandbareco-referentialpropernamesinalanguageL,thenanytruestatementSofL,thatcontainsa,canbeturnedintoatruestatementS1ofLbyreplacingawithb,andsimilarly,anytruestatementS2ofL,thatcontainsb,canbeconvertedintoatruestatementS3ofLbyreplacingbwitha.45Considerthefollowingsentences:

(1) Supermancanfly.(2) ClarkKentcanfly.

Ifonecan,accordingtothePrincipeofIntersubstitutability,replace‘Superman’with‘ClarkKent’in(1),then(2)shouldhavethesametruth-value.However,thisisnotalwaysthecase.Incasesofindirectdiscourse,wherephrasessuchas‘Isaid,’‘Johnbelieves,’‘Emmaknows,’‘theyimagine’etc.areemployedinthebeginning,replacingco-referentialexpressionsyieldcontradictorypropositions.Consider:

(3) LoisLanebelievesthatSupermancanfly.(4) LoisLanebelievesthatClarkKentcanfly.

IntheworldofMetropolis,(3)istrueand(4)isfalseonanintuitivelevel.Fregenoticedthatinpropositionalattitudereportssuchastheonesgivenabove,substitutionofco-referentialnamesdoesnotresultinsentenceswiththesametruth-values.46In“AttitudeReports:DoYouMindtheGap?”BeritBrogaarddefinespropositionalattitudesorattitudereportsasreports42SamCumming,“Names,”StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(2008):3.43Cumming2.44BeritBrogaard,“AttitudeReports:DoYouMindtheGap?”PhilosophyCompass(2008):93.45MaxDeutsch,“ThePaderewskiPuzzleAndthePrincipleofSubstitution,”GrazerPhilosophischeStudien(2011):123.46EdwardN.Zalta,"GottlobFrege,"StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(1995):18.


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aboutpeoples’statesofmind.47Inotherwords,propositionalattitudesarecognitiverelationsthatpeopleholdtowardspropositions,whicharetruth-evaluablestatements.48Propositionalattitudeverbssuchas‘believe’,‘know’,‘think’,‘fear’,‘like’etc.areutteredbeforepropositionsorthat-clauses.Forinstance,insentence(3)or(4),LoisLane’scognitiverelationtotheproposition‘Supermancanfly’or‘ClarkKentcanfly’respectivelycanbeexpressedbythepropositionalattitudeverbbelieves.Frege’sSubstitutionPuzzlethereforeposesthisimportantquestion:iftwopropernamesco-referinacertainenvironment,thenwhydoestheirintersubstitutabilityproducepropositionalattitudereports(thatcontainthosepropernames)withoppositetruth-values?Thesolutiontothispuzzleisimportantbecauseitcanhelponeunderstandtheconnectionbetweenthoughtsandmentalstates,andlanguage.Descriptivism

Inthearticletitled,“OnSenseandReference,”Fregeexplainsthatapropername(i.e.word,sign,signcombination,expression)suchas‘themorningstar’or‘theeveningstar’hasbothasenseandareference.Thepropernameexpressesitssenseasadescriptivemeaning,whichispublicandthereforecanbeunderstoodbytwoormorepeopleinthesameway.49Furthermore,thenamedesignatesaspecificreferent,whichisalsonotpersonal.50Intheaboveexample,thenames‘Superman’and‘ClarkKent’havedifferentsensesinthatbothexpressionsgiveinadifferentmodeofpresentation,buttheybothrefertothesameperson.51Inotherwords,thecognitivesignificancethatthenames‘Superman’and‘ClarkKent’evokeisdifferent.Fregeassertsthateverymeaningfulexpressionhasasense,butitisnotnecessarythatitalsohaveareference.Forinstance,thesign‘Superman’hasasense,butnoreferenceintherealworld,consideringfictionalcharactersarenotrealinthisworld.Frege’stheoryonsenseandreferenceisthebasisforTheDescriptionTheoryofNames.AlsoknownasDescriptivism,thistheorystatesthatthesemanticvalueofanameissomedefinitedescription‘theF’.52Forexample,thename‘Superman’mighthaveasemanticvalueof‘thesuperherowhocanfly’.Tofixtheproblemofnothavingasemanticvalueforpeoplewithnofamousdeedsorinanimateobjectsorimaginarybeings,Descriptivismallowsforadisjunctionofagroupofpredicates;thisiscalledClusterDescriptivism.53Asemphasizedbefore,itisatwo-elementview,whichassertsthatnameshavebothsenseandreferent.Themeaningisaclusterofdescriptionsassociatedwiththenamewhilethereferentistheobject/livingthingthatsatisfiesallormostofthedescriptions.InKripke’sexcerptsfromNamingandNecessity,Descriptivismissummedupinthefollowingsixtheses:

47Brogaard93.48ThomasMcKay,andMichaelNelson,“PropositionalAttitudeReports,”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(2000):1.49GottlobFrege,“OnSenseandReference,”ThePhilosophyofLanguage,Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa(2013):36.50Frege37.51Frege35.52Cumming4.53Cumming5.


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i. Toeveryname‘X’,therecorrespondsaclusterofproperties,thefamilyofthosepropertiesFsuchthataspeakerAbelieves‘FX’.

ii. Oneoftheproperties,orsomeconjointly,arebelievedbyAtopickoutsomeindividualuniquely.

iii. Ifmost,oraweightedmost,oftheF’saresatisfiedbyauniqueobjecty,thenyisthereferentof‘X’.

iv. Ifthevoteyieldsnouniqueobject,‘X’doesnotrefer.v. The‘IfXexists,thenXhasmostoftheF’sisknownaprioritoA.’vi. Thestatementthat‘IfXexists,thenXhasmostoftheF’sexpressesanecessary

truth.’54

TosolvetheSubstitutionPuzzle,Fregearguesthatinindirectdiscourse,‘Supermancanfly’and‘ClarkKentcanfly’referstoitscustomarysense(thought)ratherthanitsreference(atruth-value).Thesenseofaname,whichisfine-grainedandisthereforeabletoconveymoreknowledgethanthetruth-valuealone,iswhatdeterminesitsreferent.Infact,iftwonameshavethesamesense,thentheyhavethesamereferent.However,itisnotnecessaryforareferenttohavethesamesense.Thedifferenceinthesenseof‘Superman’and‘ClarkKent’explainsthedifferenceinthetruth-valuesof(3)and(4),wherethesenseorwayofpresentationof‘Superman’isasuperherowhofliesandthesenseof‘ClarkKent’isabespectacledreporterforthe“DailyPlanet”.Becausetheconceptsof‘Superman’and‘ClarkKent’donotentailthesamesense,theycannotco-referinattitudecontextandthereforearenotintersubstitutableinindirectdiscourse.Inotherwords,inpropositionalattitudereports,onehastorejectthePrincipleofIntersubstitutabilityofnamesduetotheirreferenceshift.ThisishowFregesolvesthepuzzle.DirectReferenceTheory,Millianism&Neo-Russellianism

DirectReferenceTheoryorMillianismproposesthatapropernamehasareferentonly.Strictlyspeaking,itisarigiddesignator.Thismeansthatapropernamepicksoutthesameobjectorpersoninallpossibleworldswherethatobjectorpersonexists.DirectReferenceTheoristssuchasKripkepositthatthereferenceisestablishedthroughadubbingorcreationevent,whereanameisgivenandwhichspreadsbyacausalchainofreference.KripkeelaboratestheCasualTheory:

Aninitial‘baptism’takesplace.Heretheobjectmaybenamedbyostension,orthereferenceofthenamemaybefixedbyadescription.Whenthenameis‘passedfromlinktolink’,thereceiverofthenamemust,Ithink,intendwhenhelearnsittouseitinthesamereferenceasthemanfromwhomheheardit.IfIhearthename‘Napoleon’anddecideitwouldbeanicenameformypetaardvark,Idonotsatisfythiscondition.55

54SaulKripke,NamingandNecessity,(Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1980)53.55Kripke,NamingandNecessity,63.


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Aspeaker,usinganame“NN”onaparticularoccasionisdenotingorreferringtosomeitem‘x’ifthereisacausalchainofreferencepreservinglinksleadingbackfromthespeaker’suseultimatelytotheitem‘x’itselfbeinginvolvedinaname-acquiring“baptism.”

Inthearticletitled,“OfNames,”Milldefinespropernamesinasimilarfashion.Hestatesthatpropernamesarenotconnotative,thatis,theydonotimplyanyattribute.Propernamesonlysignifyaspecificsubject.Millwrites,“Propernamesareattachedtoobjectsthemselvesandarenotdependentonthecontinuanceofanyattributeoftheobject….”56Onecanthinkofnamesastagsthatdonotprovideanyadditionalinformation.Millgoesontosay,“Itmaybesaid,indeed,thatwemusthavehadsomereasonforgivingthemthosenamesratherthananyothers,andthisistrue,butthename,onceagain,isindependentofthereason.”Evenifthedubbingeventhasareasonbehindit,thenamegiventothatindividualdoesnotcarryattributesattachedtothatindividual.ThisisconsistentwithKripke’sexampleofnamingapetaftersomeonefamouslikeNapoleon.IfInamemypetcat‘Einstein,’becauseitbehavesinaverycleverway,itisnotrationalformetobeginconnotingdefinitedescriptionsaboutsuperiorintelligencewithmycat’sname.Thatwouldbesilly! NowthatDirectReferenceTheoryhasbeenlaidout,onecanseethatboth(3)and(4)aretrue.However,howdoesthistheoryexplainthatLoisLanebelievesthatClarkKentcanfly,evenifshedoesnotbelievethesentence‘ClarkKentcanfly’?DirectReferenceTheoryclarifiesthisbyincorporatinganotherareaofthestudyoflanguage:pragmatics.AccordingtoMartinichandSosa,pragmaticsisthestudyofwhatspeakersdowithlanguage,thatis,howspeakerscanperformactionswithwordsandgetacrossmorethanthewords’literalmeanings.57TosolvethepuzzleintheSuperman/ClarkKentexample,neo-Russelliansmakeuseofconversationalimplicatures.Theyexplainthat(3)pragmaticallyimplicatesatruestatementthatLoisLanebelievesSupermancanflyasasuperherowhereas(4)pragmaticallyimplicatesafalsestatementthatLoisLanebelievesSupermancanflyasareporter.58,59Confoundingpragmaticswithsemanticsdoesnotmake(4)false.Infact,theimplicatureitgeneratesisfalse.ThisishowDirectReferenceTheoristorneo-Russelliansexplaintheapparentcontradictionduetointersubstitutabilityinattitudecontext.ReasonsforUpholdingDirectReferenceTheory

Notethat,unlikeDescriptivism,DirectReferenceTheorydoesnotgetridofthePrincipleofIntersubstitutabilityforsolvingFrege’spuzzle,butrathermakesuseofthetruth-valueofimplicaturestoexplainwhyarationalagentmightappeartobothassentandnotassenttothesamepropositionsimultaneously.Moreover,theDescriptivits’reasonforrejectingthePrincipleofIntersubstitutabilityandthussolvingFrege’sSubstitutionPuzzlecanbeshowntobeunconvincingwhenonelooksatKripke’sPaderewskiPuzzle.ThisisbecausethePaderewskiPuzzle,whichalsoinvolvespropositionalattitudereports,isnotaSubstitutionPuzzleandthereforecannotbesolvedbydenyingIntersubstitutability.60,61Consider:56JohnStuartMill,“OfNames,”ThePhilosophyofLanguage,Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa(2013):32.57A.P.Martinich,andDavidSosa,“Introduction,”ThePhilosophyofLanguage(2013):2.58McKay9.59Brogaard97.60SaulKripke,“APuzzleAboutBeliefs,”MeaningandUse(1979):449.61Brogaard97.


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5) PeterbelievesthatPaderewskihasmusicaltalent.6) PeterdisbelievesthatPaderewskihasmusicaltalent.

SupposePetercomestoknow‘Paderewski’asthefamousPolishpianist,soobviously,

heassentstothestatement‘Paderewskihasmusicaltalent.’Inanothercontext,Peterlearnsof‘Paderewski’whowasthePolishNationalistleaderandprimeminister,soafteridentifying‘Paderewski’asthePolishpolitician,Peterassentstothesentence‘Paderewskihasnomusicaltalent’.AccordingtoKripke,(6)and(7)maybebothtrueunderdifferentcircumstancesbecausePeterfailstorealizethatPaderewski,thepianist,isthesamepersonasPaderewski,thepolitician(whoPeterbelievescannothavemusicaltalentsbyvirtueofhisstatesmanship).62KripkenotesthatrejectingIntersubstitutabilitywouldnotsolvethispuzzlebecausethereisnoreplacementofco-referentialterms!Instead,someotherwayhastobedevised.BecauseDescriptivistsdenyIntersubstitutabilityinpropositionalattitudereports,KripkeassertsthattheymustpresentaseriousargumentastowhyIntersubstitutabilityhastoberejected.ThisisnottoimplythatasolutioncannotrejectIntersubstitutability,butratherthatthismovewouldnotbehelpfulforKripke’sPaderewskiPuzzle.63

BesidesprovidingabettersolutiontotheSubstitutionPuzzle,IalsothinkthatDirectReferenceTheoryprovidesabetterviewofthesemanticvalueofpropernamesthanDescriptivism.AccordingtoKripke’smodalargument,propernamesarerigiddesignatorswhiledefinitedescriptionsarenot.Ifthatisthecase,namescannothavethesamemeaningasdefinitedescription(s)associatedwithit.64

Inadditiontothat,onemightnotknowanydescriptionsassociatedwithapropername.However,thatdoesnotmeanthatpropernameshavenomeaning.Evenifonecanidentifydescriptionsforapropername,onecannotbecertainwhichdescriptionpicksoutauniqueobject/person.Forinstance,thedescriptionfor‘Aristotle’couldbearbitrarydescriptionssuchas‘theauthorofNicomacheanEthics’or‘thegreateststudentofPlato’etc.Thereisnowaytoidentifyasingledescriptionoraclusterthatactuallyassignsmeaningto‘Aristotle’.Furthermore,peopleoftenholdwrongdescriptionsforapropername.Forexample,somepeoplebelievethat‘Einstein’is‘thecreatorofatomicbomb.’Despitethefactthatthisdefinitedescriptionisincorrect,peoplearepinpointingauniqueindividualinhistory.Yet,accordingtoDescriptivism,thereferent‘thecreatorofatomicbomb’shouldbeOppenheimer. AlthoughDirectReferenceTheoryblursthedemarcationlinebetweensemanticsandpragmaticsbybringingupimplicatures,onehastorealizethatthatdistinctionhasbeendifficulttopinpoint.Theprincipalsemanticnotionsaretruthandreference,butincludingananalysisofpragmaticsprovidesafullpicture.65 DescriptivismseemstomaketheleapthattheFregeansensetransfersinformationuponitsutterancewithoutaclearjustification.DirectReferencetheoristsrecognizethefactthatthedubbingeventofapropernamemightbemotivatedbyareason,butareprudentnot

62Kripke,“APuzzleAboutBeliefs,”449.63Brogaart97.64Cumming6.65Martinich2.


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toconcludethatsomesortofknowledgeisembeddedwithinthenameitselfasaresultofthedubbing.

ItseemsthatKripkeisapplyingDavidLewis’viewofconventionoftruthfulnessandtrustfortheCasualTheory.InLewis’view,beingtruthfulroughlytranslatestosayingthingsthatonethinksaretrueandbeingtrustingmeansthatonebelievesothers’utterancestobetrue.AccordingtoLewis,thefollowingsixconditionsmustbesatisfiedforaconventionoftruthfulness/trustinLtoprevail:

i. Everyoneconformstoaconventionoftruthfulness/trustinL.ii. Everyonebelievesthattheothersconformtotruthfulness/trustinL.iii. Thebeliefthatothersconformtotruthfulness/trustinLgiveseveryoneagood

anddecisivereasontoconformtotruthfulness/trustinLthemselves.iv. Thereisapreferenceforgeneralconformitytotruthfulness/trustinLrather

thanslightly-less-thangeneralconformitytotruthfulness/trustinL.v. Thereisatleastonealternativeregularity,truthfulness/trustinL’,suchthat

condition3and4holdforL’,andsuchthatthereisnowaytoconformtotruthfulness/trustinLandL’atthesametime.

vi. Conditions1-5arecommonknowledgeinapopulationP.66

AssumingthatKripkeagreeswiththisdefinitionofcoordinationconventionbeingusedinthechainofreference,thenitadequatelyaddressesreferenceshiftexamples(e.g.aboutMadagascaroncebeingknownasaportionofmainlandAfrica,butthenundergoingareferenceshiftafterMarcoPolotookittorefertothegreatAfricanisland),broughtupbyGarethEvansin“TheCasualTheoryofNames”.67Thisisbecausetheconformityinuseofapropernameforauniqueperson/objectwouldnotallowforreferenceshift.SupposeKripke’sCasualTheorydoesnotdependoncoordinationconvention,thenhisinsistenceoncountingspeakerintentionandaudiencerecognitionandexecutionofthatintentionwhileusingpropernameswillbeenoughtocounterreferenceshiftexamples.Inviewoftheabovereasons,DirectReferenceTheoryoverridesDescriptivism.

66DavidLewis,“LanguagesandLanguage,”ThePhilosophyofLanguage,Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa(2013):684-686.67GarethEvans,“TheCasualTheoryofNames,”ThePhilosophyofLanguage,Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa(2013):79.


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References

Brogaard,Berit.“AttitudeReports:DoYouMindtheGap?”PhilosophyCompass,3.1(2008):93-118.Web.15Dec.2014.Cumming,Sam."Names."StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.StanfordUniversity,17Sept.2008.Web.15Dec.2014.Deutsch,Max.“ThePaderewskiPuzzleAndthePrincipleofSubstitution.”GrazerPhilosophischeStudien.83(2011):123-141.Web.15Dec.2014.Evans,Gareth.“TheCasualTheoryofNames.”ThePhilosophyofLanguage.Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013.74-85.Print.Frege,Gottlob.“OnSenseandReference.”ThePhilosophyofLanguage.Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013.35-47.Print.Lewis,David.“LanguagesandLanguage.”ThePhilosophyofLanguage.Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013.682-700.Print.Kripke,Saul.“APuzzleAboutBeliefs.”MeaningandUse.Ed.A.Margalet.Dordrecht:D.ReidelPublishing,1979.433-459.Print.Kripke,Saul.FromNamingandNecessity.Cambridge,Mass.:HarvardUniversityPress,1980.53-63.Print.Martinich,A.P.andSosa,David.Introduction.ThePhilosophyofLanguage.ByMartinich.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013.1-25.Print.McKay,Thomas&Nelson,Michael.“PropositionalAttitudeReports.”TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.StanfordUniversity,16Feb.2000.Web.9Dec.2014.Mill,JohnStuart.“OfNames.”ThePhilosophyofLanguage.Eds.A.P.MartinichandDavidSosa.NewYork:OxfordUniversityPress,2013.29-34.Print.Zalta,EdwardN."GottlobFrege."StanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy.StanfordUniversity,14Sept.1995.Web.14Dec.2014.

KatieCoulter SearchingforEthics’Grounding

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Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case

for Moral Feeling and the Human

Relationship to Nature Katie Coulter, Eastern Michigan University

Abstract Thefollowingessayconsidersthequestionofhowethicalandmoraltheoriesarepossibleinconjunctionwiththe“deathofGod”asconceptualizedbyNietzscheandothercontinentalthinkers.Iarguethatethicalandmoralactionbecomepossiblethrough,andrequire,adeepaffectiveexperienceofsomethingashavingabsolutevalue,andthatthiskindofexperienceofabsolutevaluecanbefoundinhumanbeings’relationshipwithnature.UsingtheworkofBernardWilliamsandJohnRusson,Iarguethattheclimatecrisisfacingtheplanetmakesapparentthisrelationship,andmakespossibleaparticularkindofaffectiveresponsetonaturewhich,inturn,makesethicalactionpossible.

Searching for Ethics’ Grounding: A Case for Moral Feeling and the Human Relationship to Nature

AsNietzscheheraldedthedeathofGod,heidentifiedanumberofconsequencesofthisintellectualevent.First,Nietzschecelebratedtheendoftheideathatethicsandmoralityaredeterminedandhandeddownbyadeity,aswellasthesweepingasideoftheideathatinorderforonetobegood,theremustbeamoralauthorityasthesourceofwhatisgood.WithacademicscholarshipandscientificinvestigationdismantlingandreplacingfoundationalaspectsofChristianityandreligiousbelief,Nietzschesaw“thecollapseofanytheisticsupportformorality”(Crowell),andthat“thebeliefintheChristianGodhasbecomeunworthyofbelief”(Nietzsche,67).ForNietzsche,theendofthenotionofadivinesourceofmoralityandabsolutevaluewas“aliberatingopportunitytotakeresponsibilityformeaning,toexercisecreativity”(Crowell).Withoutbeliefinadivinepowerdeterminingmorality,peoplearefreeandresponsibletoformulatetheirownconceptionofmoralactionandtheirownattributionofvalue.Nietzschedescribesthisfreedomthus:


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...wephilosophers...feel,whenwehearthenewsthat“theoldgodisdead,”asifanewdawnshoneonus...Atlonglastthehorizonappearsfreetousagain,evenifitshouldnotbeasbright;atlonglastourshipsmayventureoutagain...allthedaringoftheloverofknowledgeispermittedagain;thesea,oursealiesopenagain,perhapsthereasneveryetbeensuchan“opensea”(68).

WiththedeathofGod,ethicsisplacedfirmlywhereitshouldbe,anditssourceis

acknowledgedtobewhatitisandalwayshasbeenaccordingtoNietzsche:withinhumanbeings.ForNietzsche,thereisnothingbehindvaluejudgmentsotherthanone’sownwill(Leiter).Whileintheendtheviewismorecomplexthanthis,theimportanttakeawayforthispaperisthatthedeathofGodisthedeathoftheideathatthereisobjectiveorabsolutevalue.Nietzschehadhisownideasaboutwhatethicsandmoralityshouldlooklikeinthefaceofthis,butforthepurposeofmyargumentthedeathofGodpresentsbothalossandgain:thelossofamillennia-oldsourceofabsolutevalue,andthegainofone’sagency(andtherecognitionofthatagency)todetermineforoneselfwhatisgoodandbad,rightandwrong.

Withthelossofobjectivevaluecomestheprospectofnihilismandthepainandconfusionthatcanresultfromit.SeveraldecadesbeforeNietzsche,Hegeldescribedthispain:“Thepureconcept,however,orinfinity,astheabyssintowhichallbeingsinks,mustcharacterizetheinfinitepain...thefeelingthatGodHimselfisdead”(Groom,Fritz,29).Nietzscheidentifiesearlyoninhiswritinga“shadow”,asthough“somesunseemstohavesetandsomeancientandprofoundtrusthasbeenturnedintodoubt”(68).RosePfefferprovidesagoodunderstandofthepredicamentfacinghumanbeings:

Withthelossofasenseofpurpose,resultingfromthedenialofateleologicaluniverse,thefoundationofamoralworldorderisshattered.Man(sic)nolongerpossessestheidealsandabsolutegoalstowardwhichtostrive.He(sic)haslostalldirectionandpurpose...He(sic)islost,withoutaGodandwithoutthepromiseofabetterworld.

Havinglostthemostreadilyavailablesourceofabsolutevalue,onefallsintoaninfinity

ofpossiblevalueswithnohandhold.Thefeelingofresponsibilitythatcomeswiththefreedomtodeterminevalue,andthusmorality,foroneself,canbeparalyzing.Eachthingencounteredorconsideredmustbeevaluatedindependentlyanditsvaluesoughtbyeachindividualmoralagentforthemselves.Withnosolidprescriptionsofvalue,Hegel’sabyssopens,andtheprospectthatnothinghasvaluelooms.Icontendhowever,thatadditionallydistressingistheendlessinternalsearchforsomethingonwhichtobaseone’ssystemofvalue,meaning,andmorality.Theturmoilandconfusionofthissearchformoralsolidityhasnoequal,forwithoutmoralsolidity,coherenceandmeaningcannotbebuiltandrelieffromthesearchcannotbefound. Atthispointinthediscussion,Ifinditnecessarytomakeapparentanimportantdistinction.Iamnotarguingthatinordertoachieveanultimategroundingforethicsandmoralitytheremustinfactbesomethingofabsolutevalue.Idonotmeantosuggestthatmoralitynecessarilyrequiresanobjectivevalue.Onthecontrary,Ibelieve,asNietzschedid,thatbehindmoralitythereisnothingbutourownhumanformulationsofvalue,andbehind


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theseformulationsofvalueismoralfeeling.Iamarguingthattheexperienceofsomethingashavinganabsolutevalue,whetherpositiveornegativevalue,isessentialtoconstructingameaningfulunderstandingoftheworld,andthereforeforconstructinganethicaltheoryformoralaction.Atitsfoundation,ethicsisawaytofindtherelativeimportanceofvariousthingsunderconsideration–anethicaldilemmaisthestruggletodeterminewhat,inagivensituation,ismostimportant. Backtotheproblemathand:withthedeathofGod,wehavefoundourselveswithoutourmostfamiliarsourceofabsolutevalue,andastheabovedistinctionclarifies,whatwehavetrulylostisthemostreadilyavailablesourceoftheexperienceofabsolutevalue.Thereareplentyofethicaltheoriesofferingtheirbestunderstandingofwhatismostimportantandhowthatcanbedetermined.Variousdeontologies,utilityprinciplesandvirtuesystemsofferaccountsofwhatisthemostimportantgood,andyetoftenthequestionofhowtheyareultimatelygroundedremainsunanswered.Toillustratethis,itisworthlookingathowtheEuthyphroDilemmahasbeenextendedtoanysystematicethics.TheEuthyphroDilemmafindsreligion’saccountofmoralitytobewithoutsubstancebecauseiteither1)determinesthegood,inwhichcaseitcoulddecreethingsnormativelyconsideredtobeimmoral,suchasmurder,tobemoral,orit2)merelyidentifiesthegood,inwhichcasesomethingelsemorefoundationalmustfunctionasthegroundingfordeterminingwhatismoral.MarkTaylorsummarizesthepointthus:

Systematicethics,bytheirnature,identifyalmostallmoralobligationsascontingenciesthatrelyonanultimateself-sufficientprinciple.Suchaprincipleisreputedlygoodbyitsnatureandservesastheanchorpointfromwhichallotherdutiesoriginate.Infact,therestofthesystemisreallyjustanextendedexplicationofthefoundationalprinciple.Ifweweretofindthattheanchorpointisnotindependentornecessary,thenweshouldrejectthatwholesystem(46).

Theproblem,Taylorcontends,isthatallsystemsofethicsfallvictimtotheEuthryphro

Dilemma–inthecaseofconsequentialism,Taylorconcludes(aftermuchargumentationthatwillnotbecoveredhere)that“(UP)[theutilityprinciple]isthefoundationofUtilitarianmorality,andthereexistcounter-examplesshowingthat(UP)cannotbeequivalenttomoralgoodness,so(UP)andUtilitarianismarenotrelatedontologicallytomoralgoodness”(50).AllofthisistosaythattheproblemofexperiencingHegel’sabyssorNietzsche’snihilismatthelossoftheexperienceofabsolutevalueisnoteasilysolvedbyothergroundingsforethics,andthatifthisphenomenologicalexperienceofchaosandaninfinityofmoralambiguitycannotbegivensomekindofhandholdorfoundation,thensubstantivemoralactionbecomesatbestexceedinglydifficultandatworstinconceivable.Thereisaphenomenologicalelementtoethicsthat,aswithmanyphenomenologicalinsights,goesoverlookedandyetmustalwaysalreadybethecaseinorderformoralactiontooccuratanindividuallevel:onemustfeelthatsomethingisimportantinorderforonetobemovedtoact.Tobeintellectuallyconvincedistorespondtoastrongargument,butmorebasically,tobeconvincedisafeelingandanexperience.Onecanthinkthatsomethingisimportant,butunlessonealsoexperiencesitasimportant,thenimpetusforactionwillbeextraordinarilydifficulttocomeby.Theconclusionisthis:withouta


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moralfeelingtoarouse,galvanize,andthusprovokeaction,thebestethicalsystem(whetherdeontology,consequentialism,etc.)isimpotent.

Thisisillustratedbyconsideringamentalillnesslikedepression.Apersonwithsevereenoughdepressionwillfindmotivationforactionsofanykindsignificantlydifficult.Althoughcognitivecapacitiescanbeaffectedbydepression,whatismosthandicappedisone’saffectiveresponses.Theworldisnotexperiencedassignificant,important,ormeaningful–withoutthefeelingthatthingshaveimportance,thedepressedpersonoftendoesnotfeelanyincentivetocarryoutaprojectofanykind.Theresultcanbethattheperson’srationalcapacitiesareentirelyunaffected,buteventhemostcarefullyconstructedargumentforactionsofanykind,letalonemoralones,arenotconvincingtothepointofcatalyzingaction.Thedepressedpersondoesnotfeelorexperiencetheimportanceofathing,andthusisunabletogeneratesufficientmotivation.Rationalthoughtandstrongargumentaloneareaninsufficientgroundingforanethicalsystem,becauserationalargumentsdonotfulfilltherequirementoffeelingmorallymoved.Goodargumentscancontributetoorcauseone’saffectiveresponse–agoodargumentcanbethethingthatmakesoneexperiencethevalueofathing.Butthecatalystforactionremainstheexperienceofvalue.

IfindaninterestingsourceofsupportinRobertElliot’sbookFakingNature.Elliotputsforthaverycomplexandcarefulmetaethicaltheoryandgroundingforvalue.ElliotisexceedinglycarefultoavoiddoingexactlywhatIamproposing–Elliotwantshisargumenttobesolidlygroundedonaprinciplethatiscompletelyself-sufficient,andheseekstojustifyinthismannerallhisclaimsofnaturalvalue.Andyet,hiswholeaccountofvalueessentiallyrestsononefootnote:“Thatnaturehasvalueis,sotospeak,abrutevaluefact.Althoughthefactdoesnotadmitoffurtherexplanation,itrequiresemphasisanddiscussion...”(Elliot,157).WhatElliotisassertingiscontrarytohisintendedprojectoffindingindependentandnecessaryvaluethatcanavoidthepitfallsoftheEuthyphroDilemma.A“brutevaluefact”isnothingifnotsomethingthat“justhas”value.Theclaimthatsomething“justhas”valueisanaffectiveclaim.Itisfeelingandexperiencingsomethingasimportantandvaluable.Inshort,itisexperiencingabsolutevalueandthusahandholdwhilefallingintoHegel’sabyss.

Whiletheexperienceofsomethingashavingvalueisdismissedasafoundationforethicsbecauseitiscapricious,lackingrigor,orfartoorelative,Iwouldliketocontendthattheexperienceofsomethinghavingvalueisinfactoneofthebestpossiblegroundingsforethics,andasdiscussedabove,possiblyarequirementforengaginginmoralaction.Thecriticismsofcapriciousness,lackofrigorandrelativityareseriousandrequirediscussion,however.Afurtherelucidationofwhatitmeanstoexperiencesomethingashavingabsolutevaluewillhelptodispeltheseworries.

Toexperiencesomethingashavingabsolutevalue,therecanbenoambiguityatallinthatparticularexperience.Absolutevalue,orinElliot’swordsa“brutevaluefact”,impliesanall-encompassingcertaintyaboutthevaluerelationshipbetweenoneselfandthethingexperienced.Itisnotthecasethatanythingwevaluesatisfiesthisfeelingofencompassingcertainty.Ifdeeplyandthoroughlyconsidered,nearlyanythingexperiencedashavingvaluecanadmitofsignificantambiguity–eventhevalueofthoseonelovesmostcanbeconsumedandquestionedintheyawningjawsofnihilism.Thisfactispreciselywhynihilismissopersistent:Whatisleftisaworldofmereappearanceandsemblance,possessingnocertaintyorpermanence,havingnogoals,nounity,notruth,nobeing.“A“horrorvacui”seizesman(sic)...


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those“highervalues”whichthePlatonic-Christiantraditionfalselyendowedwithobjectivevalidity...areinfactmerelysubjectivecategories”(Pfeffer76,77).

Ifcarefullyconstructedanalyticalethicaltheoriesarenotenoughtoconvinceoneofsomething’svaluetothepointofinspiringsubstantiveactionandahandholdintheabyss,thenwhatwouldbeenoughtodothiswhilealsoavoidingbeing“falselyendowedwithobjectivevalidity”(Pfeffer)?Wecanfindthisverythinginthehumanrelationshipwithnature.Iwouldliketoproposethatourrelationshiptonature,whilesuperficiallyambiguous,inisfactfarmoreessentialthanwegenerallytakeittobe,andthattheclimatecrisismakesthisessential,givenrelationshipapparentagain.Withinourcomplex,technologicalanddomination-basedexperienceofnature,thereisamorefundamental,foundationalrelationshipthat,thoughobscured,isinfactoriginal.ThroughdiscussionoftheworkofBernardWilliamsandJohnRusson,Iwilloffermycaseforthisoriginalgivenessasthattowhichwecanturnfortheexperienceofabsolutevalueandahandholdastheabyssofnihilismopensbeneathusandourhumansearchforsomeabsolutevaluetroublesusevermore.

Wearesearchingforanexperiencesopowerful,complete,andunambiguousthatitservesasasourceoftheexperienceofabsolutevalue,andthereforeassomethingsolidonwhichwecanbuildourunderstandingofthevalueandimportanceofotherthingsinourexperience.Ourrelationshipwithnaturesatisfiesthiskindofcomplete,unambiguousrelationship,asJohnRussondescribes:

Thereistheinexplicablenurturanceofthesun...andoftheearththatisthefoundationofstabilityandconsistency–thesearetwooriginalsenses,irreducibleforms,thatappearcompellinglyandguidinglyforus.Theseareformstowhichweareinexplicablyattunedandtowhichweoweeverything[emphasisadded].Thiscanbesaidfortheworldofnature...ingeneral.Weonlyeveroccurourselveswithintheself-occurringrealmofnature...Thefertileearth,theskythatsuppliesnurturingwarmthandclarifyinglight,andtheself-sufficingrhythmofgrowth,death,andregenerationarenotsensesweinventorrealitieswemake.Itisonlywithintheircontextthatweoccur[emphasisadded](23).

HereRussonhighlightsourgivennessasbiologicalbeingsonanaturalplanet.Wefit

withinthebiologicalprocessesandnaturalrealitiesofearth,sky,growthanddeathinawaythatissimplyunavoidable;theseprocessescannotbecircumvented.Thenecessaryconditionsforourveryexistencearenotcontingent–lifehasdevelopedontheplanetinaparticularway,andassuchitrequiresandoweseverythingitistothegivenrealityofthenaturalworld.Wehavecertainkindsofbodies–mortalbodies,bodiesoriginatinginnature.Thisgivennessisnotambiguous,itisnotpartial,itcannotbequestioned.Itcannotbequestionedbecauseitistheveryparametersbywhichweexistatall,and“Itistheserealitiestowhichwemustanswer,andtheirveryrealityentailsthatwewillberuinedifwefailtorespectthem”(Russon,23).Ourrelationshiptonatureisoriginaryinthesensethatitisonthebasisofnaturethatweevenhavethepowertoquestionourrelationshipwithnatureatall.

Ourreality[is]thatwhichexercisesitswonderful(...bothgreatandterrible)poweralwayswithinacontextofothergivenwonders,towhichwemustbring


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theappropriatelevelofhonorandrespect.Allofouraccomplishmentsoccurwithinandinthetermsofthisgivenworld,throughourgivenpowers(especiallyour“cunning”powertocontrolnaturebyturningitspowersagainstitself).Thatwearedefinitivelyconstrainedbythegivennessisshownbytheineffaceabilityofourdeath.(Russon,25)

Thereisaveryspecific,unambiguouswayinwhichwearerelatedtonature:natureis

thatbywhichthereisanythingatall,includingus.AndasRussonindicates,ifwedoquestionordoubtthisrelationship,wedosoatourownperil.Wemayquestionourrelationshiptonatureandactwithhubrisinwaysthatfloutwhatcanonlybedescribedasaholybond,butdoingsowillonlybringusmorefirmlytotheabsolutevalue,andtoperhapstheonlythingthatcannotbecircumvented.

BernardWilliamsgiveshintstothiskindofrelationshipinhisessayMustaConcernfortheEnvironmentbeCentredonHumanBeings?ThoughWilliams’objectiveisdifferentthanmyown,attheendofhisargumentheconsiderstheideathat“humanbeingshavetwobasickindsofemotionalrelationstonature:gratitudeandasenseofpeace,ontheonehand,terrorandstimulationontheother”(238).Hegoesontotalkabout“whatmightbecalledPrometheanfear,afearoftakingtoolightlyorinconsideratelyourrelationstonature...asenseofanoppositionbetweenourselvesandnature,asanold,unboundedandpotentiallydangerousenemy,whichrequiresrespect”(239).Hethenidentifieswhatheconsiderstobeimportantaboutthisaffectiveresponsetonature:

Weshouldnotthinkthatifthebasisofoursentimentsisofsuchakind,thenitissimplyanarchaicremnantwhichwecanignore.For,first,Prometheanfearisagoodgeneralwarningdevice,remindingusstillappropriatelyofwhatwemayproperlyfear.Butapartfromthatifitissomethingthatmanypeopledeeplyfeel,thenitissomethingthatislikelytobepervasivelyconnectedtothingsthatwevalue,towhatgiveslifethekindsofsignificancethatithas.(239)ThisPrometheanfearthatWilliamsdescribesisjustthekindofaffectiveresponsethat

admitsofnoambiguity.Thedeep-seated,pervasivewarinessandrespectfornatureasbothourgenesisandthesourceofourmortalityisnotthekindofthingthatcanfallvictimtonihilism.Kantillustratesthispowerofnatureinhisconsiderationofthesublime:

Bold,overhanging,asitwerethreateningcliffs,thundercloudstoweringupintotheheavens,bringingwiththemflashesoflighteningandcrashesofthunder,volcanoeswiththeirall-destroyingviolence,hurricaneswiththedevastationtheyleavebehind,theboundlessoceansetintoarage,aloftywaterfallonamightyriver,etc.,makeourcapacitytoresistintoaninsignificanttrifleincomparisonwiththeirpower.(144)

Ifonedoesquestionordisregardthevalueofnature,whatnatureistousormeansto

us,onewillquicklyandsurelyfeelthebiteofthatmistake:youcannotdisregardyourbiologicalneedforwaterandfoodoryouwillnotsurvive,youcannotdisregardthepoweroftheoceans


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oryouwilldrown,youcannotdisregardtheforceofthewindoryouwillbebattered,youcannotfindthefreezingtemperatureofwinter“mereappearanceandsemblance”(Pfeffer,76)oryouwillfreeze.Onecannotbecomplacentinthefaceoftheabsolutegivennessofnature–therewillbeswiftconsequencestoequivocatingaboutthevaluerelationshipbetweenoneselfandnature.Theabyssofnotknowingwhatsomethingmeanstoyouorforyousuddenlyhasahundredhandholdsintheformofthingsthathavespecificandanabsolutevalue,whetherpositiveornegative,toyoursurvivalasageneralhumanbeing,andalsotothesurvivalofthespecifichumanbodythatisyou.

Andyetthereremainsanimportantquestion:isthistheexperienceofnaturethathumanityhasnow?Itseemsundeniablethatourgivennessappearsmoreandmoreasrelativity,contingency.Technologyincreasinglypervadesourlife,dominationofnaturehasonlybecomemoreprevalent–atthemostextremeintheUnitedStates,manyofusliveconstantlyinclimatecontrolleddwellings,neverexperiencingextremeheatorcoldforlong.Wepipewaterintothedesertandgrowmanicuredgreenlawns.Wehaveavailableallmanneroffoodatalltimesofyear.Everythingcanseemtobepossiblycontingent;anythingcanbecircumventedifoneemploysenoughcunning.Indeed,evenourtiestotheplanetitselfseemtobearbitrary–therehavebeenhumanbeingscontinuouslylivingoffoftheplanetontheInternationalSpaceStationinthevoidofspaceforoverfifteenyears.Ifweassertourhumanpowersenough,itseemsasthoughwearesubjecttonothing,answerabletonothing,fallingoncemoreinaanabyssofaninfinityofpossiblemeanings;oncemorenothingisabsolute.Buttheseexamplesbetraythemselves.Thereisnowherewhereourutterlyunconditionalneedforoxygenandatmosphericpressurearemoreurgentlypalpablethanwhenventuringintospace.Andbackonearth,thoughforlongwehaveevaded,questioned,andcircumventedwhatRussoncallsthat“powertowhichweowewhateverweare,”ouranswerability,ourultimategivennesismovingbackintoourawarenessintheformoftheclimatecrisis.Wecannotcontroltherisingseas,themigratingclimates,thedroughts,theincreasinglyviciousstorms,thetoxicair,allofwhichwehavesomeamountofresponsibilityfor.NatureisreassertingitselfinourexperienceasWilliams’“old,unboundedandpotentiallydangerousenemy,”onewhichrequiresourrespect,lestweriskourownruin. Pushingthelimitsonlybringsintosharperfocusthattowhichwearetrulysubject,thatwhichisnotcontingent,notambiguous,andcannotbecircumvented.Thatwhichisonceagainexperiencedasabsolute–ourgivenrelationshiptonatureasbothouroriginationandourpotentialdestruction–canbeourhandhold,itcanbeagroundingtomeaning,thesourceofexperiencesandfeelingsofsignificance,andthereforetheimpetusformoralactionthatwearesearchingfor.


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References

Crowell,Steven,"Existentialism",TheStanfordEncyclopediaofPhilosophy(Spring2015Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.).Web.16December2015.

Elliot,Robert.FakingNature.NewYork:Routledge,1997.Print.Groom,S.Alyssa,andJanieM.HardenFritz.CommunicationEthicsandCrisis:Negotiating DifferencesinPublicandPrivateSpheres.Madison:FairleighDickinsonUP,2012. Print.Leiter,Brian,"Nietzsche'sMoralandPoliticalPhilosophy",TheStanfordEncyclopediaof

Philosophy(Winter2015Edition),EdwardN.Zalta(ed.).Web.16December2015.Nietzsche,Friedrich.Existentialism.Ed.RobertC.Solomon.NewYork:OxfordUniversity Press,2005.65-101.Print.Pfeffer,Rose.Nietzsche:DiscipleofDionysus.Cranbury:AssociatedUniversityPresses, Inc.,1972.Print.Russon,John.BearingWitnesstoEpiphany.Albany:StateUniversityofNewYorkPress,2009. Print.Taylor,Mark.“TheEuthyphroDilemmaandUtilitarianism.”ActaCogitata.3(2015):43-51.

Web.15December2015.Williams,Bernard."Mustaconcernfortheenvironmentbecentredonhumanbeings?",MakingSense

ofHumanity.1sted.Cambridge:CambridgeUniversityPress,1995.pp.233-240.CambridgeBooksOnline.Web.16December2015.

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