8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

1/7

ACTION,CAUSATION ND DESCRIPTION

Mikael M. KarlssortUnivels i ty of lceland

1. And Lose he Nanreof Act ionrIn this paprer, focusupon ntent iorulact ion,whichDavidsonand manyotlrershal 'e cal led sirnplyact iott .With Dretske, believe hat many entirelyunintent ional unran oingsdeserve o be calledact ions,withoutscare uotes,and t lratot lrer hingsbesides eoplen'tay d in a robustand mporlantsense,evenwheresLrchhingsdo not,or could nclt , orm intent ions.2havegrvenanaccounto1 'my general iews on thesematters lsewhere.3believe hat t isstrategical lvetter o consider irst the broader ategory f act ion lratDretske

callsbehaviorand o considerhereafterntent ional ct lon the characterist icact ions f hurnan eings as an important pecies f act ionor behaviorn thisbroadersense.Acticln n this broadersense s whatever onething does ncontrast o lvhat t suffers, sDretskeputs t, whereas avidson ndmostotherphilosophers f act ionhave wanted o restrict he term"act ion" o intent ionalact ion, ha t s * in the diom made amil iar by Anscombe nd Davidson towhateverdoings of a thing or person are intent ionalunder at least on eapplicable escript ion. ut evenDavidson s wil l ing to say hat a beingcan dosomething,which, while no t intent ional nder dl) descript ion,s not merelysuffered. hese, n Davidson's enns,mightbe calleddoingsbut not act ions.Inthispaper, takeup th eDavidsoniandiom.aHaving cleared way his terminological rush, wil l turn to substant iveissues.Much of what u, i l l be doing herewil l be react ing o certain osit ionst William Shakespeare,anilet.Act tll, scene .2See Fted Dretske,E.tplainingBeha,''ior;Reasonsn a World qf Causes Cambridge,Massachusetts:IT Press, 988), sp. hapter. I n order o avoid erminologicaluarrels.Dretske uses he term beltavior o cover action n this broad sense, eaving to mostphilosophers f action heirnarrower seof the ermaction.3 "AgencyandPatiency Back o Nature?", hilo.sophic.al.rploratiotts (2002), p. 59-81.aThus, he broader ategory f doings ncludes oth arlions (intentional nderat leastoneapplicable escription) nd on-actiottr not ntentional nderany applicable escription).

A Explicagdo da Interprelagdo Humana / The Explanation of Human Interpretilion,Lisboa,Edig6esColibri, 2004,pp.3f3-325

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

2/7

Action. Causation ndDescription 3 1 5A Explicagdo a InterpretaqioHumana

takenby Anscombe n lntentiott5 nd some ater articles,6 nd more particularlyby Davidson n the stream f l i terature unningback o "Actions,Reasons ndCauses" f irst publishedn 1963an dnow almost40 years ld), "Agency" (theprintedversionof which dates rom 1971), Freedom o Act" (which appearedin 1973), "Intending" (f irst published n 1978), an d various later work.7Davidscln's hinking on act ion and agencydeveloped nd changed n cerlainrespectssomeof which aredetai ledn his introduct iono Es,ra,ysn Act iottsand Events.sBut I am not concemedhere with the development,or presentshape, f Davidson's iewson act ion. am concerned ereonly with a numberof specif icposit ionswhich have been, at one t ime or another, aken up byDavidson nd argued br (even f latermodif iedor abandoned)n his acutean dinimitableway. My rnainmotivat ion ere s self ish I am stuck n theprocessof trying to understandhoseposit ions nd to decidewhat I shouldmake ofthem.2. One or Many? Sarneor Different?

I turn lirst, and very briefly, to a matter about which I seem to ha ve asomewhatdif ferent idea than many other philosophers not includingAnscombe. ut apparentlyncludingDavidson a matterwhose elevanceomy presentopic s perhaps ot evidentat f irst glance. his is the question fdetermining whether and when two different descriptionsapply to the sameaction or doing, or event,or object)or to dif ferentact ions objects, ventsordoings).My idea, not original, s that dentity s not determinedn nature i t issomething we may be said, speaking oosely, to decide. The sear ch or "theidentityconditionsof such-and-such"s a search or criteriawhich there s someparticularpoint to applying n a given context and for a given purpose thesecriteria rather han those.But in a different context, or in the samecontext butfor a differentpurpose, heremay be a betterargument or applying hose atherthan hese.Identity and dffirence, I would like to say, are concepts f perspectiveoranalysis,not of description.The properapplicationof these oncepts f analysis5G. E. M. Anscombe,ntention,2"udi t ion Oxford: asi lBlackwel l , 963).6Ofparticular relevances "Under a Description" , irst published n Nor?s 3 (1979) andreprintedn the Collected hilosophical apersof G. E M. Anscombe, ol.2, Metaphysicsand the Philosoplry f Mind (Minneapolis: niversityof MinnesotaPress, 98l), pp. 208--219. n thepresentootnotes,eferenceso this article pecif y he elevant agenumbersnCollecte Philo o hical Pape s.7The essays erementionedwereall reprinted n DonaldDavidson, ssays n ActionsandEuents Oxford: ClarendonPress, 1980); a secondedition of this collection has ustappearedOxford:Clarendon ress, 001),and hepaginationor the articlesmentionedsthe same n the wo editions. n thepresentootnotes,eferenceso these rticles pecify herelevant agenumbersn Essays nActionsand Evenls.8Seeprevious ote.

re. ' / . 'uponvar iousfactsofnature,but theydr lnot thenrselvesst ra ight forwardlyclescribeny such acts. n some ases,dentityan ddif ference resimply hingslhatwe decit le. or on e eason r antrlher'Beforeanyone oncludesha t havedescencledrretrievablynt o he pit ofpost-modernir-, I hurt"n to ad d a f 'ew caveats'Many ways of makingiiscriminat ions of makingou t samenessr dif ference mongoblects, ventsor cloings ar edecided or us :by th e make-up f ou r cclncep[ualpparatt ls' yth e aniuageswhich we inheritan d which, n a cerlain ense, onst i tute s, byconventions hich ar eno t up fo r negotiat ion' nd by th epurposesha twe have_ whetherby natureor as slcond nitu.". 'Ihesecolclrmostof th e contextsnwhich sameness r dift-erence re made out and largelydetermine he way tnwhich we identify, in th e passingscene'such things as people. nd trees'bui ldingsan dbuses, unsets nd eiplosions'winksan dsneezes'nd he wa y nwh ichwed is t i ngu ish these-bo thby t ypeand ind iv idua l l y - f romother th ings ,in standarcl nJlargely self-evident ays. n thesevery many cases here sl i t t le, if any, "clecision"'an a a sense n which identityan d dif ference es th e a v i l y u p o n n ir t u r e . A n d w e c a ni n t l r e s e i n s ta n c e s s e n s i b l y i nq u i r e i n t o t heidenti iycondit ionsor such-and-such.n thehope lf discoveringhe criteria ha t*" ,pirrv to make al l thesedist inct ions; hether hese riteriaar e consistent;an dso on .I t i s a m i s t ak e , t l r o u g h ,t o a s s u m e t h a ti t i s a l w a y s l i k et h a t . P u z z l e sa r t s e .famil iarenough ()mostci us here, ve naround heconceptualdges f famil iarnn J g"n"rutty*unproblematicnt i t ies;or instance' eople'At on e ime' a while;; ; ,";"." tu . no Alice' No w Alice is amongus ' runningaround he worldreading apers n pnifosopny' l ice caTe 9 be n th eusualwa y he rmu man dda ddi i it.,"l..jott, iotngi*t an dsocial 'Bu t us t whendi dAlice come o be (a )ahuman being, (b) u pJ,.on, (c ) Aiice'?Di

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

3/7

3 1 6 A E,xpl icaqdo a InterpretaEiroumana

wherewe would need o decideLrponhe appropnatewa y of identifyingan ddif ferent iat ing. ut such a decision s typical lya decision f perspect ive ananalyt ical erspect ive rguably ppropriateor a certain Llrpose and herebyno t exclusive fotherdecisions aving he same arget. ve ndecisions earedoth esame urpose.In part icular, sconcerns ct iorrs, bel ie'e lrat a is th esame ctionas D" edescribes o matterof fact.althoughwe may sometimes av egoodreasonsorf ianringsuch an identity.without placenrentn a special oniext, he phrase,"thoseactionswhich are identicalwith ," , picks ou t no cirzss f eventsorpr()cesses.'I 'hesecomments )n th e identif icat ion nd dif lerent iat ion f act ions,ordoings. re materialo the discussionurnrundinghe ocution s dicla 2,1,oingb" which wil l come up later n this paper.t ' But for the mornent, turn t< ranother oint.3. " ln lenl ional" s Intensional

ln "Agency" an d elsewhere,Davidson maintained that th e term"intent ional" oe snot pick ou t a class f act ions r doings; or describedn on e\,\ 'ay. n act ion might be intent ional, vhi le described n anotherway, no ttntent ionalunintent ional).hu sDavidson aid, intent ional"s ntensional. i lI t i .snot clear to rne, hough, us t what Davidsonha d in mind when hespokeof intensionali ty.', ny relat ive erm can be made o exhibit a certainpseudo-intensionali tyf its relat ional aspect is sr-rppressed.gnored or -overlooked.l3hu s f .r s F in relat ion o y bu t s not F i n relat iclno z, thenx

9 n this paper, ollowing widely received ractice. .r" and "y" are usedas variablesn theusual ogicalsense,anging rnpart ial ly ve r objects, vhi leother orver-case,tal ic izedle t terssuchs"a" , "b" . "d" , " r " , s " , "1"areusedasunspec i f i cs ingular terms,commonly ina suggestive ay. as "a" for someparticular ction, d" for a description, r" for a reason,"s" for a subject agent), ndso on.l0 This 'uvasalso the focus of a paperby Ralf st6cker, which was presentedn the samesession s hepresent aper t heconference entionedn note .I r cf. "Agency",p 46, rvhereDavidson sserts,lt is a mistakeo supposehcre s a class fintentionalct ions:f we took hi s ack,we should e compel ledo say hatone and hesame ctron asboth ntentionalndno t ntentional"lnd ee ls o , 61 .l2 He might vellhavemeant o more han the semantic pacity... f attributions f intention";se e Agency", . 46 .l3 I call his "pseudo-intensio nality",mplying hatotherexamples ightbe more genuinely"intensional.n being not simply artifacts f suppressedelationality. his matter s notpursued ere. t does eemo nle hatmany fthe standardxamplesfintensional i tyanbe explainedaway in the mannersuggested ere for "intentional", .e. a refereniiallyopaque ontext anbe replaced y a rel'erentiallyransparentontextn whicha relationalitysuppressedn the ormer s madeexplicit n the atter.The questions how far one couldtake this. Perhaps hereare, after all, no "genuinely" ntensional oncepts f the kindhintedat here.while no attempt s madehere o deal with this argerquestion, he opiccomes p again n $4 ,bclow.

Action, Causatkrn nd Description

ca nbe said o be F andno t F (theancientGreeks ad un with this),and F ca nbe said o be "intensional" nd can alsobe said right lybu t misleadingly)ot trbe a term which picks out a classof things. fh e term "tal l", as Anscomberemindsus,la s a terrn ha tdcles ot pick out a classof objects on e an d hesameobject,say Socrates,s tal l comparedo Theaetetus,ut nr.rt omparedt. rPlato.Or is tal l for a Greek,bu t no t tall for a man.l5Srl beforewe rush tcrattributentensionali tyo a term,we ought o kxrk to seewhether ts ntensionalappearances perhaps nart i fact f a suppressedelat ionali ty'r6Th e view that th e term "intent i6nal" ai ls tg pick out 9r circumscribeclass of events (doings or act iotrs)always seemed o me to f t i l l withDavidson'sdea hatan action s a movingof one'sbodyoriginat ingn wlrathecalled, n "Action, Reasons, nd Causes",a printart reasott. 'h e relat ionbetweenhi sprin'raryeason, hich s a certain onative ndcognit ive tate. ndthe bodily movements thatof "ordinaryevent ausatirln", avidson ay s as fanybtxly nerv. eally.what hatwas).NO w f we playalong vithDavidson hu sfar, t woulclseem hat a bodily rnoveutent 'setngcar.rsedalbeit in th e rightway"rr) by a primary reasonwould render hi s doing intent ional;ndeed'r.r,uuldn'tha t us t be what t is l 'or he movemento be ntentional? hi s wouldbe a class if not r/re lass of intent iclnaloings; f acl iotts.Oi course,Davidsondoesn'tsa y lrat,as rve know. He might havebeettready at that t irne - an d might perhaps e readyeven lo w - to say that a

movelnent f one'sbodyori-einat ingausallyn a prirnary eason 't luldsul 'f ice(with reservat ionsbout he causation's roceedingin th e -ight ay") tl renderthat bodilv movement ntent ionalunder at leaston e applicable escript ion

3 t 7

lr Se c "Under a Descr ipt ion" .p. 208.1- 5This rnay be thought to be th e vierv expressed y P lato,1br nstanceat I ' lmedo l02B-D,

an d Aniconrbc ma y bc thought to be ref 'el r ingobl iquely to this and other Platonicpassxges. rguably. horvever ,P lato's mcssages qui te di { ferent .For a careful exp( 's i t ion'see H!ctor-N".i Cistaiieda, "Plato's PhaecloTheory of Relations,Jounnl of PhiLosophicalLoSic 1 (1912) .pp.467-480 an d Nicholaswhi te, "P lato'sMetaphysicalEpistemology" nThf, Canbr i r lge' t )onrpaniot rro Plaro (Cambr i

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

4/7

Action, Causation ndDescriPtion 3 1 93 1 8 A Explicaqdoda lnterpretaESoHumana

Davidson was,however,not ready o say that this would make that movementintentional tout court, because he movement might be unintentional underanother escript ionl nd Davidson,addit ionally, id (and doubtless oes)no lwant to say that this forces us to acknowledge or even gives us grounds oracknowledging)wo dist inctmovements r doings dist inct ecause iscerniblein the Leibnizian sense).Fl ipping th e switch, turning on th e light, andil luminating he room, act ionswhich are ntentional nder hese escript ionsttDavidson'sexample,are, n that example,on e and the sameaction- or soDavidsonwould have t - an d ar emoreover he sameactionas he alert ingofth eprowler,which s unintent ional,o described.But perhaps he apparent intensionality" of intentionalmerely eflects herelat ional atureof intention. ha t s to say;perhaps o movement r doing sintent ional ou t court but rather ntent ional-4ld-movement-of-a-certain-kind,that s, ntent ional-under-a-descript ion.o, strict lyspeaking, e shouldnot say"a is intent ictnal",ut rather d is intent ional nderdescript ion/" - just as wemight insist hat strict ly speaking t is tal l" is an abbreviat ionbr "t is tall incomparisonwith s". Turning on th e light is intent ional-under-the-descript ion--"tumingon th e ight"; but t is not ntent ional-under-the-descript ion-"alert ingprowler".An d if , as Davidsonwanted o say, urningon th e ight is the sameeventor cloing an dhere, he sameaction)as alert ing he prowler, he nwe cansa y ha talert ing he prowler s ntent ional-under-the-descript ion-"tumingn th elight"; and so on . The Davidsonian osit ioncould then become if i t wasn'talready uch):a is an action (*) (x s a descript ionnda is ntent ionalnderx),

where he ight side s non-opaquelynstant iable. l8he opensentence-A ) (- r sa descript ion nd is intent ional nderx) would, n otherwords,pick out theclassof actions; he intensionalityof interttionalwould - so far as this mattergoes collapse nto relationality.This would make clear a certaindescription--dependency f actions: o classify somethingas an action would be to class tamong he relataof a certainsortof description.And this would also emoveanapparent bstacle o sayingsomething ike this:rz s s's act ion c is a movementf s'sbodyoriginat ingn aprimary eason

4. Description and the Causal Origins of ActionsIf a bodily movements caused y a primary eason,ha tshould uff ice o

i n s u r e t h a t t h e r e i s , i n d e e d , a d e s c r i p t i o n a p p l i c a b l e t o i t u n d e r w h i c h i t i sintent ional. hy should ha t be so ?Th e reason s no t to o fa r to seek' rt usrecallDavidson's haracterizat ion1. ri tnary eas()ns:C l : r rsapr rmaryreason fo rwhyanagentper f c l rmedtheact ioncunder thedescription only if ,. .oniirtr of a pro attitudeof the.agent owardsactionswith a ceriainproperty, nda beliefof the agent hata, under hedescript ion, ha s ha tproperty'leC2 :A primary easonor an actions tscause 0

Note that I am not hereconcernedwith the merits or demeritsof this oldv i e w o f D a v i c l s o n ' s - t h e s e h a v e b e e n e x t e n s i v e l y d i s c u s s e d ' n o t l e a s t b yI)avidson irnself . us e hi saccount er eprimari ly or i l l t rstrat ion.S o , i f a d o i n g o r i g i n a t e s i n a p r i m a r y r e a s o n , i t i s . . d o n e u n d e r a c e f t a l ndescript ion'; thii locut ionha sncltproveneasy o understand'2l-take t thatwhat s envisioneds that he agentbelievesha tan y doing o which a certalndescript ion, , applieswil l havea propertywhichwil l bring ha tdoingunder heagent,.s ro attitude owafdsactionswith thatproperty;something.sdclne' all it,ion tt.t"agent 's nderstandingha td applieso it and ha t t therefores amongth e valuedactions; nd a is donebecause/ applies o it an d th e agent 'spr oatt i tudehu sattacheso it . In sucha case, / wil l be a descript ion nderwhichais nte,t iotnl. since o do somethingntentionallys to do t on th ebasis f a pr oattitude toward what is done; and here the agent has a pro attitude whichattaches o a - and, n tl.re vent,

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

5/7

320 A Explicaqaoda Interpretaqio l{umanaatt i tLrdeowards t? Di d Davidsonhave a pr o att i tude owards t'l Well, heperhaps ad a pro attitude owardswitch flipping as doings hat would pr

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

6/7

)l z A Explicagdo da InterpretagloHumana

see hatal l an agent an do -her onlycontribut iono whathappens is to movehe rbody: "the rest s up to nature."33ut a bodily movementma y be describedin dif l 'erentways,e.g.ds a movement f th e body (thequeenmovedher hand)or in termsof one or another ffect th equeenpoured oison; he queen il ledthe king). And different nl'erences an be made rom the different descriptions.For nstance,f we descr ibehe queen's ct ion sa ki l l ingof th eking, we ca ninfer that the king died, whereaswe cannot make that inference ro m th edescript ion f the queen's ct ionas a movement lf he r hand.Further,f indeed"[w]e never do more than move our bodies,"34 e can infer about an actlondescribedn other erms for instance,n terns of its outcome e.g.as a killing ofthe king) - that there s a redescription f i t as a "meremovementof the body"(e.g.as a certainmovement f the hand),which could be plugged nto a sentencestating hat the former was done by doing the atter; or Davidson epresentshe"by" locution as taking us from one description o another n the direction(ultimately)of a descriptionn termsof merebodily movement.we cannotmakesuch an inference about an action which is already describedas a bodilymovernent, or in that case we are alreadyat the point towards which the "by"locution ranslates s.35 ut noneof this means,accordingo Davidson, hat theactions escribedsay, he killing and hehand-moving) remany ather han one.As fo r the apparent patio-temporali f ferences etween he hand-movrng,pouringan d kil l ing, Davidsonargued n "Agency" rhat here s nothing ha tforces s o recognizehese sgenuine if ferences. avidson rged ha t to staywith our example) he pouring and the killing beganand ended,with the handmovement, t rnidnight.What he queen id in ki l l ing th eking was o movehe rhand at midnight, althoughother things eventuated.Given that her handmovemented (causally)o poison il l ing th eking's earand inal ly, o his death,we may referback o he r handmovementhrough hese onsequencese.g.as akilling). Her killing the king is what she did - rhe acrion she performed rocause he king's death,and what she did to cause is deathwa s to move herhandat midnight.This s th ehand-moving,ouring, r ki l l ing, howeverwe ma ydescribe t. contrary to first appearances, e are not forced to discer n severalrelatedactionswith differing spatio-temporal oordinates.On the basis of these arguments,and generalizing rom his example,Davidsonconcludes,with a shockof surprise, hat our primit iveact ions, heones we do not do by doing somethingelse, mere movementsof the body -these re all the actions hereare."36Correlatively, Davidson also concludes that the term "primitive" (as33 Agency", . 59. Davidson's ote hat hi s wa y of stat ing hings whichha softenbeenquoted) an mislead,akenout of context. n the present ontext, he eader houldnot bemisled.3a Agency", . 59 .35If this line is taken, one might say that a descrip tion f an action as a rnerebodilymovements a "primitive" description.36 Agency". . 59 .

Action, Causation nd DescriPtion 323

applieclo act ions) s intensional nd doesncltpick out a classof act ions. orexample, he queen's ct ion s perhaps rimit ive Turzand-moving, r under heclescript ignsuch and suclra movel-nentf he r hand". Jnder his descript ion,that s to say,her act ion s not done b_y oing something lse.But under hedescript ion ki l l ing th e king" her act ion s not primit ive, irr it is done bypouringpoison,whichsh edoesby movinghe rhand'As in the cases iscussed arl ier, hi s ntensionali ty ightbe said o be anaft i thctof suppressedelat ionali ty.hat s, t mightbe mainlainedhat,properlyspeaking,primit ive"(in.thesense escribed ere) s not a sirnple redicate uta relat ional erm with a descript ionas the relevant elatum.No action isprimit iveor not primit ive out courtbut is or is not primit ive-under-descriptron--r1. his is a plausible oint of view; but on emightquestionwhetherwe reallyhave an intensionali tyo l ive with here.Th e claim hat here s one restsuponthe dea ha twhatma yappeartl be manyactions re , n fact,us t one.Davidson s certainly orrect this wa salsoargued arl ier _y nsct lmbe3T- thatwe ma ydescribe n act ion n terms tl 'cclnsequenceshicheventuatero.t /fdcto ()r, rr r that matter,we may describet i n termsof its causal recursors.38Ancl I think thereforehat Davidson s right in maintaining ha t ro m th e factthat suchdescript ions ay refer o events rior or subsequento an actlonwear eno t therebl,orced o discern nd dif f 'erent iateeveralelated ct ions avingdiff'erent patio-temporal oordinates.

Horvever. his does not show that such actions ar e not dif ferent ordiscernible. suggested ariier that, as concerns he identitVor differenceofact ions,here s no fact of the matter. he properquestions rvhether,n certaincontexts, nd or certain urposes, e ma y in d reasonsor counting ariously--described ct ions s dentical r asdist inct.Davidson ha d what appeared o be a good reason or resist inganontologicaldiscriminat ion etween he queen'shand-mclving,oison-potlf ir lgand ki l l ing - he wanted o resist he dea hat he queen's and-moving ausedhe r act ionof pouring he poisonwhich n turn caused er act ionof ki l l ing theking. This is, ndeed, n de a o be resisted. ut, asDret.ske'sccount hows, tis not an de awhich s entai led y makinga dist inct ion mong he actions. le oit is not a reason or insist ingglobally on the identityof, all act ions "vithprimit iveact ions:he hesiswhichappearedo astonishing,rinmfacie'37Se e er ntentlort, p.37-47, avidson'seb t o Anscombes explicitly cknowledged.38This is what Davidson alls he "accordion ffect",a notion hat he takesup from JoelFeinberg; eeFeinberg's Action and Responsibility"n Philosophyn Anterica'ed. Ma-xBlack l thaca: omel lUniversi ty ress, 965), p. 134-160. eeDavidson'siscussionn"Agency", p .55-59.39Dretskewouid ake hequeen'smovingher handasone action,with themovementeadingcausally o the poison'i pouring. ThL queen'spouring he poisonwould be a secondaction,of which he irst s a properpart,and whichmay be said o be doneby doing hefirst action.The poison'spouring eadscausally o the deathof the king. The queen'skilling the king s thusa thirdaction, f whichher pouring hepoison s a properpart'andwhich s doneby herpouring hepoison,which s in tunrdoneby her movingher hand.

8/2/2019 Action, Causation & Description

7/7

11 / A Expl icagdo a Interpretagdo umana

As rvehaveseen,Davidson rguedhat f we say hatone act ion s donebydoinganotherwe ar e no t thereby orced o theconclusionha t he wo actlonsar e discerniblean d ar e thus dist inct. notwithstandinghe asymmetryan dirref lexivityol ' he "by" relarion; e thinks rhat he ,by" locut iorimerely akesus from one description to another (in the direction of bodily-movementdescript ions),nd that he descript ions ay al l be of on e and he am e acrron.To take on e of Davidson's xamples,f I apologize o you by saying, . Iapologize", do no t do tw o things apologizing ndsaying ,I apologize" , bu tonlv one.My saying I apolclgize"s rny apologizing.n the event,Davidsclnssurely onect;but hematters not hereby isposed f.People peak iberal ly, f th e "by" relat ion. think rrrat here s more rhanon e kind of relat ionwhich s indicatedwhen we say ha tone hing s donebydoinganother. ne of thesema1, e cal led hentodal elat ion thls s used