Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli ... · Security oncept – The Lesson from...

Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli Security Concept – The Lesson from Operation

Protective Edge

Meir Finkel, Yaniv Friedman, Dana Preisler-Swery

Introduction

The traditional Israeli security concept proposed three pillars

- deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat (hachra’a) - as the

basis for Israel’s ability to cope with the security challenges

surrounding the country.1 This concept, which had served as the

basis for Israeli thinking in the early years of the State, was found to

be lacking in the 1980s and 1990s. The missile threat on the Israeli

home front in the first Gulf War in 1991, and more so during the

Second Lebanon War in 1996, informally led to the addition, through

the Meridor Committee on Israel’s Defense Doctrine in 2007, of a

fourth, defensive pillar.2 Operations Pillar of Defense in 2012 and

Protective Edge in 2014 further demonstrated the centrality of

defense to Israel’s future security challenges.

However, a conceptual debate about the centrality of

defense within the security concept has yet to be carried out.

Despite the centrality of defense to the new concept, the requisite

combination of defense with the other components of the security

concept - deterrence, early warning, and decisive defeat - has not

yet been deeply examined. Furthermore, a comprehensive analysis

of the existing tensions and the required balance between defense

and offense and its implications has been lacking.

Operation Protective Edge will serve as the basis for our

discussion of the status of defense in the Israeli security concept.

During the operation, an active defense system was widely

employed, and we shall use this experience to examine the status of

1 Israel Tal, National Security: The Israeli Experience, Praeger Security International, 2000, pp. 67-88. 2 Dan Meridor, “Civil Defense as Part of the Israeli Security Concept,” in Elran Meir (Ed.) The Civil Front, INSS Memorandum No. 99, June 2009, pp. 15-16. [Hebrew]

138 | THE DADO CENTER JOURNAL | VOL. 4

active defense within the wider concept of the defensive pillar of the

security concept.

This article will focus on these two key issues. First, we will

examine the balance between defense and offense within the

security concept, followed by an analysis of the debate between the

political and military echelons over the role of defense. Both issues

will be examined for contrast and comparison, over two-time

periods - before and during Protective Edge.

We will offer two main arguments. The first concerns the

relationship and balance between defense and offense. Operation

Protective Edge was a defensive strategy where the defensive

element was dominant, unlike the military concepts prior to the

Operation that favored the dominance of protection. The second

argument deals with the role of defense in the eyes of the political

and military echelons, following an examination of differences

between politicians who regarded defense as external to the IDF and

equal in value to offense and the IDF which regards defense as an

integral component of its role.

This article is divided into four parts. In the first we will

discuss the dilemmas arising from the addition of the defensive pillar

to the Israeli security concept; in the second we will examine prior

concepts about the relation between defense and offense versus the

reality during Protective Edge; in the third part, we will delve into the

gaps between the political and military echelons, prior to and during

Protective Edge; and in the fourth we will summarize and propose

several operational conclusions.

A methodological note - In this article, we will discuss two

aspects of defense. One is the “defensive pillar” as a new component

of the Israeli security concept, meaning defense of the home front

from all threats. The other deals with active defense - the air defense

array and active defense systems which are concerned with

thwarting the enemy’s rocket and missile capabilities and not with

repulsing enemy forces attempting to enter our territory.

FINKEL, FRIEDMAN & PREISLER-SWERY | THE FOURTH LEG OF THE SECURITY CONCEPT | 139

Dilemmas in Force Design Due to the Addition of a Defensive

Element to the Israeli Security Concept

An understanding that Israel’s security concept needed to

change led to the addition of the defensive pillar. This addition

generated a number of dilemmas due to a clash between the

defensive element and the other elements of the security concept,

as well as the normal tensions underlying any system undergoing

change and reorganization.

Organizationally, as with any system whose resources are

limited, the addition of defensive systems directly reduces other

units' budgets. Since the struggle over resources underlies any

organization or system, the decision to develop, produce, employ,

and maintain defensive systems was met with opposition from the

proponents of an offensive approach within the IDF, who were

apprehensive about budgetary issues as well as the shift in focus to

the new systems.

Conceptually, a debate developed among decision makers,

both politicians and military officers, about the influence of

defensive systems on the decisive defeat concept and its derivative

tool - offense - on the broader IDF security concept. Opponents of

the defensive pillar raised serious arguments concerning the

problematic nature of relying on defense. They argued that “a

defensive line is bound to break,”3 and that real damage would be

sustained to the decisive defeat and offensive principles. These

might well become secondary within the security concept, due to

the creation of a defensive capacity able to neutralize the offensive

capabilities of the opponent.4

An additional conceptual debate centered around the link

between deterrence and the defensive systems. A defensive

capability does contribute to Israel’s deterrence. However, a tension

3 IDF Ground Forces Command, Ground Forces Operations, January 2012, p. 5. [Hebrew] 4 Yiftah S. Shapir. “Lessons from the Iron Dome,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 5, No. 1, May 2013, pp. 87-88.


exists between deterrence and defense. Investing in defense5 may

be perceived by the other side as an attempt to avoid confrontation,

as an Israeli vulnerability. The proponents of this approach argue

that Israeli deterrence will always provide the best defense, and

investing in defensive means is a waste of resources.6

A third, difficult dilemma that stems from the addition of a

defensive pillar to the security concept is related to the flexibility of

the force. For a long time, the IDF preferred to invest in flexible

weapons systems, with both offensive and defensive characteristics.

The clearest example is the fighter jet, capable of carrying out both

offensive action - bombing enemy targets; and defensive missions -

intercepting enemy aircraft in Israel airspace. Israeli armored forces

are another good example. The anti-aircraft array is a defensive

weapon, while tanks, according to IDF doctrine, are an offensive one.

However, already in the 1950s, the IDF preferred to rely on tanks for

defensive purposes and not only for offensive ones, and thus

consolidated the idea of flexibility.7

Defensive and active defensive systems do not realize this

conceptual idea, since they normally lack the required flexibility to

balance between offense and defense.8 A large budgetary,

operational, and conceptual investment in a non-multifunctional

system required - and still requires - a fundamental change in

attitude to force design concepts and in the willingness of decision

makers to adopt such systems.

These dilemmas, which are related to the role of defensive

systems within force design continue to accompany decision makers

who must create the required balance between budgetary

5 See, for example, former Prime Minister Ehud Olmert’s pronouncement: “A State cannot protect itself ad-infinitum,” in Ahia Rabed. “Olmert: A State cannot protect itself ad-infinitum,” Ynet, June 28, 2007, http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html [Hebrew] 6 Meir Elran and David Friedman. “Gas Masks: Toward the End of the Line?” INSS Insight, No. 487, November 24, 2013. 7 Zeev Elron. “The Armored threat and the IDF’s anti-tank array, prior to the Sinai War,” in Hagai Golan and Shaul Shai (eds). The Engines Thunder: 50 years to the Sinai War, Tel Aviv, Ma’arachot, 2006, p. 149. [Hebrew] 8 One can interpret the employment of the Vulcan cannon in the First Lebanon War as an exception.


constraints, the different elements of the security concept and

flexibility for the military force. In the article’s next section, we will

examine the balance between offense and defense in earlier

concepts, as compared to the reality of Operation Protective Edge.

The Balance Between Defense and Offense in the IDF’s Operational

Concept Compared to Its Execution During Operation Protective

Edge

In this section, we will review the IDF’s official approach9

when dealing with the defensive pillar, and compare it to the orders

which were written and distributed during Operation Protective

Edge.

The IDF’s approach, as it was developed prior to Protective

Edge, reveals the crystallization of an understanding of the role of

9 The “IDF approach” mentioned here is a summation of the conceptual papers written over the last decade, in addition to the conclusions of the Meridor Committee on Israel’s Defense Doctrine.


defense in relation to the security challenges. It supports the

centrality of defense in the changing battlefield and the need to

augment this element. On the other hand, this approach emphasizes

the importance of a balanced security concept, while doubly

emphasizing the roles of deterrence and decisive defeat. It

concludes that the defensive pillar accompanies offensive action and

in fact enables its implementation, therefore a necessary balance

must be maintained between offensive and defensive responses.

This approach makes clear the (current) need to continue

examining the defensive pillar’s influence on the other three pillars

of the concept - deterrence, early warning and decisive defeat. This

examination, which has not been satisfactorily performed, exists in

the shadow of the presumption that the role of defense is to enable

the realization of the offensive concept.

Furthermore, the secondary role of defense as a supporting

element to the offensive effort is perceived by some of the shapers

of this approach as not only secondary to the other components of

the security concept, but as a component which could actually

become a heavy burden. They fear that it could prevent further

development of the other components and damage, even weaken,

Israel’s offensive response.

In conclusion, underlying the IDF’s approach is the

assumption that the defensive pillar plays a lesser role than the role

it actually played during Protective Edge (as we will show below).

This approach even views the defensive pillar as a “stepson” of the

security concept, which was born to live in the shadow of its two

dominant brothers - deterrence and decisive defeat.

In reality, during Protective Edge, defense received a very

different type of treatment. The massive aerial bombardment and

limited ground maneuver which specifically targeted the offensive

tunnels gave the fighting the appearance of an offensive operation.

However, Protective Edge’s rationale was conservatively defensive,

with limited objectives, focused on returning calm to the south of

Israel and removing threats. Examination of the General Staff’s

operational idea demonstrates the same rationale - the defensive

effort as the priority, even during the offensive stage of the ground


maneuver. This rational was also shared by the political echelon,

prior to and during the operation, whose main objective was to

thwart and prevent injury to the Israeli home front.

This examination exposes a growing gap concerning the

defensive element between the IDF’s concept and attitudes prior to

the operation and the actual approach adopted during Protective

Edge. Prior to the operation, the prevailing concept in the IDF viewed

the defensive pillar, in the best case, as an element supporting the

offensive, which was supposed to assist the other three pillars,

primarily the offensive (decisive defeat) one; or in the worst case as

a delaying factor which would hinder the proper employment of the

other elements. In fact, it is clear that during Protective Edge, the

defensive pillar acquired a central importance, even gaining

dominance over the other elements of the classic security concept.

Why was such a wide gap created between perceptions of

defense prior to the operation (as well as during other operations)

and its actual implementation?

There are three possible reasons, which in combination

created this gap. First, the lack of study of the influence of the

defensive pillar, a pillar that has strengthened over the years, on the

other security concept elements. Second, the hostilities that led to

the writing of the General Staff and conceptual position papers were

major operations, in which the offense was the primary component,

while defense played only a supporting role. An operation directed

at achieving limited objectives, such as Protective Edge, was not

mentioned in these position papers, and therefore the defensive

element, which was central to the operation, did not find expression

in them. The third reason relates to the IDF’s ethos. The offensive

ethos of the IDF is clearly expressed in these conceptual papers, as

part of an outlook that emphasizes the centrality of offensive force

design. In the current reality, this is not the sole consideration and

other non-military considerations play a significant role too.

Despite the gap between the defense concept and its

implementation, it seems that the centrality of defense within the


Israeli security concept, and in the totality of its practical tools, is not

in doubt. Still, the question remains, why not develop defense to the

maximum?

A partial answer to this question was presented in the first

part of the present article, which noted the struggle over resources,

the balance among the security concept components, and flexibility

of force design, as considerable and counterbalancing factors against

the desire to invest greater resources in defense. However, it is

important to note two points within the IDF discourse, which hint at

dilemmas arising from apprehension about an over-reliance on the

defensive pillar.

The first is linked to the psychological-cognitive

characteristic associated with defensive capabilities and to a possible

failure of defense. We have already mentioned the basic tenet of

ground warfare that “a defensive line is bound to break,”10 as a basic

principle of defense. This accurate observation has one more

implication that is directly connected to the Israeli active defense

systems. Israeli expectations, both military and civil, as were

reflected in Operations Pillar of Defense and Protective Edge, are for

a perfect defense.

However, we should remember that there is a technological

aspect to Israel’s struggle with its opponents.11 It is entirely

conceivable that Israel’s enemies are working on a response to its

defensive advantage, and by finding a way to breach the defensive

systems, will strike, even partially, at its home front. Such a strike

may considerably reduce the effectiveness of Israel’s defensive

systems. There is an apprehension that an over-reliance on defensive

systems exposes Israel, given the sense that each blow to the home

front, even if only amounting to a few rockets and casualties, would

be considered a major failure.

A good demonstration of this was the media's attitude about

the closure of Ben Gurion Airport following the landing of a single

10 IDF Ground Forces Command, op. cit. 11 Edward Luttwak, Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard University Press, 2002.


rocket in a nearby town,12 and the resentment of the residents of the

Gaza border towns due to the IDF’s failure to intercept mortar

shells.13 Such a concept, which relies on the dominance of the

defense, may create an unachievable benchmark during a conflict,

thus generating public, psychological and operational

disappointment.

The second point is associated with the required balance

between defense, offense and decisive defeat in relation to the

length of a campaign. The success of the active defense systems in

Protective Edge, both the Iron Dome interceptions and the early

warning, identification and location system, provided political and

military decision makers with a longer period to make decisions, due

to the reduced impact on the Israeli home front. Massive damage to

the Israeli home front would have forced a shortening of the

campaign, involving a ground maneuver, a massive employment of

aerial strikes and wide collateral damage to civilians on the other

side.

This breathing room, unlike the situation in the Second

Lebanon War, had a real impact on the campaign’s length. An

examination of the strategic objectives of the operation raises an

essential question about the role of the defensive system in

influencing the operational rationale of the campaign. The limited

strategic objectives which did not seek to achieve a decisive defeat

pushed the offensive effort into second place and considerably

eroded the prevailing understanding of the need for a short

campaign. The apprehension that arises is connected to a desire to

balance defense and offense when determining the strategic

objectives of future operations, and with the need to conduct a

systemic analysis of the influences of all defensive systems on all

types of IDF operations.

12 Yiftah Shapir, “Rocket warfare in Protective Edge,” in Kurz, Anat and Brom, Shlomo, (Eds) The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS, November 2014, p. 45. 13 Oded Bar Meir, “In the Eshkol Regional Council: ‘Feeling like sitting ducks’,” Mynet, 21 August 2011, http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html. [Hebrew]

http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html


The Gap Between the Earlier Attitude and the Operation’s Conduct

What we learn from this gap leads us to two complementary

conclusions. The first relates to the importance of integrating the

defensive pillar in Israel’s security challenges, the other tries to

balance the dominance of defense, as seen in Protective Edge, with

future challenges.

Assuming that operations such as Protective Edge - with

limited objectives, lacking a clear foundation for achieving decisive

defeat, and a goal of restoring calm - will continue to form a key part

of the totality of security challenges facing Israel in the near future,

then focusing on defense in general and on active defense in

particular is both vital and proper. Planning such a campaign (of

limited objectives) and its conduct will necessitate regarding this

pillar as a key component, alongside the other security concept

elements.

That said, it is important to look forward, beyond the last

campaign. Despite the success of the active defense systems, history

teaches us that over-reliance on defensive systems is dangerous. Our

opponents’ ability to breach these systems means that over-reliance

is problematic at best, and grossly irresponsible at worst.

The challenge is twofold. From the technological-

operational perspective, we must continue to maintain Israel’s

qualitative advantage and to increase it, to be ready for any new

challenge. From the conceptual-psychological perspective, we must

not be drawn into feeling that such operations (of limited objectives)

are the only challenge. We must continue discussing both all-out and

limited war doctrines in order to develop and strengthen them. We

must examine how, in such a scenario, offense can be turned into the

main element in the decision makers’ toolbox, in order not to

unsettle the important balance between offense and defense. This

challenge is not limited to the understanding of the military echelon.

It is validated by the need to explain these insights to the political

echelon and to emphasize the complexity and problematic nature of

over-reliance on defense.


The Dispute Between the Political and Military Echelons Over Air-

Defense

Our primary argument here is about the existence of deep

conceptual gaps concerning defensive systems between the political

echelon and the IDF. While politicians regard the defensive element

as external to the IDF, a parallel track to the military-offensive and

political elements, the IDF regards defense as an integral component

of its function, to be employed in a similar manner to other

components of the military system, and devoid of any specific

importance justifying special treatment. These gaps create tensions

between the political and military echelons, regarding the type of

force design and employment to be adopted.

Even prior to Protective Edge, the political echelon placed

defense high on its list of priorities. The political echelon was the

motivating force behind the development of this capability, due to

its understanding of future challenges. It therefore gained a sense of

ownership over the system. In the statements of several defense

ministers during the years 2001-2010, and in an interview with Amir

Peretz, defense minister from 2005-2006, their perception of

defense as an important and central element is apparent: “We must

not be satisfied with offense only, but must create an integrated

defense… passive… plus Iron Dome which will guarantee the military

and political echelons completely new maneuvering space...”14 This

perception was also clearly reflected in actual force design and in the

political echelon’s will to emphasize defensive, especially active

defense systems, as significant element deserving of special

attention.15

14 Amir Peretz, an interview on the Knesset Channel, March 12, 2012, www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3LJsqI5F9k. 15 According to Amir Rapaport, in the IDF’s Multi-Year Plan Teuza, active defense is assigned the third priority (together with the Air Force) after cyberwarfare and intelligence. The ground forces are accorded the forth priority. Amir Rapaport, “The IDF’s Multi-Year Plan: force design or the dismantling of the ground forces,” in “The IDF’s Force design”, Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Colloquia on Strategy and Diplomacy, No. 28, Bar Ilan University, 2014, p. 24. [Hebrew]

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f3LJsqI5F9k


Throughout the operation one may identify the deep

involvement of the political echelon in decisions regarding active

defense and defense in general. The winds blowing in from the

political echelon regarding defense in previous years did not subside

with the beginning of Protective Edge. The importance ascribed by

the political echelon to defense and its different appreciation of

defense’s role was expressed in their involvement in decisions

regarding the employment of active defenses. The high regard and

priority given to defense was reflected in the association between

the successful employment of active defense systems in intercepting

Hamas’s rockets and missiles on the one hand, and with the political

echelon regarding this success as strategically thwarting Hamas’

objectives on the other. The strategic importance ascribed to these

interceptions became an attractive factor and greatly contributed to

the political echelon’s perspective of the defensive systems as being

external to the IDF.

The key point is connected to the political echelon’s position

on the balancing of offense and defense (as noted). The political

echelon regards defense as enabling a reduction in the need to take

the offensive and thus defense belongs to the political, not the

military, toolbox.

On the other hand, the IDF regards defense as an internal

element, similar to the other elements in its toolbox and to be

employed in the same manner. This IDF approach in not only

conceptual, but is reflected at the other military levels. This does not

relate solely to the technical-organizational level, dealing with

question of who employs the defense system and to whom it

belongs, but touches on a broader perspective of the system and

military action.

From the army’s viewpoint, since defensive tools belong to

the military, they are part of the military toolbox, not the political

echelon’s. Active defense is not a tool to be directly controlled by the

political echelon and decision makers, but a military one. The role of

defense from this perspective, is to support the offense and in effect

to enable it.


This issue is associated with an operational issue of the

highest priority: “What is to be defended?” There is a built-in tension

between the natural political inclination to defend the population in

the home front and the military-professional inclination, which is

natural as well, to protect installations of strategic importance to the

military campaign. Assuming that overall resources are limited, and

that this is a practical, not a theoretical, dilemma, we are witnessing

here another aspect of the gap between the two perceptions.16

16 Yossi Arazi and Gal Perel quote Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot, who stated as Head of the IDF Northern Command that: “The Iron Dome must be directed first and foremost at preserving the IDF’s offensive capability and not at defending civilians… it should protect Israel’s critical infrastructure, IDF bases, and military forces’ gathering points,” Yossi Arazi and Gal Perel. “Integrating Technologies to Protect the Home Front against Ballistic Threats and Cruise Missiles,” Military and Strategic Affairs, Volume 5, No. 3, December 2013, p. 94.


Two questions arise from the gap between the positions and

perceptions of the political and military echelons: Why does the

political echelon aspire to directly control the active defense

systems? Why does the IDF ignore the dissonance between itself and

the political echelon?

As for direct control, there are some possible answers. First,

regarding the ownership aspect, the political echelon regards itself

as directly responsible for the very existence of active defense

systems, having forced them upon the army, having obtained the

funding from abroad and having pushed for their employment. This

bestows upon them, in their opinion, the right to control a tool that

they promoted. Second, this aspiration is associated with changes in

the nature of war. In the past, the IDF stood between the home front

and the enemy, but currently, in the age of missile and rocket wars,

this separation has disappeared. The defense array is what separates

citizens from rockets. Therefore, this array, brought to the army by

the political echelon, should be under the latter’s control.

This point is associated with the meaning of failure. If, in the

past, a tactical, even an operational, failure on the battlefield did not

immediately affect the home front, currently, a tactical failure in

intercepting a missile or a rocket leads directly to civilian casualties.

The direct link between the success or failure of the active defense

systems and citizens' lives has major political importance, and

politicians therefore wish to control these systems, which they

assume are easier to control than offensive systems. The offensive,

decisive defeat effort draws international shockwaves, e.g. the

Goldstone Report; it may entail heavy casualties; and may critically

undermine regional stability. Therefore, the political echelon wishes

to minimize it, preferring limited campaigns of a primarily defensive

nature. Such campaigns offer better control and supervision, and

politicians believe that they should be entrusted with these.

There are several possible answers to why the IDF ignores

this dissonance between itself and the political echelon. First, the

IDF’s offensive ethos is incompatible with the spirit of this defensive

approach of limited operations. Conflicting ethos are not only a

methodological problem, they also give rise to a cognitive


dissonance that prevents one or both sides from understanding the

gap.

Second, the IDF’s force design and its major capabilities -

military units, weaponry and training- are all directed at an offensive

scenario. These existing capabilities directly address the existing

concept and prevent an understanding of the existing tension.

The third answer stems from an issue mentioned above, the

multifunctional nature of the force. The active defense array is an

anomaly in force design. It is not flexible, it cannot be employed for

both offensive and defensive purposes as most of the force

generated by the IDF.

The last reason is directly linked to the first, the offensive

ethos. The IDF does not believe in the possibility of achieving victory

in a war, campaign or a limited conflict through the defense. A victory

always entails an offensive. This cognitive gap, alongside the other

points raised above, feeds the existing dissonance between the IDF

and the political echelon.

How Can These Gaps Be Narrowed?

The response to these gaps should, first and foremost, be a

dialogue between the political and military echelons. Exposing these

dilemmas is a necessary condition for their resolution, but is not

sufficient. As noted, the military echelon should clarify to the

politicians the problematic character of an over-reliance on defense.

Both echelons should jointly study the characteristics of active

defense systems employment, especially the built-in tension

between defending critical national and military infrastructures,

which on the one hand is essential to the offense and on the other,

defending the home front and population centers.

Another issue to be clarified is the significance of overusing

defense during limited operations on the readiness for an all-out war

which may break out during such an operation. An overly intensive

employment of active defense systems, disregarding the proper

balance between these systems, during a limited operation, may


hinder the tactical-operational as well as cognitive readiness for

more intense warfare. Clarifying this issue is critical to coping with

possible future situations in which a limited campaign on one front

may escalate into an all-out war on several fronts. At that point, all

basic concepts - from the readiness to embark on such a campaign

to the level of supplies and armaments, would require a complete

rethink.

Conclusion

Operation Protective Edge was the second operation, after

Pillar of Defense, in which active defense system were widely

employed. Despite the offensive employment of the air and ground

forces, the prevailing concept throughout the operation regarded

defense as the dominant element of the security concept. In fact, we

witnessed a new IDF concept that regarded preventing enemy

achievements as the first priority, no less than achieving our own

objectives. Using soccer terminology, we may say that the IDF

preferred a 1-0 win over a 5-1 victory.

Two major conceptual gaps were discussed in this article.

The first dealt with the relation between offense and defense.

Protective Edge had a defensive operational rationale. Preserving

the status quo, seeking to achieve victory by forestalling enemy

achievements, became the main operational idea. In such a

campaign, the defensive element gained dominance over the other

security concept elements, mainly offense and decisive defeat. This

was a totally different situation from the previous national-military

concept, which was aware of the importance of the defensive pillar,

but never granted it leadership, certainly not dominance, over the

other pillars.

The other gap is related to the role of defense in the eyes of

the political and military echelons. Due to the reasons noted above

- ownership of the defensive systems, the changing characteristics of

warfare, and the will to control these systems directly - the political

echelon regards the defensive element as being somewhat external

to the IDF and on the same level as the military-offensive and the

political elements. The IDF, on the other hand, regards defense as an


internal element and therefore as part and parcel of the totality of

force design and employment. This gap creates many tensions in

force design and employment.

The main significance of the operation was in fact related to

the success of the defensive pillar. In contrast to previous experience

which demanded a rethink or a genuine process of drawing of

conclusions following a failure, the positive results of the active

defense systems encouraged us, and rightly so, to examine future

influences.

We can predict, with a certain degree of caution, that its

success will position defense as an equal, or perhaps as dominant,

among the security concept’s pillars. Therefore, we expect to see it

gaining influence among military and political decision makers.

However, due to the dangers of an over-reliance on defense, whose

risks were first exposed during the last operation, it is important to

preserve the dominance of the IDF’s offensive capabilities and to

further develop them.

The debate over the development and influence of the

active defense array, was until now focused on the capability itself. It

is our duty to develop an operational analysis of the totality of the

IDF’s capabilities, hand in hand with the political echelon, in order to

balance all of these elements, and to be prepared to optimally cope

with all the challenges waiting at the IDF and Israel’s door.


Bibliography • Aharon Bram, Shir. “Volcanic Activity.” Israel Air Force Journal, 206,

2012. [Hebrew]

• Arazi, Yossi and Perel, Gal. “Integrating Technologies to Protect the

Home Front against Ballistic Threats and Cruise Missiles.” Military and

Strategic Affairs, Vol. 5, No. 3, December 2013, pp. 89-110.

• Bar Meir, Oded. “In the Eshkol Regional Council: ‘Feeling like sitting

ducks’.” Mynet, 21 August 2011. [Hebrew]

• http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html.

• Elran, Meir and Friedman, David. “Gas Masks: Toward the End of the

Line?” INSS Insight No. 487, November 24, 2013.

• Elron, Zeev. “The Armored threat and the IDF’s anti-tank array, prior to

the Sinai War,” in Golan, Hagai and Shai, Shaul (eds). The Engines

Thunder: 50 years to the Sinai War, Tel Aviv, Ma’arachot, 2006, pp. 117-

162. [Hebrew]

• IDF Ground Forces Command, Ground Forces Operations, January

2012. [Hebrew]

• Luttwak, Edward. Strategy: The Logic of War and Peace. Harvard

University Press, 2002.

• Meridor, Dan. “Civil Defense as Part of the Israeli Security Concept,” in

Elran Meir (Ed.) The Civil Front, INSS Memorandum No. 99, June 2009,

pp. 15-18. [Hebrew]

• Rabed, Ahia. “Olmert: A State cannot protect itself ad-infinitum,” Ynet,

June 28, 2007. [Hebrew]

• http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html

• Rapparot, Amir. “The IDF’s Multi-Year Plan: force design or the

dismantling of the Ground Forces,” in “The IDF’s Force Generation”,

Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies, Colloquia on Strategy and

Diplomacy No. 28, Bar Ilan University, 2014, pp. 19-24. [Hebrew]

• Shapir, Yiftah S. “Lessons from the Iron Dome.” Military and Strategic

Affairs, Volume 5, No. 1, May 2013, pp. 81-94.

• Shapir, Yiftah S. “Rocket warfare in Protective Edge,” in Kurz, Anat and

Brom, Shlomo, (Eds) The Lessons of Operation Protective Edge, INSS,

November 2014, pp. 43-50.

http://www.mynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-4111775,00.html

http://www.ynet.co.il/articles/0,7340,L-3418874,00.html


• Tal, Israel. National Security: The Israeli Experience. Praeger Security

International, 2000.

Date post:	06-Jun-2020
Category:	Documents
Upload:	others
View:	3 times
Download:	0 times

Active Defense as the Fourth Pillar of the Israeli ... · Security oncept – The Lesson from...

Documents