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AUTHORITYGroup-4 DoDD 5200.10, 26 Jul 1962; OAG,D/A ltr., 29 Apr 1980

THIS PAGE IS UNCLASSIFIED

FOR OFFICIAL, USE ONLY CONFIDEI#IAL1ST BATTALION 69TH ARMOR3RD BRIGADE 25TH INF DIV

t TLARM-C 26 e6

COD SUBJECT: eratio e . Lessons Learned, (I - 31 August

TO: Commanding General3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry DivisionATTN: AVDC-C-OFAP San Francisco 96355

___ _ _ _ SECTION I

UNIT ACTIVITIES

1. General:

a. Mission: During the period the lst Battalion 69th ArmorC •provided the Control Headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forwardk. Base Area at Catocka. The Battalionalso provided the 3d Brigade Task

Si Force with a mobile reserve/reaction force with the elements positioned.at Catecka. The Battalion forward CP moved to an Area of Operationssouth of Duc Co to establish a screen, conduct zone reconaissance andsearch and destroy missions. In addition to the above missions this"Battalion also provided security for the Brigade Base Camp Fleiku, andSpecial Forces Camps and artillery positions at Duc Co and Plei Me bypositioning tank platoons at these locations. Other missions accomn-plised include route security, convoy escort, RRU security, LLOC sur-veillance patrols and support of infantry units conducting combat oper-ations in their assigned areas of operation.

b. Task Organization:

(1) HHC 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31 August 66.

(2) Co A 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31 August 66.

(3) Co B 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-18, 22-31 August 66.

(4) Co C 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-31, August 66.

(5) Troop C 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry, 9-31 August 66.

.(6) CoA 1st Battalion 14th Infantry, 30-31 August 66.

(7) Co C 1st Battalion 14th Infantry 27-30 August N-4(

(8) Co B" st Battalion 14th Infantry, 24-25 Au

(9) Co A 1st Battalion 35th Infantry, 1-4, 20-23 U@~ 6 9

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SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

(10) Co C lot Battalion 35th Infantry, 15-19 August 66.

(11) Co B 2d Battalion 35th Infantry, 5-9 August 66.

(12) Co C 2d Battalion 35th Infantry, 10-14 August 66.

2. Personnel:

a. Unit St rengths:

AUTH ASG PFD

0 WO EM 0 wo EM 0 wO EM

HHC 19 3 279 20 3 306 18 3 292

A 5 0 85 5 0 99 5 0 92

B 5 0 85 5 0 100 5 0 92

C ) 5 0 85 6 0 100 6 0 87

t 1 34 3 534 36 3 605 34 3 536

5SF1 III.x.Arp 5 0 179 5 0 200 5 0 178j! A=N! L.Jln.IM•aA1u•w b:. Gains, Losses, and Balances

GAINS LOSSES BALANCE-C

AM Ij CODE.L~I 0 wo EM 0 WO EM 0 WO EM

SH• 1 0 4 4 0 9 -3 +5

"A 0 0 2 0 0 1 +1

. .. . , -- 0 0 2 0 0 4 +2

Total 1 0 11 4 0 15 -3 *4

CTrp 0 0 7 1 0 4 +1 +3

c. Battle and non-battle casualties:

(1) Battle Casualties - 3

(2) Battle Casualties Evacuated - 3

(3) Non-Battle Casualties - 21

.; (4) Non-Battle Casualties Evacuated - 14

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d. Mail: Mail service during the period was good.

e. During this period the Battalion received the following

R & R allocations:

(1) Tokyo - 11

(2) Bangkok - 10

(3) Taipei - 7

(4) Hong Kong - 6

(5) Hawaii - 6

(6) Singapore - 3

(7) Kuala Lumpar - 3

(8) Manila - 3

(9) Peneng- 3 4 a

f. Promotions: Duding the period the following promotions wer=received by this Battalion: 0 0 0

botn to cJ2(1) E7 - I=L%4,(

(2) E6 - 6 - 0 0

440 0Cl

(3) E5- 50 4r. 0,-1

(4) E4 -40

g. Awards and Decorations: During the period the Battalion " * ,submitted the following awards of which 3 air medals were approved. * .

-0 .

(1) Silver Star - 4 A, .

(2) Bronze Star with V device - 6 H -V

(3) Army Commendation Medals with V Device - 3 o0cz o

(4) Bronze Star - 3 !

(5) Air Medal - 3

h. Miscellaneous: "L :'.

(1) Religious services were conducted weekly at the ""Brigade Forward Base Area (Catecka) for Battalion personnel in that area. • ) "W '

(2) During the reporting period the total PX sales were$189.70. The PX made several trips to service units in the field.

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CONFI L'FIA RL OFFICR1L USE ONLYTLARH-C 26 September 66SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lesson# Learned (U - 31 August 1966)

(3) During the period one accidental shooting was reported.

3. Intelligence: The following enemy contact was made by elementsof this Battalion during the period.

a. 8 August 66:

(1) Two tanks from Company C hit mines on the road toPlei Ho. The l1t incident at 1535 and coordinates ZA177100 and the 2dat 1915 at coordinates ZA167080, both vehicles were damaged.

b. 9 August 66: lst Platoon, attached to 9th Company 3dBattalion 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) reported enemy probe at LZ 27V(YA822155) at 2315 hours. This probe was a full attack by the 5thBattalion 88th Regiment (NVA). Results of this attack were as follows:

(1) WA casualties: 181 NVA KIA (BC), 150 NVA KIA (Pose),6 NVA CIA.

(2) Equipment Captured: 5 - 60mm mort, 98 - 60mm rounds,I - 12.7 machine gun, 45 rifles - AK-47, 19 - SKS carbines, 12 - RPG-2launchers, 357 RPG-2 rockets, 560 hand grenades, 7800 rounds loose smallarms ammunition, 23 rounds 75mm RR, 50 drums LMG ammunition, 312 - AK-47magazines, over 300 pounds of explosives, several miles of communicationwire and large amounts of individual equipment.

c. 14 August 66: Co B platoon at LZ 27V reported trip flaresset off at 2200, 1 man observed running from area. Taken under fire withnegative results.

d. 16 August 66: Two tanks hit mines on Highway 19 west ofDue Co. Both incidents occurred at coordinates YA799238, the first at1800 and the second at 2150.

e, 17 August 66: B-1-69 reported contact while under oper-

ational control of TF 2-35 during relief of CIDG forces vicinitycoordinates YA749235. Results 7 NVA KIA (BC); I SKS carbine and I7.62 LHG captured.

f. 19 August 66:

(1) Scout platoon received report from inhabitants ofMillage at ZA196218 that 30 VC wearing khakis and fatiWue uniform movedthru village at 2000 on 16 August, the VC moved northeast and were carry-ing-1 mortar of unknown caliber.

(2) Scout platoon found drawing of tank, APC's, AK-47,and MAT-49 in the dirt. The drawings were in sufficient detail thatpositive identification could be made.

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20 August 66: B-1-69 was used to relieve a patrol of TF2.35 whior was pinned down by enemy fire vicinity coordinates YA735216.

Resulta were 8 WVA Kia (BC), I AT mine was captured.

ph. 26 August 66:

(I) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located one company size assembly* area vicinity YA798223, 306 weeks old.

N (2) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located squad size base areaapproximately .2 days old vicinity YA787197, there was a trail leading SSW.

(3) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located trail running on azimuthof 280 degrees from YA785195. This trail was not recently used.

i. 27 August 66:

(1) B-1-69 tank hit two mines, one left side and oneright side vicinity YA821152.

(2) B-1-69 reported fresh dug foxholes vicinity YA825152.

(3) B-1-69 assigned mission of assisting 2-35 Infantryengaged in fire fight vicinity YA822140. Results of this engagementwere 6 NVA KIA.

J. 29 August 66:

(1) Troop C-3-4 Cavalry ambush site: Spotted 304 NVA

(at 2330) fired claymore, unknown results.

(2) At 0130 Troop C-3-4 Cavalry ambush site sighted 3 NVAand took under small arms fire, negative results.

k. 30 August 66: Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located overhead bunkers,3-4 weeks old and destroyed them. Later determination after thoroughsearch revealed the following: Bivouac area, 300' x 250', center of massYA813172, area was well worn. A trail into area ran E-w. Also located20 1-man foxholes, ?-155 artillery rounds laying side by side, 3 MG.bunkers, and 3 AA emplacements (heavy MG) and I CP type bunker.

1. 31 August 66:

(.) At 0915, Troop C-3-4 Cavalry located base area which O"contained 20 bankers with overhead cover and 20 foxholes.

"(2) At 1515, Troop C-3-4 Cavalry reported an extension ofbase area found yesterday, estimate 100 - two man bunkers with overheadcover, all interconnected, 100 foxholes, estimate area not used in 30days. Area is located vicinity YA815175.

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TLA.-C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 September 66SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

4. Operation&: During the period this battalion provided thecontrol headquarters for the defense of the Brigade Forward Base are(Watecka) and mobile reserve/reaction force for the 3d Brigade TaskForce. The Battalion forward CP moved to an area of operations south ofDue Co to establish a screen, conduct zone reconnaissance and searchand destroy missions. The Battalion was also responsible for LLOCsecurity and convoy escorts. In addition the Battalion provided securityforces for Pleiku, Plsi Me and Duc Co, security for RRU units operatingunder Brigade control and provided armor support for infantry units.

a. On 1 August the Battalion moved the forward Command Postfrom Catecka to occupy blocking positions along Highway 19 from coor-dinates YA975270 to ZA076309. During this mission, Company A-1-69(-1 platoon), Co B-1-69 (-1 platoon) and Company C-1-69 occupied blockingpositions south of Highway 19. No enemy contact was made. Troop C-3-4was OPCON TF 1-35.

b. From 2 August to 25 August the battalion remained atCatecka performing the assigned missions. During this period theBattalion Scout platoon secured the road from Catecka to check point#3 (AR774368) on six days, provided security for surveillance patrolson the land line of communication on 4 days and provide security forRRU on 11 days. On 23-25 August the scout platoon was engaged incutting timber vicinity check point #12 (YA976291) to construct apermanent bridge at that location. During this period the Battalionmortar platoon fired 1903 rounds in support of the Brigade H&I program.During the above period the attached infantry company conducted 9dismounted patrols inte vicinity of the Brigade Forwarl Base area atCatecka, and provided security for the Brigade Civic Action Team on 3days.

(1) Company A (-1 platoon) was positioned at Duc Co from2-5 August 66. One platoon was positioned at LZ 27V (YA822155) underthe operational control of the 9th Company, 3d Battalion let CavalryRegiment (ROK). On 5 August, Company A moved to Catecka with oneplatoon continuing to Pleiku to provide security for the Brigade Base

j Camp. During the period 6-25 August, Company A secured the road fromcheck point #3 to check point #6 (ZA203343) on 16 days and from checkpoint #6 to check point #8 (ZA123285) on 2 days.

(2) Company B was positioned at Catecka from 2-5 August66. During this period the company reinforced with one platoon,.Company C-1-69 and one platoon Troop C-3-4 escorted one convoy fromCatecka to check point #12 and one convoy from check point #12 toCatecka. One platoon was positioned at Plei Me until 4 August 66.On 5 August the company moved from Catecka to Duc Co to relieve CompanyA. One platoon moved to LZ 27V and came under OPCON 3d Battalion letCavalry Regiment (ROK). On 9 Ai.gust the 2d platoon was positioned

at LZ 27V when that position came under attack by the 5th Battalion88th Regiment (NVA). The attack was repulsed with heavy NVA losses(see para 3, and Incl 1). This support was provided for the ROK unituntil 21 August 66. During the period 5-17 August, the company (-)remained at Duc Co to provide security for the artillery position andSpecial Forces Camp at that location. The Company also escorted one


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TLAA.-C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 September 66SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1-31 August 1966)

convoy from check point #12 (YA976291) to Duc Co and emplaced andsecured the attached AVLB at check point #12 (YA976291) on 3 days insupport of Task Force Luat and 1-9 Cavalry operating along Highway 19.On 18 August the Company (-) was placed under OPCON TF 2-35 and operatedin the LZ 27F (YA776227) until 22 August. On 22 August Company (-)returned to Due Co with one platoon OFCON 2-35 vic LZ 27F.

(3) Company C (-platoon) was positioned at Cateckafrom 2-25 August for security of the Brigade Base Camp. On 4 Augustone platoon moved from Catecka to Plei Me to replace a Company B pla-toon which provided security for the artillery positions and SpecialForces Camp. On 5 August the platoon at Pleiku was replaced by aplatoon from Company A and moved to Catecka. On 9 August a secondplatoon returned to Catecka on 12 August. For the remainder of theperiod the company (-) was at Catecka with ona platoon positioned atPlei He. During the period 2-25 August the company elements at Cateckasecured Highway 19 from Catecka to check point #3 on 3 days, securedthe road from Catecka to check point #8 on 6 days, escorted one convoyfrom Catecka to check point #12 and two convoys from check point #12to Catecka.

(4) Troop C-3-4 (-) was OPCON to TF 1-35 Infantry from1-5 August and to 1-9 Cavalry from 5-9 August. On 9 August Troop Creturned to Catecka and operational control of this battalion. Oneplatoon remained under Battalion control during the period 2-9 Augustand was used to meet the Battalion LLOC security mission. From 9-12August the Troop remained at Catecka. On 13 August, one platoon movedto Duc Co and was placed under OPCON TF 1-35. On 16 August this platoonmoved to LZ 27Y and was placed OPCON TF 1-14. On 19 July this platoonreturned to Duc Co and was placed OPCON B-1-69 until 22 August when itreturned to Catecka. During the period 9-22 August the Cavalry Troopsecured Highway 19 from Catecka to check point #8 on 5 days, escortedone convoy from Catecka to check point #12, one convoy from check point#12 to Catecka and 3 convoys from Pleiku to Kontum to Pleiku. On 24August Troop C moved from Catecka to Duc Co and was placed under OPCONTF 2-35. On 25 Auguust, Troop C was at Duc Co and reverted to controlof 1-69 Armor.

c. On 25 August the Battalion moved the Forward Command Postfrom Catecka to Duc Co and on 26 August started operations in an areasouth of Duc Co as Task Force MAC which was still in progress at theend of the period. The AO had boundaries of Highway 19 to the north,grid line YAI6 to the South, the Cambodian border on the West and gridline YA86 to the East. The task force consisted of the Battalion For-ward Command Post (Battalion Command vehicles, Headquarters Tank Sec-tion, and a Scout Section from the Battalion Scout platoon), 5-1-69,(-) until 30 August, C-1-69 (-) from 30 August when it replaced B-1-69,C-3-4 (-) from 27 August, one platoon from A-1-35 and one platoon fromC-2-35 on 31 August. During this same period the Battalion Rear CommandPost continued to fulfill the missions of security for the Brigade.The Battalion Mortar Platoon fired 932 rounds in the Brigade H&Iprogram. The attached Infantry Company conducted 11 local patrolsaround the Brigade forward Base Area. The Battalion Scout Platoon (-)


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FTLARM-C FOR OFFICIAL USE OMLY 26 September 1966SUBJEC`: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (0 - 31 August 1966)

secured Route 19 from Catecka to check point #3 on two days and securedthe Br~igade LLOC surveillance patrol at check point #3 on one day.

(1) Company A (-) war positioned at Catecka to providesecurity for the Brigade Forward Base area from 25-31 August. Duringthis period Company A (-) secured the road from Catecka to checkpoint #3 (AR774368) for three days. Until 31 August one platoon re-mained at Pleiku to perform maintenance and for security when it re-turned to Catecka. On 28 August one platoon moved from Catecka to PleiMe to provide security for the Special Forces Camp and artillery positionsrelieving a platoon from C-1-69.

(2) Company B ont 25-26 August the Company (-) was positionedat Duc Co for security with one platoon OPCON 2-35 at LZ 18F (YA775228).On 22 August the Company (-) escorted a ROK convoy from Due Co to checkpoint #12 (YA975291). On 26 August the Company (-) conducted a mountedreconnaissance from LZ 18F and established base camp at YA827192. Oneplatoon was released from OPCON 2-35 and moved to LZ 18F with theCompany. One platoon remained at Duc Co for security. From 27-30 Augustthe Company (-) conducted sc.reening and search missions in the TF MAC ADand one tank hit two mines, one on each track at YA82L152. On 27 August thesecond platoon moved south of the AD to assist 2-35 in contact at YA822140.On 30 August the Company (-) moved from the Battalion AD to Catecka toprovide security for the Brigade Forward Base area. On 31 August oneplatoon moved to Pleiku for security and maintenance.

(3) Company C from 25-30 August provided security for theBrigade Forward area. The platoon at Plat He returned to Catecka on28 August. The company opened and secured the road from Catecka toOasis four times. On 30 August the company (-) moved from Catecka toBattalion AO in the vic of LZ 27T. One platoon was positioned at DucCo to provide security for artillery and Special Forces Camp. On31 August the Company (-) conducted a screening mission between gridline YABI and 82 and moved north and south along a ridge line and returnedto 27T with no contact.

(4) Troop C-3-4 conducted a mounted reconnaissance on

26 August from Duc Co to YA778183 to establish a Troop base. Fr(xn 27through 31 August the Troop conducted screening missions within theBattalion AO. On 27 August one platoon was assigned OPCON 2-35 andremained with that unit for the remainder of the period. On 30August the Troop discovered a 300' by 250' deserted area believed tohave been used by NVA troops, at YA813172. On 31 August a furthersearch uncovered 100 unused bunkers at YA815715.

(5) Jogistics:

a. The overall logistic support has improved duringthe reporting period. Requisitions are being handled expediently andSa better flow of supplies ard repair parts is being experienced. Amajor effort has been made to update property accountability records.There has been considerable problems in the preparation and processingof reports of surveys. The S4 of this battalion has establishedspecial routing, receipt and suspense files to eliminate delay or lossof these records.


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TLARM-C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 September 1966SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

b. Supply:

(1) Class I: Approximately 85% of the rations consumedduring the period were A rations with the balance being either C or B.

(2) Class II & IV (less repair parts): Even thoughthere has been an improvement in the availability of supplies thefollowing shortage items are considered critical:

FSN NOMENCLATURE m DSO&DM RIO/ QTY/STATUS5840-503-1083 Plotting Board PT-176/TPS 6183-016 6185-1009 05 L BM4210-771-4780 Extinguisher, fire 5 lb 6188-001 6190-1OO5 05 24 AFI 62244210-086-7543 Extinguisher, fire 10 Lb 6189-006 6190-LOO6 05 1 BM4210-202-6465 Cylinder Ass'y Fire 6189-008- 6190-1007 05 3 AFL 6224

Extinguisher LO lb4210-771-4780 Extinguisher, Fire 5 lb 6189-009 6190-1008 05 13 BM4210-223-9910 Extinguisher, Fire 2h lb 6189-024 6190-1003 05 5 AFL 62242320-629-1294 Carrier, Personnel, M-113 6191-001 6192-1003 02 1 BM2320-542-4783 Truck Utility k ton M-151 6193-003 6193-1066 02 L BM4610-268-9890 Bag water sterilizing 6207-002 6208-1003 05 2 AFL 62245805-521-1320 Telephone Set TA-l/PT 6210-008 6211-1001 02 105805-257-3602 Switch Board SB-22/PT 6213-001 6213-1013 02 12320-082-7481 Truck Cargo M-54 6214-001 6214-1005 05 85805-543-0012 Telephone Set TA-312/PT 6217-001 02 155315-350-4326 Pin Lock Tow Cable 6158-202 05 405315-706-9195 Pin Grooved Headless 6158-203 6160-0520 05 40

, 2540-302-2425 Cable towing steel 6158-204 6160-0593 05 30-5315-350-4326 Pin tow cable locking 6211-204 05 107

5215-706-9195 Pin tow cable hook 6211-205 6211-6014 )5 1072540-706-8210 Hook tow cable 6211-206 62L1-6015 05 1074910-092-9131 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-202 6225-1007 05 14910-674-8736 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-203 6226-1001 05 14910-674-8738 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-204 6226-1002 05 14910-674-8737 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-205 6226-1005 05 L4910-092-9133 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-206 6226-1004 05 14910-791-5421 Cable Ass'y power elect. 6223-207 6226-1003 05 14910-521-6220 Hose Ass'y power elect. 6224-203 6225-1006 05 14910-521-6221 Hose ass'y power elect. 6224-204 6225-1005 05 1

* 2540-202-2425 Cable towing steel 6203-203 6206-2678 05 17

(3) Supply Transactions:

(a) Requisitions Submitted:1 Non-expendable - 1132 Expendable - 184

3 Repair parts - 233

(b) Follow up status cards (AF-l) - 21

(c) Turn in - 28

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(d) Abstracts of issue or turn in- 26

(e) Reports of survey, statement of charges, combatlosses inventory adjustment reports - 19

c. Maintenance:

(1) Periodic maintenance services were completed for Itank company and selected headquarters vehicles during the period.Scheduled services are not being kept current due to the continuedcommittment of the Battalion elements.

(2) With the exception of suspension parts damaged bymines, the supply of repair parts is satisfactory.

(3) Four rebuilt tanks were issued during this period toreplace vehicles which were continually experiencing mechanical failure.Two M-113's were also issued as maintenance floats for vehicles declared,by support maintenance, as not immediately repairable due to shortageof repair parts.

(4) 5 sets of tracks for M-113 were received during this

period.

(5) Major assemblies used during the period were:

(a) Tank engines - 5

(b) Tank transmissions - 5

(c) APC engines -2

(d) APC transmissions - 3

d. Equipment: Major equipment of requisition and consideredcritical are:

(1) Xenon Searchlights

(2) Special Sets A & B for each type vehicle authorized.

e. Construction: During the period several constructionprojects were completed.

(1) One large latrine kit was'completed.

(2) Covered ammunition storage area was completed.

(3) Conex containers were modified for use as arms roomsand for sensitive items storage.

(4) One 12 man wash rack was completed.

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TLARM-C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 September 1966SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 31 August 1966)

(5) Construction of perimeter bunkers was started. Itis eatimated that they should be completed by the end of September.

(6) One guard tower adjacent to MSR South was completed.

f. Ammunition Consumption:

DODAC NOMENCLATURE QUANTITYA475-1305 .45 Cal 3,000A131-1305 7.62mm 30,000AO 66-1305 5.56mm 1,500A557-1305 .50 cal 4-1 2,000C280-1305 90 mm 510C262-1305 90 mm Cannister 200C291-1305 90 mm WP 100C704-l305 4.2 HE 2,735C708-1305 4.2 WP 50C705-1305 4.2 Ill 30B568-1305 40 mm Grenade 288G890-1305 Hand Grenade, Frag 24

6. Civic Action: This Battalion conducted no civic actionsduring the period. The attached infantry company secured the BrigadeCivic Action Team for operations in 3 villages vicinity of Catecka.

SECTION II

Observations

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. Night Surveillance under Illumination.

Item: During the attack at LZ 27V on 9 August observersexperienced difficulty detecting NVA moving toward their position.

Discussion: The battlefield at LZ 25V was under almostcontinuous illumination and flare ships were used. Tank commandersreported that they could not detect NVA moving directly towards theirposition. They also reported that they could observe the NVA movinglaterally or diagonally across their position.

Observation: When tanks are positioned in mutually sup-porting positions, the tank commander can easily detect NVA movingtoward the adjacent tank and direct his fire against them.

b. Use of searchlights during night engagements.

Item: Searchlights have been used two times in nightengagements by the Battalion.

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TLARM-C FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY 26 September 1966SUBJECT: Operational Report of. Lessons Learned (Q - 31 August 1966)

Discussion: The value of a searchlight is reduced when it /only possesses a white light capability. Infra-red would increase itseffectiveness by approximately 75% by allowing undetected observationof areas of responsibility. The operational life of a searchlight duringa heavy engagement is approximately 30 minutes. This is sufficienttime to allow employment of other means of illumination.

Observation: Infra-red capability would increase theprobability of early detection of enemy forces and prolong the combatlife of the light by allowing it to be used undetected.

c. Trip Flares:

Item: Use of trip flares as a supplementary means forbattlefield illumination.

Discussion: Trip flares are a valuable supplement forbattlefield illumination because they can be fired to silhoutte tar-gets between the defensive position and the flare, particularly, ifset for either trip or command initiation.

Observation: Trip flares should be set for either trip

or command initiation for use as an illumination supplement.

d. Movement Planning.

Item: Movement during rainy periods is hindered.

Discussion: Mud slows tracked and wheeled columns tonearly k of their dry season speeds. Movement with tanks in the DucCo area during monsoons should be made primarily along ridge lines.Trail-stream crossings as shown on maps are insufficient to supporttanks 90% of the time. Movement planning must consider the routewith fewest stream crossings on the best.

Observation: Planning time for movement with tanks ongood, dry roads (unimproved) must be approximately quadrupled whenplanning movement during and after heavy monsoon rains.

e. Tanks as a Relief Force.

Item: The battalion was called upon to provide a reliefforce for the infantry three times during Operation Paul Revere.

Discussion: Supporting fires were maintained directly onenemy positions and friendly positions were poorly dilineated.

Observation: When tanks are employed as a relief forceto elements under attack, supporting fires should be planned and coor-dinated to prohibit the enemy from withdrawing when the tanks arriveand change the balance of firepower, thus giving the tanks an opportun-ity to close with the enemy. Friendly positions must be pinpointed toavoid masking tank fires.

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3. Organization and Training: None

4. Intelligence: VC/NVA Mining Activities.

Itemý During Operation Paul Revere, which started on 10 Hay66, the Battalion encountered 51 enemy mines.

Discussion: Most of these mines were placed on Route 19west of the Oasis (ZA839249). These mines caused suspension damage-to both tanks and armored personnel carriers. The road distance onwhich mines have been encountered is approximately 31 km, this distancemakes the habitual use of mine detectors impractical.

Observation: The VC/NVA are capable of interdi:ting tkny route

in the area of operations by use of mines.

5. Logistics:

a. Land Line of Communication:

Iteu.: The unpaved land routes have been damaged by ex-tensive use during the monsoon season.

Discussion: The extensive use of the unpaved routes byheavy vehicles, both logistical and tactical have resulted in heavydamage to these routes. The heavy logistical vehicles such as the5000 gallon tanker and 5-ton artillery ammunition trucks cause the mostdamage. Tactical vehicles such as tanks and armored personnel carriersdo not cause extensive damage except where they cross routes orwhere the road bed is poorly prepared.

Observation: The use of a LLOC along an unpaved roadis not feasible during the monsoon season.

b. Requirement for cross-country capable cargo transported.

Item: The VC/NVA mining efforts are concentrated on estab-lised routes in the area of operation.

Discussion: The VC/NVA are capable of effectively inter-dicting and given route through a concentrated mining effort. Tocombat this capability resupply columns should be capable of movingcross country except where terrain obstacles channelize columns on theroad. These relatively short stretches of road could be swept bymine detector teams. In order to employ this concept a full trackcarao transporter or GOER family vehicle is needed for resupply ofisolated positions by ground means.

Observation: This concept would limit effectivenss

of the VC/NVA mining activities.

c. Tow Hooks and Tow Cables.

13


R FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

1SU CT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

Item: Carrying tow hooks and cables in the "ready" position.

Discussion: This unit has lost many tow hooks and tow lecables by carrying them in the ready position. While in the readyposition it has been found that there is a greatly increased probabil-ity of loss due to brush and trees and the amount of time saved has beenmarginal.

Observation: Tow hooks and cables should be carried inthe stowed position to reduce loss.

d. DX of Uniforms and Equipment.

Item: The present system of DX for uniforms and equip-ment is poor.

Discussion: Due to the necessity of laundering the itemsbeing DXed, much of the effect of the system is lost. There is usuallya 4 to 7 day wait for return of material sent to the laundry.

Observation: Items should be accepted for DX by the 84and then laundered on-mass by him.

e. Class "A' Rations.

Item: Cold storage facilities for perishable rations.

Discussion: Because it is impossible to establish afixed schedule for delivery of rations to forward units some perish-ables have remained packed and in the open for long enough periodsthat upon ,.eceipt large portions of them were found to be spoiled.

Observation: There is a need for some type of cold storagefacility at Catecka in which perishable rations could be stored untiltime for delivery.

f. Maintenance.

Item: Scheduled maintenances (Q service) is essential inkeeping down the dealine rate.

Discussion: After a complete Q service in August ACompany average deadline rate dropped approximately 50%. A similartrend has been observed in the other companies.

Observation: Regular quarterly maintenance is an absoluterequirement in order to maintain combat effectiveness.

g. Radio Repair.

Item: Radios are not being adequately inspected or testedduring repair.

14


-i0

C

i ~~FOR OFICIAL USE ONLY

TLARM-C 26 September 1966SUBJECT: Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 - 31 August 1966)

Discussion: This unit has sent numerous radios in forrepair which have been returned as repaired and been found to have thesame or a similar defect. Specifically C-14, C-6, and B-6.

Observation: Radio inspection procedures at the repairechelons should be tightened.

SECTION III

Recommendations

1. Personnel: None

2. Operations:

a. When this battalion is assigned a tactical mission in anarea of operations, it should be relieved of the mission of controlheadquarters for the defense and security of the Brigade Forward Basearea. A battalion Headquarters is not capable of operating two func-tional operation centers for extended periods.

b. A permanent bridge should should be emplaced at YA974291 to

facilitate use of Highway 19 to Duc Co.

3. Organization and Training: None

4. Intelligence: None

5. Logistics:

a. Route 19 west to Duc Co must be repaired if it is to beused as a lnd line of communications during next years monsoon season.This repair will require extensive engineer effort and should be pro-grammed during the upcoming dry season.

b. This battalion has had Xenon searchlights on requisition

for over one year. This unit should be given the highest priority forissue and installation of these lights and associated fire controlinstruments. This item is required to improve the night operationalcapability of this battalion.

i ~ FOR THE COMMIANDERFM /s/ Robert L. Saathoff

I Incl ROBERT L. SAATHOFF1. After Action Report of Captain, Armor

"The Battle of 27V 9-10 AdjutantAugust 1966"

15


" ' " "•\

HEADQUARTERSIST BATTALION 69TH ARM1R

3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division

APO San Francisco 96355

TLARM-C 8 September 66

/7 SUBJECT: After Action Report of "The Battle of 27V 9 - 10 August 1966"

TO: Commanding General3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry DivisionATTN; -AVDP-C-OPAPO San Francisco 96355

1. The 3d Battalion, let Cavalry Regiment (ROK) came under the operation-

al control (OPCON) o the 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry Division on 9

July 1966 and immedi8tely occupied defensive positions vicinity the Cambodian

border. On 10 July 1966 the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion 69th Armor, at

the direction of the Oommanding General, 3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry

Division, placed one tank platoon under the OPCON of the 3d Battalion, 1st

Cavalry Regiment (ROK). This platoon was positioned in the 9th Company per-

imeter on the south. This platoon was rotated with other platoons from the 1st

Battalion 69th Armor Approximately every seven days. No significant contact

was made by the 3d Battalion, 1st Cavalry Regiment (ROK) during the period

9 July 1966 to 9 August 1966.

2. On 5 August 1966 the ist Platoon, Company B, Ist Battalion 69th Armor

replaced a platoon from Company A, lst Battalion 69th Armor in the 9th Company

area on the normal rotation described above. A detailed sketch of the 9th

Company defensive position is at Inclosure.

3. During a liaison visit to the 9th Company position on 7 August 1966

Lieutenant Colonel R. J.Fairfield Jr., the Commanding Officer, 1st Battalion

69th Armor, recommended to Captain Lee, the'Commanding Officer of the 9th

Company, that he reposition the tanks to the 1st Platoon. This recommendation

was based on Colonel Fairfield's analysis of the 9th Company position, and the

avenues of approach into this position. The close proximity of the heavy Jun-

gle to the south and southeast and the concealment offered by the elephant grass

to the southwest appeared to offer the best avenues of approach into the 9th

Company position. Captain Lee considered this analysis and recommendatton but

decided against repositioning the 1st Platoon tanks.

4. Since there had been no significant contact in the area since 9 July,there is no doubt that a degree of complacency had developed, although further

discussion of the action by the 9th Company and the let Platoon will indicatethat what complacency did exist, had no significant effect on the outcome of

the engagement that was about to take place. As the sun set on the night of 9

August 1966, the usual 50% alert among personnel in the 9th Company perimeter

went into effect; all trip flares around the perimeter had been inspected, the

single strand of Concertina wire outside the perimeter was checked for breaks

and the 1st Platoon, Company b, Ist Battalion 69th Armor, under the command of

2d Lt Charles E. Markham checked the lay of their tank guns for the final time

before darkness set in. The two members of each of the five tank crews that

were not alert went to bed in tents immediately behind each tank position.

tI

TLAR-Ct 8 September 66SUBJECT: After Action Report of 1The Battle of 27V 9 - 10 August 1966"1

5. Commencing at 2010 hours, 9 August, the normal artillery harrassingand interdiction (H & 1) fires commenced to the west of the 9th Company pos-ition toward the Cambodian Border. These. fires consisted of 60sm mortars,81mm mortars, 4.2 inch mortars, 105 howitzers, 155mm howitzers, 8 inch how-itzers and 175mm guns all in support of a planned H & I program.

6. At 2315 hours, 9 August 1966, Lt Lim Bog Men of the 9th Company climbedupon on tank B-15 and told the tank commander, SSG Wallace T. Ferrneyhough,that he thought he heard digging to the southwest. SSG Ferrneyhough illuminatedthe area with his tank mounted, 18 inch, searchlight, and conducted recon-naissance by fire with his 7.62mm coaxially mounted M73 machinegun. Thisfiring immediately alerted the entire position and all personnel who werenot on alert began moving to their positions. Within seconds, the entiretreeline to the SE erupted with heavy automatic weapons fire. As a resultof this firing Lt Markham, the platoon leader and tank commander of B-Il,

and PFC Robert Merrick, the loader of B-14 were slightly wounded but stillmanaged to get aboard their respective tanks and engage in their assignedcrew duties.

7. Illumination in the battle area was initially provided by tank mountedsearchlights on B-15 and B-13 and by 60mm mortars firing from within the 9thCompany position. Subsequently, existing illumination was augmented by US

and ROK artillery and a USAF AC-47 flareship which arrived over the area atapproximately 092330. Discussion with personnel involved in this action re-vealed that the battle area was under almost continuous illumination fromapproximately 092330 until daylight on the 10th of August with only a fewbrief periods of from 10 - 15 seconds between flares. (The tank mountedsearchlights on B-13 and B-15 were both knocked out by enemy fire by 0145hours).

8. Tanks B-12, B-13 and B-14 concentrated their firing on the wood-

line to the southeast while Lt Markham in B-11 and SSG Ferneyhough in B-15

directed the majority of their fire to the south and southwest. At no timewere more than eight enemy personnel spotted in any one group. All availabletypes of tank ammunition were fired except high explosive anti-tank (HEAT)with 90mm cannister and 7. 6 2mm coaxial machine gun being the two types pre-ferred by the tank commanders.

9. Although there was a heavy volume of SA andAW fire directed at theposition throughout the night, there never appeared to be a large scale direct

assault or coordinated attack. The initial attack lasted until 0130 hours,followed by a lull until approximately 0200 hours when the enemy firing again

picked up. By 0430 hours all firing by the enemy had ceased. Although it is

merely conjecture at this point the alertness of Lieutenant Lim and subsequent

illumination and firing by SSG Ferneyhough in -B-15 appears to have disruptedthe coordinated attack that was planned. Enemy documents retrieved after the

battle and prisoner of war interrogation reports conclusively, indicate that a

coordinated attack was planned against the 9th Company position.

10. The combined effects of the tank aramament, 9th Company automaticweapons and supporting artillery and mortars had a devastating effect upon the

enemy. Inclosure 2 is a tabulation of all ammunition expended in this action.The 197 enemy dead that literally covered the battle field as the sun came up

on the morning of 10 August was a clear testimony to the fruits of a well or-

ganized defensive position.

Vi

TLARM-C 8 September 66SUBJECT: After Action Report of "The Battle of 27V 9-10 August 1966"

1o. Lieutenant Han Kwang Kuk, the Korean artillery:frward observerattached tothe 9th Company had 20 tubes of artillery available that couldfire in support of this engagement. These ranged from 105mm through 175mm.SDuring the night of 9 - 10 August, all of these artillery units were utilizedby Lt Han. At 2320 hours, after analyzing the enemy situations, Lt Han request-ed his first artillery fire. At 2324 hours, the first artillery began landingamong the enemy - this initial fire was provided by C. Battery, 61st Artillery(ROK). Within ten minutes, the additional US and ROK artillery, 61st ArtilleryDuc Co and the US 105lm Battery at LZ 27Y with the 1035th Infantry were firingin support of the 9th Company. At times, the 105mm artillery was landingwithin 30 meters of the 9th Company perimeter. The heavier artillery was ut-ilized to seal off the enemy's routes of withdrawal to the southeast, south andsouthwest. As indicated by the data at Inclosure 2 the artillery was also ut-ilized to augment the illumination provided by the USAR AC-47 flare ship.

12. This engagement was the first taste of combat by the lt Platoon,Company B, lot Battalion 69th Armor and they stood the test in an outstandingfashion. In the words of Captain Lee, the 9th Company Commander "the men ofLieutenant Markham's platoon are all brave men." An example of the typebravery that Captain Lee is talking about can be found by following the actionsof SP4 Donald R. Krug. Specialist Krug was an extra man in Lieutenant Markham'splatoon and from the outset of the engagement was observed all over the per-imeter by the American and Koreans, assisting the medical personnel, firinga Korean BAR and even at times firing his 45 caliber pistol at the enemy whenthey approached the perimeter.

13. Coordination of fire between two or more tanks was in continousevidence throughout the engagement. The main avenue of approach into the9th Company position appeared to be from the southwest approximately betwee.the two trees 125 meters southwest of the perimeter (Inclosure 1). The small(approx 5' high) finger that runs northeast - southwest along theis axis ofattach provided cover from direct fire from B-15 and B-li depending on whichside of the finger the enemy chose to go. If SSG Ferneyhough in B-15 observedthe enemy approaching on the north side of the finger they would jump overthe fipger to the south side when he took them under fire. SSG Ferneyhoughwould then call Lt Markham in B-Il and tell him to fire down along the southside of the finger. This tactic also worked in reverse and was utilized manytimes during the engagement. The searchlight mounted on SSG Ferneyhoughstank drew heavy automatic weapons fire each time it was turned on. Duringthose periods' when no enemy were observed SSG Ferneyhough would turn on hissearchlight to draw fire and Lt Markham would return the fire. This tacticonly lasted until approximately 2400 hours when the enemy fninally succeeded inknocking out SSG Ferneyhough's searchlight.

14. At approximately 0230 hours, Lt Markham received a radio call from3d Battalion, lst Cavalry Regiment (ROK) asking him to move his platoon outfrom the 9th Company perimeter in a counterattack. Lt Markham wisely decidednot to counterattack since there was no positive enemy position to attach andhis platoon would become much less effective and a great deal more vulnerablemoving around among the enemy in the dark. The propriety of the decisionwas further justified during a sweep of the enemy area at approximately0700 hours the norning of the 10th of August when 7 satchel charges and over350 RPG-2 anti-tank rockets were found littering the area.

*11

Si

TLARM-C 8 September 66SUBJECT: After Action 'Report of "Tha Battle of 27V 9 - 10 August 1966"

15. The engagement finally ended at 0430 hours the morning of 10August although there were brief periods of 5 - 10 minutes throughout the nightwhen the engagement stopped. It was impossible of course to determine theamount of enemy personnel individually killed by the 9th Company, the litPlatoon, Company B, let Batt4lion 69th Armor and the supporting US and Koreanartillery. It is obvious however that vithout any one of these elements,the number of enemy dead would have been far less than the total of 197 ahave already been counted on the battle field. The most significant aspectis that the enemy chose knowingly to attack a defensive position rinforcedby US Armor. The firepower and armor protection of the M48A3 tank proved morethan a match for his determination to overrun the 9th Company position andsucceeded in providing "Operation Paul Revere I1" with one of the most success-ful small unit engagements of the war.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

2 Incl DON A McKNIGHT1. Detailed Sketch of the 9th Major, Armor

Company Positions Executive Officer2. Ammunition Expenditures

191

, i

IFOR -f L M M

-z r~I0

I-'-

- o

ap,,

cf *

• ' " FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYmunmii.on hiperdtures

Artillery, Morturs Rounds FLred

Unit Cal No Gumia iLmINaTION VP

2 85 0 0A/6/14 US 8" 2 145 0 0c/61 ROK lO%. 6 91.1 104 100/l6h28 lICtK Q5Sv 6 ~.7169h CoRO3

Tanks. let PFatoon, Coaqar lallft Battalion 69th Armor

Tank No HE Cazmatezr WP .5 caliber 7B-l ~.0 100 1 900

B-3.2 :.0 1,50 '4~000B-13 o1 70 4500B-24 2 1 0 0 3000B.-15 5 fl0 0 3500

ii

21

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY -

4

FOR OFK;Y ONLY31T BATTALIOI 69TH AIRAPO San Francisco 96355

TURS-4 22 October 1966

SUBJECTs Operational Report of lessons Iearned (I - 30 September 1966)

TOt Commanding General3d Brigade Task Force, 25th Infantry DivisionATTN: AVDC-C-OPAPO San Francisco 96355

SECTION I

Uwrr ACTIVIT33S

1. Generals

a. The lst Battalion 69th Aror provided the perimeter defense

control headquarters for the brigade forward base area. It also provided the3d Brigade Task Force with a mobile reserve/reaction force positioned atCatecka. Additional missions weret LWDC surveillance, route security, con-voy escort, RRU security, support of infantry unit combat operations, andthe security of artillery positions and Special Forces Camps at Duc Co andP1ei No. The battalion also assisted in securing the Brigade Base Camp atPleiku by positioning elements there. Task Force 1-69 conducted search oper-ations in AO 27 from 1-7 September and the battalion forward cormznd post re-turned to Catecka from Duc Co on 9 September 1966

b. Task Organizations

(1) HHC lst Battalion 69th Armor, 1-30 September 1966.

(2) Co A Ist Battalion 69th Armor, 1-30 September 1966.

(3) no B 1st Battalion 69th Armor, 1-30 September 1966.

(4) Co C Ist Battalion 69th Armor, 1-30 September 1966.

(5) Trp C-3-4 Cavalry 1-7, 28-30 September 1966.

(6) Co A-1-14 Infantry, 1-2 September 1966.

(7) Co C-2-8 Infantry, 2-7 September 1966.


(9) Co A-2-35 Infantry 28-30 September 1966.


(11) Co B-1-14 Infantry, 17-28 September 1966., ,• . . I

I7! I

Nt

J' l'• 1'rI0IAL UE ONLY.!TAR0 U 2a Ootober 1966asUlITi oGpwatinal Report of Ieasob. Iaazned (1 - 30 September 1966)

2. Pberorinsl2

a, Unit Strengthss

AUTYH ASO PD

0 WO 3EM 0 WO am 0 WO SK

11019 3 279 20 3 299 18 2 27145 0 85% 9 0 87

B5 0 85% 3 0 91TOlIL

o Try 5 0 179 5 0 1 4 o&

b. Gains., lo•seset

MAIM5WS BALIANOB

o WO IM 0 314 0 WO 3,4

S1. 1 0 %5 2 0 17 - 0 -2

B 0 0 7 .0 0 6 0 0 +1IC 1 0, 0 o* a1 0TUPAL 3 ~! DaoTrp 0 0 U 0 0 15 0 a -4

e. Battle and non-battle casualtiess

(1) Battle Casualties - 0

S((2) Battle Casualties Evacuated - 0

(3) Ncn-Battle Casualties - 17

(4) Non-Battle Casualtie:s Evacuated - 7

(5) Non-R'attle Death - 1

R do Mail: Mal service during the period was good.

•' e During this period the battalion receivedl the following R & R

•,:i allocationst

(1) To~yo - 11

(2) gong Kcn- 9

. .) Singapore - 2 23

TURNO MR O!,r,,kAL USE~ PNLY 22 October 1966S•,•,J Operational Report of Ieesson learned (I - 30 Septeziber 1966)

(4) Taipei - 7B(a) angkok - 8

(6) Kuala Dnp - 4

(7) Pnn

(8) anila -2

(9) Hmwaii -4

f. Promotions: During the period the battalion received thefollowing

(1) 6 .-2

(2) E•..- 4.

(3) 94-4o

g o. Awards and Decorations:. During the period the battalionsubmitted the following awards.

(1) Silver Star -

(2) Bronze Star - 1

(3) ArPV Conmendation Modal - 17

(4k) Air Medal - 2

(5) legion of IMrit - 1

(6) USARv Certificate of Achievdment - 2

he Hiscellaneouss

(1) Religious services were conducted weekly at the brigadeforward base area (Catooka) for battalion personnel in that area.

(2) During the reporting period the total PX sales was $200(Sensitive Items).e

3. Intelligence: The following enenm contact was nade by elements ofthis battalion during the period.

a. I September 1966:

(1) C-1-69 patrol found enomny bivouac area and 30 foxholes atYA84i5217.

(2) HHC 1-69 patrol found abandoned medical clearing station2t

'1@a _______________________________________________ ________ _____________

TIAaE.-o .22 0otobor 11,6SUtBJ•'•lT Operational Report of Tessons learned (I - 30 Septetabur .1956)

which contained an WA poncho and bandages. 2

be 4 September 1966t Troop 0-3-4 Cavalry patrol heard noisescomig from an apparent enerV comand post or anti-aircraft location; firedorganai mortars and called for artillery fire, results unknown.

c. 5 September 19661

(1) C-1-69 patrol located a fresh trail made within 24 noursvicinity YA827l3.6

(2) C-1-69 patrol located 1 unidentifyed man who was taken.under fire cal fled vicinity YA8241 48.

(3) 0-1-69 patrol sAde eneny contact with an estimated reinfor-ced squad or platoon vicinity YA8231248, They observed one man dressed inkhakis and barefoot.

(4) 0-3-4 Cavalry located a squad size bunker which over looksa trail running northeast to southwest vicinity YA793189.

(5) C-1-69 had an infantry platoon attached who made contactwith =tmown size force vicinity of YA805201.

(6) C-1-69 had ark infantry platoon attached who made contactwith an unicown size force vicinity YA82414?.

(7) A scout platoon APC hit mine vicinity YA96)4289. The damagowas as follows: 1 trock blown off, 1 Set road wheels.

(8) A scout platoon APC hit mine vicinity YA955288. The damngowas as follows: 1 track blown off, 1 set road wheels aid 2 casualties (minorinjuries were evacuated)@

do 7 September 1966t

(1) A tank-from 0-1-69 hit mine at YA932283.

(2) A tank from C-1-69 hit mine at YA940287.

(3) A tank from HFM 1-69 hit mine at YA984294.

e. 10 Septerber 1966: A-1-69 found 1 VNCS at AR76C64 and returnedto higher headquarters for interrogation.

f. 13 Septesber 19661 Trp 0-3-4 Cavalry APC hit mine suffering 3WIA.

g, 23 September 1966t

(1) B-1-69 captured 4 VMCS, 2 at ZA230376 and 2 at ZA2233?60

(2) c-i-69 picked up 7 VC1S carrying Chieu Hoi pasees.

2:

TUR" ~ ~ P O !107I7"'' '4 -..74 "ýLY 22 October 1966SUBJPTCTt Operational Report of lessons Iearned (1 - 30 Sopterber 19c'6)

h. 24 September 1966: B-1-59 picked up 4 VMCS, 2 at AR789229 andthe other 2 at AR790219.

1, 25 September 19661 B-1-69 picked up 2 VWCS at ZA087217.

4. Operations:

a* 1-8 September 1961 The battalion (-) continued to conductscreening, zone reconnaissance and search end destroy operations in theaPsigned area of operations. This AO was bounded by the Cambodian Borderon the west, Route 19 on the north, the YA86N-S grid line on the east andthe YA16E-W grid line on the south. The battalion rear command post r .inedat Catecka to provide the control headquarters for the defense of the brigadeforward area and the mobile reserve/reaction force. It also coordinated theLIDO security operations within the brigade area of operatiins. On 7 3eptemberthe battalion forrard command post moved from the AO closing at Catecka on 9September 1966. One e odquarters tank hit a mine on 7 September enroute toCatecka.

(1) Company A (-) one platoon waos positioned at Cateoka from1-8 September 1966 for the defense of the brigade forward base area. Oneplatoon was positioned at PlFi Me for security of the Special Forces Camp andthe artillery in the area. During this period the elements at Catecka openedthe road from check point #6 to check point #3 three times, escorted AVIB tocheck point #12 two times and made one zone recon with a military intelligenceteam.

(2) Company B-l-69 Armor (-) was positioned nt Catecka for socur-ity of the brigade f:,rward base ares and one plat6on was positioned at Pleikufor security of the brigade base camp. During this period the elements atCatecka opened thc road from check point #6 to check point #3 five times.

(3) Company C (-) one platoon supported Task Force A.•C in the1-69 (-) assigned 'rea of operations. One platoon remained at Duo Co forsecurity of ihe artillery positions and the Special Forces Cnmp. From 7-9September 1966 one plntoon escorted Task Force IYC command post from coordin-ates YA975291 to Ccteckn and remained at Catecka.

(4) -C Troop 3d Squadron 4th Cavalry (-) supported Task Force MACin assigned area of o-erition ind conducted one search with nefative res-]ts.One platoon w's positioned at Dic Co•for security of the artillery position andthe Special Forces Camp znd ore platoon was OPCONT to Task Force 2-35p From2-6 Septenber the Troop (-) eupported Task Force Mr, and conducted patrols andreconnaissince in thi nosigned AO with n-pative enemy contact. One platoonwas positioned rt Duo Ca fcr security of the artillery position and SpecialForces Camp. On 7 Seotember the troop was rlelesed OPCON 1-69 Armor andwas placed OrCON Task Force 2-35.

b. 8-30 September 1966: The battalion remained at Catecka perform-ing assigned missions. The bqttalion mortar platoon fired 4045 rounds insupport of the brigade 'Rzi program during the period 1-30 September 1966 andthe attached infantr,/ company condurted 5 village seIrch oper'tions, 4126

FU OF

III I

TUR-O 22 Ootobir 'I.5T2 obM i Operationl Report of lesions Learned (1- 30 September 1966)

dismor ted patrol and 8 ambush patrols with negat ive sgnificant contactsThe scout platoon ecoured the MUon. 22 days# pffornmd il"'soort miussions whiohincluded 5 village searchess and worked on the bridge at check point 12 twodays during the period. Two APOIs hit mimno.

(2.) Company A (..) or* platoon was positioned at Catecks, from8-=5 September for the defense of the brigade forward ba•se, oam. During this

| \period one platoon was positioned at Maui 1* for the security of the SpecialForces Camp and the artillery in the area. During this period the elementsat Catecka secured Highway 19 from check point 6 to check point 3 two times,escorted 2 convoys from check point 6 to check point 12 and one convoy fromcheck point 12 to check point-6, and secured an engineer work party workingon. Highway 60 for one day. Qn 10 September Comparn (-) conducted a zone reconsouth of check point 3 and one VMHS was detained. On 17 September one platoonwas placed OPCON TF 1-14 Infantry for operations along Highway 19 vicinity PleiRongol. On 26 September Companr A (-) moved from Catecka to Plel Nb to providesecurity for the artillery position. One platoon revoined OPOON TF 1-14 foroperations along Route 19. On 27 8optenber Companr A (-) escorted one oonvoyfrom check point 5 to Plei He and back to check point 7. On 29 Seotember, theplatoon OPCON TF 1-114 returned to battalion control and was positioned atGntecka. Company (-) conducted route recon along Highway 6C from Plei Meto Plei KMy (1) and returned to Plei Me.

(2) B-1-69 (-) was positioned at ateocka for security of thebrigade forward base camp from 8-30 September. One platoon was positioned atPleiku for security of the brigade forward base canp from 8-25 September. Frm1I-22 Septeombr 1966 one platoon dssisted iW secur'ity of B-63-6 Artillory "at -

coordinates 2060143 and from 23-30 September 1966 at Than An District Head-quarters. The comprny (v) secured Highway 19 from chock point 6 to checkpoint 3 on 10 days and from check point 6 to check point 8 on 7 days. The com-pany (-) conducted search and clear operations at Plei Gae Thorg (1) (ZA230375)and Plei Gae Thong (2) (ZA223375) on 23 Septembor, Plei Del *PAR781218), PleiPeng (AR789Z28). on 21 Sept6mber and flei.Kuehg Ya Tong- (ZA085205), andElei Ta He .(ZA037220) on 26 Sept•0ber, Ruring these operations 8 vfrS wedetafnod. An element from the company seu.-ed the engineur work party on Highway60 on twb days, escorted one convoy from check point 6 to Plei !tongol, 2 convoysfrem chock point 3 to check point 5, and two convoys from check point 3 to PlMi

(3) Company C (-) remained at DuC Co for security of the artil-lery positions and the Spocial Forces Camp during the period 8 - 30 September.

Cre platoon escorted the bnttalion forwyard command post to Catecka ard remain-e,1 there, under battalion control to provide sn•ciirity for the brigade forwrardbase area and assist in LDOC security missions. Du~ing this move two tankshit mines causing light damage. On 16 Septeribr one platoon escorted BatteryA, 3d Battalion 6th Artillery (SP) (-) from Duo Co to IZ 27U (YA83l;191) andreturned to Duo Co. On 17 September one platoon escorted the Battery A trainsto IZ 27U and returned to Duo Co. On 23 September one platoon moved from DucCo to check point 12 (YA976291) to pick up engineer convoy. Seven VMC surron°-dered to this platoon at chock' point 3.2 under the Chiou Hli prograr, Thesereturnees were given medixcal tr')trel t, ford and transported ',o the the brigac-nSP0 compound for 1aturrogation. Cn Z), 24 and 26 SepteriabN. 1-%'6 the py.ntoona-';. Catocka was attnchod to the scoirt platycn (-) to soctl.o an. rný,!noar work

7AT

T=1

• • .; . . . •' ,• •J -

iI

•:. • .~~ ~~~~~~~ ,o ,...... . .......... e .. o • ",

to CeoW* eoh night. On 2$ September the platoon at %tetcs, esoorted.•na AVa •to oheok point #12 (A76291) ploiad up the tzaln olemnt ofSompawe~ 0 and Troop 0 3d Squadron 4th 0as 7 "reseorited them to Outeol.

II 4• On 30 8eptember tim pltoon at oates A%= "ottermst

September 1966. On 28 8eptember 1966 the Troop was relmasod OX0 2-35 andmve d to Duo Co. Oft 29 Septemlrb the Troop mye from Doi Co to. "AUM formint•amnoe and to aamsti in tourty of the brigade ba" oaap.

a, Om as ala latloal ma art darimn the 2at, period ba ontinmudto imprmove. frlentaU a nu and the tim lapse on aln requa.ion &afollow u? status reples have ref ted rapid hAndli. Th2 W.yWy armin wh!,'i ez~dl•ioa handlnin has been noted are In soon N Ball' repairparta1 , inor excendnble supply iasues and moes hall o2aoang fauterall. Thedirect ezohange of olothiMg and field equipunt has proven to be satl8faotory.

b. Supp2T:

(1) NON49PENDABIZ

78N NOMENCIATIEBE'TO.%Zg2-l781 T!IMOR Urlr=i 3 TON M-l15

o 0e4e,, .-Wk, kjI~p1U SS? TA-i/*PT 6212:4001/02 2.0. 2o "51-36 6 WM1TCHM ,RDSB-22/PT 6223-1013/02 12320-6-71M81 TRUCK CAROO 5 TON 1N-%tl1 62124-2005/05 85805 -.%3-OO2 TZIEPIUI SET TA-322/Pf /0 3

l%3.5-M-2067 HEIM? OVO Large 62141-IO02/0 3.68 ,1,5-0-2o66 -"'mZE CVC ReaC', 621-,1002/05 1210-1-2003 -1,M Cal 4 . 621i1s-1oo9/o% 25965;-876-2376 ADSHT .R-103/u 624.6-1016/05 82320-082-7",81 TRUTCK CARGO 5 TON *-*&I.1 621.6-,01,/05 91290-870-6276 QIADR.,AN OGUNIRS M-13B1 6255-1002/05 15280.674•,6282 TOOL KIT FM X&4.3 Set "A" 6224-1039/02 45180-674-6822 TOOL KIT FOR V43A3 Set "Be 6.121;-1o38/02 15820-8M.n993 ",,.STM .ATION xr,? icR ANR /,.O 6157-1039•/(2 7

62-6.2-89-724,412 "P &,T • r•r I) ./u-1 /02 36,;25-?717-2i7 1. Dr xv'T r•IO w ar /cx-..'-5 /-2 38415-C3. -206.7 M3UM!" CVC lo;rgs 6265-l04c/o' 58!5cCC2-2-46 fF11f.T CVO Ro~ular u646-:I39/055181-55.4-8C145 TOOL KIT EIEP(7, 6264-1033/05 114210-771-4780 FD1E ?rXT DrTI':. S lb O3 62M1-1033/?661•5-952-3767 WIT• i'.,.•:' hL- 6272-10o37/C-'; 166.50-5'1,%.94 .CjT1 i , .Yn4. ( 6269-101, 16$;,O-':L ~ A ,,i7A 6i. 'C--0,,/0. 16h5-9!"ý-3767 &' - "7,-'.. -).010/ h

28

fOR OFFICA! `77E ONLY

- --ila

5MAC0Ie Opeatiomal lepo2't of lessons Ma~rred (12 30 Sopboribori 11,'66)

(2) BBKMA Rh .32-

MS MfO3CXATMEERQN/MM r

M X5in35N026 1NFWCA TC BAI33-0-99 I M0LiVE JgADIZS 6260-052/0 40o

25Z&0mC-21425 CADIZ Tarlfln MTEL 6260-0593/05 302$40-202-242$ CABLE TW20 MML 6206W2678/0$ 1753a%-3$NO.326 PIN Locsn 105 129A"0.02..2425 CABLE TORMlI STEE /05 41453X15-350.4026 VXN Tor CABrZ 3DOIClWC1 /05 107

2125-706-9195 PIN TCW CABIR BOOK 6211-614/o•5 1072540.60?-8210 IoOK TOW CADIZ 62L2o,6315/05 10753135-708-78n3. PI iocxmo CiVs 622246012/05 1491o-092-9131 CADIZ ASSY MM ElICT. 6225-1007/05 1

"4910-674-8736 CA.Bl ASSY P0lJ 'I3C. 6226-100/ • ,Mplo6•T-8738 CADIZ AssY Paw m 1Z1. 6226-10o/05 1

14910-6714-8738 cJI3IE AssY PWKM siz3C. 6226-lceg/oS 14920.674..8737 CADIZ ASSY r0m ErECT. 6226-10051/05 149120-M-9233 CAl ASS! POM E.LCT. 6226-1004/05 1149101-523P6220 IDBE AMSY 6225:.1006/05 14910-421-6221 MISE 6225-1005/05 15130-792-9883 HDO HIR IMP. WRENCH 620-1005/0% 22540-706-8210 HDOK TOW CABDI 6265.-500Q/O• 35661-5143-138 M1UMlMER 6268-1006/05 15215-706-9195 PlN Ta, CABLE, HDOK 6271-508/0$ 5;335-350-4326 PIN Tf CABlE, HOOK 6271-.087/0% 102540-20.-24.2%5 CBl TGOINO 6271-5ce5/o- 10

(3) Supp•y Transactions

(a) Non expendable 1.53 each

(b) Expendables 82 eaoh

(o) Supp2j Division Rppamr Fartas 30 eaoh

(d) Follow-up status cards (AF-119)s 33 each

(e) Turn-ins: 70 each

(f) Report of Survey, Statoment of Charges, Combat Losses,I.A.iR.'sg 2s e2h oo

(g) Abstract issues and turn-irns 5 each

c. &aintonanceg

(1) Scheduled services for the mnnths were acczj~1ished mcceptfor Compari C. Tho sch3duled servicee will ba accomplished for this unlt c'.senf as oerational c')rnm'ittmnits permit.

(2) Tho F:lrpy'ly of repair parts re*mrin a criticai rrCo1l'r: r.r .;t,.

29

ý.A1

0

, I

F --- --- ----------

IA " MR OfflT,' T -1 22 fot-r lX6

$1240, Operatiloai Report 6f !aom tLna 30 Septeirbr V,-6)

The battailon Is using, repair parts faster than they can be supplid. Sow:Item which remult in deadliu vehicles are alternator pulleys for Us N13

peroonnal oarrAer and auspension ocuponenti for M-4U3 tanks.

(3) Ihjor compunents uwed durilng the reportIng period.

(a) Tank engines a-

(b) Twi-s transaiesionu - 7

(c) Tank final dr1w. I

(d) APO 3 enginesi - 9

(a) APO transmissions -2

(f ) APO final drive - I

(g) APC transfer cas - 3

/ . Equipments Equipm nt of this unit averaged over 90% adVai Ab11,ty.

e. Construotion.

/(1) Completed 7 bunkers and 2 towers.

(2)" Repaired and replaced the majorit' of perimeter wire./ (3) Removed the old tank bunkers.

(4) Constructed 1 OP small tent kit, 1 GP nedium tent kit anda inew shover for IWC.

(5) Reconstructed A&B -oasanie. latrines to provide largerseating capacity,

fe Statistical Datat

(1) Asmmition Expendeds

DODAC NOWNCIATTJR3UANTT, -e!r- .1 0 5 .1 o-alber.

A).32-1305 7.62 m W) 9 ,Yo4,.-.30o 5.5 N 6,250P.557-o305 o0 caliber, .4-1 (MIB) 5,710B568-o305 90 M arenade 50C200-.L305 90")04M H 9c262-..35 90 M Cannister I

C? 91-130590 12413 16

!•-01-1305,2" 41Miumination 6os-oW- 5 •.2" WP 30,•89,3-1o !wy.' Grenade Fraganutat!on It

30 /

FOR C.07 ri.

• .]. L* . ,.', .. ,- . . .. .:.

a•

;4

TlURW. 22S5E U~j~ ONYnotabar JIk348B3J 1'Ru Opesation1 Repcrt of one Learned (; Y30 82,te*,er 1•66)

(2) Ratlomns The battalion taek f o*oe consuaed 77,267 =malsdwWa the peri. Of these appr•.m•te2l 60C were Clioa A with the remain-'Ing 144 8BorG 07 rat Ions*

(3) 'Weage t

TYPS VEHICIA NUN=R ASSIGNED TOTAL NIIB 3N SBPMM114 Ton 35 3,08823 Ton 8 $,0332 2/2 Ton 23 6,873

STon 27 ., O59"N8A3 (Tank) 63 ,o960Y-.113 (Carrier Personnel) 46 24,o16M,-106am (Carrir Mortar) 7 ii02.6•7,• (Carrier Coumra Poet) 7 ST9-4~8A2 (AVIB) 2 8914M-.80(VTR)TTL f

6. Civlo Actions Civio action..p"o'rams were carried out in the follow-

ing villages by attached CA personnel during roundup operationsi

a. Plei Del - AR78.1218

b. P101 Pang - AR789228

a. P3.1i 0.. thong (1) -A307

d. Plei Gao Thong (2) U ZA223375

e. Plei Ya Ho - ZA087220

f. P.i K,,,eng Ta Tong - Z084205

SECT ION II

1. Observationse

a. Personnel: None

b. Operations t

/ (I) Item: Roundup Operationst See Thol 1

(2) Item: Tracked vehiloe ford conditions.

Discussions Approaches to tracked vehicle fords are theI•y to their suitability. During the monsoon rains the approaches may have

boan damaged by hlth water.

.1.,sei-c.tionj Traokod v•Ahicl. for'ds should an1 be cfr.rcrij,cc as proctical to determine trafficability.

3 1

;II

a

TUB"S I1¶ rit 22 O-'tober 1956SMr Mi Operatiowl Report oaf iesou, I.rned (1 - 30 S&zptfer :') .73)

I (P a.Orgonlistioua and fraizaingi None

do Mhteflences Nomn

e. Logistiuas None

f. 0thers Radio Oomi'ioations

Items During the ssonaoon season condensation collects In theS102 9/VRC and bases of the VRC series radio.

Dtse-u~seons Condensation causes short circuits and reducesoperational ranse of the VRC series radio.

Observ-ntions Durin the monsoon season inspection of thoseooponente should be wnde by organsational maintenance personnel and driedout as requfred.

2. Recowindationes None / -"

Slucl -','C. 0. CLU2K1. Roundup Operation Conducted * WC, Armo--

on 24 26 Septeiber 1966 Cowcndin

3?

iAi

.. .......

IaT BATTALZON 69T• .•A

3d Briade Task Force#. 95th Infantry DivisionAPO San Francisco 96355

XTIaRo 7 October 1966

SUBJEOT Roundup Operation (U) Conducted on 24 and 26 September 1966

TH-Us Commanding General3d Brigade Task Force25th Infantry DivisionAPO San Francisoo 96355

TO: Commanding GeneralI Field Force Vietnam

APO US Forces 96240

I1 References Paragraph 2 masease number B4732 from Comuanding

General, I Field Force Vietnam, dated 27 September 1966.

2, Operation on 24 September 1966t

a. Purpose of operations: To search villages suspected of be'nghostile and at the sawe time provide security for civic action teams workingin the villages.

be Scheme of maneuvers Two platoons of B-l-lh Infantry were airlifted into bloc'king positions south of the villages of Plei Peng (AR789228)and Plei Del (AR781218), The lift commenced at 24&315 Septenber 1966 andwas completed at 24029 September 1966. Upon touchdown the infantry movedout toward the village assuming a shallow V with the open side toward thevillage. Company B (-) two platoons, let Battalion 69th Armor (*) onescout section moved from Cateoka (7A23343) at 240530 September 1966 andarrived at Plei Pang at 2)1^28 September 1966 and Plei Del at 21A31 Septem-ber 1966. At approximately 500 meters from the villages, the armored eLe-ments changed formation from a march column to double colume with APCOstrailing and paralleled the villages on both sides, Contact with theinfantry by armor completed the surrounding of the villages vrith the APC'asforming the link betwetn the parallel armored colums. Arrival in theobjective areas by infantry and armor was io near simultaneous as possible.

o. Fire support peculiar to the operation: The operation wasbeyond the range of all friendly artillery except two 175mw guns at FleiHe (ZA26403). Fire support was supplied by 90=m tank guns of B-1-69 Armor.

d. Success of the operation: 4 VMCS were apprehended -And returnedto Catecka for further interrogation. One village confirmed hostile, PlelDel (AR781218).

3) 3

eMI T.

td'EL.U M Y 7~aa 2 October 17.1b"UT lowfdu? Operstion (0) Ooud't4 on 214 end 26Septomber 1P'S

09* Type forces involveds rnfntry., tworr pst oonu r~ainforcfido trivor,coinpuz (-) two platoon., an a scout sect i-n.

3. Opgoration on 26 September 1966s

a.Pdwoss of operational See pwgar~rph 2a.

be Soho= of mneuvert Comp--my 3 (- Wo platoo~w, 1st &ct-alio~n690h Arwr (*) scout p1,:tonu (- 9* -1-14 Infantry (-) and Hiflit~try IotA-licence Twin 'nd Civic Action Team ds;:rtnd OCitooka at 26Ol$ Septebo~r 1966for PULY. 1 f1o (Zk*8220) and Plot Kaenf Tongj (ZA2207). The infantry wamounted In APOCa a: scout platoon (-). At 26000 Septembr 196S thr; teamre'.c2lAd a. a, roximatily 40 mters north of Plot. Khoni ?on(. T*-A for-mation v.:s ca-'nF'.d from avreh column to p~rrelal coliiws ;nd thea.e in turnmoved dom.n Vie 98t %nd vast sides of tho VI. 1 q2.O m -tli; -et thi' south andThe north side of tho vifleps leas secured by Vie~ trail elements of tracolumn. Vis x'ncrclaent was completed e't 26EJ* Beptrisber 1966, ow Waren-I try were diswini'ted. At first light, th., inf.*-try wov d in to setre'i thevillage acecxpsnisd by xilit.;ry intelligence -'-.raanwl* After di~mount~Infantry# the scout p2etoon (-) moved to P1. ý 3D :innd surro':Mesd t*sT vtl-2ape b7 a sWIuiarr meneuver. This was ýt complit'ied shortly after fitrstlight -and no am~ woo allowed to lea * the vil'.jgs. 'Jpwi completion ofsearch in P~i i e'nt Tone (ZLOB2207) inf antry woved to Plot Ta ID (zAOBP270)eni .began esp-rch. Vi~e civic action teeii continr-md to work In ?1a1. 'ten&

4Tong. -Pt 26jO i-epteeimbw 1966 peycholofWic-:1 c~ ircraft made a loud-.sprjzkper -e-- -ýv r both villegs..

c. Fire supr-,ort peculi'?r to opor-tions Urm~il fir'r sup;ort coozs-ination wes Ywde. One section of SP 14.20 -rt're *,.- attechwd to B-1-:.9.

6. Suiccess of operations 2 7.% .-'ot-izd for Zu.-ther intrsrroge-tion.

* . Type_ forct'. Involveds Infantry, tV-o platoons re inforced,, cxmrw,comparl (-) two platoons (+) scout platoon (-) -nd mil 4tlnry intali-eono.eteam, civ'.1 sf2, lx team end psyc'iologiecl o,:4r!*tins to-'r.

4, leer-Am la-rnods

7. Itsx: ?' -.l r.:c-. mint vrrlw erior to or at first 1.

Observ t4:1in: 937 timinr tYr.lx r-iv~l to first 5't!L;;f-ce ill --.7va -hiis ex~~ium of 7C fore-as ra r-r.1) !n V'i- vi-ses.

,.it-'~ 7ýxn ?rr'v?.I of thq wC ill sztto*,"t to :I" 4";Vý

vi.llqe on t'-, o!zV'-de.

D i s -ion: 3rz.lI VC *liusntv -.ill vttomrt to ývri'wl ccni~ct

3 44;C C l

Io I oi WWA

TIAM4-a 7 October 196SUBJEO?. Roundup Operation (U).Ccnd~uted on 24i and 26 September 1966

Observations Simultaneous arrival of air landed infanrry andarmored elements or simultaneous approach from multiple directions willprevent VC esoaps.

o. Itbmt Roundup operations lend themselves well to conduct ofpsychological operations.

Discussion: Psychological operations conducted while-theSaudience is surrounded b:. visible power is more ef•e•time than random mis-

sions over areas where they can be readily countered bir VC present in thearea.

abservntions Psychological operations aircratb should wIcetheir passes i edite2l after the village has been surrounded and the peopleasseublad to exploit the confusion and fear created.

a. O. &IARKIrTC, AurwObtmading

II!3

4- "[• r4 4 4 ~ - - - - - -4

•? ,,'S

FORl 0191IC AL USE CNLY30 RMTALICK 69TH ARMSAPO San Fra.noisoo P535

7 November X.66

ZVrL )Et Opewational Report of Tasaonu lr"amld (1-3. Octo•bu •966)

:': Oeundza Oeneanllit •afantry Divi iaATIg AVDDH-OCAFO San Francisco %262

SECT=I

UNIT ACTIVITMS

1. Generel s

a. Mosions Durng the manth the let Battalion 69th Armor pro-vided the ontrolheadquarters for the defense of the 3d Brigade Task lorceforward bane area# provided a control headquarters for a mobile "eser.ve/reaction f~ore for the 3d Brigade Task FPore and. 4th Wnan*• Division,Elements of this battalion ware poit~ioned at Plei Nos Due Cos'Pleiku,4th Division forward OP at LZ 3G ('v'A8654.6) to provide security for SpecialForces C~mas artillery units and cowmad eloments. The battalion conducted

extonsives LIO security missions within the 3d Briado Task Force and 4hthInf~ntry Division AO. Other missions aocouV!ished by elemnts of the bat-ta).ion were security for RRU, village search and cloar, #;d spport ofinfantry uita conducting combat operations.

b. Task Organizations

(1) -EC, let Battalion, 69th Arnor, 2-,31 October 66.

(2) Co A, lst Battalion, 69th Arwr, 1-12s 30-31 October 66.

(3) Co B,3 st 3attalionr, 69th Armor, 1-31 Ootober 66.

(4) Co C, lit Battalion, 69th A,.r'•, 1-6, 1l4-31 October 60.

(5) Troop C, 3d 3quadron, )4th cavalry, 1-17, 30-31 October 606

(6) Co A, 2d Battali n, 35th Infantry, 1-5 October 66.

(7) Co C, Ist Battalion, 35th Infantry, 6-14• October 66.

(8) Platoon, Co D, 65th Engineer Battalion, 24 d6tober 66.

(9) Co B, 2d Battalion, 35h. Infantry, 15-17 October 66.

36 -.•l

F~~ft~ ONY foveivbr 1966Operationl pept at Imsems larned (1-1 O3tobr 1966)

2. Pewu•onels

u~ Unit Strengths

(1) BeginnIng Peitod StrengthsAIUTH AN F

OFF WO EM a WO EM OFF WO EMHMJ 19 3 219 20 3 300 18 2 265

A5 0 85 5 0 94~ 3 0 90B 5 0 85 5 0 100 14 0 90

(2) Gains and losses by Grades

(a) f ,inss

I 2d Lt - 1

S13-2.

(b) ,ossesi

1 lstLt - 3

kE5 -20j4 3 256 E3-18

(3) Battle Losses - 0

(4) Non-Battle Losses - 1

(5) Ending Period StrengthsAUTH ASG PFD

HM 19 3 M 29 1 O8 278 17 2 267

A 5 0 85 24 0 92 3 0 85B 0 85 0, 0.C 0 80Total .371i

I. FO I C F.. .AI !l CN7 (

TTAIAERO 7 No-oftr 1966SUB9EC~ 0 pmtw~taIV~qwt of Lessoms teamned (1-31 October 1966.)

b. Ybrales Morale was good daring the reporting period.

: (1) NI1 Servioea j -Ail- servoe was good for the reportingperiod,

(2) fRt During this period the battalion rece~ved thefolloving .R allocationst

(a) Toyo - ?

(b) Hong Kong-

(c) Singapore - 1

(d) Taipei - 6

(a) Bangkok - 6

(f) KualaLum• -I

(g) Penang 3

(h) MniIa-. 2

(3) Promotions: t40 EM were promoted during the reportingperiod.

(4) Awards and Decorations: During the period the battalion

submitted tho following awards:

(a) 1 Legion of Merit

(b) 39 Broaze Stars (26 approved)

(c) 52 Arurr Co~mendation Meadls (8 approved)

(d) 2 Air

( s) snelatentse Tbree RK enlisted during -the reportingperiod.

3. Intelligenoeo The following enemy contact was &ade by elementsof this battaimon during the reporting period.

an EnenrAotivitys

(1) 1 October 66t Scout Platoon, 1.69 picked up 1 VWJS atZAl853142.

(2) 2 October 66: A-i-69 tank hit a md.ne at ZA178122 withS3 8

.- ~ , 1

?M..C FOR' 01M M L U IAI OLY 7 November 1966SaIJiOuT Operatioalna Report of Ulssone Ianmed I(L -SI October 1966)

negative Injuries.

(3k 7 October 66t A-1-69 reported finding 3 -'antipersonnelminex at ZA-193 So

(4) 20 October 66t Scout Platoon, 1-69 picked. up 2 V•.S atU1131111. Found drawings of weapon (19S 36) on ground.

(5) 15 October 66s Scout Platoon, 1-69 located one booby

trapped trip flare. The flare body had 30 caliber carbine aun wrapped to it.

(6) 27 October 66t

(a) IQ tank hit a mine at ZU215230 with negative caeualti'sa.

(b) Scout Platoon, 1-69 reported locating one antit"kmine addsrydthe mine wihh caliber .50 -fire at ZU21O30.

(7) 31 October 661 0-1-69 tank hit a mine with negative csta-ualties at ZA196200.

S~be Terrain and VTeatharr

(1) Terrain: The terrain trafficability has imp.roved for ar-mor,wheel vehicles and foot troops during thiu period.

(2) Weather: From 1-31 October the weather was generally clearwith unlimited visibility, exceptions: early morning ground fog in area ofoperations, which dissipated early, and intermittent rain showers. The av-erage visibility for this period was 10 IN4 and the average coiling wns 3-50O0S~br oken.

.4. Operations:

ae 1-17 October 66s During this period the battalion continuedto provide the peri•eter defense control headquarters for the brigade forwardbase area and continued to provide the brigade with a mobile reserve/reactionforce positioned at Catecka. The battalion provided security for the brigadebase camp, at Pleiku and Special Forces Camps and artillery positions atDuc Co and 21.i Me. Additional missions were route security, convoy escort,village search and clear, RRU security, LIOC surveillance and support of in-fantry units conducting combat operations in their assigned areas of qW-ation. The battalion scout platoon secured the road from C #8 ZA122287to OP 3 A!•?7233" throe times and from 89 6 7=99348 to check point #3 once,provided security for RRU seven tires, searched and cleared two vil!ago, inthe vicinity of ZA185340 and ZA186402 on the 2d and 10th of October, detain-ing two suspects. Also it escorted convoys on four days and assisted inescorts three times. On 1 October the platoon (-) continued to work on con-structing a bridge at cocld .YA?52'910' The battalion mortar platoon contin-.urd to fire in support of the 3d Brijade &il prqrm. The attached infan-try compaqW conducted 23 dismounted patrols and 10 night anbushes in thevicinity of the brigade forward base area at Catecka and participated In onevillage search mission. 3 9

YR C ly

FOR OFFICAL USE ONLYf Oprstv~lRepor't of Zuasons laanred -(1.-31 October 2966)

(1) Coxewq A (.1 platoon) was positioed at Pui Me from1-12 October to provide ecurity for the artillery located near the SpooialForces CaM. One platoon was at Cateol for security of the 34 Br 1iade For-wsd Base aU, eafrom 1-7 Octobers at Duo o for secuwity of artillery and thoSpeia4l Fores Cm from 7-10 October and under OPOON TI 2-3% Wfantry. foroperations along Route 19 from 10-41,Ootober. On 10 Ootobe I platoon fromPlo-, me ed. to Waikiki (ZA18.111) and was o010 TI 1-35 unti. 22 Octoberwhen the coapSai headquarters and remaining .platoon, were placed 0100K TY2-35 and mod to Waikiki. The oon•y (-) remined 0101N TV 1-35 until314 October when the entire oovMw- moved to Pleiku to prepare for attach-mant to the lot Squadron lObhCava.ry for LIOC -security operation. betweenMeika and Abn 1he. This attachment was effected on 35 October and remained

in effect for the rempinder of thin periods On 1 October amn platoon soulo'Iraan engineer work party along Route 60, On 3 October one platoon escorteda conw7 frowCP #3 (AR77 4368) to PFi ?b and back to CP #3.. On. 7 Octoberthe 5oii1m (-) d with the CIDG from Plei Me USS? Camp south of OMa WoMomtai o inestigate a report of mines. Two antipersonnel mines werelocated at ZM165337 and removed.

(2) Comparw B remiaied at the brigade forward base area atCateoka for,: the entire period. It opened the road between OP #8 SZU22287) and0P3 S•730'. eleven times, and once'between OF #8 =1222O? and OP 6 Z199-3•0. *a convoys were escorted to Phoi N and three to Duo Coo . An onrineorwork party was secured on th1 2d4 4th, 5th, lOth, •.2th and 19th of Octobe,On the 17th 6ne platoon escorted Company C, 2-8 Wantry to a village atYA988285, secured it while it was searched ard then. returned to Catecka.

(3) Co•amnr 0 (- 1 platoon) was positioned at Duo Co tiasec.,rity of artillry and the USS? Camp from 1-6 October. On 7 0October theconmpmq (-) moved. from Duo Co to ZZ 27F (YA828179.) and was OPCON 17 2-8Infantrzy until 13 October. The ooa (-) moved on 13 October to PleikuBase CW for mintenance services. One platoon performed escort missionrifrom 1-6 October and moved to Duo Co to provide seczrity for the artilleryand USSF CaGM until 17 October. During, this. period Conmqny C elements eso,oorted 13 conroys to Duo Co, 2 frort Duo Co to Cateckap and one from 0.#3.ARW 76 to check point #12 (YA975251) and back to check point #3. Elementsalso provided security for I engineer work party and one CMG. mission duringthe period.

(4) Troop C-3-4 was positioned at Pleiku- Base Camp for main-tenance from 1-10 October 1966. On 10 October Troop C-3-4 was detached f1OS1-69 Armor and placed OPCOM 1-69 Armor. On 10 October one platoon movedfrom Pleiku was placed OPCON TF 2-35 for LIOC security missions on Route 3east of Pleiku. This platoon remined on this mission for this period how-ever OPCON passed from 2-35th Infantry to lst Squadron 10th Cava:xry. on15 October. On 33 October one platoon moved to Catecka to assist in securityof the brigade forward base area. on 314 October the Troop (-) *ovod toCatecka under OPCON 2-69 Armor. On 16 October the Troop (- I platoon) movadfrom Cateoka to escort an artillery unit to Ploi DJerenq and had progressedbo TA306315 by the nipht of 17 October.

b, 18-31 October 66: On 38 October the battalion (-) moved fra40

FOR OFFICIAL USE OWLy

TWAU- 7o!z1966iratt Ope M1 -1 october 1

Cateoka to the Pleiku Base 0•. On 20 ctobelr the let Battalion 69th'Armor was released OPOiI 3d Brigade Task Force and attached to the 4th]fantry Division On 22 October the batt;qaLim van alerted as a reaction 06force for the relief of USSFY Camps at P10i Ye and Duo Co. This missioncontinued until 30 October when the battalicn fcrward oonand post movedfrom the PMeika Base Camp to ZA05i e. From this forward location the,battL ion conuoted LIC security missien along Route 19 from ZWO1?309pnorth along coneoting road to Route 509 and along Route 509 from Plaikato P2si DOereng, During the period 20P-31 October the battalion conductedroad runner operations along Routes 19 and !)9s escorted 48 resupply corvoysand secured engineer work party on Routes 114.,, •.9 and 509.

(1) ComparW A was attached to lst Squadron 10th Cavalry forLW0C security operations along Route 19 from Pleiku to Ahn Kke from 18-29October 1966* On 30 October the company !qwoebI t6 battalion control andmoved to IZ 30 (ZA8 6 6457) and assumed LLOC security missions along Route 509from U99741• to Z&85730,o

(2) Coopaz," B conducted extensive LLOC security operatione alongRoute 509 between Pleiku and Plei Djereng. The company also provided t&eplatoon to secure the artillery and USSF Camp at Due Co from 22-31 0cto•bo1966. On 26 October the company (.) moved from Pleiku base camp to a fieldlocation vicinity coordinates ZAO58W. on 28 October the company moved toU10245O and on 30 October moved to ZUO58W.A to provide security for thebattalion forward CP and C Bpttery 5th Battalion 16th'AVtillery. Duringthis period the company escoxted 28 resupply convoys west along Route 509and 13 convoys of empty trucks back to Pleiku.

(3) Company C remained at Pleiku Base Camp until 30 October 1.56for maintenance services. Concurrently the co~qany provided security for en-gineer work party and performed convoy escort operations. On 30 October thecompany moved to Plei Rongol to conduct LIOC security operations along Routo19 from ZA903270. During this period Company C secured an engineer workparty on Route 19 and on Route 509. The company also escorted 3 east boundand 1 west bound convoy along Route 509. At 302040 OctoberConpary 0 wasplaced OPCON Ist Squadron 10th Cavalry for reinforcement of Plei Me USSF

*.. Camp. The company made a night tactical March from Plei Rongol to ZA206215closing at 310200 October.

(4) Troop C-3-4 was placed OPOON Ist Battalion 69th Armor on30 October 1966. The troop was positioned at IZ 3G IZ&856457) and assumedL14C sevirity olperations elong unniunbered route tunning from Route 19 toRoute ,509 from TA9Ot 2 70 to "U901446,

5. Logistics:

a. Logistics support during the first half of the month continuedto show improvement as the demand data accumulated by this unit during thelast five months has increased the PLL authorizations. The time lapse andpercentage of fill have continued to improve. The transfer of responsibilityfor logistic support to the 4th Infantry Division has caused several problemsbut these should be resolved as the battalion becomes familiar with the 4th


.:,:),':

T AT 7 Nowrber 1966

SLB3CTM Opurational Report of Ie ione Iearned (1-31 October 136)

Diftsion Appiy proedures*

b. Ruoupply misesons jo fait rd =mits# both it the GI locationand at foward cowbat locations remained adequate tvv the priod 1-20 October*lkrin8g the reminder of the month proper comodinatiom was mA made on sev-eral ocasions.

a* Iihintenance t

(1) maintenanoe services wore conducted for nine tanks and2? personnel carriers in the cavalry troop and. 17. tanks in C Corwqor.Scheduled services were brought to date considering the tim elementj how-ever cosid•lring the 750 mile quArterw3 services# the.vehicles should be $er-

. 'viced aptacimtel7 each 30 to 45 days.

(2) Replaosmat repair iprts were citical in the area oftank susponsion items. One other item rae critical for a period in October- ti tank gmnator control bac•.

(3) ?ajor assemblies used during this period aret

(a) Tank onginos - 4

(b) Tank transmiasiens - 7

(a) APC engines - 3_(d) APC transmssions -

(e) APC transmission 6ases - 3

(f) APO control differential -2

(g) M hengine -2a

(h) VT transmission - 1

do Construction during the month was limited in the forward. reabut when the battalion returned to base camp on the 18th of the month sovoralprojects were begun and comploted.

(1) Finished the sandbe•g•t of all perimeter bt

(2) Constructed $ CJe. medium tent kits including one (1) tobe used as an officers mesa.

(3) Constructod 2 G.P. small tent kits.

(4) Started contructio at 3 ammunition bankers.

00 Statistical Datat 42

FOR OFCAL USE CNIY

- --------

ei

FOR WPMC!A rTTj KY 7 Nov*aw 196SAO~t Ope'atioma Reqp ort issn Larned (1-31 Octobor 1966)

'(a) Dievols 4ul,000 soalm

(b)W)S)M0s 36,600 allem /

(a) Cal .45t 3,100

(b) Cal ,50 2,00O

(a) Cal 5.0=1, 1,500

(W) Ca 7.62a",• 5,000o (xm( )

(0) 90m3, 75

(f ) gain casmintwt 140

(6) 90M WIN 25

(h) 14.2* Mt 3,4OO

W1 14,2" WPs 22

(W1 4.2" fliuminationt 2

W() 40m, 75(3) Rationu:

(a) Broa~dast s 20.9450

(b) Dinners 20,850

(0) supper, 20,900

(W) Tho breakdown of tha abovo consumed rations ar6*50 Ale, 25% We, 20% C's.

(4) The following miles were travllod during the porlodt

TYPE VENICIE NUMBER ASSICGI- OTAL ME=Si Ton -30 (29 O/T3A Ton 8 2805ft T-- 17 6,109SSTon 20 3s5C6NI48&3 (tank) 514 10,526XL2o~i3 (APO) 2234,90ZU06 (bz'tar Car~rier') 14 SH448A2 (AVIB) 2602

~8 (in)43 2071OTL MUS 9,057

F(I FfIC. p AL USE OYF:

r --,_-..... .. ...... .v -

.FOR OFK : 7LY,

SDoTv Opumational Report of Lossopsa ?awd (1-31 October 19M)

6. Aviatioss

as A MO ship wasused an 27 dayU

150, These sorties were Ir~m~rily flown on U-.type ships oltgouaghZUs47 I

were used for water and heavy maintenance parts (70C-30%),

7s OCivi Action/Psychologioal Warfares Civic Action proCrams wereoarried out in the following, villages by atteched CA personnel during thisperiod:

a. Plel Xueng Ya Tog -Z 08420

be Plei Poo Xoi - ZA186402, with'2 suspects captured.

8.Enginses Supports None

S3CTION I1

1. Observational

a. Personnels None

be Operationes :

(1) Traocked vehicle ford conditions:

Items The present conditions of vehicle' fords in unknown.

Discussions Approaches to tracked YWilee fords are thekey to their suitability. During the monsoon rains the approaches may havobeen damiged by high water.

Observation, Trackod vehicle fords should all be checkedan soon as practical to determine trafficability.

(2) Convoy Organizatioii:

Items Stondard doctrine is for the slowest or most ciii-bersome vehicle to be placed in the front of the convoy.

Discusseion This practite slows oonv.ys end at times blocksthe route entfrei.y. It has been found advisable to place these vehicles atthe rear of the convoy. Tf they encounter difficulty they are near the re-coery vehicle and can be secured by elements of the route security foree.

Observation: Slow and cumbersom vehicles such as 5000gallon: tankers should be plaoed near the rear of the column.

(3) Two way traffic on secondary roads#

Items It is desirable to use secondary roads for two way,


{,I

TR. U Wo, mb,, 1 * I~ •| ,,

SUBlJCJt Operwtionalest of Zuuons Learned (1.-3. Octobat 1968)

coavcW traffic.

Discussions During cnvoy operations along Route $09 V.; .10has been found that convoy traffic in .bo*h directions can be conducted Vstrict control is maintained. There mist be estebliahed by paes and con-voy traffic controlled so that one halts while the other passe* as they,meet In areas where 2 way treffio is poasible.

ObserwPtion: It is recocmmnded that two way convoy trafflibe planned for all roads including secondary as it great.y speeds up resupp2,vand provides more security due to Increased traffic.

o Organization and Tranings None

d. Intelligence: Mining of I11OO

Ttemt Mining of mrJor lines of conmnication during periodof non use.

Discussions When major routes of commications are not travellodfor a long period of time heavy mining of the route can be expected due tcthe lack of surveillance along the route during this period.

Dbeervation" When travel Is resumed along a route which has notbeen used for a period of time (1-2 weeks) maxim• use mast be made of minesweeping techniques, :-igid convoy disciplines and route security procedure:#

e. logistics:

(1) Resupply Failures

"Item:: Resupply placed aboard aircraft did not reach theunit intended.

Discussion- On several meltion. supplies put on werimsair craft would not reach the required unit even though locatien and callsigns were given the pilots.

beaervatiom: In order to remedy the above problem it Isrecomnended that a courier of now sort accomanoy epch resupply load to ejnsurothat the proper unit or indivi~xal receives the demignated supplies.

(2) hagiee'r =Wport far M0

Item:. oads develop trouble spots when subjected to largeamounta of heavy resupply traffic.

Discussion: The escort element will be able to ldentifytrouble spots. The engineers responsible for maintenance UV the -'oute shouldbe responsive to the escort unit so that reppirs can be made before the routebee o -nusable. 45


TLA•M-C 7 Novjrer 15,66vU BUJ3CTo Opere.tional Report of Lessmo Learned (1-31 October 1956)

Observations It is reoounded that an engineer liaisonteam be assigned to the escort unit.

(3) Reduction of turn around time.

Items Turn around tim is extended greatly due to ex-oessive unload tim at destination.

Discussion: Logistics elements mest make arrangements tofacilitate rapid mnloading of supplies at the dostination. There have beenmany Instances of unload time in eccess of four hours which precluded thereturn of empty trucks or escort vehicles as planned.

Observation: It is recoriumded that adequate materialhandling equipment be provided at the forward logistical base to expiditeunloading.

f* Others Radio Cowmuicatios:

Items During the nftsoon season condensation collects in theM1T 1029/VRC and bases of the VRC series radio.

Discussiont Condensation causes short circuits and reduces oper-ational range of the VIC series radio.

Observation: During the monsoon season inspection of these com-ponents should be made by organizational maintenance personnel and &ie4 CRutS~as required.

29 Recommiendat ions t

a. Personnel: None

be Operations: It is recommended that convoys that must be escortedby combat units be limited to 30 vehicles. This will permit the employmnt.of one tank platoon which can provide adequate security and is small enough

t: for positift control.

ecs Organization and Training: See iTOE 17-360 & 17-370, HQ, IstBattalion 69th Armor dated 5 October 1966.

do Intelligences None

t e. Logiutics: Nono e - '1

. C. 0. CLARKLTC, Armor

4 46

\

4

CONFIDENTIALSG • 166

AVM-u (to N1v 66) let Ind63 8U33I0. 0pertLonal Report of Lessons Learned (1 Augut - 51 October

RDA3UTURIS, 4th Infantry Division, APO U8 oroes 96262

TO$ Commatin General, I "hros Ts ATTLN AA.4-0-OI, APO U• Forces 96350

1. (U) Forwarded is the Operational Report of Lessons Learned forquwaterIy period ending 31 October 1966, submitted by the let Battalion,69th Ansmr.

2. (U) The reported unit was attached to the 4th Infantry Divisionon 18 October 1966.

3. (0) The report is considered adequate end has been reviewed bythis Mhadquarters. Speoific comments follovw

a. Paragraph 2. Section 1119 Operational Report of LessonsLearned (1-31 Auaust 1966) recommended that the battalion should be re-lieved of the mission as a control headquarters for defense and securityof the brigade forward bas. area when assigned a tactical mission in anarea of operations. Terrain limitations in the area of operations havedictated the primary use of armor as route security. The positionAng ofthe battalion headquarters in the forward base area is necessary for thecontrol of route security missions. The Ldditional mission of controlheadquarters for base security relieves the brigade staff to devote moretime to the tactical operations. When an area of operations is availablefor armor to be used in its primary role as an maneuver element it willbe so utilised.

be Paragraph 2b Section III, Operational Report of LessonsLeared (1-31 August 19665 recommended a permanent bridge be e*placed onRoute 19 at ooordinates YA 974291. The 20th Engineer Battalion has thismission and work is almost complete.

o. Paragraph 5a Seotion III, Operational Report of LessonsLearned (1-31 AugWt 19665 recommends that Route 19 to Duw Co be repairedin anticipation of next years monsoon. The 937th Engineer Group and 20thEngineer Battalion are presently upgrading this road to class 50.

d. Paagraph 5b Section III, Operational Report of LessonsLearned (1-31 August 19665 recommends priority of issue of Xenon search-lights for the battalion. Xenon searchlights ae presently being Issuedto~the lot Battalion, 69th Armor.

0. Paragraph lb(1), Section II, Operational Report of Lesson@Learned (1-31 October 1966) recomende tracked vehicle fords in the areaof operations be checked to determine traffioability. All known traockd

47

Io CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIALO3 0 JW6

AVYZ-GC (28 Nov 66) lot mId3UJMTs Operational Report of Lessons Learned (1 August - .31 October

1966) (iHJS OV3OR-65)

vehicle fords in the area have been cnecked to deterw~ine trafficabilityand repair action taken as necessary.

t. Paragraph le, Section 11) Operational z•eport of LessonsLearned (l-l October 1966) recommends adequate material handling equip-ment be positioned at forward logistical bases to expedite unloadingthereby cutting turn-around tine. Adequate material handling equipmentis now positioned at forward logistical bases in the form of forkliftsand/or wreckcers.

g. Para-raph 2b, section II, Operational Report of LessonsLearned (1-31 October 1966) recommends that convoys should be limitedto thirty (30) vehicles when necessary tý be escorted. This enablesone tank platoon to aaequalvely secure ario control movement of the convoy.Presently, a different approach is used to secure uomriaaL terrain andestablimn strong points along routes to allow free travel or" large convoys.

FOX. THE C(1OMAN i~

3 Incl DENNIS BURES~netT, AGC

AW AG

:• •~~tD 1)'• •,)I.

CONFIDENTIAL

-- ____~ ~ 4

CONFIDENTIAL

AVFA-OC-O&T (8 Nov 66) 2d TrxiStJBJECTs Operational Report of Less~ons Learned (I. Aaisrast - ýl October

1966) RCS CS]FoRt-65 (U)

Headqaarters, T Field Force Vietnam#, APO LB k'orce 96350 1 5 DEC 1966

TOt Commanding General, !Jnitea d;tates Army Vietnam, Ai-O RS lForccos 96307

(C) The 1st B~attalion, 69th Armor 0peraVC onal Report of lessonsLearned for -')arter1lr Periou. lonaing 31 OJctober 1966 is forwarL~ec with

1p, the following comaments.

a. Section 1, 1ParW~rapn 5 (Logist~ics): Attachmi-nt of Istbattalions 69tr, Arlior to the 11tth lnarantry iUiv.].sion occaxrred .rnthe period that the 704~th Naintenance liattalion (-) was enpa..oa ineatab1.iSkdj shop facilit~ies, irnventoryinAl, ropair parts shipped from

CLLSan& esatblishing a co~n oliciateca tec' ni~cit suppl1y for c1.40m'erI sapport. AIa(Ait4Qri~zec ;Aocckrge ist, oi dhr, 701iU Lh aintenaace

b~attalion (v ias d2eveloped to sijpport unly 3.3 iaboA3 tanks sinceCompanyr B (Porvani Sapport), at~acl-ed to jd .ri sac , 11th Lnflantri1)ivision (L)PC4 to IT et'XBE~V) carried tic AALUjr3zeL ~oh~' ~~for the civlsion' a tank battalionq The 7U~tth Iiaintenanc e B~attalionhas completeci action to aojast 6tocc *levels to comp~ensate', for thleadded density, or equipr.,Tent createa by attz crament 02' itfe 1st nat~tai ion,69th Arrior.-

b. Section II, Parar. raph 4t (VC/iATA %,ininig i'cCi niq ~esArtillery int~ei-oiciion fires on or aujacent to remote, intfreqjentlyu~sed rouas have proved effective in disrapting enemy ianiniig activities.The use of time ano proxaimity razed IDign I&xplosive or Shell, APWiRS'-T,105mm, XN 54&6 is prererreo. over point detonatin- fazes since no dIMagereescriued inthe basic report, wtiicri have little or no civilian traffic,are appropribte :~or artillery interdiction. !,'here a, pr.;priate,

* interdiction fires shoaiX. 'w pl~annivxz on linu'loc;,tione;s isceptio)le toexten:,ive zaLiL~ng.

c. Fara, raph 3d of l~it rlmorsoirlnt, heatiqiaaters, imn Tinfantryvivis~iont _Itnon Stearcnliyht &its iss.Led to 1st iiattalion, 6ytri Arm,.orere receiveck lecs reqaired 1-.18 Infrared -ninocular iEnprneot. titn

Infintry j.A.v.-;sion has req xest~eo tile lat T.ogiiitic;al Commano. to expecite6elivery of 2U binoc ilars *to permit exploitat~ion o: Ul e inuraredCap&L11lity provit ecA by :,,anon 3earcnlirbIt hits.

Colonol,A !3 T ncl hAjutaflt 0~~S

no49 DOWUGIAD AT 3 YR W MRAI;NcIASSlM U11112 YBIS

CONFI DENTIAL

FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLYS~CONFIDF,NI IALAVNO-m (a N. 66) hdUJ3MJTt Operational. lreprt,-Ieuena ,awed for the Peried *dL-,M

31 October 196 E SO-5

IAJIQAWMs,, MnlYM WATUS Ara vn!AM, APO SBn ,rancis,,o 9 'O • 4141 '67

' Ot Oanmader in Chief, hidted States hAz, Pacifteo ATM GOP-OTAPO 9655

1 , This headquarkere h1a reviewed the Operational Report-LeboonsLearned for the period anding 3l October 1966 from Weadquatms, lotlBttalion, 69th Armr as Indrsoed.

2. Reference Paregraph 5bg Section m• Page 151 Paragraph •d•1aot !ndoresmmt; =A Paragraph 0, 2d Zndroements These 8eazhlightha" presently b" Installed on an VIVA combat tanse In M aspreseribed In DOWI 9-23WO22&,-3O1 , Fal~ure to Include the 11 8BLnucmbw in MOK kits received Mae been reported to the COWUS ProjectXanager foe Tarks. Corective actien Is antidpated.

FORt THg 0011iHRI s

3 Taal W. LAUTREYVic •Cpt, AGC

Asst Adjutant General

5o


!f '.Jf CONFIDENTIAL

. op-oT (8 Nov 66) 4th Ind (U)BUJZCW g OPGai4,o paro't-Loum a m , Le'ned fo the o, Pehriod Ing

31 October 1966 (RCS CSIOR-65)

HQ, V8ARMPA03MMO, APO feaVmWaoio 96558 17 JAN 1967TOt Assitant Ohiof of Btaft fow yam DnalopmantD lbpwtnnt of the

ArmW., Vsbinlgton D. 0. eM.0

This headquarters concurs in the basic report as indorsed.

FOR THE COQIANDER IN CHIEF:

3 Incl CPT, AGCLAst AG

RECRADFED UNCLASSIFIED WHENt. SI,'•" FR:OM CLASSIFIED

V 51

CONFIDENTIAL

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