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2011 2012 44: 255 originally published online 2 SeptemberAdministration & Society

Kaifeng YangAgency Duality−Actionable Knowledge and the Structure

Further Understanding Accountability in Public Organizations:

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417699 AAS44310.1177/0095399711417699YangAdministration & Society© 2012 SAGE Publications

1Florida State University, Tallahassee, USA

Corresponding Author:Kaifeng Yang, Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, 627 Bellamy Building, Florida State University, Tallahassee, FL 32306-2250, USA Email: [email protected]

Further Understanding Accountability in Public Organizations: Actionable Knowledge and the Structure– Agency Duality

Kaifeng Yang1

Abstract

Accountability research in public organizations has made significant prog-ress, but it remains unclear exactly how public managers deal with conflict-ing accountability pressures and how accountability systems can make a positive difference. This article reviews the accountability literature and sub-mits that developing more actionable knowledge requires more attention to the interactive relationship between human agency and accountability structure and to the causal mechanisms linking accountability, behavior, and outcome in a long period of time. Giddens’ structuration theory is used to illustrate a more interactive and dynamic understanding of accountability. Theoretical and methodological implications for future research are dis-cussed accordingly.

Keywords

accountability; actionable knowledge; structuration; agency

Articles

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256 Administration & Society 44(3)

Accountability is regarded as the hallmark of modern democratic governance and a central concept in public management (Bovens, 2005; Dubnick, 2005). In the past two decades, “public administration” (PA) research has made sig-nificant progress in regards to the nature, dimensions, methods, techniques, consequences, and dilemmas of accountability in public organizations (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Behn, 2001; Jos & Tompkins, 2004; Kearns, 1996; Roberts, 2002; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Much advice has been offered by scholars on how to manage and improve accountability (Gormley & Balla, 2004; Kearns, 1996; Moore, 1995; Page, 2004). Nevertheless, accountability remains to be an irritating problem: It is unclear exactly how public managers deal with conflicting accountability pressures and how accountability systems can make a positive difference. This problem becomes more pressing in the new governance environment that is more fluid, uncertain, and complex and in which power is shared by actors with relatively equal standing.

This article argues that a critical limitation of the current accountability literature is the insufficiency of actionable knowledge. In both theory and practice, the lack of accountability is often identified as the problem, and the solution is often viewed as to simply establish more accountability systems, expecting the systems will magically lead to good outcomes. Unfortunately, adding more accountability systems may aggravate, rather than solve, the problem (Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & Yang, 2011). We need actionable knowl-edge about the way actors of governance perceive, order, and deal with mul-tiple accountability pressures; the causal mechanisms that connect accountability institutions with behaviors, decisions, and outcomes; and the process in which accountability institutions are produced and reproduced by actors. This requires rethinking the ontological, epistemological, and methodological assumptions about accountability. What is useful for future research is to focus on the inter-activity between accountability structure and human agency—instead of treat-ing accountability as exogenous to actors, future research should take it as endogenous.

We begin by reviewing the accountability literature in PA regarding its focus, method, relational assumption, argument, and advice. Although the review summarizes what the literature has already accomplished, it has two other objectives: One is to show that the literature has largely treated account-ability as an exogenous entity and studied it as so, and the other is to suggest that some recent writings have realized this limitation and have been search-ing for new directions. Following the review, the next section of the article argues that the limitations and new directions identified are related to the pursuit of actionable knowledge. The third section of the article borrows




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Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory and submits that accountability has to be reunderstood in the duality relationship between structure and agency. The fourth section offers more concrete theoretical and methodological sugges-tions for future inquiry based on the second and third sections.

Counting the Accountability Research in PAAn exhaustive review of accountability research is impossible as account-ability is ubiquitous—all major schools of thought in PA are arguably about accountability and all major debates about government reforms are related to accountability (Dubnick & Yang, 2011). Thus, my review focuses on accountability studies in PA as a field of study and community of scholars, excluding those in other fields such as political science and accounting. Certainly, the separation between fields is relative, and PA scholars have much to learn from other fields (the analysis of the PA literature in this article borrows greatly from other fields).1

In addition to books (e.g., Behn, 2001; Bovens, 1998; Gormley & Balla, 2004; Kearns, 1996), articles in five journals were reviewed: Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, Administration & Society, American Review of Public Administration, and Public Performance & Management Review.2 I identified articles that contain one or more of four keywords—accountability, accountable, responsibility, and responsible—in the title or abstract.3

In selecting the books and articles, I chose those that deal with account-ability directly and substantively, avoiding those that use the term causally or iconically—as a rhetorical tool to convey an image of good governance (Dubnick, 2002). I followed Bovens’ (2005) definition of accountability as “a social relationship in which an actor feels an obligation to explain and to justify his or her conduct to some significant other” (p. 84). This definition emphasizes the sense of liability among agents of governance, which is con-sistent with the idea of answerability—going before a forum to explain (Bovens, 1998) and the idea of managing expectations (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987). Besides publications directly addressing the meaning, nature, func-tion, and mechanisms of accountability, I included publications that address accountability tools, procedures, and systems if they place the discussion explicitly in the social relationship of accountability. Although almost every-thing in PA can be related to accountability, explicitly studying accountability relationships is not of long history—“accountability studies” is only an embry-onic field (Dubnick & Frederickson, 2011).





Research Focus

Managing different and sometimes conflicting accountability pressures or orientations has been a central research focus (Posner, 2000; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987), despite occasional resistance to this approach (O’Loughlin, 1990). The potential accountability conflicts are rooted in different types of accountability to (various sources such as political and legal sources) and accountability for (various contents such as finance and performance; Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Behn, 2001). A majority of the studies focusing on account-ability to use or extend Romzek and Dubnick’s (1987) model that categorizes four types of accountability: legal, hierarchical, political, and professional (e.g., Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Schwartz & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2004). Researchers apply this model to various contexts such as nonprofit organiza-tions (Kim, 2005), the Census Bureau (Nguyen, 2007), the reinvention move-ment (Page, 2006), and local governments (Dunn & Legge, 2000).

Although accountability to is a more salient theme than accountability for, they are not necessarily separate domains but part of an iterative process: Different accountability for (contents) often comes from different accountabil-ity to (sources). There are a few studies that emphasize both aspects (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Heinrich, 2002; Wang, 2002). Many studies address a spe-cific type of accountability for, such as financial accountability (Montondon, 1995) and performance accountability (Benjamin, 2008), but they relate chal-lenges of accountability for to challenges of accountability to and acknowl-edge the importance of managing expectations.

Regardless of accountability to or accountability for, the “managing expectations” approach assumes accountability as exogenous—it is some-thing that is imposed on actors and to which actors must respond. This approach downplays the role that actors may play in establishing the very accountability systems or pressures that govern their behavior. In studying the increasingly popular collaborative governance efforts, some recent arti-cles have realized this limitation and propose new accountability forms as new ways of managing expectations. For example, dialogue is considered an alternative accountability mechanism in which expectations are negotiated in a dialogue process between equal participants (Roberts, 2002; Whitaker, Altman-Sauer, & Henderson, 2004).

MethodGiven accountability expectations as exogenous entities, many studies aim to illustrate how conflicting or changing expectations create dilemmas for actors.




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Their purpose is to describe and understand the nature, change, and conse-quence of accountability expectations, not to explain the interplay between expectations and actor choices. Typically, accountability problems or dilem-mas become observable when dramatic events occur and change the configu-ration of accountability systems or pressures. As Johnston and Romzek (1999) write, “In the American system of governance, typically one or two account-ability relationships are operating at any one time. In times of extraordinary events or crises, the other (dormant) types of accountability relationships may be invoked” (p. 387).4 Extraordinary events such as the “Challenger tragedy” are naturally occurring and nonreplicable events, for which qualitative inquiry such as case study is more likely to be the appropriate method.

Indeed, aside from conceptual pieces (e.g., Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Dubnick, 2005; Dubnick & Justice, 2006; Kearns, 1994; Weber, 1999), most empirical studies have used qualitative designs, such as single case study and comparative case study (Koppell, 2005; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000; Schwartz & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2004), interviews (Acar, Guo, & Yang, 2008), content analysis (Dicke & Ott, 1999), or mixed methods but with strong qualitative emphasis (Dicke, 2002). Case study is the most popular choice among them. Only a very limited number of studies use survey design (e.g., Dunn & Legge, 2000; Justice et al., 2004; Wang, 2002), and even fewer studies use experi-mental design (Heinrich, 2002). When accountability was a little-understood phenomenon in the past, qualitative methods are appropriate given their strength in theory generating. Nevertheless, there is a lack of methodological diversity and a dearth of quantitative designs.5 Moreover, the qualitative methods used in the past did not address well the interplay between account-ability structures and actor behaviors.

Relational AssumptionAs most studies in the literature are qualitative or conceptual, they do not use accountability formally as either an independent or dependent variable. Nevertheless, an implicit causal relationship regarding accountability is often assumed—even in conceptual studies. For example, in arguing that the accountability-performance link is unfounded, Dubnick (2005) takes account-ability as the independent variable and performance as the dependent vari-able. Given the focus on accountability pressures as exogenous entities, many studies examine the effects of accountability configuration, finding that account-ability, the lack of it, or its misconfiguration can lead to disasters (Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), impede change (Schwartz & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2004), cause management problems (Kim, 2005; Koppell, 2005), affect performance





(O’Connell, 2006; Page, 2004), influence individual judgment (Jos & Tompkins, 2004), and have an effect on policy implementation (Wise & Freitag, 2002). There are some studies that explore the factors that affect accountability, but those studies conceptualize accountability not as systems or expectations but as performance outcomes such as quality (Dicke, 2002), website open-ness (Welch & Wong, 2001), and fiscal transparency (Justice et al., 2004). In summary, few studies use accountability institutions/expectations as the dependent variable, and even fewer studies examine them as the independent and dependent variables simultaneously.

ArgumentsIn line with the research focus, choice of method, and relational assumption, the conclusions made in the literature are largely descriptive and inductive rather than prescriptive and deductive. Six general conclusions can be seen across studies. First, there are conflicts among pressures of accountability, and con-flicts lead to problems such as disasters, crises, and mismanagement (Bardach & Lesser, 1996; Dunn & Legge, 2000; Koppell, 2005; Nguyen, 2007; Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000). Second, overreliance on a par-ticular type (or types) of accountability leads to problems: Production-oriented accountability leads to disaster and impedes change (Schwartz & Sulitzeanu-Kenan, 2004), too much legal and hierarchical accountability damages profes-sional and political accountabilities (Kim, 2005), too much political and hierarchical accountability damages professional accountability (Romzek & Dubnick, 1987; Romzek & Ingraham, 2000), and formal procedural account-ability exacerbates the limitations of political accountability (West, 2004). Third, there is no perfect accountability model and each may evolve into some-thing unproductive or illegitimate (Jos & Tompkins, 2004; Weber, 1999). Fourth, accountability based on the classic principal–agent model or the market approach has serious limitations, especially in the context of contracting and privatization (Dicke, 2002; Romzek & Johnston, 2005). Fifth, contracting, privatization, and hybrid organizations lead to great accountability challenges and require particular accountability capacities (Breaux, Duncan, Keller, & Morris, 2002; Johnston & Romzek, 1999; Klingner, Nalbandian, & Romzek, 2002). Sixth, managerial reforms such as performance measurement and rein-vention have complications in traditional forms of accountability (Newcomer, 1998; Page, 2006).

These six conclusions are largely about accountability problems, not how actors should deal with the problems or how actors can build effective accountability arrangements. Actors’ role is downplayed. Only recently, in




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dealing with “wicked” problems, have scholars started to pay more attention to actors’ influence on accountability institutions. These scholars propose new forms of accountability such as dialogue (Roberts, 2002), deliberation (DeHaven-Smith & Jenne, 2006), negotiated accountability (Kearns, 1994), mutual accountability (Whitaker et al., 2004), and emergent accountability (O’Connell, 2005).

Managerial ImplicationAlthough many studies are, to some extent, less concerned with offering concrete advice to managers, the literature does include a limited number of research that offers such advice. For example, Page (2004) writes that inter-agency collaboratives can build their accountability capacity by constructing four interdependent accountability platforms (external authorization, internal inclusion, results measurement, and managing for results) with 14 indicators. Wang (2002) observes that to improve accountability, managers should elimi-nate employees’ concern for exposing their job performances through realis-tic performance targets, articulation of expectations, and due process. Managers should also consider ethics training, leading by example, and a free commu-nicative environment.

Kearns (1994, 1996, 1998) suggests that managers should use a SWOT anal-ysis of accountability audit and can engage four types of accountability strategies according to their accountability environment: compliance (legal accountability), responsiveness (negotiated accountability), advocacy (anticipatory account-ability), and professional judgment (discretionary accountability). Kearns (1996) discusses in detail what managerial activities those strategies may entail. Similarly, Acar et al. (2008) recommend managers to integrate accountability with strategic management and engage in constant dialogue with their partners. Moore (1995) develops a strategic management framework to help managers embrace accountability pressures and create public values.

To deal with accountability issues in a collaborative setting, Whitaker et al. (2004) advise that managers should (a) pay attention to powerful stake-holders’ willingness to share power, (b) know that new accountability expec-tations can only be built slowly, (c) acknowledge all four accountability perspectives, (d) identify new ways to serve, and (e) be willing and able to devote time and attention to service improvement. Young (2002) offers advice to nonprofit organizations, such as appointing board members who understand the mission of the organization, including professional workers in institutional decision making, and developing accountability systems and guidelines.





Recent literature identifies some unaddressed questions that largely fall in four categories: (a) how to build accountability capacity and accountability platforms (Page, 2004; Romzek & Johnston, 2005); (b) how context affects accountability, considering factors such as the form of government (Wang, 2002), life stages of a partnership (Acar et al., 2008), historical times (Page, 2006), policy systems (Kim, 2005), national cultures (Page, 2006), organiza-tional cultures (Klingner et al., 2002), and administrative reforms (Page, 2006); (c) how accountability affects other factors, such as the mechanisms between accountability and performance (Dubnick, 2005; O’Connell, 2006) and the impact of accountability on risk perceptions and management (Benjamin, 2008; Wise & Freitag, 2002); and (d) what new forms of account-ability are necessary, when and how to use them, and how they affect other forms of accountability (Roberts, 2002).

Although the managerial advice offered in the literature is insightful, many of the items are not actionable in the sense that they are not causal propositions that can be easily recreated in the everyday world by managers (Argyris, 1996). The four types of unaddressed questions, to the author of this article, represent a step forward in developing more actionable accountability knowledge, but they are still not complete or systematic. The following sec-tion turns to this issue, discussing why much of the accountability knowledge is not actionable and why it relates to the way accountability is approached ontologically, epistemologically, and methodologically.

The Need for More Actionable Accountability KnowledgeActionable knowledge is “the knowledge that is most likely to be of help to human beings because it prescribes how they should act” (Argyris, 2003, p. 424). It is the type of knowledge that is most relevant to actors or managers. An emphasis on managerial relevance is not to trivialize the accountability issue or downplay its political and governance implications; rather, it is driven to help managers to create a new reality, and it aims to connect the dots between accountability, environmental factors, other public management sys-tems, and individual actions and behaviors. For actors to take wise actions, they should have a timely and simplified but accurate understanding of the interrelationships among the components of the empirical world and how their behavior is shaped by and will shape the relationships. However, the past accountability research has not provided such sufficient understanding.

First, the typical arguments or conclusions in the literature, as aforemen-tioned, are largely based on reflections of dilemmas or crises resulting from




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accountability problems as exogenous issues. This is what Argyris (1996) calls science after-the-fact, which justifies or explains what has already occurred with information that actors had not possessed before the situations occurred. Actionable knowledge must inform before-the-fact and is able to recreate what we observe. In other words, the typical arguments in the litera-ture inform us what is likely to happen under the specified conditions (e.g., accountability conflict), but they fall short in explaining “how to create the conditions and actions in the first place” (Argyris, 1996, p. 392). Argyris contends that the theory of managing is different from biology or physics because the universe addressed by the latter is exogenous to human actors, whereas the universe addressed by the former is created by human beings.

From this angle, actionable knowledge requires examination of how actors reproduce or reshape the accountability environments. In other words, action-able knowledge must be based on balanced attention to both social structure and human agency (Argyris, 2003). Argyris’ (1996) own work shows that man-agers often are unable to correct errors because of organizational defense rou-tines, but those routines are created by managers in the first place. It may seem somewhat obvious that government agents often participate in designing accountability tools (e.g., performance indicators) that will be used to monitor themselves. However, with exceptions (Courty & Marschke, 2007; Roberts, 2002; Sandfort, 2000; Whitaker et al., 2004), most prior studies treat account-ability pressures as environmental forces exogenous to individuals. What is missing is how actors empirically act in relation to structures and the conse-quence of the acts in regards to structures. The aforementioned four categories of unaddressed questions all relate to the structure–agency relationship: how accountability as structural force is (re)produced by agents, how social struc-tures affect actors’ enactment of accountability structures, how accountability structures affect actors’ acts, and how new forms of structures emerge.

Second, aside from those typical arguments, the managerial advice offered in the literature is not always actionable either. For example, much of the literature focuses on managing accountability conflicts and advises that man-agers should balance different accountability pressures. But exactly how? Balance is easy to say but hard to do. Romzek and Ingraham (2000) conclude, “Sadly, it demonstrates that under the most intense pressures, the ability to make the right choices may not be present” (p. 251). Koppell (2005) laments that “this is unlikely” (p. 99). Roberts (2002) believes in the strength of dialogue-based accountability but warns that do it when other methods have failed. DeHaven-Smith and Jenne (2006) advocate for “inquirement”—“an obligation to respond discursively and publicly to a future inquiry about a speci-fied responsibility” (p. 64)—but acknowledge “it is likely to be misused” (p. 74).





These comments suggest that actionable knowledge must be based on an accurate understanding of how actors actually make sense and order of the accountability institutions or pressures, but we lack such understanding.6 Such understanding is what Argyris (1996) calls theory-in-use: models used by human beings in everyday life. Argyris argues that actionable knowledge relies on such models, although they may be perceived by some researchers as oversimplified and unscientific. Actionable theory, Argyris writes, “is stor-able in the human mind/brain and retrievable from it under everyday condi-tions” (p. 396).

Third, some of the managerial advice offered in the literature is not action-able because it neglects the fact that in responding to practical problems, managers do not have the same knowledge, time frame, and ability to control the environment as the researchers do. Argyris (2003) gives an example by discussing the finding that there is a curvilinear relationship between creativ-ity and frustration:

Let us assume that a leader of a group wishes to produce mild degrees of frustration in order to mobilize a desired degree of creativity. How will she do it? The research studies suggest that she should block the group’s action. How will she block action? How will she know the frus-tration is mild? How will she know when frustration becomes counter-productive? The researchers can specify how she could find out, because the researchers faced the same challenge. They developed several differ-ent types of measuring instruments that they used behind a one-way vision screen. But how will the group leader introduce the use of these instruments? Should she tell the group members about her intentions and about the measuring instruments? How would she interrupt the flow without confounding her problem? Could not the very mention of her plans increase the frustration? If there were a way to cover up her strat-egy, then she would have to cover up the cover-up. What are the ethical issues of researchers’ producing knowledge that requires creating such undiscussable tactics? What would happen to the sense of trust between the leader and her group if they ever found out? (pp. 433-434)

Similar observations can be applied to some accountability advice. For example, Bundt (2000) suggests that librarians should become professionals with political skills and understand the accountability environment. However, it is not clear what type of political skills should be used, to what extent they should be used, or whether they sometimes lead to negative consequences. O’Connell (2005) advises reformers should begin with an assessment of




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stakeholder dynamics in a program field, including the capacity of the vari-ous stakeholders to monitor and sanction each other for poor performance. But there is no guidance on how to conduct such an assessment, what stake-holders should be considered, and how sanction capacity is assessed. Even Kearns’ (1994) ground-breaking work leaves some unanswered questions—it is neither clear how managers can decide when it is time to be proactive or reactive nor is it clear what managers should do if the four types of environ-mental demands are in conflict.

Fourth, actionable knowledge is based on causal observations. Citing Shoham (1991), Argyris (1996) emphasizes the central importance of causality to devel-oping actionable knowledge: “Everyday life is not creatable without a concept of causality” (p. 397). Most prior studies do not forcefully address causal link-ages among constructs. Dubnick (2005) argues that the analytic approaches adopted by most people studying accountability are biased because they neglect the social mechanisms linking accountability and performance. Many studies are conducted to find out what’s wrong with accountability systems when something bad occurs but do not examine success stories in which account-ability systems have led to good things. Without such comparison, the impact of accountability systems and how the impact depends on other factors cannot be credibly established regardless of whether the research design is quantita-tive or qualitative.7 The causal dots or mechanisms linking accountability with factors such as performance have not been convincingly established (Dubnick, 2005; Yang, 2011). The aforementioned four categories of future questions should be examined with causal relationships in mind.

Actionable knowledge must be produced through credible paths as it requires designs that enable causal inferences (Argyris, 1996, 2004). Argyris (2003) argues that the only viable path to actionable knowledge is action (participatory) research—partly because such research is close to social experimentation that generates causal knowledge and partly because it solves the problem regarding the gap between the research time frame used by scholars and the real time frame faced by managers. Managers taking action in daily decision making are under pressure to act within a short time period and with bounded rationality, but scholars can take the time needed to make their analysis. This raises the question whether a complete analytic interpre-tation can be useful to someone taking action, leading Argyris to prefer action research. Nevertheless, Argyris (1996) acknowledges that other methods can contribute to developing actionable knowledge as well. Case studies, for example, can be used to test causal theories, although many case studies in the literature include only success stories or only failure stories, which cannot credibly claim that it is their explanatory factors that make the difference.





Aiming for causal inference, Dubnick (2005) calls for alternative methodolo-gies such as experiments.

To sum up, developing more actionable accountability knowledge requires answering the following three core questions: (a) Empirically, how exactly do actors of governance perceive, order, and deal with multiple accountabil-ity pressures and why? (b) empirically, what are the mechanisms or causal linkages that connect accountability institutions with actor behaviors and organizational/societal outcomes? and (c) empirically, exactly how are account-ability institutions produced and reproduced by actors? On the philosophical level, the key challenge is to appropriately address the relationship between accountability institutions (as structures) and human agency. On the method-ology level, the task is to utilize appropriate designs and methods so that causal conclusions can be made on a interactive and dynamic process.8 The following section turns to the philosophical issue.

Accountability Dynamics and the Structure–Agency DualityAccountability and the Role of Human Agency

Appropriately dealing with the issue of agency—human ability to take action, reflect, and transform—in relation to social structures is essential for action-able knowledge (Argyris, 1996, 2003). To state that prior accountability stud-ies have ignored the agency issue would be inaccurate (Dubnick & Justice, 2006). On one hand, many writings assume that accountability is necessary for principals because agents have agency and discretion. “Without discretion there can be no accountability” (Behn, 2001, p. 82). Agency is assumed to have a negative role and should be controlled. Courty and Marschke (2007) observe that performance-based accountability is a trial-and-error process: Federal agencies establish performance measures, managers learn how to game them, agencies learn about gaming and reformulate the measures, possibly leading to new gaming, and so on. March (1981) succinctly points out that “any system of account is a road map to cheating on them” (p. 22)—there is always information manipulation and strategic moves between rule setters and rule followers.

On the other hand, many studies observe that agents often participate in designing accountability systems (e.g., performance indicators) and argue that managers should proactively adopt strategies to establish negotiated and anticipatory accountabilities (Acar et al., 2008; Kearns, 1996; Moore, 1995; O’Connell, 2005). In this perspective, agency is assumed to have a positive




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role and should be encouraged. Kearns (1994) writes that “decision makers might use their discretionary authority to make internal adjustments” or “decision makers might take proactive steps to advocate certain changes in legal or regulatory requirements” (p. 68). To some people, this line of studies underestimates, to some extent, the structure’s impact on agency and may lead to unconstrained entrepreneurship and irresponsible decisions.9

These two approaches are not mutually exclusive in the literature (Behn, 2001; Bovens, 1998). For example, Jos and Tompkins’ (2004) discussion on the paradox of accountability hints to the interactive relationship between accountability and agency:

Responsible interpretation and application of legitimate external account-ability demands depends on the cultivation of the virtues that support good administrative judgment, but the institutions and mechanisms that are used to communicate these external standards, and that moni-tor compliance with them, often threaten the very qualities that support responsible judgment. (p. 256)

Writings on bureaucratic politics recognize the mutual adaptation between bureaucrats and their principals (Krause, 1999). Some recent studies adopt a more balanced view of accountability and agency in the context of collabora-tive governance that involves more horizontal relationships (Roberts, 2002; Whitaker et al., 2004).

Still, there is need to extend the literature and integrate the two approaches more clearly and effectively so that the flux and transformability of account-ability can be better illustrated. First, it is important to emphasize more that the impact of agency can be both positive and negative, depending on other factors. For example, managers can take proactive accountability strategies, but the proactive steps occur in a politicized environment, so how power, resources, legitimacy, and norms affect the steps and their impact is of great importance if we want to understand the real process of accountability dynamics. Second, it should be highlighted more that the relationship between agency and accountability structures are two-way all the time: Agents’ strate-gic behavior is embedded in and constrained by current accountability struc-tures, whereas accountability structures respond to agents’ strategic behavior. This sometimes manifests as a gaming process (Courty & Marschke, 2007), but more generally, it is a natural process of recursive interaction. Third, the recursive relationship between agency and accountability must be understood in a long period of time so that the process and mechanism of evolution can be shown in details.





Accountability and the Structure–Agency Duality

Anthony Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory helps stress the points above by establishing the structure–agency duality. Structuration means the interplay between structures and agency. Giddens argues that structure should not be taken as having some given or visible form external to people; it exists only in and through the activities of human agents: It is both an outcome and a medium of action. That is, “analyzing the structuration of social systems means studying the modes in which systems . . . are produced and reproduced in interaction” (Giddens, 1984, p. 25). Similarly, we argue that accountability can be viewed as a structural property of the governance system, which is produced and reproduced by the actions of the actors involved in the system. As structural properties, accountability affects the reproduction of the gover-nance system it is attached to or embedded in. As Brown (2007) writes, accountability has regulative and constitutive aspects. The regulative aspect means that accountability models constrain individual behaviors; the constitu-tive aspect suggests that accountability models give life to the experience of actors and the social system. Thus, Giddens’ theory helps elegantly capture the recursive relationship between accountability and structure: Accountability studies must carefully consider the role of agency—not only that of managers but also politicians, employees, businesses, nonprofits, and citi-zens;10 at the same time, equal attention must be paid to exactly how account-ability structures and struggles shape agent behavior.11

Giddens’ (1984) theory provides a somewhat unified or overarching framework for thinking about accountability. Its basic components are con-sistent with much of the accountability literature and together the structura-tion theory offers theoretical simplicity. Giddens’ assumption, that human beings are autonomous and knowledgeable agents, is consistent with Bovens’ (1998) argument that “organizations should be understood as a semi-autonomous social field,” which consists of “mutually connected individuals” (p. 71) who are also semiautonomous. Giddens submits that actors’ action have unintended consequences, which is in line with the observation that performance mea-sures may lead to goal displacement and cheating. Giddens’ idea of praxis—regular patterns of enacted conduct—emphasizes the role of time and space: Interactions occur in a definite setting for a definite period, and actors use the spatial and temporal features of the interaction as a means of organizing their exchange (Thompson, 1989). This idea echoes that of O’Connell (2005), Kearns (1996), and Roberts (2002) and is consistent with Behn’s (2001) argu-ment that the answer to the accountability question can only emerge from practice and experimentation.




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Giddens’ (1984) theory is not the only theory that can help us understand the accountability dynamics and the structure–agency relationship. For example, the idea of embeddedness and agency is also seen in sociological and economic institutionalisms; the structure–agent relationship can also be illustrated with other social theories such as Archer’s (2003) internal conver-sation between structure and agency (also Habermas and Bourdieu). The idea, that accountability is an ongoing political process in which actors inter-act and pressure each other with power was expressed sporadically in the literature (e.g., Etzioni, 1975), but it has not gained popularity in directing empirical studies. Giddens’ theory is used here as an example to show that other social and institutional theories help us take a broader, more sophisti-cated, and more realistic view of what constitutes accountable relationships. This is particularly relevant in the contemporary governance environment that is more fluid, complex, and dynamic, and is demanding a system of accountability that can be similarly more dynamic, flexible, and adjustable. Giddens’ theory allows for such dynamism and the recursive nature of accountability systems as people and structure are constantly adjusting.

Suggestions for Future InquiryI have outlined three core questions for developing more actionable account-ability knowledge and discussed the structure–agency issue on the philosophical level. I now turn to more specific topics we may study and the methodological choice we should consider.

The Nature and Evolution of Accountability in ContextUsing the structuration theory, as well as other social and institutional theories, to understand the nature and dynamics of accountability is a natural extension of the current literature. The emergent nature of accountability has been recog-nized previously (O’Connell, 2005; Whitaker et al., 2004). Drawing from Giddens (1984) and others, Sandfort (2000) observes that individuals both create and are constrained by social structures in implementing management practices, although she does not directly address the concept of accountability. Nonetheless, as Sandfort points out, the ongoing social process has not been sufficiently studied by current public management theories.

Future studies may examine how the flows of action and scripts are con-strained by and reproduce the existing structures. Thus understood, accountabil-ity is an emergent property, not a given set of rules or tools. It is constantly changing and shifting as actors—politicians, bureaucrats, citizens, and businesses—act





and interact. According to Giddens (1984), structure is constituted by rules and resources governing and available to agents. Giddens identifies three types of structures in social systems:

Rule of signification. It relates to the theory of coding and produces meaning through discursive practices or organized webs of language. They restrict and enable actors to make sense of the context they act in and to communicate this meaning and their views of ongoing practices to others.

Rule of legitimization. It relates to theories of normative legitimization and produces moral order via societal norms, values, and standards. When actors apply sanctions in interactions they draw on such norms and rules.

Rule of domination. It relates to theories of resource authorization/allocation and produces power, originating from the control of resources. To secure spe-cific outcomes, actors influence others by their power that is based on resources.

It would be important to examine what domination, signification, and legiti-mation structures an accountability system reflects and how different groups of actors perceive and communicate them. This requires studying not only account-ability tools and procedures but more importantly how the tools and procedures are negotiated and embedded in, but also manifest as, cultures, norms, resources, and values.12 Consistent with Giddens (1984), the three aspects of accountability structures are interdependent. The interaction between political action, material change, and discursive practice greatly helps us understand accountability politics. For example, the exercise of power in accountability relationships is justified and advanced by prevailing constructions and narra-tives of accountability. As the product of a particular set of historical and mate-rial circumstances, these constructions presume certain entitlements and validate some forms of power, whereas delegitimize others. This perspective helps “pro-vide the basis for understanding the place of accountability in broader construc-tions of citizenship and discourse around rights, who gets to define these, and the implications of this for the poor” (Newell, 2006, p. 39).

Some additional research questions originate from the structuration the-ory: Under what conditions does accountability make a difference, how much, and for whom? Under what conditions can actors be transformative and policy learning be achieved? What are the social costs associated with accountability struggles? What new accountability forms can help us build an effective governance system to deal with emerging challenges?

Middle-Range Theory: Felt Accountability and Public Management MechanismsFuture studies may construct more middle-range theories to take “situatedness” of accountability seriously. As Perry (1991) asserts, a middle-range theory of




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Externalactors

Externalactors

FormalAccountabilitySystems

Individual Felt Accountability• Sources• Salience• Intensity• Confusion• Comparability

OrganizationalCharacteristics

IndividualCharacteristics

IndividualAttitudesBehaviors

IndividualPerformance OrganizationalPerformance

External PoliticalEnvironment

External Political

Environment

FormalAccountability

Systems

Individual Felt Accountability• Sources• Salience• Intensity• Confusion• Comparability

OrganizationalCharacteristics

IndividualCharacteristics

IndividualAttitudesBehaviors

IndividualPerformance

OrganizationalPerformance

InternalPolitical

Environment

Felt accountability

Felt accountability

Figure 1. An illustrative model linking formal accountability, felt accountability, and performance in public organizations

administrative performance must be developed “within institutional contexts and structures characteristic of the public sector” (p. 13). Credible theories of accountability must be contingency based. In particular, mechanism-based theorizing can provide “an intermediary level of analysis in-between pure description and story-telling, on the one hand, and universal social laws, on the other” (Hedstrőm & Swedberg, 1998). A middle-range model with mechanism-based theorizing can shed light on the issue by revealing the linkages between the different forms and functions of accountability as well as how they interact to influence performance. Figure 1 provides an illustrative model. It is drawn for illustration purposes, focusing on the dynamics of accountability without showing all potential interactive links among concepts.

The key in Figure 1 is felt accountability—actors involved in the account-ability relationship have their own perceptions about the relationship and its implication. Felt accountability is important because it relates to the first of the three core questions I identified for developing actionable accountability knowledge: Empirically, how exactly do actors of governance perceive, order, and deal with multiple accountability pressures and why? Felt account-ability suggests that we examine how bureaucrats as holdees process the





information/signals they receive and how they then make decisions accord-ingly. Such processes can then be related to other public management studies. This approach is consistent with the tradition of Simon, March, and Cyert (Cyert & March, 1963; March, 1981).

More specifically, Figure 1 shows that felt accountability can be concep-tualized with various dimensions (such as intensity, confusion, compatibility, and salience), for which we can borrow from the business/psychology litera-ture that has started to examine these dimensions (e.g., Ferris et al., 1997; Frink & Klimoski, 1998). Figure 1 also shows that felt accountability is directly affected by formal accountability systems. The understanding of mechanisms between formal systems and felt accountability can be gained from the sense-making literature (Weick, 1995), the information processing literature, and the literature on institutional constraints and embeddedness. Figure 1 further shows that felt accountability is affected by organizational and individual characteristics.

Figure 1 also addresses the second core question that I identified for devel-oping actionable accountability knowledge: Empirically, what are the mecha-nisms or causal linkages that connect accountability institutions with actor behaviors and organizational/societal outcomes? In Figure 1, organizational and individual characteristics moderate the relationship between felt account-ability and individual attitudes and behaviors. In other words, accountability should be studied in connection with other management systems and literatures. As Wise and Freitag (2002) write, “Accountability systems interact with other important variables in the management context,” and “accountability . . . cannot be considered in isolation. It affects and is affected by other important variables in the management context” (p. 494). We should investigate the mechanisms linking felt accountability with individual-level consequences and organiza-tional performance. Tetlock’s (1985, 1991) approach can be helpful in this regard as it helps address how an individual perceives accountability pressure toward different sources and how this affects his or her decision making. We can also borrow from the management literature to identify moderating vari-ables at the individual level and the organizational level such as self-efficacy, hierarchical level, and organizational structure (Ferris et al., 1997; Frink & Klimoski, 1998). We may also consider public management constructs such as red tape, goal ambiguity, discretion, and public service motivation.

Moreover, Figure 1 includes external and internal political environments as factors influencing the causal mechanisms. The question here is as fol-lows: What are the contextual and environmental factors that provide the stage for public sector accountability mechanisms? Much has been written about the question in accountability studies (e.g., Behn, 2001; Kearns, 1996),




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but the political science and public management literature—such as those dealing with the concepts of delegation, discretion, and control (e.g., Bendor, Glazer, & Hammond, 2001; Krause, 1999)—can help us further understand these contextual factors and mechanisms. We link environments with account-ability by arrows pointing to both directions because public managers’ actions may transform their environment.

Finally, Figure 1 addresses the third core question that I identified for developing actionable accountability knowledge: Empirically, exactly how are accountability institutions produced and reproduced by actors? The arrow from individual behaviors to formal accountability systems is drawn to emphasize the role of agents in shaping the accountability systems that gov-ern their behavior. These agents’ influence is joined by the effects of external actors and political environment (external and internal). For example, two questions can be asked about the effect of environment: How do various gov-ernment reform programs, such as contracting and managing for affect the accountability relationships and via what mechanisms?13 How would accountability evolve in networks and governance settings? In this view, accountability systems are institutional arrangements and their evolution can be studied from various institutional perspectives such as the political econ-omy models that emphasize power struggles (Knight, 1992; Moe, 2005) and the sociological models that emphasize the framing of ideas and norms (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983; Scott, 2001).

Methodology Rigor and DiversityTo better capture the structure–agency duality and make causal observations on the interactive and dynamic accountability process, it is essential to improve methodology rigor and diversity in the research.

The issue of rigor is particularly relevant for the dominant method in the past—qualitative inquiry. To demonstrate the complexities of the interactions between actors and the reproduction of accountability structures, the traditional qualitative studies should be strengthened to better reveal the impact of context and embeddedness as well as the process of changes—such as the change of accountability demands, the emergence of negotiated accountability, the delib-erative process, and the dialogue process. Many scholars have argued that a process approach, analyzing the sequence of events that show how things change over time (Pettigrew, Woodman, & Cameron, 2001), is more effective in using Giddens’ (1984) approach (Pozzebon & Pinsonneault, 2005). Grounded theory, narrative, visual mapping, and temporal bracketing,14 all have been used in other disciplines applying the structuration theory empirically (see Langley, 1999).





Pozzebon and Pinsonneault (2005), in particular, advocate for combining narra-tive and temporal bracketing as the former helps recognize when and how changes are triggered and the latter helps explain why.

The standard of rigor should be applied to other methods as well. Method-ological pluralism is desirable in capturing the complex realities of accountabil-ity as each research approach makes unique contribution to our understanding. Methodological pluralism is necessary for actionable knowledge (Argyris, 2003) and “should not be diminished in the name of scientific advancement, from epistemological bias, or from philosophical arrogance” (Krause, 1999, p. 123). We need to recognize the strengths and limits of all methods.

One alternative qualitative methodology is participatory action research. Although it is not a process approach and not mentioned in similar studies using the structuration theory, it is helpful in generating actionable knowl-edge. Many empirical accountability studies rely on retrospective examina-tion of past cases, so they are more likely to reveal lessons about why things went wrong but not how things can go right. As Lewin (1951) argues, if we wished to truly understand the universe, try changing it. That is, the most powerful empirical tests for knowledge are not done by simply describing it but by making predictions about changing the universe (Argyris, 2003). One limitation of this method is that PA scholars may not have many opportunities to do such research.

Another alternative is experimental studies. Dubnick (2005) stipulates that future research on accountability should learn from Tetlock’s (1985, 1991) approach, which uses experimental designs to study how perceived account-ability pressures affect individuals’ cognitive and emotional state as well as how the relationship is moderated by variables such as timing, trust, and task environment. Dubnick proposes that the individual-level, Tetlock-type work should be placed in contextual settings such as systems of answerability and environments of blameworthiness. Tetlock’s model arguably provides the most influential conceptual foundation for accountability research at the behavioral level, but it is primarily based on evidence from experimental studies—it is not grounded in organizational context and thus may face ques-tions about external validity (Argyris, 1996). Furthermore, Tetlock’s studies address subjective perceptions of accountability pressure without discussing the “objective” accountability systems or the interaction between actors. The phenomenological approach advocated by Tetlock is very useful, but applying only experimental designs to advance a phenomenological perspective is somewhat limited.

Demonstrating the complexities of the interactions between actors and the reproduction of accountability structures can also be achieved via quantitative




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methods such as agent-based modeling. As an alternative to rational choice and game theory, agent-based modeling assumes actors as adaptive rather than fully rational and uses bottom–up microsimulation. In the simulation, multiple actors act according to rules, in which utility optimization is but one of many possibilities and complex social patterns emerge from the interactions among actors. As a result, agent-based modeling can show how collective phenomena occur and how the interaction of the actors leads to these phenomena. In addi-tion, agent-based modeling can explore the impact of various institutional arrangements and paths of development on the collective result. It is increas-ingly used in demography, social, economic, and environmental sciences (Billari, Fent, Prskawetz, & Scheffran, 2006). A well-known case is Robert Axelrod’s (1997) use of the method to study competition and collaboration.

Finally, if middle-range theories are to be constructed, quantitative meth-ods using survey research could also be very useful. For example, survey data can be analyzed with structural equation modeling to assess the complex mediating relationships between accountability pressures/forms, organiza-tional characteristics, individual attitudes/behaviors, and organizational per-formance. Interaction terms can be used in regression-type techniques to assess the interaction between accountability forms, between accountability systems and other management systems, or between accountability structures and individual characteristics. In addition, as Figure 1 indicates, a more com-plete examination of accountability requires observations on and connections across different levels of analysis: accountability arrangements at the gover-nance level, management practices at the organizational level, and attitudes and behaviors at the individual level. The multilevel analysis using hierarchi-cal linear modeling will be extremely helpful in analyzing such nested data sets, as suggested by Lynn, Heinrich, and Hill (2001) in proposing a new logic for empirical research on governance.

ConclusionGovernments, as well as other public organizations, have used more and more sophisticated accountability measures to improve their performance in the past several decades, but many citizens still distrust them and feel they are not accountable. Despite the fact that accountability research in PA has generated many significant findings, accountability remains to be a signifi-cant governance problem. Public managers face an increasing need for more relevant knowledge that can help them chart a course through the account-ability odyssey in the new governance environment. This article reviews the literature and finds that there is need for more actionable accountability





knowledge. Such knowledge must be based on an accurate empirical understanding of how actors of governance make sense and order of the accountability pressures they face; it must be based on causal observations of the mechanisms linking accountability structures, individual behaviors, and organizational outcomes; or it must be based on process-based causal observations in a long period of time. To generate such knowledge, a key philosophical challenge is to better deal with the relationship between agency and structure. This article uses Giddens’ (1984) structuration theory and shows how it can provide an overarching framework to direct our think-ing about accountability and to integrate the core unanswered questions in the literature. The article further submits that future inquires need to develop more middle-range, mechanism-based models, with diverse, appro-priate, and rigorous methodological choices.

A cautionary note must be made. Most of the books and articles reviewed in this article are published in the United States, so it may have a continental bias. As Schillemans and Bovens (2011) argue, Americans tend to view account-ability as a “virtue” or “ends,” whereas Europeans tend to treat is as an “instru-ment” or “means.” We hope that the approach we developed here is a balanced and general one—the structuration theory helps to show that accountability is both instrument and virtue as well as both means and ends. Certainly, structura-tion theory has its own limitations, and it is not the only theory that deals with the relationship between agency and structure, but the arguments we made based on the structuration theory are consistent with many other social or insti-tution theories. Finally, this article may leave many questions untouched such as a more appropriate normative theory of accountability and the macro-level issues relating to accountability and democracy. But at the very least, the ques-tions raised here invite new rigorous studies of accountability in public organi-zations and offer a viable alternative of conducting this endeavor.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or pub-lication of this article.

Notes

1. What is included in the review is certainly not what we have read in studying accountability. In searching for future research avenues, we read all relevant books




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and book chapters that we can access. We also searched in all major databases and major journals in other disciplines such as political science, business administra-tion, psychology, and sociology.

2. Book reviews, teaching cases, case comments, and opinion essays were not included. All published volumes before December, 2009, were included. It is pos-sible that searching for the four keywords in the title or abstract leaves out some articles that actually have implications about accountability. However, we believe this should not be a big concern. To the extent we aim to search for patterns and linkages among and across perspectives represented in the publications, this is essentially an endeavor of qualitative inquiry. After we finished Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory, Public Administration Review, Administra-tion & Society, the pattern of the findings became largely “mature”—or stable—before we read articles from American Review of Public Administration and Public Performance & Management Review. To use the term in qualitative methodology, we reached theoretical saturation, a point after which new patterns of results are unlikely to emerge. This is particularly reasonable here because academic articles make reference to other major publications, and reading the reference list helps one obtain a comprehensive picture of the research field.

3. Responsibility is often used interchangeably with accountability (see Behn, 2001; Bovens, 1998).

4. Partly because of this, much of the literature attends to, more or less, the situation of negativism—the quest for faults, guilty individuals, and punishments (Schillemans and Bovens, 2011); the potential damage resulting from the cross pressure of accountabilities; and the inevitable conflicts among accountability sources. Accountability systems are frequently not perceived by managers as something to help the execution of public duties and organizational performance but something that discourages them from taking risks and seeking improvements (Behn, 2001). This should not be the case—the more typical situation may be that accountability ensures that public organizations respond effectively to public interest or the goals and preferences of citizens.

5. Bundt (2000) realizes this problem and tries to utilize “a positive model to study accountability relationships.” But her study is actually qualitative—the two hypotheses are not written or tested according to the positive tradition.

6. For another example, Kearns (1996) discusses in detail four types of accountabil-ity strategies managers can take according to their accountability environment. But to further strengthen his advice, it is necessary to empirically assess how man-agers actually decide when it is time to be proactive rather than reactive and how managers actually behave when the four types of environmental demands are in conflict.





7. Such comparison is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for proving causal relationships. This is not to suggest that accountability systems along produce something good or bad. Accountability is just one of the forces, and it interacts with other forces.

8. It may be true that fully answering such questions require book-length manu-scripts because journal articles face length and style constraints. Nevertheless, journal articles can recognize the chain of causal mechanisms regarding account-ability and concentrate on one or more parts of the chain. The need for more actionable knowledge is based on our assessment of both books and journal arti-cles relating to accountability. It relates not to the length of writing, but to the way knowledge is produced and to the ontological, epistemological, and methodologi-cal approaches used.

9. The conception that accountability is proactively “negotiated” and “adopted” by managers may seem undemocratic or illegitimate for those who believe in less bureaucratic power. For example, O’Loughlin (1990) believes that this conception “shifts the emphasis from outside control over bureaucracies to administrative control and management of outsiders” and that “they [bureaucrats] can effectively fend off any potentially disruptive influence that we may try to exercise” (p. 281).

10. Hence, the emphasis on agency does not necessarily lead to managerialism because agents consist of more than managers.

11. Much of the public administration field is concerned with how individual behaviors are shaped by organizational practices. For example, performance-based account-ability may lead to goal displacement and organizational cheating. However, few studies consider how agent behavior (e.g., cheating) simultaneously affects the orga-nizational practice (e.g., performance-based accountability) in a recursive manner. Moreover, few studies demonstrate the mechanisms through which behaviors are shaped. For example, only recently a mechanism-based model was tested to explain organizational cheating (dishonesty) in performance reporting (Yang, 2009).

12. This idea is not necessarily attached to the structuration theory; it can come from, for example, the sociological approach of neoinstitutionalism that treats formal structure as myths, ceremonies, and norms (e.g., Meyer & Rowan, 1977).

13. The question, how government reforms affect accountability relationships, is not new, but more studies should be done to demonstrate the processes and mech-anisms by which those effects occur and to assess the simultaneous impact of accountability relationships on the implementation of the reforms. As Bovens (1998) comments on the literature, “most analyses fail to answer the question as to how that individual responsibility can take shape in the practice of complex organizations” (p. 52). Heinrich and Choi (2007) also contend that more research should be conducted to assess how contracting and performance incentives affect various actors’ perceptions and behaviors, depending on other factors.




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14. Temporal bracketing is to break down data into successive adjacent phases and then examine how actions or events in one phase cause changes in the context that will affect action in subsequent phases (Langley, 1999). Although this strat-egy may distort the meaning of duality of structure and overlook the argument that structuration occurs in every action, it nevertheless provides a useful way of studying the flow of actions and their consequences.

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Bio

Kaifeng Yang, PhD, is an associate professor and Ph.D. director of the Askew School of Public Administration and Policy, Florida State University. He is managing editor of Public Performance and Management Review, and his current research focuses on public and performance management and citizen participation.




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