Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. No. L-49705-09 February 8, 1979TOMATIC ARATUC, SERGIO TOCAO, CISCOLARIO DIAZ, FRED TAMULA, MANGONTAWAR GURO and BONIFACIO LEGASPI, petitioners, vs.The COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII (Central Mindanao), ABDULLAH DIMAPORO, JESUS AMPARO, ANACLETO BADOY, et al., respondents. Nos. L-49717-21 February 8,1979. LINANG MANDANGAN, petitioner, vs.THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, THE REGIONAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS for Region XII, and ERNESTO ROLDAN, respondents. L-49705-09 — Lino M. Patajo for petitioners. Estanislao A. Fernandez for private respondents. L-49717-21 — Estanislao A. Fernandez for petitioner. Lino M. Patajo for private respondent. Office of the Solicitor General, for Public respondents. BARREDO, J.:Petition in G. R. Nos. L-49705-09 for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by six (6) independent candidates for representatives to tile Interim Batasang Pambansa who had joined together under the banner of the Kunsensiya ng Bayan which, however, was not registered as a political party or group under the 1976 Election Code, P.D. No. 1296, namely Tomatic Aratuc, Sorgio Tocao, Ciscolario Diaz, Fred Tamula, Mangontawar Guro and Bonifacio Legaspi her referred to as petitioners, to review the decision of the respondent Commission on Election (Comelec) resolving their appeal from the Of the respondent Regional Board of Canvasses for Region XII regarding the canvass of the results of the election in said region for representatives to the I.B.P. held on April 7, 1978. Similar petition in G.R. Nos. L49717-21, for certiorari with restraining order and preliminary injunction filed by Linang Mandangan, abo a candidate for representative in the same election in that region, to review the decision of the Comelec declaring respondent Ernesto Roldan as entitled to be proclaimed as one of the eight winners in said election.The instant proceedings are sequels of Our decision in G.R. No. L- 48097, wherein Tomatic Aratuc et al. sought the suspension of the

canvass then being undertaken by respondent dent Board in Cotabato city and in which canvass, the returns in 1966 out of a total of 4,107 voting centers in the whole region had already been canvassed showing partial results as follows:

NAMES OF CANDIDATES

NO. OF VOTES

1. Roldan, Ernesto (KB)

225,674

2. Valdez, Estanislao (KBL)

217,789

3. Dimporo, Abdullah (KBL)

199,244

4. Tocao, Sergio (KB)

199,062

5. Badoy, Anacleto (KBL)

198,966

6. Amparo, Jesus (KBL)

184,764

7. Pangandaman, Sambolayan (KBL)

183,646

8. Sinsuat, Datu Blah (KBL)

182,457

9. Baga, Tomas (KBL)

171,656

10. Aratuc, Tomatic (KB)

165,795

11. Mandangan, Linang(KB)

165,032

12. Diaz, Ciscolario (KB)

159,977

13. Tamalu, Fred (KB)

153,734

14. Legaspi Bonifacio (KB)

148,200

15. Guro, Mangontawar (KB)

139,386

16. Loma, Nemesio (KB)

107,455

17. Macapeges, Malamama (Independent)

101,350

(Votes Of the independent candidates who actually were not in contention omitted)" (Page 6, Record, L-49705-09.) A supervening panel headed by Commissioner of Elections, Hon- Venancio S. Duque, had conducted of the complaints of the petitioners therein of alleged irregularities in the election records in all the voting centers in the whole province of Lanao del Sur, the whole City of Marawi, eight (8) towns of Lanao del Norte, namely, Baloi, Karomatan, Matungao, Munai, Nunungan, Pantao Ragat, Tagoloan and Tangcal, seven (7) towns in Maguindanao, namely, Barrira, Datu Piang, Dinaig, Matanog Parang, South Upi and Upi, ten (10) towns in North Cotabato, namely, Carmen, Kabacan, Kidapwan, Magpet, Matalam Midsayap, Pigcawayan, Pikit, Pres. Roxas and Tulonan, and eleven (11) towns in Sultan Kudarat, namely, Bagumbayan, Columbia Don Mariano Marcos, Esperanza, Isulan, Kalamansig, Lebak, Lutayan, Palimbang, President Quirino and Tacurong, by reason for which, petitioners had asked that the returns from said voting centers be excluded from the canvass. Before the start of the hearings, the canvass was suspended but after the supervisory panel presented its report, on

May 15, 1978, the Comelec lifted its order of suspension and directed the resumption of the canvass to be done in Manila. This order was the one assailed in this Court. We issued a restraining order. After hearing the parties, the Court allowed the resumption of the canvass but issued the following guidelines to be observed thereat:

1. That the resumption of said canvass shall be held in the Comelec main office in Manila starting not later than June 1, 1978; 2. That in preparation therefor, respondent Commission on Elections shall see to it that all the material election paragraph corresponding to all the voting center involved in Election Nos. 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 78-12 are taken to its main office in Manila, more particularly, the ballot boxes, with the contents, used during the said elections, the books of voters or records of voting and the lists or records of registered voters, on or before May 31, 1978;3. That as soon as the corresponding records are available, petitioners and their counsel shall be allowed to examine the same under such security measures as the respondent Board may determine, except the contents of the ballot boxes which shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident, the purpose of such examination being to enable petitioners, and their counsel to expeditiously determine which of them they would wish to be scrutinized and passed upon by the Board as supporting their charges of election frauds and anomalies, petitioners and their counsel being admonished in this connection, that no dilatory tactics should be in by them and that only such records substantial objections should be offered by them for the scrutiny by the Board; 4. That none of the election returns reffered to in the petition herein shall be canvassed without first giving the herein petitioners ample opportunity to make their specific objections thereto, if they have any, and to show sufficient basis for the rejection of any

of the returns, and, in this connection, the respondent Regional Board of Canvassers should give due consideration to the points raised in the memorandum filed by said petitioners with the Commission on Election in the above cases dated April 26, 1978;5. That should it appear to the board upon summary scrutiny of the records to be offered by petitioners indication that in the voting center actually held and/or that election returns were prepared either before the day of the election returns or at any other time, without regard thereto or that there has been massive substitution of voters, or that ballots and/or returns were prepared by the same groups of persons or individuals or outside of the voting centers, the Board should exclude the corresponding returns from the canvass; 6. That appeals to the commission on Election of the Board may be made only after all the returns in question in all the above, the above five cases shall have been passed upon by the Board and, accordingly, no proclamation made until after the Commission shall have finally resolved the appeal without prejudice to recourse to this court, if warranted as provided by the Code and the Constitution, giving the parties reasonable time therefor;7. That the copies of the election returns found in the corresponding ballot boxes shall be the one used in the canvass;8. That the canvass shall be conducted with utmost dispatch, to the end that a proclamation, if feasible, may be made not later than June 10, 1978; thus, the canvass may be terminated as soon as it is evident that the possible number of votes in the still uncanvassed returns with no longer affect the general results of the elections here in controversy; 9. That respondent Commission shall promulgate such other directive not inconsistent with this resolution y necessary to expedite the proceedings herein

contemplated and to accomplish the purposes herein intended. (Pp. 8-9, Record.

On June 1, 1978, upon proper motion, said guidelines were modified:

... in the sense that the ballot boxes for the voting centers just referred to need not be taken to Manila, EXCEPT those of the particular voting centers as to which the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened in order that the votes therein may be counted because said ballots unlike the election returns, have not been tampered with or substituted, which instances the results of the counting shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3, 1978; it being understood, that for the purposes of the canvass, the petitioners shall not be allowed to invoke any objection not already alleged in or comprehend within the allegations in their complaint in the election cases above- mentioned. (Page 8, Id.)

Thus respondent Board proceeded with the canvass, with the herein petitioners presenting objections, most of them supported by the report of handwriting and finger print experts who had examined the voting records and lists of voters in 878 voting centers, out of 2,700 which they specified in their complaints or petitions in Election Cases 78-8, 78-9, 78-10, 78-11 and 7812 in the Comelec. In regard to 501 voting centers, the records cf. which, consisting of the voters lists and voting records were not available- and could not be brought to Manila, petitions asked that the results therein be completely excluded from the canvass. On July 11, 1978, respondent Board terminated its canvass and declared the result of the voting to be as follows:

NAME OF CANDIDATE

VOTES OBTAIN

VALDEZ, Estanislao

436,069

DIMAPORO, Abdullah

429,351

PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan

406,106

SINSUAT, Blah

403,445

AMPARO, Jesus

399,997

MANDANGAN, Linang

387,025

BAGA, Tomas

386,393

BADOY,Anacleto

374,933

ROLDAN, Ernesto

275,141

TOCAO, Sergio

239,914

ARATUC, Tomatic

205,829

GURO, Mangontawar

190,489

DIAZ, Ciscolario

190,077

TAMULA, Fred

180,280

LEGASPI, Bonifacio

174,396

MACAPEGES, Malamana

160,271

(Pp. 11-12, Record.)

Without loss of time, the petitioners brought the resolution of respondent Board to the Comelec. Hearing was held on April 25, 1978, after which , the case was declared submitted for decision. However, on August 30,1978, the Comelec issued a resolution stating inter alia that :

In order to enable the Commission to decide the appeal properly : a. It will have to go deeper into the examination of the voting records and registration records and in the case of voting centers whose voting and registration records which have not yet been submitted for the Commission to decide to open the ballot boxes; and b. To interview and get statements under oath of impartial and disinterested persons from the area to determine whether actual voting took place on April 7, 1978, as well as those of the military authorities in the areas affects (Page 12). Record, L-49705-09 .)

On December 11, 1978, the Comelec required the parties "to file their respective written comments on the reports they shall periodically receive from the NBI-Comelec team of finger-print and signature experts within the inextendible period of seven (7) days from their receipt thereof". According to counsel for Aratuc, et al., "Petitioners submitted their various comments on the report 4, the principal gist of which was that it would appear uniformly in all the reports submitted by the Comelec-NBI experts that the registered voters were not the ones who voted as shown by the fact that the thumbprints appearing in Form 1 were different from the thumbprints of the voters in Form 5. " But the Comelec denied a motion of petitioners asking that the ballot boxes corresponding to the voting centers the record of which are not available be opened and that a date be set when the statements of witnesses referred to in the August 30, 1978 resolution would be taken, on the ground that in its opinion, it was no longer necessary to proceed with such opening of ballot boxes and taking of statements. For his part, counsel for petitioner M in G.R. No. L-49717-21 filed with Comelec on December 19,1978 a Memorandum. To quote from the petition:

On December 19, 1978, the KBL, through counsel, filed a Memorandum for the

Kilusang Bagong Lipunan (KBL) Candidates on the Comelec's Resolution of December 11, 1978, a xerox copy of which is attached hereto and made a part hereof as Annex 2, wherein they discussed the following topics: (I) Brief History of the President Case; (II) Summary of Our Position and Submission Before the Honorable commission; and (III) KBL's Appeal Ad Cautelam. And the fourth topic, because of its relevance to the case now before this Honorable Court, we hereby quote for ready reference:IV OUR POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE ESOLUTION OF THE HONORABLE COMMISSION OF DECEMBER 11, 1978 We respectfully submit that the Resolution of this case by this Honorable Commission should be limited to the precincts and municipalities involved in the KB'S Petitions in Cases Nos. 78-8 to 78-12, on which evidence had been submitted by the parties, and on which the KB submitted the reports of their handwriting-print. Furthermore, it should be limited by the appeal of the KB. For under the Supreme Court Resolution of May 23, 1978, original jurisdiction was given to the Board, with appeal to this Honorable Commission-Considerations of other matters beyond these would be, in our humble opinion, without jurisdiction. For the present, we beg to inform this Honorable Commission that we stand by the reports and findings of the COMELEC/NBI experts as submitted by them to the Regional Board of Canvassers and as confirmed by the said Regional Board of Canvassers in its Resolution of July 11, 1978, giving the 8 KBL candidates the majorities we have already above mentioned. The Board did more than make a summary scrutiny of the records' required by the Supreme Court Resolution, Guideline No. 5, of May 23, 1978. Hence, if for lack of material time we cannot file any Memorandum within the non-extendible period of seven (7) days, we would just stand

by said COMELEC/NBI experts' reports to the Regional Board, as confirmed by the Board (subject to our appeal ad cautelam).The COMELEC sent to the parties copies of the reports of the NBI-COMELEC experts. For lack of material time due to the voluminous reports and number of voting centers involved, the Christmas holidays, and our impression that the COMELEC will exercise only its appellate jurisdiction, specially as per resolution of this Honorable Court of May 23, 1978 (in G.R. No. L-48097), we, the KBL, did not comment any more on said reports. (Pp. 5-6, Record, L-49717-21.)

On January 13, 1979, the Comelec rendered its resolution being assailed in these cases, declaring the final result of the canvass to be as follows:

CANDIDATES

VOTES

VALDEZ, Estanislao

319,514

DIMAPORO, Abdullah

289.751

AMPARO, Jesus

286,180

BADOY, 2

Anacleto 85,985

BAGA, Tomas

271,473

PANGANDAMAN, Sambolayan

271,393

SINSUAT, Blah

269,905

ROLDAN, Ernesto

268,287

MANDANGAN, Linang

251,226

TACAO, Sergio

229,12

4

DIAZ, Ciscolario

187,986

ARATUC, Tomatic

183,316

LEGASPI, Bonifacio

178,564

TAMULA, Fred

177,270

GURO, Mangontawar

163,449

LOMA, Nemesio

129,450

(Page 14, Record,

L-49705-09.)

It is alleged in the Aratuc petition that:The Comelec committee grave abuse of dicretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction:1. In not pursuing further the examination of the registration records and voting records from the other voting centers questioned by petitioners after it found proof of massive substitute voting in all of the voting records and registration records examined by Comelec and NBI experts;2. In including in the canvass returns from the voting centers whose book of voters and voting records could not be recovered by the Commission in spite of its repeated efforts to retrieve said records;3. In not excluding from the canvass returns from voting centers showing a very high percentage of voting and in not considering that high percentage of voting, coupled with massive substitution of voters is proof of manufacturing of election returns;4. In denying petitioners' petition for the opening of the ballot boxes from voting centers whose records are not available for examination to determine whether or not there had been voting in said voting centers;5. In not Identifying the ballot boxes that had no padlocks and especially those that were found to be empty while they were shipped to Manila pursuant to the directive of the Commission in compliance with the guidelines of this Honorable Court;6. In not excluding from the canvass returns where the results of examination of the voting records and registration records show that the thumbprints of the voters in CE Form 5 did not correspond to those of the registered voters as shown in CE Form 1;7. In giving more credence to the affidavits of chairmen and members of the voting centers, municipal treasurers and other election officials in the voting centers where irregularities had been committed and not

giving credence to the affidavits of watchers of petitioners;8. In not including among those questioned before the Board by petitioners those included among the returns questioned by them in their Memorandum filed with the Commission on April 26, 1978, which Memorandum was attached as Annex 'I' to their petition filed with this Honorable Court G.R. No. L-48097 and which the Supreme Court said in its Guidelines should be considered by the Board in the course of the canvass (Guidelines No. 4). (Pp. 15-16, Record, Id.)

On the other hand, the Mandangan petition submits that the Comelec comitted the following errors:

1. In erroneously applying the earlier case of Diaz vs. Commission on Elections (November 29, 1971; 42 SCRA 426), and particularly the highly restrictive criterion that when the votes obtained by the candidates with the highest number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, the COMELEC ruled to exclude from the canvass the election return reflecting such rests, under which the COMELEC excluded 1,004 election returns, involving around 100,000 votes, 95 % of which are for KBL candidates, particularly the petitioner Linang Mandangan, and which rule is so patently unfair, unjust and oppressive. 2. In not holding that the real doctrine in the Diaz Case is not the total exclusion of election returns simply because the total number of votes exceed the total number of highest possible valid votes, but 'even if all the votes cast by persons Identified as registered voters were added to the votes cast by persons who can not be definitely ascertained as registered or not, and granting, ad arguendo, that all of them voted for respondent Daoas, still the resulting total is much below the number of votes credited to the latter in returns for Sagada, 'and that 'of the 2,188 ballots cast in Sagada, nearly one-half (1,012) were cast by persons

definitely Identified as not registered therein or still more than 40 % of substitute voting which was the rule followed in the later case of Bashier/Basman (Diaz Case, November 19,1971,42 SCRA 426,432). 3. In not applying the rule and formula in the later case of Bashier and Basman vs. Commission on Election (February 24, 1972, 43 SCRA 238) which was the one followed by the Regional Board of Canvassers, to wit:

In Basman vs Comelec (L-33728, Feb. 24, 1972) the Supreme Court upheld the Supreme Court upheld the ruling of the Commission setting the standard of 40 % excess votes to justify the exclusion of election returns. In line with the above ruling, the Board of Canvassers may likewise set aside election returns with 40 % substitute votes. Likewise, where excess voting occured and the excess was such as to destroy the presumption of innocent mistake, the returns was excluded.

(COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex I hereof, p. 22), which this Honorable Court must have meant when its Resolution of May 23, 1978 (G.R. No. 7), it referred to "massive substitution of voters. 4. In examining, through the NBI/COMELEC experts, the records in more than 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers which was all that was within its appellate jurisdiction is examination of more election records to make a total of 1,085 voting centers (COMELEC'S Resolution, Annex 1 hereof, p. 100), being beyond its jurisdiction and a denial of due process as far as the KBL, particularly the petitioner Mandangan, were concerned because they were informed of it only on December, 1978,

long after the case has been submitted for decision in September, 1978; and the statement that the KBL acquiesced to the same is absolutely without foundation. 5. In excluding election returns from areas where the conditions of peace and order were allegedly unsettled or where there was a military operation going on immediately before and during election and where the voter turn out was high (90 % to 100 %), and where the people had been asked to evacuate, as a ruling without jurisdiction and in violation of due process because no evidence was at all submitted by the parties before the Regional Board of Canvasssers. (Pp. 23-25, Record, L-47917-21.)

Now before discussing the merits of the foregoing contentions, it is necessary to clarify first the nature and extent of the Supreme Court's power of review in the premises. The Aratuc petition is expressly predicated on the ground that respondent Comelec "committed grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction" in eight specifications. On the other hand, the Mandangan petition raises pure questions of law and jurisdiction. In other words, both petitions invoked the Court's certiorari jurisdiction, not its appellate authority of review. This is as it should be. While under the Constitution of 1935, "the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court" (Sec. 2, first paragraph, Article X) and pursuant to the Rules of Court, the petition for "certiorari or review" shall be on the ground that the Commission "has decided a question of substance not theretofore determined by the Supreme Court, or has decided it in a way not in accord with law or the applicable decisions of the Supreme Court" (Sec. 3. Rule 43), and such provisions refer not only to election contests but even to pre-proclamation proceedings, the 1973 Constitution provides somewhat differently thus: "Any decision, order or ruling of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within thirty days from his receipt of a copy thereof" (Section 11, Article XII c), even as it ordains that the Commission shall "be the sole judge of all contests relating to the elections, returns and qualifications of all members of the National Assembly and elective provincial and city official" (Section 2(2).)Correspondingly, the ElectionCode of 1978, which is the first legislative constructionof the pertinent constitutional provisions, makes the Commission also the "sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies" and further provides that "any of its decisions,

orders or rulings (in such contoversies) shall be final and executory", just as in election contests, "the decision of the Commission shall be final, and executory and inappealable." (Section 193)It is at once evident from these constitutional and statutory modifications that there is a definite tendency to enhance and invigorate the role of the Commission on Elections as the independent constitutinal body charged with the safeguarding of free, peaceful and honest elections. The framers of the new Constitution must be presumed ot have definite knowledge of what it means to make the decisions, orders and rulings of the Commission "subject to review by the Supreme Court". And since instead of maintaining that provision intact, it ordained that the Commission's actuations be instead "brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari", We cannot insist that there was no intent to change the nature of the remedy, considering that the limited scope of certiorari, compared to a review, is well known in remedial law.Withal, as already stated, the legislative construction of the modified peritinent constitutional provision is to the effect that the actuations of the Commission are final, executory and even inappealable. While such construction does not exclude the general certiorari jurisdiction of the Supreme Court which inheres in it as the final guardian of the Constitution, particularly, of its imperious due process mandate, it correspondingly narrows down the scope and extent of the inquiry the Court is supposed to undertake to what is strictly the office of certiorari as distinguished from review. We are of the considered opinion that the statutory modifications are consistent with the apparent new constitional intent. Indeed, it is obvious that to say that actuations of the Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari technically connotes something less than saying that the same "shall be subject to review by the Supreme Court", when it comes to the measure of the Court's reviewing authority or prerogative in the premises.A review includes digging into the merits and unearthing errors of judgment, while certiorari deals exclusively with grave abuse of discretion, which may not exist even when the decision is otherwise erroneous. certiorari implies an indifferent disregard of the law, arbitrariness and caprice, an omission to weight pertinent considerations, a decision arrived at without rational deliberation. While the effecdts of an error of judgment may not differ from that of an indiscretion, as a matter of policy, there are matters taht by their nature ought to be left for final determination to the sound discretion of certain officers or entities, reserving it to the

Supreme Court to insure the faithful observance of due process only in cases of patent arbitrariness.Such, to Our mind, is the constitutional scheme relative to the Commission on Elections. Conceived by the charter as the effective instrument to preserve the sanctity of popular suffrage, endowed with independence and all the needed concommittant powers, it is but proper that the Court should accord the greatest measure of presumption of regularity to its course of action and choice of means in performing its duties, to the end that it may achieve its designed place in the democratic fabric of our government. Ideally, its members should be free from all suspicions of partisan inclinations, but the fact that actually some of them have had stints in the arena of politics should not, unless the contrary is shown, serve as basis for denying to its actuations the respect and consideration that the Constitution contemplates should be accorded to it, in the same manner that the Supreme Court itself which from time to time may have members drawn from the political ranks or even from military is at all times deemed insulated from every degree or form of external pressure and influence as well as improper internal motivations that could arise from such background or orientation.We hold, therefore that under the existing constitution and statutory provisions, the certiorari jurisdiction of the Court over orders, and decisions of the Comelec is not as broad as it used to be and should be confined to instances of grave abuse of discretion amounting to patent and substantial denial of due process. Accordingly, it is in this light that We the opposing contentions of the parties in this cases. THE MANDANGAN CASE Being more simple in Our view, We shall deal with the petition in G.R. No. L-49717-21 first. The errors assigned in this petition boil down to two main propositions, namely, (1) that it was an error of law on the part of respondent Comelec to have applied to the extant circumstances hereof the ruling of this Court in Diaz vs. Comelec 42 SCRA 426 instead of that of Bashier vs. Comelec 43 SCRA 238; and (2) that respondent Comelec exceeded its jurisdiction and denied due process to petitioner Mandangan in extending its inquiry beyond the election records of "the 878 voting centers examined by the KB experts and passed upon by the Regional Board of Canvassers" and in excluding from the canvass the returns showing 90 to 100 % voting, from voting centers where military operations were by the Army to be going on, to the extent that said voting centers had to be transferred to the poblaciones the same being by evidence. Anent the first proposition, it must be made clear that the Diaz and Bashier rulings are not mutually exclusive of each other, each

being an outgrowth of the basic rationale of statistical improbability laid down in Lagumbay vs. Comelec and , 16 SCRA 175. Whether they be apply together or separately or which of them be applied depends on the situation on hand. In the factual milieu of the instant case as found by the Comelec, We see no cogent reason, and petitioner has not shown any, why returns in voting centers showing that the votes of the candidate obtaining highest number of votes of the candidate obtaining the highest number of votes exceeds the highest possible number of valid votes cast therein should not be deemed as spurious and manufactured just because the total number of excess votes in said voting centers were not more than 40 %. Surely, this is not the occasion, consider the historical antecedents relative to the highly questionable manner in which elections have been bad in the past in the provinces herein involved, of which the Court has judicial notice as attested by its numerous decisions in cases involving practically every such election, of the Court to move a whit back from the standards it has enunciated in those decisions. In regard to the jurisdictional and due process points raised by herein petitioner, it is of decisive importance to bear in mind that under Section 168 of the Revised Election Code of 1978, "the Commission (on Elections) shall have direct control and supervision on over the board of canvassers" and that relatedly, Section 175 of the same Code provides that it "shall be the sole judge of all pre-proclamation controversies." While nominally, the procedure of bringing to the Commission objections to the actuations of boards of canvassers has been quite loosely referred to in certain quarters, even by the Commission and by this Court, such as in the guidelines of May 23,1978 quoted earlier in this opinion, as an appeal, the fact of the matter is that the authority of the Commission in reviewing such actuations does not spring from any appellate jurisdiction conferred by any specific provision of law, for there is none such provision anywhere in the Election Code, but from the plenary prerogative of direct control and supervision endowed to it by the above-quoted provisions of Section 168. And in administrative law, it is a too well settled postulate to need any supporting citation here, that a superior body or office having supervision and control over another may do directly what the latter is supposed to do or ought to have done. Consequently, anything said in Lucman vs. Dimaporo, 33 SCRA 387, cited by petitioner, to the contrary notwithstanding, We cannot fault respondent Comelec for its having extended its inquiry beyond that undertaken by the Board of Canvass On the contrary, it must be stated that Comelec correctly and commendably asserted its statutory authority born of its envisaged constitutional duties vis-a-vis the preservation of the purity of

elections and electoral processes and p in doing what petitioner it should not have done. Incidentally, it cannot be said that Comelec went further than even what Aratuc et al. have asked, since said complaints had impugned from the outset not only the returns from the 878 voting centers examined by their experts but all those mentioned in their complaints in the election cases filed originally with the Comelec enumerated in the opening statements hereof, hence respondent Comelec had that much field to work on. The same principle should apply in respect to the ruling of the Commission regarding the voting centers affected by military operations. It took cognizance of the fact, not considered by the board of canvass, that said voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones. And, if only for purposes of pre-proclamation proceedings, We are persuaded it did not constitute a denial of due process for the Commission to have taken into account, without the need or presentation of evidence by the parties, a matter so publicly notorious as the unsettled situation of peace and order in localities in the provinces herein involved that their may perhaps be taken judicial notice of, the same being capable of unquestionable demonstration. (See 1, Rule 129) In this connection, We may as well perhaps, say here as later that regrettably We cannot, however, go along with the view, expressed in the dissent of our respected Chief Justice, that from the fact that some of the voting centers had been transferred to the poblaciones there is already sufficient basis for Us to rule that the Commission should have also subjected all the returns from the other voting centers of the some municipalities, if not provinces, to the same degree of scrutiny as in the former. The majority of the Court feels that had the Commission done so, it would have fallen into the error by petitioner Mandangan about denial of due process, for it is relatively unsafe to draw adverse conclusions as to the exact conditions of peace and order in those other voting centers without at list some prima facie evidence to rely on considering that there is no allegation, much less any showing at all that the voting centers in question are so close to those excluded by the Comelec on as to warrant the inescapable conclusion that the relevant circumstances by the Comelec as obtaining in the latter were Identical to those in the former. Premises considered the petition in G.R. Nos. L-49717-21 is hereby dismiss for lack of merit. THE ARATUC ET AL. PETITION Of the eight errors assigned by herein petitioners earlier adverted to, the seventh and the sight do not require any extended disquisition. As to the issue of whether the elections in the voting centers concerned were held on April 7, 1978, the date designated by law, or earlier, to which the seventh alleged error is addressed,

We note that apparently petitioners are not seriously pressing on it anymore, as evidenced by the complete absence of any reference thereto during the oral argument of their counsel and the practically cavalier discussion thereof in the petition. In any event, We are satisfied from a careful review of the analysis by the Comelec in its resolution now before Us that it took pains to consider as meticulously as the nature of the evidence presented by both parties would permit all the contentions of petitioners relative to the weight that should be given to such evidence. The detailed discussion of said evidence is contained in not less than nineteen pages (pp. 70-89) of the resolution. In these premises, We are not prepared to hold that Comelec acted wantonly and arbitrarily in drawing its conclusions adverse to petitioners' position. If errors there are in any of those conclusions, they are errors of judgment which are not reviewable in certiorari, so long as they are founded on substantial evidence. As to eighth assigned error. the thrust of respondents, comment is that the results in the voting centers mentioned in this assignment of error had already been canvassed at the regional canvass center in Cotabato City. Again, We cannot say that in sustaining the board of canvassers in this regard, Comelec gravely abused its discretion, if only because in the guidelines set by this Court, what appears to have been referred to is, rightly or wrongly, the resumption only of the canvass, which does not necessarily include the setting aside and repetition of the canvass already made in Cotabato City. The second and fourth assignments of error concern the voting centers the corresponding voters' record (C.E. Form 1) and record of voting, (C.E. Form 5) of which have never been brought to Manila because they, were not available The is not clear as to how many are these voting centers. According to petitioners they are 501, but in the Comelec resolution in question, the number mentioned is only 408, and this number is directly challenged in the petition. Under the second assignment, it is contended that the Comelec gravely abused its discretion in including in the canvass the election returns from these voting centers and, somewhat alternatively, it is alleged as fourth assignment that the petitioners motion for the opening of the ballot boxes pertaining to said voting centers was arbitraly denied by respondent Comelec.The resolution under scrutiny explains the situation that confronted the Commission in regard to the 408 voting centers reffered to as follows :

The Commission had the option of excluding from the canvass the election returns under category. By deciding to exclude, the Commission would be summarily

disenfranchising the voters registered in the voting centers affected without any basis. The Commission could also order the inclusion in the canvass of these elections returns under the injunction of the Supreme Court that extremes caution must be exercised in rejecting returns unless these are palpably irregular. The Commission chose to give prima facie validity to the election returns mentioned and uphold the votes cast by the voters in those areas. The Commission held the view that the failure of some election officials to comply with Commission orders(to submit the records) should not parties to such official disobedience. In the case of Lino Luna vs. Rodriguez, 39 Phil. 208, the Supreme Court ruled that when voters have honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified because the officers appointed under the law to direct the election and guard the purity of the ballot have not complied with their duty. (cited in Laurel on Elections, p. 24)

On page 14 of the comment of the Solicitor General, however, it is stated that:

At all events, the returns corresponding to these voting centers were examined by the Comelec and 141 of such returns were excluded, as follows:

SUMMARY

PROVINCE TOTAL EXCLUDED INCLUDED

Lanao del Norte 30 — 30

Lanao del Sur 342 137 205

Maguindanao 21 1 20

North Cotabato 7 1 6

Sultan Kudarat 12 2 10

totals ----- 412 141 271

(Page 301, Record.) This assertion has not been denied by petitioners.

Thus, it appears that precisely use of the absence or unavailability of the CE Forms 1 and 5 corresponding to the more than 400 voting centers concerned in our present discussion the Comelec examined the returns from said voting centers to determine their trustworthiness by scrutinizing the purported relevant data appearing on their faces, believing that such was the next best thing that could be done to avoid total disenfranchisement of the voters in all of them On the Other hand, Petitioners' insist that the right thing to do was to order the opening of the ballot boxes involved. In connection with such opposing contentions, Comelec's explanation in its resolution is:

... The commission had it seen fit to so order, could have directed the opening of the ballot boxes. But the Commission did not see the necessity of going to such length in a that was in nature and decided that there was sufficient bases for the revolution of the appeal. That the Commission has discretion to determine when the ballot boxes should be opened is implicit in the guidelines set by the Supreme Court which states that '. . . the ballot bones [which] shall be opened only upon orders of either the respondent Board or respondent Commission, after the need therefor has become evident ... ' (guideline No. 3; emphasissupplied). Furthermore, the Court on June 1, 1978, amended the guidelines that the "ballot boxes for the voting centers ... need not be taken to Manila EXCEPT those of the centers as to which the petitioners have the right to demand that the corresponding ballot boxes be opened ... provided that the voting centers concerned shall be specified and made known by petitioners to the Regional Board of Canvassers not later than June 3,1978 ... ' (Emphasis supplied). The KB, candidates did not take advantage of the option granted them under these guidelines.( Pp 106-107, Record.)

Considering that Comelec, if it had wished to do so, had the facilities to Identify on its own the voting centers without CE Forms I and 5, thereby precluding the need for the petitioners having to specify them, and under the circumstances the need for opening the ballot boxes in question should have appeared to it to

be quite apparent, it may be contended that Comelec would have done greater service to the public interest had it proceeded to order such opening, as it had announced it had thoughts of doing in its resolution of August 30, 1978. On the other hand, We cannot really blame the Commission too much, since the exacting tenor of the guidelines issued by Us left it with very little elbow room, so to speak, to use its own discretion independently of what We had ordered. What could have saved matters altogether would have been a timely move on the part of petitioners on or before June 3, 1978, as contemplated in Our resolution. After all come to think of it, that the possible outcome of the opening of the ballot boxes would favor the petitioners was not a certainty — the contents them could conceivably boomerang against them, such as, for example, if the ballots therein had been found to be regular and preponderantly for their opponents. Having in mind that significantly, petitioners filed their motion for only on January 9, 1979, practically on the eve of the promulgation of the resolution, We hold that by having adhered to Our guidelines of June 1, 1978, Comelec certainly cannot be held to be guilty of having gravely abused its discretion, in examining and passing on the returns from the voting centers reffered to in the second and fourth assignments of error in the canvass or in denying petitioners' motion for the of the ballot boxes concerned. The first, third and sixth assignment of involve related matters and maybe discussed together. They all deal with the inclusion in or exclusion from the canvass of returns on the basis of the percentage of voting in specified voting centers and the corresponding findings of the Comelec on the extent of substitute voting therein as indicated by the result of either the technical examination by experts of the signatures and thumb-prints of the voters threat.To begin with, petitioners' complaint that the Comelec did not examine and study 1,694 of the records in an the 2,775 voting centers questioned by them is hardly accurate. To be more exact, the Commission excluded a total of 1,267 returns coming under four categories namely: 1,001 under the Diaz, supra, ruling, 79 because of 90-100 % turnout of voters despite military operations, 105 palpably manufactured owe and 82 returns excluded by the board of canvass on other grounds. Thus, 45.45 % of the of the petitioners were sustained by the Comelec. In contrast, in the board of canvassers, only 453 returns were excluded. The board was reversed as to 6 of these, and 821 returns were excluded by Comelec over and above those excluded by the board. In other words, the Comelec almost doubled the exclusions by the board. Petitioners would give the impression by their third assignment of error that Comelec refused to consider high percentage of voting,

coupled with mass substitute voting, as proof that the pertinent returns had been manufactured. That such was not the case is already shown in the above specifications. To add more, it can be gleaned from the resolution that in t to the 1,065 voting centers in Lanao del Sur and Marawi City where a high percentage of voting appeared, the returns from the 867 voting centers were excluded by the Comelec and only 198 were included a ratio of roughly 78 % to 22 %. [TABLE OMITED]We are convinced, apart from presuming regularity in the performance of its duties, that there is enough showing in the record that it did examine and study the returns and pertinent records corresponding to all the 2775 voting centers subject of petitioners' complaints below. In one part of its resolution the Comelec states:

The Commission as earlier stated examined on its own the Books of Voters (Comelec Form No. 1) and the Voters Rewards Comelec Form No. 5) to determine for itself which of these elections form needed further examination by the COMELEC-NBI experts. The Commission, aware of the nature of this pre-proclamation controversy, believes that it can decide, using common sense and perception, whether the election forms in controversy needed further examination by the experts based on the presence or absence of patent signs of irregularity. (Pp. 137-138, Record.)

In the face of this categorical assertion of fact of the Commission, the bare charge of petitioners that the records pertaining to the 1,694 voting centers assailed by them should not create any ripple of serious doubt. As We view this point under discussion, what is more factually accurate is that those records complained of were not examined with the aid of experts and that Comelec passed upon the returns concerned "using common sense and perception only." And there is nothing basically objectionable in this. The defunct Presidential Senate and House Electoral Tribunals examine passed upon and voided millions of votes in several national elections without the assistance of experts and "using" only common sense and perception". No one ever raised any eyebrows about such procedure. Withal, what we discern from the resolution is that Comelec preliminary screened the records and whatever it could not properly pass upon by "using common sense and perception" it left to the experts to work on. We might disagree with he Comelec as to which voting center should be

excluded or included, were We to go over the same records Ourselves, but still a case of grave abuse of discretion would not come out, considering that Comelec cannot be said to have acted whimsically or capriciously or without any rational basis, particularly if it is considered that in many respects and from the very nature of our respective functions, becoming candor would dictate to Us to concede that the Commission is in a better position to appreciate and assess the vital circumstances closely and accurately. By and large, therefore, the first, third and sixth assignments of error of the petitioners are not well taken. The fifth assignment of error is in Our view moot and academic. The Identification of the ballot boxes in defective condition, in some instances open and allegedly empty, is at best of secondary import because, as already discussed, the records related thereto were after all examined, studied and passed upon. If at all, deeper inquiry into this point would be of real value in an electoral protest. CONCLUSION Before closing, it may not be amiss to state here that the Court had initially agreed to dispose of the cases in a minute resolution, without prejudice to an extended or reasoned out opinion later, so that the Court's decision may be known earlier. Considering, however, that no less than the Honorable Chief Justice has expressed misgivings as to the propriety of yielding to the conclusions of respondent Commission because in his view there are strong considerations warranting farther meticulous inquiry of what he deems to be earmarks of seemingly traditional faults in the manner elections are held in the municipalities and provinces herein involved, and he is joined in this pose by two other distinguished colleagues of Ours, the majority opted to ask for more time to put down at least some of the important considerations that impelled Us to see the matters in dispute the other way, just as the minority bidded for the opportunity to record their points of view. In this manner, all concerned will perhaps have ample basis to place their respective reactions in proper perspective. In this connection, the majority feels it is but meet to advert to the following portion of the ratiocination of respondent Board of Canvassers adopted by respondent Commission with approval in its resolution under question:

First of all this Board was guided by the legal doctrine that canvassing boards must exercise "extreme caution" in rejecting returns and they may do so only when the returns are palpably irregular. A conclusion that an election return is obviously

manufactured or false and consequently should be disregarded in the canvass must be approached with extreme caution, and only upon the most convincing proof. Any plausible explanation one which is acceptable to a reasonable man in the light of experience and of the probabilities of the situation, should suffice to avoid outright nullification, with the resulting t of those who exercised their right of suffrage. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et at L-35918, Jude 28,1974; Villavon v. Comelec L-32008, August 31,1970; Tagoranao v. Comelec 22 SCRA 978). In the absence of strong evidence establishing the spuriousness of the return, the basis rule of their being accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the count of the votes for canvassing and proclamation purposes must be applied, without prejudice to the question being tried on the merits with the presentation of evidence, testimonial and real in the corresponding electoral protest. (Bashier vs. Comelec L-33692, 33699, 33728, 43 SCRA 238, February 24, 1972). The decisive factor is that where it has been duly de ed after investigation and examination of the voting and registration records hat actual voting and election by the registered voters had taken place in the questioned voting centers, the election returns cannot be disregarded and excluded with the resting disenfranchisement of the voters, but must be accorded prima facie status as bona fide reports of the results of the voting for canvassing and registration purposes. Where the grievances relied upon is the commission of irregularities and violation of the Election Law the proper remedy is election protest. (Anni vs. Isquierdo et al. Supra). (P. 69, Record, L-49705-09).

The writer of this opinion has taken care to personally check on the citations to be doubly sure they were not taken out of context, considering that most, if not all of them arose from similar situations in the very venues of the actual milieu of the instant cases, and We are satisfied they do fit our chosen posture. More importantly, they actually came from the pens of different

members of the Court, already retired or still with Us, distinguished by their perspicacity and their perceptive prowess. In the context of the constitutional and legislative intent expounded at the outset of this opinion and evident in the modifications of the duties and responsibilities of the Commission on Elections vis-a-vis the matters that have concerned Us herein, particularly the elevation of the Commission as the "sole judge of pre-proclamation controversies" as well as of all electoral contests, We find the afore-quoted doctrines compelling as they reveal through the clouds of existing jurisprudence the pole star by which the future should be guided in delineating and circumscribing separate spheres of action of the Commission as it functions in its equally important dual role just indicated bearing as they do on the purity and sanctity of elections in this country. In conclusion, the Court finds insufficient merit in the petition to warrant its being given due course. Petition dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs. Justices Fernando, Antonio and Guerrero who are presently on official missions abroad voted for such dismissal. Fernando, Antonio, Concepcion Jr., Santos Fernandez, and Guerrero, JJ., concur. Teehankee, J. took no part. Aquino and Abad Santos, Jr., took no part.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaEN BANC

G.R. Nos. 95203-05 December 18, 1990SENATOR ERNESTO MACEDA, Petitioner, vs. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB); MARCELO N. FERNANDO, ALEJANDRO B. AFURONG; REX V. TANTIONGCO; and OSCAR E. ALA, in their collective official capacities as Chairman and Members of the Board (ERB), respectively; CATALINO MACARAIG, in his quadruple official capacities as Executive Secretary, Chairman of Philippine National Oil Company; Office of the Energy Affairs, and with MANUEL ESTRELLA, in their respective official capacities as Chairman and President of the Petron Corporation; PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION; with CESAR BUENAVENTURA and REY GAMBOA as chairman and President, respectively; CALTEX PHILIPPINES with FRANCIS ABLAN, President and Chief Executive Officer; and the Presidents of Philippine Petroleum Dealer's Association, Caltex Dealer's Co., Petron Dealer's Asso., Shell Dealer's Asso. of the Phil., Liquefied Petroleum Gas Institute of the Phils., any and all concerned gasoline and petrol dealers or stations; and such other persons, officials, and parties, acting for and on their behalf; or in representation of and/or under their authority, Respondents.G.R. Nos. 95119-21 December 18, 1990OLIVER O. LOZANO, Petitioner, vs. ENERGY REGULATORY BOARD (ERB), PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, CALTEX (PHIL.), INC., and PETRON CORPORATION, Respondents.

D E C I S I O N

SARMIENTO, J.:The petitioners pray for injunctive relief, to stop the Energy Regulatory Board (Board hereinafter) from implementing its Order, dated September 21, 1990, mandating a provisional increase in the prices of petroleum and petroleum products, as follows:PRODUCTS IN PESOS PER LITEROPSFPremium Gasoline 1.7700Regular Gasoline 1.7700Avturbo 1.8664Kerosene 1.2400Diesel Oil 1.2400Fuel Oil 1.4900Feedstock 1.4900LPG 0.8487Asphalts 2.7160Thinners 1.7121 1 It appears that on September 10, 1990, Caltex (Philippines), Inc., Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, and Petron Corporation proferred separate applications with the Board for permission to increase the wholesale posted prices of petroleum products, as follows:Caltex P3.2697 per literShell 2.0338 per literPetron 2.00 per liter 2 and meanwhile, for provisional authority to increase temporarily such wholesale posted prices pending further proceedings.:-cralawOn September 21, 1990, the Board, in a joint (on three applications) Order granted provisional relief as follows:WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, and pursuant to Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, this Board hereby grants herein applicants' prayer for provisional relief and, accordingly, authorizes said applicants a weighted average provisional increase of ONE PESO AND FORTY-TWO CENTAVOS (P1.42) per liter in the wholesale posted prices of their various petroleum products enumerated below, refined and/or marketed by them locally. 3 The petitioners submit that the above Order had been issued with grave abuse of discretion, tantamount to lack of jurisdiction, and correctible by Certiorari.The petitioner, Senator Ernesto Maceda, 4 also submits that the same was issued without proper notice and hearing in violation of Section 3, paragraph (e), of Executive Order No. 172; that the Board, in decreeing an increase, had created a new source for the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF), or otherwise that it had levied a tax, a power vested in the legislature, and/or that it had "re-

collected", by an act of taxation, ad valorem taxes on oil which Republic Act No. 6965 had abolished.The petitioner, Atty. Oliver Lozano, 5 likewise argues that the Board's Order was issued without notice and hearing, and hence, without due process of law.The intervenor, the Trade Union of the Philippines and Allied Services (TUPAS/FSM)-W.F.T.U., 6 argues on the other hand, that the increase cannot be allowed since the respondents oil companies had not exhausted their existing oil stock which they had bought at old prices and that they cannot be allowed to charge new rates for stock purchased at such lower rates.The Court set the cases (in G.R. Nos. 95203-05) for hearing on October 25, 1990, in which Senator Maceda and his counsel, Atty. Alexander Padilla, argued. The Solicitor General, on behalf of the Board, also presented his arguments, together with Board Commissioner Rex Tantiangco. Attys. Federico Alikpala, Jr. and Joselia Poblador represented the oil firms (Petron and Caltex, respectively).The parties were thereafter required to submit their memorandums after which, the Court considered the cases submitted for resolution.On November 20, 1990, the Court ordered these cases consolidated.On November 27, 1990, we gave due course to both petitions.The Court finds no merit in these petitions.Senator Maceda and Atty. Lozano, in questioning the lack of a hearing, have overlooked the provisions of Section 8 of Executive Order No. 172, which we quote:"SECTION 8. Authority to Grant Provisional Relief . — The Board may, upon the filing of an application, petition or complaint or at any stage thereafter and without prior hearing, on the basis of supporting papers duly verified or authenticated, grant provisional relief on motion of a party in the case or on its own initiative, without prejudice to a final decision after hearing, should the Board find that the pleadings, together with such affidavits, documents and other evidence which may be submitted in support of the motion, substantially support the provisional order: Provided, That the Board shall immediately schedule and conduct a hearing thereon within thirty (30) days thereafter, upon publication and notice to all affected parties.: nadAs the Order itself indicates, the authority for provisional increase falls within the above provision.There is no merit in the Senator's contention that the "applicable" provision is Section 3, paragraph (e) of the Executive Order, which we quote:

(e) Whenever the Board has determined that there is a shortage of any petroleum product, or when public interest so requires, it may take such steps as it may consider necessary, including the temporary adjustment of the levels of prices of petroleum products and the payment to the Oil Price Stabilization Fund created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 by persons or entities engaged in the petroleum industry of such amounts as may be determined by the Board, which will enable the importer to recover its cost of importation.What must be stressed is that while under Executive Order No. 172, a hearing is indispensable, it does not preclude the Board from ordering, ex parte, a provisional increase, as it did here, subject to its final disposition of whether or not: (1) to make it permanent; (2) to reduce or increase it further; or (3) to deny the application. Section 37 paragraph (e) is akin to a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary attachment issued by the courts, which are given ex parte, and which are subject to the resolution of the main case.Section 3, paragraph (e) and Section 8 do not negate each other, or otherwise, operate exclusively of the other, in that the Board may resort to one but not to both at the same time. Section 3(e) outlines the jurisdiction of the Board and the grounds for which it may decree a price adjustment, subject to the requirements of notice and hearing. Pending that, however, it may order, under Section 8, an authority to increase provisionally, without need of a hearing, subject to the final outcome of the proceeding. The Board, of course, is not prevented from conducting a hearing on the grant of provisional authority — which is of course, the better procedure — however, it cannot be stigmatized later if it failed to conduct one. As we held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board. 7 In the light of Section 8 quoted above, public respondent Board need not even have conducted formal hearings in these cases prior to issuance of its Order of 14 August 1987 granting a provisional increase of prices. The Board, upon its own discretion and on the basis of documents and evidence submitted by private respondents, could have issued an order granting provisional relief immediately upon filing by private respondents of their respective applications. In this respect, the Court considers the evidence presented by private respondents in support of their applications — i.e., evidence showing that importation costs of petroleum products had gone up; that the peso had depreciated in value; and that the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) had by then been depleted — as substantial and hence constitutive of at least prima facie basis for issuance by the Board of a provisional relief order granting an increase in the prices of petroleum products. 8

We do not therefore find the challenged action of the Board to have been done in violation of the due process clause. The petitioners may contest however, the applications at the hearings proper.Senator Maceda's attack on the Order in question on premises that it constitutes an act of taxation or that it negates the effects of Republic Act No. 6965, cannot prosper. Republic Act No. 6965 operated to lower taxes on petroleum and petroleum products by imposing specific taxes rather than ad valorem taxes thereon; it is, not, however, an insurance against an "oil hike", whenever warranted, or is it a price control mechanism on petroleum and petroleum products. The statute had possibly forestalled a larger hike, but it operated no more.: nadThe Board Order authorizing the proceeds generated by the increase to be deposited to the OPSF is not an act of taxation. It is authorized by Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137, as follows:SECTION 8. There is hereby created a Trust Account in the books of accounts of the Ministry of Energy to be designated as Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or changes in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products. The Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) may be sourced from any of the following:a) Any increase in the tax collection from ad valorem tax or customs duty imposed on petroleum products subject to tax under this Decree arising from exchange rate adjustment, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;b) Any increase in the tax collection as a result of the lifting of tax exemptions of government corporations, as may be determined by the Minister of Finance in consultation with the Board of Energy;c) Any additional amount to be imposed on petroleum products to augment the resources of the Fund through an appropriate Order that may be issued by the Board of Energy requiring payment by persons or companies engaged in the business of importing, manufacturing and/or marketing petroleum products;d) Any resulting peso cost differentials in case the actual peso costs paid by oil companies in the importation of crude oil and petroleum products is less than the peso costs computed using the reference foreign exchange rates as fixed by the Board of Energy.Anent claims that oil companies cannot charge new prices for oil purchased at old rates, suffice it to say that the increase in question was not prompted alone by the increase in world oil prices arising from tension in the Persian Gulf. What the Court gathers from the pleadings as well as events of which it takes

judicial notice, is that: (1) as of June 30, 1990, the OPSF has incurred a deficit of P6.1 Billion; (2) the exchange rate has fallen to P28.00 to $1.00; (3) the country's balance of payments is expected to reach $1 Billion; (4) our trade deficit is at $2.855 Billion as of the first nine months of the year.Evidently, authorities have been unable to collect enough taxes necessary to replenish the OPSF as provided by Presidential Decree No. 1956, and hence, there was no available alternative but to hike existing prices.The OPSF, as the Court held in the aforecited CACP cases, must not be understood to be a funding designed to guarantee oil firms' profits although as a subsidy, or a trust account, the Court has no doubt that oil firms make money from it. As we held there, however, the OPSF was established precisely to protect the consuming public from the erratic movement of oil prices and to preclude oil companies from taking advantage of fluctuations occurring every so often. As a buffer mechanism, it stabilizes domestic prices by bringing about a uniform rate rather than leaving pricing to the caprices of the market.In all likelihood, therefore, an oil hike would have probably been imminent, with or without trouble in the Gulf, although trouble would have probably aggravated it.: nadThe Court is not to be understood as having prejudged the justness of an oil price increase amid the above premises. What the Court is saying is that it thinks that based thereon, the Government has made out a prima facie case to justify the provisional increase in question. Let the Court therefore make clear that these findings are not final; the burden, however, is on the petitioners' shoulders to demonstrate the fact that the present economic picture does not warrant a permanent increase.There is no doubt that the increase in oil prices in question (not to mention another one impending, which the Court understands has been under consideration by policy-makers) spells hard(er) times for the Filipino people. The Court can not, however, debate the wisdom of policy or the logic behind it (unless it is otherwise arbitrary), not because the Court agrees with policy, but because the Court is not the suitable forum for debate. It is a question best judged by the political leadership which after all, determines policy, and ultimately, by the electorate, that stands to be better for it or worse off, either in the short or long run.At this point, the Court shares the indignation of the people over the conspiracy of events and regrets its own powerlessness, if by this Decision it has been powerless. The constitutional scheme of things has simply left it with no choice.In fine, we find no grave abuse of discretion committed by the respondent Board in issuing its questioned Order.

WHEREFORE, these petitions are DISMISSED. No costs.SO ORDERED.Narvasa, Gutierrez, Jr ., Cruz, Gancayco, Bidin, Griño Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.Fernan, C.J., Melencio-Herrera and Padilla, JJ., no part. Feliciano, J., is on leave.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaTHIRD DIVISION

G.R. No. 173918 April 8, 2008REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE), petitioner, vs.PILIPINAS SHELL PETROLEUM CORPORATION, respondent.

D E C I S I O NCHICO-NAZARIO, J.:This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the

Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183.1 The appellate court reversed the Decision2 dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President in OP NO. Case 96-H-6574 and declared that Ministry of Finance (MOF) Circular No. 1-85 dated 15 April 1985, as amended, is ineffective for failure to comply with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987,3 which requires the publication and filing in the Office of the National Administration Register (ONAR) of administrative issuances. Thus, surcharges provided under the aforementioned circular cannot be imposed upon respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation.Respondent is a corporation duly organized existing under the laws of the Philippines. It is engaged in the business of refining oil, marketing petroleum, and other related activities.4

The Department of Energy (DOE) is a government agency under the direct control and supervision of the Office of the President. The Department is mandated by Republic Act No. 7638 to prepare, integrate, coordinate, supervise and control all plans, programs, projects and activities of the Government relative to energy exploration, development, utilization, distribution and conservation.On 10 October 1984, the Oil Price Stabilization Fund (OPSF) was created under Presidential Decree No. 1956 for the purpose of minimizing frequent price changes brought about by exchange rate adjustments and/or increase in world market prices of crude oil and imported petroleum products.5

Letter of Instruction No. 1431 dated 15 October 1984 was issued directing the utilization of the OPSF to reimburse oil companies the additional costs of importation of crude oil and petroleum products due to fluctuation in foreign exchange rates to assure adequate and continuous supply of petroleum products at reasonable prices.6

Letter of Instruction No. 1441, issued on 20 November 1984, mandated the Board of Energy (now, the Energy Regulatory Board) to review and reset prices of domestic oil products every two months to reflect the prevailing prices of crude oil and petroleum. The prices were regulated by adjusting the OPSF impost, increasing or decreasing this price component as necessary to maintain the balance between revenues and claims on the OPSF.7

On 27 February 1987, Executive Order No. 137 was enacted to amend P. D. No. 1956. It expanded the sources and utilization of the OPSF in order to maintain stability in the domestic prices of oil products at reasonable levels.8

On 4 December 1991, the Office of Energy Affairs (OEA), now the DOE, informed the respondent that respondent’s contributions to the OPSF for foreign exchange risk charge for the period

December 1989 to March 1991 were insufficient. OEA Audit Task Force noted a total underpayment of P14,414,860.75 by respondent to the OPSF. As a consequence of the underpayment, a surcharge of P11,654,782.31 was imposed upon respondent. The said surcharge was imposed pursuant to MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended by Department of Finance (DOF) Circular No. 2-94,9 which provides that:

2. Remittance of payment to the OPSF as provided for under Section 5 of MOF Order No. 11-85 shall be made not later than 20th of the month following the month of remittance of the foreign exchange payment for the import or the month of payment to the domestic producers in the case of locally produced crude. Payment after the specified date shall be subject to a surcharge of fifteen percent (15%) of the amount, if paid within thirty (30) days from the due date plus two percent (2%) per month if paid after thirty days.10 (Emphasis supplied.)

On 9 December 1991, the OEA wrote another letter11 to respondent advising the latter of its additional underpayment to the OPSF of the foreign exchange risk fee in the amount of P10,139,526.56 for the period April 1991 to October 1991. In addition, surcharges in the amount of P2,806,656.65 were imposed thereon.In a letter dated 20 January 1992 addressed to the OEA, respondent justified that its calculations for the transactions in question were based on a valid interpretation of MOF Order NO. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985 and MOE Circular No. 85-05-82 dated 16 May 1985.12

On 24 March 1992, respondent paid the OEA in full the principal amount of its underpayment, totaling P24,554,387.31, but not the surcharges.13

In a letter14 dated 15 March 1996, OEA notified the respondent that the latter is required to pay the OPSF a total amount of P18,535,531.40 for surcharges on the late payment of foreign exchange risk charges for the period December 1989 to October 1991.In a letter15 dated 11 July 1996, the DOE reiterated its demand for respondent to settle the surcharges due. Otherwise, the DOE warned that it would proceed against the respondent’s Irrevocable Standby Letter of Credit to recover its unpaid surcharges.On 19 July 1996, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal before the Office of the President. The Office of the President affirmed the conclusion of the DOE, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996. While it admitted that the implementation of MOF Circular No. 1-85 is contingent upon its publication and filing with the ONAR, it noted that respondent failed to adduce

evidence of lack of compliance with such requirements. The aforementioned Decision reads:16

Given the foregoing, the DOE’s implementation of MOF Circular 1-85 by imposing surcharges on Pilipinas Shell is only proper. Like this Office, the DOE is bound to presume the validity of that administrative regulation.WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Department of Energy, contained in its letters dated 15 March 1996 and 11 July 1996, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

Respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision dated 19 August 2003 of the Office of the President, which was denied on 28 November 2003.17

Respondent filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals wherein it presented Certifications dated 9 February 200418 and 11 February 200419 issued by ONAR stating that DOF Circular No. 2-94 and MOF Circular No. 1-85 respectively, have not been filed before said office.The Court of Appeals reversed the Decision of the Office of the President in O.P. CASE No. 96-H-6574 and ruled that MOF Circular 1-85, as amended, was ineffective for failure to comply with the requirement to file with ONAR. It decreed that even if the said circular was issued by then Acting Minister of Finance Alfredo de Roda, Jr. long before the Administrative Code of 1987, Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book 7 thereof specifies that rules already in force on the date of the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987 must be filed within three months from the date of effectivity of said Code, otherwise such rules cannot thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.20 According to the dispositive of the appellate court’s Decision:21

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Decision dated August 19, 2003 and the Resolution dated November 28, 2003 of the Office of the President, are hereby REVERSED.ACCORDINGLY, the imposition of surcharges upon petitioner is hereby declared without legal basis.

On 25 September 2006, petitioner filed the present Petition for Review on Certiorari, wherein the following issues were raised:22

ITHE SURCHARGE IMPOSED BY MINISTRY OF FINANCE (MOF) CIRCULAR No. 1-85 HAS BEEN AFFIRMED BY E.O. NO. 137 HAVING RECEIVED VITALITY FROM A LEGISLATIVE ENACTMENT, MOF CIRCULAR NO. 1-85 CANNOT BE RENDERED INVALID BY THE SUBSEQUENT ENACTMENT OF A LAW REQUIRING REGISTRATION OF

THE MOF CIRCULAR WITH THE OFFICE OF THE NATIONAL REGISTER

IIASSUMING THAT THE REGISTRATION OF MOF NO. 1-85 IS REQUIRED, RESPONDENT WAIVED ITS OBJECTION ON THE BASIS OF NON-REGISTRATION WHEN IT PAID THE AMOUNT REQUIRED BY PETITIONER.

This petition is without merit.As early as 1986, this Court in Tañada v. Tuvera23 enunciated that publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect, to wit:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation. (Emphasis provided.)

Thereafter, the Administrative Code of 1987 was enacted, with Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII thereof specifically providing that:

Filing. — (1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months from the date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons.(2) The records officer of the agency, or his equivalent functionary, shall carry out the requirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action.(3) A permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection. (Emphasis provided.)

Under the doctrine of Tanada v. Tuvera,24 the MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, is one of those issuances which should be published before it becomes effective since it is intended to enforce Presidential Decree No. 1956. The said circular should also comply with the requirement stated under Section 3 of Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 – filing

with the ONAR in the University of the Philippines Law Center – for rules that are already in force at the time the Administrative Code of 1987 became effective. These requirements of publication and filing were put in place as safeguards against abuses on the part of lawmakers and as guarantees to the constitutional right to due process and to information on matters of public concern and, therefore, require strict compliance.In the present case, the Certifications dated 11 February 200425 and 9 February 200426 issued by ONAR prove that MOF Circular No. 1-85 and its amendatory rule, DOF Circular No. 2-94, have not been filed before said office. Moreover, petitioner was unable to controvert respondent’s allegation that neither of the aforementioned circulars were published in the Official Gazette or in any newspaper of general circulation. Thus, failure to comply with the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances renders MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, ineffective.In National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board,27 this Court emphasized that both the requirements of publication and filing of administrative issuances intended to enforce existing laws are mandatory for the effectivity of said issuances. In support of its ruling, it specified several instances wherein this Court declared administrative issuances, which failed to observe the proper requirements, to have no force and effect:

Nowhere from the above narration does it show that the GRAM Implementing Rules was published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Significantly, the effectivity clauses of both the GRAM and ICERA Implementing Rules uniformly provide that they "shall take effect immediately." These clauses made no mention of their publication in either the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Moreover, per the Certification dated January 11, 2006 of the Office of the National Administrative Register (ONAR), the said implementing rules and regulations were not likewise filed with the said office in contravention of the Administrative Code of 1987.Applying the doctrine enunciated in Tañada v. Tuvera, the Court has previously declared as having no force and effect the following administrative issuances: (1) Rules and Regulations issued by the Joint Ministry of Health-Ministry of Labor and Employment Accreditation Committee regarding the accreditation of hospitals, medical clinics and laboratories; (2) Letter of Instruction No. 1416 ordering the suspension of payments due and payable by distressed copper mining companies to the national government; (3)

Memorandum Circulars issued by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration regulating the recruitment of domestic helpers to Hong Kong; (4) Administrative Order No. SOCPEC 89-08-01 issued by the Philippine International Trading Corporation regulating applications for importation from the People’s Republic of China; (5) Corporation Compensation Circular No. 10 issued by the Department of Budget and Management discontinuing the payment of other allowances and fringe benefits to government officials and employees; and (6) POEA Memorandum Circular No. 2 Series of 1983 which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders. In all these cited cases, the administrative issuances questioned therein were uniformly struck down as they were not published or filed with the National Administrative Register. On the other hand, in Republic v. Express Telecommunications Co., Inc, the Court declared that the 1993 Revised Rules of the National Telecommunications Commission had not become effective despite the fact that it was filed with the National Administrative Register because the same had not been published at the time. The Court emphasized therein that "publication in the Official Gazette or a newspaper of general circulation is a condition sine qua non before statutes, rules or regulations can take effect."

Petitioner’s argument that respondent waived the requisite registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, when it paid in full the principal amount of underpayment totaling P24,544,387.31, is specious. MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended imposes surcharges, while respondents’ underpayment is based on MOF Circular No. 11-85 dated 12 April 1985.Petitioner also insists that the registration of MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, with the ONAR is no longer necessary since the respondent knew of its existence, despite its non-registration. This argument is seriously flawed and contrary to jurisprudence. Strict compliance with the requirements of publication cannot be annulled by a mere allegation that parties were notified of the existence of the implementing rules concerned. Hence, also in National Association of Electricity Consumers for Reforms v. Energy Regulatory Board, this Court pronounced:

In this case, the GRAM Implementing Rules must be declared ineffective as the same was never published or filed with the National Administrative Register. To show that there was compliance with the publication requirement, respondents MERALCO and the ERC dwell

lengthily on the fact that parties, particularly the distribution utilities and consumer groups, were duly notified of the public consultation on the ERC’s proposed implementing rules. These parties participated in the said public consultation and even submitted their comments thereon.However, the fact that the parties participated in the public consultation and submitted their respective comments is not compliance with the fundamental rule that the GRAM Implementing Rules, or any administrative rules whose purpose is to enforce or implement existing law, must be published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. The requirement of publication of implementing rules of statutes is mandatory and may not be dispensed with altogether even if, as in this case, there was public consultation and submission by the parties of their comments.28 (Emphasis provided.)

Petitioner further avers that MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, gains its vitality from the subsequent enactment of Executive Order No. 137, which reiterates the power of then Minister of Finance to promulgate the necessary rules and regulations to implement the executive order. Such contention is irrelevant in the present case since the power of the Minister of Finance to promulgate rules and regulations is not under dispute. The issue rather in the Petition at bar is the ineffectivity of his administrative issuance for non-compliance with the requisite publication and filing with the ONAR. And while MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended, may be unimpeachable in substance, the due process requirements of publication and filing cannot be disregarded. Moreover, none of the provisions of Executive Order No. 137 exempts MOF Circular No. 1-85, as amended from the aforementioned requirements. IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the instant Petition is DENIED and the assailed Decision dated 4 August 2006 of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No. 82183 is AFFIRMED. No cost. SO ORDERED.Austria-Martinez, Acting Chairperson, Carpio-Morales*, Tinga*, Reyes, JJ., concur.

Republic of the PhilippinesSUPREME COURT

ManilaSECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 156287 February 16, 2010FELICITAS M. MACHADO and MARCELINO P. MACHADO, Petitioners, vs.RICARDO L. GATDULA, COMMISSION ON THE SETTLEMENT OF LAND PROBLEMS, and IRINEO S. PAZ, Sheriff IV, Office of the Provincial Sheriff, San Pedro, Laguna, Respondents.

D E C I S I O NBRION, J.:Before this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioners Felicitas M. Machado and Marcelino P. Machado (the Machados), assailing the decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated January 31, 2002 and the resolution3 dated December 5, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65871. The CA decision dismissed the Machados’ petition for certiorari and their motion for reconsideration, and upheld the jurisdiction of the Commission on

Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP) to render judgment over a private land and to issue the corresponding writs of execution and demolition.

THE FACTUAL ANTECEDENTSThe dispute involves two adjoining parcels of land located in Barangay San Vicente, San Pedro, Laguna, one belonging to the Machados, and the other belonging to respondent Ricardo L. Gatdula (Gatdula). On February 2, 1999, Gatdula wrote a letter4 to the COSLAP requesting assistance because the Machados allegedly blocked the right of way to his private property by constructing a two-door apartment on their property. Acting on Gatdula’s letter, the COSLAP conducted a mediation conference on February 25, 1999; the parties then agreed to have a verification survey conducted on their properties and to share the attendant expenses. Thereafter, the COSLAP issued an Order dated March 16, 1999 directing the Chief of the Survey Division of the Community Environment and Natural Resources Office – Department of Environment and Natural Resources (CENRO-DENR), to conduct a verification survey on May 9, 1999. The order likewise stated that in the event that no surveyor is available, the parties may use the services of a private surveyor, whom the CENRO-DENR Survey Division would deputize.As scheduled, a private surveyor, Junior Geodetic Engineer Abet F. Arellano (Engr. Arellano), conducted a verification survey of the properties in the presence of both parties. Engr. Arellano submitted a report to the COSLAP finding that the structure built by the Machados encroached upon an alley found within the Gatdula property. Engr. Arellano’s findings corroborated the separate report of Engineer Noel V. Soqueco of the CENRO, Los Baños, Laguna that had also been submitted to the COSLAP.The Machados contested these reports in their position paper dated August 26, 1999. They alleged that Gatdula had no right of action since they did not violate Gatdula’s rights.5 They further assailed the jurisdiction of the COSLAP, stating that the proper forum for the present case was the Regional Trial Court of San Pedro, Laguna.The COSLAP RulingOn October 25, 1999, the COSLAP issued a resolution6 (October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution) directing the Machados to reopen the right of way in favor of Gatdula. In so ruling, the COSLAP relied on the verification survey made by Engr. Arellano, which established that the Machados had encroached on the existing alley in Gatdula’s property.The COSLAP declared the Machados estopped from questioning its jurisdiction to decide the case, since they actively participated

in the mediation conferences and the verification surveys without raising any jurisdictional objection. It ruled that its jurisdiction does not depend on the convenience of the Machados. The Machados filed a motion for reconsideration which the COSLAP denied in a resolution dated January 24, 2000.On February 18, 2000, the Machados filed a notice of appeal7 with the Office of the President (OP). While this appeal was pending, the COSLAP, upon Gatdula’s motion, issued a writ of execution8 enforcing the terms of the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution. The Machados opposed the writ by filing a motion to quash on March 30, 2001.9 They argued that the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution was not yet ripe for execution in view of the pending appeal before the OP.Since the Machados persistently refused to reopen the right of way they closed, the provincial sheriff recommended to COSLAP the issuance of a writ of demolition. The COSLAP issued the writ of demolition10 on July 12, 2001. The CA RulingOn July 31, 2001, the Machados went to the CA for relief through a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,11 claiming that the COSLAP issued the writs of execution and demolition with grave abuse of discretion.The CA found the Machados’ claim unfounded and, accordingly, dismissed their petition in its decision of January 31, 2002.12 It declared that the COSLAP correctly issued the assailed writs because the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution had already become final and executory for failure of the Machados to avail of the proper remedy against the COSLAP orders and resolutions. Under Section 3 (2)13 of Executive Order No. 561 (EO 561), the resolutions, orders, and decisions of the COSLAP become final and executory 30 days after promulgation, and are appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. In Sy v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems,14 it was held that under the doctrine of judicial hierarchy, the orders, resolutions and decisions of the COSLAP, as a quasi-judicial agency, are directly appealable to the CA under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and not to the Supreme Court. Thus, the CA ruled that the Machados’ appeal to the OP was not the proper remedy and did not suspend the running of the period for finality of the October 25, 1999 COSLAP Resolution.On the issue of jurisdiction, the CA found that the COSLAP was created to provide a more effective mechanism for the expeditious settlement of land problems, in general; the present case, therefore, falls within its jurisdiction.15 Moreover, the Machados’ active participation in the mediation conference and their consent

to bring about the verification survey bound them to the COSLAP’s decisions, orders and resolutions.From this CA decision, the Machados filed a motion for reconsideration,16 which the CA subsequently denied in its Resolution of December 5, 2002.17

The Machados thus filed the present Rule 45 petition with this Court, raising two vital issues:

1. Whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over Gatdula’s complaint for right of way against the Machados; and2. Whether the COSLAP can validly issue the writs of execution and demolition against the Machados.

THE COURT’S RULINGWe find the petition meritorious.

The COSLAP does not have jurisdiction over the present case

In resolving the issue of whether the COSLAP has jurisdiction over the present case, a review of the history of the COSLAP and an account of the laws creating the COSLAP and its predecessor, the Presidential Action Committee on Land Problems (PACLAP), is in order.The COSLAP’s forerunner, the PACLAP, was created on July 31, 1970 pursuant to Executive Order No. 251. As originally conceived, the committee was tasked to expedite and coordinate the investigation and resolution of land disputes, streamline and shorten administrative procedures, adopt bold and decisive measures to solve land problems, and/or recommend other solutions. On March 19, 1971, Executive Order No. 305 was issued reconstituting the PACLAP. The committee was given exclusive jurisdiction over all cases involving public lands and other lands of the public domain,18 and was likewise vested with adjudicatory powers phrased in broad terms:1. To investigate, coordinate, and resolve expeditiously land disputes, streamline administrative proceedings, and, in general, to adopt bold and decisive measures to solve problems involving public lands and lands of the public domain.19 [emphasis supplied]Thereafter, Presidential Decree No. 832 (PD 832)20 was issued on November 27, 1975 reorganizing the PACLAP and enlarging its functions and duties. The decree also granted PACLAP quasi-judicial functions. Section 2 of PD 832 states:Section 2. Functions and duties of the PACLAP. – The PACLAP shall have the following functions and duties:

1. Direct and coordinate the activities, particularly the investigation work, of the various government agencies and agencies involved in land problems or disputes, and streamline administrative procedures to relieve small

settlers and landholders and members of cultural minorities of the expense and time-consuming delay attendant to the solution of such problems or disputes;2. Refer for immediate action any land problem or dispute brought to the attention of the PACLAP, to any member agency having jurisdiction thereof: Provided, That when the Executive Committee decides to act on a case, its resolution, order or decision thereon shall have the force and effect of a regular administrative resolution, order or decision, and shall be binding upon the parties therein involved and upon the member agency having jurisdiction thereof;

x x x x4. Evolve and implement a system of procedure for the speedy investigation and resolution of land disputes or problems at provincial level, if possible. [emphasis supplied]

The PACLAP was abolished by EO 561 effective on September 21, 1979, and was replaced by the COSLAP. Unlike the former laws, EO 561 specifically enumerated the instances when the COSLAP can exercise its adjudicatory functions:Section 3. Powers and Functions. – The Commission shall have the following powers and functions:

x x x x2. Refer and follow up for immediate action by the agency having appropriate jurisdiction any land problem or dispute referred to the Commission: Provided, That the Commission may, in the following cases, assume jurisdiction and resolve land problems or disputes which are critical and explosive in nature considering, for instance, the large number of the parties involved, the presence or emergence of social tension or unrest, or other similar critical situations requiring immediate action:

(a) Between occupants/squatters and pasture lease agreement holders or timber concessionaires;(b) Between occupants/squatters and government reservation grantees;(c) Between occupants/squatters and public land claimants or applicants;(d) Petitions for classification, release and/or subdivision of lands of the public domain; and(e) Other similar land problems of grave urgency and magnitude.

The Commission shall promulgate such rules and procedures as will ensure expeditious resolution and action on the above cases. The resolution, order or decision of the Commission on any of the foregoing cases shall have the force and effect of a regular

administrative resolution, order or decision and shall be binding upon the parties therein and upon the agency having jurisdiction over the same. Said resolution, order or decision shall become final and executory within thirty (30) days from its promulgation and shall be appealable by certiorari only to the Supreme Court. [emphasis supplied]Under these terms, the COSLAP has two different rules in acting on a land dispute or problem lodged before it, e.g., COSLAP can assume jurisdiction only if the matter is one of those enumerated in paragraph 2(a) to (e) of the law. Otherwise, it should refer the case to the agency having appropriate jurisdiction for settlement or resolution.21 In resolving whether to assume jurisdiction over a case or to refer it to the particular agency concerned, the COSLAP considers: (a) the nature or classification of the land involved; (b) the parties to the case; (c) the nature of the questions raised; and (d) the need for immediate and urgent action thereon to prevent injury to persons and damage or destruction to property. The terms of the law clearly do not vest on the COSLAP the general power to assume jurisdiction over any land dispute or problem.22 Thus, under EO 561, the instances when the COSLAP may resolve land disputes are limited only to those involving public lands or those covered by a specific license from the government, such as pasture lease agreements, timber concessions, or reservation grants.23

Undisputably, the properties involved in the present dispute are private lands owned by private parties, none of whom is a squatter, a patent lease agreement holder, a government reservation grantee, a public land claimant or a member of any cultural minority.24 Moreover, the dispute between the parties can hardly be classified as critical or explosive in nature that would generate social tension or unrest, or a critical situation that would require immediate and urgent action. The issues raised in the present case primarily involve the application of the Civil Code provisions on Property and the Easement of Right of Way. As held in Longino v. General,25 "disputes requiring no special skill or technical expertise of an administrative body that could be resolved by applying pertinent provisions of the Civil Code are within the exclusive jurisdiction of the regular courts."The Machados cannot invoke Section 3, paragraph 2(e) of EO 561, which provides that the COSLAP may assume jurisdiction over complaints involving "other similar land problems of grave urgency," to justify the COSLAP’s intervention in this case. The statutory construction principle of ejusdem generic prescribes that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words

are not to be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind as those specifically mentioned.26 A dispute between two parties concerning the right of way over private lands cannot be characterized as similar to those enumerated under Section 3, paragraph 2(a) to (d) of EO 561.1avvphi1In Davao New Town Development Corporation v. Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems27 – where we ruled that the COSLAP does not have blanket authority to assume every matter referred to it – we made it clear that its jurisdiction is confined only to disputes over lands in which the government has a proprietary or regulatory interest. The CA apparently misread and misapplied the Court’s ruling in Bañaga v. Court of Appeals.28 Bañaga involved two contending parties who filed free patent applications for a parcel of public land with the Bureau of Lands. Because of the Bureau of Lands’ failure to act within a reasonable time on the applications and to conduct an investigation, the COSLAP decided to assume jurisdiction over the case. Since the dispute involved a public land on a free patent issue, the COSLAP undeniably had jurisdiction over the Bañaga case.

Jurisdiction is conferred by law and a judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void

By reason of the Machados’ active participation in the mediation conferences and the COSLAP verification surveys, the CA declared the Machados estopped from questioning the body’s jurisdiction and bound by its decisions, orders and resolutions. We disagree with this ruling.Jurisdiction over a subject matter is conferred by law and not by the parties’ action or conduct.29 Estoppel generally does not confer jurisdiction over a cause of action to a tribunal where none, by law, exists. In Lozon v. NLRC,30 we declared that:Lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the suit is yet another matter. Whenever it appears that the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, the action shall be dismissed. This defense may be interposed at any time, during appeal or even after final judgment. Such is understandable, as this kind of jurisdiction is conferred by law and not within the courts, let alone the parties, to themselves determine or conveniently set aside. In People v. Casiano, this Court, on the issue of estoppel, held:The operation of the principle of estoppel on the question of jurisdiction seemingly depends upon whether the lower court actually had jurisdiction or not. If it had no jurisdiction, but the case was tried and decided upon the theory that it had jurisdiction, the parties are not barred, on appeal, from assailing such jurisdiction, for the same ‘must exist as a matter of law, and may

not be conferred by consent of the parties or by estoppel’ However if the lower court had jurisdiction, and the case was heard and decided upon a given theory, such, for instance, as that the court had no jurisdiction, the party who induced it to adopt such theory will not be permitted, on appeal, to assume an inconsistent position – that the lower court had jurisdiction. Here, the principle of estoppel applies. The rule that jurisdiction in conferred by law, and does not depend upon the will of the parties, has no bearing thereon. [emphasis supplied]In this case, the COSLAP did not have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint filed by Gatdula, yet it proceeded to assume jurisdiction over the case and even issued writs of execution and demolition against the Machados. The lack of jurisdiction cannot be cured by the parties’ participation in the proceedings before the COSLAP.31 Under the circumstances, the Machados can rightfully question its jurisdiction at anytime, even during appeal or after final judgment. A judgment issued by a quasi-judicial body without jurisdiction is void.32 It cannot be the source of any right or create any obligation. All acts pursuant to it and all claims emanating from it have no legal effect. The void judgment can never become final and any writ of execution based on it is likewise void.33 WHEREFORE, premises considered, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari. The assailed Court of Appeals decision dated January 31, 2002 and resolution dated December 5, 2002 in CA-G.R. SP No. 65871 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the Commission on the Settlement of Land Problems dated October 25, 1999 in COSLAP Case No. 99-59, as well as the writ of execution dated March 21, 2001 and the writ of demolition dated July 12, 2001, are declared NULL and VOID for having been issued without jurisdiction.SO ORDERED.