Advanced Vessel Technologies Program

Program Element 2.3

Advanced Vessel Technologies

Program Element 2.3.2 HSS Ship Construction Evaluation and Analysis

P.E. 2.3.2.1 Assess Global and Domestic Shipbuilding Requirements for

High Speed Ship Systems

P.E. 2.3.2.2 Evaluate Barriers to High Speed Ship Fabrication

Marine Transportation Center

The University of Alabama Tuscaloosa, AL

June 30, 2000

Revised September 15, 2000

This report was prepared under contract with financial support from Department of Defense. The content reflects the views of the CSULB Foundation’s Center for the Commercial Deployment of Transportation Technologies (CCDoTT) and/or its contractors, and does not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense.

HSS Ship Construction The University of Alabama

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Table of Contents

Executive Summary 1 1.0 Conclusions 2 2.0 Recommendations 4 3.0 Detailed Reports on Shipbuilding Technology and Barriers to High- Speed Ship Production 5

3.1 Introduction and Methodology 5 3.2 Barriers to Construction of Advanced High Speed Craft 5

3.2.1 Business Processes 5 3.2.2 Fabrication Technologies 6 3.2.3 Implementation of Technology 7 3.2.4 Design and Construction of Problems of Specific High speed Sealift Vessels 8

3.2.4.1 Features of High speed Sealift Designs 8 3.2.4.2 Construction Problems with Lightweight Materials 9 3.2.4.3 High speed Sealift Construction Experience 10

3.2.5 The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry 11 3.2.5.1 Setting the Stage 11 3.2.5.2 Plan for International Competitiveness 13 3.2.5.3 Maritech Programs 13 3.2.5.4 Assessment of Maritech 14 3.2.5.5 Future of Maritech 16

3.3 Shipbuilding Technology and Technical Barriers to HSS Construction 18 3.3.1 Technical Problems in Existing HSS Shipbuilding Systems

and Materials 18 3.3.1.1 Material Stiffening 18 3.3.1.2 Cutting and Forming Technologies 18

3.3.1.2.1 Cutting 18 3.3.1.2.2 Forming 19

3.3.1.3 Joining Technology 21 3.3.1.3.1 Joining Steel 21 3.3.1.3.2 Joining Aluminum Alloys 26 3.3.1.3.3 Joining Other Materials 27 3.3.1.3.4 Development of Joint Quality Tests for

High speed Conditions 29 3.3.2 ABS High speed Craft Guide – Materials 30 3.3.3 Example: Adoption of Design-to-Cost and Build Approach in

Recent U.S. Commercial Ship Construction of MV R. J. Pfeiffer at NASSCO 31

3.3.3.1 Lessons Learned 33 3.3.3.2 Drawing Parallels for High speed Sealift Vessel

Production 34 3.3.3.3 U.S. Shipyard Productivity 34

3.3.4 Evaluating an Alternate Hull Structure for Construction 35 3.3.5 Summary 36


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3.4 Gulf Coast Shipbuilding Technology 38 3.4.1 Shipyard Descriptions 38 3.4.2 Maritech at Gulf Coast Shipyards 41 3.4.3 Fast Ferry Designs Available to Gulf Coast Shipyards 43

4.0 References 45


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Executive Summary

The University of Alabama and its subcontractors have studied the economic and technical feasibility of developing high speed sealift capability within the commercial sector of the economy. Our conclusions are that such a capability is needed, and that there are significant technical problems that need to be addressed to develop this capability. For the purposes of this study, we have defined high speed ocean-borne cargo transportation to mean cargo loads of at least 2,000 metric tons, distances of at least 4,000 nautical miles, and speeds between 40 and 70 kt. This report addresses issues of ship construction and barriers thereto.

The current state of shipbuilding in the United States is such that a high speed ship can be built by a consortium of American yards and naval architects and marine engineers, or by a single American yard collaborating with a suitable foreign yard. The collaboration could take the form of a joint venture or a licensing agreement. The ship would reflect current state of the art in high speed craft, as exemplified by high speed ferries, a number of which are under construction in the United States. For advanced (i.e., beyond the current state-of-the-art) high speed cargo ship designs, using advanced materials and hull forms, we have concluded that the technology is not sufficiently developed to permit such ships to be designed or built domestically or overseas. There is thus an opportunity for American yards to develop and implement technology in the application of advanced materials and hull forms to high speed cargo vessels. Development of those techniques, and better usage of data transfer are essential to the achievement of these goals. A number of barriers were identified to the development of high speed cargo ships in the United States. These include current business practices, which have traditionally discouraged collaborative methods in design and construction, relative ignorance of the opportunities and problems faced when using lightweight materials and advanced hull designs, little research and development support to extend the use of these materials and designs, and reluctance to implement modern technology when it is developed.


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1.0 Conclusions

We have reached the following conclusions about the capabilities of U.S. shipyards to build High Speed Sealift Systems and the critical technologies for economic construction of High Speed Sealift Systems: 1. The construction of “first generation” or “near term” High Speed Sealift Systems is

feasible today in U.S. shipyards. “First generation” and “near term” are defined as ships using existing designs and traditional materials such as steel and aluminum in traditional applications of these materials or technology that may be expected to transition to the commercial market within five years. “Advanced” or “far term” designs are defined as designs incorporating complex hull shapes to reduce drag and wake wash, improved power and power transmission systems (either mechanical or electric drive), propulsors, and non-traditional lightweight metals, alloys and composites to reduce weight and improve performance. These technologies require significant research and development expenditures prior to implementation, and are not expected to be used in ship construction for at least five years.

The normal material used in construction of cargo ships is steel. In fast ferries,

aluminum alloys are often preferred. However, the very high cost of fuel for cargo vessels places a premium on the use of lightweight materials that are not traditionally used in ship construction, such as resin-matrix composites, intermetallic alloys, and perhaps other, more exotic materials. The shipbuilding industry has little experience with these alloys, and lack of capabilities to form, assemble, join and coat these materials in the sizes and shapes needed appears to be a major barrier.

2. While many U.S. shipyards currently lag their foreign competitors in shipbuilding

techniques, the Maritech and Maritech ASE programs are addressing most of the problems in an effective manner. (A description of the Maritech and Maritech ASE programs will be found in section 3.2.5.2 on page 16 of this report.) These programs support the goals of the High speed Sealift (HSS) program, and their results will strengthen the High speed Sealift program.

3. Barriers to the applications of advanced designs include:

• The organization of the construction cycle, and relationships between owner, operator, shipyard and vendors

• Limitations of current hull and superstructure materials (steel and aluminum alloys)

• The still-evolving science of hull form design and hydrodynamics. 4. Current barriers to the construction of more advanced HSS systems include a lack of

manufacturing technology that directly relates to the problems of non-traditional materials and designs encountered in high speed ship designs. Construction of advanced High Speed Ships will be facilitated by the development of the following critical technologies:


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• Forming and curing methods for composite complex hull form components up to 900 meters in length

• Joining methods for composites • Joining methods for advanced metallic materials and alloys, such as Al-Li

alloys, to themselves and metal-matrix and resin-matrix composites • Coating application methods for large structures, such as hulls • Real-time data interchange between all members of the shipbuilding team,

including owners and sub-contractors. 5. Data Transfer

At present, no single U.S. shipyard appears to be capable of providing all of the skills and equipment necessary to design and build a high speed cargo carrier, using the most advanced designs and materials. Instead, the most likely way in which this country will successfully enter the high speed shipbuilding arena is through joint ventures and collaborations between U.S. yards, and between U.S. and foreign yards. Key to these collaborations will be electronic data transfer protocols and systems. U.S. yards are currently working on the problem of data transfer and updating within and between yards as part of the Maritech ASE program. These efforts should be substantially encouraged in shipyards considering construction of advanced high speed cargo craft.

6. Shipyards

Our study has focused on shipyards located on the U.S. Gulf Coast. We have concluded that these shipyards are representative of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and that the skills required to design and build high speed ships exist among these yards. They have actively participated in Maritech programs, and continue to participate in the Maritech ASE programs. Recently announced mergers among some of these yards should strengthen their ability to design and build the advanced vessels required. These shipyards jointly have the capability – or the ability to develop the capability – to build the advanced high speed cargo shipping craft for the 21st century.


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2.0 Recommendations Obstacles that currently affect productivity in building conventional ships may also be expected to affect the productivity of high speed ship building. In this study, we have chosen to focus on those manufacturing problems that we expect to be unique to high speed ships. Manufacturing concerns are primarily centered on the fact that in building advanced high speed cargo craft, shipyards will be working with materials with which they are generally unfamiliar. These problems include:

C Joining lightweight materials such as titanium alloys, intermetallics, and

composites C Manufacturing large composite materials C Joining high strength steels C Determining the quality levels required for the service conditions that the

joints and materials will see C Lack of electronic shipbuilding data in standard communication formats

that can be shared with customers and suppliers C Real-time data transfer between all stakeholders: owners, designers, and

shipbuilders C Lack of accurate market data on the needs and requirements of high speed

cargo ships in various markets. As a consequence, we recommend that development work begin immediately in the following areas:

1. Joining technologies for composites, and joining of composites to light alloys 2. Joining technologies for lightweight alloys, such as aluminum-lithium alloys 3. Extensive testing of welded joints in a marine environment to establish design

levels and quality criteria for advanced materials in marine environments and loadings typical of high speed ship operations

4. Manufacturing methods for forming large complex shapes in resin-matrix composites. These shapes should represent hull forms and sizes anticipated for high speed cargo ships.

5. Coating methods for large complex hulls 6. Expansion of computer-based design tools and data interchange systems to

link owners, designers and shipbuilders during the design and build stage. Finally, funding constraints limited our ability to evaluate all domestic and foreign yards’ ship design and construction capability. Therefore, we recommend that a full, focused study, involving experts from the government, industry and academia be carried out as a first step in a comprehensive program to develop U.S. high speed cargo design, construction and operational capacity. There are a number of U.S. government programs in place today to organize and facilitate such a study.1


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3.0 Detailed Reports on Shipbuilding Technology and Barriers to High Speed Ship

Production 3.1 Introduction and Methodology The detailed reports presented below are the result of a one-year study carried out by the authors of each of the sections. To gather information in each area visits were made to Gulf Coast shipyards and designers, and a literature search was made. Each of the authors has considerable professional expertise in the areas discussed, and extensive use of industry sources was made to augment traditional sources. 3.2 Barriers to Construction of Advanced High Speed Sealift Systems R.C. Foley, University of South Alabama and R. Latorre, University of New Orleans A 1996 Joint Staff study2 concluded that advances in technology had reached the point where building a commercial, militarily useful high speed ship at a reasonable price was achievable. Given sufficient investment and lead time, shipbuilding/manufacturing processes will be able to support production of all high speed sealift ships envisioned. Financial risk will have to be considered and shipbuilders, including Gulf Coast shipbuilders (see below) will have to continue to make the transition to world-class manufacturing facilities to compete in the market. 3.2.1 Business Processes More emphasis must be placed on business and construction processes and training and education to include resolving terminology differences in business/ design/production processes. For example, most ships constructed in U.S. yards are customer-designed. Before the start of a contract it is naturally assumed that the vessel can be made to the price and time quoted and invariably this assumption is proven wrong, because at best the process to be used in its manufacture is not stable enough to be predictable. Tools and technology are available that would allow control of these business processes. Skills and training are necessary to integrate these tools and technology into the shipyard working environment. Collaborative methods are essential in which the product and process technology can be developed and effectively used in cooperation among clients, shipbuilders, workers, suppliers and regulators. Customers work with the designer and the designer selects all subcontractors during the design and estimating process (in communication with the customer). The integration of design and production starts at the beginning. No time is lost, but the advantages of competitive bidding may be lost. On the other hand, the formation of a highly integrated team to accomplish a major building project can pay off in faster deliveries, less waste and lower overall costs to the project (avoidance of overruns).


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Even the U.S. Navy is transitioning to this approach: its award of a $641M contract to Litton/Avondale Industries team for the design and construction of the first LPD-17 Amphibious Assault Ship was the first naval ship to be designed using 3D modeling software. The use of a common 3D modeling platform was most famously used by the Boeing Co. to design the 777 passenger airplane; the project has become a textbook example of how to implement computer-integrated design. In the complex world of ship design and construction it should be obvious that a similar approach would pay great dividends to designers, shipyards and customers. The infrastructure within the U.S. shipbuilding industry needs to be established so that such teaming arrangements can be rapidly and efficiently created in response to the needs of the market. Ship design innovation is typically irrelevant to shipbuilding competitiveness unless it has a direct impact on shipbuilding technology. Recent trends in shipbuilding design have emphasized smaller crew sizes, increased use of electronics, automation and improved cargo handling. These areas have little impact on shipbuilding technology. High speed sealift designs hold the potential for being the platform to usher revolutionary shipbuilding technologies into the shipbuilding industry. Proposed lightweight materials and the fabrication techniques associated with them, advanced hull designs, and the drive for economic market advantage will dictate that the industry incorporate and apply the latest technologies available. Because the market for fast ships is not large, there is far too little emphasis on development of advanced shipbuilding techniques that this new class of products will demand. 3.2.2 Fabrication Technologies Most U.S. shipyards have readily implemented advanced ship production processes, e.g., advanced material handling, steel cutting, forming, welding, pipe fabrication, or will do so as their financial situation permits it. Shipyard process innovation and technology adoption, however, appears to be piecemeal or random, and mostly motivated by individuals interested in specific areas. Recognizing the benefits and efficiencies to be gained, most have incorporated elements of Computer Aided Design, Product Work Breakdown Structure, Computer Aided Manufacturing and Integrated Hull Construction, Outfitting and Painting. For example, dimensional control of interim assemblies and subassemblies using statistical process control and optical/laser coordinate measuring devices reduced hull construction labor costs by 30%. These advanced product3 design and manufacturing technologies form the basis for adoption of a Computer Integrated Manufacturing (CIM) environment. However, computerization of design and production cannot proceed isolated from each other and all other aspects of a manufacturing system. This will be especially important for high speed sealift vessels, where working with non-traditional materials for the hulls and superstructure will require coordination between vendors, suppliers and the shipyard. New process technologies are not always effectively operated and investments in very expensive Computer Aided Manufacturing systems, such as self-adaptive robotic welding, cannot achieve their goals if they are not served by appropriate data. A barrier to CIM is the lack of electronic shipbuilding data in standard communication formats that


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can be shared by customers and suppliers. This data must be used and developed during the design process to facilitate product model data in a neutral and standardized structure. It will also replace the normal flood of customer-vendor paperwork and helps industry maintain close relationships with their suppliers and customers. Consortium members of the MariSTEP program have made progress in the electronic exchange of shipbuilding data among diverse shipbuilding environments. In August 1998 a successful demonstration of data exchange was conducted between shipbuilders and Computer Aided Design Systems developers. The exchange was conducted using prototype translators based on the Standard for the Exchange of Product model data (STEP) developed within the International Standards Organization. Application areas included ship molded forms, ship arrangements and ship piping. Each of the members enhanced their internal systems’ product model data to support the export and import of shipbuilding data. The goal of the consortium is to complete translators for the exchange of ship structures. The implementation of this technology will have a significant impact on the entire U.S. shipbuilding industry and will permit radical advances in CIM processes. Electronic customer and supplier interaction, close collaborations and teamwork between different companies will become the norm. The implementation of this technology is essential for the shipyards that will participate in the construction of high speed sealift vessels. A secondary benefit of electronic exchange and CIM is the implementation of Agile Manufacturing technologies. Agile Manufacturing is a system designed to produce different parts without sacrificing efficiency. The U.S. shipbuilding industry is traditionally a “one of a kind” manufacturing industry. Shipbuilding uses the same workforce and facilities to produce different types of ships simultaneously. Agile Manufacturing permits the efficient transition from an existing product of ship construction project to a new product at the same facility. 3.2.3 Implementation of Technology Lack of access or availability of technology is not the reason for slow improvement in U.S. shipyards. Segments of most major shipyards have been extensively involved in development and application of new technologies, such as CAD. To be effectively implemented in a CIM environment, technological change must be introduced in management, production, marketing and engineering in a systematic and not piecewise manner. Even after introduction of technology care must be exercised to manage the soft skills required to implement technology. Shipbuilding, as an industry, recognizes and takes pride in its tradition and organizational culture. While “pride in product” has its associated advantages, the disadvantage is a culture that is slow to change. Organizational culture may be defined as a pattern of basic assumptions – invented, discovered or developed by a given group as it learns to cope with its problems of external adaptation and internal integration – that has worked well enough to be considered valid and therefore to be taught to new members as


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the correct way to perceive, think and feel in relation to those problems. CIM represents a major change to the shipbuilding organizational culture and will change the way shipbuilding does business, is organized, managed and operated, especially in marketing and procurement.4 Ship manufacturing must be seen as an information process where machine instructions stored in computers will describe how a piece of materials should be made. 3.2.4 Design and Construction Problems of Specific High Speed Sealift Vessels

The University of Alabama team visited Litton/Ingalls Shipyard, Halter Marine Gulfport yard, and Litton/Avondale Shipyard. In each visit the shipyard engineers indicated they could build a High speed Sealift vessel. This response reflected several assumptions:

1. The High speed Sealift (HSS) vessel design would be complete. 2. The HSS design would be in compliance with the IMO high Speed Code,

ABS and US Coast Guard rules and regulations. Materials other than steel or aluminum would also be available from vendors and be certified as being in compliance with appropriate rules and regulations.

3. Adequate research and development would be completed to ensure that appropriate material fabrication, forming and joining practices would be established for any new material. This might be in the form of a demonstrator craft.

4. The high speed sealift vessel would be priced to be profitable after costs of materials, components and labor had been estimated.

From the High speed Sealift program this willingness to pursue the vessel construction on the part of these U.S. shipyards is very important. It reaffirms the 1997 HSS Workshop Shipbuilding-Manufacturing Work Group conclusion that “given sufficient investment and lead time, shipbuilding/ manufacturing processes will be able to support production of all high speed sealift ships envisioned at the workshop.”5 3.2.4.1 Features of High Speed Sealift Design The High speed Sealift program has inspired a number of proposed designs. Note that, as all high speed sealift vessels will be built for the commercial, not the military market, actual requirements will be set by potential ship owners. These vessels include:

• Roll-on Roll-off monohulls such as the BATHMAX-15006,7 • Roll-on Roll-off catamarans • Roll-on Roll-off trimarans8 • Roll-on Roll-off pentamaran slender hull with sponsons9 • Roll-on Roll-off surface effect craft such as the Ingalls SEV.10

The University of Alabama team discussed the trimaran and pentamaran designs

during the October 1999 Halter Gulfport visit and the SEV during the September 1999


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visit to Litton/Ingalls Shipyard. Our conclusion was that there are no impediments to the construction of these ships, provided that they are built of traditional materials, i.e., steel or aluminum alloys.

3.2.4.2 Construction Problems with Near-Term Lightweight Materials

A number of High Speed Sealift designs have been reviewed by Dannecker et a131 They are summarized in Table 1 along with several other designs. In reviewing Table 1, three points must be kept in mind:

1. The shipyards are organized for steel ship construction. 2. The designers/shipyards have little experience with large ship construction

using alternate lightweight materials. 3. There is little data for estimating a new ship material, labor and build

schedule using alternate lightweight materials. Point 1 leads to three obvious recommendations for research and development to support the construction of high speed commercial cargo ships:

1. Manufacturers and suppliers of alternate (non-traditional) materials should be asked to join a cooperative effort to develop these products for the High Speed Sealift near term and far term applications.

2. Studies of alternate materials should consider three applications for non-traditional shipbuilding materials:

a. Evaluation of alternate materials and fastening for secondary interior structure. b. Evaluation of alternate materials and fastening for exterior deck and deck house application.

c. Evaluation of alternate materials for hull structure fabrication. 3. The benefit of alternate lightweight materials should be determined using

shipyard metrics: a. Delivery/Manufacturing cost. b. Needs for complicated joining equipment and increase in manhours. c. Lightweight structure modules ability to be outfitted. d. Shipyard staff capability to work with alternate lightweight materials.

The cost benefit evaluation can be part of a simulation based design study. This

evaluation could be accomplished using the software developed for the High Speed Sealift workshop.4 Only recently has large high speed aluminum vessel construction begun. In January 1999 Halter Marine announced the Halter-Bazan joint venture.11 Halter Marine will begin the construction of a 40 kt. Bazan-designed, aluminum Alhambra Class-fast ferry. This ferry is designed to transport 1,250 passenger/240 vehicles at 40 knots. However, the designs in Table 1 have been developed for steel construction.


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Table 1. High Speed Sealift Designs Compared to the SL-7

Container Ship

Item Units 33 Kt SL-7 BATHMAX FastShip Atlantic

Ingalls SEV

Pentamaran

Vessel Type

Container-ship

Container-ship

Containership

Ro-Ro/Cont.

Ro-Ro/Cont.

Hull Steel Steel Steel Steel H.T. Steel Length LW m 274.2 250 229 - -

Length LPP

m 260 240

Beam m 32.1 27.5 40 49.4 N/A L/B 8 9.1 5.73 5.26 N/A

Full Load Draft

m 9.14 9 10 - N/A

Displace-ment

Long tons

51,815 27,100 32,340 19,200 N/A

Structure Weight

Long tons

16,506 N/A N/A N/A N/A

Power Plant

Steam Turbine

Gas Turbine Gas Turbine

Gas Turbine

Diesel

Horse-power

SHP 120,000 106,666 317,333 240,000/ 300,000

144,440

Speed kt. 33 33 38 45/55 37.5 Range Nautical

Miles 11,000 8,000 6,500 3,500 3,500

Cargo/Dis-placement

0.28 0.36 0.30 0.23 -

Empty Wt. Ratio

0.476 - - 0.598 -

Transport Factor

95 57.7 26.6 24.8/24.2 -

3.2.4.3 High Speed Sealift Construction Experience

At the present time, the only experience that the United States has had in acquiring high speed sealift capability is that associated with the SL-7 ships nearly thirty years ago.12 The eight 33 knot SL-7 container ships were constructed in Europe. The vessel specifications called for the ships to be U.S. flag regardless of where they were built so ABS and US Coast Guard approval was required. This resulted in the following specification format:

1. Specifications were written detailing each piece of machinery by size, manufacturer, and model number.


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2. Auxiliary machinery sizes were consolidated to minimize the number of motor, valve, etc., sizes. Standardization reduced the inventory of shipboard and land-based spares. All eight ships were required to use identical equipment and arrangements.

3. To assure consistency in the final vessels, the contract plans were very detailed. An engine room model was constructed during this stage to minimize redesign. An engine room model was supplied to each shipyard as part of the contract plans. Hull lines, shafting arrangement, propeller and rudder details were all tightly specified and carefully depicted on the contract plans. With these specifications, the owner assumed responsibility for the sufficiency of the design. The contracts contained no speed, fuel rate, or other normally required technical guarantees. This assumption of responsibility by the owner and his design agent was cited as

producing a better contract design with less compromise. Few development problems were encountered during construction. The final vessels differed very little from the original contract plans. During construction other advantages to this system were found:

1. The shipyards were able to order equipment immediately after contract signing, so

more efforts could be concentrated on production planning. This resulted in faster deliveries of the ships.

2. All equipment was specified to be of U.S. manufacture, providing a common price basis for all bidding shipyards.

3. In the specifications and related documents, the owner assumed the responsibility for USCG approval and inspection.

Even with the more efficient production planning, the August 1969 contracts

showed the last ship from each yard to be delivered in February, June, and July of 1973. These last three ships were actually delivered on September 17, September 20, and December 4, 1973. 3.2.5 The U.S. Shipbuilding Industry Although representing only a small segment of the U.S. manufacturing sector, the shipbuilding industry is also considered to be critical to the country’s defense industrial base. Since the late 1980’s significant progress has been made in improving the competitiveness of U.S. shipyards. Most programs have been government-directed and focused on dual-use technology. Many companies are now investing more of their own attention and resources on improving international competitiveness in the commercial shipbuilding industry. By world-class benchmarks there is still room for further improvement. 3.2.5.1 Setting the Stage

U.S. yards made the transition from building military vessels during World War II to building commercial ones after the war. However, global market share was lost


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because they could not compete on a cost basis with their overseas rivals as subsidies rose and domestic builders adapted their structure and facilities to the particular demands of their most important customer, the Navy. To compensate, the U.S. government protected the industry through construction subsidies, which improved U.S. sales considerably. In the early 1980’s, however, these subsidies ended and a dramatic decrease in the U.S. share of the commercial market began. The shipyards’ situation was worsened by a general decline in the Navy’s ship procurement budgets that began in the late 1980’s.

The lack of participation in the commercial markets in an era of sharply reduced

military demand has had an understandably large impact on the shipbuilding industry and its affiliates. U.S. participation in the international shipbuilding market could be accomplished by adopting the dual-use approach desired by the Department of Defense, but only if a viable commercial industry exists.

U.S. shipbuilders, who built twenty large commercial ships per year on average in

the mid-seventies, now average fewer than two ships per year. This threatens not only the ability to compete in global commercial shipbuilding, but also the ability to build cost- effective naval ships.

The world commercial market belongs to Japan, Korea, Europe and China. U.S.

builders have less than 1% of that market. The global commercial shipbuilding industry currently has too much capacity, possibly by as much as 30%. Even so, Korea recently embarked on an effort to double its capacity and aggressively increase market share,13 and the emergence of China is also expected to exacerbate the situation. Additionally, subsidies still abound in the international market.

However, a strong case can be made that given the designs, tools, culture, and

repeat business, U.S. yards can be competitive based on the example set by several of the smaller yards, who compete successfully in the international market against subsidized yards in several market segments (drill rigs, supply vessels, yachts, etc.). Korea recently demonstrated the feasibility of penetrating and acquiring sizable market share by rapidly improving productivity and cutting prices. Further, the market trends look good. Shipborne commerce is increasing, and the world fleet is aging. Therefore, new building demand should be robust in the future.

The domestic market is more accessible than the world market. However,

problems exist even here, due principally to U.S. process inefficiencies, lack of proprietary designs and material standards, and a dearth of component suppliers. Smaller shipyards seem to have more commercial success than large shipbuilders do, but again the success is largely in the domestic field. Protection offered by the Jones and Passenger Service acts covers only 300 or so ships above 2,000 gross tons. U.S. ship owners have a backlog of repairs and orders that will form a “bow wave” of near-term domestic business into the next decade.


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Recent studies by KPMG, First Marine International, and Stellar Carson Associates (among others) have confirmed that large commercial ships built in U.S. shipyards are about 1.5 – 2.5 times the cost of similar ships built in leading overseas yards. This factor is crucial in a market where price discrimination is the key buying decision determinant. There is an imbalance between labor cost and productivity in U.S. yards, resulting in a higher level of added value per ship. Material costs are also significantly higher. 3.2.5.2 Plan for International Competitiveness

President Clinton established the Maritech Program in 1993 as an element of the

initiative Strengthening America’s Shipyards: A Plan for Competing in the International Market. Maritech was initially established as a five-year plan that concluded in 1998.14 The Maritech Program began principally to encourage the U.S. shipbuilding industry to expand into the commercial sector, thereby expanding its customer base in light of sharp reductions in defense spending, and passing savings gained from commercial efficiencies and economies of scale to the Navy.

Five objectives were adopted by Maritech to facilitate pursuit of commercial competitiveness in the shipbuilding sector. These objectives were listed in the President’s plan and the National Shipbuilding and Shipyard Conversion Act of 1993:

• Encourage and support proactive market analysis and product development • Develop a portfolio of U.S. designs • Develop innovative design and production processes and technology • Facilitate government and industry technology transfer activities • Encourage formation of consortia for short- and long-term technology

investment strategies.

3.2.5.3 Maritech Programs The Maritech Program15 sponsored over 65 projects involving 18 shipyards and

over 100 other companies operating in over 40 states. The effort included 34 projects related to ship design development and 18 projects in advanced technology development (note: some of these 18 projects had elements of two or more subcategories, resulting in eight projects in process improvement, 19 in product improvement, and 13 in the electronic commerce area). The cost of this work was shared between industry and its suppliers. Direction, goals, planning and coordination for the Maritech Program were provided by government.

Shipbuilding industry efforts in the Maritech program are displayed in Table 2. A

summary of results of industry wide Maritech projects is presented in Table 3.


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Table 2. Industry Participation in Maritech

SHIPYARD BUILD PROJECTS

DESIGN PROJECTS

PROCESS PROJECTS

FACILITIES PROJECTS

Alabama X X X X Avondale X X X X Bath Iron Works X X X Bender X X X X Bollinger X X X Electric Boat X X Gladding-Hearn X X X X Halter Marine X X X Ingalls X X X Marinette NASSCO X X X X Newport News X X X X Nichols Brothers X X X Todd Pacific X X

3.2.5.4 Assessment of Maritech

Maritech helped the U.S. shipbuilding industry start on the path to international competitiveness by first focusing on basic facility improvements and commercial design development, then moving into information technology projects. DARPA reported the following industry-wide specific accomplishments from Maritech projects conducted between 1993 and 1998:

• Shipyard product development capability established at numerous shipyards • Over 30 commercial ship designs developed • Competitive build strategies developed and implemented • Average reduction in construction cycle-time: 8-12 months • Average reduction in labor man-hours: 20% • Facility modernization plans developed for most yards • Over $500 million invested in new facilities • Industry-wide electronic infrastructure partially established • 13 commercial ships under construction (three for export) versus zero in 1993.

Maritech appears to have had a major impact on inroads made recently by U.S. shipbuilders in the commercial market. As of April 1998, there were 21 commercial ships on U.S. order books, each of which were developed under Maritech, with a total contract value of approximately $1 billion.


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Table 3. Summary of Maritech Industry-wide Projects

Project Title: COMPASS – Component Object Model of Products/Processes for an Advanced Shipbuilding System Objective: Explore and implement infrastructure technologies to move the industry toward an integrated product and process development (IPPD) environment. Embodies the virtual enterprise philosophy, where a central product model provides all participants with a comprehensive understanding of the ship’s design. Team Members: Newport News Shipbuilding Intergraph Federal Systems University of Michigan American Bureau of Shipping Project Title: MAAST – MAritime Agile Shipbuilding Toolkit Objective: The Virtual Shipbuilding Consortium (VSC) is defining an architecture for the application of virtual organization procedures to shipbuilding. The operations concept is designed to support one-of-a-kind ship production in today’s commercial yards at a competitive price and schedule. It is being designed to be equally effective for other types of heavy industrial products that are suited to fabrication in a shipyard. Working together as a virtual corporation, the project team is addressing new business operations, yard operations, management processes, design processes, material control, and human resource management. Team Members: Avondale Industries Raytheon Systems Co. Intergraph Federal Systems Ornicon Corp. American Bureau of Shipping Advanced Marine Enterprises Inc. Project Title: MariSTEP – Maritime Standard for Exchange of Product Model Data Objective: To implement a neutral file transfer capability between the product models at U.S. shipyards, and to develop a United States marine industry prototype product model database that will facilitate the implementation of translators and product model data architectures by U.S. shipyards and CAD system developers. Team Members: Ingalls Shipbuilding Intergraph Federal Systems Avondale Industries University of Michigan Electric Boat Corp. Computervision Corp. Newport News Shipbuilding Kockums Computer Systems, Inc. Carderock Division of NSWC Advanced Management Catalyst Project Title: SHIIP – The Shipbuilding Information Infrastructure Project Objective: Develop and deploy a new shipbuilding methodology that addresses both people and organizational issues. New shipbuilding processes will be developed, documented, and validated by a broad-based team of shipbuilders. New organizational paradigms, such as a team-based approach to shipbuilding, deployed, and measured for effectiveness. Team Members: Alabama Shipyard Computer Sciences Corp. Avondale Industries C.L. Harshman and Associates Bath Iron Works Deneb Robotics Electric Boat NIIIP Consortium (IBM) NASSCO Structured Tech. Corp. Todd Pacific Shipyards


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The Maritech Program Office, which operated under the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA), has been transferred to the Navy in 1999. It became clear during this program that creating a competitive U.S. shipbuilding industry is a bigger challenge than was generally recognized at the start. Nonetheless, a recent detailed review16 of the program showed success in closing the gap with improvements in processes, systems technology, facilities and tooling, and product design capability. 3.2.5.5 Future of Maritech

During the spring of 1997, an effort began to establish a consortium of U.S.

shipbuilders with the purpose of developing and executing a shipbuilding R&D program as a Maritech successor. The concept for the follow-on program differed from the original Maritech in that the industry would plan and direct the R&D in a cooperative, collaborative manner. Shipyards would work together, as well as with the supply chain. This new program is titled “Maritech Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise” (Maritech ASE), and in response U.S. shipbuilders have formed a collaboration to speak with one voice in developing an industry-wide strategic investment plan to focus cooperative R&D efforts. The industry crafted this plan as a mix of strategic outlook, business plan, investment portfolio, and R&D roadmap, designed to guide the cost-effective, goal-oriented investment of an estimated $400 million government-industry program over a five-year period. The plan: • Provides a high-level industry roadmap that calls attention to future technology

needs; provides a structure for organizing technology forecasts; and, communicates to the industry, suppliers and government which technologies must be developed and implemented for future business success.

• Leverages the work done by a variety of organizations in the mid-1990’s, including the National Research Council, the Maritime Agility Group, Center for Naval Analysis, and other efforts by the industry and government to identify and prioritize shipbuilding technology gaps.

• Involves the entire shipbuilding enterprise through inclusion of the supply chain, designers, classification societies, builders, customers, and operators.

• Specifies portfolio development and management methodology to ensure clear business case evaluation of proposed projects. ROI assessment, portfolio balance, and coherence between industry strategic direction and project selection.

Table 4 lists Maritech ASE programs selected for funding in FY 2000.17


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Table 4. Maritech ASE Programs for FY 2000

Area Project Title Team Funding Business Process

Technology

Shipbuilding Supply Chain

Virtual Enterprises

SAPRS Consortium, Bath Ironworks, Electric Boat,

Newport News Shipbuilding, Ingalls, Marine Machinery Ass.,

NIIP, IBM, ERIM

$12.89 M

Systems Technologies

Integrated Shipbuilding Environment

Integrated Shipbuilding Environment, Electric Boat,

Newport News, NIIP, Intergraph, ABS, Avondale/Ingalls

Shipbuilding, Bath Ironworks, Dassault Systems, ERIM, IBM,

KCS, MMA, M Information Engineering, NASSCO,

NSWCCD, Proteus Engineering, SIMSMART, STEP Tools, U of

Michigan

$33.7 M

Support of OSHA Maritime Initiatives

OSHA, Rupy Innovations, Newport News, NASSCO,

Baltimore Marine Industries, Avondale, Electric Boat,

International Boilermakers, I.B.E.W.

$386 K

Applications and Education

Programs for Shipyards

Todd Pacific, Atlantic Marine, V2R Consulting Group

$911 K

Treatment of Shipyard

Stormwater

NASSCO, Hart Crowser, Stormwater Mgt., Expert

Advisory Panel

$819 K

Facilities and Tooling

Welding Emissions Edison Welding Institute, Shipyards, NSWC

$2.2 M

Crosscut Initiatives

Resource Center for Crosscut Initiatives

Electric Boat, UMTRI, Bath Ironworks, Avondale, Cascade General, Jeffboat, Todd Pacific

$1.26 M

Laser Assistad Forming of Hull

Components

Ingalls, ARL Penn State, MTS Systems

$586 K Shipyard Production

Process Technology Ultra High-Pressure

Water Blasting Atlantic Marine, Todd Pacific,

Munro & Assoc., Dana M. Austin Environmental Consulting

$566 K


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3.3 Shipbuilding Technology and Technical Barriers to HSS Construction V.L. Acoff and P. Ray, The University of Alabama, and R. Latorre, University of New Orleans 3.3.1 Technical Problems in Existing HSS Shipbuilding Systems and Materials

There are a number of shipbuilding technologies applicable to advanced high speed cargo ships. They cover the general areas of material stiffening, forming and joining technologies. Because hull forms in high speed craft tend to have more complex shapes than those found in conventional vessels, the ability of shipyards to economically produce the shapes needed is important in facilitating the construction of these ships. 3.3.1.1 Material Stiffening In steel ship construction, steel plates are stiffened by longitudinals and transverse stiffeners into a grillage.18 This is usually the basis of the global and local strength. This type of design is evaluated on the basis of strength demonstrated by material certification, allowance for natural loss by rusting, and quality of weld demonstrated by welder certification and, in some cases, laboratory tests.

In typical aluminum construction, the aluminum plates are stiffened by longitudinal and transverse aluminum stiffeners. These stiffeners are extruded through dies to produce the desired stiffener geometry. One additional problem is the limited availability of some aluminum alloys in the United States. A number of designs, optimized for aluminum, allow 5083 alloy for plate and 6082 alloy for extrusions and tube support. In the U.S. a number of high speed aluminum ferry craft are built using 5086 plates and 6061 extrusions and tubing.19 3.3.1.2 Cutting and Forming Technologies

Shapes for ship forms are made by cutting and forming steel or other materials. As in all metal processes, there are a variety of methods available to do these operations:

3.3.1.2.1 Cutting

a) Oxyfuel Gas Cutting (OFC) is primarily used for cutting carbon and low-alloy steels. Other iron-based and nonferrous metals can be cut using this method if certain modifications are made in the process. However, the quality of the cut is not as high. Large-scale applications of OFC are found in shipbuilding.

Advantages of OFC compared to arc cutting, milling, or sawing:

C Metal can be cut faster. Setup is simpler. C Oxyfuel gas cutting patterns are not confined to straight lines. C Manual OFC equipment costs are low. C With advanced machinery, OFC lends itself to high-volume parts

production.


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C Large parts can be cut quickly in place by moving the torch rather than the plate.

C Two or more pieces can be cut simultaneously. C Numerically controlled cutting heads can traverse a piece of plate,

allowing the process to be automated. Disadvantages of OFC: C Dimensional tolerances are poorer than for machining and shearing. C The process is limited to cutting steels and cast iron because OFC relies on

oxidation of iron. C Heat generated by OFC can degrade the metallurgical properties of the

material adjacent to the cut edges.

b) Plasma Arc Cutting (PAC) uses a constricted arc in the form of a highly ionized gas to melt and sever metal in a narrow, localized area.

Advantages of PAC: C Cutting speed is approximately three times as fast as that of OFC. C The quality of cut is superior to that for OFC. C There is less tendency for plate distortion as less heat is transferred to the

workpiece. Disadvantages of PAC C The PAC nozzle is bulky, thus primarily used for machine cutting. C Cutting over a water surface is required to substantially decreases fumes

and noise.

c) Air-Carbon Arc Cutting (CAC-A) removes metal physically rather than chemically as in OFC. Gouging, or cutting, occurs when the intense heat of the arc melts part of the workpiece and the air simultaneously passes through the arc to blow away the molten material.

Advantages of CAC-A:

C The process requires less heat input, thus there is less distortion than produced by OFC.

C Oxidation is not required to maintain the cut; thus CAC-A can be used for cutting metals that OFC cannot.

C The process is useful for back gouging and excavating defective areas. Disadvantages of CAC-A:

C Dimensional control is not as good as in PAC and OFC. 3.3.1.2.2 Forming

Forming technologies used to shape plates for hulls, decks and superstructures are grouped into two classes: a) Cold Forming is used to produce plates of desired configuration. Excessive straining can reduce notch toughness properties.


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1) Rolling: Bending rolls consist of a large diameter top roll and two smaller bottom rolls. 2) Pressing (also referred to as keel bending): Hydraulic presses can have both horizontal and vertical rams operating independently. The process is used for bending angles and Tee shapes.

b) Hot Forming is used when curved plates and shapes cannot be formed by cold forming using strictly mechanical means.

1) Furnacing: Steel is formed while it is heated to a "red heat." Heat treated materials must either be cold formed or heated to a temperature below which the materials’ properties and microstructure are affected. 2) Line Heating: This is a combination of linear heating and quenching used to shape plates. Compound curvatures can be achieved with this method.

The implementation of “design for construction” has resulted in a review of the

desirability of complex shapes in hulls and superstructures. In many cases this review has reduced the use of these shapes, leading to savings in man-hours, overall schedule as well as rework required to fit the complex shape into the hull/superstructure.20 High speed craft, however, often depend on hull forms that are complex. In these vessel designs the complex shapes would be formed by developable or compounded curved surfaces, which would be faired using a computer-aided hull fairing – design systems.21 These plates could be formed using one of several processes, such as mechanical plate bending using a press or rollers, or thermo-plastic bending by line heating using flame or laser heat sources.22,23

These processes are presently done manually by skilled workmen. There is an ongoing research and development activity to computerize this process so it can properly integrate into the overall CAD-CAM activity of the shipyard.24 Complex geometry bending machines have been in use in the aircraft industry for years, although they bend thinner gauge aluminum metal. An alternative approach in aluminum fabrication is to cut the panel and weld it along a seam. Because aluminum is often used in building high speed ferries and because it does not form like steel, the special problems that it poses are reviewed: Handling and precautions:

C Aluminum must be handled with more care than steel as it is softer than steel.

C Aluminum should be stored inside on racks made of wood or aluminum to avoid scratching the surface of the material.

C Smooth grip clamps or vacuum pads should be used to manipulate the plates for the same reason.

C Repairing damaged aluminum components is difficult. Although the material’s inherent softness makes it easy to straighten, weld repair is


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difficult, and often requires subsequent heat treatment. C Both solvents and mechanical means should be used to remove oil, oxide

films, etc. Welding must be performed immediately, before the oxide forms again.

C Using abrasive wheels to prepare edges must be done with care to avoid embedding abrasive material into the aluminum surface.

Forming:

C Conventional equipment can be used. However, care must be taken to insure that tools and forming and bending equipment are clean and smooth to avoid marring the surface of the material.

C Shearing is not recommended for preparing plate edges. Oil and dirt may be entrapped in the roughened edges due to shearing and must be removed.

Extruded shapes:

C An advantage of aluminum alloys is that extrusion is relatively easy. Dies can be made at reasonable prices.

In summary, cutting and forming technology is available for the complex shapes required for high speed craft construction. However, the opportunity exists for improvements in this technology aimed specifically at high speed craft construction, such as improvements in automation of forming technologies, and extension of existing technologies to lightweight materials such as intermetallics and Al-Li alloys. Current hand work methods are expensive, and raise the initial cost of high speed craft. 3.3.1.3 Joining Technology

Joints can be joined by a variety of methods, including fusion welding, solid state welding, brazing, adhesives and mechanical means. Most ship structures are joined by welding. The methods of joining used depend on the metal used in construction, on the properties desired, and on the joint configuration. 3.3.1.3.1 Joining Steel

The majority of today’s ships are welded steel. Only in certain joints such as the deck to superstructure are mechanical connections used. Typically welders are certified by completing the appropriate shipyard or classification society-sponsored training course.25 The welding skill level also reduces the distortion.26,27

The weld process is usually carried out in two steps:

1. The pieces are tacked together.


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2. The tacked pieces are welded intermittently (internal) or continuously (external hull tanks).

Automatic (all parameters and electrode manipulation are automatic) and semi-

automatic (electrode manipulation is manually controlled; all other welding parameters and rate of electrode feed are controlled automatically) welding processes are used extensively in the shipbuilding industry. Table 5 divides the welding processes typically used in shipbuilding into three categories: manual, semi-automatic, and automatic.

Table 5. Steel Welding Processes Used in Shipbuilding

Manual Semi-Automatic Automatic

SMAW GMAW GMAW

GTAW GTAW GTAW

FCAW SAW

SW ESW

SAW EGW

A brief description of each is given below:

C Shielded Metal Arc Welding (SMAW) is often used for manual welding in shipbuilding when versatility is desired. The process is known as Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW) when it is mechanized or automated.

C Gas Tungsten Arc Welding (GTAW) is occasionally used for depositing root passes. The filler metal is usually fed manually, although it can be fed automatically and the torch can be moved mechanically. GTAW is best for welding conventional and advanced (intermetallics) titanium alloys and for situations where autogenous (without filler metal) welding is required.

C Gas Metal Arc Welding (GMAW) is used for joining aluminum, stainless steels and low carbon steels in the shipbuilding industry.

C Flux Cored Arc Welding (FCAW) is commonly used for welding steels. C Stud Welding (SW) is widely used in shipbuilding for attaching items

such as studs, clips, and hangers to structural members. C Submerged Arc Welding (SAW) is the most widely used automated

welding process for steels. Deep weld penetration can be achieved with SAW, which allows welding of very thick sections.

C The highest deposition rate for steel welding is accomplished with Electrogas Welding (EGW) and Electroslag Welding (ESW). Exceptionally thick materials (up to 16 inches thick) can be welded in a single pass. However, the high heat input rates associated with EGW and ESW lead to greater degree of grain growth and other metallurgical changes in the heat affected zone than other welding processes.


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The size of steel plates commonly used in shipbuilding usually ranges from ½ to

7/8 inches thick. The number of weld passes required depends upon the welding process used for joining. Single pass welds can be achieved with SAW, ESW and EGW processes. As joining technologies improve, the manufacturing industry in general is incorporating more types of automatic joining equipment and is expending significant efforts to make automatic welding equipment more efficient. One of the most important approaches, called "intelligent automation," combines automatic joining equipment, the knowledge of human experts in terms of joining, and artificial intelligence (AI). Currently, an AI automation system for arc welding, called WELDEXCELL, is being developed by the American Welding Institute for the U.S. Navy. Less complex systems should be released in the near future by welding robot vendors.

The importance of automating the joining process comes from the observations of Okumoto et al:28 “The improvement of productivity in response to changes in the labor force—related largely to a decreasing number of skilled workers—has become a major concern of production engineering in shipyards. The following problems were pointed up by an analysis of production tasks: (1) Most work time is wasted in the repair or adjustment of inaccuracies, such as wide gap, lap, or deformation in structural components, which are accumulated at the preassembly stage. (2) If the accuracy of fabrication and assembly of hull structures is measurably improved, productivity will rise respectively, and effective mechanization and automation of production can be achieved.” In the mid 1980’s the Japanese ship building industry, supported by the Ministry of Transport, (MOTO) invested in a five year research and development program to develop devices to automate welding, painting, assembly and other shipbuilding processes. This resulted in the evaluation of existing robots and development of the next generation of robots and a scheduling assessment of the number of robots a shipyard worker could properly supervise.29 The operation of a robot in the weld-up of a module requires a robot handling aid. With these the Japanese were able to introduce robots into shipbuilding. Similar work was carried out in the U.S. Maritech program (1997-1999).

An interesting case study on the effect of automation on welding steel is that of Odense Steel Shipyard.30 Odense Steel Shipyard began automating ship production in 1984 with an ESPRIT project to apply computer-integrated manufacturing (CIM) to heavy welded fabrication. In 1987, they entered into a license agreement with Hitachi Zosen and began incorporating NC robots into their automation. They have made a sizable investment in the development of their own proprietary software and hardware to apply these numerically controlled (NC) robots in their ship production. Their robot systems, off-line programming software, welding processes and manufacturing methods are now considered to be among the best in the world. They have


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rationalized and integrated a total shipbuilding factory and improved the efficiency of the application of NC robots. They have also developed proprietary robot handling equipment, programming tools, and process monitoring systems. By 1991 they were producing double hulled tankers with this system, and are currently expanding and improving its performance.

Specialized software was developed by the shipyard to automate the programming of NC robots directly from the CAD ship design data. Their software incorporates rule-based methods to create individual weld path programs from a library of weld process plans. The software also divides the welding tasks for an entire ship panel to create task plans for each welding robot.

Because of the cost savings and improvement in weld quality that can result from using robotic welding, the use of welding robots may be expected to impact high speed ship construction beneficially. An example is provided by the Odense shipyard, which produces various types of vessels, ranging from supply vessels to super tankers in the very large crude carrier (VLCC) class. Throughput is important to this yard’s operation; each production department completes its work on a ship in 60 days, and a ship leaves the shipyard in 10 months.

The yard currently has 26 robots in production that are used in both block assembly and in sub-element fabrication for blocks. Four methods move and position robots for welding double hulled tankers: (1) manual relocation, (2) gantry positions, (3) master-slave gantry positioning, and (4) telescoping boom system for double hulled tankers. Gantry robot application---In the gantry robot application there are four independent gantries mounted on one rail system. Each gantry has three servo-controlled axes to position the robots over the sub-elements to be welded. The track is 68 m. (223 ft) long, and up to two gantry robots can work on the same sub-element at the same time. The shipyard reports that the one-robot-per-gantry system is very flexible and it is easy for one operator to handle multiple gantries. Manual welding speed and robot welding speed differ due to the more efficient process delivery capabilities of the robot. Table 6 lists average welding speeds for both types of welding. An analysis was carried out to compare robot efficiency with manual welding efficiency. Manual welding efficiency---Manual welders range between 10% and 40% arc time. Typically they average between 20% to 30% arc time. The work day consists of 14.4 productive hours on two shifts. Of this, 1.4 hr are used in repair, netting 13 hr of welding each day, or 6.5 hr per shift per welder. For ship sub-elements, 20% of the welding is vertical up and 80% is downhand, yielding an average manual weld speed of 220 mm/minute. Therefore, a person with an arc time between 20% and 30% produces between 16 and 24 m/day of weld.


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Table 6. Welding Speed Comparison

Weld Manual Robot Position Welder Welder Vertical up 100 mm/min 150 mm/min Downhand 250 mm/min 400 mm/min Gantry robot welding efficiency---The gantry robot department produces about 370 sub-elements per ship. With 233 workdays available per year and 60 days per ship, this yields 1440 total sub-elements per year. The average weld length per sub-element is about 100 m; therefore, the average weld length produced per day is:

(1440 subs x 100 m weld/sub)/233 days = 618 m/day As there are four robots, this yields:

618 m/day/4 robots = 155m/robot/day which is equivalent to between 6 and 10 manual welders per robot. Future efficiency improvements---The factors that affect system efficiency are robot availability, material availability, and data availability. One way to measure total system performance is to calculate arc-on-time. For this gantry system the average weld speed for robot welding of the subelements is 350 mm/min. Therefore the average arc-on time for each robot is:

(155 m/350 mm/min)/(14.4 hr/day4 x 60min/hr) = 52% calculated arc time

Because of work schedule rules (required breaks) for this facility, this calculated arc time must be adjusted to obtain true arc time. The adjustment factor is 0.8, therefore the effective arc time is :

52%/0.8 = 65% arc time.

The current goal is to increase effective arc time to 75%, and the shipyard

automation team believes that 82% arc time is possible. When this level of efficiency is achieved, the robots will be producing at the equivalent rate of 5 to 7.5 manual welders per shift.

To achieve these levels, improvements in operator efficiency and machine

availability must be made. The 65% arc time represents 75% of the actual run time. The remaining 25% is used for robot positioning, sensing, calibration, and safety. For this


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system the gantry run time is 87% of the total time, with 13% of the time used for consumables, handling, and setup. This can be expressed as follows:

Arc time % = operator efficiency x machine availability x process efficiency

Currently the shipyard is achieving:

52% = 80% x 87% x 75% In the near term the goal is to improve operator efficiency to 90% and machine availability to 97%, in order to reach arc time efficiency of 75%.

75% = 90% x 97% x 85%. Weld wire deposition rates are compared in Table 7. This shows the success of Odense Steel Shipyard in applying NC robot technology to shipbuilding. They had to modify production processes, the workplace, and the materials to provide a sufficiently structured and controlled environment in which an NC robot can perform its planned tasks. They have shown that careful planning, creation of a technical development staff, involvement of all shipyard disciplines, and a total shipyard commitment are necessary ingredient for successful implementation of this shipbuilding technology.

Table 7. Welding Wire Deposition Estimates and Targets Amount of Weld Source Wire Deposited Odense Shipyard ---- ’93 4,200 kg/robot/yr Best Japanese shipyard --- ’93 3,300 kg/robot/yr Other Japanese shipyards 2,500 kg/robot/yr Odense target 15,000 kg/robot/yr Japanese target 10,000 kg/robot/yr 3.3.1.3.2 Joining Aluminum Alloys Overall, aluminum alloys are not as easy to weld as steel. Fusion welding aluminum alloys requires the use of pulsed arc welding processes. Pulsed arc welding together with an argon-helium gas mixture instead of pure argon permits the penetration required to weld 1-1¼” aluminum to be achieved. However, recent improvements in welding technology, such as square wave AC welding, have made the welding of aluminum alloys less difficult. Also, second generation aluminum-lithium alloys (2195) can be fusion welded, unlike the previous aluminum-lithium alloys. However, some problems do exist when back gouging the weld and re-welding.


27

A recently-developed joining process, called “friction stir welding,” substantially alleviates these problems. Friction stir welding, invented by The Welding Institute in 1991, is a fully penetrating solid-phase joining process that can be used to join aluminum alloys without filler wire or shielding gas.31 The use of friction stir welding for joining or weld repair may reduce or eliminate the buildup of residual stresses. In friction stir welding the two pieces to be joined are firmly clamped, and a rotating tool traverses the surfaces to be bonded. The tool heats the material in the area of the bond to a high temperature below the melting point of the alloy, and physically mixes material from both pieces together along the bond line. Since this is a solid-state welding process, the problems associated with fusion welding alloys no longer exist. There is no solidification structure, no extensive heat affected zone, no segregation, and no weld porosity or inclusions. NASA has successfully used friction stir welded AL-Li alloy 2195 on recent space shuttle flights. Although this process has received rave reviews in the automotive, aerospace, and shipbuilding industries,32 lack of fusion does occur and the nondestructive examination procedures normally employed in the welding and shipbuilding industry (radiography and ultrasound) cannot detect these flaws.

Friction stir welding has received a great deal of attention in the shipbuilding

industry. Its use is limited, however, to relatively thin plate, because of the large clamping forces needed to maintain the positions of the pieces to be joined. It is far from clear that this technology can be used to join the large complex structures required for high speed ships of the future, although it should be thoroughly investigated for the materials under consideration for high speed cargo ships. 3.3.1.3.3 Joining Other Materials Although it is easiest to join members made of the same alloy, it is frequently necessary, especially in lightweight construction, to join dissimilar materials. This causes problems at the joint of fatigue problems resulting from differences in thermal expansion and elastic strain response to stress and, particularly in marine environments, of corrosion. Thus each material combination that must be joined presents unique problems.

a) Joining Steels to Lightweight Alloys The greatest problem in welding dissimilar metals is the possibility of galvanic corrosion. However, applying coatings in the areas near the joints often can alleviate this problem. The common types of dissimilar welds that are found in shipbuilding are aluminum alloys joined to carbon steels. Aluminum cannot be joined to carbon steel using conventional fusion welding (the process normally employed in the ship manufacturing industry). An aluminum-to-steel transition joint, made by a solid-state welding process called explosion welding (also called explosive bonding), is used in such cases. This allows the aluminum side of the transition joint to be welded to aluminum and the steel side to be welded to steel using conventional welding processes typically used in shipbuilding (see Table 5). This technique is employed to join aluminum deckhouses to steel decks on ships. This method


28

is also used in the aerospace industry to make titanium-to-stainless steels transition joints. Other joining techniques such as brazing and high energy processes (e.g. electron beam or plasma welding) can also be employed for joining steels to lightweight alloys.

b) Metal-to-Composite Joining To select the best methods for joining composites to metals, the particular combination of composite and metallic materials to be joined and the design details and/or requirements must be determined. For example, consider joining a carbon-epoxy laminate to a metal section using an adhesive that must perform well in a hot-wet environment. Aluminum is a poor choice for the metal section because the adhesive must be cured at an elevated temperature to develop hot-wet strength. Aluminum has a high coefficient of thermal expansion (CTE) and carbon-epoxy composites have a very low one. This results in thermal stresses in the adhesive bondline at room temperature after the high temperature cure. These stresses can cause the adhesive to fail before any mechanical loads are applied. Aluminum-to-carbon-epoxy composite joints are also highly susceptible to galvanic corrosion. Titanium is a much better choice to join to carbon-epoxy laminates. Since titanium has less than one-half the CTE of aluminum, the effect of thermal stresses is reduced. Titanium is also good for minimizing corrosion.

c) Joining Other Lightweight Materials Joining procedures for lightweight materials that are attractive for high speed ship performance, such as aluminum and titanium alloys, intermetallics and composites, need to be developed. The development effort should characterize joint microstructure and properties under simulated load and environmental conditions. Fusion welding of aluminum alloys, titanium alloys, and intermetallics is more difficult than welding steels. Although Pequot River Shipworks (among others) was successful in manufacturing an aluminum fast ferry using fusion welding,33 significant additional development is needed before the larger structures required for high speed long range cargo ships can be confidently joined with fusion or solid state welding techniques. Sound (crack and void free) welds could not be made using fusion welding for the first generation of Al-Li alloys. Recent advances in alloy development for Al-Li have made fusion welding of these new alloys possible. However, a difficulty which still exists for these new Al-Li alloys is that they cannot be repaired by welding. The added heat from repair welding causes localized residual stress buildup.34 Weld repair techniques that eliminate residual stress buildup need to be developed for these alloys. Friction stir welding should also be investigated for the joining of aluminum-lithium alloys having the thickness needed for high speed ship performance.

Conventional titanium alloys are weldable. However, protection from contamination by the atmosphere (shielding) is more important than it is for steels. Contamination of titanium by oxygen and nitrogen due to poor cleaning results in reduced ductility and toughness. The welding of titanium aluminide intermetallics is even more difficult than conventional titanium alloys. Although major advances in the fusion


29

welding of intermetallics have been made,35,36,37,38,39,40,41,42,43,44 significant additional development is needed before intermetallics can be used in high speed cargo ships.

High strength low alloy steel HSLA-65 is being considered for replacing DH-36 currently used for ship structures. HSLA-65 alloys have been shown to be weldable using 70-series consumables, employing the same conditions currently used in conventional shipbuilding.45 However, Charpy V notch requirements for weld metals in HSLA-65 must be established for both conventional and high speed ships. d) Joining Composites

Composites are candidate materials for lightweight structures for high speed cargo vessels. They present another series of joining problems. Resin-matrix composites can be divided into two categories: thermoset composites (resin chemical reactions occurring during 120EC to 175EC cure) and thermoplastic composites (resin melt fusion between 315EC and 400EC). Thermoset composites can be joined to metals by adhesive bonding, whereas thermoplastic composites can be joined either by adhesive bonding or through the use of a melt-fuse interphase (amorphous) bond. The aircraft industry currently uses a film adhesive called FM300K for joining thermoset composites to titanium. For joining thermoplastics to metals, a thermoplastic film called Ultem is commonly employed for amorphous bonding whereas FM300 and FM73 are used for adhesive bonding. Generally speaking, adhesives used to join composite materials will have an adverse affect on other materials. Corrosive materials, flammable liquids, and toxic substances are commonly used in adhesive bonding. Therefore, manufacturing operations are subject to the application of extensive safety procedures, protective devices, and protective clothing. 3.3.1.3.4 Development of Joint Quality Tests for High Speed Conditions Once sound joints are made using alloys that are not traditionally employed in the shipbuilding industry, the mechanical properties and joint integrity must be determined. Conventional testing such as tensile testing and varestraint testing can be used to some extent. However, these testing methods will have to be modified to simulate the loads that the joints will experience at high speeds. These tests will have to performed under conditions that simulate a marine environment. Definition of test conditions, and methods of simulating in-service test conditions, must be defined in order to generate the data necessary for classification societies to accept non-traditional materials and the joints between them in high speed cargo ships. At present, the definition of these conditions is not fully developed.


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3.3.2 ABS High speed Craft Guide – Materials

The ABS-HSC Guide gives requirements for hulls constructed of various materials, and these requirements frequently specify general process parameters. Examples are given below. This means that process development work (establishment of equipment, process procedures and parameters) must be coordinated with the classification societies before new manufacturing methods can be used in the construction of high speed ships.

Aluminum: Section 2/4 – Materials and Testing, and Appendix 2E - Welding Section 2/4 gives requirements for test methods, and the minimum mechanical properties to be test attained for the various alloys in plate, extruded or cast form. Appendix 2E give requirements for weld procedures, workmanship, preparation for welding, production welding, filler metals, mechanical properties and welder qualification. Fiber Reinforced Plastic: Section 2/5 Materials and Testing This section covers resins, liquid and cured conditions mechanical properties; core materials, reinforcing materials, laminates and core and laminate mechanical properties. It also describes the various fabrication procedures that are acceptable and gives general guidance on fabrication, including sandwich panel lay-ups and secondary bonding. Steel: The material requirements for steel are given in a separate ABS Rule booklet. Quality Control: The section of the Guide on Materials and Testing also includes detailed requirements for quality control of the builder’s facilities and the building process description on which the quality control is based, covering:

1.1 building facilities - materials storage - mold construction - laminating premises - equipment

1.2 material specifications and data sheets 1.3 receiving materials 1.4 laminating procedure 1.5 inspection


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1.6 fault correction Requirements are given for quality control, and, in addition, the optional detailed requirements for ABS certification of the builders quality assurance system. 3.3.3 Example: Adoption of Design-to-Cost and Build Approach in Recent U. S. Commercial Ship Construction of Matson’s MV R.J. Pfeiffer at NASSCO. As an example of the problems that might be encountered in constructing a high speed sealift vessel, the following history is supplied. In January 1990 Matson Navigation Company contracted with National Steel Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) to build the diesel containership MV R.J. Pfeiffer,46 summarized in Table 8. This vessel is comparable to high speed sealift designs in Table 2, in that it posed the application of a design somewhat different than traditional designs. In addition, it involved the collaboration of domestic and overseas shipyards in the design and build of the ship. The experience of designing bidding, contracting and building the containership was summarized by Hasket et al.47 This experience is expected to be applicable to building a high speed sealift as a commercial vessel, which will have to meet requirements of the ship owner. Matson’s business analysis indicated a need for this containership. They proceeded in the following steps:

I. Working with a naval architecture firm, Matson established the containership mission, essential ship characteristics to fulfill the mission and a preliminary ship design which was denoted as an inquiry package.

II. While developing the preliminary design Matson communicated with seven U.S. shipyards qualified on basis of 1. shipyard size and capacity 2. previous commercial experience 3. adequate management and technical staff 4. shipyard interest 5. adequate financial strength.

III. By January 1988 two U.S. shipyards dropped out due to overriding commitments to Navy shipbuilding program. The Matson group visited the remaining five U.S. shipyards to discuss the planned acquisition process. This process required that: 1. Shipyards prepare their own contract design to satisfy Matson

preliminary design requirements outlined in the inquiry package 2. Down-selection of the finalists to three would be based on the

contract design and cost.

IV. By August 25, 1988 the inquiry package was sent to three shipyards. The shipyards had five months (February 1989) to prepare the contract and bid. Two of the U.S. Shipyards subcontracted overseas for design assistance, one with Gotaverlain and Trans Consultants in Sweden, and the other with Odense shipyard, Denmark. One shipyard was unable to obtain a performance bond for the $80 million containership. A second dropped


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out leaving National Steel and Shipbuilding Company (NASSCO) as the sole bidder.

Table 8. Particulars of MV R.J. Pfeiffer

Item Units Notes Length Lpp Beam Draft Displacement Displacement Speed Engine Containers Cargo weight Cargo weight ratio

m m m m3

Long Tons Knots - - tons -

205.1 32.2 10.52 36,868 35,215 23 Slow Special Diesel 1980 19,008 0.53

Full Load Full Load Full Load Design Twenty foot equivalents TEU Estimated 8.6 ton/TEU estimated

V. The NASSCO Bid submitted on February 1989 was:

1. $40 million over Matson’s budget. 2. Qualified with numerous exceptions to design. 3. Supported by no performance bond.

When NASSCO received Matson’s inquiry package in August 1988, NASSCO

found: 1. The Matson preliminary design was more specific and detailed than

a typical commercial contract design with which they were used to working.

2. With forward and aft deckhouses, dedicated multi-deck auto garage, bulk cargo tanks, luxurious accommodation standards and system redundancies, it was a very expensive ship.

3. The pro forma contract was heavily skewed in favor of the owner at the expense of the shipyard.

NASSCO personnel also noted: “From a technical standpoint, we were very concerned that the specificity and detail of the “preliminary” design package would limit our ability to apply innovative design solutions or producibility improvements. In other words, the key design elements, especially the cost drivers, had been already cast in concrete by the owner. This turned out to be the case. We had very little choice other than to develop our “contract” design and bid based strictly on the Matson “preliminary” design. This led to the over-budget pricing”.

The failure to meet budget led to a new approach: design to cost and build which was adopted by Matson and NASSCO. This was completed in two steps. In April 1989 Matson contracted for design development with NASSCO and Odense Shipyard for a


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containership similar to the Maerisk Line “L” and “M” class containerships built by Odense. The effort focused on design and cost reduction. It was organized as follows:

• Hull technical and structural plans – Odense • Machinery Arrangement & Diagrammatic Plans – Odense • Electrical Power Systems and Controls – Odense • Specifications – NASSCO/Matson • Accommodation/pilot house – NASSCO/Matson

The running estimate of the vessel cost was maintained during the design. It was found that while this effort did cut costs, the redesigned containership was still more expensive than Matson had budgeted.

VI. In January 1990 the contract was signed for a construction cost of $129.4

million dollars with a delivery date of June 1992 (28 months). The construction and delivery was completed in the following schedule: Jan. 1990 – Jan. 3, 1991 - Completion of design and construction documents (12 months)

Jan. 8, 1991 - First plate of steel cut – Month 12 March 27, 1991 - First subassembly in Gravingdock – Month 14 February 15, 1992 - Christening and Float out – Month 24 June 24, 1992 – Engine Trials – Month 28 July 11, 1992 - Dock Trials – Month 29 August 8, 1992 – Sea Trials – Month 30 August 9, 1992 – Delivery – Month 30.

The total cost of the ship was $130.1 million, which reflected $700,000 of owner- initiated charge orders.

3.3.3.1 Lessons Learned The experience taught lessons, both for the shipyard and for the owners of the vessel: NASSCO personnel indicated that the primary lesson to be learned from Matson’s experience is that the substantive involvement by the owner with a shipyard, from the earliest stages of requirements definition, will result in delivery of a quality ship, at the best possible price and schedule. Odense Shipyard personnel provided a more detailed discussion of lessons learned for owners:

• Buy ships built in series • Specify strict requirements only • Leave actual design to shipyard • Reduce amount of required tender documentation

(More affordable to yards, so more yards are prepared to bid).


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They also had advice for shipyards:

• Increase the efforts into design for production and production engineering. • Use “short cuts” to get down the learning curve by, e.g., joining forces

with relevant shipyards already there. 3.3.3.2 Drawing Parallels for High speed Sealift Vessel Production

To some extent the High speed Sealift Workshop has moved the project forward through steps I and II described in the MV R.J. Pheiffer example given above. The U.A. team has visited three shipyards, Avondale, Halter and Ingalls, paralleling step III. The team found that Ingalls and Bath have designs with steel hulls that, while quite different, appear to be acceptable for commercial service and meet the goals of shipping 2,000 metric tons 4,000 nautical miles at speeds up to 60 knots. The next step would be design to cost: step VI. The team should initiate the design to cost reflecting the near term availability of lightweight materials such as aluminum, aluminum honeycombs as well as composite materials. They should evaluate this impact on the design to cost described in step VI. It is obvious from the discussion of the Sealand SL-7 program and the Matson experience that a multi-ship acquisition will reap the maximum cost benefit.

3.3.3.3 U.S. Shipyard Productivity

The NASSCO Fabrication to delivery of the containership MV Pfeiffer was January 1991 to August 9, 1992 – 18 months. This is compared to other fabrication to delivery times in Table 9. It would appear from the comparisons that a Japanese shipyard would have delivered the MV Pfeiffer in 10-11 months if it were among their portfolio of standard designs.48,49 It would also appear that U.S. shipyards were at a significant disadvantage in the international market regarding delivery times in the 1980’s and 1990’s.

Table 9. Comparison of Fabrication to Delivery Times

Date Vessel Builder Months to Deliver 1980 18,000 Dwt. Oiler US shipyard 35 1981 40,000 Dwt. Tanker US shipyard 24 1983 Mobilization Ship US shipyard 18 1983 40,000 Dwt. Tanker US shipyard 17 1986 25,000 Dwt. Oiler US shipyard 29 1988 Mobilization Ship Japanese shipyard 10 1991 39,000 Container Ship NASSCO 18 1993 290,000 Dwt. Tanker Japanese shipyard 11

This short delivery time in the Japanese shipyard is due to three factors.

1. Japanese mastery of ship production planning


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2. Japanese reliable and economic vendor base 3. Integration of the vessel design for ship production.

3.3.4 Evaluating an Alternate Hull Structure for Construction Daidala50 has discussed in some detail how an alternate structural system could be evaluated for construction. He outlines a series of steps, which include:

I. Synthesis of the structural system alternatives into a set of drawings for

design and production comparisons II. Preparation of estimates for each structural system alternative, including:

1. Weight of structure based on midship section and scanting plan. 2. Schedule – contract to delivery 3. Contract and detail man-hours 4. Design man-hours.

This can be done using a portion of the hull midbody – keel to main deck, extending from a transverse bulkhead to the next. The hull can than be broken down into the component parts and the measurement of length of cutting, edge preparation, welding or adhesive can be estimated for the construction man-hours comparison. The construction man-hour estimate and schedule would take into account 15 entries:

1. Amount of welding 2. Type and number of frames, and stiffeners 3. Number of unique parts 4. Total number of parts 5. Number, type, and position of joints 6. Self-alignment and support 7. Need for jigs and fixtures 8. Work position 9. Number of physical turns/moves before completion 10. Dimensional control 11. Space access and staging 12. Standardization 13. Number of compartments to be entered to complete work 14. Degree to which pre-outfitting and machinery/piping package units

can be accommodated 15. Accuracy control.

These would allow the shipyard-design team to properly evaluate the cost benefit of each system for the high speed sealift vessel.


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3.3.5 Summary

Technical issues remain to be resolved for joining metals and for joining composites to metals in high speed ship systems. The major issues of concern for joining metals in building high speed ships are:

1. The performance of joints is unknown at high speeds (which presumably implies high loads) over long periods of time in a marine environment.

2. Thus it is necessary to evaluate whether existing metal joining processes are adequate for high speed ships.

The major concerns regarding composites in HSS shipbuilding are:

1. How can large (compared to those used in the aerospace industry) composite sections be manufactured?

2. How can these large composite sections be joined? Based upon the evaluation of existing manufacturing technologies and the technical issues remaining to be resolved, an assessment matrix was constructed for technical concerns in HSS shipbuilding (Table 9). The four major areas of technology concern in HSS shipbuilding are forming, joining, inspection, and safety and environment. The components assessed were hull form, decking, hull, and superstructure. Steel, aluminum, titanium, and composites were the materials assessed for the hull, decking and superstructure. The forming capabilities of steel, aluminum, and titanium are well documented in the literature. For composites, the issue of whether large (relative to those used in the aerospace industry) composite parts can be manufactured remains to be answered. Under normal conditions at the speeds presently employed for ships, no major problems exist for welded metal joints and inspection methods. However, the performance of welds and inspection methods at high speeds is unknown. Safety and environmental concerns exist for using titanium and composites. Fire concerns exist for titanium. For composites, the substances commonly used in adhesive bonding are usually corrosive, flammable and toxic. Beyond these technical problems are problems of owner/designer/shipyard coordination, communication and information. Because ship design and build takes a significant amount of time, during which owners, designers and yards may change or be forced to change specifications, economical construction of ships requires a high degree of coordination between all parties responsible for the final vessel. In building a high speed cargo ship, for which there are no existing models, this coordination will be crucial if the vessel is to be obtained on-time, within cost estimates, and perform satisfactorily. In building such a ship, coordination with classification societies will also be required. Thus the management aspects of shipbuilding must be emphasized for profitable construction of high speed cargo ships.


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Table 9. HSS Shipbuilding Technology Concerns

Hull Form Forming Joining Inspection Safety and Environment

Monohull 4 U U N/A

Multihull 2 U U N/A

Hull

Material

Steel 4 3 3 4

Aluminum 3 2 2.5 4

Titanium 3 2 2.5 2

Composites MU U U 2

Decking

Material

Steel 4 3 3 4

Aluminum 4 2 2 4

Titanium 2.5 2 2.5 2

Composites MU U U 2

Superstructure

Material

Steel 4 3 3 4

Aluminum 4 2 2.5 4

Titanium 2.5 2 2.5 2

Composites MU U U 2

Rankings: 4 = excellent; 3 = good; 2 = fair; 1 = poor; U = unknown performance in this application;

MU = ability to manufacture large sections unknown


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3.4 Gulf Coast Shipbuilding Technology R.C. Foley, University of South Alabama There is often doubt expressed as to whether large shipyards that have specialized in U.S. Navy ship construction will ever be able to become commercially competitive. The traditional Navy acquisition process and economic incentives conflict with business practices required for commercial effectiveness. While the Navy is exploring the benefits of adopting commercial business practices and standards, smaller shipyards have begun to exploit their commercial opportunities. Gulf Coast shipyards emphasizing defensible, profitable, specialty niche markets (e.g., deep water drilling ships, casino boats, offshore support vessels) have experienced an industrial resurgence. Located in the temperate climate close to the Gulf of Mexico, the Gulf Coast is the most active and productive shipbuilding region in the United States. Located within the region are two of the “Big Six” shipbuilding companies, Ingalls and Avondale, now both owned by Litton Industries; a commercial contract for oceangoing vessels among the first to be built for export in 40 years at Alabama Shipyards; and a shipyard that has recently signed a joint venture with a major foreign supplier of fast ferries, Bender Shipbuilding and Repair. Shipbuilding and ship repair employees of the Gulf Coast form a larger share of the manufacturing industry than is typical in other shipbuilding regions of the country (see Table 10). Examination of the status of Gulf Coast shipbuilding technology therefore provides a good representation of the current environment and competitiveness of shipbuilding throughout the country.

Table 10. Shipbuilding and Repair Employees As a Share of Manufacturing Employees, 1995

LOCATION SHIPBUILDING SHARE

San Diego County 5.1% Louisiana 6.9% Alabama 5.0% Mississippi* 4 – 10% Virginia 5.8% United States (total) 0.5% *Because of disclosure rules, the Census Bureau only reports a range of values for people employed by SIC 3731 in Mississippi Source: Bureau of the Census 3.4.1 Shipyard Descriptions Alabama Shipyard Inc., Mobile, AL Atlantic Marine, Inc. (ship repair and conversion) and Alabama Shipyard, Inc. (new construction) share facilities near Mobile Bay across from downtown Mobile, AL. Specializing in the construction of steel-hulled vessels for the international commercial market, Alabama Shipyard is constructing ships up to a maximum size of 950 ft (290 m)


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by 160 ft (49 m). A recent contract with a Danish export customer, Dannebrog Rederi AS, to construct two 16,000 dwt IMO II chemical tankers (with an option for a third) is the largest export contract ever in the state of Alabama. The double hull tankers were designed by Skipkonsulent AS of Norway and are approximately 144 meters long, 23 meters wide, and 12.4 meters deep. Delivery of the first vessel was in May 1997, and the second vessel was delivered in December 1998. Alabama sees opportunities in the double hull tanker market, as well as in the articulated tug/barge market. The shipyard has designed two different sizes for the barge units and is currently marketing these designs.51 Litton/Avondale Industries, New Orleans, LA Avondale’s main shipyard is located on the Mississippi River twelve miles upriver from the Port of New Orleans. Avondale has used modular construction technology since 1982 to build ships. Avondale has the capacity to design, fabricate and assemble most types of ships, and is primarily a manufacturer of oceangoing vessels for the military and commercial markets. Vessel classifications include U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships, fleet support ships, surface combatants, Coast Guard icebreakers and cutters, product and chemical carriers, lighter aboard ships (LASH vessels), and dredges. Avondale presently has a Healey Class Coast Guard Icebreaker, 125,000 dwt 1 million barrel ARCO double-hull tankers, and the fourth of six T-AKR “Bob Hope” class sealift vessels under construction. Avondale also leads the corporate team that won the Navy’s $642 million LPD-17 contract. This is the Navy’s first class of large ships to be designed using three-dimensional design techniques. Twenty-five million of the contracted price will go for an unprecedented array of computer hardware and software provided by Intergraph Corp. Litton Industries, which owns Ingalls Shipbuilding Division (see below) has recently acquired Avondale. At this writing, however, the two divisions continue to operate independently. Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co., Inc., Mobile, AL Bender is a newbuild and ship repair facility on the central Gulf of Mexico. New construction projects are typically special-use vessels; more than 800 Bender-built ships currently operate world-wide: crabbers, offshore supply vessels, shrimp boats, factory trawlers, riverboats, passenger vessels, tuna seiner, tug boats, etc. Bender has recently signed a joint venture with Austal Ships of Australia, a leading supplier of high speed catamaran ferries.52,53 The joint venture, to be located in Mobile, will build ferries for the American market to satisfy Jones Act requirements. The yard is expected to open in the summer of 2,000. Austal has expressed interest in building high speed sealift craft for the U.S. market, and intends to become a major supplier of high speed craft worldwide.


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Bollinger Shipyards Inc., New Orleans, LA Bollinger’s Lockport yard is a new construction. Situated on 250 acres, this new construction site offers over 400,000 square feet of indoor fabrication shops of under-roof construction. Employing computer-aided manufacturing in cutting and machining along with computer-aided design capabilities, Bollinger can design, build and deliver vessels of up to 400 feet in length in aluminum, steel, and fiberglass. They are currently focused on a contract for patrol boats for the U.S. Coast Guard. Halter Marine Group Inc., Gulfport, MS Halter Marine Group, Inc. claims to be the world’s most versatile shipbuilder. They have designed, built, repaired or converted over 2600 vessels. They build ships of steel, aluminum or composites with a large production capacity in 22 U.S. shipyards. Current U.S. Navy construction projects include the T-AGS Ocean Survey Ships and T-AGOS Ocean Surveillance Ships. Halter is also active internationally with co-production and technology transfer programs. Advanced technology and methods are employed, such as computer-aided design and manufacturing, modular construction, and zone outfitting. Halter is the largest producer in the United States of advanced diesel-electric vessels and it has built vessels with propulsion systems ranging from propellers and paddlewheels to water jets and steerable Z-Pellers and cycloidal propulsion. Halter has recently merged with Friede Goldman International.54 However, the future of the shipyards that have the most experience in building high speed vessels is unclear at this time. Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding Division, Pascagoula, MS Ingalls Shipbuilding division of Litton Industries is a systems company for the design, engineering, construction, life cycle and fleet support, repair and modernization of advanced surface combatant ships for the U.S. and international navies, and for commercial marine structures of all types. Located in Pascagoula, Ingalls is Mississippi’s largest private employer, with 10,900 employees. Since 1975, Ingalls has delivered 76 new major surface warships into the U.S. Navy’s fleet. Current Navy construction projects include the DDG-51 Guided Missile Cruisers and LHD Amphibious Assault Ships. Additionally, dozens of other naval combatants have returned to Ingalls over the years for modernization and overhaul-related projects. Ingalls is also a major participant in the offshore commercial market, principally in the areas of drilling rig construction, repair and overhaul, and in the construction of advanced, deepwater offshore supply vessels. In October 1998, Ingalls was chosen to complete final negotiations for the contract to build the first major cruise ships to be launched in the U.S. in over 40 years. The contract calls for two $400 million Hawaiian cruise ships and an option for four more, for American Classic Voyages, Inc.


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McDermott Shipbuilding, Inc., New Orleans, LA McDermott Shipbuilding, Inc. (MSI) offers advanced ship designs, project management, procurement, shipbuilding, ship repair and construction management services to shipowners worldwide. MSI operates two shipyards. The newly refurbished TNG shipyard in Veracruz, Mexico builds ships to Panamax size and also provides repairs, maintenance and structural fabrication. The McDermott shipyard in Morgan City, LA, is a builder of river and ocean class barges using automated efficient techniques to supply standardized fuel, deck and hopper barges. Trinity Industries, Gulfport, MS The Halter Marine Group acquired many of Trinity’s shipyards in 1996. Trinity Industries, however, retains yards that build inland barges. 3.4.2 Maritech at Gulf Coast Shipyards

The Maritech program and projects have been essential ingredients in improving the effectiveness of Gulf Coast shipyards. Under the program many facets of Gulf Coast shipyards have undergone change and revision. Some shipyard executives have used Maritech as an opportunity to focus corporate market strategy. In addition to the individual projects at Gulf Coast yards that are reviewed below Maritech also sponsored industry-wide projects designed to improve infrastructure technologies required for virtual business operations and electronic information exchange. The participation of Gulf Coast yards in these projects was displayed in Tables 2 and 3. All of these Maritech projects are expected to impact high speed cargo ship design and manufacturing technology. Indeed, many of the projects anticipated the needs of high speed shipbuilders in fabrication technologies and information exchange. Alabama Shipyard Inc. Alabama’s Maritech involvement has been critical to its long-term competitiveness strategy. Its management feels that it has overcome early problems with cost estimation and market forecasting and is positioned to further improve processes. • Two ships were designed, marketed and sold on the international market. • Improved accuracy control from using CAD/CAM software and workstations to

reduce interferences and re-work saved 20% on production labor hours. • Use of dedicated pipe fabrication and blast coating facilities improved quality and

reduced re-work.

Litton/Avondale Industries Avondale’s Maritech experience has been extremely useful, and the company is committed to increasing its commercial portfolio of complex ships. • The factory project yielded productivity improvements of 15%.


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• The “standard tanker design” in the early Maritech tanker program provided up-front experience that enabled the company to facilitate an early start on the ARCO contract and some reduction in cycle time.

• Using improved CAD/CAM software tools and experience gained in the pre-award design work enabled Avondale to start cutting steel in seven months on the ARCO tanker contract.

Bender Shipbuilding and Repair Co. Bender credits two Maritech projects concentrating on design with improving its production planning, which resulted in the design of the Reefer 21, the construction of two off-shore supply vessels and four more under contract, and a Multi-Mission Cargo Ship design. Through the Reefer 21 project, Bender learned how to develop a build strategy and began considering improvements to the yard’s material flow and processes. Its yard is fully networked using fiber optic cables, and it is now using 3D software, including AutoCAD. The new CAD and layout software has reduced the time spent re-piping and re-running pipe by 30%, saving 4-5,000 man-hours per ship. It is also creating better production packages. • Production Processes: Bender’s first approach concentrating on designs was not the

correct one. After examining various markets and foreign yards, it realized that shipbuilding processes are the keys to being competitive. This led to adopting new software systems, 3D design and robotic welding, and networking the yard.

• Technology: Bender perceives that technology implementation (learning to use efficiently the technology that they have) is what U.S. yards should be concentrating on, rather than technology development. Bender was greatly influenced by the foreign yards’ superior processes and accuracy controls. Many of its computer enhancements, automated welding, and laser cutting projects are a direct result of this influence.

Bollinger Shipyards, Inc. The Stewart and Associates Simulation-Based Design Tool produced savings of 10% on material and production costs, as well as reducing the time required to develop proposals by a factor of four. Also, Bollinger changed to AutoCAD during the Maritech program. This change from its previous CAD/CAM program reduced the design process by a factor of five. • Bollinger learned to team with vendors from the start of the project. It discovered that

including them as part of the teams in the beginning committed them to the delivery of the entire product, not just their piece of it.

Halter Marine Group, Inc. Halter’s Maritech programs resulted in the following designs: one 23K dwt Container/Bulk Carrier, three Container Feeders, and ten Fast Car Passenger Ferry designs. Halter recently completed building a prototype 42.5 m High Speed, Low Wake Passenger Ferry that was demonstrated at the October 1998 IMTA conference.55 Halter improved its material flow at its Pascagoula yard and realized that it could build larger


43

ships at that facility. In addition, it is now using light gage aluminum construction techniques and has re-oriented a production facility to begin aluminum fabrication of ferries. • International Competitiveness: As a result of Maritech, Halter has made a

commitment to enter the Large Fast Ferry market internationally, using designs acquired through the program. It has been able to make a significant number of potential international customer contacts and has three potential customers who are interested in various types of large fast ferries and high speed, low wake ferries. Since the merger with Freide-Goldman, however, the future of these plans has become unclear.

• Foreign Associations and Teaming: Halter worked with foreign designers, test facilities, shipyards and owners on its Maritech projects.

• Litton/Ingalls Shipbuilding Division Prior to participation in Maritech, Ingalls’ use of robotic welding was 2 – 5%. Through the use of automated welding processes developed in Maritech, Ingalls plans to increase the use of robotic welding to 5 – 9%. • Teaming: Maritech programs offered Ingalls its first opportunity to team with foreign

yards in cruise ship design, and domestic yards’ they plan to continue teaming arrangements.

• Processes: Ingalls tried to adopt some of the commercial processes found in other yards; however, approval of the Navy has not been received yet on some of those processes.

3.4.3 Fast Ferry Designs Available to Gulf Coast Shipbuilders

The present state of the art in high speed vessel design is focussed on fast ferries.

It is logical to conclude that the next evolutionary step in high speed cargo ships will build on current fast ferry experience. For this reason, the ability to design and construct fast ships based on ferry designs is a necessary requirement to compete in the high speed sealift market. Fast ferry designs available to Gulf Coast Shipbuilders are summarized in Table 11. The Table does not include the range of Austal Ships’ designs that have now become available to the Bender-Austal joint venture. This new entry into the domestic fast craft market is expected to re-vitalize the North American fast ferry shipbuilding market, which has recently seen the closing of Pequot River Shipyards, and the announcement that BC Ferries is exiting the fast ferry construction market.


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Table 11. Available U.S. Gulf Coast Ferry Designs*

Ferry Name

L (M)

B (M)

T (M)

Speed (Knots)

Displacement (MT)

Passengers Car Engine Builder

Catamaran

32 10 1.5 32 100 150-300 - 2 Diesel Swiftships

E-Cat 45 11.6 1.3 35 - 250-400 - Diesel or Gas Turbine

Halter Marine Group

HSM 150

67 11.7 2.4 35 650 250 40 4 Diesel Halter Marine Group

HSM 280

91.5 15 2.4 35 1200 450 85 Gas TurbineWater Jet

Halter Marine Group

Trinity Sea Flight

116 31.5 4.2 35 2,000 400-1500 100-300

2 Gas Turbines

Halter Marine Group

HST 630

150 30 5 33 3300 900 216 2 Gas Turbines

Halter Marine Group

HST 800

165 30 5 31 4,000 1200 288 6 Gas Turbines

Halter Marine Group

HST 850

185 35 5 31 5,000 1500 360 Halter Marine Group

Transatlantic Pentamaran

60 Halter Marine Group (U.S. Licensee)

*Does not include Austal designs available through the Bender/Austal joint venture. Source: Swift Ships Halter Marine Group (now part of Friede Goldman International Inc.) R. Latorre, University of New Orleans


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4.0 References 1 For an example of one of these programs, readers are referred to the International Technology Research Institute at Loyola College of Maryland. Information on recent studies, and copies of reports of recent studies are available at http://itri.loyola.edu. 2 Land Power Essay Series “Move Faster” – Strategic Mobility in the 21st Century,” Final Draft, 8/4/98, p. 3, para. 4. 3 Manninen, M, and J. Jaatinen, Production Method and System to Control Dimensional Uncertainties at Final Assembly Stages in Ship Production,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 8, no. 4 (November, 1992). 4 Rogness, J, “Breaking the Chains of Tradition and Fantasy – A Revolutionary Approach to the Constraints on Productivity,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 8, no. 2 (May, 1992). 5 Kennell, C., D. Lavis and M. Templeman, “High Speed Sealift Technology,” SNAME Marine Technology, vol. 35 (July 1998), p. 135. 6 Levander,K, “Fast and Efficient Monohull Ferries,” Paper IMTA 98, New Orleans, October 1998. 7 Dannecker, J.D., T.P. McCue and R.H. Mayer, “SOCV: A sealift Option for Commercial Viability,” paper I, SNAME Transportation, Operations, Management and Economic Symposium, New York, 1997. 8 Lindstrom, J., Sirvio, J., and A.Yli-Rantala, “Super-Slender Monohull with Outriggers,” Proc. FAST ’95, Lubeck, Germany, 1995, p. 295. 9 Gee, N., “The Economically Viable Fast Freighter,” Paper 15, RINA Conf., Fast Freight Transportation by Sea, London, December 1998. 10 Bowden, J., “SEV, The Ingalls 55 Knot, 20,000 ton Surface Effect Vehicle,” SNAME-ASNE Gulf Section Meeting, Biloxi, December 1995. 11 Anon, “Halter and Bazan Form Joint Venture,” Marine News, January 25, 1999, p. 27. 12 Boylston, J.W., de Koff, D.J. Muntjewerf, “SL-7 Containerships Design, Construction, and Operational Experience,” Transactions SNAME, vol. 82, 1974, pp. 427-478. 13 A. Walker, “Korea’s newbuilding price policies: How they hurt us and what we can do about it,” Marine Log, vol. 105, no.1 (Jan., 2,000), p. 11. 14 “Clinton Unveils His Strategy for U.S. Shipyard Competitiveness,” Marine Log, November, 1993, p. 19. 15 Maritech Advanced Shipbuilding Enterprise Strategic Investment Plan, June 1, 1998, Sponsored by the Executive Control Board of the National Shipbuilding Research Program. 16 Maritech Program Impacts on Global Competitiveness of the U.S. Shipbuilding Industry and Navy Ship Construction, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, July 1, 1998. 17 “$53,000,000 Research Boost for U.S. Shipbuilding,” Marine Log, vol. 105, no. 4 (April, 2000), p. 26. 18 Hughes, O., Ship Structural Design, A Rationally-based, Computer-aided, Optimization Approach, SNAME, New Jersey, 1995. 19 Wood, W.A., Hunter, J. A. “TRICAT High Speed Ferry-Redesign for the U.S. Market” Marine Technology, vol. 35 No. 1, 1999. pp 45-54.


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20 Sarabia, D. and Gutierrez, “A Return to Merchant Ship Construction: The International Impact of The NSRPad American Technology.” Journal of Ship Production, Vol. 8, No. 1. 1992, pp. 28-35. 21 Shin, J. G. Kin, W.D. “Kinematic Analysis of the Process Planning for Compounding Ship Hull Plates,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 13, No. 1, 1997, pp. 28-35. 22 Lleda, Y. Murakawa, H., Rashwan, A.M. Neki, L. Kamichik, R. Ishinyama, M. Ogawa, J. “Development of Computer-Aided Plate Bending by Line-Heating (Report 3),” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 10, No. 4, 1994, pp. 248-257. 23 Scully, K., “Laser Line Heating”, Journal of Ship Production, vol. 3., No. 4, 1987, pp. 237-246. 24 Slim, J.G. Kim, W. D., Lee, J. H. “An Integrated Approach for the Computerized Processing of Curved Hull Plates,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 14, No. 2, 1998, pp. 124-133. 25Anon, “A Director of Skilled Trades, Training Courses and Training Aids in U.S. Shipyards,” NSRP Report, No. 0818., December 1983. 26Latorre, R. Birman V., “Soviet Technique for Estimating Post-Welded Deflection: Case of Butt Welding”, Journal of Ship Production, vol. 5, 1985, pp. 10-15. 27Michaleris, P., DeBiccari, “A Predictive Technique for Buckling Analysis of Thin Section Panels Due to Welding,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 12, No. 4, 1996 pp. 269-275. 28 Okumoto, Matsuzaki, S., “Approach to Accurate Production of Hull Structures” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 13, No. 3, 1997, pp. 207-214. 29 Williams, P. and Orrick, P. “Are Portable Welding Robots A Practical Shipbuilding Tool?” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 8, No. 3, 1997, pp. 148-156. 30 Reeve, R. and Rongo, R. “Shipbuilding Robotics and Economics” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 12, No. 1, 1996, pp. 49-58. 31 Kalee, S., “TWI Works on Friction Stir Welding for Lightweight Automotive Structures,” Metallurgica, vol. 64, p. 119. 32 Johnson, M.R., “Friction Stir Welding Shows Great Promise for Joining Difficult-to-Weld Materials,” vol. 76, no. 6 (1998), p. 20. 33 Irving, b., “The Pequot Tribal Nation Enters the Fast Ferry Boat Business,” Welding Journal, vol. 77, no. 12 (1998), p. 33. 34 Chien, P, “Welding the Space Shuttle’s Al-Li External Tank Presents a Challenge,” Welding Journal, vol. 77 no. 6 (1988), p. 45. 35 Anand, P and V. Acoff, “Analysis of Welds in Gamma Titanium Aluminide,” Microstructural Science, (in press). 36 Bharani, D.J., and Acoff, V.L., Autogenous Gas Tungsten Arc Weldability of Cast Alloy Ti-48Al-3Cr-2Nb (at%) Versus Extruded Alloy Ti-46Al-2Cr-2Nb-0.9Mo (at%),” Met. and Mater. Trans. A, vol. 29A (3A), p. 927.


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37 Acoff, V.L., R.G. Thompson and R.D. Rubin, “The Effect of Postweld Heat Treatment on Ti-14%A-21%Nb Fusion Zone Structure and Hardness,” Welding Journal, vol. 74, no.1 (1995), p. 1s. 38 Acoff, V.L., R.G. Thompson, R.D. Griffing and B. Radhakrishnan, Mat. Sci. and Eng., vol. A152, (1992), p. 304. 39 Arenas, M, and V.L. Acoff, “Computer Simulation of Welds in Titanium Aluminide Intermetallics,” Trends in Welding Research: Proceedings of the 5th International Conference, (in press). 40 Acoff, V.L., and M. Arenas, “Evolution of the Fusion Zone Microstructure during Autogenous Gas Tungsten Arc Welding of Gamma Titanium Aluminide,” Joining of Advanced and Specialty Materials, ASM International, Materials Park, OH, 1998, p. 101. 41 Acoff, V.L., P. Anand and D. Bharani, “Characterization of Welds in Gamma Titanium Aluminides,” Advanced Materials and Processing – PRICM3, TMS, Warrendale, PA, 1998, p 2235. 42 Baeslack II, W., T.J. Mascorella and T.J. Kelly, Welding Journal, vol. 68, no. 12 (1989), p. 483s. 43 Kelly, T.J., Proc. Third Internat. SAMPE Mater. Conf. 1992, p. M183. 44 Mallory, L.C., W.A. Baeslack III, and D. Phillips, J Mat. Sci. Let., vol .13, p. 106. 45 Konkol, P.J., J.L. Warren, and P.A. Hebert, Welding Journal, vol. 77, no. 9 (1998), p. 361-s. 46 Blake, W.K., Chen, Y.K. Walter, D. Briggs, R. “Design and Sea Trial Evaluation of the Containership MV. Pfeiffer for Low Vibration,” Trans. SNAME, vol. 102, 1994, pp. 107-136. 47 Haskell, A.J., Briggs, R. “Contracting for the Building of a Containership in the U.S. – A Buyer’s Story,” Trans. SNAME, vol. 101, 1993, pp. 195-214. 48 Bunch, H.M., “Comparison of the Construction Planning and Manpower Schedules for Building the PD-214 General Mobilization Ship in a U.S. Shipyard and in a Japanese Shipyard,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 3, No. 1, 1987. 49 Nierenberg, A.B. and Caronna, S.C., “Proven Benefits of Advanced Shipbuilding Technology: Actual Case Studies of Recent Comparative Construction Programs,” Journal of Ship Production, Vol. 6, No. 3, 1990. 50 Daidola, J.C. “A Plan for Identifying More Producible Structure for Tankers,” Journal of Ship Production, vol. 10, No. 2, May 1994 , pp. 73-81. 51 Levert, E.C., “Alabama’s Ships are Coming In Again,” Business Alabama Monthly, November 1998. 52 “Good Fit”, Marine Log, vol. 105, no.2 (Feb., 2000), p. 20. 53 “Austal Ships to establish joint venture yard in United States,” Fast Ferry International, vol. 39, no. 1 (Jan.-Feb., 2,000), p. 5. 54 Krapf, D.A., “Halter to Finally Reach Its Goal,” Workboat, July 1999, p. 4. 55 Snyder, J., “New low-wake high speed craft unveiled by Halter Marine,” Marine Log, November, 1998.

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