Advantaging Celebrity Marginals:

From Public Figures to Public Office

Jeremy Hosein

Senior Honors Thesis

April 2004

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Index of Tables

Table 1.1: House fundraising regression……………………………….18 Table 1.2: Senate fundraising regression Table 2.1: House media hits regression………………………………...20 Table 2.2: House media hits regression model 2 Table 2.3: Senate media hits regression………………………………...22 Table 2.4: Senate media hits regression model 2 Table 3.1: House campaign expenditures regression…………………...25 Table 3.2: Senate campaign expenditures regression Table 4.1: House general votes regression……………………………..31 Table 4.2: Senate general votes regression Table 5: Means in celebrity contests…………………………………...33 Table 6: Legend for regression analysis variables……………………....36

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Table of Contents

I. Introduction……………………………………………….4 II. Framework………………………………………………... 6 III. Methodology…………………………………….................. 7

Empirical Modeling……………………………………………..8 Qualified Candidates..............................................................................9

IV. Findings……………………………………………………...14

Campaign Fundraising and Expenditures………..…………….…..14 Branded Loyalties: Party Leaders and Political Actors……………... 26 The Contender………………………………………………….27 Voters and Celebrities………………………………………….. 29

V. Suggestions for further study...…………………………...….. 32

VI. Conclusion|Winning celebrities……………………………....33

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I. Introduction

om Osborne (R-NE) had already established himself as a home state hero

before running for office. His notoriety was rivaled by Congressmen with

twenty years of experience. As a pro football player, and most notably, one of the most

winningest coaches in college football history, his reputation preceded him. Over his

twenty five year coaching history, he brought three national championships, four perfect

seasons, and was inducted into the College Football Hall of Fame. While coaching, he

earned his Ph.D. in educational psychology at the University of Nebraska. In 2000, 3rd

District Congressman Bill Barrett announced retirement, and Tom Osborne ran for office

against other non-incumbents, former Nebraska Republican Chairman and Secretary of

State John Gale and state Board of Education member Kathy Wilmot.1 Though they had

solid political backgrounds and were probably more qualified for office, Osborne’s

challengers hopelessly lost, with Osborne carrying 71% in the primaries and 82% in the

general election. His first experiences as a House member were less impressive,

however. He drew 39 out of 39 for the freshman office lottery and was unable to attain a

spot on Appropriations. He did, though, receive seats on the Agriculture, Education, and

Resource Committees where he was able to work on farm mentoring programs that

greatly benefited his constituency.

Elections are at the very forefront of a democratic regime. Its practice is a

display of public opinion’s profound impact on government and ensures the sovereignty

of the people. But the elements for qualifying a given candidate for congressional office

T

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have been the subject of an extensive and healthy debate among political scientists. It has

long been known that voters’ familiarity with a candidate increases a candidate’s

electoral successes. As Gary Jacobson clarifies, “Voters were known to favor candidates

with whom they were familiar (that is, whose names they could recall when asked)…”2

Naturally, celebrities have notoriety with the public, so they would make logical

candidates. Party committees and influential electoral constituencies have always

pursued these viable contenders.

Celebrity contenders still follow basic guidelines in their attempts to gain office.

Although elections are more candidate-centered than anything else, party committees and

PAC’s play an important role in the electoral successes of candidates.3 Any strong

constituency with important political resources will scrutinize political contenders and

what they are likely to accomplish in office if elected. These constituencies, or political

actors, have votes, money, and power; thus, congressmen often cater to these political

actors whether in position-taking or legislation. Constant awareness to this differential4

is just one of the many perpetual activities of a congressman related to elections. Another

is advertising. In an effort to gain notoriety, most political challengers must present their

names en masse to the public5, for the career in office itself is the political commodity6

that they seek.

1 Barone, Michael and Richard Cohen. The Almanac of American Politics 2002. (Washington D.C.: National Journal, 2002). 2 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p32. 3 Ibid, p57. 4 Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. (New Haven: Yale, 1974), p63. 5 This particular activity is negligible in the case of the celebrity candidate, as I will discuss later.

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II. Framework

Background Literature. Little scholarly work has been devoted to the celebrity,

progressively following celebrities through all stages of the electoral process. In many

studies, “celebrity status” has been earmarked as an independent variable in candidate

quality or amateurism in elections. The best of these studies is David Canon’s Actors,

Athletes, and Astronauts. Canon does well to address the ambition theory, stating that the

motivations for political amateurs (in which he quantifies celebrities) may differ by their

behavior in running for a Congressional seat. Specifically, he points to ambitious

amateurs and experience-seeking amateurs. He presents excellent evidence of “behavioral

differences both among amateurs and between amateurs and experienced politicians.”7

Canon tries to identify successful amateurs by a “comprehensive theory of ambition and

careers”8 to predict those outcomes. His study fails, however, to analyze variables in the

structural nature of political campaigns including, but not limited to, campaign

fundraising, campaign expenditures, and causal predictors of media attention. Other

scholars present scant attention to the celebrity. Jonathan Krasno and Donald Philip

Green use celebrity as a minor indicator of quality among other quality indicators

(previous congressional run, type of office, professional status).9 Similarly, Alan

Abramowitz uses celebrity as a minor indicator in explaining Senate election outcomes

among other institutional conditions (open seats, national political conditions, challenger

political experience, campaign expenditures). The most robust findings of his study

6 Ibid. 7 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p xii. 8 Ibid. p87.

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indicate that candidate characteristics accounted for Senate electoral successes, with

candidates increasingly relying on personal appeal to grab votes.10 The author’s work was

significant in that it presented a revealing calculus of an individual candidate’s own

appeal to garner the electorate. This significance is underscored in my attempt to find

more specific determinates of electoral success for celebrity candidates only. By the

analysis of the data collected, we may be able to explain relationships within the

structural nature of political campaigns that blitz the celebrity contender during the

electoral process and into public office. We will be able answer some important

intermediate questions as to whether the celebrity has an electoral advantage, costs of

campaigning for the celebrity, and so forth. Are they qualified for public office? How do

they differ from their more politically experienced challenger counterparts? And finally,

do they (celebrities) necessarily have an electoral advantage?

III. Methodology

I restrict my analysis to the 2000 electoral cycle. The players involved in this

model and analyses include the potential celebrity candidate, the incumbent (if one

exists), the challenger(s), party leaders, other political actors, and voters. The model is an

analysis on celebrities from various regions who bid for Congress strategically, either for

an open seat or a contested seat against an incumbent. The collected data includes

campaign funds raised and spent, population totals for each district, primary election

voting results, general election voting results, whether the candidates have any political

9 Krasno, Jonathan S. and Donald Philip Green. “Preempting Quality Challengers in House Elections.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 50, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 920-936. 10 Abramowitz, Alan I. “Explaining Senate Election Outcomes.” The American Political Science Review. Vol. 82, No.2 (Jun., 1988), pp. 385-403.

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electoral experience, their professions, their party labels, and how often these candidates

were in the media.

We must define some key terms here. “Qualified” candidates refer to competent

and skilled in the legislative processes that govern our institution. A celebrity is any

individual with a nonpolitical basis for being well known, generally with good repute,

popular to the public, and famous in their respected field; i.e. actor, singer, sports figure,

famous family, war hero, etc. One of the dilatory tasks of this research was assigning a

celebrity status to individuals. I coded these values using their professions and Lexis-

Nexis hits to gauge their celebrity extant. Media attention, or how often the contender is

cited in the press, is an appropriate indicator of celebrity status. An incumbent is a

member of a political institution previously elected and holding on to the office. A

challenger is a non-incumbent that is vying for the same seat against the celebrity. Party

leaders refer to members of the respective party in high positions that control the ebb and

flow of party policy, members, and, at times, member policy. These members may be

party whips, chairman of the national committees, the respective leaders in the House and

Senate, and the president. Political actors include PACs, generous high-profile campaign

contributors, and other individuals or organizations that contribute to the electoral success

of a candidate. Voters are members of the electorate who cast votes for a particular

delegate.

Empirical Modeling. I empirically modeled my research by means of statistics.

The aggregate of numbers gathered on campaign fundraising and expenditures, general

vote totals, celebrity status, qualified candidacy (education, occupations, experience in

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prior elected office), were compared with each other. I ran regression analyses with

campaign funds raised, campaign expenditures, media hits, and vote shares being the

dependent variable against all the independent variables to determine the relationship

between the response and predictor variables. I also used frequency and means to find

individual data on independent variables. The relationships among the variables are

given in table format.

Qualified candidates. Clearly, in any given congressional race, there are better

candidates than others. Peverill Squire offers some conditions that qualify these

contenders.11 First and foremost, those with previous political experience, specifically

challengers who have held elected public office in the past naturally have traits that

characterize the quintessential candidate, requiring the political savvy and personal

appeal that draws votes. Some of these characteristics include “physical attractiveness,

oratorical and organizational skills, and telegenic appeal.”12 All of these were found to

be positively associated with thermometer scores and voting. Individuals with previous

electoral success have demonstrated these qualities by virtue of their previously holding

public offices.

How do celebrities fit into this framework? Depending on their background, they

indeed possess many of the same qualities as skilled, experienced office-holders. By

virtue of their celebrity identity, they have mass personal appeal with the public. Also,

celebrities possess certain qualities that make them more eligible for candidateship than

the average citizen. For instance, John Glenn (D-OH) was the first man to orbit the

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moon. His immortalized exploits provided him with electoral benefits. Similarly, Tom

Osborne possessed a strong curriculum vitae that provided and harbored electoral

benefits. Apart from previous political experience and celebrity status, we can determine

if there are other factors that may constitute a good, effective candidate such as

education, leadership roles, experiences from previous occupations, and recruitment and

training by party organizations.

Next, I adopt David Cannon’s understanding of political amateurs. In my analysis

of celebrity candidates, they are, by nature, amateurs to political office-holding. Cannon

categorizes amateur political candidates into two groups: ambitious amateurs who are

serious about winning a seat, and experience-seeking amateurs who run for their own

private utility. Those experience-seeking amateurs may run for several reasons including

the experience for another electoral bid in the future or simply for the thrill of the chase.

As Cannon mentions, these candidates have little hope of winning.13 It is my contention

that all celebrities who run are ambitious amateurs. Cannon, like Roderick Banks and

Jeffrey Kiewiet, argue that amateur motivations in running for office are based on

whether or not it is an open-seat contest and the presence of strong or weak candidates;14

however, I intend to suggest moreover that individuals who are leaving their profession

as entertainers, astronauts, or athletes for whatever reason, make decisions to enter a

House or Senate race utilizing rational choice from the beginning and have utility

tradeoffs that are greater than the average candidate. The experienced officeholder will

11 Squire, Peverill. “Candidates, Money, and Voters: Assessing the States of Congressional Elections Research.” Political Research Quarterly. Volume 48, Issue 4 (Dec., 1995), pp. 891-917. 12 Ibid. 13 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p30.

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enter a race that he thinks he can win;15 I believe celebrities follow this same logic, for

these powerful challengers have more to lose if they do not succeed in their bid for office.

A display of their eagerness for office is shown that of the 36 celebrities running in 2000,

most were able to fundraise money comparable to other serious contenders for the seat

and 31 ran under a major party label.16 Also, deference is given here to the political

ambition theory for celebrities, but that does not entirely explain their reasoning for

running for office. Running for office for these ambitious celebrities is unique in the

sense that they forego their celebrated professions for public office while most

challengers seeking public office either retire from their private sector jobs or leave in

pursuit of an office-holding position; however, the public naturally scrutinizes celebrities’

motivations and their campaigns closely versus other races. The opportunity costs for

celebrities running for office are high. The decision to leave showbiz for public office

could potentially damage both career paths in the occasion that the personality loses.

This is often the case with more politically experienced challengers as well. As one

commented, “’If I lose, my political future is demolished. You can’t afford a couple of

losses, so this could be the last hurrah for me.’”17 While media exposure is naturally

higher in the case of celebrity elections, this type of media exposure can affect the

14 Ibid. 15 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p153. 16 On the Senate side, celebrities were a little more diverse on their party labels, but still most were either Republican or Democrat. Also, because of restrictions to information, some of their campaign funds raised and spent were unavailable. 17 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p37.

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outcome of that race.18 Thus, strategic maneuvering and self-perception on the part of

celebrities is a necessity.

Such was the case for Hillary Clinton in New York’s 2000 Senate race. These

celebrities will seek to maximize their utility when deciding to run for office. For

instance, as ambitious amateurs, celebrities assume a high probability of winning, thus

their impetus to enter a race is already greater than those who are experience-seeking and

is equivalent to veteran officeholders who are deciding to run. For instance, using Hillary

Clinton as an example:

EU = (PW * UW) + (PL * UL)

As an ambitious amateur, she gauges her probably of winning (PW) at 70% over Mayor

Rudy Giuliani. Her utility from winning is a modest 10. Thus, her probability of losing

(PL) is 30% and her utility from losing (UL) is -10. Therefore,

(.60 * 10) + (.30 * -10) = 3

Assuming that 0 marks indifference either way, a positive value will denote a preference

to run since rational choice assumes that the player will weigh costs and benefits of each

option and then determine the biggest payoff. Mrs. Clinton should apply this expected

utility model to winning the primary in New York in order to win the Democratic

nomination. While she is ambitious, she is also strategic at the same time and will apply

the same model to winning the general election. Because any campaign for office is

dynamic with opinions and voter perceptions changing, Mrs. Clinton may reevaluate her

ability to win. For instance, how might Mrs. Clinton’s perception of winning have

18 Mayhew, David. Congress: The Electoral Connection. (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press), p177.

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changed when Rudy Giuliani dropped out and Congressman Rick Lazio stepped in? We

can use Bayes’ Rule to answer this question. “Bayes’ Rule states that an initial belief, or

prior probability, is changed to an updated belief, or posterior probability, based on the

observation of conditional events.”19 The formula for Bayes’ Rule is as follows:

p(C | O) = [p(O | C) * p(C)] / [p(O | C) * p(C) + p(O | ~C)* p(~C)]

where C is the “condition” and O is the “observation”, and | is “given.” We are trying to

find the probability that Mrs. Clinton wins (C) given (|) that Mayor Giuliani does not run

(O). Given our prior belief that Hillary Clinton will win the race p(C) = 60% and also

given that if Giuliani does not run (Congressman Lazio runs), Mrs. Clinton’s belief that

her probability of winning (p(O|C)) is 90% and that her probability of not winning given

Lazio runs (p(O | ~C) is 10%, should she still run?

[(.90) * (.60)] / [(.90) * (.60) + (.10) * (.40)] = .93

With her updated belief that she has a 93% chance of winning, we find that it is still in

her interest to run. Her utility to run in the general election is as follows:

(.93) * (10) + (.07) * (-10) = 8.6

The purpose of this analysis is to show the strategic nature of the ambitious

amateur. Because of their greater utility tradeoff, they must carefully consider the

possibilities of winning and losing in their bid for congress. Had a stronger candidate

Republican candidate entered the race during before the primary, this could have easily

altered Mrs. Clinton’s perception of winning the race, and she might have dropped out.

19 Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Principles of International Politics. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2000),

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IV. Findings

Campaign Fundraising and Expenditures. One of the most important resources

necessary to communicate with voters is money.20 It buys access to the media, which in

turn provides advertising for the challenger to gain publicity; however, for the celebrity

challenger, money may not be needed to gain this publicity. By nature of their celebrity,

the electorate knows who they are. As Squire states, “The more money a challenger has

to spend, the better able is he or she to increase his or her name recognition, and to give

the voters reasons to prefer him or her to the incumbent.”21 This statement can be

modified to include any challenger versus a celebrity as well. Like a challenger going up

against an incumbent, there is substantial difficulty in challenging a celebrity, albeit an

amateur one. Significant questions are raised then: How much does a personality need to

spend? Or, how much less do they need to spend compared to an average challenger or

incumbent? For instance, here are the campaign funds raised for Tom Osborne in 2000.

Tom Osborne (R): 2000 Election Cycle

PACs $0 0%

Individuals $442,209 90%

Other Sources $51,147 10%

Total Contributions $493,356 100%

Source: opensecrets.org

p335. 20 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p58. 21 See footnote 7.

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Although it was highly anticipated that Tom Osborne would win the election, he

nevertheless campaigned hard, traveling 60,000 miles and created an extensive grassroots

campaign. Osborne’s decision to reject all PAC donations did not hamper him at all.

Rollie Reynolds (D): 2000 Election Cycle

PACs $250 2%

Individuals $12,756 92%

Other Sources $913 7%

Total Contributions $13,919 100%

Source: opensecrets.org

Rollie Reynolds was Osborne’s closest competitor, winning 16% of the vote share in the

general election. He did accept PAC donations, but was largely unsuccessful in doing so,

mainly because Democrats had little chance of winning the seat in this largely

Republican-leaning district, and that Osborne was the challenger. The discrepancy in

fundraising and expenditures was large and illustrates the difficulty of raising campaign

money, particularly against an incumbent.

It is no secret that campaigns are fueled by money. When the tap runs dry, a

candidate often has no other choice than to drop out. In Gary Jacobson’s elegant study

on the effect of campaign spending, he states, “…campaign money is crucial to

challengers…”22 Money’s utility in a campaign allows a challenger to reach voters. He

finds that campaign spending has a bigger payoff to challengers at a certain level than

incumbents, and often times, Senate challengers become as well known as the

incumbents in a race. Jacobson also found evidence of diminishing marginal returns after

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a certain amount spent, so the effect of expenditures may not be so linear. Another

limitation is the dynamic nature of spending across states. An election in Nebraska will

not cost as much as an election in New York. The wide variation in state populations is

not controlled for in my study. I do not entirely discount the effects of campaign

spending; instead, I give more attention to recognition of the candidate quantified by

media coverage. Senate challengers are often higher quality challengers and possess a

higher amount of media coverage than House challengers. As we already stated before,

familiarity with the voter is an important stepping stone for a seat, but what about a

celebrity who already retains voter recognition by virtue of his celebrity? What effect

does the personality have on campaign funds raised and spent?

In the House, celebrities did not perform well in raising money against their non-

celebrity counterparts and particularly against those with previous electoral experience.

The interrelational effect of the non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits (the number of cited

references enjoyed by non-celebrities in the media) did offer a significant positive

correlation with fundraising, producing $675 in campaign funds per hit in the media.

Among those included in non-celebrity hits are contenders with electoral experience, an

often quantified variable of the quality candidate, who received a significant advantage

over other challengers in raising money.23 We must therefore maintain that Tom Osborne

22 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p153. 23 Inclusion of the electoral-experienced candidate within the “noncelebhits” variable may reflect disproportionate campaign fundraising for those experience-seeking amateurs and also may not be accurate indicators of fundraising ability for those experienced candidates. This is also the case for the Senate findings.

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was an anomaly whose success in raising campaign funds was not equally shared by his

celebrity counterparts.

In the Senate24, we find that being a celebrity is insignificant to raising campaign

money. This may be explained by the nature of many Senate races. Since the seats are

fewer and highly contested, candidates often enjoy more media attention, so celebrity

status becomes less significant as other candidates enjoy media coverage as well. The

interrelational effect of the celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits (the number of hits enjoyed by each

celebrity) display that celebrities perform just as well or even better than their

counterparts, earning over $31,000 per instance of media attention. The interrelational

effect of non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits demonstrate that non-celebrities earned nearly

$6000 per hit of media attention.

24 See table 6 for definition of regression analysis variables.

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Table 1.1 House Fundraising Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb 47669.8 118180 0.40 0.687 -184106.8 to

279446.4 Celebhits 1472.489 907.9367 1.62 0.105 -308.1712 to

3253.15 Noncelebhits 675.7478 73.6971 9.17 0.000 531.2118 to

820.2838 Electexp 634357.5 25434.59 24.94 0.000 584474.7 to

684240.2 Constant 61160.18 13722.98 4.46 0.000 34246.44 to

88073.92 Table 1.2 Senate Fundraising Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb -1623571 1625002 -1.00 0.319 -4821819 to

1574676 Celebhits 31142.95 4901.907 6.35 0.000 21495.26 to

40790.63 Noncelebhits 5847.162 903.8586 6.47 0.000 4068.233 to

7626.091 Electexp 1711813 705697.7 2.43 0.016 322894.1 to

3100731 Constant -270072.7 323964 -0.83 0.405 -907682.2 to

367536.8

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Next, we look at the variables earning those contenders media attention. What

factors contribute to a receptive media? I control for incumbents with Lexis-Nexis hits

over 1000 for a more accurate gauge of all challengers in the election year. In the House,

there is a significant positive relationship for celebrities, producing more Lexis-Nexis hits

for those contenders who are celebrities. Those with elected experience, however, earn

more hits than celebrities. The most significant variables in this analysis25 that provide

the most media attention for candidates are campaign spending and winning. The more a

candidate spent on his campaign, the more media attention he attracted and effectively, if

a candidate wins the election, he receives more media attention than those who do not.

This is an expected outcome, for when the runner wins the primary, the race tapers down

to fewer candidates who receive more media attention in the final stretches of the

campaign. Another analysis26 was done to distinguish between celebrity spending and

non-celebrity spending. Here, it is evident that the celebrity campaign spending does not

produce a significant correlation with media attention. This may point to celebrities

already possessing media attention and thus have diminishing returns on campaign

spending for that media attention. Non-celebrities, in fact, were able to earn more results

per dollar than celebrities.

25 Refer to table 2.1

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Table 2.1

House Media Hits Regression Model 1 (lexishits2000)27

Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval

Celeb 30.32172 14.68265 2.07 0.039 1.525572 to 59.11786

Campaign_Exp 5.46e-05 4.09e-06 13.33 0.000 4.66e-05 to 6.26e-05

Electexp 38.03659 6.986727 5.44 0.000 24.33396 to 51.73921

Won 68.78571 7.663882 8.98 0.000 53.75502 to 83.8164

Constant 30.5432 2.38595 12.80 0.000 25.86379 to 35.22261

Table 2.2

House Media Hits Regression Model 2 (lexishits2000)

Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval

Celeb 16.9352 29.46282 0.57 0.565 -40.84778 to 74.71819

Celebspend 4.42e-05 4.6e-05 0.96 0.337 -4.6e-05 to 1.344e-04

Noncelebspend 5.13e-05 7.0e-06 7.33 0.000 3.76e-05 to 6.5e-05

Electexp 25.7179 11.83388 2.17 0.030 2.509077 to 48.92671

Won 77.00351 12.94759 5.95 0.000 51.61047 to 102.3966

Constant 48.29687 4.029382 11.99 0.000 40.39438 to 56.19936

26 Refer to table 2.2 27 Controlling for those with hits over 1000, notably includes incumbents.

21

Senate outcomes painted a much different picture for the celebrity.28 There was a

negative relationship between the celebrity and media attention. The variables producing

the positive relationship were campaign spending, electoral experience, and whether the

candidate won, producing many more hits in the media than in the House. To explain

this discrepancy from the House, I point out again that Senate contenders were more

likely to possess characteristics that made them higher quality candidates than many

candidates running in the House which may discount the celebrity factor for those who

ran in the Senate. Also, the highly visible nature of Senate contests and fewer candidates

enable the media to focus more attention on each candidate which may also detract from

the value of being a celebrity. The second analysis29 shows that celebrity spending had a

slightly significant effect on the number of hits received, but non-celebrity spending still

earned more media attention, confluent with the House outcomes.

28 Refer to table 2.3 29 Refer to table 2.4

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Table 2.3 Senate Media Hits Regression Model 1 (lexishits)30

Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf. Interval

Celeb -28.79036 53.90199 -0.53 0.594 -134.9323 to 77.35157

Campaign_Exp 1.33e-05 2.55e-06 5.23 0.000 8.30e-06 to 1.83e-05

Electexp 190.4614 28.12999 6.77 0.000 135.0688 to 245.854

Won 190.9799 44.34659 4.31 0.000 103.6542 to 278.3057

Constant 65.84498 11.14117 5.91 0.000 43.90617 to 87.7838

Table 2.4 Senate Media Hits Regression Model 2 (lexishits) Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb -85.62172 89.78052 -0.95 0.341 -262.3258 to

91.08232 Celebspend 2.42e-05 9.57e-06 2.53 0.012 5.38e-06 to

4.31e-05 Noncelebspend 1.66e-05 3.43e-06 4.86 0.000 9.90e-06 to

2.34e-05 Electexp 232.5303 43.24317 5.38 0.000 147.4201 to

317.6406 Won 244.0741 60.79755 4.01 0.000 124.4137 to

363.7345 Constant 117.9297 18.00134 6.55 0.000 82.49989 to

153.3596

30 Controlling for those with hits over 1000; notably includes incumbents.

23

My next analysis details how media exposure might affect campaign spending in

the House. A significant positive correlation is found between the interrelational effect of

non-celebrity Lexis-Nexis hits and campaign spending, suggesting that for every instance

of media attention, celebrities here spent $665. Also important is the electoral experience

of the candidate, which presents a strong correlation to campaign expenditures. As noted

in the fundraising analysis above, the ability of the electoral-experienced candidate to

raise money also indicates that he has more to spend, as the data below dictates. The

interrelational effect celebrity factor here was insignificant, suggesting a weak correlation

between celebrity exposure in the media and campaign expenditures in total. I explain

this by the ability of House celebrities to attract media attention by virtue of their

celebrity; therefore, their campaign expenditures need not be at the degree of their other

experience-seeking or electoral-experienced counterparts.

Interestingly, the celebrity variable displayed a negative correlation with

campaign spending in the Senate. Celebrities’ presence in the media had a significant

affect on their campaign expenditures, as did their non-celebrity counterparts, and, to a

lesser extent, those with electoral experience. It is important to note, however, that

former first lady Hillary Clinton had a skewing affect on the data, as her campaign

expenditures totaled over $29 million, a few standard deviations away from the mean of

$197059 for the celebrity candidate. This variance is one of the limitations of this

particular analysis given the varying expenditures totals across the states. Both the

celebrities’ and the non-celebrities’ presence in the media produced a significant positive

relationship with campaign spending. This relationship may suggest that their presences

24

in the media compel both types of candidates to spend more toward media attention since

it is evident that spending produces a net flow of media attention. Also, consistent with

the previous analysis on campaign fundraising, the celebrity variable by itself produced a

negative relationship with campaign expenditures. The explanation here is a bit elusive,

but I suggest that the celebrities in the Senate posed no real advantage versus other

contenders, and their ability to spend campaign money is predicated on their ability to

raise money. Controlling for Mrs. Clinton, we may suggest that the Senate celebrity

candidate was not as successful in raising and spending money as their counterparts.

Again, considering that the celebrity candidates were running against higher quality

candidates than in the House, this can account for the negative relationship between

celebrity status and campaign expenditures.

25

Table 3.1 House Campaign Expenditures Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb 48550.62 119500.2 0.41 0.685 -185815.2 to

282916.4 Celebhits 1569.637 918.0795 1.71 0.087 -230.9158 to

3370.19 Noncelebhits 665.4195 74.52039 8.93 0.000 519.2689 to

811.5701 Electexp 575791.6 25718.73 22.39 0.000 525351.6 to

626231.6 Constant 59269.2 13876.28 4.27 0.000 32054.8 to

86483.6 Table 3.2 Senate Campaign Expenditures Regression Model Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb -1615676 1634004 -0.99 0.324 -4831640 to

1600287 Celebhits 30846.93 4929.06 6.26 0.000 21145.8 to

40548.06 Noncelebhits 5664.654 908.8654 6.23 0.000 3875.871 to

7453.437 Electexp 1599445 709606.8 2.25 0.025 202833.1 to

2996058 Constant -253410.8 325758.5 -0.78 0.437 -894552.2 to

387730.6

26

Branded Loyalties: Party Leaders and Political Actors. In our candidate-centered

electoral system, political parties have increasingly taken a backstage to the individual

vying for office. However, backstage does not mean out of sight. Candidates, especially

amateurs, rely on party organizations and other political actors in the process of running.

Party organizations are good sources to obtain backing for logistics, campaign money,

and support. Sometimes, these party organizations supply the candidate as well. GOPAC

was the Republican Party recruitment mechanism.31 Its purpose is to draft viable

candidates to the party, hold workshops and focus groups to align the party with a

coherent party message along with its newly recruited members. It also trains its recruits

in campaigns and issue advocacy. This party machinery had vast successes with the

Republican influx in 1994 and undoubtedly again this past election year. Examples of

GOPAC’s powerful influence include convincing some office-holders to retire, others to

go into office, and convincing high-profile financial backers to support certain

candidates. J.C. Watts (R-OK), former star quarterback at the University of Oklahoma

and professional football player and now head of GOPAC, elicited the help of Gingrich’s

GOPAC to win a House seat in 1994.32 According to David Canon,

Celebrity amateurs have been recruited by party officials, especially in Senate races, yet these cases are typically limited to races against popular incumbents or to the minority party that does not have a large pool of experienced politicians. When there is a good chance of defeating an incumbent, or if the seat is open, amateurs often must run against a party favorite in the primary.33

31 Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and its Members. (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2002), p59. 32 See footnote 1. 33 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p71.

27

Party officials often strategize on Congressional races, especially if there is much

at stake; i.e. a thin line between the majority and minority in the House and Senate. They

may send a personality to run against a popular opposite party candidate, or a popular

analogous candidate depending on the circumstances. There are, of course, costs

attributed to eliciting help from such organizations. During an important vote on a salient

issue, party leaders expect a vote along partisan lines. The incentive exists insofar that

the candidate relies on the party machinery for election. Nevertheless, it is an important

to note their relationships with party leaders in office in order to find determinate

motivations for their seeking office. Going further, in recent years, controversy has

sparked over money’s irrefutable link to the efficacy of a candidacy. On March 27, 2002

House Resolution 2356, better known as the McCain-Feingold/Shays-Meehan campaign

finance bill, was signed into law by President Bush. It can be argued that the constraints

on soft money, or the unlimited transferal of funds into political parties’ accounts,

increased pressure on candidates to look for party support when edifying a bid for

Congress. In my analysis, I attributed party support after a candidate wins the party’s

primary, thus, if they received votes in the general election, I assume party support. In

the House, an overwhelming 88 percent34 of celebrities had party support. In the Senate,

60 percent35 had party support.

The Contender. Pertaining to the political candidates vying for office (celebrity,

incumbent, challenger) only, Joseph Schlesinger theorizes that there are aggregate

patterns of political careers. His ambition theory suggests that if the House was filled

34 30 out of 34 celebrities had party support in the House.

28

with three-fourths of individuals who served on their state legislatures, experienced

political candidates will attempt to move up the political hierarchy by starting at state

legislatures.36 David Canon suggests that this theory needs must include political

amateurs. “The increasing incidence of nonofficeholding candidates reduces the utility of

a theory that focuses only on incumbents” and that the theory “must be broadened to

encompass the behavior of [political] amateurs.”37 If there is a political career ladder,

what percentages of congressmen follow it? Does it affect celebrities? Observing past

experiences of these political contenders, what are the celebrities’ own career ladders? In

effect, do the two ever mesh? Keeping in mind the prior assumption used to

operationalize the celebrity as an individual who receives notoriety by nonpolitical

means, I discounted observations where political careers and celebrity meshed. It is

important to mention, however, that an incumbent may have become a celebrity by virtue

of his tenure in public office. For instance, former New York City Mayor Rudy Giuliani

is widely regarded as a hero who triumphed during his term, enjoying wide public

support after September 11 and appearing on news media outlets frequently, not to

mention guest appearances on television programs (Saturday Night Live, among others).

Although no other incumbents may reach celebrity of this magnitude, they may have

established a positive repute with their voters and thus may deserve a celebrity mark. In

order to maintain consistency and reduce randomness in my findings, though, I only

observe celebrities within their respective industries outside of politics. Referring back to

35 6 out of 10 celebrities had party support in the Senate. 36 Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966), p20. 37 Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1990), p xiv.

29

the career ladders of contenders, I observe those of high quality candidates in the Senate:

24 percent38 of contenders previously held a position with elected experience and in the

House, 29 percent39 did. However, previous elected experience is not the only indicator

of quality. There were higher ratios of celebrities in the Senate (Of the candidates in the

Senate, 3.4 percent40 were celebrities, and in the House 1.8 percent41 were celebrities) as

well as businessmen, attorneys, and those with experience in the political arena. My data

offers no suggestions that political ladders of any sort affect the motivations of celebrities

in running for higher office. The career path of the celebrity does not often cross into the

political realm. I contend that celebrities use their personalities to propel them into the

public eye and eventually to their desired public office as viable candidates without

seeking previous elected experience to do so. The celebrities offered in my analysis

stayed within their respective enterprises, though celebrities such as Hillary Clinton may

have found it easier to utilize her position as former first lady to earn her Senate seat,

before entering a contest.

Voters and Celebrities. Voting behavior is a strongly controversial topic for

scholarly debate. But “among the most consistent findings produced by studies of

congressional voters over the past generation is that simple knowledge of who the

candidates are is strongly connected to voting behavior.”42 Voters do vote for celebrities

and they are elected into office, as evidenced by the data. So, how do celebrities market

themselves effectively for electoral success? Moreover, what is the appeal of sending a

38 70 candidates out of an overall 290. 39 558 candidates out of an overall 1900. 40 10 celebs out of 290. 41 34 celebs out of 1900 candidates.

30

celebrity into public office? According to Jacobson’s elegant survey of congressional

voters and their behavior, “a plurality of positive comments about candidates of all kinds

have to do with personal characteristics, which frequently seem… empty of political

contact.”43 This seems to be a plausible explanation for the celebrity candidate, who as

ambitious amateurs, possess no experience in the electoral arena and yet receive votes in

congressional elections. For the purposes of this model, I will assume that voters will

vote for the contender they are most familiar with and gain the greatest expected utility

from.

In my analysis of general vote shares, I find that celebrities have a significant

impact on general votes received in House contests. How often candidates are shown in

the media also has a positive correlation with general votes received. Finally, those with

previous electoral experience also produce a positive relationship with general votes

received. All the coefficients are larger than twice their standard errors and achieve below

a .05 level of significance. These findings are important, yet somewhat unsurprising. By

holding our prior assumptions, voter familiarity with the candidate through previous

electoral experience, presence in the media, and celebrity status all contribute to a voter’s

knowledge of the candidate and influences the number of votes received.

In the Senate, we find that celebrity is an insignificant independent variable and

electoral experience, interestingly enough, hurts the candidate in general vote shares.

Again, we can explain this in terms of higher quality candidates, and while many have

electoral connections, there are also, as David Cannon states, those strong candidates

42 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p110.

31

without electoral experience who do not. The only positive association is the candidates’

presence in the media.

Table 4.1 House General Votes Regression Model (genvote) Coefficient Std. Error T P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb 17028.91 6736.967 2.53 0.012 3808.875 to

30248.95 Lexishits2000 251.3401 16.70056 15.05 0.000 218.5684 to

284.1119 Electexp 46981.02 3669.86 12.80 0.000 39779.61 to

54182.43 Constant 18280.95 1295.992 14.11 0.000 15737.81 to

20824.09 Table 4.2 Senate General Votes Regression Model (general_results) Coefficient Std. Error t P>t 95% Conf.

Interval Celeb 192747.6 2642089 0.07 0.942 -5021711 to

5407207 Lexishits 5189.233 1405.055 3.69 0.000 2416.199 to

7962.267 Electexp -2262264 1173980 -1.93 0.056 -4579247 to

54717.88 Constant 71840 559408.4 0.13 0.898 -1032215 to

1175895

43 Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. (New York: Longman, 2000), p127.

32

V. Suggestions for further study.

Further research of celebrities in congressional elections could produce far

reaching and valuable results. In the context of political campaigns and elected office,

celebrities possess unique qualities in a time where personal appeal earns votes from the

electorate. A data set with a greater sample size of celebrities in the regression analyses,

particularly longitudinal studies of celebrity races, may help to shed light on general

determinates of celebrity candidate success in congressional elections. Moreover, this

would help to discount the copious variant effect of former first lady Hillary Clinton’s

campaign in the Senate. The longitudinal study may also include voter turnout for races

with celebrities now and in the past in the same district to determine if particular districts

are receptive to the celebrity candidate. We may also establish voters’ perceptions of a

celebrity and the celebrity’s perceptions of himself in the state or district that may reflect

the reasons for voting for the respective personality and his reasons for running for office.

Also, a continuing study following the elected celebrity into public office could produce

valuable information. Do voters make good decision by voting for a celebrity? To

ascertain the quality of a celebrity’s representation, what is the quality of legislation after

elected; how many amendments are presented and bills drafted and sponsored? Once in

office, what are their motivations? Are they constituency-driven or ambition-driven to

higher positions within the hierarchical ranks of the House and Senate? It is also

significant to observe whether celebrities maintain the career track of an average

politician once elected, or leave public office and regress to their role as a personality.

Subsequent data gathering should reveal this information.

33

Finally, controlling for population sizes in states to control for variance in

fundraising and spending is necessary. A candidate may not raise and spend, or may not

need to raise and spend, the same amount of campaign money in Nebraska as in New

York. Therefore, controlling for these factors may produce a clearer observance of

causal relationships of campaign funds across state lines.

V. Conclusion | Winning Celebrities

What was peculiar about the 4 celebrities in the House and the 1 celebrity in the

Senate who won in 2000? Can we find a formula for success in congressional elections

by climbing the celebrity ladder? First, all successful celebrities were well financed,

from over $30,000,000 in the Senate for former first lady Hillary Clinton’s (D) NY

campaign to over $1 million in the House for former conservative talk show host Mike

Pence’s (R) IN campaign. The average in the winning celebrity’s campaign chest in the

House was $1,089,222 while the mean for the celebrity was $135,315. In the Senate, the

details are a bit more dramatic since former first lady Hillary Clinton was the only

celebrity who won, raising $30,153,926 versus $138,936 for the losing celebrity.

Table 5

Means in Celebrity Contests

House Senate

Campaign_expenditures µ= 1057446 µ= 126337 µ= 30153926 µ= 138936

Funds_raised µ= 1089222 µ= 197959 µ= 29871577 µ= 148057

Celebwon =1 Celebwon = 0 Celebwon = 1 Celebwon= 0

34

By no means is the ability to raise and spend money the only variates to winning.

In a tight race with incumbent Lane Evans (D) in Illinois’ 17th district, former television

anchorman Mark Baker (R) was able to raise and spend considerable sums of money near

the means of the winning celebrities’ campaign funds raised and spent, but he was

narrowly defeated. The partisan leaning of a district, Republican coattails in a

presidential election year and other variables not undertaken by this study also account

for the narrow margin of victory. Also, the celebrity candidate makeup in the Senate was

far weaker than in the House. The losing celebrities were unable to compete with their

other high quality contenders in campaign fundraising and expenditures.

We find that in nearly all cases, celebrities possess an advantage in House

elections. There exist positive significant relationships between celebrity status and

presence in the media and the votes received in the general election. Their status did not,

however, have a significant effect on campaign fundraising nor campaign expenditures.

These findings suggest that celebrities may not need to raise or spend as much money, for

media attention comes free to the celebrity candidate. In the Senate, celebrities possessed

no advantage over their high quality counterparts. This can be explained by the nature of

Senate races which are highly competitive and attract stronger, high-quality candidates.

The interrelational effect of celebrity status and the number of hits they received in Lexis-

Nexis did produce a positive relationship with campaign fundraising and vice versa,

suggesting a two-way causal association that celebrities’ presence in the media

strengthens their ability to fundraise and spend money toward media attention. Also

35

consistent with this analysis is the positive relationship between celebrity campaign

spending and their presence in the media.

Although Tom Osborne had no previous experience for public office, his

credentials as a celebrity and a leader brought him great support which was reflected in

his percentage of the vote share. Although he never held elected office, he brought

several national championships to Nebraska, and coached many “homegrown” players.

Challengers regarded him as “my hero” and “everyone’s hero.”44 Although his

opponents were surely defter in the political arena, he proved to be a great politician,

bringing home particularized benefits for the farmers of Western Nebraska and earning

respect from his colleagues on Capitol Hill. However, hindsight is always 20/20. It was

unclear whether Tom Osborne will possess the non-homologous talent in the political

arena as he did in the football arena. As is the case with other elected celebrities in 2000,

time will tell.

44 See footnote 1.

36

Table 6

Legend for Regression Analysis Variables

Celeb Dichotomous variable in House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if candidate is celebrity and 0 if he is not

Electexp Dichotomous variable in House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if candidate has previous elected experience and 0 if he does not

Lexishits2000 Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each candidate in the House

Lexishits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each candidate in the Senate

Celebhits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each celebrity candidate in the House and Senate

Noncelebhits Total number of hits received on Lexis-Nexis for each non-celebrity candidate in the House and Senate

Campaign_exp Total amount of campaign expenditures for each House and Senate candidate

Funds_raised Total amount of campaign funds raised for each House and Senate candidate

Celebspend Total amount of celebrity campaign expenditures in the House and Senate

Noncelebspend Total amount of non-celebrity expenditures in the House and Senate

Genvote Total amount of votes received in the general election for House contests

General_results Total amount of votes received in the general election for Senate contest

Won Dichotomous variable in the House and Senate analysis coded as 1 if the candidate won and 0 if he did not

37

Works Cited

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Washington D.C.: National Journal, 2002.

Bueno de Mesquita, Bruce. Principles of International Politics. Washington D.C.: CQ

Press, 2000. Canon, David T. Actors, Athletes and Astronauts. Chicago: University of Chicago Press,

1990. Davidson, Roger H. and Walter J. Oleszek. Congress and its Members. Washington

D.C.: CQ Press, 2002. Jacobson, Gary C. The Politics of Congressional Elections. New York: Longman,

2000. Krasno, Jonathan S. and Donald Philip Green. “Preempting Quality Challengers in House

Elections.” The Journal of Politics. Vol. 50, No. 4 (Nov., 1988), pp. 920-936. Mayhew, David R. Congress: The Electoral Connection. New Haven: Yale University

Press, 1974. Schlesinger, Joseph A. Ambition and Politics: Political Careers in the United States.

Chicago: Rand McNally, 1966. Squire, Peverill. “Candidates, Money, and Voters. Assessing the States of Congressional

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