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    Leonardo

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    On the ossibility o Aesthetic Atheismhilosophy nd the arket n rt

    David Carrier

    Abstract-What anwe earn bout rtbyanalyzingheartmarket? heauthor ffers skepticalrgument.Judgementsf aesthetic alue hangewith ime.Since hosechanges eflectmarketalue,perhaps ecanshow hataesthetic alues market alue.Thecritic,wewould henbelieve,eeks opersuades hatarthasaesthetic alue, or ourbeliefsaboutart'svaluedepend pona consensusstablishednpartbythe critic.Recentlyomecriticsandphilosophersave rguedhat he raditionsfartaredead.Theprospectsor uchan'aesthetic theism'n relation o thisskeptical rgumentre discussed.I. ON BECOMING A CYNIC

    No other activity so closely combinessnobbery and scholarship as the artmarket.Dependent for its existenceuponthe good will and dedication of many,mostly impecunious, artists, art dealersand art critics, this market effectivelyfunctions to provide masterpieces to bepurchased by the very rich. Recentlyseveral philosophers have discussed howobjects like Duchamp's readymades areaccepted as art [1]. This paper exploresthe relatedcynicalview raisedby critics ofcontemporary art and society [2] thatpeople might cease to believe that art-works possess the qualities traditionallycalled aesthetic. I term this view 'aestheticatheism', drawing an analogy to therejection of traditional religious beliefs.I concentrate upon contemporarypainting in the art market and its rela-tionship to the theories of art discussedincommercial art journals. Much art-most of that considered in Leonardo,forexample-falls outside that market, andmany visual artists working with film,multiples or performance attempt toremain outside that commercial arena. Ifmy analysis is found interesting,it wouldbe worthwhile asking if it applies also tosuch non-commercial art.That is the taskfor another article.In a recent paper I describe the systemof art production [3]. Two points fromthat account are relevant here. First,famous art is extremely expensive.Second, the art world suffers from ex-treme overproduction. Few art studentscan hope to make a living from theirwork. Observing a nineteenth-centuryexhibit, a Henry James character re-marked: There are too many of them,

    David Carrier philosopher),Departmentof Historyand Philosophy, Carnegie-Mellon University,Schenley Park, Pittsburgh, PA 15213, U.S.A.Received 26 January 1984.

    poor devils; so many who must maketheir way ... Some of them ... stand ontheir heads ... to make people noticethem [4]. One way of attracting atten-tion is througha critic's review.However,the reviews published in commercial artjournals are difficult to understand; fewpeople could explain the theories used tovalidate the works they observe. Dis-course in any technical field is abstrusefor outsiders, but there is somethingnovel about this situation in which theinfluential literature of art is overlytechnical.An historical perspective is valuable.Few of the nouveauricheAmericanswhopurchasedRaphaels in the late nineteenthcentury knew about art. They desiredprestige, and the role of the art historianwas to guarantee that they purchasedgenuine works [5]. The modern museumdirector must be, in part, the agent ofthose collectors he must satisfy in ordertoattract donations for the museum'scollection. When Richard Wollheimspeaks of the devices by which art hasbeen segregated from those for whom itwas made and turned into a preserve ofthe rich and arrogant [6], we mustrecognize that he is a utopian. When hasart been made for anyone but thewealthy? It would be naive to seemuseums as anything but the naturalproducts of contemporary capitalism.Raphael's works have always beentreasured,and genuineRaphaelsare rare.Today a few younger artists, unknown 5years ago, achieve substantial prices,while the work of some seniorfiguresis asvaluable as lesser-known old masters.The value of these works is notestablished by the test of time thatvalidates Raphael, but by the con-troversial claims of critics. Manycommodities are expensive because theyare rare and highly desired;no theory isneeded to explain their worth. Forexample, barbed wire, decoy ducks andstamps can be collector's items. Detached

    from their original use, as when anantique car ceases to be used fortransport, they become valued for theirrarity [7]. In contrast, the value ofcontemporary artworks depends uponbeliefs about their aesthetic significance.And one function of criticism is tosupport such beliefs.

    II. IS CYNICISM JUSTIFIED?My philosophical question is whetherthe cynic's argument outlined above isjustified. I will proceedin four stages.Theacceptance of my earlierstages need notimply agreement with the later ones, andonly in the last stage will I sketch anargument for aesthetic atheism. LikeDescartes in his Meditations,I want to seehow far a skeptical argument can betaken. I begin by arguing that aestheticrelativism is true; that is, judgements ofaesthetic value, of the artisticworth of anartwork, do change with time. Second, Isuggest that this makes plausible areductionist theory of aesthetic value.Aesthetic value, that theory claims, ismarket value. Third, I arguethat there isthen reason to critically question thebelief that critics identify aestheticvalue.Finally, I move from contemporaryarttoa more sweeping application of thisposition.My aim is not to arguepolemically foror against these conclusions, but to seewhat kind of argument is possible. Thisaccount might be introduced by notingparallels in philosophical discussions ofknowledge and ethics. Do we possess anyknowledge? Are our actions evermorallyjustified?These are the parallelquestionsof the skeptic. The aim is not to doubt theexistence of the external world or the

    validity of moral obligations, but toexplore how such beliefs are justified.Skepticismabout aestheticvalue has beendiscussed less frequently. A societygenuinely skeptical about its knowledgeor morality ishardto imagine,for a socialPergamon Press Ltd.Printed in Great Britain.0024-094X/85 $3.00+0.00 LEONARDO, Vol. 18, No. 1, pp. 35-38, 1985 35

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    system requires some such stability tofunction. A society similarly skepticalabout the value of art is easier to imagine.Many traditionalreligious groups-Jews,Muslims, Christian iconoclasts-havebeen hostile to representationalart. Myconclusion will suggest that we may forvarious reasons become hostile to art. Ifneither sensory errors,nor the possibilitythat I am dreaming, nor the existence ofan evil demon can deprive me ofknowledge, then, Descartes argues, myknowledgeis secure.Perhapsthis analysiscan similarly justify our belief in art'svalue.

    III. CYNICISM AND AESTHETICRELATIVISMAesthetic relativismhas been borne out

    by history. For a long time the mostadmired artworksin EuropewereRomancopies of Greek sculpture;a centuryago,salon painting was generallypreferred owork of the impressionists; n his lifetime,Jackson Pollock was not widely ap-preciated. Today all thesejudgementsarerejected by most authorities [8]. Theusual explanation is that new art isdifficult to evaluate; time is needed tojudge its true value. For reasons I havegiven elsewhere, that theory is question-able [9]. How long does the test of timetake? Interest in some early Renaissancepainting has only recently revived, whilePollock's work quickly became widelyappreciated. Why should time allow us tobetter judge an artwork?Raphael aimedto satisfy hiscontemporaries,so why doesthe test of time show that his painting isgreat? Today we need the aid of arthistorians to understand his work andtherefore it is unclear why we are betterjudges of it than Raphael's contemporaryaudience.The belief that a work's excellence is aproperty of that object, like its shape andcolor, seems implausible. In societieswhere changes in beliefs about aestheticquality occur slowly, aesthetic relativismseems a fantastic notion. But ourjudgments about contemporary art arevolatile. The critic'sclaim to perceivethework's actual value is impossible toverify. By the time I see a painting, I haveoften read or heard many accounts of it.Even if I rejectthese views, myjudgmentis socially conditioned. The reason thatjudgments about contemporary art aremore debatable than those about olderwork has little to do with the test of time.Rather, since Raphael's works are in themuseum and he is an established figure,nothing could be more quixotic than anattack on him. By contrast, praise or

    criticism of a contemporary artist canhave real impact.In part, changes in taste reflect factsabout the art market. In 1910, Cezannewas little known and so not collected;today he has almost the status ofRaphael, and so hisworkis veryvaluable.Most collectors today cannot afford aCezanne, and therefore turn to otherartists. Everyone knows that Pollock'swork was inexpensive 30 years ago, sonow collectors of contemporary art seekhis successor. The art marketdepends inpart upon the belief that major new workis being created; looking for Pollock'ssuccessors seems more exciting thanseeking out his minor contemporaries.But while it took a long time to seeCezanne's importance, now that processis speeded up. For everyone has read thestories of how Cezanne and then Pollockbecame famous and their work valuable.The result is that ultimately aestheticvalue is reflected in market value. I mayadmire the work of someone obscure;once she or he is widely written about, Ianticipate that that person's art will bemarketable.It is unnecessaryto moralize about thissituation. What is more naturalthan thatthe works most highly regarded shouldbecome the most valuable? Theseobservations become philosophicallyinteresting only when they prompt areductionist theory of aesthetic value.

    IV. A REDUCTIVE THEORY OFAESTHETIC VALUEThe theory is easy to state: aestheticvalue is market value. That Pollock wasonce thought minor means that once hisworks were cheap; that Pollock is calledgreat means that now his art is expensive.Few people admiredhim in 1950, and sothen the statement Pollock's work isexcellent was only a good prediction.How can aesthetic value bejust marketvalue? Consider a parallel, thematerialist's claim that mental states arebrain states [10]. That conclusion is notestablished by showing that everymentalstate coincides with some brain state;the

    materialist wants to show that mentalstates are nothing over and above brainstates. So he makes two moves. He showsthat mental states, when scientificallyanalyzed, are simply brain states. And heexplain why people once thought thatthere was something more to mentalstates. The cynic follows the sameprocedure,showing that aestheticvalueismarket value and then explaining whypeople have believed otherwise.This parallel is doubly problematic.First, much recent discussion questions

    materialism'sinterpretation.Second, wemight think that materialism involves ascientificdiscovery,while the reductionisttheory of aesthetic value is merely asociological hypothesis. Because he stateshis case against such claims in detail,Gombrich's account is worth study. Hemakes two key points [11]. Standardsaredefined by the canon of achievementshanded down in tradition as a touch-stone of excellence. So the artist believesin values which willalwaystranscendhisskill as an individual.The concept of a canon is complex, forthe modern museum brings togetherobjects from many cultures, taking workout of context to make it art. ForGombrich our canon ends with cubism.For some critics it includes Pollock butexcludes Duchamp. For others,Duchamp is important. So, when thereare such serious disagreements it ismisleading to speak of 'the canon' as ifeveryone were talking about the samething.Certainly Gombrich is correct to saythat relativism is difficult to imagine. Ifall our reactionsareequallysubjective ...the idea of a canon would collapse... Iconfess that whenever I get involved inthis argument I have a curious feeling ofunreality. Were I a contemporary ofPollock, I might be more critical of hiswork; were I a Muslim, Persian calli-graphy would be easier to understand.Equally, if I accepted the reductionisttheory of aesthetic value, I woulddisagree with Gombrich. That point canbe made in an uninteresting way. That Ican imagine myself a sincere terroristdoesn't undermine my present beliefs;asa terrorist, I would be a differentperson.The interesting question is how mybeliefsmight change. Showing how belief in thecanon could collapse may undermineGombrich's claims.The relationship between my ex-perience and beliefs is complex. Avegetariancannot enjoy BeefWellington,nor an admirer of Ruskin, Palladiarchurches. They do not think of these asattractive things that are also morallyreprehensible. Such people cannotreconcile the evils of animal suffering orRenaissance society against the pleasuresthey obtain from such evils. Gombrichthinks that we could admire an artist'sskill even while disliking his work. Thatmay be true, but only up to a point.Raphael is admired by non-Christians,but a real iconoclast would not care forhis work. I might understand an artist'sgoals and dislike her or him all the morefor promoting what were for meunacceptable practices. So the caseagainst relativism remains incomplete.

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    V. ON THE ROLE OF ART CRITICSThese arguments show only that thereductionist position is possible. Thatalone is of some interest, for the troublewith many relativistic positions is thatthey are self-refuting. No statements aretrue; All moralities are equally good:these appear self-contradictory claims.To explain why anyone would bemotivated to become a relativist, I mustreturn to mydiscussion of the critic's role.Were aesthetic relativismfalse, then we

    might think of the critic as someone whohelps us to see the artwork as it is. Oncewe give up that view of aestheticvalue, itis more natural to think of criticismas anexercise in persuasion. The critic offersargumentsfor his or herjudgments,and ifwe are convinced, we accept thosejudgments, which today typically involveappeal to some complex theory of art.This does not imply that critics 'create'aesthetic value. Many, perhaps all,artworks may have some inherentaesthetic value; they can be enjoyed fortheir color, drawing or spatial relation-ships. But I am interestedin how today afew artists'works are singled out as beingof major importance. In our society thereis a sharp distinction between expensiveworks whose importance is validated bycritical consensus and those many otherartworks known and enjoyed only byfriends of the artist.The philistine, too ignorant to under-stand the arthe detests, mayagreewith allof this, but I am interested in how suchbeliefs arisefrom within the artworld. Asis true for most institutions, people in theart world may question some but not allof the accepted beliefs before they ceaseto be members of that community. ACatholic may question some papaljudgments, but does not suggest thatMohammedwas a trueprophet.Similarly,someone may disagree about the signifi-cance of individual artists, but assertingthat Raphael was the last great painterprevents one from being a memberof theart community. One differencebetween areligious community and an artisticcommunity is that religiousbeliefs aim tobe true to the facts, while beliefs aboutaesthetic value are merely shared judg-ments.These distinctions must be developedin more detail. What is important here isto understand the relationship betweenthe art world consensus and the role ofcritics. Once we give up the claim thataesthetic judgments are statements offact, then the role of rhetoric in artcriticism is worth considering. If the artcommunity is bound together by accept-ing judgments of quality, and if those

    judgments are a product of critics'rhetoric, then the art world consensus isthe product of a general agreement toaccept the arguments put forward bycritics. So described, that agreementseems frail. Today almost everyone cansee Pollock's greatness; it is not as if wehave just all agreedto admirehis art. Butthat belief, which I share, is in one senseless a fact about the work than astatement of how we all judge it.Certainly many do not admire his art,butthey are typically markedas outsiders tothe art world. A critiqueof Pollock mightchange our consensus, but such anaccount would be taken seriously only ifpresented from within the art world [12].When three decades ago a few criticsadmired Pollock, their claims wereconsidered eccentric. Now their judg-ments aregenerally acceptedas truein theonly sense of 'truth' possible here, truthrelativeto the beliefsof the community. Ifwe think of aesthetic judgments asstatements about the private experiencesof individuals, then it may seem almostmiraculous that we achieve so muchagreement. But there is another way tolook at this situation. Were suchagreement-including, often, the agree-ment to accept disagreement-lacking,then the art world could not exist. Werethere no general belief that a fewcontemporaryartists are significant, thenour art market could not exist. Thisanalysis may treat the relationshipbetween rhetoric and truth too simply.Rhetoric may serve the interestsof truth,as when St Augustine urgedthe preacherto master pagan rhetoric [13]. And thereneed be no logical connection betweenhow I come to hold my beliefs and thetruth of those beliefs. Even when werecognize the connection between artcriticism and the art market, it doesn'tfollow that the claims of critics areuntrue. The claims of the critic, I amurging, are true relative to the artcommunity; the search for some furthersense in which those claims are true inrelation to the artwork itself may befutile.I am discussing only contemporaryworks and only those relatively fewdiscussed by critics. Much can be learnedby examiningthe cases closer at hand. Asmy parallels with epistemological andmoral skepticism indicate, studies of thefoundations of our knowledge typicallybegin with a few selected cases. The closelink between art making and the artmarket; the introduction of complextheories of critics: these are newphenomena. Raphael did not paint toexhibit in galleries, nor were his works

    validated by discussion in artjournals ofthe time. Let us envisagea moresweepingpresentation of these claims.VI. AESTHETIC ATHEISM

    Imagine someone who has come toquestion not just the claims made aboutsome contemporary artists, but the wayartworks are handled in our society. Justas someone who lost faith might stillenjoy visiting churches, so this personmight still aesthetically appreciate manythings outside the museum. But thisaesthetic atheist would be unwilling andunable to enjoy art as we have institu-tionalized it. How could we describe theinner life of this person?My account draws on Nietzsche'sanalysis of morality in On the Genealogyof Morals, for he is concerned with theinterests served by religiousbeliefs, and Iwith those served by belief in art. Just asNietzsche wants to undermine thosefoundations of morality by describingtheir genesis, so I am interested inunderstanding how a genealogy ofaesthetic value might lead to aestheticatheism. But my account is in one waymore modest in its goals than his, and thisdifference may make aesthetic atheismmore acceptable. Nietzsche's challengingclaimis that such a genealogyunderminesitself, the search for truth leading toskepticism about the existence of truth[14].

    AfterChristian ruthfulnessasdrawnone nference fteranother,tmustendby drawingts moststrikingnference,its inferenceagainst tself... it posesthequestion what s themeaning fallwill to truth?Unlike the critic of traditional morality,who perhapswill producesomeequivalentfor the beliefs he rejects, the aestheticatheist seeks no substitute for art. Thetrouble with revolutionary kinds of art isthat they become absorbed into the artmarket; by now, nothing is moretraditional than such would-be attacks onthe art world. But the aesthetic atheistwants us to stop making art.In this situation, my analysis may seemclose to the criticism I discuss. Critics userhetoric to sustain belief in aestheticvalue, and my criticism of their role isonly a similar exercise. Aesthetic atheismwould become true for the relativistonlyif such beliefs were widelyaccepted.Sincebelief in aesthetic value depends uponconsensus, if that agreement ceases tohold, then aesthetic value (in the specialway I describe it) will cease to exist.The aesthetic atheist is interestednot instepping outside contemporary practice,

    Carrier,Possibility of AestheticAtheism 37

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    but in pointing to how that practiceitselfmay break down. Just as Marxists areinterested in working out what they callcontradictions of capitalism and not inmoralizing about that system, so here wemay point to a growing awareness withinthe art world of the claims I describe.A group of recent critics, identifiedas'postmodernists', argue that the end ofpainting has come [15]. This newpresentation of a claim made by Hegel inthe early nineteenth century has recentlybeen made in another context by thephilosopher Arthur Danto [16]. As thename 'postmodernists' indicates, thesecritics believe that the great tradition oftwentieth century innovation in painting-the time of 'modernism'-is nowclosed. Some of these critics areinterestedin photography,multiplesorperformance,and they offer varied positive recom-mendations about what an artistworkingin these media today may constructivelydo. These challenging claims are worthfurther study. Here I focus just on whatthe postmodernists have to say about theend of painting, for only that portion oftheir claims is directly relevant to mydiscussion of aesthetic atheism. Thoughthese authors disagree about much, theyagree that the ability of today's artiststocontinue the traditions of art is in doubt.They dispute not only judgments aboutthe importance of individual artists-every critic does that-but the wholesystem within which suchjudgments aremade. Like skeptics about knowledge ormorality, they ask us to considerwhetherour collective beliefs are justified. Thesepostmodernists are only a small group,relatively isolated from much artmakingthat proceeds without knowledge of orinterestin suchtheorizing.But the historyof art should teach us that sometimesmovements that start in small ways canhave large effects.If, as the postmodernists suggest,aesthetic experience itself has beenrendered doubtful, then it is hard toimagine that such an end to the traditionwould not affect how we view establishedart. Placing a Pollock in the museum

    along with a Raphael is justified by thebelief that both artists are engaged in acommon concern. In this respectthey aresomewhat like two scientists working atdifferent times. But, just as the discoverythat scientific laws were impossible toformulate would affect how we judge theachievements of older science, so be-coming aesthetic atheists would influenceour view of the whole artistic tradition.Consider, too, the parallelmy title Onthe Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism is

    intended to invoke, the history of attackson religion. From the Enlightenmentonward, most important philosophershave been highly critical to the claims ofChristianity. As one result such esotericdebates have influenced many peoplewho know nothing of Kant, Hegel, Marx,Nietzsche or Freud. Almost withoutexception, these critics of moral andreligious institutions exempted art fromtheir criticism. Perhaps they came tooearly to see how art as much as religionmight be attacked. Meanwhile, art hasbecome, for many people, a substituteforreligion. Such an activity, my analysissuggests, is possible only within a largersociety which supports beliefs in itsgeneral goals. This account aims neitherto promote aesthetic atheism nor toattack it, but to begina discussion towardunderstanding the very interesting andnovel situation in which that position canbe articulated.

    Acknowledgements-Forelpfuldiscussionthank artists Sharon Gold, ThomasNozkowski,Joyce Robinsand Sean Scully;the criticJosephMasheck;ndArthurDanto,AlexanderNehamas, Marianne'Novy andMarkRoskill.Perhapsmy largestdebtis toClement Greenberg, or everythingI sayargueswith hiswork.

    REFERENCES1. G. Dickie, Art and the Aesthetic (Ithaca:CornellUniv. Press, 1974);A. Danto,The Transfigurationof the Commonplace(Cambridge,Mass.:Harvard niv.Press,1981).

    2. T. Wolfe, ThePainted Word New York:Bantam, 1976) is an unpleasantanddeeply gnorant, ut nfluential,ccount.C. Ratcliffs CriticalThought,MagicalLanguage , Art in America, p. 184(Summer 980)offers heperspectivef aworking ritic.3. D. Carrier, Artand Its Market ,n R.Hertz, ed., Theoriesof ContemporaryArt(EnglewoodCliffs,NewJersey: rentice-Hall, 1984).4. H. James, The TragicMuse (Harmonds-worth,Middlesex: enguin,1982)p. 14.5. D. A. Brown, Raphael and America(Washington, D.C.: U.S. NationalGallery,1983).6. R. Wollheim,ntroductiono The magein Form: Selected Writings of AdrianStokes (Harmondsworth,Middlesex:Penguin,1972)p. 31.7. J. Alsop, The Rare Art Traditions(NewYork:Harper&Row,1982) sa longandthoroughaccount.See the reviewbyE.H. Gombrich in TheNew YorkReview39(2 December1982); lso,K.Clark, TheIdealMuseum ,Artnews, . 29(January1954).8. F. Haskell, Rediscoveries n Art (Ithaca,NY: CornellUniv.Press,1976).See thereviewreprinted n C. Rosen and H.Zerner, Romanticismand Realism (NewYork:Viking,1984).9. D. Carrier, eviewof AnthonySavile'sThe Test of Time in The Journal ofPhilosophy, . 116 April1984).10. J. O'Connor, ed., Modern Materialism:Readings on Mind-Body Identity (NewYork:Harcourt,Brace& World,1969).11. E. Gombrich, Ideals and Idols (Oxford:Phaidon,1979)pp. 156,128,157.12. See, for example,R. Hennessy, TheMan WhoForgotHow to Paint ,Art nAmerica, . 13(Summer1984).13. See StAugustine,De doctrinachristianna,liber quartvs, Tr. with commentary bySister Therese Sullivan (Washington,D.C.: The Catholic University ofAmerica,1972).

    14. Nietzsche, On the Genealogyof Morals,W. Kaufman, trans. (New York:RandomHouse,1967)p. 161.15. H. Foster, ed., The Anti-Aesthetic(PortTownsend, Washington: Bay Press,1983) and T. Lawson, Last Exit:Painting , Artforum,p. 40 (October1981).16. A. Danto,TheEndofArt forthcoming);E. Wind, Art and Anarchy (New York:Vintage,1969)offersa defense fHegel'sviews.17. D. Carrier, Art Fashion , Journal:AContemporary Art Magazine, p. 32(Summer1982) discusses these issuesfrom a relatedpointof view.

    Carrier,Possibility of Aesthetic Atheism8


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