This article was downloaded by: [University of Sheffield]On: 22 April 2014, At: 09:32Publisher: RoutledgeInforma Ltd Registered in England and Wales Registered Number:1072954 Registered office: Mortimer House, 37-41 Mortimer Street,London W1T 3JH, UK

Critique: Critical MiddleEastern StudiesPublication details, including instructions forauthors and subscription information:http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/ccri19

Afghanistan's relations withits neighborsAlam Payind aa Director of the Middle East Studies Center , TheOhio State University , Columbus, OhioPublished online: 11 Apr 2007.

To cite this article: Alam Payind (1996) Afghanistan's relations with itsneighbors, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, 5:8, 61-70, DOI:10.1080/10669929608720082

To link to this article: http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/10669929608720082

PLEASE SCROLL DOWN FOR ARTICLE

Taylor & Francis makes every effort to ensure the accuracy of allthe information (the “Content”) contained in the publications on ourplatform. However, Taylor & Francis, our agents, and our licensorsmake no representations or warranties whatsoever as to the accuracy,completeness, or suitability for any purpose of the Content. Any opinionsand views expressed in this publication are the opinions and views ofthe authors, and are not the views of or endorsed by Taylor & Francis.The accuracy of the Content should not be relied upon and should beindependently verified with primary sources of information. Taylor andFrancis shall not be liable for any losses, actions, claims, proceedings,demands, costs, expenses, damages, and other liabilities whatsoeveror howsoever caused arising directly or indirectly in connection with, inrelation to or arising out of the use of the Content.

This article may be used for research, teaching, and private studypurposes. Any substantial or systematic reproduction, redistribution,

reselling, loan, sub-licensing, systematic supply, or distribution in anyform to anyone is expressly forbidden. Terms & Conditions of accessand use can be found at http://www.tandfonline.com/page/terms-and-conditions

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

Critique, Spring 1996

Afghanistan's Relations With ItsNeighbors

Alam Payind

It has been the unhappy fate of Afghanistan to be the stage for numerousinternal conflicts and foreign invasions. While many of these conflicts havebeen generated within Afghanistan or within the region itself, others have beenprovoked from without. Just in the passed 100 years, Afghanistan was invadedeither partially or completely six times by outsiders. Contemporary Afghansrecognize that in the absence of a legitimate and effective central authority, theircountry will continue to serve as a battlefield where the contradictory interestsof various Afghan ethnic and linguistic groups and of Afghanistan's neighborsconverge. They also recognize the ways in which these conflicts and wars haveforced changes in traditional relations among various Afghan ethnic andlinguistic communities.

This article on the perceptions of Afghans about their country's relationswith its neighbors is based on views gathered through interviews conducted bothinside and outside Afghanistan between 1992 and 1994. More than 110 Afghanswere interviewed, representing a broad spectrum of Afghan ethnic and classgroups. The aim of the interviews was to assess attitudes toward recent politicaldevelopments in Afghanistan. Specifically, how does the Afghan awam (generalpublic) perceive its vital interests and how do its perceptions coincide with ordiffer from the views of the Afghan armed groups or the political leasders ofChina, Iran, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, the United States,and Uzbekistan. Ghulam Hassan, a Hazara scholar, summarized the views ofmany Afghans toward the current situation in Afghanistan:

Alam Payind is the Director of the Middle East Studies Center of The Ohio StateUniversity, Columbus, Ohio. The information presented in this paper is primarily basedon the author's field work in Afghanistan and Pakistan.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

62 * Payind

When Afghans as a front line people were fighting against the Soviet occupyingforces and their clients for 14 years, and were absorbing the blood of over onemillion casualties, the United States, Pakistan, Iran, and the Arab Gulf Stateswere saying "Well done, we are with you." They labeled Afghanistan, "Acountry of unbending, freedom-loving heroes."

Praises accompanied by weapons and money were pouring into the resistancecamps. But when the Soviet troops, after devastating Afghanistan, retreatedfrom it, outsiders, including those who supported Afghans in their 14 years ofresistance, abandoned them. The country which burned for 14 years in theflames of cold war between superpowers now is burning in the flames of a less-known "cold war" waged among the secondary and tertiary level powers ofIran, Pakistan, Saudi Arabia, and the Central Asian countries still ruled byformer communists. What a fateful reward for yesterday's heroes?1

Ghulam Hassan rather poetically expressed a common theme stated by theAfghan awam since the Soviet invasion of their country in 1979: "most majorarmed groups inside Afghanistan have formed close associations with foreignpowers, especially Pakistan."2 These co2y relationships with, and thedependence on outside, especially neighboring countries, have deprived thewarring factions of legitimacy in Afghanistan. Pakistan, due to its geopoliticalsituation and its involvement in Afghanistan's ongoing conflicts, continues to bein a unique position. During the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, 3.5 millionAfghans sought refuge in Pakistan. Although Afghans generally appreciate thehospitality, support and cooperation extended by the Pakistani people, theyresent the domineering tendencies of the Pakistani military. Afghanistan'sInterim Government (AIG), comprised of members of pro-Pakistan mujahidintanzims (Pakistan supported political parties), not only was formed in Pakistan,but according to many Afghan and Pakistani scholars, it was created by thePakistani military.3 Moreover, all the major accords among Afghan warringfactions were signed under the watchful eyes of its military. Pakistan under thelate President Zia ul-Haq's policies set a pattern of supporting only Pakistan-based mujahidin tanzims and undercut the formation of nationalist, traditionalist,moderate, and democratic organizations and movements among the Afghanresistance and refugee groups. There is consensus among Afghans that even inthe post-Soviet era the Pakistani military has continued to pursue Zia's modelof supporting the monopoly and control of only pro-Pakistani Islamist mujahidin

1. Interview, Jalalbad, Afghanistan, August 25, 1992.2. John FuIIerton, "A Rift Among Rebels," Far Eastern Economic Review, (October

29, 1982), p. 20.3. Mushahid Hussain, "Prospect for die Peaceful Settlement," Seminar Report on

Afghanistan, Institute of Strategic Studies in Islamabad, (December 1990), p. 8.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

Afghanistan's Relations with its Neighbors 4» 63

tanzims over arms and political power. Referring to the government changessince Zia's death, one scholar has argued, "The personnel change did not, infact, lead to the anticipated modifications of Pakistan's Afghan policies. Themilitary resisted any diminution of the ISI's (Inter Services Intelligence)power. "4

Indian strategists and security experts watch Pakistan's continued support foronly pro-Pakistani Afghan factions with great concern. They view thisdevelopment as a mw/a/»Vftn-Islamabad alliance against Indian security interestsin the region. While criticizing Pakistan's interference in Afghan affairs, Indiastill maintains its own close relations with the remnants of the Soviet-supportedPeople's Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA). In a similar fashion,Pakistani analysts criticize Russian-PDPA-Indian relations as an attempt toresuscitate "the failed Moscow-Kabul-Delhi axis. "5 Some Afghan and Pakistanianalysts even argue that India pursues its own crude version of a "triplecontainment" with respect to Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Kashmir.6

Iran, because of its own internal and external conflicts during the Iran-IraqWar, initially was more cautious than Pakistan in the support it extended toAfghan resistance groups. The Iranian government supported only those AfghanShi'i political parties it believed were ideologically closest to it and thus couldhelp to export the Iranian revolution and strengthen Iranian influence inAfghanistan.7

Two pro-Iran Shi'i Afghan groups, Nasr and Sepah, became the majorrecipients of Iranian assistance. Shaykh Asif Muhsini, although a prominentShi'i scholar and resistance leader from Kandahar and an Afghan nationalist, notonly was prevented from supporting anti-Soviet Afghan refugees and resistancegroups based in Iran, but also was forced to move the center of his resistanceactivities to Pakistan. While in Pakistan, Muhsini discovered that his Afghannationalistic views were not tolerated by the Pakistani military either.Eventually, he and his associates felt compelled to move their headquarters backinside Afghanistan. Among warring Afghan factions, Iran also supported theNorthern Alliance of armed groups. Many members of this alliance, such asIsmaili Shi'i leader Jaffar Naderi, Hezbi-Wahdat leader Abdul Ali Mazari,Jam'iyyat-e-Islami leaders Ahmad Shah Masoud, Ismail Khan and BurhanuddinRabbani received political and moral assistance from Iran.

4. Marvin G. Weinbaum, Pakistan and Afghanistan: Resistance and Reconstruction,(Boulder: Westview Press, 1994), p. 44.

5. Interview with a former sociology professor of Kabul University, who resides andconducts research in Pakistan and prefers to remain anonymous, August 1993.

6. Ibid.7. Sudur-e-inqilab, (exporting revolution) has been a proclaimed major objective of

Iranian foreign policy since the establishment of the Islamic Republic in 1979.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

64 * Payind

Just as pro-Pakistan and pro-Iran mujahidin parties were and are therecipients of weapons from their respective supporters, General Rashid Dostum,a former Soviet-trained Uzbek militia commander, received his share ofweapons, spare parts, and fuel through and from Uzbekistan since 1992.Moreover, under current post-Soviet relationships, any Uzbek-Tajik conflict tothe north of the Amu Darya (Amu River) affects the Uzbek-Tajik relations onthe Afghan side of Amu Darya.

Azizullah Wasifi, a former cabinet member and the last president of the"loya jirgah" (Afghan's grand national council) before the Soviet invasion ofAfghanistan, stated:

It is true that the Soviet troops have left Afghanistan in disgrace, but thephysical and social devastations that resulted from the 10-year occupation andsubsequent conflicts are very difficult to repair. It is not die end of the story,Yeltsin's Russia under its policy toward its "near abroad" and the formernomenklatura who rule in Tashkent, Almata, Ashkabad, Dushanbe, and Bishkikall want to influence developments in Afghanistan to their liking.8

The newly independent but landlocked Muslim countries of Central Asianeed stability and peace in Afghanistan, which can link them to internationalmarkets and reduce their dependency on Russia. However, the secular leadersof these predominantly Muslim states feel insecure enough to be fearful of anypossibly adverse impact of a perceived threat of an "Islamic Comintern" comingout of Afghanistan. For instance, President Islam Karimov of Uzbekistanapparently considers all forms of political activity by Muslims as "Islamicfundamentalism" dedicated to reviving, in his words, "medieval horror." Hehas declared that no Islamist movement should be tolerated in the region and hehas denounced the various political activities and movements of Muslimsregardless of their root causes and targets, as links in the same chain ofextremism with an ideology of expansionism.9

In Moscow, policy-makers, who hope to attract U.S. and Europeancooperation in perpetuating Russian hegemony over its "near abroad" sound likeacademics Samuel Huntington and Bernard Lewis, for whom the "clashes ofcivilization" between "the West and the rest" is a reality.10 Even VladimirZhirinovsky, leader of the Russian ultranationalist Liberal Democratic Party, inhis November 1994 California speech warned his American audience "to watch

8. Interview, California, June 1994.9. Time, (July 25, 1994), p. 21.10. Richard E. Rubenstein and Farle Crocker, "Challenging Huntington," Foreign

Policy, n. 96, (Fall 1994), p. 114. Also see Samuel P. Huntington, "The Clash ofCivilizations," Foreign Affairs, n. 72, v. 3, (Summer 1993), pp. 21-49.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

Afghanistan's Relations with its Neighbors * 65

out for those Chinese and Muslims."" According to Azizullah Wasifi, Afghanexperts who study nationalist movements among non-Russians of the formerSoviet Union were not surprised when the Russian government and medialabeled the Chechin uprising a movement of bandits, criminals and Islamicfundamentalists.12

Russian leaders and their Tajik, Turkmen and Uzbek counterparts seem tobelieve that Islam is the primary cause of social unrest in predominantly Muslimareas. In reality the root cause of problems and conflicts are in chronicoppression, authoritarian regimes, crises of legitimacy, and extremism, bothreligious or secular. However, former communists like many authoritarianleaders in Egypt, Morocco, Syria, and Tunisia, often have magnified the threatof religious movements to obscure more pressing political, social and economicproblems.

In Afghanistan most people and many international observers view theongoing war and its consequences as reflections of a combination ofincompatible political and economic interests of the Afghan warlords and foreignpowers, especially neighboring countries, whose influences have disturbed thedelicate balance of ethnic, linguistic, tribal and mudhabi (Sunni Shi'i)relationships that prevailed in Afghanistan prior to 1979. According to oneTajik scholar who conducts research on Tajikistan and Afghanistan:

The fighting in Afghanistan has been going on for 15 years. It is thecontinuation of a Cold War tragedy now being played out by several actors.Inside Afghanistan, the main actors are: (1) the Pakistan-supported Jamiat-iIslami of Burhanuddin Rabbani; (2) the Hezb-i Islami of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar,also supported by Pakistan; and (3) the formerly Soviet-supported and nowUzbekistan-supported General Rashid Dostum. Other actors are Pakistan, Iran,Saudi Arabia and the rulers of newly-independent Central Asian countries whoare former communists and continue to follow directions of Moscow.13

The Afghan scholar Hafizullah Emadi, agrees with this assessment. Themain thesis of his book, which was written before the Soviet withdrawal in1989, is that the United States, Pakistan, Iran, and Saudi Arabia providedfinancial and military support only to so-called Islamic parties in the hope that,after overthrowing the Afghan communist leadership, these parties would servetheir respective interests in Afghanistan and in the region. Emadi further arguesthat, from the beginning of the popular uprising against the Soviet occupation,

11. New York rimes, (November 9, 1994), p. A6.12. Interview with Azizullah Wasifi, California, June 1994. Also see The Message,

v. 20, n. 3, (September 1995), p. 13.13. Interview with a Tajik visiting professor, who preferred to remain anonymous,

Columbus, Ohio, March 19, 1994.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

66 * Payind

some of the recipients of assistance, under the pretext of fighting "communism,"carried out repressive policies against traditionalists, intellectuals, nationalists,and democrats throughout Afghanistan and the Pakistan-based refugee camps.These policies of repression, along with the pervasive corruption within theranks of the self-declared Islamic parties, have isolated them from the people.14

Many foreign observers have noted the transformation of the mujahidin intogroups interested only in pursuing the personal ambitions of their respectiveleaders. The support of outside powers has facilitated this process. Forexample, Stephen Masty, an American who has worked for years with Afghanrelief programs, said: "The United States was not responsible for the SovietUnion invading Afghanistan, but we [Americans] were responsible for armingthe mujahidin groups that grew to be Frankensteins."15

In August 1992, five months after the collapse of the Najibullah governmentand during the second Pakistan-negotiated mujahidin administration ofBurhanuddin Rabbani, one of the disillusioned field commanders commented:

The fall of Najib sharpened the rivalries and ambitions among Pakistan, Iran,and Central Asian countries as well as among different mujahidin partiessupported by these countries. Instead of promoting reconciliation amongmujahidin and between mujahidin and common Afghans, the Pakistani, Iranian,Saudi and Central Asian governments are aggravating the division amongAfghans by favoring one political party or one group over the others. What ismore, all parties are heavily armed and continue to receive arms and moneyfrom their foreign supporters.16

Both casual and serious observers of Afghanistan who visited the countryafter the fall of Najibullah government witnessed the diminishing popularity ofthe foreign-supported mujahidin parties, which are fighting with each other forthe control of Kabul and other provinces. Since 1979, the leaders andcommanders of Pakistan-based mujahidin parties and Pakistani war profiteershave accumulated power and wealth beyond their imagination. They do notseem to be willing to give up their newly acquired power. At the risk ofbecoming marginalized, these leaders and other Afghan, Pakistani, and Iranianwar profiteers have resisted adjustment to the new realities of a post-SovietAfghanistan. An Afghan observer summed up this dilemma in two sentences,"Before we had one king in Afghanistan. Now a Soviet-made Rashid Dostum,

14. Hafizullah Emadi, State, Revolution and Superpowers in Afghanistan, (NewYork: Praeger, 1990), p. 11.

15. The New York Times, (February 22, 1994).16. Alam Payind, "Evolving Alternative Views on the Future of Afghanistan," Asian

Survey, v. 235, n. 9, (September 1993), p. 927.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

Afghanistan's Relations with its Neighbors * 67

Pakistan-made mujahidin leaders and Saudi-sponsored Wahabbis all behave likekings."17 To make his point clear, he shyly used the Persian proverb: "Thelegacy of the dead bear is now acquired by hyenas."18 After a decade ofresistance (1979-1989) against the Soviet occupying forces and more then sixyears of ruthless fighting among warlords since 1989, Afghans have lost hopeof realizing reconciliation among foreign-supported tanzims. This resentmentagainst the arrogant and corrupt behavior of warlords and hunger for peaceamong the Afghan awam has paved the way for the surprising success of a newforce in Afghanistan, the Taliban (translated as students of religious institutions).According to the Taliban leaders, their objectives are to eliminate oppressiveTanzims and warlords and establish a united Islamic government in Afghanistan.This new force captured nearly half of Afghanistan in only five monthsbeginning in September 1994. Later, in the fall of 1995, the Taliban capturedall of Western Afghanistan, thus bringing the largest chunk of Afghanistan underunified control since the Soviet occupation began in December 1979.19

Reports from inside Afghanistan indicate that the Taliban have disarmed mostof the warring factions and have established relative calm in areas under theircontrol.

In early 1995, the Taliban began an offensive to capture the capitol, Kabul,but this move has been blocked (as of 1996) by stiff government resistance. Thecapital and northern Afghanistan have become testing areas for the Talibanforces, which have been halted five miles from Kabul. As of February 1996,the Taliban have failed in their attempts to topple President Rabbani and hiscommander, Ahmad Shah Masoud. The Rabbani government's propagandaagainst the Taliban, labeling them clients of a foreign country, seems to besucceeding in areas under government control.20 Many Afghans speculate thatthe Taliban, like their predecessors the seven Pakistan-based mujahidin tanzims,also are supported by the Pakistani government. The difference is that themujahidin tanzims of Said Ali Gailani, Gul Buddin Hekmatyar, Younis Khalis,Mohammed Nabi Mohammadi, Sibghatullah Mujjaddedi, Burhanuddin Rabbani,and Abdul Rab Sayaf were under the control of the Pakistani ISI while theTaliban are supported primarily by the Pakistani Ministry of Interior under theleadership of retired General Nasirullah Babur. Several Pakistani newspapersincluding the Muslim, the News, and the Frontier Post have published articlesabout the ongoing relationships between the Pakistani government and the

17. Interview with Ghulam Hassan, Jalalabad, Afghanistan, August 25, 1992.18. Ibid.19. The New York Times, (February 16, 1995).20. Mohammad Zahid, "Taliban and Afghan Imbroglio," The Writer's Union of Free

Afghanistan (WUFA), n. 6, (December 1995), p. 26.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

68 * Payind

leaders of Taliban.11 A U.S. magazine quoted Pakistani and foreign sourcesas referring to Pakistan's role in this dangerous "game."22 In an interviewwith the WUFA newspaper, General Nasirullah Babur denied that Pakistan wassupporting the Taliban forces in Afghanistan.23

One solution suggested by most Afghans to their country is the conveningof a lay a jirgah, under the auspices of the United Nations and the Organizationof the Islamic Conference (OIC). For nearly 300 years, the loya jirgah hasproven to be an effective institution during many crises in Afghan history.24

The devastating results of the 10-year Soviet occupation and the continuinginfighting among tanzims have compelled the traditionally self-reliant andxenophobic Afghan awam to welcome the United Nations' peace-makinginitiatives. Because Pakistan, Iran and Saudi Arabia have involved themselvesin the inter-tanzimat conflicts, many Afghans view their roles in the peacenegotiations with suspicions.

Supporters of the idea of convening a loya jirgah argue that a primaryreason for the ongoing crisis in Afghanistan can be found in the exclusion of thegeneral Afghan public from all the negotiations, accords and discussions since1979. This exclusion of the general Afghan public has resulted in a lack ofpopular support for the foreign-supported formulations. Consequently, sixpresidents have failed to acquire a token Bai'at (legitimacy)—a very high rateof failure even by Afghan standards. It is important to note that all sixpresidents since 1978 (Nur Mohammed Taraki, Hafizullah Amin, BabrakKarmal, Najibullah, Sibghatullah Mojaddedi, and Barhanuddin Rabbani) havebeen viewed by the general Afghan public as foreign-imposed or foreign-supported.

Supporters of the idea of convening a loya jirgah under the auspices of theU.N. and OIC range from The Writers Union of Free Afghanistan to popularpublic figures such as the late Abdul Rahman Pazwak, Said ShamsuddinMajrooh, Said Qasim Rishtiya, many prominent Afghan ulama, former electedmembers of the Afghan parliament, and the former king, Zahir Shah. Howeverwhen Benon Seven and Mehmud Misteri, United Nations' special envoys toAfghanistan, tried to include independent or non-tanzim moderate Afghans inpeace-making efforts, their plans were sabotaged by the extremist tanzims.After these failures, most Afghans have concluded that the militant tanzim

21. See for example The Frontier Post, (Peshawar, Pakistan: December 11, 1994).22. U.S. News and World Report, (March 6, 1995), p. 66.23. The Writer's Union of Free Afghanistan (WUFA), (Peshawar, Pakistan: No

publisher, November 1994), p. 6.24. Sayid Qasim Rishtiya, "The Right Way Out of the Current Dangerous Crisis in

Afghanistan is to Resort to the Will of General Public in Afghanistan Under U.N.Observation," Writers Union of Free Afghanistan, May 23, 1993.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

Afghanistan's Relations with its Neighbors * 69

leaders, for reasons of personal ambitions, have pushed Afghanistan to adangerous level of civil war. Moreover, Afghans believe that as long as thetanzim leaders suffer no consequences for sabotaging peace plans, the tanzimsand their supporters will continue to violate all peace efforts.

Many Afghan observers and United Nations diplomats fear the furtherdeterioration of the Afghan crisis into the level of ethnic cleansing. If such atragedy were to happen neither Pakistan, Iran, nor the Central Asian countriescould remain immune. Even Iranian leaders who in the past criticized the U.N.role have come to support the peace-making efforts of Mehmud Misteri. Forexample, Alaeddin Boroujerdi, Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister, expressedsupport for the U.N. plan to send a special envoy to Afghanistan: "Theimplementation of such a plan would be a major step toward the peacefulsettlement of the Afghan crisis."25

The British learned in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries and the Sovietsin the 1980s that too much meddling in Afghanistan's internal affairs invitesdisaster. Nevertheless, it is difficult to predict when Pakistan, Iran, SaudiArabia and the Central Asian countries will understand that their meddling inAfghanistan's internal affairs is counter productive.

The challenge faced by those involved in Afghan affairs seems to be toachieve a better understanding of the history and complex realities of thatcountry and its neighbors. It appears that after paying the heaviest cost inhistory for independence, the Afghan general public will not be satisfied witha government which is "foreign-supported, oppressive and, worst of all,mediocre."26 Popular sentiments with regard to the current state of affairs inAfghanistan often is expressed by educated Pashto-speaking Afghans who recitethe 17th century Afghan poet and leader, Khushal Khan Khattak:

The fame of Bahlol, and of Sher Shah too, resoundethin my ears.

Afghan Emperors of India, who swayed its sceptereffectively and well.

For six or seven generations did they govern sowisely that all their people were filled withadmiration of them.

Either those Afghans were different, or these havegreatly changed.

Or otherwise, at present, such is the Almighty'sdecree

If the Afghans shall acquire the gift of concord andunity,

25. Ettela'at, (November 21, 1995).26. Interview with Hzizallah Wasifi, California, June 30, 1994.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14

70 * Payind

Old Khushal shall, a second time, grow youngtherefrom.

Let it not be, that every bad rider should mountfortune's steed:

If it be ridden by any one, at least a good horsemanlet him be.27

Similarly, Dari-speaking Afghans often recite Shaykh Sa'di's following"story-in-verse," to describe the selfishness and greed common among Afghanwarring factions and their foreign backers:

I heard [a fable] that a sheep had been rescued by a great man from the jawsof a wolf. When the evening fell, the rescuer pressed his own sharp knifeagainst the sheep's throat. Whereon the soul of the sheep complained to theman: "You have snatched me away from the claws of a wolf, but at last I sawthat you turned out to be the ultimate wolf."28

27. Khushal Khan Khattak, Collected Works, (Peshawar: No publisher, 1952), pp.214,215.

28. From Gulistan (Rose Garden) of Shaikh Sa'di Shirazi. Sa'di died in 1291 A.D.,Kulliyati Sadi, (Tehran: Feroghi, 1988), p. 75.

Dow

nloa

ded

by [

Uni

vers

ity o

f Sh

effi

eld]

at 0

9:32

22

Apr

il 20

14