The processing of fingerprintevidence after the introductionof the National AutomatedFingerprint IdentificationSystem (NAFIS)

Home Office Online Report 23/04

MHB (Morgan Harris Burrows)

The views expressed in this report are those of the authors, not necessarily those of the Home Office (nor do theyreflect Government policy).

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The processing of fingerprint evidence after the introduction of the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) MHB (Morgan Harris Burrows)

Online Report 23/04

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Acknowledgements We would like to thank all those in the five police forces, their identification bureaux and the corresponding units of the Crown Prosecution Service who collaborated in this research. They dealt patiently with all our questions, helped in assembling the data used in the research, and their comments during the course of the research were particularly helpful. But, of course, we take full responsibility for the conclusions we have drawn from the data. We would also like particularly to acknowledge the advice and help provided by Alaster Smith (RDS), Colin Patton of the Police Information Technology Organisation and David Blakey, Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary. Thanks are due to those who provided advice during the preparation of this report and all those who were kind enough to provide comments on previous drafts. The comments provided were invaluable in assisting us to improve the quality of the document. The advice received from our colleagues at MHB, especially John Burrows and Alan Mackie was always helpful, as was the support and advice of Professor John Raine of Birmingham University’s Institute of Local Government Studies. We are indebted to them and express our thanks to them also. The authors James Morgan is a partner in consultants Morgan Harris Burrows (MHB). Nicola Ponikiewski, now at the National Centre for Volunteering, who was a research consultant at MHB, assumed responsibility for the interviews and data collection in the five police forces and their identification bureaux. Eileen Dunstan, a research assistant at Birmingham University’s Institute of Local Government Studies, was responsible for the interview programme and data collection in the corresponding units of the Crown Prosecution Service.

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Contents Acknowledgements ii Executive summary v 1. Introduction 1 Relevant literature 2 2. Use of fingerprints in investigating crime 5 Searching for marks 6 Use of computers in fingerprint retrieval 6 NAFIS 7 Print-to-print searches 7 Mark-to-print searches 7 Print-to-mark searches 8 Mark-to-mark searches 8 Palm prints 8 How NAFIS relates to other police computer systems 8 3. Fingerprint practices within police forces and the CPS 9 Practices in bureaux 9 The process of scanning and searching 10 Increasing the yield of identifications from crime scenes 11 Feedback to bureaux 11 Police investigation practices - making use of fingerprint evidence of identity 12 The progress of cases and investigative changes 13 Raising police officer awareness 13 CPS practices 13 4. The use of NAFIS - information available at the centre 17 Growth in the use of NAFIS 17 Number of identifications in forces 17 5. How cases progress: the process of attrition 19 Scene examinations and identification 19 Identifications in the five forces 19 Outcomes following identification 20 Timeliness 22 6. Opportunities for making better use of fingerprint identification 24 supported by NAFIS Managing the overall process 25 Within the bureau 26 Following up the identification achieved 26 Getting ten-prints to the bureau and confirming identity 27 Prosecution 27 References 28

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Table 5.1 Progress of volume crime cases involving fingerprint evidence 23 from offence to final outcome

List of figures 4.1 Smoothed average idents/100 officers per month for each force 18 5.1 NAFIS volume crime cases for which finger-marks were received 20 by bureaux 5.2 NAFIS - outcomes from volume crime identifications: attrition 21 of cases where fingerprint evidence is available 5.3 Attrition of cases with NAFIS identifications 22

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Executive summary Background This report outlines the results of a research investigation of the impact of the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS) on the police use of fingerprint evidence. The prints of all people who have had fingerprints taken as part of a criminal investigation can now be searched using computer-assisted methods (this includes people without criminal records but known to the police), to confirm the identity of those who are arrested, and to compare with marks left at crime scenes. NAFIS, which provides these facilities, has been implemented as a national standard in all forces in England and Wales. At the time the field work was conducted the rate of NAFIS identifications from scenes of crime was approximately 1,400 per month. The monthly rate of identifications from scenes of crime has now grown to around 4,500 (Spring 2004), an increase of 221 per cent. The research concentrated on the use of fingerprint evidence in dealing with the ‘volume’ crimes (principally burglary, and thefts of and from motor vehicles). Detailed research work was conducted in five police forces which had been relatively early in implementation of NAFIS, and which had been relatively frequent users of NAFIS. The research also draws upon nationally collected statistics on the performance of NAFIS collected by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) and interviews with officers who have led investigations drawing on fingerprint evidence. In addition, research was conducted on NAFIS submissions for a sample of 1,000 volume crime cases (burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crimes) selected for more detailed consideration. It also includes data on cases which drew on fingerprint evidence (and led to prosecutions) and interviews with senior CPS staff. The findings reveal how NAFIS has had an impact on the police use of fingerprint evidence and how the process of attrition operates between collecting useable finger-marks and eventual prosecution and sentence of offenders. Main findings Since the introduction of NAFIS, the number of identifications achieved each month has increased in each force, as has the proportion of submissions to fingerprint bureaux resulting in identifications. This is a result of several factors. First, the ability to conduct more searches than before the introduction of NAFIS, through the reduction in the time each search requires. Second, as a consequence of the increased size of the database of stored fingerprints which can be searched. Finally, through a more efficient search process yielding a higher percentage of identifications from a given number of searches. Changes to police practice Some changes to police practices were observed following the introduction of NAFIS in the forces which collaborated in the research. For example, one force introduced a ‘fast-track’ approach to prioritise searches of finger-marks left at the scenes of volume crimes such as burglary. This force has shown that undertaking scene examinations without delay and obtaining, if possible, an identification quickly can lead to timely apprehension of suspects, additional evidence and better prospects of recovering stolen property. Another force reported success in using intelligence analysts attached to the force’s Scientific Support Unit to ‘chain’ intelligence about marks, linking this with other sources of forensic intelligence. Other than these examples, and the increased speed, efficiency and effectiveness of fingerprint bureaux in achieving identifications, there were no major or general changes in how the investigation process was managed in the forces in which the research was undertaken. Other processes involved in following through investigations had not generally been adapted to match the speed with which information from fingerprint evidence can now be obtained. In all the

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forces in which the research was conducted, the overall system of investigative activities for volume crimes such as burglary – from scene visits, use of NAFIS to make identifications, gathering of other evidence, interviewing suspects, and preparing the case for prosecution – appeared to be somewhat disjointed. No single person appeared to exercise responsibility for controlling the whole process, or to be concerned with overall ‘system performance’. Although the introduction of NAFIS has improved the effectiveness and the efficiency of the work of the fingerprint bureaux significantly, other administrative practices did not, in some cases, appear to have been changed to match this improvement. When bureaux are able to establish evidence of offender identity through the use of fingerprints in high profile cases such as murder or assault their role is acknowledged and bureau staff are able to see how their work has contributed to successful investigation. However, there was little, if any, feedback to most bureaux about the results of their work on volume crime. Since in these cases there is also a significant attrition between successful ‘idents’ (suspect identifications) and completed prosecutions, bureaux staff are deprived of an important element of feedback for judging the success of their contribution in dealing with these forms of crime. The impact on the criminal justice system CPS did not regard the use of NAFIS to obtain fingerprint identification evidence, as opposed to manual methods, as a material factor in decisions to prosecute or in the subsequent course and outcome of cases. NAFIS had made little or no difference to the CPS or the courts; CPS staff were of the opinion that it was not likely to do so in future. In none of the five areas covered by the research had the CPS experienced an increase of workload. Nor did it seem that the introduction of NAFIS had led to a higher rate of ‘guilty pleas’ as those accused of crimes become aware of the greater likelihood of fingerprint evidence playing a part in prosecutions and convictions. There is therefore some confirmation and reassurance from the research that the implementation of NAFIS has not resulted in ‘knock on’ or unintended (perverse) effects downstream in the criminal justice system. Identification rates The data obtained through tracking the progress of cases where finger-marks had been submitted from crime scenes to the force bureau showed that, in each of the five forces, about 20 per cent of marks submitted to bureaux and searched using NAFIS gave rise to identifications. The balance of 80 per cent of unidentified marks remained in store in the NAFIS computer system, available for subsequent investigation. Attrition in fingerprint cases Analysis was undertaken on those cases that resulted in a NAFIS match and were followed up by the police. Average figures for 157 cases in four of the five forces revealed the following pattern.

• Thirty-eight per cent of cases resulted in criminal justice outcomes of guilty, TIC (taken into consideration) or caution.

• In a further five per cent of cases ‘not guilty’ verdicts were returned. • In a further six per cent of cases suspects had been charged, but some ten months after

the offence the case had not yet been to court. • In four per cent of the cases where identifications had been achieved, the crime was a

matter for another force. (This can happen, for example, when a vehicle stolen from the area covered by force A is abandoned in the area covered by force B).

• In 15 per cent of the cases identifications were of people who were deemed to have had legitimate access to the crime scene.

• In 14 per cent of cases it had been decided to take no further action (NFA), in some instances because of delay after charge.

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• In 19 per cent of cases no further information was available, either because the case could not be traced, or because the case was still being investigated at the time the research was undertaken (some ten months after the date of the offence).

Timeliness Where an identification had been achieved, bureaux were able to provide notification of an ident within 34 days (including weekends) in 50 per cent of cases and within 137 days in all but 10 per cent of cases (average figures for four forces for which data were available). Half of cases in which charges had been made went from identification to charge within 38 days (90% - 112 days). Opportunities for improvement The research reported here leads to the conclusion that the forces have a number of possible opportunities to improve the overall process of making use of fingerprint evidence. Foremost is the opportunity to achieve more coherent management of the overall process of investigating and prosecuting crimes where identification evidence is potentially available. Opportunities for improvement are evident in the individual processes of:

• work within the bureau – chiefly through providing better feedback on the results of

their efforts to bureau staff, but also through developing strategies for research of outstanding marks and for linking identification evidence with other forms of intelligence;

• following up the identifications provided – chiefly through ensuring timely investigation, but also through strategies such as the use of concentrated operations to follow up a number of outstanding identifications, and perhaps specifying standards for intelligence packages;

• getting ten-prints of those arrested to the bureau and confirmation of identity back to the arresting officer. The main opportunity for improvement will come with the adoption of Livescan (currently deployed in around half of forces). The investment in time and effort in investigation and the possible consequences of delay, such as releasing a suspect wanted in relation to other charges, are such that there is little economic sense in tolerating delay in getting confirmation of identity back to arresting officers; and

• prosecution, perhaps by providing more guidance to police officers on the circumstances when fingerprint evidence on its own might be regarded as sufficient to progress a case and the nature of supporting evidence which might otherwise be required.

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1. Introduction For fingerprints to play a full part in detecting and prosecuting crime, it is essential that finger-marks taken from a scene of crime are matched with prints already on record as accurately and as swiftly as possible. The main objective of the study was:

to examine the use being made by the police of fingerprint evidence, with reference to the impact of the National Automated Fingerprint Identification System (NAFIS).

This study concentrated on the way NAFIS has affected police investigations. It has also provided information on how cases incorporating NAFIS-based evidence proceed through the prosecution and court system. Detailed research work was conducted in five police forces which had been relatively early in their implementation of NAFIS, and which the evidence available from national statistics maintained by the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO) suggested had been relatively frequent users of NAFIS. It is hoped that this will enable dissemination of good practice amongst other forces getting to grips with the NAFIS system, and also provide early warning of any key problems in the practical use of NAFIS which they may encounter, and examples of how any such problems are being addressed. The investment in NAFIS has been based on two major assumptions. These are: • fingerprint evidence can play an important role in the detection and reduction of volume crime;

and • the implementation of NAFIS will increase the capability of the police to use fingerprints and

numbers of marks collected from scenes of crime – thereby making it possible to achieve a greater number of detections and prosecutions.

The research draws upon national statistics on the performance of NAFIS collected by PITO and an assessment of ‘fingerprint practices’ in five police forces. The five areas can be summarised as follows:

Force A – a middle-sized force in a predominantly urban and industrial area based on the

existing county boundaries; Force B – a large force in the south-east covering several existing county areas with

several large cities and towns and a substantial rural area; Force C – a large force in the west covering several existing county boundaries with a

large conurbation and a substantial rural area; Force D – a large force in the west covering substantial urban and rural areas with several

large conurbations and industrial towns; and Force E – covered a very large, primarily urban area.

Information was also gathered on cases that had drawn on fingerprint evidence and which led to prosecution, so that various ‘outcomes’ could be monitored – both before and after they reached the courts. Interviews were undertaken with officers who had led investigations drawing on fingerprint evidence. Finally, interviews were held with senior CPS staff on the value of fingerprint evidence in these cases. The research team collected information on two divisions in each force. In each force area the research involved obtaining and analysing data about a sample of cases. The research concentrated on ‘volume’ crimes, mainly burglary and theft, taking a motor vehicle without the owner’s consent (TWOC), and theft from vehicles. The use of NAFIS in relation to more serious crimes, such as assault or murder, was not considered.

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To obtain a representative sample of cases a start date was identified and the next 200 cases, which resulted in the submission of finger-marks to the force’s fingerprint bureau for identification, were tracked. This gave a sample of cases covering a period of three to five months from the beginning of year 2000 for each force area. From these cases it was established whether the case was successfully resolved, whether other evidence followed the identification through fingerprints, the age of the alleged offender, and the disposition of the case. A selection of officers who dealt with these cases were interviewed. The interviews focused on informing the research in more qualitative matters, for example, whether the fingerprint evidence led to other paths of enquiry, confession or identification of accomplices. In particular, it was hoped that the research would indicate the extent to which more timely identifications could be achieved with the use of NAFIS and how far this could contribute to more effective and timely investigation. More generally, the interviews with officers covered: the advantages and disadvantages of the system; ‘human factors’; the individual’s experience of following through cases involving fingerprint evidence; how it has changed force practices; and training needs which are apparent. The team also exchanged information with colleagues involved in evaluations of the FSS Pathfinder Project and National DNA Database Expansion Programme, and made a visit to one of the pilot implementations of the Livescan system. Relevant literature The literature available on the subject of fingerprinting is not extensive. The majority of recent research discussing fingerprints has been a component of broader studies concerned with forensic services. Over the last 15 years the role of forensic science has been examined in more detail than ever before. This is due both to advances in technology and also to concerns about efficiency and effectiveness in the use of forensic science. A brief overview of the literature is therefore helpful in setting the scene. In 1987, Touche Ross (1987) undertook A Review of Scientific Support for the Police. Its criticism of the management and use of scientific support led to the establishment of Scientific Support Units bringing together Fingerprint Departments and Crime Scene Examiners (CSEs). Training and communication weaknesses were also identified. This report had “wide scope and extensive influence”. Tilley and Ford (1996) set out a full discussion of its implications. This was followed in 1988 by Improving the performance of the fingerprint service, a report by the Audit Commission (1988). This study, which did not include the City of London or Metropolitan Police, concentrated on the effectiveness of the service. It found that the fingerprint service was achieving significantly below its potential. At that time (before the implementation of NAFIS) the capacity which forces had to collect marks from scenes of crimes outstripped the capacity in their own bureaux to search for matches among their local collections of fingerprints. The report noted that two million crimes were recorded in 1987 with only one in three scenes of crime examined for finger-marks; in some forces finger-marks were collected from less than ten per cent of scenes. The Audit Commission concluded that fingerprint bureaux were under-resourced and that there was a need to increase efficiency and invest in the staffing of the service. Five years later the Audit Commission (1993) reported more widely on crime investigation. It found that 80 per cent of forces had less than 50 CSEs per 100,000 crimes – in spite of recommendations made in the commission’s previous report that there should be 75 CSEs for 100,000 offences. Efficiency of the service continued to be an issue. The report also noted that, due to scientific support being largely a civilian function, it was viewed as having low status and was not utilised to its full potential in the criminal investigation process.

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Using Forensic Science Effectively, a report published jointly by ACPO, the FSS and Audit Commission (National Project Team,1996), recommended good practice and echoed similar findings to the Audit Commission report of 1993. Tilley and Ford (1996), in their complementary report for the Home Office, evaluated the police use of forensic science. They also assessed the extent to which police needs were met in the provision of forensic science. They found that the suggestions about the structure of the forensic science service made in the Touche Ross report of 1987 had largely been implemented, although recommendations that forces improve yields in the volume of forensic evidence had varied in their take-up. Tilley and Ford also found continuing wide variations in the number of CSEs relative to the numbers of police officers and numbers of reported crimes, and wide variations in the amount spent on external forensic science services (which Touche Ross [1987] had reported earlier). Finally, the authors reported a lack of widespread awareness of the use of forensic science within the police service, with it being used rarely as a proactive tool in crime investigation. While forensic science was used effectively for major crimes, it was more difficult to find evidence of its effective application in relation to volume crime. Training and communication weaknesses identified by Touche Ross in 1987 were also still evident in some forces. In 2000, the summary of the good practice recommendations made in Using Forensic Science Effectively (1996) were included in Under the Microscope, which set out the findings of the thematic inspection by Her Majesty’s Inspector of Constabulary (HMIC, 2000) of scientific and technical support. HMIC found awareness of the Using Forensic Science Effectively report to be limited. HMIC felt that the recommendations of Using Forensic Science Effectively should act as a cornerstone in the development of exploitation of forensic science. It echoed previous concerns about training and communication identified by Touche Ross (1987) and Tilley and Ford (1996). The HMIC report concluded that fingerprints were likely to remain a substantial source of identification evidence for the foreseeable future. Its recommendations highlighted the importance of timeliness in the submission of fingerprints and the speed with which recording and investigation of fingerprint identifications were undertaken. HMIC emphasised the need for service level agreements between fingerprint bureaux and investigators, since failure to use the potential of fingerprint identification would allow offenders to remain at large. They further concluded that “the introduction of a properly resourced NAFIS system, and the revision of the necessary ingredients of an individual identification to reflect contemporary thinking, together provide an opportunity to capitalise on existing expertise” (HMIC, 2000). Beeson and Davis (1999), in a report commissioned for the Police Information Technology Organisation (PITO), examined the implementation of NAFIS. Their report concentrates on the processes within bureaux and the efficiency of processing, rather than changes of approach made by investigating officers. A summary of the problems forces had in implementing the system include issues relating to lack of communication and information exchanges across departments, and a lack of understanding of the changes brought about by the implementation of the system. In summary, therefore, the key issues from the literature in this field relate to the need for:

• police officers to be aware of the potential evidence available at any scene of crime, not just scenes of serious crimes;

• using CSEs/fingerprint officers in ways which ensure that finger-marks are obtained from crime scenes effectively and efficiently – and the full potential of NAFIS realised. This may point to the need for CSEs to receive additional training;

• improvements in communication between bureaux and investigating officers and in training – so that police officers are fully aware of the capabilities of NAFIS;

• attracting and retaining skilled fingerprint officers – in order to capitalise on the investment in NAFIS;

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• financial investment – to ensure that NAFIS is properly resourced to capitalise on new technology and existing expertise as called for by HMIC in Under the Microscope (this level of resourcing has been achieved); and

• continued attention by the Home Office and individual forces so that recommendations are acted upon to improve the service which the police provide.

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2. Use of fingerprints in investigating crime Retrieving fingerprints from scenes and taking suspect fingerprints Before examining in detail the research findings, it is helpful to consider briefly the process by which fingerprints are used in investigating crime and, specifically, how NAFIS has changed the process of fingerprint identification. The use of fingerprints in the detection of crime was established in the late 19th century when Sir Francis Galton developed a system of classifying patterns of fingerprints. Edward Henry built on this and was put in charge of Scotland Yard’s new fingerprint branch in 1901. This led to the development of fingerprint bureaux in police forces. A fingerprint is a record of the friction ridge detail on a finger, which can be matched by a fingerprint expert with a mark left as a result of contact by the same person’s finger on a receptive surface. Fingerprints have traditionally been obtained for this purpose by rolling the finger on to a flat surface, using paper and ink. Developments in computer technology now enable images of fingerprints to be taken and stored electronically. A set of ten fingerprints (‘ten-prints’) is taken when a suspect is charged or cautioned with an offence; these are stored in the force’s fingerprint collection and on NAFIS. When it is possible to do so, finger-marks are obtained from a scene of crime, usually by a crime scene examiner (CSE). Each force will usually have policy guidelines on when an examiner should attend a crime scene. Marks are generally recovered using fingerprint powder and tape. Some items, such as plastic bags, are not suitable for this treatment and other methods, such as chemical treatment can be used to recover a finger-mark. In such cases a specialised Chemical Treatment Unit (CTU) usually undertakes this work. The marks ‘lifted’ (recovered from the scene) by the CSE are then submitted to the force identification bureau for appraisal. There can be several marks in each ‘lift’ and more than one lift in each case submitted to the bureau. In many forces both CSEs and the identification bureau form part of the force’s Scientific Support Services. Until recently, local collections of paper-based fingerprints were searched manually by fingerprint officers in order to find a match against finger-marks recovered from a crime scene. This was often confined to a search with a nominated suspect or speculative searching against fingerprint collections of a small geographical area; quite frequently, particular subsets of the collections were searched. Whenever a suspect is charged with an offence a set of ‘ten-prints’ is obtained for comparison with the marks obtained from the scene of crime. For an identification to be made and used in evidence the match between the mark and prints has to be proved by three fingerprint officers, of whom two must be recognised as experts. The training period for fingerprint experts is not specifically time-based but can take approximately three years. Each bureau has its own training regime based primarily on informal apprenticeship, and supported by the National Training College. Before qualification, a would-be expert must attend a three-week advanced fingerprinting course, including evidence preparation and mock court exercises. Following the successful completion of the course, the expert's name is recorded in the national register of fingerprint experts. Until recently, a benchmark of 16 points of agreement was used to establish identification in comparing the mark with the suspect’s fingerprint. This standard was reduced to ten points in each of two different fingerprints, and eight points for serious crimes. This somewhat anomalous benchmark, whereby an apparently lower standard of proof was considered acceptable where someone was accused of a more serious crime, had no basis in law. It was, however, generally accepted by those working in the criminal justice system since 1953, when the then Home

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Secretary expressed the view that there should be some definable standard to which reference could be made. In 1992 the Fingerprint Evidence Standard National Project Board of the Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO) proposed changes from the ‘sixteen-point’ benchmark, and withdrawal of the numeric standard was implemented in June 2001. Since this date a fingerprint expert provides an opinion whether a positive identification is made; this is then corroborated by two further experts. This may possibly lead to more ‘idents’ (or person identifications) which are below the ‘sixteen-point’ standard. A discussion of the ‘sixteen-point’ benchmark is contained in the report by Evett and Williams (1996). Searching for marks Before NAFIS was implemented, each force held a relatively small, paper-based collection of the fingerprints of criminals active in the local area for crime investigation. Forces relied on the ‘National Collection’ of fingerprints held by the National Identification Service at New Scotland Yard for more extensive searches and attempts to establish the identity of arrestees to ensure criminal records were accurately created and updated. The only large-scale electronic fingerprint matching system and database, pre-NAFIS, was introduced in 1992 by a consortium of police forces. This system did not hold the complete National Collection, however, as a large proportion of forces did not take up the system. Almost inevitably, the resources needed to run the National Collection and to conduct searches on behalf of forces meant that its use was relatively limited in comparison with its potential. The National Collection is now held within the NAFIS system and it is updated whenever a new set of ten-prints is taken1. Use of computers in fingerprint retrieval The need for access to a greater number of fingerprints has increased in part as a result of the greater mobility of criminals. Before computerisation, manual-searching techniques focused searching on subsets of collections. As a result of computerised comparison it is now possible to search bigger collections of fingerprints from wider geographical areas. The first system of this kind was introduced in 1992 by a consortium of police forces. The Automatic Fingerprint Retrieval (AFR) system allowed the searching of suspects’ fingerprints held on the database for comparison with finger-marks left at a crime scene. The majority of forces in England and Wales adopted this system, though a significant minority did not. The original AFR has now been replaced by NAFIS, which has been implemented as a national standard in all forces in England and Wales. Livescan is a system allowing immediate electronic capture of the fingerprints of a person who has been charged, using a scanner located in the police station where charges are recorded. The ten-prints captured as a result are transmitted electronically to NAFIS. They can be used to compare with fingerprints of known offenders already stored on the NAFIS system – and so provide confirmation of identity – as well as to compare with outstanding scenes of crime marks filed on the system and so possibly link the person with other offences.

1 Until the implementation of the Criminal Justice and Police Act 2001, if an individual whose fingerprints had been taken on arrest for an offence was not cautioned or convicted, the set of ten-prints relating to that offence had to be destroyed. Following the passing of the Act, fingerprints need not be removed, but they will be kept in a separate part of the overall NAFIS system.

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NAFIS Significant investment by the police service in improving the technology used in fingerprint retrieval resulted in the NAFIS system linking all fingerprint bureaux in England and Wales by Spring 2001. The system has enabled the devolution of the National Fingerprint Collection (previously held at Scotland Yard) to forces, enabling fingerprint officers to search a range of levels from local, through regional to the national database. NAFIS provides facilities for word processing, report writing, record-keeping, and accessing the national criminal records system for offender details. NAFIS has the capability to perform a number of types of search for matches between prints and marks. These are:

• print-to-print • mark-to-print • print-to-mark • mark-to-mark

Print-to-print searches Print-to-print searches are used to verify the identity of suspects detained by the police. The set of ten-prints stored on NAFIS for the suspect is compared with a new set of ten-prints taken from the suspect and forms the majority of searches undertaken; this work plays an important part in the processes of updating and creating new criminal history records2. The advent of NAFIS, and in some areas Livescan, is enabling this confirmation of identity (or query where a suspect may have presented a false identity), to be achieved more quickly than previously (in many cases while the suspect is still in custody). Print-to-print searches to confirm the identity of suspects are now being made routinely, and the fingerprint bureaux are also inputting the ten-prints of those charged with offences. These elements of maintaining the National Fingerprint Collection have now been devolved to the forces themselves. Print-to-print searches are the most frequently used NAFIS facility. NAFIS has the capacity to update individual poor quality fingerprints when a new set of ten-prints has been received – since, in some cases, the previous National Fingerprint Collection may not contain on one record a ‘perfect/usable’ set of ten prints to search. Mark-to-print searches When a mark is retrieved from the scene of crime it may come in a variety of forms, such as tape and fingerprint powder or photograph. It is then scanned onto the NAFIS system. The fingerprint officer will ‘inter-code’ the mark using his judgement to highlight the breaks and deviations of the mark. If the officer is able to deduce which finger the mark came from this information can be entered into NAFIS prior to a search of the database. When a search is initiated, the fingerprint officer will define the geographical area, as well as possible fingers, to search on the database. Using computer-based pattern matching algorithms, NAFIS generates a list of the best 15 matches on the search criteria selected. If this list does not lead to an identification by a fingerprint expert, more searches can be performed on different geographic areas. The generally accepted practice, which PITO recommends, and which was followed in each of the forces in which the research reported here was undertaken, is to make first local, then regional, then national searches (only progressing to wider searches if the more localised ones are unsuccessful). NAFIS will not suggest any record previously rejected by the fingerprint officer. Mark-to-print searches are the second most used facility after print-to-print searches.

2 Information included in a criminal history may include information relating to matters such as outstanding warrants.

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Print-to-mark searches Searches can also be performed against outstanding finger-marks taken from crime scenes, but against which earlier searches did not result in a match (perhaps because the matching prints were not within the national collection at the time). This facility is used when it is thought that a suspect who has been detained may have been active in relation to other offences. This type of search is not carried out routinely; the bureaux which are the most active users of NAFIS tend, instead, to relaunch their outstanding unsuccessful mark to print searches on a six-monthly or annual basis. This approach is preferred because there is a better chance of successful identification with mark-to-print searches. The bureaux will also try to relaunch outstanding mark-to-print searches before their ‘old’ marks are archived within the NAFIS computer system. However, at least one force does advocate routine print-to-mark searches, considering them to be a productive search strategy from which successes have been achieved. Mark-to-mark searches In the instances where a mark-to-print search has been unsuccessful, a mark-to-mark search can be used to link a number of crime scenes, providing useful intelligence data. At the time the research was conducted this facility had not been greatly used. Palm prints Palm prints should be taken at the same time as fingerprints and these (generally paper-based) records are stored locally within forces. It is estimated that palm marks are recovered from 20 per cent of the cases in which marks are found. However, most forces only had the ability to check palm marks manually against known suspect records. Two police forces have stand-alone automated systems to do this and PITO is examining options for a national palm searching system. How NAFIS relates to other police computer systems It should be noted that NAFIS is not, and was not intended to be, a criminal history system and so does not itself contain a full list of convictions. NAFIS can use broad ‘crime types’ as a search filter. A full list of convictions is held on PNC/Phoenix and to enable fingerprint officers to have access to the criminal history system, NAFIS has terminal emulation to PNC (provided the operator has the relevant PNC user authority). This was provided for ease of use and to minimise the amount of equipment needed within a bureau. Before NAFIS, most bureaux only had one PNC terminal in-house; but now that NAFIS is installed, and all terminals have PNC emulation, fingerprint officers have much easier access to PNC. Not all minor offences and cautions are currently recorded on NAFIS. This is because pre-NAFIS the National Identification Service (NIS) at New Scotland Yard did not have the resources to process all minor offences and cautions. Some of these fingerprints were held locally by forces and not centrally recorded. Since the introduction of NAFIS all of the new arrests for these offence types have been recorded on NAFIS. Particular variations and similarities in fingerprint processes within the five forces that were examined in detail in this study are discussed in the following chapter.

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3. Fingerprint practices within police forces and the CPS Practices in bureaux The five forces that participated in the research had different experiences of using computer technology to help to identify finger-marks before NAFIS was introduced to the force. One force had no previous experience of using a computerised system. During the period of research, the police forces that had been part of the AFR consortium still had access to this system, and had a duty to ensure that the system was maintained for administrative purposes. The contract for the AFR system terminated shortly after the NAFIS system was rolled out. NAFIS was highly regarded in all the five forces. Since the introduction of NAFIS the number of identifications has increased absolutely in each force. This is a result both of the ability to conduct more searches than previously and also the more efficient search process yielding a higher per centage of identifications from a given number of searches. The new arrangements under which sets of ‘ten-prints’ for those who have been charged are taken within a force area, checked and scanned into NAFIS by the force bureau has reduced backlogs of prints waiting to enter the National Fingerprint Collection. They have also led to a substantial improvement in the quality of the National Collection. All of the five bureaux that collaborated in the research were found to work in similar ways. Once a finger-mark is retrieved (lifted) from a crime scene by a crime scene examiner it is sent to the fingerprint bureau in an envelope known as a ‘docket’, usually through the force’s internal mail system. The majority of marks taken from scenes of crime are ‘lifted’ on to acetate. In some cases it is necessary for the mark to be processed in a chemical treatment laboratory. This can cause delay, as some processes are lengthy. In all bureaux a rigorous record was kept of the receipt and location of the marks which form the evidence recorded from the crime scene. The information recorded on the outside of the docket varied from force to force, but would typically include: • the crime reference number, allocated when the crime was reported; • a scene of crime reference number allocated by the crime scene examiner; • the offence category/type; • the name of the scene of crime officer/crime scene examiner; • the number of marks lifted from the scene; • reference numbers for each mark lifted; • which lift(s) were to be treated at the chemical treatment laboratory; • diagram(s) and/or descriptions of where the lifts were taken from; • names of potential suspects to search against; and • whether elimination prints were requested or available. The majority of dockets were allocated to members of the bureau staff to work through during a set period of time, with more serious offences taking priority. The size of the batch allocated to an individual would be determined locally depending on their experience, and the preferences of the bureau-head. The largest force involved in the research had introduced a ‘fast-track’ approach for searching finger-marks for volume crimes. This involved prioritising searches for crimes such as burglary to help in the retrieval of stolen property. This force has shown that undertaking scene examinations

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without delay and obtaining, if possible, an identification quickly can lead to timely apprehension of suspects and improved prospects of recovering stolen property, as well as additional evidence. When a mark reaches the bureau it is assessed for its suitability for searching on NAFIS. However, not all marks are deemed suitable – for example, cases where the lift was not of sufficient quality to be scanned. Marks might also not be launched onto the NAFIS system when a set of ‘elimination prints’3 is available for a visual comparison to be made by a fingerprint officer. The forces taking part in the research had different quality standards for marks going on to NAFIS, and differing practices for using elimination prints. At least one of the forces involved in the research considered that because of the delays that are often incurred while elimination prints are obtained, it is preferable to search for a match using NAFIS without waiting for the elimination prints. This practice is now possible because of the efficiency of NAFIS – under previous manual procedures such a course of action could not be considered due to resource limitations. The process of scanning and searching Once the mark is deemed to be suitable for use it is scanned into the NAFIS computer system. Care is taken to ensure that the mark captured is the best image possible to search. The operator is able to change the angle from which to view the mark, and alter the contrast of light and shade. Information relating to the crime is also input into the system, a NAFIS number is allocated and a bar code sticker attached to the docket. This reference identifies the docket and mark(s) scanned on to NAFIS. As soon as an image is in the system, the operator can specify which finger to search, and the key characteristics of a mark can also be plotted. The NAFIS system has the facility to use computer-based algorithms to plot certain characteristics. Most operators observed by the research team, however, expressed a preference to ‘plot their own characteristics’. When the operator is content that the mark is correctly ‘marked up’, the search can be started. The time the system takes to complete a search varies. This is because of local capacity and the overall load on the system at different times. The largest force experienced difficulties with searches due to the volume of cases searched and scanned on the system. Staff operating the system reported that at certain times of the day searches would take longer to complete than at other times. For most cases contracted, response times were being met. When a search is completed, a list of 15 possible ‘respondents’ is generated by the NAFIS computer system. NAFIS uses a pattern-matching algorithm that examines the pattern of characteristics set up by the operator. The operator will then make a detailed assessment, comparing the original mark with the respondents suggested by the NAFIS system to see if an identification is found. If the mark and a fingerprint are found to match then the mark and print will be compared and verified by two further accredited fingerprint experts, working independently. The date of the verification by the fingerprint expert is noted on the docket and, in each of the five forces that took part in the research, a letter is then sent from the bureau to the relevant crime management unit to inform them of the positive identification. Well-established procedures were followed in each bureau to provide a sound basis for evidence to be given in court when necessary. All forces had quality management processes in accordance with the requirements of ISO 9001; in one force a bureau quality manager had been appointed with specific responsibility for quality matters. One of the major benefits of NAFIS is that it enables ‘print-to-print’ comparisons to be made efficiently and quickly to provide fast confirmation

3 Elimination prints are sets of ten-prints which are taken from those people who may have had legitimate access to a crime scene so that marks left by these people can be eliminated from further consideration. While obtaining elimination prints can be relatively simple in some cases, such as a domestic burglary, there are frequently complications. For example, the elimination prints may be taken by an inexperienced officer in less than ideal surroundings or all the people from whom elimination prints should be taken may not be readily available.

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of identity. Suspects giving false names have been identified in a number of cases, especially when Livescan has been used to record ten-prints ‘on line’. In these cases it was possible to discover the real identity before it was necessary to release them from custody, and so avoid consequent difficulties in tracing them. Although the introduction of NAFIS has speeded up the work of the bureaux significantly, other administrative practices do not, in some cases, appear to have been changed to match the speed at which a fingerprint identification can now be achieved. For example, in one force the ‘ident’ letters produced by a fingerprint expert to inform the divisional crime managers of a positive identification are sent out in the internal post. This system is slow: if an identification is achieved on a Friday afternoon and the letter misses the post, the division might not receive confirmation until Tuesday. Forces had noted some anomalies within the system. For example, a full list of convictions was not available (with some minor offences and cautions not appearing). Improvements to the system were anticipated. Following the implementation of NAFIS, some forces scanned their outstanding old marks into the NAFIS system. Since searches using NAFIS are so much less time-consuming than the previous approaches, searches of these old marks have been easier to undertake, leading to solution of some previously undetected volume crimes. As a consequence, a number of such cases have been put forward for prosecution a considerable time after the date of the offence. In one area CPS staff had expressed a concern that some ‘old’ volume crime cases for which fingerprint evidence had become available as a result of this strategy were being pursued a considerable time after the date of the original offence. This led to a meeting with the local CPS branch prosecutor to make them aware of the changes in practices at the bureau. It was deemed not to be in the public interest to prosecute some of these older cases involving less serious crimes. Several of the five forces had backlogs of old marks now transferred to NAFIS, but not yet searched. Increasing the yield of identifications from crime scenes A number of bureaux have strategies for increasing the yield of identifications from crime scenes. These include systematic relaunch of marks for search, since NAFIS does not always find a match. New sets of ten-prints may have been added to the system since the original search, or sets of ten-prints of better quality may have replaced those previously used for reference. The strategies also include: launching ‘fingerprint-to-mark’ searches for suspects who have been arrested; establishing links between criminals where marks from several different people have been found at a crime scene; and following up similar links where other evidence such as DNA or footmarks as well as finger-marks from different people may be present at the same crime scene. In one force, intelligence analysts were co-located with the force’s scientific support services to follow up links between crimes and evidence of identity. For example, where identification evidence had indicated that two criminals, Offender A and Offender B, were both present at the same crime scene, the available evidence about other crime scenes where Offender A’s presence had been deduced was re-examined to seek evidence connecting Offender B with those crimes. This process can be repeated to further link the offenders with other criminals, and so on. Feedback to bureaux When bureaux are able to establish identity through the use of fingerprints in high profile cases such as murder or assault, their role is acknowledged and bureau staff are able to see how their work has contributed to a successful investigation. However, there is little, if any, feedback to most bureaux about the results of their work in the case of volume crime. Since in these cases there is also a significant attrition between successful identifications from marks from the scene

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of the crime and completed prosecutions, bureaux staff are thereby deprived of an important element of feedback for judging the success of their contribution to dealing with these forms of crime. Police investigation practices – making use of fingerprint evidence of identity Once a fingerprint identification has been achieved, and confirmed, a notification of the result is sent to the originator of the docket. This is usually the Crime Management Unit of the appropriate division. The procedures and flows of information then followed vary considerably. The variety of procedures was noted between divisions in the same force as well as between forces. There are, however, a number of common features at the operational level when notification of an identification is received. On receipt from the bureau of the notification of identity the Crime Management Unit, or Force Intelligence Service, will research the case and compile a ‘package’ of intelligence about the person identified. The contents of the package will usually include:

• a physical description of the person and photograph(s); • last known address and other contact addresses; • previous convictions; • risks, including health risks (e.g. HIV), history of violent behaviour, use of

weapons etc.; and • known associates.

If the suspect’s presence at the crime scene is linked with evidence of others at the same (or other) scenes, or with other evidence or intelligence, these links will also be noted. When the intelligence package has been prepared it will be issued to police officers – or a team, if appropriate – for investigation. Other available evidence, such as witness statements, will be considered, but it will usually be necessary to interview the suspect. Assuming that their whereabouts is known, it may be necessary to arrest the suspect. It may also be necessary to arrange a search of premises associated with the suspect. One force has adopted the practice of conducting ‘operations’ to detain a number of suspects for different offences at the same time. Typically, such an operation would be focused on one district. Several teams of officers would make arrests and searches at the various addresses. In this way, back-up support arrangements and other resources could be put in place according to a plan. At the same time the responses of the several detainees to questions in interviews could be readily compared. While this approach has benefits, it can also cause delay in arresting offenders whose presence at a crime scene has been indicated by the identification evidence. During the delay the suspect may ‘disappear’ and police cease to know where they can be found. They may commit other crimes and stolen goods may disappear without trace. If the fingerprint and other evidence obtained in following up the case are deemed to meet the general standards agreed between the police and CPS, the suspect will be charged, if appropriate bailed, and the case papers will be prepared for hand over to the CPS. A suspect may claim to have had legitimate access to a crime scene for various reasons. If the reason why the finger-marks could have been found is considered valid, and no other evidence links the individual to the crime, then no further action may be taken. Because of the acceptance that fingerprints are unique, fingerprint evidence can be used as a sole form of evidence, although unusual, if the police are able to show that the suspect could not have had legitimate access to the crime scene. In practice, however, this rarely happens unless the suspect has admitted to a crime prior to a court appearance. It may also be the case that defence solicitors advise clients not to admit to offences unless further information about the evidence is supplied, to establish how much is known by the police.

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On the other hand, it appears that some suspects may admit to offences once they know that fingerprint evidence exists, and this can also lead to the admission of other offences. In most instances individual police officers are responsible for deciding whether to charge a suspect with an offence. The time it would take to process all of the relevant paperwork, the seriousness of the offence, the length of time since a suspect last committed an offence and whether, in the investigating officer’s opinion, the fingerprint evidence alone would be enough to convince the CPS to pursue the case are all factors which influence the decision to charge on the basis of fingerprint evidence only. The progress of cases and investigative changes There are many stages in the processes involved in following up fingerprint evidence where pursuit of the case might be delayed. Delay might be because, for example: appropriate resources are not available; the case has a lower priority than other urgent business; the suspect cannot be found easily, or at all; or action is in the hands of another force to detain a suspect living in their area. It was, in practice, extremely difficult in all of the five forces, to discover what had happened, or was happening, to outstanding cases where fingerprint evidence of identity had been achieved. None of the forces appeared to have overall control of the progress of such cases. The whole system of investigative activities for these volume crimes, from scene visits through use of NAFIS to make identifications and on to gathering of other evidence, detaining and interviewing the persons identified, appeared to be somewhat disjointed. No single person appeared to exercise responsibility for the whole process, or was concerned with overall ‘system performance’. Several changes to police practice since the introduction of NAFIS were identified in the study forces. These included the use of Livescan, fast tracking of cases and ‘chaining’ intelligence about marks. However, with the exception of the speed and efficiency in which fingerprint bureaux could now achieve identifications, there were no major changes in the way that the investigation process was managed. Indeed, the data gathered through tracking cases suggest that the other processes undertaken to follow up investigations have not been adapted to match the speed with which information from fingerprint evidence can now be obtained. Raising police officer awareness New recruits to the police are given some information about NAFIS during their basic training and so should be aware of its potential. How thoroughly NAFIS is promoted to officers with a number of years of service varied between forces. In two of the five forces that collaborated in the research, the force’s fingerprint service had made special arrangements to promote knowledge of NAFIS among the force’s police officers. One had conducted its own publicity campaign by giving presentations, producing leaflets and promotional material, including ‘flyers’ attached to canteen menus. The other had supported a ‘roadshow’ with a caravan visiting stations in each of the force’s divisions. In the other forces no particular efforts had been made to promote NAFIS and its capabilities to police officers with significant service; and in these forces officers were starting to learn about NAFIS through their own experience or discussion with colleagues. CPS practices The introduction of NAFIS did not appear to have had any impact on the way fingerprint cases were dealt with by the CPS or affected their progress through the courts. Nor was there any tendency for the defence to react differently in cases where evidence had been obtained through the use of NAFIS. The arguments were most usually to do with continuity of evidence, and claims of legitimate access to the crime scene.

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The key issue for the CPS component of the study was if and how the availability of NAFIS might affect decisions in the CPS to prosecute or not. The intention was therefore to track through the CPS and the courts, sub-samples of cases involving NAFIS-based evidence that had already been examined in relation to police investigative work and decision-making. The research was organised in five criminal justice areas, corresponding to the police force areas. A sample of cases was followed through from initial lifting of prints to the final disposition of the case. In each area interviews were arranged with senior representatives of the CPS to explore the perceived impact of NAFIS on their work more generally, and to establish the view on their involvement in the sample of cases in more detail. The interviews were arranged through the Chief Crown Prosecutors, following clearance for the research from the CPS Chief Executive. In the event, four out of the five CPS areas found it difficult to trace individual cases in which identifications had been achieved through NAFIS. This was because the police did not use the same system of reference numbers as those used by the CPS (the so called Unique Reference Numbers). In the one area where it was possible to track the progress of cases through prosecution the exercise showed that, out of a total of 15 cases:

• Eleven were convicted following pleas of ‘guilty’; • one was convicted at the magistrates’ court following a plea of ‘not guilty’; • one was found not guilty by the magistrates after a plea of ‘not guilty’. This was after

claims of legitimate access and that a police officer had been mistaken in identifying the rider of a stolen motor cycle;

• two cases were discontinued by the police; and • nine out of the 13 completed cases were heard at the magistrates’ courts with

resulting sentences varying from 12 months imprisonment to 140 hours Community Service.

• Of the two ‘not guilty’ pleas, one was found ‘guilty’ at the magistrates’ court and

resulted in a six months concurrent custodial sentence. The case found ‘not guilty’ at the magistrates’ court was on ‘no evidence’ grounds.

• Three appeals against sentences by the magistrates were forwarded to the Crown Court. Two were subsequently abandoned while the third was changed from a four month Detention and Training Order to a two year Supervision Order.

• Four of the cases (all guilty pleas, including one where the original ‘not guilty’ plea had been changed to ‘guilty’) were forwarded for trial at the Crown Court. Sentences imposed were: three years Probation Order; 30 months Young Offenders Institution; 18 months imprisonment and a 2.5 years concurrent sentence – of which 10 months had to be served.

• In three of the cases further charges had been added by the CPS to the original police charges.

In none of these cases was the use of NAFIS, as opposed to the earlier, manual methods, to obtain fingerprint identification evidence regarded as a material factor in either the decision to prosecute or in the subsequent course and outcome of the case. Through the interviews, substantiated and developed through the case-tracking work, efforts were made to establish how, and to what extent, the introduction of NAFIS by the police was affecting CPS case review and decision-making. This included establishing:

• general status of fingerprinting evidence in cases such as burglaries and thefts (for example, its reliability, refutability and capacity to translate into evidence of offending, as opposed to simply evidence of ‘presence’);

• role of police submissions and other evidence alongside fingerprinting evidence in helping CPS decision-making;

• extent of awareness within the CPS of NAFIS and of its use in the cases now being passed for consideration from the police;

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• experience and perceptions within the CPS of the impacts (actual and potential) of automated fingerprint storage and retrieval on case-work; and

• processes of feedback and learning when cases being prosecuted are dismissed at court or when the CPS is unsuccessful in prosecuting a case that goes to trial.

The transition from manual to automated systems for fingerprint identification was found to have made little or no difference to the CPS and it is not considered likely, by CPS staff, to do so in future. Several of the CPS personnel, however, felt uninformed about the advent of NAFIS. Although they were uncertain what the acronym stood for, they were aware of the introduction of computer-assisted fingerprint technology. Those consulted considered that the development meant no change in terms of the status of fingerprint evidence for the CPS and NAFIS was viewed essentially as a development for police officers. They regarded the storage and retrieval of fingerprint evidence as a matter that did not concern the CPS. Key issues on fingerprint evidence for the prosecution process remained unaltered by the development – notably the change from the ‘sixteen-point’ to a non-numeric standard of proof. The point was made several times that the main arguments about fingerprint evidence take place between experts within the police and that, usually, fingerprint evidence is only presented to the CPS when it is considered conclusive. In one of the five areas, the CPS did express awareness of an increase in the number of older cases recently coming forward for prosecution as a result of the relative ease with which the NAFIS system could be used to search old marks. In this instance, the local CPS staff felt that there could potentially be an on-going effect on the volume of cases coming forward. The potential significance of this development, however, was tempered by questions about the likelihood of further prosecutions being pursued in older and relatively minor cases where the suspects were already in prison. The point was also made that victims might potentially be able to take action under the Human Rights Act if it seemed that the police, having had finger-marks from crimes committed some considerable time ago, and which had not been searched previously, were now bringing to light the results of searches more recently undertaken using NAFIS as new evidence. There was consensus among those interviewed that the main benefit of NAFIS would be in speeding up the investigative process rather than the prosecution process. But they felt it was unlikely that this would show in the performance statistics as the time taken from initial reporting of crime to first or final court appearance is usually determined by other variables. For example, statements may be missing, there may be more than one defendant and, as one interviewee put it, ‘police reports may be slow to materialise’. So far as CPS decisions to prosecute are concerned, it was clear that many other factors besides fingerprint evidence could influence decision-making. Most of the prosecutors were quick to point out that fingerprint evidence alone would normally be regarded as insufficient grounds for prosecution. It was generally considered to form only a small part of the admissible evidence needed for prosecution when a ‘not guilty’ plea has been entered. The prosecutors did believe that good fingerprint evidence was likely to result in more ‘guilty’ pleas on the basis that offenders often think fingerprint evidence is conclusive. This, in turn, would mean that such cases would be completed more quickly. CPS staff agreed that NAFIS is providing the police with greater capacity to identify suspects in criminal cases through fingerprint information and to speed up the process of matching prints for the purpose of compiling evidence. This is leading to progress on older cases and saving time, both with clear advantages to the police. The research has highlighted that NAFIS is making little difference for the courts, except perhaps in terms of the volume of cases involving fingerprint evidence the police may be able to pass to CPS. Even that is generally not thought to be problematic for the CPS. None of those within the CPS interviewed were concerned at the implications of NAFIS, either in terms of experience to date or prospective effects. In none of the five areas had the CPS experienced an increase of workload, and did not believe that any material increase was likely in the future.

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There are well-defined feedback mechanisms in place for failed trials’. In Crown Court cases, the caseworker attending completes a report form that is passed to the reviewing lawyer for comments. It is then sent to the Head of Trials Unit for analysis and on to the Chief Crown Prosecutor. Issues raised are discussed at monthly meetings of the Area Management Board. There is space on the form for comments by each of the relevant parties at all stages. The questions asked on the form include ‘Reason for non-conviction?’ and ‘Could the outcome have been changed by any other action by Police/CPS?’ A similar process is used at magistrates court trials. The lawyer conducting the trial fills in the form initially and forwards it to the reviewing lawyer and so on to the Chief Crown Prosecutor. The operation of these feedback mechanisms suggests that there has, so far, been little, if any, comment on the part played by fingerprint evidence supported by NAFIS in failed cases. Nor does it seem that there have been any perverse or unanticipated effects of NAFIS in the court system. The hypothesis that the introduction of NAFIS might lead to a higher rate of ‘guilty pleas’ as those accused of crimes become aware of the greater likelihood of fingerprint evidence playing a bigger part in prosecutions and convictions, finds no particular support in this research. The main finding of this part of the study is to suggest that the implementation of NAFIS has not resulted in ‘knock on’ or unintended (perverse) effects down the line in the criminal justice system.

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4. The use of NAFIS – information available at the centre Data on the number of identifications achieved through the use of NAFIS are recorded by PITO, the contracting authority for NAFIS. These data refer to person identifications – instances where the use of NAFIS enables a set of crime scene marks to be matched with the reference set of fingerprints held in NAFIS. It includes those cases where the person identified is subsequently able to show that they had legitimate access to the scene from which the marks were taken. The definition does not include confirmation of the identity by matching the set of ten-prints taken from a person who has been arrested with the reference set held in NAFIS. The data are used by PITO mainly to monitor the performance of the NAFIS computer system.

• The data PITO maintains can be used to show how the use of NAFIS has grown since the first implementation in forces in July 1998. PITO’s data can also be used (although they were not intended for this purpose) to indicate how, considering all the forces that have implemented NAFIS, there appear to be substantial differences between forces in the number of identifications achieved. This is apparent not only in terms of absolute numbers – which might be expected, given the differences in size in the forces – but also in terms of the number of identifications per officer for a given period.

PITO provides a monthly summary report which shows the: • total of all identifications achieved so far from using the NAFIS mark-to-‘ten-print’ search

facility; • number of bureaux processing marks and ‘ten-prints’ using NAFIS; • frequency with which the identifications achieved were in the first position in the list of 15

specific matches suggested by NAFIS, and how frequently in the other positions; and • the proportion of different types of crimes for which identifications were achieved. Growth in the use of NAFIS The number of identifications per month reported by each force varies, and although forces appear generally to have submitted complete returns immediately following full implementation of NAFIS in their area, some forces appear to have become less diligent in submitting returns of person identifications as time has gone on. However, with this reservation, according to the data maintained by PITO, the total number of identifications using NAFIS has risen steadily from June 1998, as NAFIS has been implemented in more and more forces. At the time the field work was conducted the rate of NAFIS identifications from scenes of crime was approximately 1,400 per month4. The monthly rate of identifications from scenes of crime has now grown to around 4,500 (Spring 2004), an increase of 221 per cent. Number of identifications in forces It seems possible that some forces have become less diligent in reporting identifications to PITO once NAFIS has been fully implemented in their area for a few months. To compensate for the fact that the data might not fully reflect levels of NAFIS identification, the data supplied by PITO were examined on a force-by-force basis and the average number of identifications reported in the last 12 months noted. Where the data appeared incomplete (because PITO had not received notification of any identifications at all for a force in the period), the average figure for the most recently reported data for the period was noted. This approach was followed to obtain a monthly average number of identifications for any force where the data set was incomplete. Where complete data were available, the average number of identifications for the last 12-month period

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were used. In this way a ‘smoothed 12-month average’ number of identifications per month was obtained for each force featured in the PITO data. Dividing the ‘smoothed 12-month average’ number of identifications per month by the number of serving officers for the force to calculate a ratio of identifications per month per 100 serving officers reveals quite wide variations between forces in the number of identifications per month per 100 serving officers (Figure 4.1). The most productive forces were generating three times as many identifications per month per 100 serving officers as those forces generating the lowest corresponding numbers of identifications. Figure 4.1: Smoothed average idents/100 officers per month for each force (a)

(a) Data relate only to those forces for which implementation of NAFIS was complete by April 2001. It was not possible, within the scope of the research reported here, to investigate the reasons for this wide variation between forces in numbers of identifications per officer, except to note that similar variation is evident if the number of identifications is related to the population served by each force. Williams (2004) has explored in more detail the relationship between fingerprint (and DNA) performance in volume crime investigation and highlighted the important role that structure and management factors appear to play.

‘Smoothed’ average Idents/100 officers per month for each force

0.00

0.50

1.00

1.50

2.00

2.50

3.00

3.50

Forces (each vertical bar represents a force)

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5. How cases progress: the process of attrition One of the central questions this study attempted to address was: how often will an examination of the scene of a crime lead to identification of a suspect by matching finger-marks left at the crime scene with fingerprints held on NAFIS? The answer to this question is partly dependent on the nature of the offence. Not all crime scenes are examined by CSEs, and the extent of the examination will vary accordingly. Scenes of murders and serious assaults are likely to be examined most intensively. The research described here concentrated on the use of NAFIS in relation to ‘volume’ crimes such as burglary and vehicle crimes. Furthermore, only a proportion of crime scenes attended will ‘yield’ finger-marks of acceptable quality for search using NAFIS. There are a variety of possible reasons why scenes do not yield marks: the criminal may not have touched a receptive surface; may be protected by wearing gloves; the marks may be smudged; or the victim may have cleaned up a scene before an examiner attends. When the crime scene examination does yield marks, more than one ‘lift’ may be included in the submission from the scene to the force’s fingerprint bureau, and each lift may contain more than one searchable mark. It was apparent from the more detailed study in the five forces that the processes and practices followed at crime scenes vary between forces. Some forces, for example, will concentrate on finding a very limited number of ‘good quality’ marks from each scene. In other forces, by contrast, it may be more usual to lift and submit to the bureau a larger number of marks from each scene examined. Scene examinations and identification To address the success bureaux had in achieving identifications from the submissions made to them, PITO provided data on submissions to fingerprint bureaux from scenes of crime, lifts, marks searched and identifications during the period January 2000 to November 2000. Consistent data relating to this topic were available in relation to 21 bureaux. The other forces had either not at that time fully implemented NAFIS, or had not supplied the appropriate data to PITO. There is no reason to doubt the representativeness of a sample of forces of this size. The data show that there were, on average:

• 1.4 lifts per SOC submission; and • 1.5 marks searched per lift.

Not all mark searches yield identifications of suspects. They may, for example, have been left by someone with legitimate access to the crime scene, or have been left by a person whose fingerprints are not recorded on NAFIS. The PITO data for the 21 bureaux revealed that on average:

• Eleven per cent marks give mark identification; and • there were 1.20 mark identifications per person (where more than one mark is searched

from a lift there can be more than one mark identification for the same person). Overall, the data from the 21 bureaux reveal that, on average, there were 19 person identifications for every 100 submissions. Identifications in the five forces In each of the five forces in which the detailed research was conducted the NAFIS record of submissions to the bureau was examined and a sample of 200 volume crime cases (burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crime) selected for more detailed consideration. The 200 cases were selected as those relating to the period immediately following 14th January, 2000. This number of cases spanned a period of four to five months, and potential difficulties that might have followed from having a high proportion of cases relating to the Christmas and New Year were avoided by

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selecting a start date in the middle of January. The data showed that in each of the five forces, about 20 per cent of marks submitted to bureaux and launched on NAFIS gave rise to identifications (Figure 5.1). This was consistent with the figure of 19 person identifications for every 100 submissions noted for all forces for which data were available through PITO. Figure 5.1: NAFIS volume crime cases for which finger-marks were received by bureaux (a)

(a) Burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crime. Based on 200 cases in each force. The balance of unidentified marks remain in store in the NAFIS computer system, available for subsequent investigation. For example, if an offender does not have a record, and accordingly his/her ‘ten-prints’ are not held in the NAFIS system, there will be no match when marks they may have left at a crime scene are searched. However, if an offender continues to be active then marks may be left at other scenes which, may be linked to one another or to the marks at the original scene by ‘mark-to-mark’ searches. They may also result in links to associates who do have prints recorded in NAFIS (because the marks, or other evidence such as DNA traces of two or more criminals may be found at the same crime scene). Finally, when the offender is apprehended and charged, perhaps in relation to other offences, their marks may be matched with the outstanding marks held on NAFIS. Outcomes following identification Further analysis was done on those cases that resulted in a NAFIS match and were followed up by the police. For one of the five initial sample forces, it was not possible to obtain data on the outcomes of identifications. For the remaining sample cases yielding identifications (157 cases in total), outcome data were collected.

NAFIS volume crime cases for which finger-marks were received by bureaux

0%

10%

20%

30%

40%

50%

60%

70%

80%

90%

100%

Force A Force B Force C Force D Force E Total

Cases with finger-rmarks still outstanding on NAFISNumber of cases: elimination prints received and matched, no more marks on NAFISNumber of cases resulting from a NAFIS match to be followed up by the police

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Average figures for 157 cases in four of the five forces revealed the following pattern.

• Thirty-eight per cent of cases resulted in criminal justice outcomes of guilty, TIC (taken into consideration) or caution.

• In a further five per cent of cases ‘not guilty’ verdicts were returned. • In a further six per cent of cases suspects had been charged, but some ten months after

the offence the case had not yet been to court. • In four per cent of the cases where identifications had been achieved, the crime was a

matter for another force. (This can happen, for example, when a vehicle stolen from the area covered by force A is abandoned in the area covered by force B).

• In 15 per cent of the cases identifications were of people who were deemed to have had legitimate access to the crime scene.

• In 14 per cent of cases it had been decided to take no further action (NFA), in some instances because of delay after charge.

• In 19 per cent of cases no further information was available, either because the case could not be traced, or because the case was still being investigated at the time the research was undertaken (some ten months after the date of the offence).

The breakdowns for each of the four forces are illustrated in Figure 5.2. Figure 5.2: NAFIS – Outcomes from volume crime (a) identifications: attrition of cases where fingerprint evidence is available

(a) Burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crime.

• To summarise, in ‘attrition’ terms, in the forces for which data were available, after about one year from the original identification, a minimum of just under 50 per cent of cases were known to have proceeded to charge. However, not all of these had reached court, or necessarily arrived at a guilty verdict.

A

B

C

D

A v gU n k n o w n - s t i l l o u t s ta n d in g e t c .

L e g it im a te a c c e s s

N F A - N o c r im e - d e c l in e t o p r o s e c u te e t c

O th e r fo r c e c r im e

C h a r g e d , b u t n o c o u r t y e t

T IC

C a u t io n e d

G u i l t y

N o t G u i lt y

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Figure 5.3: Attrition of cases with NAFIS identifications (a)

(a) Burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crime. Timeliness The time it takes to get marks to the bureaux and to process identifications when they are achieved are both important issues. Average figures for the four forces for which data were available revealed that, where an identification had been achieved, bureaux were able to provide notification: • in 50 per cent of cases within 34 days (of receiving the marks into the bureau); • in 75 per cent of cases within 64 days ; and • in 90 per cent of cases within 137 days.

Delays in the time it takes to achieve an identification can be explained by a number of factors. These include: • marks not being identified on the first search but were found when the search was re-

launched. This could be because better quality ‘ten-prints’ were placed on the system; and • successful matching when a ‘print-to-mark’ search was made for a person who had been

arrested. In some cases, there can be a notification of identity after a suspect has been charged (for instance in a case where the offender had been charged on the basis of other evidence, and the fingerprint evidence provided corroborating evidence). The very long times between

0.0%

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Total all crimeswith

identifications

After otherforce crime

After legitimateaccess

After NFA After no knownprogress - still

outstanding etc.(10 months after

offence)

After cautioned After TIC After not guiltyverdictsbalance

Proportion of cases remaining after stated cause of attrition (out of 157 cases with identification in four force areas)

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identification and charge in some cases may reflect problems in locating a named individual, delays while other evidence is sought, or because the suspect is in prison for another offence. The difficulty of obtaining data about the final disposition of cases meant that it was only possible to obtain reasonably complete data on timeliness for three of the five forces. For these forces 50 per cent of cases in which the offender had been charged went from identification to charge within 38 days (90 per cent had progressed this far within 112 days). Half of cases which went to court progressed from charge to court within 28 days (90 per cent - 103 days). Fifty per cent of cases for which the final outcome was known went from offence to final outcome in 147 days (90 per cent - 341 days) (see Table 5.1). Table 5.1: Progress of volume crime cases involving fingerprint evidence from offence to final outcome Number of days elapsed for each stage

Force B Force C Force D Average for all three forces

50% of cases 39 21 45 36 75% of cases 66 34 68 60

Offence to identification

90% of cases 135 71 120 113 50% of cases 42 48 29 38 75% of cases 63 95 49 64

Identification to charge

90% of cases 133 100 94 112 50% of cases 25 44 23 28 75% of cases 55 77 69 65

Charge to court

90% of cases 76 140 110 103 50% of cases 153 155 136 147 75% of cases 301 248 193 248

Offence to final outcome

90% of cases 383 340 297 341 (a) Burglary, criminal damage and vehicle crime. Several points are worth noting from Table 5.1. For these three forces (in which NAFIS was firmly established) the time between when an offence was committed and when an identification is achieved is only a small part of the total time that elapses between the original offence and the final outcome. Secondly, for all forces combined, the median (i.e. 50 per cent) duration between offence and identification and identification and charge was broadly similar (36 compared with 38 days). Finally, although the pattern of timing varied within the three courses at the initial stages, the median duration from offence to final outcome was broadly consistent across all forces (ranging only from 136 to 153 days).

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6. Opportunities for making better use of fingerprint identification supported by NAFIS NAFIS was highly regarded in all the five forces in which the research was undertaken. Since the introduction of NAFIS the number of identifications and the proportion of successful searches has increased in each force. One reason for this is that by using NAFIS, bureaux staff have been able to conduct searches more quickly than previously and consequently have been able to complete more searches. A second reason is that the more efficient search process yields a higher percentage of identifications from a given number of searches. Even though the successes achieved through NAFIS and the dissemination of the benefits arising from NAFIS to investigating officers have increased the number of marks submitted to bureaux, the quicker and more effective search process has led to substantial reductions in the backlogs of marks awaiting search in the bureaux. Furthermore, it is important to point out that since the original fieldwork was undertaken, there have been a range of further improvements in the way in which fingerprint services are applied, alongside technical enhancements in NAFIS. ACPO established the National Fingerprint Board (NFB) charged with examining the fingerprint service from end to end. Its four main sub groups have been charged with looking at performance, development, standards, and personnel and training and have already started making fundamental changes to the provision of fingerprint services. Moreover, NAFIS has gone through a series of technical enhancements. These include: • improvements in print-to-mark searching capability that allows more identifications with

reduced fingerprint officer effort; • software to create and print high resolution ten-print forms/marks from NAFIS databases; • the implementation of a Serious Crime Cache against which all arrestee ten-print sets are

now searched; • the setting up of Operational Response Databases in every bureau to allow the generation of

locally held databases of prints in response to particular policing needs; • a facility to allow mutual searching on the Immigration and Asylum Fingerprint System (and

vice versa); and • full continuity arrangements for NAFIS. Further enhancements are expected through the procuring of IDENT1. Bureaux staff and investigating officers in the forces commented on the positive effect NAFIS has had in reducing the time it takes to achieve an identification. Bureau managers reported to PITO a significant increase in the number of identifications made on NAFIS compared to the systems in use prior to its introduction. Some bureaux stated that it had led to more than 100 per cent increase in identifications. The most notable effect has been in achieving identifications in cases where previously it would not have been possible, since bureaux staff have been able to undertake more searches against a much bigger universe of fingerprints to seek a match. There remains a significant attrition of the cases in which identifications are achieved. As has been demonstrated, this attrition may be of the order of half of the cases in which identifications have been achieved, after taking account of the almost 15 per cent of instances when the person identified had legitimate access to the scene. Improving the management processes for police investigations dealing with cases where an identification has been achieved should lead to further improvement in reducing attrition and the time it takes to bring a case to a final conclusion.

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The implementation of NAFIS has meant that the time taken in searching for a match to the marks submitted to the bureau has been reduced. Moreover, practices such as not waiting for elimination prints can also help in keeping delays in the search process to a minimum, and bureaux can use a number of approaches to increase the yield from the marks submitted to them, as has been shown. The research reported here has shown that in 50 per cent of cases, bureaux are able to provide notification of an identification within 34 days, including weekends, of receiving a set of marks (36 days, on average from the time of the offence). Of course, for urgent and high profile cases which receive a high priority, such as murder or serious assault, this time can be substantially reduced. Reducing attrition and delay during the process of following up successful identifications would appear to be an important factor in improving the yield from the overall process of using finger-mark evidence to detect and convict offenders. As a result of the full implementation of NAFIS, fingerprint evidence to support the detection and prosecution of offenders should be available to investigating officers more readily and with less delay than it has been until now. The research reported here leads to the conclusion that the forces now have open to them a number of possible ways to improve the overall process of making use of fingerprint evidence. These are in:

• managing the overall process of investigating volume crimes where fingerprint or similar evidence of identification is available; and

• activity within the different stages which make up the overall process: - within the bureau; - following up the identifications provided; - getting ten-prints of those arrested to the bureau and confirmation of identity back

to the arresting officer; and - prosecution.

Managing the overall process Although the five forces in which the research was conducted were selected for study because they appeared to be making more use of NAFIS than other forces, the overall process of obtaining and examining finger-mark evidence and following up investigations in these volume crime cases appeared to be disjointed. For example, the forces reported routine management information about the yield of the identification process, in terms of the number of marks examined and identifications made. The information provided to senior management did not, however, extend to the contribution identifications made to clearing up crimes and the conviction of offenders. It was difficult to track what had happened to cases where identifications had been made, and in a number of instances no information could be obtained. Nor did there appear to be any particular concern to monitor the timeliness with which investigations were conducted or concluded. Likewise, while workloads were controlled effectively within the bureau and the progress of cases monitored, many bureau staff felt that they would welcome improved liaison with the police officers investigating the cases and better feedback on the results of their identifications. The NAFIS system now provides the opportunity for better feedback to bureaux. The question of how clear responsibility for managing the overall process and reviewing its performance in these terms should be defined is, of course, one for forces themselves. Achieving improvement would require the use of appropriate performance measures and management information, the facility to track how long it is taking to progress cases and what is happening to the individual case where identification is achieved. One area not explored within this study is the balance between national, regional and local searches on NAFIS. This may be an important area for further work, particularly in relation to what is known about patterns of cross border crime. One concern (Williams, personal communication) is investigating officers’ awareness of the level of searching conducted in individual cases. In particular, it is not clear what criteria bureaux apply in deciding on the level of NAFIS search to be used (nor is it clear that this is routinely fed back to investigating officers).

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Within the bureau In the study forces there were no specific guidelines on what it was reasonable to expect – for example in the case of ‘volume crime’ – in terms of the number of mark searches that a trained and experienced examiner might be expected to make in a given time. The number of marks that can be examined in any bureau is, necessarily, limited by the number of appropriately trained and experienced fingerprint officers (FPOs) available. Guidelines could be provided on the number of searches a trained and experienced examiner might be expected to make in a day – possibly by agreement with a representative group. However, the variation in quality of the marks received, and the difficulties which can be experienced in individual cases are such that guidelines would be valid only for planning resources and should not be used to monitor the performance of individuals. A number of practices were noted in individual force bureaux that led to an increased yield of identifications. These included:

• regular relaunch of unresolved ‘old’ marks, through which identifications may result if new, or better quality ten-prints have become available in NAFIS;

• undertaking ten-print-to-mark searches using the ten-prints of recently charged suspects to compare with outstanding marks; and

• assigning intelligence analysts to work specifically with the identification bureau to pursue linkages between cases and within groups of offenders.

Following up the identifications achieved The research has indicated that, as a consequence of the use of NAFIS, the contribution that identification evidence can make may be particularly significant when follow-up investigations are given priority by those with responsibility for managing the investigative activities. Moreover, NAFIS can be particularly useful when out-of-area criminals are involved in the crimes. Forces demonstrated a number of strategies to make good use of the identifications. These included:

• using ‘operations’ to ensure that resources could be concentrated on following up identifications and that adequate back-up resources were available; and also to enable investigating officers to compare the responses of those arrested;

• using intelligence analysts to pursue linkages, evident through marks, between cases and within groups of offenders; and

• preparing intelligence packages on those identified to inform the way the investigation is managed.

Preparing an intelligence package is an almost universal practice, and this work often seemed to represent a bottleneck in the overall process of following up an identification. It is suggested that forces might wish to consider defining a ‘Standard Intelligence Package’, the preparation of which would be triggered automatically whenever an identification was achieved for transmission to the appropriate investigating team. The content of such a standard package might include:

- photographs - age - known associates - last known address - previous record of convictions - methods of operation - history of violence - health issues

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- results of previous packages - most recent contact.

Getting ten-prints to the bureau and confirming identity Since it is now much quicker to access the reference set of ten-prints within NAFIS than it was previously, and NAFIS supports the comparison process, it should often be possible to obtain confirmation of identity, when this is needed, while a person who has been charged is still being held. The assumption here is that the ten-print set taken after the charge is of good quality, is transmitted to the bureau without delay, and that there is appropriate scheduling of work within the bureau to enable this to happen. While this is possible with the older ‘ink pad’ methods – if all works properly – it is possible to view such a process as normal through Livescan. Livescan yields speedier processing of arrestees, reductions in the amount of police time wasted following up wrong identities, and it less likely that a wanted person may be released inadvertently or that someone will be released without the police obtaining appropriate contact details. The current situation (Spring 2004) is that around half of forces have some access to Livescan (there are close to 200 Livescan terminals). Prosecution The flow of cases to the courts does not seem to have increased as a consequence of the implementation of NAFIS to an extent that is noticeable by the CPS. Nevertheless, as a result of NAFIS fingerprint evidence will become more important to the police. As has been noted, there may be benefits in making clearer at a local level the circumstances when fingerprint evidence, on its own, can be sufficient to progress a case, and the nature of the supporting evidence which might otherwise been required.

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References Audit Commission (1988) Improving the performance of the fingerprint service. London: HMSO Audit Commission (1993) Helping with enquiries: tackling crime effectively. London: HMSO. Beeson, I. and Davis, C. (1999) The Impact of NAFIS on the Process and Organisation of Fingerprint Identification. Bristol: University of the West of England unpublished Interim Research Report. HMIC (2000). Under the Microscope. London: Home Office. Evett, I. W. and Williams, R. L. (1996) A Review of the Sixteen Point Fingerprint Standard in England and Wales. Journal of Forensic Identification, (online) Vol. 46 (1) Available from: http://www.scafo.org/library/120101.html (Accessed date: 4th July 2001). National Project Team (1996) Using Forensic Science Effectively, FSS/ACPO. Tilley, N. and Ford, A. (1996) Forensic Science and Crime Investigation, Crime Prevention and Detection Series Paper 73, Police Research Group, London: Home Office. Touche Ross (1987) A Review of Scientific Support for the Police 3 Volumes London: Home Office. Williams, R. (2004) The management of crime scene examination in relation to the investigation of burglary and vehicle crime. Home Office Research Findings 235, London: Home Office.

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