AFR RESERVED ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL, REGIONAL BENCH ...aftlko.up.nic.in/AFR/AFR 2017/TA 1288 of 2010...

1

T.A. No. 1288 of 2010 Chandra Bhushan Yadav

AFR RESERVED

ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL, REGIONAL BENCH, LUCKNOW

COURT NO. 1

(List -A)

T.A. No. 1288 of 2010

Tuesday, this the 18th day of April, 2017

Hon’ble Mr. Justice Devi Prasad Singh, Member (J) Hon’ble Air Marshal Anil Chopra, Member (A)

Chandra Bhushan Yadav son of Shri Vikram Rawat , House No. EWS-4801, Awas Vikas -3, Panki, Kalyanpur Road, District Kanpur (U.P.) - Petitioner

Versus

1. Union of India, through the Secretary to Ministry of Defence, Ministry of Defence, Bharat Sarkar, New Delhi.

2. The Chief of the Air Staff, Air Headquarters (Vayu Bhawan) Rafi Marg, New Delhi.

3. Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief, Headquarters, Maintenance Command, Vayu Sena Nagar, Nagpur.

4. Air Commodore JS Apte, Air Officer Commanding, 402 Air Force Station, Chakeri, Kanpur.

5. Wing Commander MC Singhal, The Presiding Officer, Court of Inquiry, 402 Air Force Station, Chakeri, Kanpur.

6. Wing Commander R Govind, Assistant Provost Marshal, 4 Provost & Security Unit, Air Force, Chakeri, Kanpur.

7. Corporal Mani GS, Equipment Assistance 7 Air Force Hospital, Chakeri, Kanpur.

2


8. Sqn Ldr RP Singh, Deputy Comd, Judge Advocate, HQ, Maintenance Command, Nagpur.

9. Flt Lt AK Awasthi, HQ, 402 AF Station, Chakeri, Kanpur.

10.AOC, 402 AF Station, Chakeri, Kanpur.

- Respondents

Learned counsel appeared - Shri M.S. Yadav, Advocate for the applicant Learned counsel appeared - Shri Md Zafar Khan, Advocate, for the respondents assisted by Wg Cdr Sardul Singh,

OIC Legal Cell

ORDER

Per Hon’ble Mr. Justice Devi Prasad Singh, Member (J)

1. Being aggrieved with the impugned order of discharge,

petitioner preferred a writ petition, bearing No. 55395 of 2003 in the

High Court of Judicature at Allahabad, which has been transferred to

present Tribunal in pursuance to power conferred by Section 34 of

the Armed Forces Tribunal Act, 2007, now registered as T.A. No.

1288 of 2010.

2. We have heard learned counsel for the petitioner Shri M.S.

Yadav and learned counsel for the respondents Shri Md Zafar Khan,

assisted by Wg Cdr Sardul Singh, OIC Legal Cell and perused the

record.

3


3. Petitioner was enrolled in the Indian Air Force in the Trade of

Equipment Assistant on 18.01.1988 and later on in August, 1997 he

was posted to 402 Air Force Station, Kanpur. On 02.02.2000 he was

assigned duty in diesel and petrol store. The controversy in question

in brief as borne out from record begins from 02.05.2000 when

representative of 7 AFH, Corporal GS Mani was delivered 2,400 litres

kerosene oil, though without gate pass for the reason that kerosene

oil store is situated out of Technical Area. It is alleged that Corporal

GS Mani demanded 1400 litres of diesel. According to the petitioner a

fresh voucher was raised by Corporal GS Mani for 2400 litres of

kerosene oil and 1400 litres of diesel, which was duly approved by

Warrant Officer Incharge POL Group, SK Singh. Required paper was

signed by petitioner while issuing the kerosene and diesel, which was

duly acknowledged by Corporal GS Mani. He also signed in the Store

Out Book (SOB) Exhibit-AX2, acknowledging the receipt of 2400 litres

of kerosene and 1400 litres of diesel. It is alleged by the petitioner

that four copies of issue vouchers for kerosene oil were destroyed out

of six and two copies (red and blue), which were in possession of

Corporal GS Mani, could not be destroyed. Gate pass was issued for

1400 litres of diesel and 2400 litres of kerosene oil, which were

booked out by Corporal GS Mani from Guard Room A. Later on

Corporal GS Mani was charged with the allegations that he had

drawn 7 barrels of diesel in civil area.

4. It was on 03.05.2000 at about 08.00 hrs 4 Provost in Security

Unit got a tip of two Airman, one of dark complexion and other of

4


normal complexion, offloaded some barrels at about 14.00 hrs on

02.05.2000 at Pappu Ka Plot, situated in civil area. The informer also

informed that similar theft was committed on 20.04.2000. Assistant

Provost Marshal (APM) went to Senior Logistic Officer (SLO) raising

complaint against the petitioner that he was involved in selling POL

items in civil area. On SLO‘s direction the store under the charge of

the petitioner was checked by Logistics Adjutant and one Corporal

but no deficiency was found. However, a Junior Warrant Officer

Bajwa from P&S Unit went to Pappu Ka Plot and recovered 8 empty

barrels, smelling diesel and kerosene oil.

5. Subject to aforesaid backdrop on 04.05.2000 an identification

parade was conducted in 4 P&S Unit. Corporal GS Mani was

identified by one civilian. Corporal GS Mani is a man of dark

complexion. Thus, it was only GS Mani, who was identified by civilian

in the alleged involvement of selling of diesel/kerosene oil. No effort

was made to find out second man of normal complexion. The report

of identification parade has been filed as Annexure No.3 to the T.A.

The pleading as contained in Para- 7 of the petition has not been

disputed in the counter affidavit under Para-20 with remark that it

requires no comment. Thus, it appears that only Cpl GS Mani was

found to be involved in the racket in accordance to the test

identification parade.

6. It has been pleaded in T.A. under Paras-8, 9, 10 and onwards

that the petitioner was called at 09.00 hrs on 05.05.2000 at P&S Unit

where Wg Cdr R Govind persuaded him for confessional statement

5


or to sign a blank paper. According to the petitioner when he refused

to concede the demand, respondent no.6 commanded Cpl TB Sarkar

and others to confine him in a room, striped off his uniform, started

beating him with ‗Danda‘ and fist and later on dragged him out and

left in scorching sunlight. While the petitioner was facing this tragic

situation, one Corporal Pandey tried to help him by calling Station

Medic Centre (SMC) but no one turned up to provide medical

treatment. Consequently he informed petitioner‘s parent who

reached there at about 18.00 hrs and admitted him in civil hospital.

Petitioner‘s father lodged an FIR at PS Chakeri, Kanpur but it was not

recorded. After first aid, he was taken to SMC where Wing

Commander RN Pandey, Medical Officer treated the petitioner and

exempted him from duty.

7. After medical examination the Medical Officer prepared an

injury report and sent it to Station Commander in terms of Para

1340(g) of Regulations for AF and Para 183 of Regulations for

Medical Services. Since under the influence of Station Commander,

Police had not registered an FIR, petitioner filed an application under

Section 156(3) of Criminal Procedure Code on 11.05.2000 against

Wing Commander R Govind and others in the Court of CMM Kanpur,

who called for report and later on directed for registration of FIR at

the Police Station concerned. This part of pleading in Paras 8 and 9

of the T.A. has not been denied with reason in Paras 21, 22 and 23

of the counter affidavit. With regard to pleading of Para-9 of the T.A.

only reply given in Para-22 is that the averments contained therein

6


need no comments from the answering respondents. It means that

the petitioner suffered injury, no medical aid was provided during day

hours and Wing Commander RN Pandey, Medical Officer treated

him, exempted from duty, raised an injury report and forwarded it to

the Station Commander in terms of Para 1340(g) of Regulation for AF

and Para 183 of Regulations for Medical Services and on being not

attended or heard, petitioner further filed a complaint under Section

156(3) Cr. P.C. on 11.05.2000.

8. It has also been stated that Wing Commander R Govind in

collusion with Corporal Mani fabricated the records with unused Gate

pass, created forged evidence and submitted a false report against

the petitioner and used these as Exhibits Q and R during trial. The

false report, based on alleged fabricated record dated 10.05.2000

was relied upon by respondents no.2, 3 & 4 for further action. It has

been alleged by the respondent no.6 that 6200 litres of DHPP and

400 litres of petrol were misappropriated from 402 AF Station and 7

AF Hospital. The corpus-delicti was the subject matter of two Units.

Allegations were raised in spite of the fact that there was no loss or

discrepancy or deficiency in stock of 7 AF Hospital nor in the stock of

SLO, 402 AF Station. Whole stock was complete in itself without any

deficiency but even then convening order dated 16.05.2000 was

issued (Annexure No.4) with regard to alleged loss of diesel and

petrol. Interestingly, averments contained in Para-12 that there was

no deficiency in the stock of diesel and petrol, have not been disputed

7


while giving reply in Para-24 of the counter affidavit with remark of no

comments.

9. It is alleged that Wing Commander R Govind changed the

mode and direction of inquiry and made it exclusively pertaining to

402 AF Station and accordingly vide SRO No. 57/2000 dated

16.05.2000 Court of Inquiry was convened. The relevant portion of

term of reference as contained in Annexure No.4 to the petition in

view of order dated 16.05.2000 is as under :-

―1. To investigate into the matter of

misappropriation of approximately 6200 ltrs DHPP (N),

400 ltr Petrol and 100 ltr of K‘ oil belonging to Logistic

section of 402 AF Station.‖

10. It is submitted that the Court of Inquiry proceeded with bias

against the petitioner and he was not given opportunity to be present

throughout the inquiry, watch demeanor and cross examine the

witnesses whose evidences in his opinion were affecting his

character and service reputation. Neither the documents were

produced in petitioner‘s presence nor he was allowed to cross

examine the witnesses in accordance with Rule 156(2) of Air Force

Rules and the provisions contained in Para-790 of the Regulations for

Air Force were not followed. The Court of Inquiry suppressed

identification parade dated 04.05.2000 (supra) and testimonies of

civilians Ramu and Umesh, Sgt Vaidya, NC (E) Nanhe Lal and

others. It has been pleaded in Para-16 of T.A. that the Guard Room

records indicate that the quantity booked-out at Guard-Room is in the

agreement with quantity shown in Gate-pass and POL items have

8


gone out without covering vouchers on Gate-pass for the excess

quantity of POL products as shown in the Gate- pass and Guard-

Room records.

11. It is vehemently argued that Para- 791 of the Regulation for Air

Force has not been complied with while recording finding to ensure

that such findings are supported by evidence. It is categorically stated

in Para- 18 of T.A. that nothing had gone out of POL Group belonging

to the petitioner without proper covering voucher. Interestingly, the

pleadings contained in Para-12 to 18 of the T.A. have not been

denied with categorical averments as is evident from Para-24 of the

counter affidavit and the only remark in it is of no comments.

Accordingly, the pleadings with regard to holding Court of Inquiry in

Paras-8 to 20 seem to be genuine and may be relied upon.

12. The finding recorded by the Court of Inquiry dated 31.05.2000

has been filed as Annexure No. 5 to T.A. and for convenience same

is reproduced as under :-

“ Confidential FINDINGS

The COI having assembled on 20 May 2000 and subsequent days to investigate the misappropriation of POL items found the followings:-

(a) The following items have been misappropriated by Cpl Yadav CB (witness No. 3) and Cpl Mani GS (witness No 4) of 402 Stn and 7 AFH respectively.

(i) DHPP-5800 Ltrs.

(ii) Petrol-200 Ltrs. (b) This act was accomplished by raising gate passes for quantity more than authorized by issue vouchers and obtaining SLO’s signature and issuing the same for taking

9


out these items from Guard Room. A second set of vouchers was prepared to support gate pass, if needed and destroyed it later, after safe passage.

(c) Items mentioned at Para 1 (a) were made surplus by Group i/c POL Store (402 Stn) with a malafide intention for wrongful gain.

(d) Witness No 5 (Cpl Singh S MTD) of 7 AFH) has helped in taking out these items in his vehicle and obtained monitory gains.

(e) Witness No 6 (NCE R Hasan) and witness No 7 (NCE Rajendra Prasad) both of 7 AFH, has also helped this act by concealing the facts and not disclosed to admin authorities.

(f) Misappropriated items have been disposed of in civil.

(g) WO i/c POL, WO SK Singh has failed to perform his duties out responsibilities properly. However, his direct involvement in misappropriation is not seen. (h) 7 AFH is dependent on 402 Stn, the nodal agency, for POL. Sd/- x x x (MC Singhal) Wg Cdr

31 May 2000 Presiding Officer Sd/- x x x x (BK Sinha) Flt Lt Member

Confidential”

13. A plain reading of the finding recorded by the Court of Inquiry

shows that the petitioner was not permitted to participate in the Court

of Inquiry though statement of Sqn Ldr JK Chakraborty, who

appeared as witness no.1 tarnished petitioner‘s reputation in the Air

Force.

14. It has been alleged that since the proceeding of the Court of

Inquiry was sent to Head Quarters by the Commanding Officer with

10


remark that the evidence is too weak to stand, hence the trial by

Court Martial not only against the petitioner but also against Cpl GS

Mani is outcome of imagination and surmises. In response to it, Head

Quarters Maintenance Command by letter dated 24.11.2000

(Annexure C.A.2) suggested for severe disciplinary action against the

petitioner under Section 82 of the Air Force Act, after completion of

disciplinary proceedings against the petitioner. The copy of

instructions issued by the Head Quarters, Maintenance Command

has been filed as Annexure No.C.A.2 to the counter affidavit. For

convenience the order dated 24.11.2000 as contained in Annexure

No.C.A.2 is reproduced as under :-

“CONFIDENTIAL

Tele: 526011/2223 HQ Maintenance Command Indian Air Force Vayu Sena Nagar Nagpur-440007

MC/C 5023/1/7/P1 24 Nov 2000

MISAPPROPRIATION/MAKING AWAY OF POL PRODUCTS BY 726592-A CPL YADAV CB EQ/ASST IN

CONNIVANCE WITH OTHERS

1. Reference is made to your letter No 402 Stn/C 2811/1077/P1 dated 26 Jul 2000.

2. The proceedings of C of I have been approved by the AOC-in-C. The following course of action is suggested:-

(a) Severe disciplinary action be initiated against 726592 Cpl Yadav CB Eq/Asst.

(b) Disciplinary action against 702670 Cpl Mani GS Eq/Asst, 721703 Cpl Singh S MTD, 803991 NC(E), Prasad R Lascar and 804195 NC (E) Hasan

11


R Lascar may be initiated u/s 82 of AF Act, 1950 after completion of disciplinary proceedings against Cpl Yadav CB.

3. Proceedings of Court of Inquiry (in original) enclosed for your further necessary action.

Sd/- x x x (Rakesh Srivastava) Wg Cdr O i/c Pl For SAASO

Encl : As stated. CONFIDENTIAL”

15. In pursuance to instructions issued by the Head Quarter,

Maintenance Command i.e. higher forum, Commanding Officer heard

the case on 19.12.2000 under Rule 24 of the Air Force Rules for 14

charges and directed it to be reduced in writing vide Annexure No. 28

to T.A. However, no reason has been assigned by the Commanding

Officer. In pursuance thereof summary of evidence (SOE) was held

between 21.12.2000 to 03.02.2001. DCM Commanding Officer

reduced the charges from 14 to 9, vide Annexure-29 to T.A. The

convening authority further dropped the charges and added 4 new

charges while convening DCM, vide Annexure No. 30 to T.A. For

convenience the charge-sheet is reproduced as under :-

―CHARGE SHEET

The accused No.1, 726592-A Cpl Yadav CB of 402 AF Station an airman of the regular Air Force, is charged with:-

First Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF section 52 (c) PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE GOVT Air Force Act,

1950 In that he,

12


At 402 AF Station, on 28 Feb 2000, being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station, and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit , dishonestly misappropriated 400 lrts of DHPP(N) by raising IAFF(Q) 429 No.EX/IV/P/182 (99-2000) for 400ltrs of Petrol 87 MT, but physically issuing to 702670 –K Cpl Mani GS Eqpt Asst of 7 AF Hospital 800 ltrs of DHPP(N) and 400 ltrs of Petrol 87 MT.

Second Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF

Section 52(c) PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE GOVT. Air Force Act, 1950

In that he,

At 402 AF Station, on 14 March 2000, being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit , dishonestly misappropriated 400 lrts of DHPP(N) by raising IAFF(Q) 429 No.EX/IV/P/189 (99-2000) for 800 ltrs of DHPP (N) and 3100 ltrs of Kerosene oil, but physically issuing to 702670 –K Cpl Mani GS Eqpt Asst of 7 AF Hospital 1200 ltrs of DHPP(N) and 3000 ltrs of Kerosene.

Third Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF

Section 52(c) PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE GOVT Air Force Act, 1950

In that he,

At 402 AF Station, on 23 Mar 2000, being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit , dishonestly misappropriated 1000 lrts of DHPP(N) by issuing to 702670-K K Cpl Mani GS Eqpt Asst of 7 AF Hospital without having raised supporting IAFF(Q) 429 voucher.

Fourth Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF

Section 52 (c) PROPERTY BELONGING TO THE GOVT Air Force Act, 1950

In that he,

At 402 AF Station, on 07 April 2000,being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit , dishonestly misappropriated 1200 lrts of DHPP(N) and 200 ltrs of Petrol 87 MT by raising IAFF(Q) 429 No.EX/IV/P/04 (2000-2001) for 400 ltrs of DHPP (N) and 2400 ltrs of Kerosene oil, but physically issuing to representative of 7 AF Hospital 1600 ltrs of

13


DHPP(N) and 200 ltrs of Petrol and 2400 ltrs of Kerosene oil.

Fifth Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF


In that he,

At 402 AF Station, on 20 April 2000,being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit, dishonestly misappropriated 1400 lrts of DHPP(N), by raising IAFF(Q) 429 No.EX/IV/P/10 (2000-2001) for 200 ltrs of Petrol 87 MT 800 ltrs of DHPP (N), but physically issuing 702670-K Cpl Mani GS Eqpt Asst of 7 AF Hospital 200 ltrs of Petrol 87 MT, 2200 ltrs DHPP(N) and nil Kerosene oil quantity, by writing quantity 200 ltrs of Petrol 87 MT, 800 Ltrs of DHPP(N) and 1400 ltrs of Kerosene Oil on gate pass No. 3129 dated 29 April 2000.

Sixth Charge COMMITTING CRIMINAL BREACH OF TRUST IN RESPECT OF


In that he,

At 402 AF Station, on 02 May 2000,being the NCO i/c POL, stores of 402 AF Station and in that capacity entrusted with POL stores of the unit, dishonestly misappropriated 1400 lrts of DHPP(N), by making use of two sets of IAFF(Q) 429 bearing same serial No.EX/IV/P/16 (2000-2001) for a single transaction of issue of POL to 7 AF Hospital first set ( receipted blue ) showing issue of 2400 ltrs of Kerosene oil only and second set ( original black ) showing issue of 2400 ltrs of kerosene oil and 1400 ltrs of DHPP (N), and physically issuing to 702670-K Cpl Mani GS Eqpt Asst of 7 AF Hospital as per second set and gate pass No. 3131 dated 02 May 2000.

-Sd- Place: Kanpur (JS Apte) Air Cmde Date: 14 August 2001 Commanding Officer 402 A F Stn TO BE TRIED BY JOINT DISTRICT COURT MARTIAL -Sd- Place: Nagpur (AK Gurtu)

14


Group Captain Senior personnel Staff Officer Date: 18 August 2001 for Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Maintence Command, IAF ‖. From the charges quoted above, we fail to understand as to

how the convening authority added four new charges while convening

the District Court Martial proceedings.

16. The DCM commenced on 27.08.2001 and concluded on

25.10.2001 with the finding that the petitioner is guilty of charges

No.1, 2, 5 and 6 and not guilty of charges No.3 and 4. The DCM

sentenced the petitioner to suffer three months‘ RI with reduction in

rank and dismissal from service.

17. Before confirmation of the sentence by confirming authority,

petitioner was put in Air Force Cell on 25.10.2001 itself in

contravention of Regulation 646 of Regulations of Air Force. The

confirming authority could not find any evidence for two charges i.e.

charges no.1 and 2 and remitted back unexpired portion of

imprisonment. Being aggrieved with the impugned order of

punishment petitioner submitted a statutory complaint under Section

161 (2) of Air Force Act, 1954 in June, 2002 and April, 2002 against

the impugned order of dismissal. During pendency of statutory

complaint, petitioner filed Writ Petition No.55395 of 2003 in the High

Court of Allahabad to quash the finding and sentence recorded by

DCM on 25.10.2001. However, High Court directed to dispose of the

representation, directing the competent authority to decide the

statutory complaint of the petitioner in accordance with law, which

15


later on was rejected being devoid of merit. The impugned order

dated 02.09.2003 has been filed as Annexure No.32 to T.A., which is

being reproduced hereunder in its totality :-

―No.Air HQ/C.23405/3597/PS/1393/DS(Air.III)/2003

Government of India Ministry of Defence New Delhi, the 02nd September, 2003

Ex-Cpl Yadav CB E. W.S.4801, Awas Vikas -3 Panki Kalyanpur Road Kanpur – 208017 Subject :- PETITION UNDER SECTION 161 (2) OF AF Act, 1950

I am directed to refer to your petition dated 19 April, 2002 and

application dated 28 January, 2002, submitted to the Secretary,

Ministry of Defence against the Findings and Sentence of District

Court Martial held at 402 AF Stn on 27 August, 2001 and subsequent

days.

2. The petition has been considered by the Central Government

alongwith relevant records and the same has been rejected being

devoid of merit.

Sd-

(Gurdial Singh)

Deputy Secretary to the Government of India‖

18. A plain reading of the impugned order shows that the petitioner

had submitted a complaint on 28.01.2002, followed by petition dated

19.04.2002 with regard to finding and sentence of District Court

Martial dated 27.08.2001. The petition was rejected by passing a

cryptic and unreasoned order (supra).

19. The learned counsel for the petitioner Shri M.S. Yadav while

assailing the impugned order of punishment submitted that the Court

16


of Inquiry was not held in accordance with Para- 786 of the

Regulations for the Air Force read with Rule 156(2) of Air Force

Rules, Para 790 (a),(b) and (c) of the Regulations of Air Force. The

material civilian witness, like Ramu and Sgt Vaidya, JWO Bajwa,

who recovered the empty barrels were not examined, which is

patently in violation of Para 786 (a) of the Regulations for the Air

Force. The identification report and APM report were suppressed,

which is also in violation of Para 792(c) of Regulation for Air Force.

Court of Inquiry was held in utter disregard to principles of natural

justice without petitioner‘s participation. It is further submitted that the

proceedings were initiated in contravention of Rule 24 of Air Force

Rules at the instructions of superior authority. The Commanding

Officer himself has not applied mind independently to initiate the

proceedings against the petitioner because of binding instructions

issued by the higher forum as there was no option with Commanding

Officer except to send the case for summary of evidence in terms of

order passed by Head Quarters, Maintenance Command.

20. According to petitioner‘s counsel, petitioner was not provided

the material documents, like charge-sheet, copy of Court of Inquiry in

full, report of identification parade, copy of APM report. All the

charges were based on documents but documents were not

provided. Only particulars of witnesses had been written and not the

entire proceedings in terms of Rule 24 of Air Force Rules. Petitioner

has not been given option to avail opportunity provided by Section 26

of Air Force Act, which confers statutory right. Petitioner‘s application

17


was forwarded to Air Force Head Quarters, respondents no.2 on

14.06.2001 without any comment in violation of Para- 621(k) of

Regulation for the Air Force. Petitioner‘s statutory complaint has been

rejected without assigning any reason.

21. The convening order has been signed by Staff Officer without

any authority in contravention of Rule 43(4) on 14.08.2001. On the

date of approval of DCM i.e. 17.07.2001, charge-sheet dated

19.02.2001 was before him and not the charge sheet dated

14.08.2001 but the final order was passed referring the charge-sheet

dated 14.08.2001 on the basis of two charge-sheets in violation of

Rule-43(1) of Air Force Rules and Para-732 of Regulations for the Air

Force. The complete proceedings of the Court of Inquiry and

additional inquiry report and list of defending officers were not given

in violation of principles of natural justice.

22. Defending Officer was not provided in accordance with

petitioner‘s choice in contravention of Rule 102 of Air Force Rules.

Petitioner was not allowed to rejoin six times in violation of Rule-94 of

Air Force Rules. DCM while recording the finding of guilt has not

recorded any finding as to how he reached to the conclusion of guilt.

23. Petitioner was put in Air Force Cell immediately after

pronouncement of DCM on 25.10.2001 though NCO cannot be put in

Cell as provided in Para-646(a)(ii) of Regulations for Air Force.

Petitioner could not have been put to Cell without confirmation of the

punishment as provided under Sections 152 and 164 of AIR Force

Act, 1950 read with Rule 147. Since PW6, PW7 and PW8 all are

18


accomplice, the evidence led by them is not admissible in view of

illustration (b) to Section 30 of Indian Evidence Act. Otherwise also

the evidence as accomplice may not be relied upon unless supported

by other record. The evidence of PW6 has not been corroborated by

even another accomplice and suffers from major contradictions.

24. On the other hand the learned counsel for the respondents has

vehemently defended the impugned order of punishment and submits

that the petitioner is guilty of commission of theft of Government

property, charges have been proved and no lenient view can be

taken.

Court of Inquiry

25. It has been vehemently argued by petitioner‘s counsel that in

spite of the fact of involvement of petitioner‘s character and service

reputation, copy of the Court of Inquiry was not given and also he

was not permitted to remain present and cross-examine the

witnesses. Attention has been invited to Sub-Rules (2),(6), (7), (8), (9)

and (10) of Rule 156 of Air Force Rules, 1969, for convenience which

are reproduced hereunder :-

―156. Courts of inquiry other than those held under section

107. –

(1) ………

(2) Save in the case of a prisoner of war who is still absent,

whenever any inquiry affects the character or service reputation

of a person subject to the Act, full opportunity must be afforded

to such person of being present throughout the inquiry and of

making any statements and of giving any evidence he may wish

to make or give, and of cross-examining and witness whose

evidence, in his opinion, affects his character or service

19


reputation, and producing any witnesses in defence of his

character or service reputation.

(6) The proceedings of a court of inquiry, or any confession or

statement or answer to a question made or given at a court of

inquiry, shall not be admissible in evidence against a person

subject to Air Force Law, nor shall any evidence respecting the

proceedings of the court be given against any such person

except upon the trial of such person for wilfully giving false

evidence before that court.

(7) Any person subject to the Act whose character or service

reputation is, in the opinion of the Chief of the Air Staff, affected

by anything in the evidence before or in the report of a court of

inquiry, shall be entitled to a copy of the proceedings of such

court unless the Chief of the Air Staff sees reason to order

otherwise.

(8) Any person subject to the Act who is tried by a Court-

Martial in respect of any matter or thing which has been

reported on by a Court of inquiry shall be entitled to a copy of

the proceedings of such Court, including any report made by

the Court:

Provided that if the Chief of the Air Staff considers that it

is against the interests of the security of the State or friendly

relations with a foreign State to supply a copy of the

proceedings or any part thereof, such person shall not be

furnished with such copy, but in such cases he shall, subject to

suitable precautions as to security, be permitted inspection of

such portions of the proceedings of the Court of inquiry, on the

basis of which the charges, on which he is arraigned before the

Court-Martial, have been framed.

(9) A copy of the proceedings of the Court of inquiry shall be

furnished under sub-rules (7) and (8) on payment for the same

of a sum calculated at the rate of fifty paise for every two

hundred words or part thereof.

(10) A person subject to the Act before he is, under sub-rule

(7) or sub-rule (8), furnished with a copy of the proceedings of

the Court of inquiry or is permitted to inspect any portion of the

proceedings shall be required to render certificate that he is

aware that he may render himself liable to prosecution under

the Official Secrets Act, 1923 (19 of 1923) for any breach of the

provision of the said Act, in relation to such proceedings or

portion thereof.‖

20


26. Regulation 790 of Air Force Regulations deals with the Court of

Inquiry, which is reproduced as under :-

― 790. Action when Character, etc. of persons is affected

(a) As soon as it appears to the court that the character or

professional reputation of an officer or airman is affected by the

evidence recorded, or that he is to blame, the affected person is

to be so informed by the court. All the evidence recorded up to

that stage is to be read over to the affected person, and the

court is to explain to the person, if so required by him, how, in

its opinion, it appears that the officer's or airman's character or

professional reputation is adversely affected, or how he

appears to be to blame.

(b) From the time an officer or airman is so informed, in

accordance with sub-para (a) above he has the right to be

present during all the ensuing proceedings, except when the

court is deliberating privately. The fact that an officer or airman

to whom this para applies is or is not present will be recorded in

the proceedings.

(c) The affected officer or airman may, if he so desires,

cross-examine any witness whose evidence was recorded prior

to the action taken under sub-para (a) above. He may, likewise,

cross-examine subsequent witnesses after their statements

have been recorded. He may also request the court to record

the evidence of any witness in his defence. The officer or

airman may make any statement in his defence.

(d) In case the officer or airman affected cannot, for any

reason be present to exercise his privilege under sub-paras (a),

(b) and (c) above, the court is to inform him by letter (or

otherwise as may be convenient) of the reasons why, in the

opinion of the court, his character or professional reputation

appears to be affected, or he appears to be to blame. The

affected person may make a statement in writing in denial,

exculpation, or explanation. This statement is to be attached to

the proceedings, and the court is to endeavour, by examining or

recalling witnesses, to accord, to the affected person, such

protection as is intended in sub paras (a), (b) and (c) above.

(e) If, after recording all the evidence, and after taking such

action under sub-paras (a) to (d) above as may be called for in

the circumstances the court is of the opinion that an officer or

21


airman is to blame, or that his character or professional

reputation, is affected, the entire proceedings are to be shown

to the affected person, and he is to be asked whether he

desires any further statement to make. Any such statement is to

be recorded, and fresh points are to be fully investigated by the

court.

(f) The findings, and recommendations, if called for, of the

court may then be made in accordance with the terms of

reference.

(g) An officer or airman to whom sub-para (a), (b), (c) or (d)

applies does not have the right to demand that the evidence be

taken on oath or affirmation, or, except so far as the assembling

authority or the court may permit, to be represented by a

solicitor or other agent.

(h) If the assembling authority attributes blame to an officer

or, an airman other than the officer or airman held to blame by

the court, or attributes blame in a way substantially different

from that of the court, the proceedings will be returned to the

presiding officer of the court (without any endorsement on the

proceedings) by the assembling authority together with a

statement from the assembling authority as to why that

authority considers that blame should be attributed to such

officer or airman or in a way substantially different from that of

the court. This statement will form part of the court of inquiry

proceedings. The court of inquiry will be reconvened and the

court will show to the affected person the entire proceedings

and statement of the assembling authority. The court will then

obtain from the person any statement that he may wish to make

and record the evidence of any witnesses he may wish to call in

cross-examination or of any fresh witnesses. When complete,

the proceedings will be forwarded to the assembling authority

together with any additional findings and or recommendations

that the court may wish to record. The assembling authority will

endorse its remarks on the proceedings only after completion of

action under this para.

(j) If blame is attributed by any authority higher than the

assembling authority to an officer or airman other than the

officer or airman held to blame by the court or the assembling

authority, the proceedings will be returned to the assembling

authority together with such authority's statement for action as

per sub para (h). The concerned higher authority will endorse

its remarks on the proceedings, only after the proceedings are

22


received back from the assembling authority after completion of

action. When forwarding the proceedings to higher authority

after taking action under this para, the assembling authority or

any other intermediary authority may append remarks on any

additional findings recommendations made.

(k) The same court which originally investigated the particular

occurrence will, as far as possible, be reconvened for purposes

of sub-paras (h) and (j). A fresh court is to be assembled only in

exceptional circumstances.‖

27. Hon‘ble the Supreme Court while considering the right of the

accused to be present during the course of inquiry, has specifically

held that in case the character or military reputation is affected of the

charged officer, then he or she shall be permitted to remain present

during recording of evidence and will also be permitted to cross-

examine the witnesses and lead evidence in defence, vide 1997(9)

SCC 1 Maj Gen Indrajit Kumar vs. Union of India, 1991 (2) SCC 382

Maj G.S. Sodhi vs. Union of India and 1982 (3) SCC 14 Lt Col Prithivi

Pal Singh Bedi vs. Union of India. Their Lordships of the Hon‘ble

Supreme Court held that Court of Inquiry or other similar proceedings

are statutory for collecting evidence.

28. In the case of Maj G.S. Sodhi (supra) it was held that in case

there is violation of mandatory rule (supra), the benefit of same shall

be given to the delinquent. For convenience Paras-22, 25, 26 from

the judgment of Maj G.S. Sodhi are reproduced as under :-

22. The next submission is in respect of the alleged unfair

manner in which the general court-martial was conducted. It is

submitted that the witnesses cited as D.Ws were examined as

PWs. However, according to the petitioner Maj. B.N.

Lawerence, Capt. R. Choudhury and Capt. Pranvir Singh gave

false evidence and the Judge advocate failed in his duties.

23


According to the petitioner when his Kurta was torn Maj. B.N.

Lawerence, Lt. Col. Sukhdev Singh and Capt. R. Choudhury

were present. It is also his submission that S.S. Bisht, Maj. B.N.

Lawerence and Capt. Gandhi denied having seen the

petitioner's head hitting Capt. Shukla's face and that this aspect

has not been taken into consideration by the general court-

martial. It must be noted that under Rule 77(1) "it is the duty of

the prosecutor to assist the court in the administration of justice,

to behave impartially, to bring the whole of the transaction

before the court, and not to take any unfair advantage of, or

suppress any evidence in favour of the accused." On perusal of

record it would be seen that the witnesses were examined only

from the point of view of bringing the whole transaction before

the court. Therefore, there cannot be any grievance against

examination as prosecution witnesses of the persons

requisitioned as defence witnesses. Coming to the version of

the witnesses examined we cannot re-appreciate the evidence

and that is not the scope of this Writ Petition, in any event all

the necessary evidence have been brought on record and the

defence has cross-examined the witnesses effectively and it

cannot be said that there is no evidence against the accused.

Therefore, it was for the GCM to arrive at a conclusion on the

basis of the evidence. The next submission is that there is

discrimination in award of punishment. It is submitted that Maj.

S.C. Mehra tried in a similar offence was awarded "severe

reprimand" and in the case of Maj. Sen Verma only loss of six

month seniority was awarded. We see no merit in the

submission. It is for the general court-martial to decide as to

what sentence should be awarded in the given circumstances

of the case. We are unable to hold that the sentence awarded

is wholly disproportionate. The further submission is that the

findings of the general court-martial have not been confirmed

as required under the rules. Section 154 of the Act deals with

this aspect and lays down that the findings and sentence cf

general court-martial may be confirmed by the Central

Government or by an Officer empowered in this behalf by

warrant of the Central Government. As per Section 156 such a

warrant issued under Section 154 by the Central Government

may contain restrictions, reservations or conditions as the

Central Government may deem fit. It is submitted that the

alleged confirmation was on 18th August, 1989. On 19th

August, 1989, 5 Power of Attorney copies were asked from the

petitioner and on 26th" August, 1989 the petitioner is

purportedly dismissed from service without any promulgation.

https://indiankanoon.org/doc/560899/



24


The submission is that the powers so conferred should be by

way of notification and until so notified the powers cannot be

exercised. Therefore the alleged confirmation is defective.

25. The petitioner has also contended that he submitted a

petition under Section 154(1) of the Act and the same was not

disposed of before confirmation. As per this section any person

aggrieved by findings of any general court-martial can present a

petition to the Central Government or the Chief of Army Staff or

any prescribed officer. In the instant case, the petition dated 5th

July, 1989 is admittedly received on 14th July, 1989. It is stated

on behalf of the respondents that the same was forwarded to

the Headquarters 9 Infantry Division which in turn forwarded the

same to the Headquarters 11th Corps who further forwarded

the same to the Command Headquarters and while processing

the petition it was observed that the said petition was not

accompanied by power of attorney and the petitioner was

apprised of the same and that in the meantime the Army

Commander confirmed the findings. It is also submitted by the

respondents that the petitioner was apprised of the same and

was advised to submit a petition under Section 164(2) of the

Act. The said provision lays down that any person subject to the

Act, aggrieved by a finding or sentence of any court-martial

which has been confirmed may present a petition to the Central

Government or the Chief of Army Staff or to any prescribed

officer superior in command to the one who confirmed such

findings, as the case may be. We have perused the petition

dated 5th July, 1989. It is a very lengthy one. The main prayer

in the petition is that the petitioner's posting at Dharandhera

may be carried through and that the court-martial proceedings

may be annulled and that guilty be court-martialled. It can

therefore be seen that this petition in substance is a post

confirmation one though dated 5th July, 1989 and the same

cannot vitiate the verdict passed by the court-martial and the

confirmation thereupon even if this petition is not disposed of.

26. Relying on these above-mentioned so-called irregularities

from the point of view of the petitioner, the learned Counsel in a

general way relied on the two judgments of this Court. In Ranjit

Thakur's case it is observed that:

―The procedural safe-guards contemplated in the Act

must be considered in the context of and corresponding

the plenitude of the Summary jurisdiction of the Court

Martial and the severity or the consequences that visit the



25


person subject to that jurisdiction. The procedural safe-

guards shall be commensurate with the sweep of the

powers.‖

In Capt. Virendra Kumar v. Union of India the termination order

passed in non-compliance of the procedural requirements of

either Rules 15 or 15-A was held to be invalid. We have

examined Rules 15 and 15-A and they deal with a different

situation. In the instant case the general and main complaint is

about the non-observance of certain rules particularly Rules 22

to 25 of the Army Rules. We have already considered this

aspect and we are firmly of the view that there is no flagrant

violation of any of the provisions of the Act and the Rules

dealing with the procedure which has caused prejudice to the

petitioner. For all these reasons, this Writ petition is dismissed.

However, in the circumstances of the case, there will be no

order as to costs. ‖

29. In view of above, since the provisions contained in Sub-Rule

(2) of Rule 156 read with Sub-Rules (6) & (7) of Rule 156 have not

been followed at the face of record the subsequent proceeding as a

follow up action after Court of Inquiry shall be vitiated.

Production of documents

30. Regulation 792(c) of Regulations for Air Force makes it

mandatory for production of material documents, like identification

parade, APM report etc., which appears to have been suppressed

and not brought during the course of inquiry. Regulation 792(c) is

reproduced as under:-

―792(c) The court will attach to the original proceedings all

relevant document produced before the court, including

exhibits, maps, plans, sketches, copies of any standing orders

shown to have been material, and correspondence relating to

the investigation, and police or other reports, copies of such

exhibits will be provided for each copy of the proceedings.‖


26


31. It has not been disputed by the respondents while filing the

counter affidavit that identification parade was held to find out the

persons who were seen lifting the barrels from the premises. In the

identification parade only one person, namely, Cpl GS Mani was

found to be involved (Annexure No.3). Non production of documents,

which goes to the root of the allegation, appears to be fatal.

MATERIAL EVIDENCE

32. It has not been disputed by the respondents while filing the

counter affidavit that identification parade was held to find out the

persons who were seen lifting the barrels from the premises. In the

identification parade only one person, namely, Cpl GS Mani was

found to be involved (Annexure No.3) and identified by witness.

33. Further it is not denied that the witnesses who saw lifting the

kerosene/diesel oil barrels were civilian, namely, Ramu and Umesh,

Sgt Vaidya, NC (E) Nanhe Lal and concerned IAF (P) personnel at

Sub-Guard-Room ‗A‘ 7 AF Hospital Gate. Why these persons were

not produced either during Court of Inquiry or during Court Martial

proceedings is not understandable and shakes the trust and

genuineness of the proceedings convened and held against the

petitioner. Non production of material witnesses and material

documents make the trial arbitrary and violative of principles of

natural justice, vide Ramaswamy vs. Muthu {Madras High Court

1976-MAD LJ-1-282} Para-5 and 8, Supreme Court in State of U.P.

vs. Jaggo (1971-AIR(SC)-0-158 and Supreme Court in Ishwar Singh

vs. State of U.P. (AIR 1976 SC 2423), Para-6.

27


F.I.R.

34. Allegation of charges against the petitioner is of theft and

misappropriation of kerosene and diesel oil (supra). Para-804(b) of

Regulations for Air Force provides that such incidents should be

reported to the Police through F.I.R. For convenience Para-804(b) is

reproduced as under :-

―A loss which is supposed to be due to theft will be reported at

once to the civil police, when the circumstances warrant the

course of action. In any court of inquiry which may

subsequently be held, evidence will be taken to show the date

on which the loss was so reported.‖

When it was transpired that there are allegations of theft or

misappropriation of material (supra) against the petitioner then in

accordance with the provisions of Para-804(b) of Regulations for Air

Force an FIR should have been lodged. Such slackness or illegality

creates reasonable doubt over the fairness of the respondents to

prosecute the petitioner.

35. Apart from Para-804(b) of the Air Force Regulations (supra),

Section 154 of Cr.P.C. makes it mandatory to register an F.I.R. in

case a cognizable offence is made out. Section 154 of Cr.P.C. is


―154. Information in cognizable cases.- (1) Every information

relating to the commission of a cognizable offence, if given

orally to an officer in charge of a police station, shall be reduced

to writing by him or under his direction, and be read over to the

informant; and every such information, whether given in writing

or reduced to writing as aforesaid, shall be signed by the

person giving it, and the substance thereof shall be entered in a

28


book to be kept by such officer in such form as the State

Government may prescribe in this behalf.

36. Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a case reported in 1972 (4) SCC 773

Sheikh Hasib alias Tabarak vs State of Bihar held that the principal

object of the first information report from the point of view of the

informant is to set the criminal law in motion and from the point of

view of investigating authorities is to obtain information about the

alleged criminal activities so as to take suitable steps for tracing and

bringing to book the guilty party.

37. Their Lordships in the case reported in 1972 (1) SCC page-107

Damodarprasad Chandrikaprasad vs. State of Maharashtra held

that in certain cases the first information report can be used under

Section 32(1) of the Evidence Act as to informer‘s conduct.

38. A Constitution Bench of Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a case

reported in (2014) 2 SCC 1 Lalita Kumari vs. Government of Uttar

Pradesh and others held that in case the cognizable office is made

out then in such situation the registration of F.I.R. is mandatory. For

convenience Para-119 from the judgment of Lalita Kumari (supra) is


―119. Therefore, in view of various counterclaims

regarding registration or non- registration, what is necessary is

only that the information given to the police must disclose the

commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation,

registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable

offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need

not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can

conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the

limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable

offence has been committed. But, if the information given

clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there

29


is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other

considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of

FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether

the information is genuine, whether the information is credible,

etc. These are the issues that have to be verified during the

investigation of the FIR. At the stage of registration of FIR, what

is to be seen is merely whether the information given ex facie

discloses the commission of a cognizable offence. If after

investigation, the information given is found to be false, there is

always an option to prosecute the complainant for filing a false

FIR.‖

39. In the case of Lalita Kumari (supra) Hon‘ble Supreme Court in

Para- 120 concluded with their finding with regard to registration of

F.I.R. and variety of cases dealing with different circumstances. For

convenience Para-120 to 120.8 are reproduced as under :-

―120. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we hold :

120.1 The registration of FIR is mandatory under Section

154 of the Code, if the information discloses commission of

a cognizable offence and no preliminary inquiry is permissible

in such a situation.

120.2 If the information received does not disclose a

cognizable offence but indicates the necessity for an inquiry, a

preliminary inquiry may be conducted only to ascertain whether

cognizable offence is disclosed or not.

120.3 If the inquiry discloses the commission of a

cognizable offence, the FIR must be registered. In cases whee

preliminary inquiry ends in closing the complaint, a copy of the

entry of such closure must be supplied to the first informant

forthwith and not later than one week. It must disclose reasons

in brief for closing the complaint and not proceeding further.

120.4 The police officer cannot avoid his duty of

registering offence if cognizable offence is disclosed. Action

must be taken against erring officers who do not register the

FIR if information received by him discloses a cognizable

offence.

30


120.5 The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the

veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to

ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable

offence.

120.6 As to what type and in which cases preliminary

inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which

preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/latches in initiating

criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months' delay in

reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the reasons

for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all

conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

120.7 While ensuring and protecting the rights of the

accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be

made time- bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days.

The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in

the General Diary entry.

120.8 Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary is

the record of all information received in a police station, we

direct that all information relating to cognizable offences,

whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry,

must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary

and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be

reflected, as mentioned above."

40. The judgment of Lalita Kumari (supra) has been reiterated by

Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2015) 6 SCC 287

Priyanka Srivastava and another vs. State of U.P. It was a case

31


where ambit of Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. was considered by Hon‘ble

Supreme Court, reiterating the principles flowing from the judgment

of Lalita Kumari (supra).

41. In a recent judgment reported in (2017) 2 SCC 779 State of

Telangana vs. Habib Abdullah Jeelani and others Hon‘ble

Supreme Court reiterated and followed the Constitution Bench

judgment of Lalita Kumari (supra) and held as under :-

―6. Having stated what lies within the domain of the

investigating agency, it is essential to refer to the Constitution

Bench decision in Lalita Kumari v. Government of Uttar

Pradesh and Ors[2]. The question that arose for consideration

before the Constitution Bench was whether "a police officer is

bound to register a first information report upon receiving any

information relating to commission of a cognizable offence

under Section 154 CrPC or the police officer has the power to

conduct a 'preliminary inquiry' in order to test the veracity of

such information before registering the same"?

While interpreting Section 154 CrPC, the Court

addressing itself to various facets opined that Section 154(1)

CrPC admits of no other construction but the literal

construction. Thereafter it referred to the legislative intent of

Section 154 which has been elaborated in State of Haryana

and Ors. v. Bhajan Lal and Ors.[3] and various other

authorities. Eventually the larger Bench opined that

reasonableness or credibility of the information is not a

condition precedent for the registration of a case. Thereafter

there was advertence to the concept of preliminary inquiry. In

that context, the Court opined thus:-

"103. It means that the number of FIRs not registered is

approximately equivalent to the number of FIRs actually

registered. Keeping in view the NCRB figures that show that

about 60 lakh cognizable offences were registered in India

during the year 2012, the burking of crime may itself be in the

range of about 60 lakhs every year. Thus, it is seen that such a

large number of FIRs are not registered every year, which is a

32


clear violation of the rights of the victims of such a large number

of crimes.

104. Burking of crime leads to dilution of the rule of law in

the short run; and also has a very negative impact on the rule of

law in the long run since people stop having respect for the rule

of law. Thus, non- registration of such a large number of FIRs

leads to a definite lawlessness in the society.

105. Therefore, reading Section 154 in any other form

would not only be detrimental to the scheme of the Code but

also to the society as a whole. It is thus seen that this Court has

repeatedly held in various decided cases that registration of FIR

is mandatory if the information given to the police under Section

154 of the Code discloses the commission of a cognizable

offence."

42. While dealing with the question with regard to misuse of the

provision, Hon‘ble the Supreme Court again reiterated Lalita Kumari

(supra) and observed as under :-

―7. While dealing with the likelihood of misuse of the

provision, the Court ruled thus:-

"114. It is true that a delicate balance has to be

maintained between the interest of the society and protecting

the liberty of an individual. As already discussed above, there

are already sufficient safeguards provided in the Code which

duly protect the liberty of an individual in case of registration of

false FIR. At the same time, Section 154 was drafted keeping in

mind the interest of the victim and the society. Therefore, we

are of the cogent view that mandatory registration of FIRs

under Section 154 of the Code will not be in contravention of

Article 21 of the Constitution as purported by various counsel."

43. Subject to aforesaid observations in the case of Habib

Abdullah Jeelani (supra) Hon‘ble Supreme Court has also

considered the exceptions given in Lalita Kumari and some of its

earlier judgments. It shall be appropriate to reproduce the same as

under :-

33


―8. The exceptions that were carved out in Lalita Kumari

case 3 pertain to medical negligence cases as has been stated

in Jacob Mathew v. State of Punjab5. The Court also referred to

the authorities in P. Sirajuddin v. State of Madras6 and CBI v.

Tapan Kumar Singh7 and finally held that what is necessary is

only that the information given to the police must disclose the

commission of a cognizable offence. In such a situation,

registration of an FIR is mandatory. However, if no cognizable

offence is made out in the information given, then the FIR need

not be registered immediately and perhaps the police can

conduct a sort of preliminary verification or inquiry for the

limited purpose of ascertaining as to whether a cognizable

offence has been committed. But, if the information given

clearly mentions the commission of a cognizable offence, there

is no other option but to register an FIR forthwith. Other

considerations are not relevant at the stage of registration of

FIR, such as, whether the information is falsely given, whether

the information is genuine, whether the information is credible,

etc. At the stage of registration of FIR, what is to be seen is

merely whether the information given ex facie discloses the

commission of a cognizable offence.

9. Be it noted, certain directions were issued by the

Constitution Bench, which we think, are apt to be extracted:-

"120.5. The scope of preliminary inquiry is not to verify the

veracity or otherwise of the information received but only to

ascertain whether the information reveals any cognizable

offence.

120.6. As to what type and in which cases preliminary

inquiry is to be conducted will depend on the facts and

circumstances of each case. The category of cases in which

preliminary inquiry may be made are as under:

(a) Matrimonial disputes/family disputes

(b) Commercial offences

(c) Medical negligence cases

(d) Corruption cases

(e) Cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in

initiating criminal prosecution, for example, over 3 months'

delay in reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the

reasons for delay.

The aforesaid are only illustrations and not exhaustive of all

conditions which may warrant preliminary inquiry.

34


120.7. While ensuring and protecting the rights of the

accused and the complainant, a preliminary inquiry should be

made time-bound and in any case it should not exceed 7 days.

The fact of such delay and the causes of it must be reflected in

the General Diary entry.

120.8. Since the General Diary/Station Diary/Daily Diary

is the record of all information received in a police station, we

direct that all information relating to cognizable offences,

whether resulting in registration of FIR or leading to an inquiry,

must be mandatorily and meticulously reflected in the said diary

and the decision to conduct a preliminary inquiry must also be

reflected, as mentioned above."

44. Thus, the only exception given to withhold the registration

of first information report relates to matrimonial/family disputes,

commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption

cases and cases where there is abnormal delay/laches in

initiating criminal prosecution i.e. 3 months’ delay or over in

reporting the matter without satisfactorily explaining the

reasons for delay and with other cases having reasonable

explanation and justified circumstances.

In the cases referred to herein above, as a matter of

exception in view of Habib Abdullah Jeelani’s case (supra), the

preliminary inquiry should be done in time bound frame and in

any cases it should not exceed 7 days and causes of delay must

be explained in the General Diary and in the event of Army in its

proceedings. It means, a court of inquiry must be conducted in

7 days, if required, to lodge an F.I.R.

35


Abuse of power

45. Lodging of first information report may not be abused against

the innocent hence in Habib Abdullah Jeelani (supra) Hon‘ble

Supreme Court discussed the remedy. The relevant Paras 11,12 and

13 from the aforesaid judgment are reproduced as under :-

―11. Once an FIR is registered, the accused persons can

always approach the High Court under Section 482 CrPC or

under Article 226 of the Constitution for quashing of the FIR. In

Bhajan Lal (State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC

335) the two-Judge Bench after referring to Hazari Lal Gupta v.

Rameshwar Prasad [(1972) 1 SCC 452], Jehan Singh v. Delhi

Administration [(1974) 4 SCC 522], Amar Nath v. State of

Haryana [(1977) 4 SCC 137], Kurukshetra University v. State of

Haryana, [(1977) 4 SCC 451], State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha

[(1980) 1 SCC 554], State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar

Guha [(1982) 1 SCC 561], Nagawwa v. Veeranna

Shivalingappa Konjalgi [(1976) 3 SCC 736], Madhavrao

Jiwajirao Scindia v. Sambhajirao Chandrojirao Angre [(1988) 1

SCC 692], State of Bihar v. Murad Ali Khan [(1988) 4 SCC 655]

and some other authorities that had dealt with the contours of

exercise of inherent powers of the High Court, thought it

appropriate to mention certain category of cases by way of

illustration wherein the extraordinary power under Article 226 of

the Constitution or inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C.

could be exercised either to prevent abuse of the process of

any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice. The Court

also observed that it may not be possible to lay down any

precise, clearly defined and sufficiently channelized and

inflexible guidelines or rigid formulae and to give an exhaustive

list of myriad cases wherein such power should be exercised.

12. The illustrations given by the Court need to be

recapitulated: [State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1)

SCC 335, SCC pp.378-79, para 102)-

―(1) Where the allegations made in the first information

report or the complaint, even if they are taken at their face

value and accepted in their entirety do not prima facie

constitute any offence or make out a case against the accused.

36


(2) Where the allegations in the first information report

and other materials, if any, accompanying the FIR do not

disclose a cognizable offence, justifying an investigation by

police officers under Section 156(1) of the Code except under

an order of a Magistrate within the purview of Section 155(2) of

the Code.

(3) Where the uncontroverted allegations made in the FIR

or complaint and the evidence collected in support of the same

do not disclose the commission of any offence and make out a

case against the accused.

(4) Where, the allegations in the FIR do not constitute a

cognizable offence but constitute only a non-cognizable

offence, no investigation is permitted by a police officer without

an order of a Magistrate as contemplated under Section 155(2)

of the Code.

(5) Where the allegations made in the FIR or complaint

are so absurd and inherently improbable on the basis of which

no prudent person can ever reach a just conclusion that there is

sufficient ground for proceeding against the accused.

(6) Where there is an express legal bar engrafted in any

of the provisions of the Code or the concerned Act (under which

a criminal proceeding is instituted) to the institution and

continuance of the proceedings and/or where there is a specific

provision in the Code or the concerned Act, providing

efficacious redress for the grievance of the aggrieved party.

(7) Where a criminal proceeding is manifestly attended

with mala fide and/or where the proceeding is maliciously

instituted with an ulterior motive for wreaking vengeance on the

accused and with a view to spite him due to private and

personal grudge.‖

It is worthy to note that the Court has clarified that the said

parameters or guidelines are not exhaustive but only illustrative.

Nevertheless, it throws light on the circumstances and

situations where court‘s inherent power can be exercised.

13. There can be no dispute over the proposition that

inherent power in a matter of quashment of FIR has to be

exercised sparingly and with caution and when and only when

such exercise is justified by the test specifically laid down in the

provision itself. There is no denial of the fact that the power

37


under Section 482 CrPC is very wide but it needs no special

emphasis to state that conferment of wide power requires the

court to be more cautious. It casts an onerous and more diligent

duty on the Court.‖

46. Right from Lalita Kumari (supra) to Habib Abdullah Jeelani,

Hon‘ble Supreme Court has not carved out any exception, like

incident or crime committed in the Armed Forces. Accordingly, the

judgment of the Apex Court is binding on the Members of Armed

Forces also in view of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. It shall

be appropriate for Armed Forces to take note of these developments

in law while dealing its subject matters.

47. Section 379 read with 409 of the Indian Penal Code is

cognizable offence under First Schedule of Code of Criminal

Procedure, hence in view of provisions contained in Regulations for

Air Force (supra) read with 154 of Cr.P.C., it was incumbent on the

appropriate authority to lodge the first information report, being

mandatory (supra).

Interference by higher authorities

48. It is vehemently argued and pressed that under Air Force Rule-

24 only Commanding Officer is competent to decide as to whether

the Air Force should proceed against an incumbent or not and

independent application of mind is necessary. For convenience Rule-

24 of Air Force Rules is reproduced as under :-

― 24. Disposal of the charge of adjournment for taking down the summary of evidence. -

(1) Every charge against a person subject to the Act shall be heard in the presence of the accused. The accused shall have full liberty to cross-examine any

38


witness against him, and to call any witnesses and made any statement in his defence.

(2) The commanding officer shall dismiss a charge brought before him if, in his opinion, the evidence does not show that some offence under the Act has been committed, and may do so if, in his discretion, he thinks the charge ought not to be proceeded with.

(3) At the conclusion of the hearing of a charge, if the commanding officer is of opinion that the charge ought to be proceeded with, he shall, without unnecessary delay, either: -

(a) Dispose of the case summarily; or

(b) Refer the case to the proper superior air force

Authority for sanction under section 83; or

(c) Adjourn the case for the purpose of having the

evidence reduced to writing.

(4) Where the case is adjourned for the purpose of having the evidence reduced to writing, at the adjourned hearing the evidence of the witnesses who were present and gave evidence before the commanding officer, whether against or for the accused, and of any other person whose evidence appears to be relevant shall be taken down in writing in the presence and hearing of the accused before the commanding officer or such officer as he directs.

(5) The accused may put questions in cross-examination to any witness, and the questions with the answers shall be added in writing to the evidence taken down.

(6) The evidence of each witness when taken down, as provided in sub-rules (4) and (5), shall be read over to him, and shall be signed by him, or if he cannot write his name, shall be attested by his mark and witnessed. Any statement of the accused material to his defence shall be added in writing and read over to him.

(7) The evidence of the witnesses and the statement, if any,of the accused shall be recorded in the English

language. If the witness or accused, as the case may be, does not understand English the evidence or statement; as recorded; shall be interpreted to him in a language which he understands.

39


(8) If a person cannot be compelled to attend as a witness, or if owning to the exigencies of service or any other grounds (including the expense and loss of time involved), the attendance of any witness cannot, in the opinion of the commanding officer or the officer taking the summary (to be certified in writing by the commanding officer or such officer), be readily procured, a written statement of his evidence purporting to be signed by him may be read to the accused and included in the summary of evidence.

(9) (a) Any witness who is not subject to the air force

law may be summoned to attend by order under

the hand of the commanding officer of the

accused. The summons shall be in Form C. I as

provided in the Third Schedule.

(b) The summons shall be in Form ―C-I‖ as provided

in the Third Schedule.‖

49. A plain reading of the aforesaid rule shows that every charge

shall be heard in the presence of accused and will have full liberty to

cross-examine witnesses and to call any witnesses and make any

statement in his defence. It is the Commanding Officer who has been

conferred the jurisdiction to dismiss the charge brought before him or

proceed ahead.

50. In the present case at the face of record the Commanding

Officer seems to have not applied his mind. In pursuance to report

the decision to proceed against the petitioner on the basis of

evidence and material on record was taken by Rakesh Srivastava,

Wing Commander on behalf of SAASO. No decision has been taken

by Commanding Officer with a finding to proceed against the

petitioner, after recording satisfaction. A power conferred by Act or

Statute may be exercised by same officer or authority to whom such

power has been conferred. The right of Commanding Officer to take a

40


decision by his independent mind cannot be delegated in writing or

impliedly unless the Statute permits so. No option was left over to the

Commanding Officer to take contrary decision than the order dated

24.11.2000 (supra) passed by the Head Quarter, Maintenance

Command, except to charge the petitioner.

Hearing of charges

51. The submission of petitioner‘s counsel that before hearing of

charges under Rule- 24 (supra), the copy of material documents, like

charge sheet, copy of Court of Inquiry in full, copy of identification

parade and copy of APM report were not provided hence framing of

charges is hit by Article 14 of the Constitution of India, being violative

of principles of natural justice.

52. During the course of trial on behalf of the prosecution 10

witnesses appeared, namely, witness no.1 Cpl MK Sharma, witness

no.2 Sgt L Singh, witness no.3 WO SK Singh, witness no.4 Wg Cdr

JK Chakravary, witness no.5 Flt Lt Arvind Kumar, witness no.6 Cpl

GS Mani, witness no.7 Cpl S Singh, witness no.8 NC(E) Hasan R

Lascar , witness no.9 NC(E) Rajendra Prasad Lascar and witness

no.10 Sahab Dayal Lascar .

53. On behalf of defence (petitioner) 3 witnesses appeared,

namely, defence witness no.1 Flt Lt SM Moorthi, defence witness

no.2 WO PS Bajwa and defence witness no.3 Sgt Shakya PK. One

witness was got examined under Section 143 of the Air Force Act,

1950, namely, Flt Lt KC Biswas.

41


54. During the trial number of documents were exhibited and a list

of exhibits was also prepared, in column no.2 of which particulars of

exhibits were noted. Some of the Annexures attached with the Court

Martial Proceedings are medical fitness certificate of Cpl CB Yadav

(Annexure No.1), summary of evidence of Cpl CB Yadav (Annexure

No.2), medical fitness certificate of Cpl GS Mani. The summary of

evidence was recorded from 21st December, 2000 to 03rd February,

2001. During course of arguments attention has not been invited by

the learned counsel for the petitioner with regard to any irregularity

and evidence, hence same need not be discussed elaborately.

55. The proceeding of the District Court Martial, in short DCM,

begins on 27.08.2001 in pursuance to order of Air Marshal SS Gupta,

ADC Air Officer Commanding–In-Chief, Maintenance Command,

Indian Air Force dated 18.08.2001. It continued for some time and

concluded with finding of sentence on 07.10.2001.

56. A perusal of the DCM proceedings shows that number of

objections were raised by the accused at the beginning of trial and

finding has been recorded thereon. Learned counsel for the petitioner

argued that the convening order was not passed by the competent

authority, hence subsequent trial becomes bad. The second objection

raised by the accused/ petitioner was that DCM may not continue on

account of pendency of ROG application dated 30th March, 24th April

and 24th July, 2001. Being not satisfied with the disposal given by HQ

MC, petitioner requested to forward his ROG applications dated 30th

42


March, 24th April and 24th July, 2001 to next higher authority but no

response was received.

Convening Order

57. So far as convening order is concerned, from the material on

record it appears that the convening order has been signed by Group

Captain AK Gurtu, SPSO, Head Quarters MC IAF though according

to the petitioner ‗s counsel the convening authority in terms of Section

111 of Air Force Act, 1950 is AOC –in-C Maintenance Command,

Indian Air Force. This plea against the convening authority was

rejected by the DCM with its finding, which is reproduced as under :-

―The issue relating to signing of convening order has

been explicitly dealt with under rule 43(4) of the AF Rule, 1969

(rule 43(4) read and explained). As per this sub-rule convening

order of the Court Martial and endorsement on the charge

sheet for trial of the accused by Court Martial may either be

signed by the convening officer or by staff officer on his behalf.

In view of the above provisions of the AF Rules it is for

the consideration of the Court whether or not the order

convening the District Court Martial is properly signed and the

Court has jurisdiction to try the accused.

The Court may now sit in close court to consider its

decision.‖

The Court is closed to consider its decision.

The Court considers submission of the Accused No.1, reply by the Prosecutor and advice of Judge Advocate and overrules the plea.‖

58. It may be noted that the convening order was passed for joint

trial of two persons, namely, petitioner and Cpl GS Mani but later on,

on objection raised by the petitioner, the Court (DCM) decided to try

the petitioner separately. However, convening order refers to both the

43


accused. For convenience convening order dated 18.08.2001,Exhibit

‗ G‘ is reproduced as under :-

―ORDERS BY AIR MARSHALL SS GUPTA, PVSM,AVSM,VSM,ADC AIR OFFICER COMMANDING-IN-CHIEF, MAINTENANCE COMMAND

Nagpur 18 August 2001

726592A Cpl Yadav CB Eq Asst of 402 AF Stn And 702670K Cpl Mani GS Eq Asst of 7 AF Hospital attached To 402 AF Stn

The detail of officers as mentioned below will assemble at 402 AF Stn at 1000 hrs on the twenty seventh day of August, 2001 for the purpose of trying by a Joint District Court Martial, the accused persons named in the margin.

The senior offi cer to sit as Presiding Officer. MEMBERS Wg Cdr SS Sandhu (13713) AE(L) - 3 BRD, AF Sqn Ldr DV Shukla (16450) Lgs - 7 BRD, AF Sqn Ldr BN Kanaujia(19759) AE(L) - AMSE WAITING MEMBER One Wg Cdr/Sqn Ldr is to be de tailed by AOC, 402 AF Stn as waiting member. JUDGE ADVO CATE Sqn Ldr RP Singh (19474) Adm/Lgl of HQ MC, IAF is appointed Judge Advocate. PROSECUTOR Flt Lt AK Awasthi (21685) Adm of 402 AF Stn is appointed Prosecutor. The accused will be warned, and all witnesses duly required, to attend.

44


The proceedings, (original and four copies) will be forwarded to HQ MC, IAF in a confidential cover marked for personal attention of ―Senior Personnel Staff Officer.‖

Signed this Eighteenth day of August 2001

Sd/- ( AK Gurtu ) Group Captain Senior Personnel Staff Officer For Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief Maintenance Command, IAF ‖

59. A plain reading of the convening order shows that it has been

signed by AK Gurtu, Group Captain SPSO, Head Quarters for Air

Officer, Commanding-In-Chief.

60. While defending the impugned convening order, it has been

submitted by the learned counsel for the respondents that the

competent authority had delegated the power and in any case on the

basis of instructions issued by the competent authority, it could have

been signed by the officer concerned.

Two questions cropped up, firstly, as to whether the power

could have been delegated by AOC-In-Chief, Maintenance

Command, Indian Air Force to Group Captain AK Gurtu, SPSO, Head

Quarters, Maintenance Command, IAF and secondly whether as held

by DCM in view of provisions contained in Rule 43(4) of the Air Force

Rules convening order could have been issued by Group Captain

Gurtu.

61. Section 111 of the Air Force Act deals with the authority who

passes the convening order, which refers to Section 110, by which

power has been conferred to appropriate authority to convene GCM.

45


For convenience Section 109, which provides different court martials

and section 110 for GCM and also section 111 for DCM are


― 109. Different kinds of courts-martial.—For the purposes of this

Act there shall be three kinds of courts-martial, that is to say,—

(a) general courts-martial;

(b) district courts-martial; and

(c) summary general courts-martial.

110. Power to convene a general court-martial.—A general

court-martial may be convened by the Central Government

or [the Chief of the Air Staff or by any officer empowered in this

behalf by warrant of the Chief of the Air Staff.

111. Power to convene a district court-martial.—A district court-

martial may be convened by an officer having power to

convene a general court-martial, or by any officer empowered

in this behalf by warrant of any such officer.‖

62. A plain reading of the aforesaid statutory provisions, which

have got mandatory force, shows that a convening order may be

passed by the Central Government or the Chief of the Air Staff. The

statutory provision does not empower to delegate the power to other

subordinate authority.

63. Accordingly, the DCM proceedings could have been convened

only by AOC-in- C, Maintenance Command, Indian Air Force and not

by the Group Captain AK Gurtu. Convening order does not show that

some decision was taken at the hands of AOC-in-C, Maintenance

Command, Indian Air Force and the Group Captain Gurtu is only the

communicating authority. Accordingly, it may be safely inferred that






46


AOC-in-C, Maintenance Command, Indian Air Force had not

convened the DCM but it was convened by Group Captain AK Gurtu.

Hence all subsequent proceedings proceeded on its basis seem to

have been vitiated because the convening order has been passed by

incompetent person.

64. Now let us consider the second limb of argument advanced by

the learned counsel about finding recorded in DCM proceedings with

regard to Rule 43. For convenience Rule 43 is reproduced as under :-

―43 Convening of general and district court-martial. — 1

(1) An officer before convening a general or district Court-

Martial shall first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by

the Court-Martial are for offences within the meaning of the Act,

and framed in accordance with law, and that evidence justifies

a trial on those charges he may amend the charges if he deems

fit, and if not so satisfied order release of the accused, or refer

the case to superior authority.

(2) He shall also satisfy himself that the case is a proper

one to be tried by the description of court-martial he proposes

to convene.

(3) The officer convening a court-martial shall appoint or

detail the officers to form the court, and may also appoint or

detail such waiting officers as he thinks expedient. He may

also, where he considers the services of an interpreter to be

necessary, appoint or detail an interpreter to the court.

(4) After the convening officer has appointed or detailed

the officer to form a Court-Martial under sub-rule (3), convening

order of the Court-Martial and endorsement on the charge-

sheet for trial of the accused by court-martial may either be

signed by convening officer or by a staff officer on his behalf.

The charge sheet on which the accused to be tried, the

summary of evidence and the convening order for assembly of

Court-Martial shall then be sent to the senior officer of Court-

Martial and the Judge Advocate, if appointed.‖





47


65. A plain reading of Sub-Rule (1) shows that the convening order

shall first satisfy himself that the charges to be tried by the Court-

Martial are for offences within the meaning of the Act. It is the

convening authority who has got power to amend the charges if he

deem fit and even release the accused, if not satisfied with the

charges against the accused or may refer it to the higher authority.

66. Legislature to their wisdom have used the words ―satisfy

himself that the charges to be tried by Court-Martial‖. Satisfaction

means the convening authority himself satisfy that there exists

substantial probable cause for believing that prima facie charges are

made out to try the accused for court martial, vide (2012) 10 SCC 561

State of Maharashtra v. Vishwanath Maranna Shetty.

67. Hon‘ble Supreme Court in a case reported in AIR 1960 SC 7

C.S.D. Swamy vs. State considered the word ‗satisfactorily‘ and held

that it casts burden on the accused (in the present case convening

authority) to offer a plausible explanation as to how he came to the

conclusion that the charges are made out.

68. The word ‗satisfied‘ has been defined in shorter Oxford

dictionary 3rd Edition as under :-

―The word "satisfied" has been defined in Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (3rd Edn. at p. 1792) :

"4. To furnish with sufficient proof or information, to set free from doubt or uncertainty, to convince; 5. To answer sufficiently (an objection, question); to fulfill or comply with (a request); to solve (a doubt, difficulty); 6. To answer the requirements of (a state of things, hypothesis, etc.); to accord with (conditions)."

48


69. In S.R. Bommai vs. Union of India (1994) 3 SCC 1, Hon‘ble

Supreme Court consider the word ‗satisfactorily‘ and relied upon the

meaning given in Oxford Dictionary and held that it is not the personal

whim, wish, view or opinion or the ipse dixit of the authority dehors

the material but a legitimate inference must be drawn from a material

placed before the President, which is relevant for the purpose.

70. The provisions contained in Sub-Rule (1) of Rule 43 requires

that the convening authority must be satisfied and a satisfaction must

be borne out from the record that he has applied his mind. This duty

of the convening authority is further strengthened by Sub-Rule (2) of

Rule 43 (supra), which casts a duty on the convening authority to

decide the description of Court Martial he proposes to convene. As a

follow up action, it is the convening authority who shall detail the

officers to form the court and not any other person.

71. Sub-Rule (4) of Rule 43 has been amended and substituted by

SRO 127 dated 27.07.1995, which provides that the convening

authority after detailing the officers to Court Martial under Sub-Rule

(3) shall make endorsement on the charge-sheet for accused, which

either may be signed by convening authority or by Staff Officer on his

behalf.

72. Thus, the legislature to its wisdom has conferred power only on

the convening authority to pass the convening order and not on the

Staff Officer, of course he can delegate his power to the Staff Officer

to sign the charge-sheet on his behalf.

49


73. Thus, the power to pass the convening order falls in exclusive

domain of competent authority under his own signature by application

of his mind in view of mandate contained in Sub-Rules (1) and (2) of

Rule 72. It cannot be delegated for any reason whatsoever in the

absence of enabling provision in this behalf in the Act itself.

74. It is well established that judicial or quasi judicial power

conferred by a statute cannot be delegated except when specifically

permitted, vide AIR 1956 SC 285, Pradyat Kumar vs. Chief Justice

of Calcutta High Court, AIR 1965 SC 1486 Bombay Municipal

Corporation vs. Dhondu, AIR 2000 SC 2008 Skypak Couriers Ltd.

Vs. Tata Chemicals Ltd.

75. The principle against sub-delegation is reasoned from the

maxim ‗delegatus non potest delegare‘ i.e. means a discretion

conferred by statute is prima facie intended to be exercised by the

authority on which the statute conferred it and by no other authority,

vide AIR 1967 SC 295 Barium Chemicals Ltd vs. Company Law

Board.

76. Even discretionary power entrusted by Statute to a particular

authority cannot be further delegated, except as otherwise provided

in the Statute. If any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the

behest or on the suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to

play, the same would be ultra vires. In (2004) 2 SCC Page-65 (at

page 74-75) Bahadursingh Lakhubhai Gohil vs. Jagdishbhai M.

Kamalia their Lordships of Hon‘ble Supreme Court held as under :-

50


―24. The impugned order was preceded by a direction of the Home Minister on 7.9.1996. A change in the opinion came into being only upon change in the holder of the office and that too within a few days. Not only had the matter not been admittedly placed on the agenda of the meeting dated 25.7.1997, the same was considered showing undue haste.

25. In S.P. Kapoor (Dr.) v. State of H.P. this Court held that ;when a thing is done in a post-haste manner, mala fide would be presumed, stating : 71 Page 71 of 85

26. It is also well settled that if any decision is taken by a statutory authority at the behest or on the suggestion of a person who has no statutory role to play, the same would be ultra vires. (See Commr. of Police v. Gordhandas Bhanji and Mohinder Singh Gill v. Chief Election Commr.)‖

The aforesaid proposition of law also emerges out from the

judgment of Hon‘ble Supreme Court, reported in AIR 2003 SC 146,

Union of India vs. D.N. Jha.

77. In view of above, the order dated 24.11.2000 (supra) passed by

Head Quarter, Maintenance Command to take severe disciplinary

action against the petitioner and in pursuance thereof action taken by

the competent authority i.e. Commanding Officer to proceed with

DCM without applying own mind and exercising discretion seems to

be an incident suffering from want of jurisdictio9n and it vitiates the

trial in view of provisions contained in Sub –Rule (2) and (3) of Rule

24 of Air Force Rules, 1969, as the Commanding Officer should have

formed the opinion to proceed with the trial by passing convening

order.

78. Sub Rule (3) of Rule 24 of Air Force Rules, 1969 provides that

after hearing of charges, Commanding Officer should form the

opinion that the charges ought to be proceeded with but the letter

51


dated 24.11.2000 had taken away the discretion of the Commanding

Officer, provided by Sub Rule (2) and (3) of Rule 24 of Air Force

Rules, 1969, which seems not permissible and hits the very root of

proceedings.

79. In view of above, since under Section 111 the convening

authority has not been conferred power to delegate his own power

with regard to convening of court martial and no finding has been

recorded and material has been placed before the Tribunal that the

convening authority has recorded his satisfaction to convene DCM,

keeping the mandate of Sub-Rules (2) and (3) of Rule 43, the

convening order suffers from the lack of jurisdiction, hence

subsequent DCM proceedings vitiates.

Charge Sheet

80. A perusal of the charge sheet shows that though it has been

signed by the Commanding Officer but the direction for trial by District

Court Martial has been signed by Gp Captain A.K. Gurtu, Senior

Personnel Staff Officer on behalf of Air Officer Commanding-in-Chief.

It shall be appropriate to consider Rules-37 and 38, which deal with

regard to signature on charge-sheet and follow up action. Question

cropped up whether the Staff Officer could have passed an order on

behalf of AOC-in-C for trial by Joint District Court Martial ?.

Provisions contained in Rules 37 and 38 deal with the signature on

the charge sheet. For convenience the same are reproduced as

under :-

52


―37. Signature on charge-sheet.—The charge-sheet shall

be signed by the commanding officer of the accused or by the

officer who, in respect of the accused, is an officer empowered

under section 82 to exercise the powers of a commanding

officer, and shall contain the place and date of such signature.

38. Validity of charge-sheet.—

(1) A charge-sheet shall not be invalid by reason only of any

mistake in the name or description of the person charged, if he

does not object to the charge-sheet during the trial, and it is not

shown that injustice has been done to the person charged.

(2) In the construction of a charge-sheet or charge, there shall

be presumed in favour of supporting the same every

proposition which may reasonably be presumed to be impliedly

included though not expressed therein.‖

81. A plain reading of the aforesaid provisions shows that the

charge sheet may be signed by an Officer duly authorized in

pursuance to power conferred by Section 82 of the Air Force Act and

shall not be invalid for the facts and the ground given in Rule

38(supra).

82. Section 82 of the Air Force Act, 1950 deals with the power of

punishment, other than officers and warrant Officers. It confers power

on a Commanding Officer or an officer authorized with the consent of

Central Government. For convenience Section 82 is reproduced as

under :-

―82. Punishment of persons other than officers and

warrant officers.—Subject to the provisions of section 84, a

commanding officer or such other officer as is, with the consent

of the Central Government, specified by 15 [the Chief of the Air

Staff], may, in the prescribed manner, proceed against a person

subject to this Act otherwise than as an officer or warrant officer

who is charged with an offence under this Act and award such

person, to the extent prescribed, one or more of the following

punishments, that is to say,—





53


(a) detention up to twenty-eight days;

(b) confinement to the camp up to fourteen days;

(c) extra guards or duties not exceeding three in number;

(d) deprivation of acting rank;

(e) forfeiture of badge pay;

(f) severe reprimand or reprimand;

(g) fine upto fourteen day‘s pay in any one month;

(h) penal deductions under clause (g) of section 92;

(i) admonition;

(j) any prescribed field punishment upto twenty-eight

days, in the case of a person on active service.‖

83. Coming to the facts of the present case, as we have observed

the charge-sheet (page-32) of the DCM proceedings (Exhibit B-2) has

been signed by the Commanding Officer but order for trial (convening

order) by joint District Court Martial has been signed by AK Gurtu,

Group Captain, hence the trial vitiates.

Defence Counsel

84. One of the objections raised by the learned counsel for the

petitioner is that the defence counsel was not given of petitioner‘s

choice. However, objection raised by the petitioner ‘ counsel with

regard to defence counsel seems to be incorrect for the reason that

initially the respondents very fairly provided the service of a defence

counsel from the list submitted by the petitioner and later on agreed

to change him, by providing the service of an Advocate. Respondents

have been fair enough while dealing with the present case, so far

allocation of defence counsel is concerned.











54


Evidence

85. PW 1 Cpl MK Sharma has not identified the signatures

appended on the vouchers being not familiar with it.

86. Second witness Sgt L Singh is the Record Keeper in Security

Section, working in Pass Section. He is the person who was in

custody of gate pass and produced the same before the court. He

identified the accused and produced the gate passes. He stated that

he was not aware as to who was responsible for issue of kerosene oil

since he never went for collection of kerosene oil. He also stated that

he is not familiar with the hand writing or signature of persons

working in guard room. Specimen signature of Flt Lt AK Singh given

to guard room was not found to tally with the signatures of the person

taking item as mentioned in gate pass register of guard room.

87. Third witness WO SK Singh appeared for prosecution, who

identified the accused and stated that he was working as WO i/c

POL. He does not seem to have made any statement assailing the

petitioner‘s conduct though he stated that he was responsible to O i/c

POL for receipt, safe custody and issue of POL. He also admits to be

responsible to ensure the position held with Group i/c was in

agreement with SSRC. He also does not remember various dates

and datas with regard to deficiency on particular dates. After perusal

of record he stated that:

―no deficiency was found in POL during the weekly snap checks

from February to May, 2000.‖

55


88. One important statement given by this witness is that during

February to May 2000 Cpl VK Yadav was NCO i/c kerosene oil and

the accused was in no way related to issue of kerosene oil. During

that time telephonic demand used to come to NCO i/c POL for issue

of POL. During cross-examination he admitted in summary of

evidence that he stated with regard to transaction of 14 March, 2000

that thereby 400 litres of DHPP(N) was reflected in the gate pass and

in gate pass register.

89. Wg Cdr JK Chakraborty appeared as PW 4, who was posted to

402 AF Station since 15.02.2000 and stated that POL group was

handled by WO SK Singh as WO i/c POL and under him diesel and

petrol was looked after by Cpl CB Yadav. He also stated that Group

i/c is responsible for unauthorized issue of diesel and petrol. He

submits that the accused had handed over charge to Cpl Sidharthan

(page-97). He submits that WO SK Singh was responsible to ensure

correctness of gate passes and he never reported any irregularity in

issuance of gate passes. He further agreed with the defence‘s

suggestion that there was no deficiency of diesel at the time of

handing and taking over of duty by the accused (page-99). He failed

to identify the hand writing of the accused/petitioner.

90. PW 5 Flt Lt Arvind Kumar, who was posted to 402 AF Station

from 14.09.1998 stated that from June 1999 till 14th February, 2000

he was functioning as SLO in absence of Wg Cdr and from

15.02.2000 he functioned as Lgs Offr and looked after LP Section,

POL and Tech Stores. He stated that in POL WO i/c SK Singh was

56


WO i/c POL and Cpl CB Yadav was Group i/c POL for petrol and

diesel. He categorically stated that he proceeded on leave some time

in April, 2000 and returned in May, 2000. When he came back after

leave he was informed by SLO that APM had apprehended some

barrels of Air Force in civil area and taken Cpl CB Yadav, the then

Group i/c of POL for interrogation. Thereafter SLO ordered check of

POL. However, on checking of POL no surplus or deficiency was

found (Page 104).

91. PW 6 Cpl GS Mani happens to be co-accused, who was initially

tagged for joint trial but later on separated. He stated that on

14.03.2001 he came to POL store with 19 empty barrels for collection

of 800 litres of diesel and 3000 litres of kerosene oil. He collected 800

litres of diesel and gone to Kerb side pump outside Sub-Guard Room

‗B‘ for kerosene oil. The kerosene oil was filled as per meter reading.

He stated that there was various about dip reading of the barrel and

meter reading of pump which was minimum 10 litres per barrel. It was

supplemented by filling from the pump. The voucher was accordingly

amended to 3100 litres to make it agree with the Kerb side pump

reading (page 116). He stated that he was not having gas pass and

went out through Sub-Guard Room ‗B‘ where POL store was checked

by WO PS Chauhan. On 23.03.2000 he again came to POL store for

kerosene oil collection but without gate pass. On 06.04.2000 the

witness came to POL store of 402 AF Station with 14 empty barrels

for collection of 2400 litres of kerosene. That day also he was not

having gate pass. POL store was checked by WO PS Chauhan. It is

57


stated by the witness that on 19.04.2000 he gave a ring to the

accused and told him about requirement of 200 litres of petrol and

800 litres of diesel. He stated that on that day accused came to 7

AFH and requested him to pickup seven empty barrels from civil

area. According to him accused informed him that the barrels were

sent to civil area for repairs. Witness declined the request. On

20.04.2000 accused again came to the section of the witness and

requested to pick up the empty barrels. On this time the witness

accepted the request and requested him to meet him on the way. On

20.04.2000 on the way to 402 AF Station from 7 AFH witness alleged

to see four or five people alongwith the accused at the place called

Pardevanpurwa (page117). Seven empty barrels were loaded with

the help of civilians at POL store. It is alleged that accused requested

to carry back seven barrels filled with diesel in civil area. It is also

alleged that vehicle was permitted to go out after the barrels were

checked by the watchman. The filled up barrels of diesel were off

loaded by the civilians who had loaded the empty barrels at

Pardevanpurwa. Thereafter witness gone to POL where WO PS

Chauhan checked POL as per store vouchers. He stated that similar

request was made on 30.04.2000 but declined by the witness. An

amount of Rs.1500/- was forcibly given to him. On 02.05.2000, on

request made by the accused/ witness again he carried twelve empty

barrels from 7 AFH for collecting 2400 litres of kerosene oil and again

collected seven barrels from same place (supra) and loaded with the

aid of civilians seven empty barrels and thereafter 7 AFH vehicle was

parked in front of POL office at 402 AF Station. Thereafter seven

58


empty barrels were off loaded from the vehicle and another seven

barrels with DHPP(N) were loaded. The barrels were counted by the

Watchman and after counting the vehicle was allowed to go out. On

the way of 7 AFH the vehicle was stopped at Pardevanpurwa where

same four-five civilians who loaded the seven empty barrels, off

loaded the seven barrels filled with DHPP(N).

92. During cross-examination PW 6 admitted that he committed

offence while loading and off loading the barrels of diesel (supra).

The witness was contradicted with the statement given by P&S

personnel on 03.05.2000 with the following statement :-

―Defence counsel states that have you stated on 03 May 2000 to P&S personnel that ― On 20 Apr 2000 I collected 200 ltrs of Petrol and 800 ltrs of DHPP(N) from 402 AF Station Lgs Section vide EX/IV/P/10 (2000-2001) ltrs of K‘ Oil vide EX/IV/P/16 (2000-2001). The subject items were collected in the 200ltrs sized barrels and further I say that I was not issued with any gate pass on both the occasions‖

The Witness states he gave this statement. In clarification he states ―I had written whatever was dictated by the P&S personnel. From 03 May 2000 for about four days I was being called daily to P&S Unit and whatever they used to say I wrote in order to escape from manhandling. Subsequently I have not given application to the authorities that I was forced to give statement before the P&S personnel‖

The P&S personnel did not manhandle me. I wrote whatever they stated. ‖

93. However, the statement of PW6 seems to be full of

contradiction and when confronted from his previous statement, he

stated that he made earlier statement to P&S personnel in the state

of confusion, rather he proceeded to say that the accused had not

given him any money on another occasion other than what was paid

on 30.04.2000 (supra). The witness has been confronted from the

59


statement given during court of inquiry, which seems to suffer from

major contradiction with regard to payment of cash. The statement of

PW 6, who is co-accused does not seem to be reliable being not

corroborated by other evidence required under Section 133 of the

Evidence Act.

94. PW7 Cpl S Singh was detailed on 20.04.2000 for collection of

POL store. He stated that he was stopped by Cpl GS Mani and

brought to a persons who was in Air Force uniform. He stated that

four or five persons loaded few barrels in his vehicle and came to

POL office of 402 AF Station. From where on the asking of Cpl GS

Mani I took the vehicle at the filling point of MT Section, where he

saw Cpl CB Yadav, who was identified by the witness as accused in

the court. He affirmed the occurrence of loading the barrels at POL at

the behest of Cpl GS Mani. He admits that no action was taken

against him though he loaded barrels and off loaded the empty

barrels. Though he had seen accused C B Yadav at filling point but

so far loading and off loading of diesel barrels with or without consent

is concerned, he stated that he did so on the asking of Cpl GS Mani.

95. PW8 Hasan R Lascar was working in the Medical Ward for

cllection of medicines from Lucknow, collection of POL from 402 AF

Station etc. He stated that on 20.04.2000 under the instruction of Cpl

GS Mani he loaded empty barrels in the vehicle, five at one place and

seven empty barrels at another place. According to PW8 empty

barrels were filled up by Cpl CB Yadav. He stated that he filled up the

barrels by holding the filling nozzle of the pump. After filling up of

60


seven barrels, he filled up eleven barrels of diesel and one barrel of

petrol and the vehicle left Guard Room ‗A‘, whereafter it was stopped

near Khalsa School and reached to a place where the seven empty

barrels were loaded. It is stated by him that Cpl Mani was alongwith

the accused when barrels were filled up.

96. PW9 Rajendra Prasad Lascar also reiterated with regard to

loading and off loading of barrels of diesel at Pardevanpurwa and

stated that he empty barrels were filled up at the filling station in the

presence of accused and Cpl GS Mani.

97. PW10 Sahab Dayal was posted at 402 AF Station and working

in POL group of 402 AF Station. He stated that on 02.05.2000

accused Cpl CB Yadav told him to off load seven empty barrels from

the vehicle and load seven filled barrels from the store.

98. From the oral evidence led by the prosecution, there appears to

be filling of diesel from Air Force Station and off loading of the same

in civil area. Petitioner CB Yadav seems to be present at the filling

station whereas Cpl GS Mani seems to be actively managing the

things for transporting of diesel barrels in civil area. Though Cpl Mani

seems to have tried to involve the accused/petitioner as the main

culprit but from the evidence on record it appears that entire

management outside the station was done by Cpl GS Mani and being

accused he shifted the entire burden on the petitioner with regard to

alleged theft of oil. No link seems to have been established with

regard to active collusion of petitioner and GS Mani.

61


Defence Witness

99. DW1 Flt Lt SM Moorthi stated that he was posted from April to

June, 2000 at 402 AF Station. He conducted the identification parade

memo, which he produced before the court during the trial. The

memo of identification parade was signed by him. Zerox copy of the

memo was taken on record with the consent of parties during trial. It

has been stated by the defence witness during identification parade

that witness Ramu identified Cpl GS Mani.

100. DW2 WO PS Bajwa was posted from April to May, 2000 at the

strength of No.4 P&S Unit. He has been the investigator and

recovered 8 empty barrels smelling of kerosene oil or diesel.

However, he could not recollect the date of recovery. DW2 recorded

the evidence of witnesses and submitted the copy of gate passes,

copy of SOB and stock register etc. He stated that he admits that on

prosecution query during investigation Cpl GS Mani had accepted his

involvement with accused and other people involved in it. He stated

that he has not mentioned the name of accused in the investigation

report in the last column as his name was not reflected in the gate

pass on records. In the second last column of Analysis Chart the

witness mentioned the name of Cpl GS Mani, who seems to be

involved with other persons and also paid to driver and civilians of

Pappu Ka Hata.

101. The third witness produced on behalf of the accused as DW3

is Sgt PK Shakya, who was posted in 402 AF Station during the

62


period in question. He stated that he did not find any deficiency in

diesel, except some permissible deficiency of petrol.

Theft and Misappropriation

102. Petitioner has been charged for theft and misappropriation of

kerosene oil. Theft has been defined under Section 378 of Indian

Penal Code, which reproduced as under :-

―378. Theft.—Whoever, intending to take dishonestly any

moveable property out of the possession of any person without

that person‘s consent, moves that property in order to such

taking, is said to commit theft.

Explanation 1.—A thing so long as it is attached to the

earth, not being movable property, is not the subject of theft;

but it becomes capable of being the subject of theft as soon as

it is severed from the earth.

Explanation 2.—A moving effected by the same act which

affects the severance may be a theft.

Explanation 3.—A person is said to cause a thing to

move by removing an obstacle which prevented it from moving

or by separating it from any other thing, as well as by actually

moving it.

Explanation 4.—A person, who by any means causes an

animal to move, is said to move that animal, and to move

everything which, in consequence of the motion so caused, is

moved by that animal.

Explanation 5.—The consent mentioned in the definition

may be express or implied, and may be given either by the

person in possession, or by any person having for that purpose

authority either express or implied.‖

103. In the present case burden was on the prosecution to establish

that the kerosene and diesel oil were taken out by the petitioner

himself from the depot without lawful right. The evidence on record

attributed mainly to GS Mani and petitioner has been seen at the time

63


of filling up in barrel, does not seem to constitute offence of theft.

Respondents should have established that it is the petitioner who had

taken out the diesel and in case the petitioner has not taken out the

diesel/ kerosene oil from depot then he could have been charged for

criminal conspiracy or collusive act with the help of Section 34 of

Indian Penal Code or Section 149 of Indian Penal Code as the case

may be but here it is not the case. No evidence has been brough on

record that the petitioner himself has taken out the diesel or kerosene

oil barrels out of depot. The other charge on the petitioner is of

misappropriate of property. Under Indian Penal Code

misappropriation is punishable under Section 403, which is


―Section 403. Dishonest misappropriation of property.-

Whoever dishonestly misappropriates or converts to his own

use any movable property, shall be punished with imprisonment

of either description for a term which may extend to two years,

or with fine, or with both.

Explanation.1-A dishonest misappropriation for a time

only is a misappropriation with the meaning of this section.

Explanation 2. -A person who finds property not in the

possession of any other person, and takes such property for the

purpose of protecting if for, or of restoring it to, the owner does

not take or misappropriate it dishonestly, and is not guilty of an

offence; but he is guilty of the offence above defined, if the

appropriates it to his own use, when the knows or has the

means of discovering the owner, or before he has used

reasonable means to discover and give notice to the owner and

has kept the property a reasonable time to enable the owner to

claim it.

What are reasonable means or what is a reasonable time

in such a case, is a question of fact.

It is not necessary that the finder should know who is the

owner of the property, or that any particular person is the owner

64


of it; it is at the time of appropriating it, he does not believe it to

be his own property, or in good faith believe that the real owner

cannot be found.‖

104. From the reading of the material on record (supra) it does not

seem to be borne out that the petitioner has dishonestly

misappropriated or converted the kerosene oil as well as diesel as of

his own property. No evidence has been led that the petitioner has

sold the oil and after selling the kerosene oil/ diesel the petitioner

enriched himself or received cash of the diesel / kerosene oil while

misappropriating the property.

Finding

105. The ingredients as defined by Indian Penal Code with regard to

offence seem to be missing, which fettered the court martial. In view

of above, we conclude our findings as under :-

(I) In every case where a cognizable offence is made out, it shall

be incumbent on the Members of the Armed Forces to lodge a first

information report in police station, subject to preliminary inquiry/

court of inquiry within a week for specified offences as held by

Hon‘ble Supreme Court (supra), like, matrimonial disputes/family

disputes, commercial offences, medical negligence cases, corruption

cases or where there is abnormal delay/latches in initiating criminal

prosecution of over 3 months but that too shall be subject to

appropriate court of inquiry within a week.

(II) In the present case court martial proceedings has not been

passed in conformity with the mandatory provisions(supra), hence

trial under court martial vitiates, in consequence thereof punishment

awarded to the petitioner is not sustainable and is liable to be set

aside.

65


(III) The court martial also fails since the material evidence which

includes non production of memo of identification parade, actual eye

witnesses (civilian), who saw lifting of kerosene oil/ diesel barrels and

other material documents (supra).

(IV) There appears to be no evidence to satisfy the ingredients of

theft as well as misappropriation by the petitioner as defined in Indian

Penal Code, for which the petitioner has been charged.

(V) Since trial held on account of direction issued by higher

authorities and non-application of mind by the Commanding Officer

himself to proceed with the charges keeping in view the statutory

mandate (supra), it seems to vitiate the trial.

(VI) The convening order has not been passed by the competent

officer in compliance of mandatory provisions contained in Sections

110 and 111 of the Indian Air Force Act, which goes to the root of the

matter, hence trial vitiates.

(VII) There is no evidence on record, which may indicate that the

convening authority or commander empowered under rule, has

delegated his power to Staff Officer, empowering him to sign the

convening order. Burden was on the prosecution to come forward

with required material, which has not been done, hence also trial

vitiates.

(VIII) The statement given by the defence witnesses as well as

prosecution witnesses indicates that there was no short fall of

kerosene/ diesel oil in the stock of Air Force. A case has been set up

by the respondents that there was extra diesel and kerosene oil in the

stock available on account of short measurement or otherwise, which

was taken away by the petitioner or others. In case it was so then the

charges should have been framed with relevant material and

evidence to establish this fact but it has not been done, hence the

whole trial vitiates.

106. In view of above, T.A. deserves to be allowed. Keeping in view

that Indian Army/ Air Force and Navy sometime do not lodge F.I.R.

even in cognizable offences, in view of binding judgment of Hon‘ble

66


Supreme Court and statutory mandate under Section 154 of

Cr.P.C.(supra), it shall be appropriate that the change of law may be

communicated to all the three Chiefs of the armed forces to do

needful and proceed keeping the observations made in the present

order/ judgment based on law laid down by Supreme Court (supra)

while dealing with the offences in their respective branches.

ORDER

(1) T.A. is allowed accordingly. The impugned orders dated

25.10.2001, passed by District Court Martial, contained in

Annexure No.1, in respect of the petitioner on 27.08.2001 and

subsequent days, finding and recommendation recorded by the

COI on 31.05.2000, contained in Annexure No.5 and charge-

sheet IAFF (P)-13 dated 19.12.2000 and subsequent

proceedings initiated in pursuance thereof as contained in

Annexure No. 28 to the petition and the punishment awarded

thereof are set aside with consequential benefits. Petitioner

shall be deemed to have been in continuous service to the full

of his term of the rank from which he has been dismissed for

the pension and other service benefits. However, the payment

of arrears of salary is confined to 50%.

(2) Let the consequential benefits be provided to the petitioner

within four months from the date of communication of order.

(3) A copy of present judgment/ order shall be sent to the Chief of

the Air Force, Chief of the Army Staff and Chief of Naval Staff

by the Registry within a week to bring in their notice with regard

to change of law and appropriate action thereon.

(4) No order as to costs.

( Air Marshal Anil Chopra) (Justice Devi Prasad Singh) Member (A) Member (J) Dated: April 18,2017

JPT

Date post:	29-Aug-2019
Category:	Documents
Upload:	phungtram
View:	225 times
Download:	3 times

AFR RESERVED ARMED FORCES TRIBUNAL, REGIONAL BENCH ...aftlko.up.nic.in/AFR/AFR 2017/TA 1288 of 2010...

Documents