African land tenure

Agricultural Administration 23 (1986) 109-122

African Land Tenure

John Hunter

Department of Economics, National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho

&

Carl Mabbs-Zeno

Africa and Middle East Branch, Economic Research Service, US Department of Agriculture, Washington, DC 20005-4788, USA

(Received: 1 October, 1985)

SUMMARY

Foreign advisors and donor agencies often recommend change in land tenure as an important component of African rural development. These recommendations are founded on experience in developed nations as interpreted both by capitalist and by socialist paradigms. The considerable African experience with land reform displays fundamental divergence from these paradigms, resulting both from the unique institutional composition existing in Africa and from the present relationship of Africa to the rest of the world. Tenure systems have shown greaterflexibility than is generally acknowledged, suggesting that efforts to strengthen agriculturalperformance should notfocus on these systems as a constraint to development.

INTRODUCTION

Land reform and the restructuring of tenure relationships have been political demands with wide popular support in many areas of Latin America and Asia owing to the often highly unequal distribution of land

109 Agricultural Administration 0309-586X/86/$03.50 0 Elsevier Applied Science Publishers Ltd, England, 1986. Printed in Great Britain

110 John Hunter, Carl Mabbs-Zeno

in these areas. Reflecting this, as well as the desire to utilize land and labor resources more efficiently, development experts have included them in their strategies for rural development. In Africa (with the exception of Ethiopia and the settler-dominated regimes) there has been less popular demand for land reform since domination of peasants by large landowners has been rarer. Instead, the impetus has usually come from foreign advisors and donor agencies. This is especially true today where, in the face of the widely acknowledged agricultural crisis, land reform is often viewed as a prerequisite to development and improved land use. In many areas, wide-ranging land reforms have been either undertaken or are in the planning stage.

This paper examines the nature of these reforms and why they were undertaken and supports three hypotheses: (1) that the major paradigms underpinning land reform elsewhere are less useful in the African context (2) that traditional tenure systems are more flexible and are less of a constraint to agricultural development than is commonly supposed; and (3) that tenure restructuring is difficult and expensive to achieve and may not warrant as high a priority as several other more immediately effective reforms. We discuss both individualistic and communal attempts at reform from both an historical and theoretical perspective. The option of retaining traditional institutions is discussed and future problems are anticipated. Our position is motivated by pragmatism and not by romanticism for tradition nor by antipathy to radical change.

Despite a wide variation in detail, traditional African land tenure systems have been characterized by a common theme-that the land is held in trust by the community or lineage for future generations and individuals are entitled to usufruct or use rights only. These rights are allocated typically by a local chief or headman whose power derives, variously, from his personal lineage, his ability to satisfy family heads in his community, and his loyalty to a higher political authority. Use rights may be earned by clearing land or by inheritance. Generally, however, membership in the community and willingness to use the land are sufficient.

A persistent theme of much of the discussion by policy-makers of African agricultural development and methods for improving land use is the necessity of substantially reforming or even radically replacing the traditional tenure system. Although they arrive at their conclusions via different routes and may differ as to their proposed changes they propose, both capitalistically and socialistically oriented policy-makers agree that

African land tenure 111

traditional tenurial forms cannot meet the challenge of supporting the new behavioral patterns necessary to transform agriculture and lay a foundation for economic development.

The impetus for much of this consensus comes from the historical experiences of the presently industrialized countries and from the theoretical constructs which have been devised to understand those experiences. There, land reform accompanied or, often, preceded agricultural development. The necessity of the former for the latter was assumed, perhaps not surprisingly.

THE INDIVIDUALISTIC LAND TENURE PARADIGM

The neoclassical model of efficient resource allocation by individual optimizers is based on Western European and North American experience. It requires for its operation both transferable, individual ownership of and developed markets for scarce resources. In this regard, criticism of traditional African tenure is motivated by perceptions of the operation of communal tenure and is heavily ideological. Common property and the lack of secure title, it is alleged, result in inefficient allocations of scarce resources and provide inadequate incentives to invest effort or capital in agriculture. Traditional tenure institutions are the foundation of agricultural underdevelopment. 1g,34*40

Numerous attempts have been made to transfer the Western model of individualized and alienable land tenure to Africa. As early as 1922, Uganda borrowed its land laws from Australia and, in the next year, Tanganyika modeled its laws on England’s.42 One of the most extensive and best studied tenure reforms was that associated with the Swynnerton Plan in Kenya. Begun in 1954, during the Mau Mau emergency, the plan sought to consolidate holdings and to register individual land titles. Since its inception, well over six million acres have been brought under the plan. While agricultural output has certainly gone up, so too has landlessness (pp. 479-81). 3g There is little disagreement that the plan had the latter impactAisplacement and off-farm migration is an inevitable result of such tenure change. There is substantial disagreement about the cause of the former, however. Some have argued that the relaxation of restrictions on Africans in agriculture as well as the investments in rural infrastructure following political independence were as important as the tenure reorganization, if not more s0.l


In Nigeria, Ike17 attributed increased agricultural productivity to individualization of fee-simple rights as did Richards et al. ,35 in Buganda and Koehn21 in Ethiopia. There are opposing views, however. Yudelman’s46 survey found that the major determinants of productivity lie not in the tenurial arrangements but in managerial ability. A recent review from Noronha32 for the World Bank concludes that none of the neoclassical charges against communal tenure have been broadly verified by African experience. The empirical record is, thus, inconclusive. Even the causal relation between tenure changes and the changes in yields, technology, and profitability in pre-Industrial Revolution European agriculture has come under challenge.45

Depending on circumstances, an economic stimulus can lead to a variety of different, rational responses. Berry 5 observes that the presump- tion of rational economic behavior in Africa does not justify prediction. Traditional cultural norms, extended family relations, etc., affect decision-making. Thus, the connection between tenure relations and predicted rational behavior is weak.

Regardless of the strength of the empirical evidence, however, the European experience is of limited applicability because of the unique circumstances confronting African economies today. Both the preconditions and the pace of change were different. First, European agriculture was more productive prior to the industrial transformation than is now the case in Africa. Thus, it yielded a greater surplus and was better able to support the off-farm migration which resulted from the enclosure and individualization of holdings.3 Second, the pace of change was slow and evolutionary by modern standards and provided better opportunities for adaptation by the people affected. In England, for example, the enclosure movement went through several stages over several centuries. Also comparatively slow was the pace of population growth. African population growth is presently about four times as rapid as it was in England prior to the Industrial Revolution.

Despite this, many more people left the land than could be absorbed in the relatively more labor-intensive industry of the time. Many were fortunate to emigrate to the ‘empty’ lands of the Americas and Australia. The increase in population in the British Isles between 1846 and 1890 would have more than doubled had not 8 million people left. An additional 9 million people emigrated from Europe during this period (p. 87).6 This safety valve, notwithstanding the period of agrarian transformation, was marked by immense and long-lasting rural suffering


and was punctuated by outbreaks of violence (Chapter 7).12 Without opportunities for widespread emigration and facing a rather more capital-intensive technology, African societies face much greater stress from rapid off-farm migration and much greater strains on their frequently fragile polities. Already rapid rural-urban migration and high rates of urban unemployment are causing concern in a number of countries. European experience provides too facile a lesson for Africa.

Nor do United States or Australian tenure arrangements provide much of an example for African policy-makers. In these countries the establishment of freehold tenure was not a transformation but a replacement by conquest, over a century, of pre-existing arrangements. In stark exaggeration, perhaps, their implications for Africa might best be observed in South Africa where a similar process took place. In addition, Latin American experience with attempts to legislate such changes have faced repeated frustration and serve as a warning of the difficulty of institutional transfer.*

THE COLLECTIVIST LAND TENURE PARADIGM

If the experience of Western, individualistic land reforms has produced mixed results in Africa and if the historical example upon which they are based is largely irrelevant to contemporary African experience, similar criticisms of socialist, collective land reforms can also be advanced. In addition, they have some problems of their own. This accounts for their general lack of success in Africa.

Collective tenure changes have either been premissed on socialist ideological grounds or have been adopted in an attempt at avoiding the undesirable features of individualistic reforms. They have taken as their model either the experience of already existing socialist countries, such as the Soviet Union or China, or some presumed traditional African communalism. The relevance of either is questionable.

The Soviet writer, Ivanov, justifies collectivization by characterizing the social relations of production in African villages as feudal or semi- feudal (pp. 115-l 17).’ * Despite the fact that the African agrarian structure bears little resemblance to that of medieval Europe, it is, nonetheless, exploitative, he claims. Individualized tenure would only increase the inequity of the rural structure. To prevent and reverse this and guarantee the widest possible access to productive resources by peasants, collective tenure is necessary, he argues.


Soviet collectivization was not aimed so much at agricultural as at industrial development. It sought, successfully, to transfer a pre-existing agricultural surplus to the industrial sector and neglected the problems of increasing agricultural productivity until the 1950~.~~ Since then, this has been a major problem with Soviet agriculture. Today, the Soviet Union counsels caution in instituting collective tenure in Eastern Europe while promoting it in Africa. ’ 8

The Chinese reform, by contrast, was aimed at agricultural development. Its implementation was unique, however, as it followed 30 years of guerrilla activity and rural mobilization. As a result, a strong and dynamic Communist party, with cadres drawn from the peasant ranks, was, created and charged with carrying out the reform. Despite these substantial organizational resources, the reform was administratively taxing and the development of communal forms took place in stages at a pace conditioned by the recognition by peasants of the need for institutions for wider co-operation. 43 Even so, the Chinese have been retreating from some stages of collectivization recently in an attempt to stimulate agricultural productivity.

A very different justification is the traditionalist argument, of which perhaps the best known exponent has been Tanzania’s president, Julius Nyerere. According to this position, African rural society was traditionally communal and non-exploitative. Communal tenure reforms are aimed at restoring and revitalizing these traditional social relations (pp. 305-8 and Chapter 37).33

As Ault and Rutman’ point out, however, traditional tenure relations were neither so static nor so ideally communal as the traditionalist position maintains. Where land is plentiful it should have no value and, hence, will not be marketable. With increases in population growth and opportunities for commercializing agriculture, however, this situation should change. Unless blocked, traditional tenure will adapt so as to accommodate these new pressures-a process that is evident in many parts of Africa, they claim. Unfortunately, adaptation is also frequently blocked. Colonial regimes in their ignorance or in an attempt at control often rigidified traditional institutions. 5 Traditionalists have perpetuated this rigidity with their idealization of traditional forms.2

The most studied and debated attempt to develop a co-operative form of tenure in Africa is probably the Tanzania’s Ujamaa experiment. This provides some instructive lessons about attempts at wholesale collective tenure reform. After more than 15 years of implementation, large


numbers of people have been registered in Ujamaa villages. Nonetheless, the level of co-operation has remained rudimentary in most. In addition, the program has suffered from poor planning, occasionally authoritarian and arbitrary administration and indifferent results regarding agricultural output and productivity. Uncommonly poor weather may have accounted for some of this poor performance. Most of it is associated fundamentally with the conception of the program itself, however. It required for its success large capital costs, careful planning and phased implementation, and a well-trained and dedicated cadre of implementers willing to listen to the advice of villagers. In all of these, Tanzania was in short supply. 10~22,23 Agricultural production suffered as a result.

Elsewhere, some co-operative reforms have met with greater success. In Benin (formerly Dahomey), according to Mensah,27 planrlers learned from past mistakes and adopted a highly pragmatic approach to implementation. He writes :

‘Through her co-operative d’amenagement rural scheme. Dahomey has been able to carry out a quiet but effective land reform program in the land-hungry southern part of the country. Beyond land reform, agrarian revolution took place and rural development was induced. Technical, economic, and socio-political difficulties were encountered, but 12-l 3 years’ experience have shown that adequate resource allocation, good management, and persistent educational efforts will succeed in making the scheme the spearhead of rural development in Dahomey’ (p. 286).

Seidman36 draws similar conclusions about the viability of co- operative developments although she observes that shortage of capital to take advantage of economies of scale as well as lack of trained and ideologically committed leadership and of technical manpower are severe constraints. She suggests that countries wishing to adopt a co-operative agriculture take a gradualist, pragmatic approach and writes that they

‘should encourage attainment of the essential preconditions of producer co-operatives-in particular training cadres of leaders and developing attitudes and activities fostering co-operation whenever possible-while avoiding any rigidification of individualised tenures’ (p. 180).

Slow, phased implementation limits the ability of land reform to have much short-term impact on agricultural output, however.


Whether we consider the case of Western individualistic reforms or socialist-oriented collective reforms, we are faced with a number of serious problems in instituting them in the African context. Since the historical context is different, we should expect different results from the model changes. Further, a widespread tenure reform uses intensively financial, foreign exchange, manpower and organizational resources that are presently in very short ~upply.~~ Since the connection between improved land use and tenure is not as strong as once believed, the case for widespread tenure change would seem to be weakened. If the goal is improved land use, policy-makers and administrators should be pragmatic and flexible in seeking means to this end. Improved pricing, better credit and input facilities, and more efficient marketing channels will usually have more substantial and quickly realized returns at a lower cost than attempts at tenure reform. In addition, policies which facilitate the adaptation of traditional tenure institutions may have high payoffs.

RETAINING TRADITIONAL TENURE

If the advantages of individualist or collectivist tenure structures have been exaggerated or taken out of context, the strengths of traditional institutions have been minimized. Scholars, policy-makers and administrators have tended to characterize them incorrectly as rigid and inflexible. Some of this may be due to the needs of colonial administrators and some to the idealization of African tradition. Some may also be due to the snapshot observations of anthropologists who first described these institutions.2

The historical record displays a great deal of flexibility, however. In this regard, Morgan28 writes:

‘For the whole period of which we have knowledge of African peasant agriculture, we have evidence of adaptation and change. In part, changes have arisen not through conscious interference with agriculture or attempts at improvement but indirectly through the introduction of new means of exchange, methods of transport, the slave trade, the encouragement of migration and the introduction of new crop plants’ (p. 267).

This flexibility and adaptability should be encouraged. The rapid adoption of new crops in Africa, over many hundreds of


years, belies the neoclassical prediction of inadequate incentive to innovate. Many of these innovations occurred in the pre-colonial period. For example, Indo-Malaysian crops such as yams and plantains had spread across Africa by the year AD 500.” American crops such as maize, groundnuts, and cassava spread with the rise of trans-Atlantic trade after 1500 (pp. 30-2).24

In the former Gold Coast (now Ghana), cocoa cultivation increased from 370 tons in 1900 to 130 000 tons in 1920, making it the world’s leading producer. 38 Adaptations of existing law, not a restructuring of tenure relations, provided the foundation for these changes (p, 6O).l’ Similarly, cocoa production expanded rapidly under African initiative in Nigeria without any formal land reform (p. 23).4 The development of the Nigerian groundnut industry was spontaneous and came as a complete surprise to colonial observers.20 In Lesotho, wheat and peas were introduced by missionaries in the late nineteenth century, just when the South African market for such output was expanding rapidly. According to Murray, the Basotho farmers ‘. . . responded to the incentive of the market with such zeal and success that. . . the missionaries expressed anxiety lest their material prosperity endanger their spiritual progress’ (P. 11). 3o This market-oriented production induced adoption of more intensive cultivation methods-often requiring tenure adaptations. Winter cropping, previously unknown and in conflict with the practice of using winter fields for communal grazing, was adopted, for example.26

Sometimes, if not properly grounded in the reality it is intended to describe, theory can impede understanding and distort the formulation of policy. This is evident in the case of African land tenure. The notion of ‘communal holding’ was more a convenient simplification in the minds of colonial administrators than it was an accurate description of prevailing reality (p. 57). 32 While land sales may have been relatively unimportant when population pressure was low and markets for agricultural produce were undeveloped, precursory markets were often contained in the traditional systems enabling farmers to respond to incentives as they developed.31,2 For example, cocoa farming, which requires long-term investment, has been associated with individualized tenure in Ghanal and Nigeria4 while still subject to traditional authority.

‘Illegal’ land sales have become routine in built-up areas of Uganda (p. 72)42 and Lesotho while increasing extralegal land sales have been reported in rural Niger (pp. 206-7)41 and in the Ivory Coast.r3 Not all farmers have felt constrained by legal definitions of tenure in surveys of


their holdings. In a northern Nigerian study, for example, users reported that much of their agricultural land had been acquired by purchase.i4 In a Lesotho study, the most common source mentioned for acquiring use rights was inheritance. 25 In neither case was the cited mechanism for acquiring land legally recognized.

Thus, traditional systems have demonstrated considerable adaptability. They also exhibit considerable consistency. Many government efforts to alter rural land rights have been frustrated as traditional institutions have prevailed over more formal systems. This failure to implement legislated change is usually attributed to weak central government administration. 7 In many cases, however, attempts at land reform have been thwarted by traditional authorities jealous of their authority. In other cases, where peasants are wholly or nearly self- sufficient, the state may have relatively little leverage for imposing its will. This autonomy has been noted as a factor limiting participitation in Ujamaa villages in Tanzania1 6 but it was first described by Chayanov5 in relation to the Soviet peasantry at the time of the revolution.

This persistency should not be seen only as obstructionism. It may also be interpreted as an attempt at conserving a social structure when no viable alternative is presented. Traditional tenure institutions imply and are implied by wider socio-economic and political relations-relations not only among people but also between people and their natural environment. They may help to provide some stability in an otherwise tumultuous process of economic development. Policies which facilitate adaptation are likely to be more beneficial than widespread upheaval in tenure relations.

FUTURE TENURE CHANGE

This review has suggested that traditional forms of African land tenure need not be an impediment to agricultural development. Except where rigidified by colonial authorities or idealized by traditionalists, African tenure institutions have proven remarkably able to adapt to changing land-use requirements. This adaptation accommodates change while minimizing accompanying social dislocation. The task of planners and policy-makers should be to facilitate this change by intervening in the traditional structures at strategic locations. To this end, much greater detailed knowledge of the structure and dynamic of these traditional institutions is required. 5 This has tended to be neglected in the past.g


We have argued that the case for widespread tenure change, whether of an individualist or collectivist nature, to promote improved land use is not strong. African conditions are significantly different from the circumstances in which these reforms had been successfully implemented in the past. In addition, the financial, bureaucratic and enforcement resources of African governments are generally severely constrained and inadequate to the task. Resources would better be spent in facilitating the adaptability of existing institutions and improving pricing, credit, marketing, etc., policies.

Nevertheless, this argument should be accepted pragmatically and not as an article of faith. Present and future conditions may exert unprecedented pressures on agrarian structures which traditional tenure institutions can neither adapt to nor accommodate. In particular, Either and Baker9 have identified four areas requiring increased research attention. First, is the increasing problem of landlessness in Africa. Traditional tenure institutions which permit discrimination on the basis of gender, ethnicity, religion, politics, etc., may exacerbate the problem. Means must be found to overcome this. Second, are the special problems of tenure in river basins. This is particularly important because many development projects are designed specifically for this environment. This can also involve research on the relationship between tenure forms and the natural environment. Third, are tenure problems associated with irrigation schemes. Since irrigation offers great potential for increased productivity in many parts of Africa, there will be increasing pressure to extend it to areas with little or no experience with water management. How is this to be integrated into tenure structures? Fourth, are the problems resulting from the increasingly common transition from nomadic to sedentary livestock production. How is this strain, for which extra-African experience may provide little guidance, to be eased?

In addition to the problems cited by Either and Baker, afforestation programs will challenge tenure institutions. Soil conservation and fuel provision are major needs which may be met through afforestation. Maintenance responsibilities and use rights have yet to be determined, however.

Where land reform is deemed necessary, the African experience demonstrates the need for flexibility in both the design and administration of new institutions. Flexibility is necessary to handle the myriad of unforeseen effects which inevitably arise from tampering with such a complex institution at its most basic level. Acceptance of the inability to plan precisely represents significant progress toward better planning.


REFERENCES

1. Anthony, K. B., Bruce, R. M., Johnston, F., Jones, W. 0. &Uchendu, V. C., Agricultural change in tropical Africa, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1979.

2. Ault, D. E. & Rutman, G. L., The development of individual rights to property in tribal Africa, Journal of Law and Economics, 22 (April 1979) pp. 163-82.

3. Bairoch, P., The economic development of the Third World since 1900, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1975.

4. Berry, Sara, Fathers work for their sons, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1985.

5. Berry, Sara, The food crisis and agrarian change in Africa: A review essay, African Studies Review, 27 (June 1984), pp. 59-112.

6. Borrie, W. D., The growth and control of worldpopulation, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, London, 1970.

7. Bruce, J. W., Land administration issues in agricultural development. Paper presented at Seminar on the Land Act and Agricultural Development, 19-22 March. Quthing and Maseru, Lesotho, 1984.

8. de Janvry, A., The agrarian question and reformism in Latin America. Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1982.

9. Either, C. K. & Baker, D. C., Research on agricultural development in sub- Saharan Africa: A critical survey, MSU International Development Paper No. 1, East Lansing, 1982.

10. Ellman, A., Group farming experiences in Tanzania. In: Cooperative and commune.’ Group farming in the economic development of agriculture (Dorner, P. (Ed.)). University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1982.

11. Gershenberg, T., Customary land tenure as a constraint on agricultural development: A re-evaluation, East Africa Journal of Rural Development, 1971.

12. Hammond, J. L. & Hammond, B., The rise of modern industry, Methuen, London, 1925.

13. Hecht, R. M., Cocoa and the dynamics of socio-economic change in Southern Ivory Coast, PhD, University of Cambridge, 1982.

14. Helleiner, G. K., Socialism and economic development in Tanzania, Journal of Development Studies, 8 (1972) pp. 187-204.

15. Hill, Polly, The migrant cocoa farmers of Southern Ghana: A study in rural capitalism, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1963.

16. Hyden, G., Beyond Ujamaa in Tanzania: Under-development and an uncaptured peasantry, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1980.

17. Ike, D. N., A comparison of communal freehold and leasehold land tenure: A preliminary study in Ibadan and Ife, Western Nigeria, American Journal of Economics and Sociology, 36 (1977), pp. 187-95.

18. Ivanov, Y. M., Agrarian reforms and hired labour in Africa, Progress Publishers, Moscow, 1979.

19. Jacoby, E., Man and land, Andre Deutsch, London, 1971.


20. Jones, W. O., Agricultural trade within tropical Africa: Historical background. In: Agricultural development in Africa: Issues of public policy (Bates, R. H. and Lofchie, M. F. (Eds)). Praeger Press, New York, 1980.

21. Koehn, P., Ethopia: Famine, food production and changes in the legal order, The African Studies Review, 22 (March 1979), pp. 51-71.

22. Lappe, Frances Moore & Baccar-Varela, Adele, Mozambique and Tanzania: Asking the big questions, Institute for Food and Development Policy, San Francisco, 1980.

23. Lele, Uma, The design of rural development: Lessons from Africa, Johns Hopkins Press, Baltimore, 1975.

24. Levi, J. & Havinden, M., Economics of African agriculture, Longmans, London, 1982.

25. Mabbs-Zeno, C. C., Land tenure in rural Lesotho, Department of Economics, National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho, 1984.

26. Mashinini, I. V., Land tenure and agricultural development in Lesotho, Urban and Region Planning Programme Report VI, Department of Geography, National University of Lesotho, Roma, Lesotho, 1983.

27. Mensah, M. C., An experience of group farming in Dahomey: The rural development cooperatives. In: Cooperative and commune: Group farming in the economic development of agriculture (Dorner, P. (Ed.)). University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1977.

28. Morgan, W. B., Peasant agriculture in tropical Africa. In: Environment and land use in Africa (Thomas, M. F. & Whittington (Eds)). Methuen, London, 1969.

29. Murdock, G. P., Africa, itspeople and their culture history, McGraw-Hill, New York, 1959.

30. Murray, C., Families divided: The impact of migrant labour in Lesotho, Ravan Press, Johannesburg, 198 1.

3 1. Nkunya, G. K., Land tenure andagriculturaldevelopment in the Angola area of the Volta Region, LTC No. 120, Land Tenure Center, Madison, Wisconsin, 1974.

32. Noronha, R., A review of the literature on land tenure systems in sub- Saharan Africa, Report No. ARU 43, World Bank, Washington, 1985.

33. Nyerere, J., Freedom and socialism, Oxford University Press, Dar es Salaam, 1968.

34. Parsons, K. H., The landreformproblem in Nigeria, USAID, SR/LR/C-15, June, 1970.

35. Richards, A. I., Sturrock, F. & Fortt, J. M. (Eds), Subsistence to commercial farming in present day Buganda: An economic and anthropological survey, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1973.

36. Seidman, Ann, Planning for development in sub-Saharan Africa, Praeger, New York, 1974.

37. Shaffer, H. G. (Ed.), Soviet agriculture: An assessment of itscontributions to economic development, Praeger, New York, 1977.

38. Skinner, S. W., Ghana’sagriculture and trade infarmproducts, USDA, FAS- M-34, April 1958.


39. Taylor, D. R. F., Agricultural changes in Kikuyuland. In: Environment and land use in Africa (Thomas, M. F. & Whittington, G. W. (Eds)), Methuen, London, 1969.

40. Uchendu, V. C., Some issues in African land tenure, Tropical Agriculture, 44 (April 1967).

41. University of Arizona, Arid Lands Saharan Resources Committee, Final Report of the National Resource Plan and Program for the Province of Zinder, Niger, Vol. II, Tucson, Arizona, 1979.

42. West, H. W. Current land tenure trends in independent countries of Africa. Paper presented at the Seminar on Problems of Land Tenure in African Development, December, Leiden, Holland, 1971.

43. Wong, John, Communication of peasant agriculture : China’s organizational strategy for agricultural development. In: Cooperative and commune: Group farming in the economic development of agriculture (Dorner, P. (Ed.)), University of Wisconsin Press, Madison, 1977.

44. World Bank, Toward sustained development in sub-Saharan Africa, Washington, 1984.

45. Yelling, J. A., Common field and enclosure in England: 1450-1850, Macmillan, London, 1977.

46. Yudelman, M., Africans on the land, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MA, 1964.

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African land tenure

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