After the Spring: Reforming Arab Armies

8/20/2019 After the Spring: Reforming Arab Armies

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Strategic Studies Instituteand

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AFTER THE SPRING:REFORMING ARAB ARMIES

Florence Gaub

September 2014

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FOREWORD

Although Arab military forces had somewhat dis-appeared from the political landscape since the 1970s,the events of the “Arab Spring” in 2011 have broughtthem back to the forefront of political change, for bet-ter or for worse. Not only were all the challenged re-gimes of military background, i.e., in Tunisia, Egypt,Libya, Syria, and Yemen, but the armed forces playeda decisive role in the fall or maintenance of the regimesin question.

The future of these forces is therefore crucial in acontinuing time of often turbulent change in the Arabworld. Outsiders, such as the United States, are chal-lenged to go beyond classical security sector assistanceand instead rethink the security sector in these statesin a more holistic and comprehensive manner.

As Dr. Florence Gaub shows in this compellingmonograph, seven areas are of particular concernwhen addressing the reform of Arab military forcesand their domestic counterparts. Ranging from over-politicization to nancial constraints, the task to reformmight be huge but is not unmanageable. Although theongoing security challenges may invite postponementof reform until a more suitable moment, the time toreform is now more than ever.

As the Arab world navigates this difcult time oftransition, the capacity of its external and internal se-curity sectors to reform themselves will be crucial inthe outcome of this challenging journey.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR. Director Strategic Studies Institute and U.S. Army War College Press


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SUMMARY

The Arab Spring had a military dimension in bothits targets—regimes with a military background—andits outcomes. Where the armed forces in their entiretyor partially sided with the protesters regime changesucceeded; where they did not, it failed.

The somewhat renewed political role of Arab forc-es has therefore underlined not only their importance,but also the necessity for reform. This monograph fo-cuses on the structural aspects of reform that wouldbenet the Arab Spring forces; it identies seven fea-tures which need to be addressed when attemptingArab military reform in the countries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011. These are: an unclear mandate,over-politicization, lack of civilian oversight, a chal-lenging ongoing security situation, limited resources,

pockets of paramilitary activity, and, in parts, lack ofan institutional perception of the need to reform. Itlooks at the reasons for these features and formulatespossible solutions.

Generally speaking, Arab military forces operatein a very difcult environment on several accounts:usually part of state systems which emerged only inthe 20th century, they are tied to weak states in termsof sovereignty but also in terms of legitimacy; they arealso challenged geographically and militarily; and of-ten suffer from lack of funding either due to economicconstraints or deliberate shortage by the regime whichseeks to keep the military weak. Institutionally, Arabarmed forces need not only internal reform but wouldalso benet greatly from greater regional integration,

stabilization, and the resolution of ongoing conicts.Arab military forces need political neutralization in abenign (rather than malign) manner, such as fully pro-


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fessional and meritocratic recruitment and promotioncriteria, educational curricula emphasizing the subor-

dination of the armed forces to civilian control, clearseparation of internal and external security tasks, anda spelled out national security strategy streamliningthe military’s efforts.

It is important to involve the security sector agentsthemselves in the process to overcome institutionalopposition; appealing to professional ethics and iden-tity is equally bound to be more successful than pa-tronizing civilian attitudes. Ultimately, security sectorreform against the wishes of the sector in question willalways result in mitigated success, if not to say failure.

For better or for worse, Arab security sectors re-main one of the pillars of Arab states. Without secu-rity, no economic development is possible in eitherLibya or Egypt—and economic conditions led to the

2011 events in the rst place. Western governments sofar have refrained from extensive security sector re-form in the Arab world, preferring security sector as-sistance or occasional training. What 2011 has shown,however, is that reforms are not only benecial, but atthis stage mandatory. Since civilian actors are them-selves challenged by ongoing transitions, the mainagents in this reform will have to be the institutionsthemselves. Understanding their concerns and needswill certainly foster their cooperation—and in anycase such understanding is crucial to delivering the ef-cient and legally bound security sector that citizensand institutions alike are striving for.

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AFTER THE SPRING:REFORMING ARAB ARMIES

The Arab Spring was widely hailed as a popularuprising against authoritarian dictatorships; but it alsohad a military dimension in both the protests’ targetsand the role of the armed forces in facilitating, or ob-structing, regime change. All the challenged regimeshad a military background—Tunisia’s President ZineEl Abidine Ben Ali, a former air force ofcer, seizedpower in 1987 with the help of two fellow graduatesfrom the French military academy Saint-Cyr; Yemen’sPresident Ali Abdullah Saleh was an army ofcerturned military governor who became president, chiefof staff and commander in chief in 1978; Egypt’s Presi-dent Hosni Mubarak, previously commander of thenation’s air force and a trained ghter pilot, took over

from President Anwar Sadat (himself an army ofcer)following his assassination in 1981; Libya’s ColonelMuammar Gadda came to power in a 1969 militarycoup; and Syria’s President Bashar al-Assad’s fatherHafez, from whom he inherited the rule, had risen topower from the air force’s ranks.

Because the regimes had come to power and con-solidated themselves by military means, the armedforces were seen as part and parcel of the systems,loyal to the rulers, and integral parts of a system ofrepression. In two of the countries, Egypt and Tunisia,the military forces joined the demonstrators; in two,Libya and Yemen, they disintegrated in the face ofpopular protest; and in only one, Syria, did the mili-tary forces stand (and continue to stand) rmly with

the regime.It has been explained elsewhere how these actions

depended in large part on the internal state of the


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armed forces and their reduced, or adequate, militarycapabilities1; this monograph, however, seeks to assess

the challenges these forces are facing when it comes toreform in the near- and mid-term future. It focuses onthe ve countries of the Arab Spring (Tunisia, Egypt,Libya, Yemen, and, to some extent, Syria), but lessonsdrawn here are applicable to other Arab states as well,and it prioritizes the armed forces over the police, al-though similar features are present there as well.

Although security sector assistance has beengranted to these states by several outside actors rang-ing from the United States to Europe and internationalorganizations in the last decades, security sector re-form (SSR) is more comprehensive and holistic. TheArab security sectors affected by the Arab Springare also the ones that require SSR the most; not onlybecause they are in a particularly challenging situa-

tion of transition, but also because their condition hascontributed to the Arab Spring.

What Is Security Sector Reform?

Born in 1998, SSR is a concept which introducestwo criteria to assess the effectiveness and efciencyof a given sector. These are the professional deliveryof security to individual citizens and civilian controlor accountability. Although often seen primarily asthe attempt to install human rights protection intothe sector in question, SSR is also about profession-alization of the armed forces in order to improve thedelivery of security to the people.

In an ideal world, the security sector has laws and

doctrines explaining its task, its mandate, and its pur-pose; a sector which knows what to do how to do itand why—in other words, is professional. It is con-


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trolled by certain elements of the state and society, andis subject to codied law. In a triangle of state, people,

and security sector, the former, accountable to its peo-ple, controls the latter so that it delivers security to itspeople. In the Arab world, this is often upside down:Nobody is accountable to the people, and thereforethe state controls the country, often violently. At thesame time, the state generally does not trust the armedforces and therefore makes sure that they underper-form in order to not become a political threat. In otherwords, the system is upside down; changing it meanschanging the whole system; the people, rather thanbeing the object of security, have to become its subject.

This monograph focuses on the structural aspectsof reform the Arab Spring forces would benet from;it identies seven features which need to be addressedwhen attempting Arab military reform in the coun-

tries affected by large-scale unrest in 2011: 1) an un-clear mandate, 2) over-politicization, 3) lack of civilianoversight, 4) a challenging ongoing security situation,5) limited resources, 6) pockets of paramilitary activ-ity, and, in parts, 7) the lack of an institutional percep-tion of the need to reform. Arab military forces gener-ally operate in a very difcult environment on severalaccounts: usually part of state systems which emergedonly in the 20th century, they are tied to weak statesin terms of sovereignty but also in terms of legitimacy;they are also challenged geographically and militarily;and often suffer from lack of funding either due to eco-nomic constraints or deliberate shortage of resourcesby the regime which seeks to keep the military weak.Institutionally, Arab armed forces need not only inter-

nal reform but would also benet greatly from greaterregional integration, stabilization, and the resolutionof ongoing conicts.


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in spite of strategic evolutions and the fact that theman-power intensive wars of 1948, 1967, and 1973 did

not achieve the desired result. Although ossied, thisstance suited the political narrative and prevented anevolutionary debate on defense and security.

The absence of such a document has not only sev-eral reasons, it also has crucial consequences: inef-cient spending of an already limited defense budget,inadequate training and leadership conceptualization,doctrines detached from strategic goals, and incoher-ent prioritization of resources and personnel, to name just a few. Where a national strategy is nonexistent, itis logically also not reviewed regularly, and, as a con-sequence, a generalized process of renewal does nottake place—or if it does, it does not do so as a resultof strategic considerations, but of logistical or politicalones. The Egyptian switch from Soviet to American

doctrine in the late-1970s, for instance, was not trig-gered by a renewal in strategic thinking (although thereturn of the Sinai to Egyptian control was indeed theresult of Sadat’s improved strategic assessment).2 Thisis not to say that the mentioned states do not havea strategy—but they do not have a basic documentavailable to all, the result of an institutional debateserving as a guiding star in all decisions pertaining tonational security and defense.

This blurring of purpose is found not only in mat-ters of national defense; it exists at the security level atlarge. More often than not, Arab military forces takeon internal security tasks. This is the result of a hori-zontal rather than vertical division of labor betweenexternal and internal security forces; a hierarchy in

which the armed forces usually rank above the othersecurity agencies. Unclear responsibilities, preferen-tial political treatment, uneven resources and lack of


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distinction between security agencies lead to idiosyn-cratic and convoluted security structures. Reected

in the resemblance of police and military uniforms,the armed forces often take on internal security tasksranging from securing of elections to riot control.

This vague purpose of existence, mission, and tasksacross different agencies has a negative effect not onlyon the armed forces, but on all actors in the securitysector; a starting point for reform therefore would bethe establishment of key documents such as a nationalsecurity strategy as well as mission statements for thesecurity agencies in charge of its execution, includingthe military.

Over-Politicization.

Arab armed forces have more often than not played

a political role since independence; coups d’etat—heredened as a forceful seizure of executive authorityand ofce by a dissident/opposition faction with thesupport/impetus of military ofcers, (excluding revo-lutions, victories by oppositional forces in civil wars,popular uprisings, and palace coups) are a frequentfeature in the Arab world.

Since the rst coup occurred in 1936 in newly sov-ereign Iraq, almost 60 military attempts at politicalinterference have taken place, half of them successful.Syria and Iraq were particularly prone to them (17 at-tempts in the rst case, 11 in the second), contrary tothe commonly held belief that coups are less frequentin plural societies since ofcers would struggle tobuild cross-communitarian alliances.3 Although it is

true that the phenomenon has died down somewhatsince the 1980s—most coups have taken place in thethree decades following World War II—it is still not


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extinct: Successful coups in Sudan in 1989, Algeria in1992, Mauritania in 2008, and in Egypt in 2013 (not to

mention four failed attempts in Iraq, Sudan, and Mau-ritania between 1990 and 2008) remind us that Arabarmed forces still do play a political role.

Coup frequency, however, is not a reliable indi-cator for military involvement in politics; absence ofmilitary coup attempts, such as in Syria since 1982,might simply indicate that the regime has managedto consolidate itself by co-opting the armed forcesinto its system. It is worth noting that military coupsoccur more often in republican systems—this is lessso because monarchies do not attract military med-dling, but rather because coups take place more oftenin states in which they have already occurred. Simplyput, military coups attract more military coups. Mon-archies such as Jordan, Morocco, Libya (until 1969),

and Iraq (until 1958) have indeed experienced suchattempts, also; but whereas the rst two managed tocontain the threat, the latter two did not. In contrast tothis, the Gulf States, by and large, have not seen anymilitary interference with their politics.

Events since 2011 have indeed shown that the Arabarmed forces are still very much involved in their na-tional politics; the Yemeni as well as Tunisian militaryfacilitated regime-change by siding with the protest-ers; Egypt’s armed forces helped oust rst an autocratand then an elected president; and the Syrian armedforces are ghting a domestic war against their ownpeople on behalf of the regime. In Lebanon, a formerofcer is leaving the presidential palace only to be re-placed by another; and rumors of Tunisia’s previous

Chief of Staff running for president in late-2014 arealready ripe.


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There are several reasons for Arab military in-volvement in their country’s politics; for a start, armed

forces have coercive advantages they can use for po-litical means, but in many Arab states they are alsoun-checked by the civilian regime. Weak states andgovernments, largely the outcome of unconsolidatedsovereignty and lack of resources, are easy targetsfor armed forces eager to get involved in politics.4 Itis therefore a combination of push- and pull-factorswhich lead to political involvement by the military.

The involvement of the armed forces in politicsis a concern when it comes to SSR. It not only nega-tively affects the establishment and consolidation ofdemocratic systems, but it equally has a detrimentaleffect on the armed forces’ capacity. It distracts fromthe military’s main purpose—defense of the nation—and thereby impedes cohesion, command and control

structures, and leadership, and invites corruption intothe military. The 1967 defeat of Egypt against Israel isan example of how the close intertwinement of mili-tary and politics will have a negative effect on stra-tegic assessment, command, control, and leadership.5

Where the military is seen as a potential threatto the regime, the latter might even take purpose-ful measures to deliberately reduce the institution’scoup capacity. A side effect of such “coup-proong”measures is an immediate reduction in military pro-fessionalism and capability. A salient example is theLibyan military, which Colonel Qadda coup-proofedto the extent that it was of almost no use at all duringthe 2011 war.6

Removing the armed forces from politics is there-

fore in the professional interest of any military organi-zation, but it is notoriously long to achieve—accordingto a World Bank study, it took the fastest 20 countries


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17 years for achievement.7 Successful measures toneutralize the military politically include fully profes-

sional and meritocratic recruitment and promotioncriteria, educational curricula emphasizing the subor-dination of the armed forces to civilian control, clearseparation of internal and external security tasks, anda spelled out national security strategy streamliningthe military’s efforts. Logically, these efforts neverinvolve just the armed forces themselves, but are em-bedded in a broader political and social context.

Lack of Civilian Oversight.

Civilian oversight over the security sector in Arabcountries is either nonexistent or mostly malign, ratherthan benign. More often than not, it consists of delib-erate techniques aiming at weakening those aspects of

the armed forces which could be used in a coup ratherthan ensuring its maximum professional capacity witha minimum of a political threat. Civilian oversight, asit is at its most effective, includes parliamentary over-sight, transparent resource allocation, management ofthe defense sector, and clear legal as well as institu-tional frameworks. Most of these aspects are missingin the Arab world.

To begin with, some Arab parliaments (Morocco, Jordan, Oman, and Qatar) do not have a defense com-mittee at all; in Tunisia, national defense was handledin parliament by the foreign affairs committee, butits powers were severely curtailed. It had no con-trolling rights over national defense industries andno say in the sending of troops abroad. Its function,

rather than exerting civilian oversight over the armedforces, consisted in advising presidential nationaldefense policies.


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But even where a dedicated armed forces commit-tee exists, its effective controlling mechanism is usu-

ally limited. This reects of course these parliaments’limited role altogether, not just in matters pertainingto defense matters.

Things are slightly more intricate in Egypt,which has undergone several changes since the fallof Mubarak—none of which challenged the ratheropaque control mechanisms over the armed forces.

In the 2012 constitution, defense was the matterof a subcommittee of the Committee on the System ofGovernment. The 2014 constitution does not spell outthe parliamentary committees, but it denes oversightof the executive as one of its tasks (which the 2012 con-stitution had not specied). Elsewhere, the militaryseems to control the civilians rather than the otherway around: The Defense Minister, by law a military

ofcer, needs to be approved by the Supreme Coun-cil of the Armed Forces, and civilians can be tried inmilitary courts.8 While parliament technically has fullaccess and control over the state’s budget, this doesnot apply to the defense budget which is overseen bya new body, the National Defense Council. Chairedby the President, it includes the Prime Minister, theSpeaker of the House of Representatives, the Minis-ters of Defense, Foreign Affairs, Finance and Interior,the Chief of the General Intelligence Service, the Chiefof Staff of the Armed Forces, the Commanders of theNavy, the Air Forces and Air Defense, the Chief of Op-erations of the Armed Forces, and the Head of Mili-tary Intelligence. Effectively, only six of its 14 mem-bers are civilians. According to the 2014 constitution,

the council is “competent to discuss the budget of theArmed Forces, which shall be included in the Statebudget under one budget line.”9 This means that par-


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liament will only see the total combined budget of thearmed forces rather than a detailed breakdown, while

control or even approval of the budget is not foreseen.On a more positive note, the President requires a two-thirds majority of the House of Representatives to de-clare war and send troops abroad.

Structures as the Egyptian one are rather commonin Arab states; then again, the rather far-reaching mea-sures of military self-protection against civilian inter-ference do have a justied reason. Where institutionsare weak and nepotism is frequent, decisionmakingstructures pertaining to personnel, strategy develop-ment and even arms procurement are very vulnerableto political interference. This is particularly the casein highly hierarchical systems such as in the smallerGulf States, where decisionmaking is highly person-alized. Relevant bureaucracies, in particular defense

ministries, therefore, need to be reformed alongwith the armed forces and be decoupled from thepolitical level.

Finally, parliamentarians who have been electedin a fully democratic fashion frequently lack the ex-perience and knowledge of how to full their man-date of oversight, and rarely have the adequate staffwhich could make up for this want. A case in pointare the Libyan members of the General National Con-gress (GNC), who lacked clarity on the identity of thecommander-in-chief, the role of the defense ministerespecially in relation to an overly active chief of staff,their own oversight role, and their available tools.10 Inconsistencies in the institutional and legal contexthave seriously hampered Libya’s reconstruction and

has led to a high uctuation in personnel: Chief ofStaff Youssef al-Mangoush was removed by a vote ofthe GNC defense committee rather than the GNC as a


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whole, his differences with interim defense ministerOsama al-Juwaili obstructed the drafting of Libya’s

White Paper; al-Juwaili’s successor, Mohammed al-Barghati, had to resign at the same time as al-Man-goush, making way for Libya’s third defense minis-ter in 2 years, former military ofcer (and now primeminister) Abdullah Al-Thini.11 Training is necessary toclarify the role of parliaments and of the different se-curity agents, the available tools to exert control, andthe existing legal frameworks.

More often than not, armed forces argue that theurgency of conict and the necessity of secrecy in atime of war require limiting civilian interferencewith their affairs. Although it is true that the ratherunique mission of the armed forces requires uniqueworking conditions, this is not a valid argument inthat it removes the armed forces effectively from any

civilian control.

The Challenging Ongoing Security Situation.

A large majority of Arab countries are facing sig-nicant ongoing security challenges impeding reformefforts. These range from domestic turmoil to coun-terinsurgency, terrorism, civil war in Syria, and post-conict insecurity features.

Egypt and Tunisia, for instance, have faced large-scale internal chaos since 2011, including mass dem-onstrations, riots, and arson. Egyptian security agents,largely untrained in crowd control and unequipped,have brutally repressed the masses. In the rst waveof demonstrations in early-2011, at least 840 people

were killed and 6,467 others were injured.12 Almost12,000 civilians were arrested and tried in militarycourts.13 Throughout 2011 and 2012, protesters repeat-


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edly clashed with security forces, resulting in severaldead and injured. Between the coup in the summer

of 2013 and the spring of 2014, more than 2,500 Egyp-tians have been killed, more than 17,000 wounded,and more than 16,000 arrested in demonstrations andclashes.14 Undertaking reforms in such a context is ar-guably difcult, as the Egyptian Minister of InteriorGeneral Mohammed Ibrahim, put it:

I have 186 dead ofcers and more than 800 injured so

far, petty ofcers preventing security chiefs from en-tering ofces, a presidential palace being torched ona weekly basis by a 100 or so kids, and Egypt’s larg-est government complex was blocked for 4 days, so:when will I have time to reform? When these politicalpolemics end.15

As security forces are overstretched, crime rates

have gone up, too: Homicide rates have tripled sincethe 2011 uprising, kidnappings and car thefts havequadrupled, and armed robberies have increased 12-fold.16 Under these circumstances, Egyptian policehave gone on strike, protesting against their workingconditions and the politicization of their work.17

In addition to this, terrorism is on the rise given the

collapse of security agents in several Arab countries;terrorist attacks in Egypt, previously largely connedto the Sinai, have expanded throughout the country,claiming the lives of 281 Egyptians between July 2013and January 2014, a 10-fold increase from the 28 vic-tims during President Mohamed Morsi’s year in ofce(July 2012-June 2013). Similarly, terrorism is on therise in Tunisia, Libya, and Algeria; the terrorist attack

on the Algerian gas facility in Amenas in early-2013by an al-Qaeda afliated group resulted in the deathof 39 foreign hostages.


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Libya in particular is facing severe post-conict se-curity challenges. It currently has over 150,000 militia-

men on its streets, is awash with weapons and ammu-nition, and there is virtually no civilian oversight overthe security sector. Police and armed forces largelymelted away during the 2011 conict and now needto be reconstructed amidst a very insecure and vola-tile environment.18 While Libya turns into an almostlawless zone, its executive and legislative branchesstruggle with basic features of security sector recon-struction: 3 years after Qadda’s demise, there is stillno white paper on defense, no legal clarity on thepost of commander-in-chief, and no agreed timelinefor reforming security and integrating the militias,which now largely run the country. Frequent changesof ministers of interior and defense, as well as chiefsof staff, and an ongoing political vetting process have

depleted the security sector of experienced person-nel capable of implementing the necessary measures.In the absence of these, Libya has been unable to ab-sorb the many assistance offers which were made bythe United States as well as the European Union, itsmember states and the North Atlantic Treaty Organi-zation. In contrast to Egypt or Tunisia, Libya’s secu-rity institutions are not overstretched, they are simplynot able to perform at all, given their lack of trainingand personnel. At the time of this writing, Libya hadabout 5,000 ofcers of colonel rank and just graduatedits rst batch of junior ofcers—there are virtually nomiddle rank ofcers and only a handful of junior ones.

The situation is complicated further by the fact thatsecurity institutions are now under attack by terrorists

and angered civilians alike. In Libya, a targeted assas-sination campaign of security ofcials in the country’sEast has claimed at least 90 lives so far.19 Vengeance


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attacks are also on the rise in Egypt, where a policeheadquarter was bombed in early 2014, and ofcers

and soldiers have fallen victim to targeted assassi-nations.20 In March 2014, Egyptian judges sentenced529 people to death for attacking a police station,dragging out its chief ofcer and bludgeoning him todeath.21 Absenteeism, already signicant before theuprisings, has grown sharply in Libya, with estimatesranging from 20 to 40 percent after ofcers were beingharassed on the street by civilians.22

SSR, or reconstruction, is severely restricted bysuch conditions which limit time, resources, and per-sonnel; where SSR has taken place successfully—mostnotably in Eastern Europe and the Balkans, securityconditions were either stable enough, or security pro-visions were ensured by an external force. Neitheris the case in those Arab countries facing the most

pressing need for SSR.

Limited Resources.

At rst sight, the Middle East and North Africa is aregion dense in military spenders. Six of the global top10 military spenders are located in the region: Oman(8.61 percent), Saudi Arabia (8 percent), Israel (5.7 per-cent), Jordan (4.6 percent), Algeria (4.5 percent), andLebanon (4.1 percent) spend the equivalent or morethan Russia and the United States (both 4.4. percent)in terms of gross domestic product (GDP) percentage,where the global average is 2.52 percent. In all cases,these states spend more on defense than on educationand health.

But when taking into account the total amountof money spent on defense and security, a differentpicture presents itself. By and large, Arab security


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sectors operate in a highly resource restrained en-vironment. In 2012, Tunisia spent U.S.$709 million,

Yemen U.S.$1,439 million, Jordan U.S.$1,448 million,Lebanon U.S.$1,735 million, and Libya U.S.$2,987 mil-lion. Even Algeria, the top North African spender,with U.S.$9,325 million spent only a fraction of whatGermany (U.S.$45,785 million), the United Kingdom(U.S.$60,840 million) or the United States (U.S.$682,478million) spent. Egypt’s military budget (U.S.$4,376million) is a bit more difcult to assess given the large-scale economic activity the armed forces are engagedin and are not forced to disclose.23

Numbers are lower when it comes to internal secu-rity, although the events of 2011 have triggered higherspending in this domain. In Tunisia, the interior min-istry’s budget has increased to U.S.$86 million for2014, to U.S.$3.3 billion in Egypt, and to U.S.$7.2 bil-

lion in Algeria.24

Most of these added funds will go topersonnel costs, either new positions (8,700 created inTunisia) or salary increases and rewards for existingstaff. This reects spending on internal and externalsecurity more generally which is personnel-intensiverather than focused on weaponry or police equipment(with the notable exception of the Gulf States, whichkeep investing in modern technology).

But this spending is clouding a difcult nancialreality. In Tunisia, the average police ofcer earns theequivalent of U.S.$250—in comparison, a local busdriver or a lower-level bank employee earns more. InEgypt, lower-ranking police ofcers are paid some 800Egyptian pounds—around U.S.$115—per month.25 Inaddition, internal security forces are over-burdened,

often working a minimum of 12-hour shifts in areasas diverse as riot control, criminal investigation, traf-c control, or monitoring of political opponents. Most


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judicial police are so underequipped that trials arebased on witness accounts and confessions more than

on evidence such as ngerprint analysis or DNA test-ing—or, in some cases as in Egypt there is no judicialpolice force at all. Those units conducting criminalinvestigation are limited not only in their executivepowers but also in their resources.

The reason for this is that, with the exception of theGulf States, most Arab states struggle nancially. InNorth Africa and the Levant, economic performancehas improved over the last decades, but it is still low:Egypt’s per capita GDP is at U.S.$3,112 (in compari-son, the American GDP per capita is at U.S.$49,922).High poverty rates, corruption, and low foreign directinvestment result in underperforming institutions atall levels, including those in the security sector. Whatis worse, dysfunctional institutions and lack of secu-

rity impede economic development signicantly. Ac-cording to the World Economic Forum, Egypt ranks117 out of 148 when it comes to basic institutionalrequirements for competitiveness such as judicial in-dependence, security, and the rule of law. It fared par-ticularly badly with regards to the business costs of ter-rorism (148 out of 148), of crime and violence (143 outof 148), organized crime (138 out of 148), and reliabil-ity of police services (132 out of 148). Tunisia rankedsomewhat higher, with 73 out of 148 when it comes toinstitutions, but like Egypt scored particularly badlyon terrorism, organized crime, violence, and police re-liability. Similar statistics exist for Algeria, Lebanon,Yemen, and Libya. Lebanon in particular has seen adirect impact of deteriorating security on its economy;

its growth has been depressed to 0.9 percent in 2013,while the cumulative loss of GDP since the beginningof the crisis in 2011 stands now at U.S.$9.7 billion.26 Of


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the non-Gulf Arab states, Jordan fared the best, rank-ing 28th out of 148 when it came to the reliability of

its police forces, and 13th as well as 16th, respectively,with regard to organized crime and violence.

Simply put, Arab security sectors underperformin part due to harsh economic conditions, which inturn exist in part because the security sector under-performs. As a result, conditions for impending eco-nomic change are not ripe: Egypt, Algeria, Yemen,and Libya rank behind states such as Ghana or Jamai-ca in terms of competitiveness.27 None of this appliesto the Gulf states, which have managed to utilize theirpetroleum rents to further institution building; all ofthem fared well in categories such as police reliability,organized crime, and business costs of terrorism, withQatar ranking amid the top three in every categoryrelated to institutions.

The case of Jordan, which ranks above Europeanstates such as France, Italy, or Portugal in terms ofpolice reliability, proves, however, that resource con-straints do not necessarily constitute an insurmount-able obstacle to the establishment of security condi-tions conducive to economic development. Its GDP is atU.S.$4,879, which ranks below Lebanon (U.S.$10,311),Libya (U.S.$12,778) or Algeria (U.S.$5,694), and onlyslightly above Egypt and Tunisia—all states whichscore considerably worse than Jordan on security andinstitutional criteria.28 This is not to say that Jordanianpolice are accountable, transparent, and respectful ofhuman rights—in fact, they have been criticized forquite the opposite29—but they do support conditionsfor economic development. SSR therefore does not

need to be obstructed solely by nancial limits—butmore often than not, includes side effects of low eco-nomic development; fuel shortages and other prob-


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lems such as corruption, terrorism, and organizedcrime impede reform.

Pockets of Paramilitary Activity.

A signicant number of Arab states have troubleasserting a monopoly of violence over their territory,which affects SSR considerably. Pockets of paramili-tary activity hollow out not only existing provisionsfor civilian control and rule of law—since they oper-ate outside the state system—they also disrupt otherefforts related to SSR. Nonstate violence affects eco-nomic development even more than state-inducedviolence because it is less predictable; it weakens thestate not only in its credibility, but is also a symptomof state weakness in the rst place.

The most structured cases of paramilitary activity

are Libya and Iraq; in Libya, up to 250,000 men areorganized in militias which have emerged from thecivil war in 2011. Worse, they have continued to pro-liferate once the conict ended in the absence of stateinstitutions. Over 300 of these groups, mostly clus-tered along regional lines, control security in areas asdiverse as oil platforms and civilian neighborhoods.Attempts to disarm and demobilize them have beenlargely hampered by political indecisiveness and aculture of impunity institutionalized following the fallof Qadda’s regime. The militia ghters received onepayment ($3,140 for married and $1,884 for unmarriedghters) without having to provide substantial prooffor their contribution or to return weapons. In May2012, Law 38 granted them immunity for “military,

security, or civilian acts undertaken with the aim ofensuring the revolution’s success and its goal,”30 in-cluding murder and forced displacement, seizure, de-


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disbanded in 2008—only to be replaced by the Prom-ised Day Brigades, whose size is estimated to be to-

day at 5,000. Its one-time ally, the Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq(League of the Righteous), was created following asplit with the Mahdi Army in 2006, and is believedto count about 2,000-3,000 men. The Kataib Hezbol-lah (not to be confused with the Lebanese Hezbollah)is a 400-man group and, like the others, enjoys con-siderable Iranian support. The Sheibani network, alsoknown as the Kataib Sayyid al-Shuhada, counts about200 men and is particularly experienced in smuggling.Most of the Badr Organization, related to the party Is-lamic Supreme Council of Iraq, has integrated into theIraqi military, but remnants of it continue to be activeoutside the legal framework. All of these groups arerumored to be currently actively involved in the civilwar in Syria on the side of the government.32

The same is true for the Lebanese Hezbollah;originally born in the context of the Israeli invasionof Lebanon in the early-1980s, it was exempted fromthe post-civil war demobilization of militias and con-tinued as Lebanese resistance. It continued to launchattacks against Israel, resulting in a full-scale war in2006. Central governments are equally challengedin Yemen and, of course Syria, where paramilitarygroups are seeking to topple the central government.

The disarmament, demobilization and reintegra-tion (DDR) of these groups is more often than not partof a broader political problem rather than merely atechnical process. In Lebanon, the disarmament of He-zbollah requires a broad societal consensus currentlynot in place; in Iraq, the multitude of militias reects

the inadequacy of the Iraqi state institutions as wellas the discontent many Sunnis feel towards the post-Saddam Hussein system; in Libya, the central gov-


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ernment is lacking the sheer capacity or legitimacy todisarm. Solving this issue therefore always requires a

broad and holistic approach; political solutions hencehave to precede the DDR process.

Lack of an Institutional Perceptionof the Need to Reform.

One of the main problems in Arab security sec-tor reform is that the institutions themselves do notperceive the need for change. Resistance from withinthe bodies concerned makes reform attempts not onlymore difcult, it can derail the process altogether. Un-derstanding the reasons for this resistance is impor-tant, as it provides the basis for strategies to counter it.

One reason for opposition to change is the fact thatthe delivery of security services in the countries con-

cerned is satisfactory—or at least, used to be. Beforethe Arab Spring, homicide rates in Egypt were onlya fth of America’s, and a 20th of Brazil’s. The ratio-nale for change is not always evident if the delivery ofservices seems adequate.

While this has changed since 2011—in Egypt, ho-micide rates have tripled from 774 in 2010 to 2,144in 201233—Arab citizens are, across the board, satis-ed with the security services they receive from theirstates, see Figure 1. According to a survey conductedin 12 Arab countries,34 67 percent of respondents weresatised or somewhat satised with security in theirhome countries, with a great variety across countries.Overwhelming satisfaction—90 percent—was report-ed in states such as Jordan, Saudi Arabia, and Mauri-

tania; 60-75 percent satisfaction was recorded in Su-dan, Lebanon, Egypt, Tunisia, and Palestine. Overall,numbers were less positive in states with regular po-


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litical unrest; Iraqis for instance were overwhelminglydissatised—57 percent—with their level of security.

Source: United Nations Ofce on Drugs and Crime, available fromhttps://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/data-and-analysis/homicide.html.

Figure 1. Intentional Homicide,Rate per 100,000 Population (1995-2011).

The institutions themselves fare surprisingly well;77 percent of Arab citizens were condent or some-what condent in their countries’ armed forces—thehighest level of trust any institution could gather.The police forces are deemed trustworthy or some-what trustworthy according to 55 percent of respon-

dents—in comparison, 47 percent are condent ingovernment, 36 percent declare to have trust in theircountry’s legislative body, and 23 percent in politicalparties.35 Although it is true that the Arab Spring has

2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011

Algeria 0.6 0.9 0.8 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.8

Bahrain 0.6 0.9 0.4 0.6 1.1 0.9 0.5

Egypt 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.2 1.1 2.3 3.3

Morocco 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.4 n.a.

Lebanon 3.8 2.1 2.6 6.0 1.9 2.2 n.a.

Jordan 1.3 1.8 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Tunisia n.a. n.a. n.a. 1.1 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Kuwait 2.9 1.8 3.1 2.2 2.2 n.a. n.a.

Qatar 0.7 0.2 2.5 0.9 n.a. n.a. n.a.

Saudi Arabia 1.2 1.0 1.0 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.

Yemen 4.6 4.2 4.1 3.9 4.2 n.a. n.a.

United States 5.6 5.8 5.7 5.4 5.0 4.7 4.7

Brazil 22.0 21.0 20.4 22.8 21.7 22.4 21.8


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liman, two police ofcers charged with the death ofprotester Khaled Said in 2010, were handed 10-year

prison sentences—this is more often than not the case.On the other hand, none of the nine ofcers indictedin 2012 following riots at a soccer stadium that cost thelives of at least 74 people were sentenced.37 Six ofcerscharged in the context of the death of 83 protesters inAlexandria in 2011 were also acquitted.38

This culture of impunity does not help to institu-tionalize an atmosphere of reform, in which account-ability plays a major role. In return, the aftermath of2011 created the reverse situation in which securityagents were considered guilty by association. In Tuni-sia, Libya, and Egypt, police stations were ransackedas symbols of the former regime; reform attempts inan environment which antagonized large parts of theexisting security structure were met with resistance.

The key to overcoming institutional oppositionto change can be approached with different strate-gies. Involving the security sector will lead not onlyto cooperation but also to a sense of ownership whichis crucial to SSR success. Appealing to professionalethics and identity is equally bound to be more suc-cessful than patronizing civilian attitudes. Ultimately,SSR against the wishes of the sector in question willalways result in mitigated success, if not to say failure.

Conclusion.

Arab security sectors, for better or for worse, re-main one of the pillars of Arab states. Without security,no economic development is possible in either Libya

or Egypt—economic conditions led to the 2011 eventsin the rst place. Western governments so far have re-frained from extensive SSR in the Arab world, prefer-


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ring security sector assistance or occasional training.What 2011 has shown, however, is that reforms are

not only benecial, but at this stage mandatory. Sincecivilian actors are themselves challenged by ongoingtransitions, the main agents in this reform will haveto be the institutions themselves. Understanding theirconcerns and needs will certainly foster their coopera-tion—and, in any case, reform is crucial to deliver theefcient and legally bound security sector citizens andinternational supporters alike are striving for.

ENDNOTES

1. Florence Gaub, “Arab Armies: Agents of Change?” ChaillotPaper No. 131, Paris, France: European Union Institute for Secu-rity Studies, March 2014.

2. Risa A. Brooks, “Civil-Military Relations and Military Ef-

fectiveness: Egypt in the 1967 and 1973 Wars,” Risa A. Brooksand Elizabeth A. Stanley, eds., Creating Military Power: The Sourcesof Military Effectiveness, Redwood City, CA: Stanford UniversityPress, 2007.

3. Eliezer Be’eri, “The Waning of the Military Coup in ArabPolitics,” Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 18, No. 1, January 1982,pp. 69-81.

4. William R. Thompson, “Toward Explaining Arab MilitaryCoups,” Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Vol. 2, Fall, 1974,pp. 237-250.

5. Brooks, pp. 106-134.

6. Florence Gaub, “The Libyan Armed Forces between Coup-proong and Repression,” Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 36, No.2, April 1, 2013.

7. World Bank, World Development Report 2011: Conict, Secu-rity, and Development, Washington, DC: The International Bank forReconstruction and Development, 2011, p. 11.


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8. “Military Retain 8-Year Veto over Defense Minister inEgypt’s Constitution,” Alahram Online, November 20, 2013,available from english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/1/64/87088/Egypt/ Politics-/Military-retain-year-veto-over-defence-minister-in.aspx.

9. The Constitution of the Arab Republic of Egypt 2014, Ar-ticle 203, available from www.sis.gov.eg/Newvr/Dustor-en001.pdf .

10. “GNC Empowers Abu Sahmain with ‘Commander-in-Chief’ Duties,” Libya Herald, January 23, 2014, available fromwww.libyaherald.com/2014/01/23/gnc-empowers-abu-sahmain-with-commander-in-chief-duties/#axzz2xH4EXEGK .

11. “Libyan Rebel Leader Sacks Executive Branch of Transi-tional Council,” Al-Arabiya, August 8, 2011, available from english.alarabiya.net/articles/2011/08/08/161430.html.

12. “840 Killed in Egypt’s Revolution, Health Ministry Of-cial Says,” Al-Masry Al-Youm, April 4, 2011, available from www.almasryalyoum.com/en/node/385973.

13. Human Rights Watch, “Egypt: Retry or Free 12,000 afterUnfair Military Trials,” September 10, 2011, available from https:// www.hrw.org/news/2011/09/10/egypt-retry-or-free-12000-after-un- fair-military-trials.

14. Michele Dunne, “Egypt’s Unprecedented Instability bythe Numbers,” Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for Inter-national Peace, March 24, 2014, available from carnegieendowment.org/2014/03/24/egypt-s-unprecedented-instability-by-numbers/h5j3.

15. Abo Elnnaga, Press Conference of the Egyptian Ministerof the Interior, February, 19, 2013 (in Arabic).

16. “Egyptians Become Victims of Soaring Crime Rate,”Financial Times, May 1, 2013, available from www.ft.com /intl/cms/s/0/7ffac226-adab-11e2-a2c7-00144feabdc0.html#axzz2xWywGjZl.

17. “Egyptian Police Go on Strike,” The Guardian, March 10,2013, available from www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/10/ egypt-police-strike.


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27. World Economic Forum and the European Bank for Re-construction and Development (EBRD), The Arab World Competi-tiveness Report 2013, World Economic Forum, Geneva, Switzer-land, 2013, available from www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_AWCR_Report_2013.pdf .

28. Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014, World EconomicForum, Geneva, Switzerland, 2013, available from www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf .

29. “Heavy Hand of the Secret Police Impeding Reform in ArabWorld,” The New York Times, November 14, 2005, available fromwww.nytimes.com/2005/11/14/international/middleeast/14jordan.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0.

30. “Libya grants immunity to ‘revolutionaries’,” AirFrance Press, May 3, 2012, available from www.alarabiya.net/articles/2012/05/03/211978.html.

31. “Libya Oil Output Dives after Key Field Shut,” Al- jazeera, February 23, 2014, available from www.aljazeera.com/news/africa/2014/02/libya-oil-output-dives-after-key-field-shut-2014223153123479374.html.

32. Michael Knights, “Iran’s Foreign Legion: The Role ofIraqi Shiite Militias in Syria,” Washington, DC: The WashingtonInstitute, June 27, 2013, available from www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/irans-foreign-legion-the-role-of-iraqi-shiite-militias-in-syria; Mapping Militant Organizations, Iraq, Redwood,CA: Stanford University, available from www.stanford.edu/group/mappingmilitants/cgi-bin/maps/view/iraq.

33. “Egyptians Become Victims of Soaring Crime Rate.”

34. Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Mauritania, Moroc-co, Palestine, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Tunisia, and Yemen.

35. “The Arab Opinion Project: The Arab Opinion Index,”Qatar: Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, March 2012,p. 46, available from english.dohainstitute.org/release/5083cf8e-38f8-4e4a-8bc5-fc91660608b0.


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36. “Egyptians Embrace Revolt Leaders, Religious Parties andMilitary, As Well,” Pew Research Global Attitudes Project, April25, 2011, available from www.pewglobal.org/2011/04/25/egyptians-embrace-revolt-leaders-religious-parties-and-military-as-well/ .

37. “75 Charged in Deaths at Soccer Riot in Egypt,” TheNew York Times, March 15, 2012, available from www.nytimes.com/2012/03/16/world/middleeast/75-charged-in-deaths-at-soccer-riot-in-egypt.html?_r=0.

38. “Verdict in Police Brutality Case in Egypt May Be Excep-tion,” Al-Monitor , March 4, 2014, available from www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/03/egypt-khaled-said-alexandria-trial-police-brutality.html#ixzz2zuLRhwEj.


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U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE

Major General William E. RappCommandant

*****

STRATEGIC STUDIES INSTITUTEand

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE PRESS

DirectorProfessor Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.

Director of ResearchDr. Steven K. Metz

AuthorDr. Florence Gaub

Editor for ProductionDr. James G. Pierce

Publications AssistantMs. Rita A. Rummel

*****

Composition

Mrs. Jennifer E. Nevil


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After the Spring: Reforming Arab Armies

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