AGENDA MEETING OF THE

BOARD OF GOVERNORS of the Illinois State Bar Association

Ritz-Carlton Hotel 160 East Pearson Street

Chicago, Illinois

July 13, 2012

Friday, July 13 8:30 AM - Breakfast (a hot breakfast is being provided for this meeting) Glass Room 9:00 AM - Board Meeting Convenes Versailles Suite 12:15 PM - Lunch Glass Room 6:30 PM - Alumni Board Reception Terrace & Glass Room 7:45 PM - Annual Alumni Board Dinner Concorde Room

SPECIAL SETTINGS 9:10 AM Presentation on Board Service

Former Board of Governors member, Honorable Naomi H. Schuster will offer her thoughts on being a productive and responsible board member. (Action Item #3B)

9:20 AM Introduction of New Board Members Charles Davis, Springfield Jean Kenol, Joliet Sonni Choi Williams, Peoria 10:30 AM Special Committee on Judicial Disqualification Standards

Christopher Hurley, member of the Special Committee, will report on the purpose and activities of this new group. (Action Item #95)

10:40 AM Special Committee on Membership Enhancement

Second Vice President Richard D. Felice, chair of the Special Committee, will report on the purpose and activities of the group. (Action Item #94)

ACTION AGENDA

1. MINUTES

Attached is a copy of the Minutes of the May 18, 2012 meeting of the Board of Governors.

2. VACANCY – BOARD OF GOVERNOR’S

The Board of Governors will fill a vacancy for a regular Cook County board seat created by Umberto Davi’s election as Third Vice President. The member selected for this position will be required to run for reelection in 2013. Nominations will be taken from the floor. If there is a contest, voting will be by secret ballot.

3. PRESIDENT’S REPORT A. Report from President Thies

B. Serving on the Board: How to be Productive and Responsible ` (Honorable Naomi Schuster)

Former Board of Governors member, Honorable Naomi H. Shuster will offer her thoughts on being a productive and responsible board member. This has been set for a Special Setting at 9:10 AM.

8. ADMINISTRATIVE MATTERS

A copy of the ISBA Conflict of Interest Policy is attached. Each Board member is requested to read, sign and return the Policy at the July 13th meeting.

10. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS

The Board will be asked to adopt Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions 12-17, 12-18, 12-19, 12-20, and 12-21. Please refer to the attached memorandum from the General Counsel.

11. ELECTIONS

A. Secretary A secretary will be elected by members of the Board of Governors from among members of the Board from Cook County. The term is for one year. Bylaw 3.5 (copy attached) governs. Nominations will be taken from the floor. If there is a contest, voting will be by secret ballot. B. Treasurer A Treasurer will be elected by members of the Board of Governors from among members of the Board from outside Cook County. The term is for one year. Bylaw 3.4 (copy attached) governs. Nominations will be taken from the floor. If there is a contest, voting will be by secret ballot.

C. Committee on Scope and Correlation Those who automatically serve as members of the Scope Committee are: Richard Felice as Chair and Umberto Davi and John Locallo as members. Seven additional members will be elected from among the members of the Board. Terms are for one year and members may serve consecutive terms. Nominations will be taken from the floor. If there is a contest, voting will be by secret ballot.

12. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR’S REPORT The Executive Director will give a brief report on ISBA History and facts.

STANDING COMMITTEES

77. LEGISLATION (John Locallo, Chair / Board Liaison) A. Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012 (S. 2197)

The Board of Governors will be asked to take a position on Senate Bill S. 2197, the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012. Please see attached memo and documentation from Jim Covington, Director of Legislative Affairs. B. Proposal 98-1 (Maintenance Guidelines) The Board of Governors will be asked to add an amendment to the provision of the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act as part of the ISBA Legislative Package. Please see attached memo and documentation from Jim Covington, Director of Legislative Affairs.

SPECIAL COMMITTEES

94. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON ISBA MEMBERSHIP ENHANCEMENT (Richard Felice, Chair / Board Liaison)

Chair of the Special Committee, Second Vice President Richard Felice will provide an update on the special committee. This has been set for Special Setting at 10:40 AM.

95. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON JUDICIAL DISQUALIFICATION STAN DARDS

(Honorable Gino DeVito & Warren Lupel, Co-Chairs) (Hurley, Board Liaison)

Christopher Hurley, member of the Special Committee, will report on the purpose and activities of this new group. This has been set for a Special Setting at 10:30 AM.

OTHER MATTERS

150. 2012 DISTINGUISHED COUNSELLORS

The Board of Governors is requested to approve the members of the 2012 Class of Distinguished Counsellors. Please refer to attached list.

INFORMATION AGENDA

1. CALENDAR Attached is a copy of the 2012 – 13 Board Meeting schedule.

131. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION The current edition of the ABA Bar Leader Magazine will be distributed as a handout.

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 1 Minutes

MINUTES

MEETING OF THE BOARD OF GOVERNORS The Westin St. Louis Hotel

St. Louis, Missouri May 18, 2012

Members Present: Locallo, Thies, Holderman, Felice, Hassakis, Arquilla DeBoni, Bracewell, Cornelius, Davi, Draper, Enright, Glorioso, Hammer, Hartigan, Jensen, Komie, McCluskey, Nisivaco, Nyuli, Pacey, Rhode, Scott, Sommario, Wojcik, Wysocki Also Present: Tish Sheats, Assembly Agenda Committee; and staff members, Craghead, Northrup, Anderson, and Barringer President Locallo called the meeting to order at 9:00 a.m. and extended congratulations to Board members Russell Scott and Mauro Glorioso on recognition awards each had recently received. ACTION AGENDA 1. MINUTES Motion duly made and seconded to approve the minutes of the March 9, 2012 meeting of the Board of Governors. Motion carried. 3. PRESIDENT’S REPORT President Locallo reported that he had conducted media interviews at locations around the state in support of the Illinois Supreme Court’s order allowing cameras in the court as a pilot project in several circuits. He told the Board of a visit to ISBA’s Chicago office by the president of the Moldova Bar, who selected Illinois as a model for shaping his country’s bar. President Locallo reported on several recent events including: ISBA officers/staff participation in meetings with Illinois Congressional delegation in Washington, D.C., in conjunction with ABA Day lobbying activities; the Women in the Law event in Mt. Vernon; the Illinois Bar Foundation’s tribute to Chief Justice Thomas Kilbride in Rock Island; his participation on a panel discussing social media at the ABA Bar Leadership Institute; his speech at the Winnebago County Bar Association/Prairie State Legal Services Law Day program; and the ISBA-sponsored trip to South America. He also reported his attendance at meetings of the following bar associations and legal organizations: McLean County, Phi Alpha Delta Legal Fraternity, Decalogue Society, Korean Bar, Dekalb County, Whiteside County, Saline County, Jackson County/Southern Illinois University School of Law, Champaign County, Chicago Kent School of Law, Joe Daviess County, Stephenson County, Lake County, and Macon County. 4. PRESIDENT-ELECT’S REPORT

President-Elect Thies reported that the following four special committees have been appointed to work on projects during his year: Disqualification of Judges, chaired by Justice (ret.) Gino DiVito and Warren Lupel; Fair and Impartial Courts, chaired by Judge Patricia Golden and Justice James Wexstten; Legal Education Debt and its Impact on the Delivery of Legal Services; and Lawyers Feeding Illinois, chaired by Theresa Thies. He reported that the October 2012 edition of the Illinois Bar Journal will be dedicated to issues of interest to senior lawyers. President-Elect Thies also reported on these additional items of emphasis during the coming year: ISBA participation in the debate over the ABA Ethics 20/20 proposal; the Solo and Small Firm Conference to be held this fall in Itasca; a Leadership Conference for affiliated bar associations; ISBA-sponsored trips to China in September and a Mediterranean cruise in spring 2013; and the Allerton House Conference at Starved Rock in spring 2013. 5. BUDGET AND AUDIT The Board met in executive session to consider the report of the Personnel Committee, and then returned to regular session. Mr. Barringer presented the proposed budget for 2012-2013. He noted that the projected deficit amount of $153,000 has been determined to be, in fact, a deficit amount of $108,000, and the proposal should be amended to reflect the lower amount. After discussion, motion duly made and seconded to adopt the budget as amended to reflect a deficit of $108,000 and recommend its adoption to the Assembly. Motion carried. The Board also received the Operating Statement and Budget for the period July 1, 2011 through March 31. 2012. 6. SCOPE AND CORRELATION Chair Holderman reported that the Committee recommends the following three recipients be approved to receive the 2012 Board of Governors Awards – Appellate Court Justice Carol Pope, Julie Ann Sebastian, and Edward Burt. Motion duly made and seconded to approve the awards. Motion carried. 10. PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINIONS

The Board reviewed six Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions – 12-11, 12-12, 12-13, 12-14, 12-15 and 12-16. Motion duly made and seconded to adopt all six opinions. Motion carried. 11. ELECTIONS The Board received the Tellers’ Report for the 2012 ISBA Elections showing 1,451 electronic and 123 written ballots were cast. President-Elect Thies requested approval of the appointment of Jean Kenol to an “Under-Represented” Board of Governors seat. Motion duly made and seconded to ratify the appointment of Mr. Kenol to the Board. Motion carried.

SECTION COUNCILS 23. ANIMAL LAW The Animal Law Section Council requested that ISBA support and co-sponsor the recommendation of the ABA Tort Trial and Insurance Practice Section on “Due Process and Comprehensive Dangerous Dog Laws, scheduled for consideration by the ABA House of Delegates in August, 2012. Motion duly made and seconded to place this matter before the ISBA Assembly for determination as to the position of the Association. Motion carried. 78. LEGISLATION The Board considered Illinois HB 5170, the Religious Freedom and Marriage Fairness Act. Mr. Wojcik noted that the bill’s sponsor, Rep. Harris, is seeking ISBA support but also recognizes the ISBA’s process for taking positions on legislative proposals. Mr. Wojcik suggested that the bill be circulated to ISBA sections and committees seeking their opinion. Motion duly made and seconded to circulate the most current version of HB 5170 to all section councils and standing committees with a request that they respond with their comments prior to the October 1, 2012, and that the Assembly be notified of this action. Motion carried. The Board considered federal S. 2197, the Fairness in Disclosure of Evidence Act of 2012, dealing with exculpatory evidence. Mr. Komie said Senator Durbin is seeking ISBA’s position on the bill. Motion duly made and seconded to adopt a resolution in support of S. 2197. Substitute motion duly made and seconded to refer the bill to the Criminal Justice Section to consider on an expedited basis and report back to the Board. Motion to substitute carried. Main motion as substituted carried. 88. SUPREME COURT RULES Past President John O’Brien appeared before the Board to discuss nine recommendations under consideration by the Supreme Court Special Committee on Mortgage Foreclosure and to request the Board to take a position on the recommendations. Comments from ISBA section councils and others were presented to the Board. Motion duly made and seconded to approve the recommendations. Motion duly made and seconded to bifurcate Recommendation #6. Motion carried. Motion duly made and seconded to bifurcate Recommendation #9. Motion failed. Original motion to approve carried. Motion to approve Recommendation #6 with an amendment that plaintiff’s counsel be required to send notice rather than the county clerk. Motion to approve Recommendation #6 as amended carried. [Board member Hammer abstained.] A copy of the recommendations considered by the Board of Governors is attached and made part of the Minutes. OTHER ORGANIZATIONS 133. ILLINOIS BAR FOUNDATION Amendments to the By-Laws of the Illinois Bar Foundation, as approved by the Foundation’s Board of Directors, were presented to the Board for approval. Motion duly made and seconded to approve the amended By-Laws. Motion carried. 141. LAWYERS’ TRUST FUND

The Board received a request from the Lawyer’s Trust Fund to make two ISBA appointments to the Fund’s board. The Lawyer’s Trust Fund had recommended Herb Franks and Beth Jensen fill the two seats. Motion duly made and seconded to appoint Franks and Jensen. Motion carried. [Board member Jensen abstained.] INFORMATION AGENDA 131. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION The most recent issue of Bar Leader magazine was provided to the Board. President-Elect Thies reported on progress in placing a resolution regarding the Ethics 20/20 proposals on the agenda of the ABA House of Delegates at its August meeting. Efforts are also underway to obtain co-sponsors for the resolution. RESOLUTIONS President-elect Thies presented a resolution honoring four Board members for their service on the Board – Carl Draper (2006-12), Mauro Glorioso (2004-12), Mark Hassakis (2002-12), and Beth Jensen (2002-12). Motion duly made and seconded to adopt the resolution. Motion carried. Mr. Thies then presented a resolution expressing the Board’s appreciation of John Locallo’s service as President of the Association in 2011-12. Motion duly made and seconded to adopt the resolution. Motion carried. There being no further business before the Board, the meeting was adjourned. Respectfully submitted, ______________________ _______________________ Russell K. Scott, Secretary John G. Locallo, President

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 8 Administrative Matters – Conflict of Interest

Illinois State Bar Association Conflict of Interest Policy

I. Purpose The Illinois State Bar Association is a voluntary, professional 501(c) (6) organization whose employees, officers, directors, council, and committee members are chosen to serve the purposes to which it is dedicated. These persons have a duty to conduct the affairs of the Association in a manner consistent with such purposes and not to advance their personal interests or financial enrichment. These persons have a clear obligation and commitment to conduct all affairs of the organization in accordance with the highest standards of integrity and ethics, in compliance with applicable federal and state laws, and within the standards set forth in this conflict of interest policy. This conflict-of-interest policy is intended to permit the Association and its employees, officers, board, council, and committee members to identify, evaluate, and address any real, potential, or apparent conflicts of interest that might, in fact or appearance, call into question their duty of undivided loyalty to the Association. This policy is intended to supplement but not replace any applicable state and federal laws governing conflict of interest applicable to the Association. II. Definition of Conflict Employees, officers, directors, councils, and committee members of the Illinois State Bar Association (“Association”) shall have a conflict of interest, for the purposes of this Policy, and shall abstain from the discussion and voting on matters before the Association in the following situations:

1. When the person, or a member of the person’s immediate family or household, is on the board or staff of an organization that would be directly or materially affected by the decision of the Association on a particular matter;

2. When the person, or a member of the person’s immediate family or household, personally

would be directly or materially affected by the decision of the Association on a particular matter; or

3. When the person otherwise determines in good faith that he or she would be unable to act

impartially on the matter for any reason. III. Duty to Disclose In the event a person determines he or she has a conflict of interest on a particular matter, he or she shall disclose the conflict to the board, council, or committee in which the matter is being

considered. After responding to any questions, he or she shall leave the room prior to the discussion and vote on the matter. IV. Documentation The minutes of the Board and all councils or committees shall contain the names of the persons who disclosed that they have a conflict of interest. V. Annual Statements Annually, each employee and board member shall read and sign this policy and give it to the Executive Director of the Association. Annually, each council and committee member of the Association shall be provided a copy of the Association’s Conflict of Interest Policy. VI. Prohibition on Gifts No person shall accept anything of value from another that is or may reasonably be expected to do business with the Association, including entertainment, tickets, meals or other items, unless (i) such gift is of nominal value, (ii) the recipient is not expected to take or refrain from taking any action in connection with the receipt of the gift, or (iii) the gift is in keeping with good business ethics or refusing such gift would be contrary to the accepted norms under the circumstances. VII. Doing Business with the Association No board, committee, or council member may provide goods or services to the Association as a paid vendor without full disclosure to, and advance approval by the full Board of Governors.

Approved by Board of Governors January 25, 2008

I have read and understand the Illinois State Bar Association Conflict of Interest Policy. Name (please print)

Signature Date

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 10 Professional Ethics Opinions

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MEMORANDUM

To: Board of Governors From: Charles Northrup, General Counsel Date: July 2, 2012 Re: Proposed Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions _______________________________________________________________________ Attached please find five draft Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions that the Professional Conduct Committee unanimously recommends the Board adopt. Upon adoption by the Board, the Opinions will be properly formatted, labeled, and added to the ISBA website. A brief synopsis of the opinions follows: Recommended Opinion 12-17 (Rewritten Opinion 94-05) This opinion is a redraft of old opinion 94-05. The issue is whether a non-Illinois licensed lawyer may represent a party in an Illinois arbitration proceeding. In light of the 2010 changes to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, the opinion now concludes that such representation is possible under certain circumstances. Those circumstances are identified in RPC 5.5(c) and are limited to where the representation is temporary, reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice outside of Illinois, and the tribunal does not require pro hac vice admission. Comments concerning the propriety of advertising in Illinois by non-Illinois licensed lawyers remain the same as in the old opinion. Recommended Opinion 12-18 (New Opinion) This opinion is new and discusses the practice known as “taint shopping.” Taint shopping is where a prospective client meets with a lawyer for the sole purpose of seeking to disqualify that lawyer from representing an opponent of the prospective client. The opinion concludes that it is improper for a lawyer to advise a client to engage in taint shopping. The opinion also generally discusses issues related to new Rule 1.18 concerning prospective clients. Recommended Opinion 12-19 (New Opinion)

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This opinion is new and provides some guidance on the application of “advanced payment retainers.” The opinion concludes that in the two divorce case scenarios at issue, advance payment retainers should not be used because the preferred, and most common, type of retainer, the security retainer, is available to meet the client’s purposes. The opinion reinforces the pronouncement of the Court that “advanced payment retainers” are to be used only sparingly. Recommended Opinion 12-20 (New Opinion) This opinion is new and addresses the propriety of charging a contingent fee for discovering and collecting unclaimed property of a client. The opinion concludes that the propriety of a contingent fee in such a representation is dependent on a number of factors including the state of mind of the lawyer at the time the contingent fee was entered into. The opinion cautions lawyers, however, that any such contingent fee must be objectively reasonable. Recommended Opinion 12-21 (New Opinion) This opinion is new. It may also be controversial for those lawyers engaged in family law. The opinion concludes that without first contacting counsel for the parents of a minor in a divorce proceeding it is improper for a court appointed attorney acting as a GAL for the minor to contact the minor’s parents to (1) interview them and (2) arrange a meeting with the minor. This may be controversial in that such contact with the parents’ counsel may be viewed as overly burdensome and inconsistent with current practice. This opinion was shared with the Family Law Section Council and a number of lawyers expressed strong reservations about it.

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ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion

_________________________________ Opinion No. 12-17 July 2012

Subject: Advertising and Solicitation; Arbitration and Mediation; Multijurisdictional Practice; and Unauthorized Practice of Law

Digest: Representation of a party in a grievance arbitration in Illinois may

be considered the practice of law, however, a lawyer licensed in another state may serve as representative of a party at a grievance arbitration without being admitted to practice in Illinois so long as the representation is in accordance with Illinois Rules of professional Conduct RPC 5.5(b) and (c). With regard to advertising, nothing in the Rules specifically authorizes lawyers admitted in jurisdictions other than Illinois to advertise in Illinois, therefore, whether and how lawyers may communicate the availability of their services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction is governed by Rules 7.1 to 7.5.

References: Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, Rules 5.5, 7.1, 7.2, 7.3, 7.5, 8.5 ABA Model Rule 5.5

68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.90 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.90 50 Ill. Adm. Code 8100.2112 Colmar, Ltd. v. Freemantlemedia North America, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 977 (2003).

NISHA, LLC v. Tribuilt Const. Group, LLC., 2012 Ark. 130, 2012 Ark LEXIS 157 (2012).

People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8

N.E. 2d 941 (1937). People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assoc. v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87

N.E. 2d 773 (1949). In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill.2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987).

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FACTS

A lawyer licensed in a jurisdiction other than Illinois seeks to represent employers in union grievance arbitration proceedings in Illinois. The grievance arbitration proceedings usually arise from collective bargaining agreements to settle contract disputes by use of third-party arbitrators. The arbitrators are not judges and frequently are not lawyers. The arbitration takes place at a hearing where the formal rules of evidence do not apply. The collective bargaining agreements provide that either party may choose a representative, who may or may not be a lawyer, to present their arguments.

QUESTIONS

1. Is representation of a party in a grievance arbitration in Illinois considered the practice of law?

2. May a lawyer licensed in another state serve as representative of a party at a grievance arbitration without being admitted to practice in Illinois?

3. Does the text of the following advertisement violate the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct?

Grievance Arbitration John Doe, J.D., Ph.D. Representing Management 1/800/555-5555 4. Might the advertisement appear in a professional or trade journal in Illinois? 5. Might the advertisement be mailed directly to an employer in Illinois?

OPINION

I. Is representation of a party in a grievance arbitration in Illinois considered the practice of law? The Illinois Supreme Court has held, consistent with the generally held principle, that the practice of law involves more than the representation of parties in litigation and includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge. People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Assoc. v. Schafer, 404 Ill. 45, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776 (1949); See also, In re Yamaguchi, 118 Ill.2d 417, 515 N.E. 2d 1235 (1987). The Court has also held that the representation of parties in contested workers' compensation matters before an arbitrator of the Illinois Industrial Commission constituted the practice of law. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Assoc. v. Goodman, 366 Ill. 346, 8 N.E. 2d 941, (1937). The respondent in Goodman had argued that he was not practicing law because he was representing parties before an administrative agency rather than a court. The Supreme Court responded that the "character of the act done, and not the place where it is committed" is the decisive factor. Goodman, 8 N.E. 2d at 947. Illinois courts have not directly addressed whether representing a party in an arbitration constitutes the practice of law, however, the Illinois Appellate Court has

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determined that an out-of-state lawyer representing a party in an arbitration is not necessarily engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. Colmar, Ltd. v. Freemantlemedia North America, Inc., 344 Ill. App. 3d 977 (2003) (finding arbitration award was not void because party was represented by attorney not authorized to practice law in Illinois); compare, NISHA, LLC v. Tribuilt Const. Group, LLC., 2012 Ark. 130, 2012 Ark LEXIS 157 (2012)(a non-lawyer appearing in a representative capacity in an arbitration engages in the unauthorized practice of law.) In light of Colmar and the revisions to Rule 5.5 discussed below, we need not determine whether representing a party in an arbitration constitutes the practice of law, and can instead directly address the question of whether an out-of-state attorney can represent a party in an arbitration1. II. May a lawyer licensed in another state serve as representative of a party at a grievance arbitration without being admitted to practice in Illinois? By statute, 705 ILCS 205/1, no person is permitted to practice law in Illinois without an Illinois license. Certain exceptions have been recognized to this general rule. For example, a lawyer may obtain permission to participate in a particular cause pursuant to Supreme Court Rule 707. Further, in its Opinion No. 92-6 the Committee concluded that principles of federal preemption would permit a lawyer from another jurisdiction to practice in the federal courts in Illinois even though the lawyer did not have an Illinois license. This exception was codified in Illinois Rule 5.5(d) which mirrors ABA Model Rule 5.5 (d) and provides, in relevant part:

A lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction, and not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction, may provide legal services in this jurisdiction that:

* * * (2) are services that the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal law or other law of this jurisdiction. Comment [18] to Rule 5.5 further defines “other law” as including statute, court rule, executive regulation or judicial precedent.

1 Regardless of whether representing a party in a grievance arbitration constitutes the practice of law, there is significant authority to support the proposition that any attorney acting in that capacity must still adhere to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct even if non-lawyers may also appear. See, e.g., 68 Ill. Adm. Code 1110.90 (attorneys appearing in a representative capacity in administrative hearings before the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation must conform their conduct to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct even though non-lawyers may also appear in a representative capacity); 83 Ill. Adm. Code 200.90 (all persons, lawyer and non-lawyer, appearing in proceedings before the Illinois Commerce Commission shall conform to the standards of conduct of attorneys before the courts of Illinois as set forth in the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct); 50 Ill. Adm. Code 8100.2112 (attorneys appearing in a representative capacity in administrative hearings under the Title Insurance Act before the Department of Financial and Professional Regulation must conform their conduct to the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct even though non-lawyers may also appear in a representative capacity.)  

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Rule 5.5(c) goes even further and allows a lawyer admitted in another United States jurisdiction who is not disbarred or suspended from practice in any jurisdiction to provide legal services on a temporary basis in this jurisdiction that: (1) are undertaken in association with a lawyer who is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction and who actively participates in the matter; (2) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential proceeding before a tribunal in this or another jurisdiction, if the lawyer, or a person the lawyer is assisting, is authorized by law or order to appear in such proceeding or reasonably expects to be so authorized; (3) are in or reasonably related to a pending or potential arbitration, mediation, or other alternative dispute resolution proceeding in this or another jurisdiction (emphasis supplied), if the services arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice and are not services for which the forum requires pro hac vice admission; or (4) are not within paragraphs (c)(2) or (c)(3) and arise out of or are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in a jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted to practice. Subsection (c)(3) would seem to directly address the second question of this inquiry and the Committee concludes that it would allow an attorney licensed in another United States jurisdiction who is not disbarred or suspended to provide legal services in connection with the grievance arbitration, so long as the services are: 1) temporary; 2) are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in another jurisdiction; and 3) are not in a forum which requires pro hac vice admission.

In determining whether the services are temporary, Comment [5] specifies that this Rule does not authorize a lawyer to establish an office or other systematic and continuous presence in this jurisdiction without being admitted to practice generally here other than under the two circumstances enumerated in Rule 5.5(d), i.e. the services are being provided to the lawyer’s employer or its organizational affiliates, or are services the lawyer is authorized to provide by federal or other law. (Note that Comment 4 states that systematic and continuous presence is not limited to instances where the lawyer is physically present in this jurisdiction.) Comment [6] states that, although there is no single test to determine whether a lawyer’s services are provided on a “temporary basis,” services may be “temporary” even though the lawyer provides services in this jurisdiction on a recurring basis, or for an extended period of time, as when the lawyer is representing a client in a single lengthy negotiation or litigation.

Second, Comment 14 to Rule 5.5 gives further guidance on the factors to consider in determining whether the services are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice. Specifically, when the client has been previously represented by the lawyer, or may be resident in or have substantial contacts with the jurisdiction in which the lawyer is admitted; when the matter, although involving other jurisdictions, may have a significant connection with that jurisdiction; when significant aspects of the lawyer’s work might be conducted in that jurisdiction or a significant aspect of the matter may involve the law of that jurisdiction. The necessary relationship might also arise when the client’s activities

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or the legal issues involve multiple jurisdictions. In addition, the services may draw on the lawyer’s recognized expertise developed through the regular practice of law on behalf of clients in matters involving a particular body of federal, nationally uniform, foreign, or international law. Because the inquirer did not provide information on the nature of his/her practice, the committee declines to opine on whether or not this aspect of the analysis is satisfied. Third, Comment 12 relates specifically to subsection (c)(3) and notes that the lawyer must still obtain admission pro hac vice in the case of a court-annexed arbitration or mediation or otherwise if court rules or law so require. Assuming the arbitration at issue in this inquiry is not court-annexed, this requirement would be satisfied. Finally, Comment 4 provides that a lawyer who is not licensed in this jurisdiction but undertakes to provide legal services here in accordance with the relevant provisions of Rule 5.5 discussed above, must not hold out to the public or otherwise represent that the lawyer is admitted to practice in this jurisdiction. See also Rule 7.1. In addition, Comment 20 cautions that, in some circumstances such as when the representation occurs primarily in this jurisdiction and requires knowledge of the law of this jurisdiction, a lawyer practicing under these provisions may be required to inform the client that the lawyer is not licensed to practice law in this jurisdiction. It is worth noting that Comment 19 provides that any lawyer who provides legal services in accordance with the relevant provisions of Rule 5.5 discussed above, is subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction. See Rule 8.5(a). III. Issues related to advertising With respect to the proposed advertisement, the Committee initially notes that Comment 21 to Rule 5.5 specifically states that Paragraphs (c) and (d) do not authorize communications advertising legal services to prospective clients in this jurisdiction by lawyers who are admitted to practice in other jurisdictions, but instead directs lawyers to the provisions of Rules 7.1 to 7.5 for guidance in determining what types of communications are appropriate. Illinois Rule 7.1 provides generally that a lawyer shall not make a false or misleading communication about the lawyer or the lawyer's services. Rule 7.5(b) provides that firm letterheads and identification of affiliated lawyers from different jurisdictions shall make clear the jurisdictional limitations of lawyers not licensed to practice in the jurisdiction where the office is located. Any advertisements or solicitations directed to potential Illinois clients would be misleading if the lawyer's jurisdictional limitation were not disclosed clearly. Therefore the text of the proposed advertisement as stated would violate the Illinois Rules in that regard. The Committee expresses no opinion as to any other aspect of the text of the proposed advertisement.

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The inquirer also asks whether the proposed advertisement could appear in a professional or trade journal in Illinois and whether it could be mailed directly to Illinois employers. Rule 7.2 provides that appropriate advertising may be conducted through any public media. If the proposed advertisement otherwise complies with the Illinois Rules, then its appearance in a trade or professional journal would not violate the Rules. With regard to the final question of whether the advertisement could be mailed directly to an employer in Illinois, under Rule 7.3, direct solicitation of potential clients, which includes written, recorded or electronic communication addressed to specific recipients, is permitted under certain circumstances providing that such communications include the words “Advertising Material” on the outside envelope, if any, and at the beginning and ending of any recorded or electronic communication. The general requirements of Rule 7.1 also apply to any materials used in direct mail solicitation. The Committee expresses no opinion as to when a non-Illinois lawyer’s advertisements in Illinois constitute such a continuous and systematic presence that renders the lawyers’ Illinois activities no longer temporary and therefore in violation of Rule 5.5.

CONCLUSION Although it is undetermined whether representing a party in a grievance arbitration constitutes the practice of law in Illinois, the committee concludes that Rule 5.5 provides that an attorney licensed in another United States jurisdiction who is not disbarred or suspended may provide legal services in connection with the grievance arbitration, so long as the services are: 1) temporary; 2) are reasonably related to the lawyer’s practice in another jurisdiction; and 3) are not in a forum which requires pro hac vice admission. The committee further concludes that attorneys not licensed in Illinois may advertise their services by direct mail and/or professional trade journals in Illinois so long as the advertisements conform to Rules 7.1 through 7.5 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct, paying careful attention to making proper disclosures as to where the attorney is licensed so as not to be misleading, and keeping in mind whether such advertisements would constitute a continuous and systematic presence in Illinois in violation of Rule 5.5. Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions are provided by the ISBA as an educational service to the public and the legal profession and are not intended as legal advice. The opinions are not binding on the courts or disciplinary agencies, but they are often considered by them in assessing lawyer conduct. © Copyright 2012 Illinois State Bar Association

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ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion

________________________________ Opinion No. 12-18 July 2012

Subject: Prospective Clients; Conflicts of Interest Digest: An attorney may not encourage a client to engage in the practice known as

“taint shopping,” whereby a prospective client meets with an attorney for the sole purpose of disqualifying the attorney from representing an opponent. An attorney who participates in an initial consultation with a prospective client, but who is not retained by the prospective client, is not prohibited from later representing a client with materially adverse interests in the same or in a substantially related matter if: (a) before the consultation, the attorney obtained the prospective client’s informed consent of any conflict that might arise from the information disclosed by the prospective client; (b) even in the absence of an informed consent, the attorney did not receive information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter; or (c) the attorney can establish that the prospective client revealed information to the attorney with no intention of retaining the attorney.

References: Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.0(e), 1.2(d), 1.6, 1.7, 1.9, 1.18,

4.4(a), 8.4 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 1.18, Comments 2-6 Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct 4.4, Comment 1 Restatement (Third) of the Law Governing Lawyers, sec. 15 ABA Formal Op. 90-358 (1990) ISBA Op. 12-05 (2012) ISBA Op. 95-4 (1995) Montana Bar Ethics Op. 010830 (2000) Virginia Legal Ethics Opinion 1794 (2004)

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FACTS

A family law attorney advises a divorce client to meet with other attorneys in the community for the sole purpose of creating a conflict of interest so that the client’s spouse could not retain the other attorneys in the divorce matter. The client then proceeds to meet with the other attorneys with no intent of retaining their services.

QUESTION 1. May an attorney advise a client to meet with other attorneys in the community

solely for the purpose of disqualifying the other attorneys from future representation of an opponent?

2. If an attorney meets with a prospective client, may the attorney later represent a

client with materially adverse interests in the same or in a substantially related matter?

OPINION

A. An attorney may not advise or direct a client to meet with other attorneys in the

community solely for the purpose of disqualifying the other attorneys from future representation of an opponent.

Taint shopping refers to the actions of someone engaging in the strategic elimination of potential attorneys for an opposing party by consulting with those attorneys for the sole purpose of disqualifying them from future adverse representation. Rule 8.4(c) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct provides that it is professional misconduct for a lawyer to engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud, deceit, or misrepresentation. Rule 8.4(d) prohibits an attorney from engaging in conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice. Rule 8.4(a) provides that it is improper for an attorney to violate the rules through the actions of another. Rule 1.2(d) prohibits an attorney from counseling a client to engage in conduct that the lawyer knows is fraudulent. Taint shopping requires the use of deceit in order to be effective and accordingly, an attorney may not advise a client to engage in such conduct. Directing a client to engage in taint shopping also violates Rule 4.4(a) which provides, “In representing a client, a lawyer shall not use means that have no substantial purpose other than to embarrass, delay, or burden a third person or use methods of obtaining evidence that violate the legal rights of such a person.” As set forth in Comment [1] to Rule 4.4,“Responsibility to a client requires a lawyer to subordinate the interests of others to those of the client, but that responsibility does not imply that a lawyer may disregard the rights of third persons. It is impractical to catalogue all such rights, but they include legal restrictions on methods of obtaining evidence from third persons and unwarranted intrusions into privileged relationships, such as the client-lawyer relationship.” Taint shopping interferes with the ability of another to retain the counsel of his or her choice

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and is thus just such an unwarranted intrusion into a prospective attorney-client relationship. Taint shopping burdens the unsuspecting lawyer to unnecessarily prepare for the initial consultation and participate in the meeting and assists in defeating the legal rights of other individuals to hire the counsel of their choice. See, e.g., Virginia Ethics Opinion 1794 (2004).

B. An attorney who participates in an initial consultation with a prospective client, but who is not retained by the prospective client, is not prohibited from later representing a client with materially adverse interests in the same or in a substantially related matter if (a) the attorney obtained informed consent from the prospective client including consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter; (b) even in the absence of informed consent, the attorney received no information that could be significantly harmful if used in the matter, or (c) the attorney can establish that the prospective client revealed information to the attorney with no intention of retaining the attorney.

Generally, lawyers have a duty, in their representation of clients, to maintain the confidentiality of information relating to the representation pursuant to Rule 1.6 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Responsibility and to avoid impermissible conflicts of interest pursuant to Rules 1.7 through 1.9 of the Rules. However, lawyers’ duties to prospective clients are not as extensive as the duties to clients. As the Restatement Third of the Law Governing Lawyers, sec. 15 cmt. B notes, in explaining why the prospective client should not receive all the protections given to a client, “A lawyer’s discussions with a prospective client often are limited in time and depth of exploration, do not reflect full consideration of the prospective client’s problems, and leave both prospective client and lawyer free (and sometimes required) to proceed no further. Hence, prospective clients should receive some but not all of the protection afforded clients.” Rule 1.18 addresses a lawyer’s obligations to prospective clients. The Rule provides as follows:

(a) A person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship with respect to a matter is a prospective client. (b) Even when no client-lawyer relationship ensues, a lawyer who has had discussions with a prospective client shall not use or reveal information learned in the consultation, except as Rule 1.9 would permit with respect to information of a former client. (c) A lawyer subject to paragraph (b) shall not represent a client with interests materially adverse to those of a prospective client in the same or a substantially related matter if the lawyer received information from the prospective client that could be significantly harmful to that person in the matter, except as provided in paragraph (d). If a lawyer is disqualified from representation under this paragraph, no lawyer in a firm with which that lawyer is associated may knowingly undertake or continue representation in such a matter, except as provided in paragraph (d).

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(d) When the lawyer has received disqualifying information as defined in paragraph (c), representation is permissible if:

(1) both the affected client and the prospective client have given informed consent, or (2) the lawyer who received the information took reasonable measures to avoid exposure to more disqualifying information than was reasonably necessary to determine whether to represent the prospective client; and that lawyer is timely screened from any participation in the matter and is apportioned no part of the fee therefrom.

Pursuant to the Rule, information given to a lawyer by a prospective client seeking legal representation is protected. Moreover, if the initial consultation with the lawyer is bona fide and the lawyer receives information from the potential client that could be significantly harmful, then the prohibitions against conflicts of interest could potentially preclude future representation of an adverse party. See also ISBA Op. 12-05 (2012) and 95-04 (1995). If, on the other hand, the person consulting with the lawyer was not genuinely seeking legal representation, then the Rule would not apply. Under the Rule, a prospective client is defined as “[a] person who discusses with a lawyer the possibility of forming a client-lawyer relationship.” As noted in Comment [2], “Not all persons who communicate information to a lawyer are entitled to protection under this Rule.” If the individual has no real expectation of retaining the attorney, then the individual would not qualify as a true prospective client and the reasonable expectation of confidentiality would be absent. See, e.g., Montana Bar Ethics Op. 010830 (2000). Thus, if the lawyer can establish that the prospective client revealed information to him or her with the sole intention of disqualifying the lawyer from future representation, then the prohibitions of Rule 1.18 would not apply. Unfortunately, proving such circumstances may be difficult. Given the problems of proving the prospective client’s deceit, an attorney should consider limiting initial interviews with prospective clients so as to only obtain the information necessary to determine whether or not to undertake the new matter. See, Rule 1.18, Comment [4]. If the lawyer obtains no information in the initial consultation that could be significantly harmful if used in the subsequent matter, then the lawyer would not be precluded from future adverse representation. Rule 1.18, Comment [6]. Limiting information received at an initial consultation also has the added benefit of minimizing the imputation of any conflict to other members of the disqualified lawyers firm. The lawyer may also wish to consider obtaining the informed consent of the prospective client. As set forth is Comment [5] to Rule 1.18:

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A lawyer may condition conversations with a prospective client on the person’s informed consent that no information disclosed during the consultation will prohibit the lawyer from representing a different client in the matter. See Rule 1.0(e) for the definition of informed consent. If the agreement expressly so provides, the prospective client may also consent to the lawyer’s subsequent use of information received from the prospective client.

Rule 1.0(e) defines informed consent as “the agreement by a person to a proposed course of conduct after the lawyer has communicated adequate information and explanation about the material risks of and reasonably available alternatives to the proposed course of conduct.” To be effective, the informed consent should identify the risks of disclosure of information to the lawyer in the initial consultation. See, e.g., ABA Formal Op. 90-358 for more information regarding advance waivers of conflicts of interest.

CONCLUSION A lawyer may not advise or direct a client to engage in the practice commonly known as taint shopping whereby a client consults with other lawyers in the community for the sole purpose of disqualifying the other lawyers from future representation of an opponent. A lawyer who meets with the prospective client is not prohibited from future adverse representation if the lawyer can prove that the prospective client had no intention of actually hiring the lawyer, if the lawyer received no information that could be significantly harmful to the prospective client pursuant to Rule 1.18, or if the lawyer can demonstrate that the lawyer first obtained the informed consent of the prospective client pursuant to Rule 1.18 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct. Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions are provided by the ISBA as an educational service to the public and the legal profession and are not intended as legal advice. The opinions are not binding on the courts or disciplinary agencies, but they are often considered by them in assessing lawyer conduct. © Copyright 2012 Illinois State Bar Association

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ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion

________________________________ Opinion No. 12-19 July 2012

Subject: Client Funds and property; Fees and Expenses; Fees Paid by Third Party Digest: An “advance payment retainer” can be used by or on behalf of a spouse in

a divorce case if all of the requirements of Rule 1.15 are satisfied. The advance payment retainer should not be used, however, if the client’s purpose can be accomplished with a “security retainer.”

References: Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.15 Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc. 226 Ill. 2d 277, 875 N.E. 2d 1012 (2007)

FACTS Lawyer represents spouse in a divorce. Spouse is concerned whether or not Spouse will have enough money to pay lawyer for the divorce. Lawyer sets up an advance payment retainer in full compliance with the Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct, but does not factor those funds in as part of the marital assets, and refunds unused funds to Spouse directly after the settlement is reached. Is this proper under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct? Lawyer represents Spouse in a divorce, but Spouse does not have money to pay for legal services. Parent of Spouse agrees to pay for the divorce. Rather than give money to Spouse directly for fear it could be considered a marital gift and therefore joint property of the marriage, Lawyer sets up an advance payment retainer in full compliance with the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct and Parent pays Spouse’s legal fees up front through these funds. Upon completion of the divorce, unused funds are returned to the Parent. Is this proper under the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct?

QUESTION

Is the use of an “advance payment retainer” appropriate under the two scenarios set forth above?

OPINION Rule 1.15 of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct permits the use of an “advance payment retainer” whereby the retainer, upon payment to the lawyer, becomes

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the property of the lawyer and is to be deposited in the lawyer’s general account rather than the lawyer’s trust account. However, any unearned portion of the retainer must be returned to the client. The Rule does not limit the use of such retainers to any particular type of legal proceeding. Although this Opinion deals specifically with advance payment retainers, first recognized in 2007 in Dowling v. Chicago Options Associates, Inc., 226 Ill. 2d 277, 875 N.E. 2d 1012 (2007), Rule 1.15 defines and discusses two other types of retainers which have been long-recognized: (1) the “general” or “classic” retainer which is paid to ensure the lawyer’s availability for a particular matter; and (2) the “security retainer” which secures payment for future services by the lawyer. The Rule also discusses and distinguishes from retainers the payment of a fixed fee for legal services. The Rule provides in part:

(c) A lawyer shall deposit in a client trust account funds received to secure payment of legal fees and expenses, to be withdrawn by the lawyer only as fees are earned and expenses incurred. Funds received as a fixed fee, a general retainer, or an advance payment retainer shall be deposited in the lawyer’s general account or other account belonging to the lawyer. An advance payment retainer may be used only when necessary to accomplish some purpose for the client that cannot be accomplished by using a security retainer. An agreement for an advance payment retainer shall be in a writing signed by the client that uses the term “advance payment retainer” to describe the retainer, and states the following:

(1) the special purpose for the advance payment retainer and an explanation why it is advantageous to the client; (2) that the retainer will not be held in a client trust account, that it will become the property of the lawyer upon payment, and that it will be deposited in the lawyer’s general account; (3) the manner in which the retainer will be applied for services rendered and expenses incurred; (4) that any portion of the retainer that is not earned or required for expenses will be refunded to the client; (5) that the client has the option to employ a security retainer, provided, however, that if the lawyer is unwilling to represent the client without receiving an advance payment retainer, the agreement must so state and provide the lawyer’s reasons for that condition. The characteristics and distinctions between these forms of payment for legal services are discussed in detail in comments [3A], [3B], [3C], and [3D] to the Rule.

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While the two fact situations above involve efforts to use advance payment retainers, each situation also involves substantive divorce law. It is beyond the scope of this Committee to determine, for example, whether the Spouse’s lawyer in the first scenario has violated any substantive divorce or discovery rule by not factoring the advance retainer into the mix of marital assets or whether in the second fact situation the Spouse’s parents have made a marital gift. However, we can opine upon the propriety of the use of advance payment retainers in each situation. First, we note that the comments to the Rule provide that an advance payment retainer should be used “sparingly.” More importantly, the Rule itself provides that such a retainer “may be used only when necessary to accomplish some purpose for the client that cannot be accomplished by using a security retainer.” We believe that the fee payments in both fact situations could have been accomplished through the use of a security retainer and that the use of the advance payment retainer was not justified in either case. In the first situation the Spouse could have given the lawyer the same amount of money in the form of a security retainer as he or she did with the advance payment retainer. There was no threat of bankruptcy or any other fact to indicate the Spouse was better off through the use of an advance payment retainer. The lawyer could use the funds regardless of the form of the retainer, and the client would have satisfied his or her spendthrift tendencies by giving the money to the lawyer in the form of a retainer. Moreover, the lawyer would have to determine whether the funds as marital assets regardless of the type of retainer. The funds would come from the Spouse in either case. The same is true in the second case. Whether or not the parents of the spouse made a marital gift to the Spouse is not dependent on the type of retainer given to the lawyer. In both types of retainers the lawyer would use the funds and return any unused portion. So once again, the payment to the lawyer could have been accomplished through the use of a security retainer, and should have been done in this instance. Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions are provided by the ISBA as an educational service to the public and the legal profession and are not intended as legal advice. The opinions are not binding on the courts or disciplinary agencies, but they are often considered by them in assessing lawyer conduct. © Copyright 2012 Illinois State Bar Association

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ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion ________________________________ Opinion No. 12-20 July 2012

Subject: Contingent Fees Digest: Whether a lawyer may charge a contingent fee for seeking to identify and

recover unclaimed property of a client is dependent on the extent of the lawyer’s knowledge of various factors at the time of undertaking the representation. However, such a fee, even if otherwise appropriate, must be reasonable.

References: References: Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 1.5(a) In re Teichner, 104 Ill. 2d 150, 470 N.E. 2d 972 (1984);

In re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507, 548 N.E. 2d 1051 (1989); In re Doyle, 144 Ill. 2d 451, 581 N.E. 2d 669 (1991); Guerrant v. Roth, 334 Ill. App. 3d 259, 777 N.E. 2d 499 (1st Dist. 2002); In re Estate of Sass, 246 Ill. App. 3d 610, 616 N.E. 2d 702 (2nd Dist.

1993);

Schweihs v. Davis, Friedman, Zavett, Kane, 344 Ill. App. 3d 493, 800 N.E. 2d 448 (1st Dist. 2003);

Robert S. Pinzur, Ltd. v. The Hartford, 158 Ill. App. 3d 871, 511 N.E. 2d 1281 (2nd Dist. 1987)

ISBA Opinion No. 91-13

QUESTION An attorney inquires whether he may properly charge a contingent fee for representing a client in discovering and obtaining unclaimed property.

OPINION

A. Case Law Discussion

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The present inquiry in reality presents two (2) questions; i.e., (a) the propriety of charging on a contingent fee basis to discover and obtain unclaimed property; and (b) the reasonableness of the contingent fee as is thereafter sought to be collected by the attorney. Several Illinois Supreme Court cases have dealt with similar issues in a disciplinary setting. Such cases have concluded that the charging of a contingent fee for services akin to those involved here is not of itself improper if the attorney is unaware at the time of undertaking the representation that the locating and obtaining of such property will be simple and involve minimal services or risk on his part. However, the Court has in each such instance then gone on to test the reasonableness of the amount of the contingent fee sought to be collected as against the time incurred, the difficulty encountered, the risk of non-recovery undertaken by the attorney, and the applicability of the other factors listed in Rule 1.5(a) in determining the reasonableness of a fee. To this effect, Rule 1.5(a) of the Illinois Rules of Professional Conduct has as its benchmark that “(a) lawyer shall not make an agreement for, charge, or collect an unreasonable fee...” The list of factors therein set forth to be considered in determining the reasonableness of a fee includes, among other things, “whether the fee is fixed or contingent.” Comment 3 to such Rule goes on to elaborate that “[c]ontingent fees, like any other fees, are subject to the reasonableness standard of paragraph (a) of this Rule,” and that “[i]n determining whether a particular contingent fee is reasonable, or whether it is reasonable to charge any form of contingent fee, a lawyer must consider the factors that are relevant under the circumstances.” The Illinois Supreme Court discussed such issues in In Re Teichner, 104 Ill. 2d 150, 470 N.E. 2d 972 (1984). Such case involved a disciplinary proceeding arising from an attorney’s having undertaken to represent a woman on a twenty-five percent (25%) contingent fee basis for seeking to recover as beneficiary of a life insurance policy taken out by the man with whom the client had cohabited and raised a family for in excess of twenty (20) years. The client had already, at the time of retaining the attorney, submitted a claim with the insurance company. She was concerned, however, as to her right to recovery both because she and the decedent were never married, and because the decedent was still legally married at the time of his death to a woman who had indicated that she would make a claim on the policy. However, the wife thereafter failed to make any such claim, and the insurance company paid off on the policy to the attorney’s client in a matter of just three weeks, with little being done by the attorney other than a couple of phone calls to the insurance company. The attorney claimed and received a contingent fee of approximately $7,000.00 against the $28,000.00 value of the life insurance policy. The Supreme Court in Teichner first discussed the propriety of the attorney having undertaken the insurance policy claim on a contingent fee basis. The Court expressed its belief that the disciplinary hearing panel had been unduly critical of the attorney’s taking the matter on a contingent basis, with the Court stating that at the time of doing so, realistic concerns existed as to the right and ability of the client to recover on the policy. While the client shortly thereafter obtained payment on the policy with little

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effort by the attorney, the Court recognized that the attorney was unaware at the time of taking on the representation that such a routine payment would so quickly resolve the matter. The Court concluded that, judging the matter in light of the circumstances as they existed when presented to the attorney, the attorney’s belief that the claim might prove questionable and time consuming was not unreasonable. Accordingly, while noting that the better course might have been for the attorney to await word from the insurance company as to the already submitted claim before taking the case on a contingency basis, the Court deemed the taking of the claim on such basis to be appropriate under the circumstances. However, the Court’s inquiry did not end there. Rather, the Court went on to analyze the reasonableness of the fee collected under the circumstances as they came to be known subsequent to the undertaking of the representation. In so proceeding, the Court noted that a contingency fee contract is always subject to the supervision of the Court as to its reasonableness, and that it is the duty of the Court to guard against the collection of an excessive fee. The Court determined that the services claimed to have been rendered by the attorney were minimal and artificial, and took little effort on the attorney’s part. Accordingly, the Court determined that the attorney was not entitled to collect a contingency fee in the amount claimed and originally agreed upon with the client. In so holding, the Court stated that a lawyer of ordinary prudence would be left with “a definite and firm conviction” that a $7,000.00 fee in the circumstances of the case was not only excessive, but was, as the hearing panel had earlier concluded, unconscionable, and warranted discipline. Similar considerations were presented in In Re Gerard, 132 Ill. 2d 507, 548 N.E. 2d 1051 (1989). Such case involved an eighty-four (84) year old woman who, in the process of having her will prepared by the attorney, asked his help in finding certain paper assets which she claimed to be missing, and which she believed to have been taken from her when she had recently been hospitalized. The attorney offered her the choice of an hourly or contingent fee, and she selected a one-third (1/3) contingency. At the time, the attorney did not know the nature of the assets that were missing, their value, or the circumstances of their disappearance beyond what is recited above. Shortly thereafter, however, upon making inquiry, the attorney learned that the supposedly missing assets were Certificates of Deposits issued by seven (7) financial institutions, the funds of which were safely accounted for at the issuing banks, and the value of which totaled approximately $450,000.00. Under such circumstances, the attorney had little more to do than to register the CD’s in the name of the trust which he had established for the client. The attorney claimed and received for his efforts, as per the agreed upon contingent fee, a fee in the amount of almost $160,000.00. The Supreme Court did not agree with the client’s contention that the attorney had committed a fraud in having entered into a contingent fee agreement, stating, as it had in Teichner, that such a claim must be viewed in light of what was known by the attorney at the time of entering into the fee agreement. The Court went on, however, to analyze the

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reasonableness of the amount of the fee as against the work performed by the attorney, and concluded that the fee was excessive. As in Teichner, the Court stated that a lawyer of ordinary prudence would have been left with a definite and firm conviction that a $160,000.00 fee was excessive for what the Court termed to be essentially administrative/non-legal services, and stated that the attorney, upon learning the true facts concerning the status of the CD’s, should have reformed the fee agreement with the client to provide for a fee in a reasonable amount. The Court thus found that the circumstances presented warranted discipline of the attorney. It should be noted that the Court in Gerard, in discussing the propriety of contingent fees generally, questioned the charging of such a fee in a non-adversarial, non-litigation setting. The Court stated that it is common knowledge that contingent fees are to be collected only if an attorney successfully champions the legal rights and claims of his client, with the result that the client is compensated through a settlement or judgment against those who denied his claims. The Court went on to state that the attorney in the case before it could not charge or collect a one-third (1/3) contingent fee because he did not “recover” the CD’s by means of a settlement or judgment. The Court cited approvingly to an Appellate Court decision (See Robert S. Pinzur, Ltd. v. The Hartford, 158 Ill. App. 3d 871, 511 N.E. 2d 1281 (2nd Dist. 1987)), to the effect that the term “recovered” requires that an attorney’s recovery of property or money for a client resulted from an action taken by the attorney, and that otherwise the attorney receives an unjust windfall. Finally, in 1991, the Supreme Court decided the case of In re Doyle, 144 Ill. 2d 451, 581 N.E. 2d 669 (1991), where the Court went through a similar analysis in determining the propriety of an attorney’s collecting a contingent fee of $34,000.00 as against the proceeds of a life insurance policy which was recovered. In reliance upon Teichner, the Court recognized that, while a contingent fee contract may be valid at the time of its formation, the Court still has a duty, after review of the facts, to safeguard the public from the collection of an excessive fee. Thus, the Court recognized that the attorney in question had a good-faith belief, at the time of taking on the representation on a contingent fee basis, that the client’s claim on the insurance policy would be disputed, and therefore that the charging of a contingent fee was appropriate. The Court went on, however, to conduct a reasonableness analysis. In doing so, it recognized that by the time that such contingent fee actually came to fruition, the attorney was aware that no challenge had been brought as to the policy, and that the policy had been honored in routine fashion within a mere month of the claim on the policy having been submitted. The Court nonetheless found, however, that the contingent fee agreed upon was reasonable because it was to be applied in payment not just for the services performed in making the claim on the insurance policy, but also for a multitude of other services performed by the attorney, which the Court found to be substantial. Having conducted such an analysis, the Court found that, contrary to the circumstances present in Teichner and Gerard, a lawyer of ordinary prudence would not have definitely and firmly believed that a $34,000.00 fee was excessive, and the Court accordingly found that no discipline was warranted.

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It should again be noted that, as had been stated by the Supreme Court in Gerard, the Court in Doyle reiterated that a contingent fee is appropriate and may be collected only if an attorney champions the legal rights and claims of the client, with the client being compensated through a settlement or judgment against those who denied his claims. Other cases subsequently decided by the Illinois Appellate Court in reliance on the aforesaid Supreme Court decisions include Guerrant v. Roth, 334 Ill. App. 3d 259, 777 N.E. 2d 499 (1st Dist. 2002); In re Estate of Sass, 246 Ill. App. 3d 610, 616 N.E. 2d 702 (2d Dist. 1993); and Schweihs v. Davis, Friedman, Zavett, Kane, 344 Ill. App. 3d 493, 800 N.E. 2d 448 (1st Dist. 2003). B. Application of the Law to the Present Inquiry

The present inquiry asks the general question of whether an attorney may represent a client on a contingent fee basis in seeking to discover and obtain unclaimed property. However, it sets forth none of the information from which such an inquiry may be answered. The Supreme Court Opinions previously discussed recognize that no per se prohibition exists as would in all instances preclude the charging of a contingent fee for the type of services here involved (but see discussion, infra). Rather, the propriety of charging such a fee in any given instance is dependent on the extent of the attorney’s knowledge at the time of undertaking the representation as to the existence, amount and difficulty in locating and obtaining the property, as well as the risk being undertaken by the attorney that the representation will result in a non-recovery. By way of example, were the lawyer’s task limited to a simple internet search or the submission of a claim form, we would consider undertaking such an engagement on a contingent fee basis improper. Conversely, if the matter required significant effort or sophisticated research, or both, with no certainty on the lawyer’s part that any property exists, a contingent fee would likely be appropriate. Accordingly, just as we cannot say that the charging of a contingent fee for locating and recovering unclaimed property is per se improper, we cannot state as a general proposition that the charging of a contingent fee for the locating and recovery of unclaimed property is appropriate in all instances. We can only direct the inquiring attorney to apply the Supreme Court’s decisions against the circumstances of his situation. Moreover, the attorney must be aware that even if the charging of a contingent fee would otherwise be proper based on the facts known to him at the time of undertaking the representation, the reasonableness of such a fee will remain at issue, and subject to the Court’s subsequent review. Accordingly, the possibility exists that an agreed upon contingent fee may not be fully recoverable should the services actually performed be such as to, in the words of the Supreme Court, result in a definite and firm conviction that the amount of the fee is excessive. We feel that some comment is necessary on our part as to the discussion in Gerard, also referenced in Doyle, to the effect that any contingency fee is proper only if

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the attorney successfully champions the legal rights and claims of his client, with the result that the client is compensated through a settlement or judgment. Although such was stated by the Court, the fact is that neither the Gerard case, nor arguably the Teichner or Doyle cases, involved adversarial or litigated claims, yet the Court in each such instance conducted an analysis of the propriety of charging a contingent fee and concluded in each such instance that the charging of such a fee was proper under the circumstances. Seemingly, such discussion would have been unnecessary were a contingent fee to always be improper in matters not involving adversarial or litigated claims subject to resolution by settlement or judgment. Moreover, we see no reason why the propriety of charging a contingency fee should be restricted to litigated or adversarial matters resulting in a settlement or judgment. In this regard, see our previous Opinion No. 91-13, where we recognized, in accord with the Comments to ABA Model Rule 1.8 then existing, that contingency fee agreements may be employed in non-litigation contexts. We noted, however, that since such matters generally involve less uncertainty than litigation, the reasonableness of the contingent fee may be more closely scrutinized by the Courts. We believe such rationale to be correct, and to be consistent with the analyses conducted in the Supreme Court Opinions. Additionally, we believe, consistent with the above, that contingent fees have a proper place in providing counsel to persons not otherwise able to afford an attorney to locate unclaimed property, regardless of the possibly non-adversarial nature of the matter involved. A contingent fee in such circumstances may provide the only means by which a party can obtain the services of a lawyer. Moreover, should lawyers not be allowed to charge a contingent fee to perform services of the nature here involved, the only alternative remaining available to the client may be to use the services of an asset finding firm, which typically charges on a contingency basis for the purported locating of assets which it is already aware of both as to location and amount. Such firms are not, however, as are lawyers, subject to ethical rules which would limit the contingency fee charged to an amount that is reasonable, and subject to review by the Court. Accordingly, a client is afforded substantial protections by being able to retain an attorney to investigate and recover property on a contingent fee basis, rather than being left to other available alternatives. Finally, question could be raised as to whether an attorney’s being retained solely to locate and recover unclaimed property is so non-legal in nature as to be inappropriate, regardless of whether done on a contingency or other fee basis. For many of the reasons already stated, we do not believe such to be the case. Moreover, as previously alluded to in our discussion of the Gerard case, the Supreme Court in such instance referred to the services therein involved, i.e., locating a client’s CD’s, as being essentially administrative and non-legal in nature, and requiring no legal skills. The Court nonetheless approved of the attorney’s taking of such matter on a contingency basis, criticizing the attorney only for the unreasonableness of the amount subsequently sought to be collected based on the services actually performed. Accordingly, it does not appear that the Court viewed services such as the locating of a client’s CD’s as being inappropriate for an attorney to

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perform, regardless of whether they were being done on a contingency or other fee basis. The same would seemingly be true in the present instance.

CONCLUSION Whether an attorney may represent a client on a contingent fee basis for seeking to discover and obtain unclaimed property depends largely on the extent of the attorney’s knowledge at the time of undertaking the representation as to the existence, amount, and difficulty in locating and obtaining such property, and the risk of there being a non-recovery. However, the contingent fee charged, even if otherwise appropriate at the time of the representation being undertaken, must be reasonable Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions are provided by the ISBA as an educational service to the public and the legal profession and are not intended as legal advice. The opinions are not binding on the courts or disciplinary agencies, but they are often considered by them in assessing lawyer conduct. © Copyright 2012 Illinois State Bar Association

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ISBA Professional Conduct Advisory Opinion

________________________________ Opinion No. 12-21 July 2012

Subject: Communications with Represented Person Digest: A lawyer, serving as a guardian ad litem of minors in an adoption

proceeding, must contact the lawyer for the petitioning parties and obtain that lawyer’s consent before interviewing them and before contacting them to request an interview with the minors.

References: Illinois Rule of Professional Conduct 4.2

Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. Freitas, Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J L & Family Stud 43 (2011)

D.C. Bar Opinion 295 (2000)

Illinois Adoption Act, 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(a)

Disciplinary Proceedings against Kinast, 192 Wis. 2d 36, 43-44, 530 N.W. 2d 387, 390-91 (1995)

In re Galic, ARDC No. 02 CH 104, pp. 16-17, 2004 Ill. Atty. Reg. Disc. LEXIS 334, *26 (ARDC Hearing Board, August 18, 2004)

FACTS In a proceeding for the adoption of minors, the court has appointed an attorney as guardian ad litem (GAL). The petitioners are represented by an attorney. Following receipt by the GAL of the order of appointment, the GAL sends a letter directly to the petitioners instead of their attorney, requesting an interview. After receiving the letter, the petitioners contact the GAL, who interviews the petitioners and requests an interview with the children whose adoption is sought.

QUESTION After being appointed by the court to serve as GAL in an adoption proceeding, does the GAL need to obtain the consent of the lawyer representing the petitioners prior to contacting the petitioners?

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OPINION

The question posed requires the consideration of Rule 4.2, which provides as follows:

In representing a client, a lawyer shall not communicate about the subject of the representation with a person the lawyer knows to be represented by another lawyer in the matter, unless the lawyer has the consent of the other lawyer or is authorized to do so by law or a court order.

Rule 4.2, Comment [1], sets forth the purposes of the rule: This Rule contributes to the proper functioning of the legal system by protecting a person who has chosen to be represented by a lawyer in a matter against possible overreaching by other lawyers who are participating in the matter, interference by those lawyers with the client-lawyer relationship and the uncounselled disclosure of information relating to the representation. Given the text of the rule and its purposes, the Committee concludes that any communication between the GAL and the petitioners, related to the adoption proceeding, must be preceded by a request for, and the receipt of, the consent of the petitioners’ attorney. (Under the facts presented, it is assumed that there is no legal authority or court order permitting petitioners’ counsel to be bypassed.)

By its terms, Rule 4.2 applies only to a lawyer “representing a client.” Broadly speaking, a GAL “...is an individual appointed by the court to serve as an independent advocate who promotes the best interests of minors, elders, and legally incompetent persons in custody disputes, abuse and neglect cases, guardianships, and other court proceedings.” Marcia M. Boumil, Cristina F. Freitas & Debbie F. Freitas, Legal and Ethical Issues Confronting Guardian ad Litem Practice, 13 J L & Family Stud 43 (2011). Absent a conflict between the best interests of a minor and the minor’s self-interest (it is assumed in the present inquiry that there is no such conflict), the GAL serves the dual role of fact-finder for the court and representative of the child’s best interests. See D.C. Bar Opinion 295, p. 2 (2000).

While the GAL-ward relationship does not bear all of the attributes of the attorney-client relationship as it is traditionally understood, the GAL’s function in an adoption case is sufficiently akin to the role of representing a client that the Committee considers Rule 4.2 to be applicable to the factual situation described. Even if a GAL should be appointed strictly for the purpose of serving as an investigator, the GAL’s obligation to serve the minor’s best interests is a form of representation. Indeed, the statute under which a GAL is appointed in an adoption case requires a licensed attorney to be appointed “as guardian ad litem to represent a child sought to be adopted.” 750 ILCS 50/13(B)(a).

In the circumstances posed, the Committee concludes that the GAL’s conduct, in sending the letter to the petitioners and then interviewing them without the knowledge

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and consent of their attorney, is in contravention of Rule 4.2. Obviously the interview of petitioners concerns the subject of the GAL’s representation, i.e., the adoption of the children. It cannot be assumed that the petitioners consulted with their attorney before contacting the GAL in response to his letter. Nor can it be assumed that the petitioners’ attorney would not need to counsel his clients in advance of an interview, given the fact that parental rights are at stake in the adoption proceeding. Thus, the purposes of the rule are furthered by requiring GALs to contact counsel in the first instance, just as an attorney for an interested party is required to contact a minor’s GAL in order to interview the minor. See Disciplinary Proceedings against Kinast, 192 Wis.2d 36, 43-44, 530 N.W.2d 387, 390-91 (1995). The second aspect of the question presented concerns the GAL’s request to interview the children whom he represents. While such contact in some instances may be viewed as administrative in nature and seemingly innocuous, that may not always be the case because the contact could lead to a substantive conversation. Consequently, the Committee believes that the petitioner’s lawyer should be notified, and consent obtained, before such a contact is initiated—even if arranging the minor’s interview were the sole purpose of the contact. “There is no provision in Rule 4.2 which requires that the communication must be substantive, only that it must be on the subject of the representation.” In re Galic, Commission No. 02 CH 104, pp. 16-17, 2004 Ill. Atty. Reg. Disc. LEXIS 334, *26 (ARDC Hearing Board, August 18, 2004). The interview request is a communication about the subject of the GAL’s representation because it is motivated by the GAL’s role in the adoption proceeding, and therefore it is prohibited by Rule 4.2. Professional Conduct Advisory Opinions are provided by the ISBA as an educational service to the public and the legal profession and are not intended as legal advice. The opinions are not binding on the courts or disciplinary agencies, but they are often considered by them in assessing lawyer conduct. © Copyright 2012 Illinois State Bar Association

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 11A Elections - Secretary

SECTION 3 Officers and Their Duties

Sec. 3.5. Secretary. The Secretary shall supervise the preparation of the minutes of the meetings of the Board of Governors, the Assembly, and the Association and shall supervise the keeping of all records and archives of the Association. A Secretary shall be elected by the Board of Governors from among the 20 governors described in Section 5.2. It is the policy of the Association that the office of Secretary be rotated in alternate years between those residing in the 1st Judicial District and those residing in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th Judicial Districts. The Secretary shall be elected from the same division of the state as the First Vice-President.

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 11B Elections - Treasurer

SECTION 3 Officers and Their Duties

Sec. 3.4. Treasurer. The Treasurer is ex-officio, a member of the committee charged with the preparation of the annual budget and has general supervision of the financial operations of the Association. A Treasurer shall be elected by the Board of Governors from among the 20 governors described in Section 5.2. It is the policy of the Association that the office of Treasurer be rotated in alternate years between those residing in the 1st Judicial District and those residing in the 2nd, 3rd, 4th, or 5th Judicial Districts. The Treasurer shall be elected from the same division of the state as the President.

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Agenda Item 150 Distinguished Counsellors

2012 Class of Distinguished Counsellors

First Name Last Name Bar Entry

Date Donald Aldeen 1/1/1962 Dale Anderson 11/15/1962 F. David Aubuchon 5/22/1962 Alvin Becker 1/1/1962 Alvin Becker 11/1/1962 Jordan Bell 11/15/1962 Thaddeus Bojanowski 11/15/1962 Richard Boyle 5/22/1962 Edward Burke 1/1/1962 Karl Canavesi 1/1/1962 F Willis Caruso 1/1/1962 Charles Caufield 1/1/1962 Myron Cherry 1/1/1962 Frederick Cohn 1/1/1962 William Colson 11/15/1962 Peter Coppa 1/1/1962 Gary Cordes 11/15/1962 Frank Cosentino 1/1/1962 Michael Costello 5/22/1962 Phillip Couri 11/15/1962 Philip Cowan 1/1/1962 Robert Cummins 11/15/1962 Sheldon Davidson 1/1/1962 John Dentzer 1/1/1962 Dominick Dolci 1/1/1962 Gerald Dorf 11/15/1962 Brian Duff 1/1/1962 Robert Edler 1/1/1962 Grant Erickson 1/1/1962 James Evans 1/1/1962 Allen Fagel 11/12/1962 Ronald Farkas 4/18/1962 Dominic Fichera 1/1/1962 Peter Fieweger 1/1/1962 Richard Fleisher 1/1/1962 J. Flynn 1/1/1962 James Fouts 5/22/1962 Michael Fox 1/1/1962

Guy Fraker 1/1/1962 Paul Freehling 1/1/1962 Charles Freeman 5/22/1962 Robert Gandy 5/22/1962 Alan Garland 1/1/1962 Robert Glick 1/1/1962 William Goldberg 1/1/1962 Roger Gomien 1/1/1962 Robert Gordon 1/1/1962 Burton Grant 1/1/1962 David Griffin 1/1/1962 Phillip Grossman 1/1/1962 James Gustafson 11/15/1962 David Hanson 1/1/1962 Roger Harris 1/1/1962 William Hegan 1/1/1962 Benjamin Helsel 5/22/1962 George Herbert 11/15/1962 David Hilliard 1/1/1962 Daniel Houlihan 1/1/1962 Fredrick Huber 11/15/1962 Melroy Hutnick 1/1/1962 Thomas C. Hynes 1/1/1962 Jack Johnston 1/1/1962 John Jurus 1/1/1962 David Kahn 11/15/1962 Stanley Kaplan 1/1/1962 Martin Katz 1/1/1962 Thomas Kauper 1/1/1962 Edward Kionka 1/1/1962 Richard Kissel 1/1/1962 Arthur Klein 1/1/1962 George Klepec 1/1/1962 Wendell Knox 1/1/1962 James Knox 12/5/1962 Marshall Krolick 1/1/1962 Robert Kroll 1/1/1962 Joel Kunin 1/1/1962 Joseph Laraia 1/1/1962 Jerald Lavin 1/1/1962 Thomas Londrigan 1/1/1962 Stephen Luzbetak 1/1/1962 James Malloy 11/15/1962

Philip Mandell 1/1/1962 David Mann 1/1/1962 Marvin Margolis 1/1/1962 Robert Martwick 1/1/1962 Russell Matthias 1/1/1962 Maureen McCord 5/22/1962 Eugene McMahon 1/1/1962 August Meyer 1/1/1962 Sherwin Miller 1/1/1962 Robert Milligan 1/1/1962 Richard Moenning 10/30/1962 Bernard Moltz 11/15/1962 C. Montgomery 1/1/1962 Thomas Moran 1/1/1962 Henry Morris 1/1/1962 Morrie Much 1/1/1962 James Mulvaney 1/1/1962 Timothy Murtaugh 1/1/1962 George Nafziger 1/1/1962 Barry Nekritz 1/1/1962 Richard Nelson 1/1/1962 Richard Neu 1/1/1962 Edward Notz 1/1/1962 John Owens 1/1/1962 Nicholas Pamel 1/1/1962 Dale Park 1/1/1962 Thomas Peterson 1/1/1962 Jay Pollak 12/29/1962 Paul Proteau 1/1/1962 George Riseborough 1/1/1962 Joseph Roddy 1/1/1962 Howard A. Rosenfeld 1/1/1962 Martin Rudman 1/1/1962 Martin Ruken 5/22/1962 Herman Runge 1/1/1962 Richard Russell 1/1/1962 Edmund Sajewski 1/1/1962 Sheldon Sandman 1/1/1962 Karl Schelly 1/1/1962 Frank Schneider 1/1/1962 Walter Schousen 1/1/1962 James Schumann 1/1/1962 Peter Sfikas 1/1/1962

John Shonkwiler 1/1/1962 James Sloan 11/15/1962 Lute Smith 1/1/1962 Donald Smith 1/1/1962 Larry Spears 1/1/1962 Carmen Speranza 1/1/1962 Anthony Spina 1/1/1962 Frank R. St. Lawrence 1/1/1962 Edward Styka 1/1/1962 Michael Susman 1/1/1962 Edward Tepper 1/1/1962 Lott Thomas 1/1/1962 Charles Thompson 1/1/1962 Neal R. Toback 1/1/1962 Milton Tornheim 11/15/1962 John Vassen 11/15/1962 Richard Verkler 1/1/1962 Bernard Wall 1/1/1962 William Weidenaar 1/1/1962 Don Wheeler 1/1/1962 Bernard Wiczer 1/1/1962 Ernest Wilhelm 5/22/1962 Charles Wilhelm 1/1/1962 Norman Wilson 1/1/1962 Walter Winget 1/1/1962 David Wittenberg 1/1/1962 Reed Woolley 11/9/1962 Chris Zogg 1/1/1962

Board of Governors

July 13, 2012

Information Agenda Item 1 Calendar

7/5/2012

2012/2013 BOARD OF GOVERNORS

MEETING SCHEDULE

2012 June 14th – 16th 136th ISBA Annual Meeting (Thursday - Saturday) The Abbey Resort

Fontana, Wisconsin July 13th Board of Governors (Friday) Ritz Carlton

Chicago August 2nd – 7th ABA Annual Meeting (Thursday – Tuesday) Chicago October 19th Board of Governors (Friday) Four Seasons Hotel Chicago December 13th – 15th ISBA Midyear Meeting (Thursday – Saturday) Sheraton Chicago Hotel & Towers Chicago

2013

January 18th Board of Governors (Friday) ISBA Chicago Regional Office Chicago March 8th Board of Governors (Friday) I-Hotel, Champaign May 17th Board of Governors (Friday) Eagle Ridge Resort & Spa

Galena June 20th – 22nd ISBA Annual Meeting (Thursday – Saturday) Grand Geneva Resort & Spa Lake Geneva, Wisconsin